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
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**A digest of the law of libel and slander**



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A DIGEST  
OF THE LAW OF  
LIBEL AND SLANDER;

WITH THE  
EVIDENCE, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE, BOTH IN  
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES,  
AND  
PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS.

BY  
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BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

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BY MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, PH.D.

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TO  
ARTHUR CHARLES, Esq., Q.C.,  
RECORDER OF BATH,  
IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF MANY KINDNESSES,  
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK.



## EDITOR'S PREFACE.

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THE excuse, if one be needed, for another book on LIBEL AND SLANDER, and that an English one, may be found in the excellence of the author's work. A clear head and a skilled hand are to be seen throughout. And this, with the further fact that the volume is a fresh exposition of the latest phase of the law, made *uno ictu* and not piecemeal, is sufficient to justify the editor in asking for it a place alongside the valuable work of Mr. Townshend.

The work too is in the editor's opinion extremely valuable in the part more peculiarly English. The rules of practice, the forms and precedents, and the details concerning the conduct of causes, will prove almost as suggestive here as in England, whether in aid of litigation or of legislation; and the editor does not know where so much valuable information of the kind may be obtained within convenient limits.

The American cases are cited as late as September, so far as the Reports were at hand at that time.

BOSTON, Sept. 16, 1881.





## P R E F A C E.

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THIS book has been called "A Digest of the Law of Libel and Slander," because an attempt has been made to state the law on each point in the form of an abstract proposition, citing the decided cases in smaller type merely as illustrations of that abstract proposition.

Every reported case decided in England or Ireland during the last fifteen years has been noticed. Every case reported in England during this century has, I believe, been considered and mentioned, unless it has either been distinctly overruled or has become obsolete by a change in the practice of the Courts or by the repeal of some statute on which it depended. The earlier cases have been more sparingly cited, but I think no case of importance since 1558 has been overlooked. The leading American decisions have also been referred to, and whenever the American law differs from our own, the distinction has been pointed out and explained.

Canadian and Australian decisions have also been quoted, whenever the English law was doubtful or silent on the point. The cases have been brought down to the early part of January, 1881.

It would be of but little use to place all these decisions before the reader and leave him to draw his own conclusions. A huge collection of reported cases piled one on the top of the other is not a legal treatise, any more than a tumbled pile of bricks is a house. I have throughout attempted to strike a balance, as it were, and state the net result of the authorities. But this is a process requiring the greatest care and much expenditure of time. When I commenced this book in 1876, I did not at all realize the amount of labor which was requisite in order to ascertain the law and state it clearly in an abstract form.

It is often very difficult to determine whether or no a decision has ceased to be a binding authority: our judges in the present day seldom expressly overrule a previous decision; they comment on it, distinguish it, explain it away, and then leave it with its lustre tarnished, but still apparently a binding authority should identically the same facts recur. There is no rule which decides how long the process of "blowing upon" a case must continue before it may be considered overruled. Whenever such a case has been cited, I have always referred the reader to the places where it has been criticised, adding, however, my own opinion as to the effect of such criticism on the authority of the case. And in many places it has been necessary to review the cases in a note, showing how they bear one on another, and justifying the view which I have taken of their result. Such notes are printed in a medium type, smaller than that devoted to the abstract propositions of the Digest, larger than the Illustrations which follow them.

In thus ascertaining the principles underlying the various decisions, no assistance whatever has been derived from any previous book on the Law of Libel and Slander. No such book has been written on the same plan. For all conclusions of law herein stated, I am, of course, solely responsible.

My object throughout has been to save the reader trouble. All the references to every decision have always been cited. All considerations of style, &c., have been sacrificed to clearness and convenience. I have abruptly changed from the third to the first or second person, whenever there was any possibility of mistaking the antecedent of any pronoun. It is sometimes difficult to follow A., B., and C., through a long sentence: it is easier to distinguish between "I," "you," and "he." Again, whenever I have been in doubt whether the law on a particular subject should be noticed in one chapter or in another, I have invariably stated it in both. Thus, nearly the whole of the chapter on Malice will be found scattered up and down the long chapter on Privilege. So, too, for the sake of practical convenience, all the cases as to the Innuendo and the construction to be put on De-

famatory Words, have been collected in Chapter III. In Chapter XII. all the law as to Husband and Wife, Principal and Agent, &c., &c., has been gathered together under the somewhat stilted but convenient title of The Law of Persons. A separate chapter has been devoted to the subject of Costs. In the chapters on Blasphemous and Seditious Words, I have not hesitated to express freely my conviction that many of the early decisions would not be followed in the present day.

One difficulty connected with the subject-matter of the book I have endeavored to avoid by restoring the word "malice" to its simple and ordinary meaning. The distinction between "malice in law" and "malice in fact" is of comparatively recent origin. "Malice in law" is the vaguest possible phrase; it merely denotes "absence of legal excuse." The plaintiff is never called on to prove the existence of "malice in law;" the defendant has to show the existence of some legal excuse. In short, to say that a libel must be published "maliciously" means merely that it must be published "on an unprivileged occasion." I have therefore abandoned this technical and fictitious use of the word. Throughout this book (to use the words of Brett, L. J., in *Clark v. Molyneux*, see p. 266) "'Malice' does not mean 'malice in law,' a term in pleading, but actual malice, that which is popularly called malice."

The second part of the book is devoted to Practice, Procedure, and Evidence. I have fought both a civil action and a criminal trial through from beginning to end, giving practical hints to each side. Chapter X. is in short a manual of the practice in an action of tort under the Judicature Act. I have taken up the subject at an earlier point than is usual in law books, and have submitted to the plaintiff certain matters which he should carefully consider before he issues his writ (p. 449).

In the Appendix will be found a full collection of Precedents of Pleadings, both in Civil and Criminal cases. Some are drawn from the reports; others are hypothetical cases of my own invention; but the majority are pleadings in actions in which friends of mine, or I myself, have been professionally engaged.

In June, 1880, appeared the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the Law of Newspaper Libel. I have ventured to deal *seriatim* with the three recommendations contained in this Report, and to express my opinion thereon (pp. 261, 391, 531). A copy of the Report will be found in Appendix B. (p. 662).

In conclusion, I have to acknowledge my great obligation to my learned friend, Mr. Wurtzburg, of Lincoln's Inn, who has kindly revised the proofs of this book, added all the references to the various reports, and prepared the elaborate Table of Cases at the commencement of the volume.

W. BLAKE ODGERS.

5, HARE COURT, TEMPLE, E. C.  
*February, 1881.*



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE
TABLE OF CASES . . . . .	xxi - xlv
TABLE OF STATUTES CITED . . . . .	xlvii - xlix
TABLE OF RULES AND ORDERS CITED . . . . .	1 - lii

## PART I.

### A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER.

#### CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY . . . . .	1-16
Definitions . . . . .	1
Distinction between Libel and Slander . . . . .	3
Motive Immaterial, save on the Question of Damages . . . . .	5
Acts injurious to Reputation . . . . .	8
"Liberty of the Press" defined . . . . .	10
History of the Censorship of the Press . . . . .	ib.
Injunction to Restrain a Libel will not be granted . . . . .	13

#### CHAPTER II.

DEFAMATORY WORDS . . . . .	17-92
Definitions . . . . .	17
Injury to the Reputation the gist of the Action . . . . .	18

#### PART I. — LIBEL. \*

Libel defined . . . . .	21
Libels on Persons in Office . . . . .	27
Libels on Professional Men . . . . .	29
Libels on Traders . . . . .	30
Libels on Traders' goods . . . . .	32
Fair and <i>bonâ fide</i> Comment on Matters of Public Interest . . . . .	34
Criticism defined and distinguished from Defamation . . . . .	36
Malicious and Unfair Attacks . . . . .	38

What are Matters of Public Interest . . . . .	41
Affairs of State . . . . .	42
Administration of Justice . . . . .	44
Public Institutions and Local Authorities . . . . .	46
Ecclesiastical Affairs . . . . .	47
Books, Pictures, &c. . . . .	48
Theatres, Concerts and other Public Entertainments . . . . .	49
Other Appeals to the Public . . . . .	50

## PART II.—SLANDER.

I. Words imputing an Indictable Offence . . . . .	54
Early Cases on this Subject . . . . .	58
The Charge must be Specific and Precise . . . . .	60
The Crime imputed must be possible . . . . .	61
II. Words imputing a Contagious Disease . . . . .	62
III. Words spoken of the Plaintiff in the way of his Office, Profession, or Trade . . . . .	64
Such Words must affect him in such Office, Profession, or Trade . . . . .	65
Imputation of Professional Ignorance or Unskillfulness . . . . .	67
Plaintiff must be carrying on such Trade, &c., at the time he is Defamed . . . . .	69
Words imputing Want of Integrity to any one holding an Office of Trust . . . . .	70
Words concerning Clergymen . . . . .	72
Words concerning Barristers, Solicitors, &c. . . . .	74
Words concerning Physicians and Surgeons . . . . .	75
Words affecting Traders in the way of their Trade . . . . .	77
Imputations of Insolvency . . . . .	78
Imputations of Dishonesty and Fraud in the Conduct of their Trade . . . . .	79
IV. Words Actionable only by reason of Special Damage . . . . .	82
Words imputing Immorality . . . . .	83
Words imputing Unchastity . . . . .	84
Unsatisfactory State of the Law on this point . . . . .	86
All Words causing Special Damage are Actionable . . . . .	87

## CHAPTER III.

CONSTRUCTION AND CERTAINTY . . . . .	93-132
What Meaning the Speaker <i>intended</i> to convey is immaterial . . . . .	93
Libel or no Libel is a question for the Jury . . . . .	94
Duty of the Judge . . . . .	94
Words not to be construed <i>in mitiori sensu</i> . . . . .	95
Jury to consider the Words as a whole . . . . .	98
When Evidence may be given of other Defamatory Publications by De- fendant of Plaintiff . . . . .	99
Of the Innuendo . . . . .	100
The Words must be set out <i>verbatim</i> in the Statement of Claim . . . . .	101
1. Words clearly Defamatory . . . . .	105
2. Words <i>primâ facie</i> Defamatory . . . . .	107

3. Neutral Words . . . . .	109
4. Words <i>primâ facie</i> Innocent . . . . .	112
5. Words clearly Innocent . . . . .	116
Certainty. Early Technicalities . . . . .	118
Certainty of the Imputation . . . . .	120
Criminal Charges . . . . .	121
Indirect Imputations . . . . .	125
Certainty as to Person Defamed . . . . .	127

## CHAPTER IV.

<i>SCANDALUM MAGNATUM</i> . . . . .	133-136
Statutes . . . . .	133
What Words are included therein . . . . .	135

## CHAPTER V.

SLANDER OF TITLE, OR WORDS CONCERNING THINGS . . . . .	137-149
Definition . . . . .	137
I. Slander of Title proper . . . . .	138
Actionable, if words <i>false</i> and <i>malicious</i> , and if <i>special damage</i> be proved . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Proof of Malice . . . . .	142
II. Slander of Goods Manufactured or Sold by another . . . . .	145
Other Words producing Special Damage . . . . .	148

## CHAPTER VI.

PUBLICATION . . . . .	150-168
Definition of . . . . .	150
Plaintiff must Prove a Publication by the Defendant <i>in fact</i> . . . . .	153
Publication <i>per alium</i> . . . . .	155
Publication in a Newspaper . . . . .	157
Repetition of a Slander . . . . .	161
Naming your Authority now no Defence . . . . .	162
Rule that every one Repeating a Slander becomes an Independent Slanderer . . . . .	166
Exceptions to this Rule . . . . .	167

## CHAPTER VII.

JUSTIFICATION . . . . .	169-181
Onus of Proving Words true is on the Defendant . . . . .	169
The whole Libel must be Proved true . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
The Rule applies to all Reported Speeches or Repetitions of Slander . . . . .	173
Justification must be Specially Plead . . . . .	177
Justification in a Criminal Case . . . . .	178
Roman Law as to Truth of Libel . . . . .	180

## CHAPTER VIII.

PRIVILEGED OCCASIONS . . . . .	182-263
Defence that Words were spoken on a Privileged Occasion . . . . .	182
Occasions Absolutely Privileged . . . . .	183
Occasions in which the Privilege is Qualified . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
The Judge to Decide whether Occasion is Privileged or not . . . . .	185

## PART I.

OCCASIONS. ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED . . . . .	185-196
(i) Parliamentary Proceedings . . . . .	186
(ii) Judicial Proceedings . . . . .	188
Words Spoken by a Judge . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Words Spoken by Counsel . . . . .	190
Words Spoken by a Witness . . . . .	191
(iii) Naval and Military Affairs. . . . .	194

## PART II.

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. . . . .	196-263
Cases of Qualified Privilege classified . . . . .	196
I. WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES CAST UPON THE DEFENDANT THE DUTY OF MAKING A COMMUNICATION.	
A. <i>Communications made in pursuance of a Duty owed to Society</i> . . . . .	198
Duty may be Moral or Social . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
(i) Characters of Servants . . . . .	200
(ii) Other Confidential Communications of a Private Nature.	
(a) Answers to Confidential Inquiries . . . . .	203
(b) Confidential Communications not in answer to a previous Inquiry . . . . .	207
(c) Communications made in discharge of a duty arising from a Confidential Relationship existing between the parties . . . . .	209
(d) Information volunteered when there is no Confidential Relationship existing between the Parties . . . . .	213
Difficulty of the Question . . . . .	215
(iii) Information given to any Public Officer imputing Crime or Misconduct to others . . . . .	220
Such Officer must have some Jurisdiction to entertain Complaint . . . . .	223
B. <i>Communications made in Self-Defence.</i>	
(iv) Statements necessary to protect Defendant's private Interests . . . . .	225
(v) Statements provoked by a previous attack by Plaintiff on Defendant . . . . .	228
Statements invited by the Plaintiff . . . . .	230
II. WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE COMMUNICATION, AND THE PERSON TO WHOM THE COMMUNICATION IS MADE, HAS A CORRESPONDING INTEREST . . . . .	233
Where a large Body of Persons are interested . . . . .	237
If Strangers present, the Privilege will be lost . . . . .	239

## III. PRIVILEGED REPORTS.

(i) Reports of Judicial Proceedings . . . . .	243
Matters <i>coram non judice</i> . . . . .	244
Reports not privileged . . . . .	249
Reports must be accurate . . . . .	250
No Comments should be interpolated . . . . .	254
An accurate Report may still be malicious . . . . .	256
(ii) Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings . . . . .	257
(iii) Other Reports . . . . .	259
Suggestion of the Select Committee of the House of Com- mons . . . . .	261

## CHAPTER IX.

MALICE . . . . .	264-288
Intention of Defendant as a rule immaterial . . . . .	264
Material when the Occasion is one of Qualified Privilege . . . . .	266
Onus of proving Malice lies on the Plaintiff . . . . .	269
I. Extrinsic Evidence of Malice . . . . .	271
Former publications by Defendant of Plaintiff . . . . .	272
That the Words are false is alone no evidence of Malice . . . . .	274
II. Evidence of Malice derived from the Mode and Extent of Publication, the Terms employed, &c. . . . .	277
(i) Where the Expressions employed are exaggerated and un- warrantable; but there is no other Evidence of Malice . . . . .	279
(ii) Where the Mode and Extent of Publication is Excessive . . . . .	282
Communications volunteered . . . . .	286

## CHAPTER X.

DAMAGES . . . . .	289-333
General and Special Damage Defined and Distinguished . . . . .	289
I. <i>General Damages</i> . . . . .	291
General Loss of Custom . . . . .	293
II. <i>Evidence for the Plaintiff in Aggravation of Damages.</i>	
(i) Malice . . . . .	296
(ii) Extent of Publication . . . . .	298
(iii) Plaintiff's Good Character . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
III. <i>Evidence for the Defendant in Mitigation of Damages.</i>	
(i) Apology and Amends . . . . .	299
(ii) Absence of Malice . . . . .	301
Conflicting Cases on this Point . . . . .	303
(iii) Evidence of the Plaintiff's Bad Character . . . . .	304
(iv) Plaintiff's previous Conduct in provoking the Publication . . . . .	306
(v) Absence of Special Damage . . . . .	308
IV. <i>Special Damage where the words are not actionable per se.</i> . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
What constitutes Special Damage . . . . .	309
Special Damage must be specially pleaded . . . . .	313
Special Damage subsequently arising . . . . .	317
V. <i>Special Damage where the words are actionable per se.</i> . . . .	318
VI. <i>Remoteness of Damages</i> . . . . .	321



Damage resulting to the Husband of the Female Plaintiff . . . . .	323
Damage caused by the act of a Third Party . . . . .	325
Not essential that such Third Person should believe the Charge . . . . .	327
Wrongful and Spontaneous Act of a Third Person . . . . .	328
Originator of a Slander not liable for Damage caused by its repetition . . . . .	329
Exceptions to this Rule . . . . .	331

## CHAPTER XI.

<b>COSTS . . . . .</b>	<b>334-343</b>
Costs now follow the Event . . . . .	334
All early Statutes as to Costs repealed by Judicature Act . . . . .	335
Application to deprive successful Plaintiff of Costs . . . . .	336
Costs of New Trial . . . . .	338
Apportionment of Costs of Issues . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Costs after Payment in Court . . . . .	340
Costs of Counterclaim . . . . .	341
Costs in Criminal Proceedings . . . . .	343

## CHAPTER XII.

<b>THE LAW OF PERSONS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES . . . . .</b>	<b>344-372</b>
1. Husband and Wife . . . . .	345
Claim by Husband for Words defamatory of Wife . . . . .	347
Married Woman Defendant . . . . .	350
Criminal Liability of a Married Woman . . . . .	351
2. Infants . . . . .	352
3. Lunatics . . . . .	353
4. Bankrupts . . . . .	354
5. Receivers . . . . .	355
6. Executors and Administrators . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
7. Aliens . . . . .	356
8. Master and Servant—Principal and Agent . . . . .	358
Master's Commands no Defence . . . . .	359
Principal liable for Words spoken by his Authority . . . . .	360
Ratification . . . . .	361
Criminal Liability of Master or Principal . . . . .	362
9. Partners . . . . .	365
10. Corporations and Companies . . . . .	367
11. Other Joint Plaintiffs . . . . .	369
12. Joint Defendants . . . . .	370

## CHAPTER XIII.

<b>CRIMINAL LAW . . . . .</b>	<b>373-393</b>
Illegality of Contracts as to Libellous Matter . . . . .	374
I. Criminal Remedy by Indictment . . . . .	375
Special Intent, when necessary . . . . .	376

Punishment at Common Law . . . . .	378
Statutes . . . . .	397
II. Criminal Remedy by Information . . . . .	380
Libels on Foreign Ambassadors, &c. . . . .	383
III. Law Common to all Criminal Cases . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Publication of a Libel by one unconscious of its Contents . . . .	384
Criminal Liability of an Employer . . . . .	385
Justification not permitted at Common Law . . . . .	388
Justification under Lord Campbell's Act . . . . .	389
Considerations as to Criminal Proceedings for Libel . . . . .	390
Suggestion of the Select Committee of the House of Commons . . . .	391

## CHAPTER XIV.

BLASPHEMOUS WORDS . . . . .	394-403
Blasphemous Words defined . . . . .	394
Intent to bring Religion into Contempt . . . . .	395
Honest Advocacy of Heretical Opinions . . . . .	396
Justification not allowed . . . . .	398
Statutory Provisions . . . . .	400
Jurisdiction of Ecclesiastical Courts . . . . .	402

## CHAPTER XV.

OBSCENE WORDS . . . . .	404-408
Test of Obscenity . . . . .	404
Summary Proceedings under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83 . . . . .	405

## CHAPTER XVI.

SEDITIONOUS WORDS . . . . .	409-448
Seditious Words defined . . . . .	409
Treasonable Words . . . . .	410
Words Defamatory of the Sovereign himself . . . . .	413
Truth no Defence . . . . .	414
Words Defamatory of the King's Ministers . . . . .	415
Words tending to Subvert the Government . . . . .	418
Words Defamatory of the Constitution . . . . .	419
Latitude allowed to Political Writers . . . . .	420
Words inciting to Disaffection and Riot . . . . .	421
Words Defamatory of either House of Parliament . . . . .	422
Commitment for Contempt . . . . .	423
Colonial Legislative Bodies . . . . .	425
Words Defamatory of the Superior Courts of Justice . . . . .	426
Contempt of Court . . . . .	428
Wilful Disobedience to an Order of Court . . . . .	431
Attachment and Committal . . . . .	433
Colonial Courts of Justice . . . . .	438
Words Defamatory of Inferior Courts of Justice . . . . .	440

Contempt of an Inferior Court of Record . . . . .	442
Sureties for Good Behavior . . . . .	444
Statutory Powers of Inferior Courts . . . . .	445
Ecclesiastical Courts . . . . .	448

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## PART II.

### PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND EVIDENCE.

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#### CHAPTER XVII.

PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES . . . . .	449-570
Considerations before Writ . . . . .	449
Parties . . . . .	452
Letter before Action; Notice of Action . . . . .	453
Choice of Court . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
District Registry . . . . .	454
Statute of Limitations . . . . .	455, 490
Former Proceedings . . . . .	456
Joinder of Causes of Action . . . . .	458
Indorsement on Writ . . . . .	459
Service of the Writ . . . . .	460
Appearance . . . . .	462
Judgment by Default . . . . .	463
Matters to be considered by the Defendant . . . . .	465
Security for Costs . . . . .	466
Remitting the Action to the County Court . . . . .	468
Statement of Claim . . . . .	469
Venue . . . . .	474
Instructions for Statement of Defence . . . . .	475
Demurrer . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Particulars . . . . .	479
Statement of Defence . . . . .	480
Traverses . . . . .	481
<i>Bona Fide</i> Comment. No Libel . . . . .	483
Privilege . . . . .	484
Justification . . . . .	485
Apology . . . . .	487
Accord and Satisfaction . . . . .	489
Previous Action . . . . .	490
Other Defences . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Payment into Court . . . . .	491
Counterclaims . . . . .	494
Judgment in Default of Pleading . . . . .	495
Reply . . . . .	496
Rejoinder . . . . .	498
Amendment of Pleadings . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Default in Pleading . . . . .	500

Interrogatories . . . . .	500
Striking out Interrogatories . . . . .	509
Answers to Interrogatories . . . . .	511
Further and Better Answers . . . . .	515
Discovery of Documents . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Further and Better Affidavit . . . . .	519
Inspection of Documents . . . . .	520
Default in making Discovery . . . . .	522
Notice of Trial. Entry for Trial . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Advice on Evidence . . . . .	524
Examination of Witnesses before Trial . . . . .	526
Special Jury . . . . .	528
Change of Venue . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Trial . . . . .	529
Proof of the Plaintiff's Special Character . . . . .	530
Proof of Publication . . . . .	531
Proof of the Libel . . . . .	535
Proof of the Speaking of the Slander . . . . .	537
Evidence as to the Innuendo . . . . .	538
Proof that the Words refer to the Plaintiff . . . . .	540
Proof that the Words were spoken of the Plaintiff in the way of his Office, Profession, or Trade . . . . .	541
Evidence of Malice . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Evidence of Damage . . . . .	542
Nonsuit . . . . .	543
Evidence for the Defendant . . . . .	545
Withdrawing a Juror . . . . .	550
Summing-up . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Verdict . . . . .	551
Judgment . . . . .	552
Costs . . . . .	553
Proceedings after Judgment . . . . .	554
Application for a New Trial . . . . .	556
Proceedings in the Court of Appeal . . . . .	561
County Court Proceedings . . . . .	565
Other Inferior Courts . . . . .	569

## CHAPTER XVIII.

PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES . . . 571-596

## PART I.

PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF INDICTMENT . . . . .	571-591
Proceedings before Magistrates . . . . .	571
Indictment . . . . .	574
Pleading to the Indictment . . . . .	576
Certiorari . . . . .	578
Evidence for the Prosecution . . . . .	580

Evidence for the Defence . . . . .	582
Summing-up and Verdict . . . . .	585
Proceedings after Verdict . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
Sentence . . . . .	589
Costs . . . . .	590

## PART II.

PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION . . . . .	591-596
Motion for the Rule . . . . .	591
Argument of the Rule . . . . .	593
Compromise . . . . .	594
Trial and Costs . . . . .	595

## APPENDICES.

A. APPENDIX OF PRECEDENTS OF PLEADING, ETC. . . . .	596-661
Contents . . . . .	596
I. Precedents of Pleadings in Actions for Libel . . . . .	600
II. Precedents of Pleadings in Actions of Slander . . . . .	621
III. Precedents of Pleadings in Actions of Slander of Title . . . . .	634
IV. Forms of Pleadings, Notices, &c., in the County Court . . . . .	644
V. Precedents of Criminal Pleadings . . . . .	649
B. REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE LAW OF LIBEL . . . . .	662
C. APPENDIX OF STATUTES . . . . .	664-683
Contents . . . . .	664

GENERAL INDEX . . . . .	685-748
-------------------------	---------



# TABLE OF CASES.

## A.

— v. Moor	305
Abrahams v. Kidney	313
Abrams v. Smith	94, 99
Abud v. Riches	434
Adams v. Hannon	305
v. Kelly	155, 333, 533, 535, 538
v. Lawson	22, 298
v. Meredew	104
v. Rankin	84
v. Rivers	83
v. Smith	305, 313
Adcock v. Marsh	298
Adlam v. Colthurst	433, 447
Aish v. Gerish	131
Alderman v. French	274, 435
Aldrich v. Press Printing Co.	40, 368
Alexander v. Alexander	54, 55
v. North Eastern Ry. Co.	170, 173, 253, 368, 497, 498, 549
v. Thomas	291
Alfred v. Farlow	56, 60, 123
Allardice v. Robertson	190
Allen v. Crofoot	120, 183, 191
v. Eaton	76
v. Hillman	55, 122
Alleston v. Moor	71, 75
Alley v. Neely	57
Allhusen v. Labouchere	505, 510, 511
Allsop v. Allsop	86, 312, 323, 325, 349
Alpin v. Morton	207, 293
Amann v. Damm	217, 218, 220, 225, 475
Ames v. Hazard	177
Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia	516, 517
v. Dunn	424
v. Hamilton	536
Andres v. Koppenheaver	55, 56
Andres v. Wells	271, 362
Andrews, <i>Ex parte, In re Fells</i>	431
v. Chapman	251, 255
v. Van Duzer	169
v. Woodmansee	55
Angle v. Alexander	66, 78, 103, 120, 295
Anihal v. Hunter	169
Annison v. Blofield	75, 111
Anon.,	22, 24, 56, 60, 66, 74, 84, 96, 102, 104, 122, 126, 130, 139, 169, 328, 381, 441, 472, 558, 575

Anstey v. N. & S. Woolwich Sub-way Co.	515
Anthony v. Halstead	557
Appleby v. Waring	520
Archbold v. Sweet	29
Armitage v. Dunster	537
v. Fitzwilliam	503
Armstrong v. Lewis	551
Arne v. Johnson	65, 79, 115
Arnold v. Clifford	374
v. Cost	55
Ashley v. Harrison	293, 314, 319, 322
v. Taylor	506
Ashworth v. Outram	337, 565
Asquith v. Molineux	524
Astley (Sir John) v. Younge	192, 193
Aston v. Blagrove	69, 71
Atherley v. Harvey	505
Atkins v. Johnson	211
v. Perrin	144
Atkinson v. Fosbrooke	470, 503
v. Hartley	53
v. Reding	55
Atthill v. Soman	295
Attorney-General v. Le Merchant	581
v. Siddon	364
Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Macpherson	425
Atwill v. Mackintosh	22, 210, 271
Atwinger v. Fellner	151
Augustinus v. Nerinckx	506
Ausman v. Veal	84
Austin (Sir J.) v. Culpepper	8, 22
Austria v. Day	13
Axmann v. Lund	144
Ayre v. Craven	66, 76, 77, 84, 541
Ayres v. Grider	122

## B.

Baal v. Baggerley	55, 122
Baboneau v. Farrell	80, 114
Bagg's Case	441
Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co.	29, 40, 94, 106, 271, 305
Bainbridge v. Lax	489
Baker v. Lane	504
v. Morfue <i>vel</i> Morpew	39, 68, 75
v. Newton	507
v. Oakes	336

Baker v. Pierce	18, 55, 61, 122	Bell v. Byrne	125, 471, 536
v. Young	536, 537	v. Midland Railway Co.	83, 292
Baldwin v. Elphinstone	152, 157, 472, 532	v. Parke	207, 208, 305, 306
v. Flower	350	v. Stone	22
v. Hildreth	540	v. State	404
v. Soule	271, 537	v. Wilkinson	478
Ball v. Roane	119	Bellamy v. Burch	64, 81
Banister v. Banister	139, 143	Benbow v. Low	498
Bank of Australasia v. Harding	439	Bendish v. Lindsay	5, 6
v. Nias	439	Benedict v. Westover	151
Bank of British North America v. Strong	191, 228	Bennett v. Barry	236
Banks v. Allen	74	v. Bennett	302
Barbaud v. Hookham	238	v. Deacon	215, 218
Barber v. Barber	298	v. Hyde	298
Barclay v. Thompson	54	v. Watson	447
Barfield v. Britt	169, 178	Bennifield v. Hypres	350
Barger v. Barger	123	Benson v. Flowers	354
Barham's Case	103	Bent v. Mink	151
Barker v. Commonwealth	404	Berdan v. Greenwood	301, 480, 492, 493, 494
Barmund's Case	85, 311	Berdeaux v. Davis	57
Barnabas v. Traunter	59, 311, 325	Berkeley v. Standard Discount Co.	502
Barnard v. Boulware	456	Berry v. Carter	84
Barnes v. Hamon	93, 94	Berryman v. Wise	69, 530
v. Holloway	537	Besant v. Wood	553
v. McCrate	191	Bickford v. Darcey	504
v. Prudlin, or Bruddel	312, 316	Biddulph v. Chamberlayne	177, 340
Barnett v. Allen	24, 61, 83, 539	Biggs v. Great Eastern Railway Co.	173, 253
Barr v. Hack	271, 305, 480	Bignell v. Buzzard	31
v. Moore	6, 22, 40, 236, 271, 292	Bigsby v. Dickinson	564, 565
Barratt v. Collins	370	Bill v. Neal	69, 71
Barret v. Jarvis	53	Billings v. Waller	169
Barrett v. Long	272, 276	v. Wing	55
Barrons v. Ball	118	Birch v. Benton	55, 536
Barrow v. Lewellin	150, 151	Birmingham Estates Co. v. Smith	495
Barry v. Barclay	527	Bisbey v. Shaw	169
v. M'Grath	301, 493	Bishop, <i>In re</i> , <i>Ex parte</i> Smith	432
Bartlett v. Lewis	504	v. Latimer	30, 75, 99, 172, 256, 486
Barton v. Holmes	93	Bishops' (The Seven) Case	534, 581
Bartow v. Brands	271	Bissell v. Cornell	55
Barwell v. Adkins	274, 276	Bittridge's Case	99, 109
Barwis v. Keppel	195	Black v. Hunt	61, 82
Bash v. Sommer	350	Blackburn v. Blackburn	264
Bassell v. Elmore	84, 308, 309, 316, 321, 331	Blackham v. Pugh	145, 226, 235
Bateman v. Lyall	315, 330, 543	Blackman v. Bryant	61, 82, 111
Bathurst v. Cox	440	Blades v. Lawrence	567
v. Kearsley	14	Blagg v. Sturt	29, 224, 270, 276
Baum v. Clause	58	Blake, <i>Re</i>	7, 253
Baylis v. Lawrence	94, 265, 550	v. Albion Assurance Society	272
Beach v. Beach	349, 490	v. Appleyard	341, 342
v. Ranney	312, 345	v. Pilfold	217, 223, 535
Beamond v. Hastings	71	v. Stevens	7, 30, 154, 170, 173, 253, 297
Beardsley v. Bridgman	271	Blickenstaff v. Perrin	84
v. Maynard	306	Bliss v. Stafford	140
v. Tappan	212	Bloodworth v. Gray	63
Beasley v. Meigs	271	Bloom v. Bloom	458
Beatson v. Skene	204, 206, 519, 545	Blumley v. Rose	106
Beaumont v. Barrett	425, 426	Bodwell v. Osgood	9
Bechler v. Steever	298	v. Swan	271
Bechtell v. Shatter	110	Bolckow v. Young	508
Becket v. Sterrett	55	Bold v. Bacon	139
Beddington v. Beddington	357	Bolton (Sir William) v. Dean	9
Bedwell v. Wood	337	Bond v. Douglas	155, 272, 333, 533
Beggarly v. Craft	169		
Behrens v. Allen	171, 486		

Bonomi v. Backhouse	317, 456	Brooker v. Coffin	84
Boosey v. Wood	489	Brookes v. Tichborne	533
Booth v. Briscoe	28, 47, 365, 370	Brooks v. Blanshard,	216, 218, 238, 286
Boston v. Tatam	58	v. Israel	336
Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf. Co.	13	Broome v. Gosden	101, 102, 129, 539, 540, 558
Botelar v. Ball	271	Brow v. Hathaway	200, 220, 241
Botterill v. Whytehead	68, 77, 172, 214, 219, 234, 601	Brown, <i>Ex parte</i>	425, 426
Bourke v. Warren	129, 130, 540	v. Barnes	271, 298, 305, 537
Bourland v. Eidson	306	v. Brashier	151
Bourn's (Sir John) Case	131	v. Croome	226, 241, 275, 283, 542
Bowden v. Allen	513	v. Hanson	123
Bowe v. Rogers	291	v. Hirley	458
Bower v. Deideker	537	v. Lane or Low	131, 542
Bowey v. Bell	336	v. Mims	80
Boxe v. Barnaby	75	v. Murray	525
Boydell v. Jones	23, 27, 99, 116, 256	v. Nickerson	66
Boyle v. Wiseman	504, 534, 536	v. Piner	100
Brace v. Brink	123	v. Remington	22
Bracebridge v. Watson	311	v. Smith	78, 291
Bracegirdle v. Bailey	8, 305	v. Wootton	457
v. Orford	8	Bruce v. Nicolopulo	536
Braden v. Walker	274	v. Soule	62, 63
Bradlaugh, <i>Ex parte</i>	406	Brunkard v. Segar	61, 82
v. The Queen	405, 424, 586	Brunswick (Duke of) v. Harmer	160, 168, 230, 232, 293, 456, 532, 539, 592
Bradley v. Gibson	305	Bruton v. Downes	24, 193
v. Heath	237	Bryant, <i>In re</i>	432
v. Methwyn	5	v. Loxton	67, 80
Bradt v. Towsley	313	Buchanan v. Taylor	508
Brady v. Wilson	114	Buck v. Hersey	66
v. Youlden	67, 317	Buckingham v. Murray	471
Brand v. Roberts	59, 85	Buckley v. Knapp	6, 169, 177, 271, 292, 298
Brandreth v. Lance	15	v. O'Niel	61
Brandrick v. Johnson	66, 77	v. Wood	192, 193, 245
Braveboy v. Cockfield	9	Bucton v. Higgs	341
Bray v. Ham	80	Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde	429, 436
Brayne v. Cooper	56, 66, 78, 84	Buford v. McLuny	305
Brembridge v. Latimer	102, 177, 487	Bull v. Chapman	374
Brennan v. Tracy	367	Bullard v. Lambert	305
Brett v. Watson	154, 271	Bullock v. Koon	123
Brettun v. Anthony	93, 94, 100, 114	Bump v. Betts	6, 292
Brewer v. Dew	8	Bundy v. Hart	54, 536
Brewster's Case	420, 421	Burbank v. Horn	151
Bridges v. Playdel	56	Burcher v. Orchard	351, 371, 560
Bridgman v. Hopkins	305	Burder v. —	403
Brigg's Case	56	Burdett v. Abbot	154, 155, 157, 426, 435
Briggs v. Byrd	94, 220, 540	v. Colman	423
Brine v. Bazalgette	275, 288	Burford v. Lenthall	340
Brinsmead v. Harrison	457	v. Wible	169
Brite v. Gill	122	Burges v. Bracher	96, 558
Brittain v. Allen	271	Burgoine v. Taylor	530
Broadhurst v. Willey	341	Burke v. Rooney	522
Brocklebank v. King's Lynn Steam- ship Co.	354, 467	Burkett v. McCarty	123
Broke's Case	74	Burnet v. Wells	79, 137
Bromage v. Prosser	164, 206, 240, 264, 267, 282, 471	Burnett v. Chetwood	14
Bromefield v. Snoko	80	Burson v. Edwards	271
Brook v. Evans	249, 436	Burt v. McBain	84, 271, 313, 318, 345
v. Rawl	141, 143	Burtch v. Nickerson	80
v. Wise	63	Burton v. Burton	57
Brooke v. Avrillon	274	v. Plummer	537
v. Clarke	68	Bush v. Prosser	274, 305
v. Montague (Sir Henry)	190	v. Trowbridge Waterworks Co.	477
		Bustros v. Bustros	357

Bustros <i>v.</i> White	517, 521
Butt <i>v.</i> Conant	428, 571
Button <i>v.</i> Heyward	18, 55, 96
<i>v.</i> Heywood	93
<i>v.</i> Woolwich Mut. Bg. Soc.	569
Byrchley's Case	75
Byrd <i>v.</i> Nunn	499
Byrket <i>v.</i> Monohon	178, 298

## C.

Cæsar <i>v.</i> Curseny	64, 71
Calder <i>v.</i> Halket	188
Caldwell <i>v.</i> Abbey	55
Caley <i>v.</i> Caley	352
Calkins <i>v.</i> Sumner	183, 191
Callan <i>v.</i> Gaylord	531
Camfield <i>v.</i> Bird	273
Camp <i>v.</i> Martin	75, 76
Campbell <i>v.</i> Butts	271, 490
<i>v.</i> Spottiswoode	22, 30, 35, 38, 39, 40, 49
<i>v.</i> The Queen	588
Canadian Oilworks Corporation <i>v.</i> Hay	475
Cane <i>v.</i> Golding	141, 143
Cannell <i>v.</i> Curtis	69, 530
Cannon <i>v.</i> Phillips	123
Cans <i>v.</i> Roberts	59, 85
Canterbury <i>v.</i> Hill	123
Capel <i>v.</i> Powell	351
<i>v.</i> Jones	104, 115
Capes <i>v.</i> Brewer	460
Capital & Counties Bank <i>v.</i> Henty	26,
103, 116, 228, 236, 555	
(C. A.) 26, 103, 113, 116, 228, 236,	540, 555
Carew <i>v.</i> Davies	505
Carmichael <i>v.</i> Shiel	94
<i>v.</i> Waterford & Limerick Ry. Co.	270, 297
Carn <i>v.</i> Osgood	71
Carpenter <i>v.</i> Bailey	169, 177, 185, 308, 313
<i>v.</i> Dennis	78
<i>v.</i> Tarrant	58
Carr <i>v.</i> Duckett	142, 487, 639
(Sir John) <i>v.</i> Hood	37, 48
<i>v.</i> Jones,	24, 46, 176, 255
Carrol <i>v.</i> Bird,	201
<i>v.</i> Falkiner	327
Carroll <i>v.</i> White	75, 76
Carslake <i>v.</i> Mapledoram	63
Carson <i>v.</i> McFadden	449
Carter <i>v.</i> Andrews	122
<i>v.</i> Howe Machine Co.	868
<i>v.</i> Jones	530
<i>v.</i> Leeds Daily News Co.	511, 514, 515, 620
<i>v.</i> Stubbs	522
Cartwright <i>v.</i> Wright	471
Cary <i>v.</i> Allen	22, 100
Case <i>v.</i> Marks	298
Casey <i>v.</i> Arnott	148, 537

Cashin <i>v.</i> Cradock	499, 516
Cass <i>v.</i> Anderson	123
Castle <i>v.</i> Houston	389
Castleberry <i>v.</i> Kelly	53
Castro's Case	430, 433
Catling <i>v.</i> King	477
Catterall <i>v.</i> Kenyon	372
Caulfield <i>v.</i> Whitworth	269, 274, 537, 542
Cawdrey <i>v.</i> Highley	68, 74
Ceeley <i>v.</i> Hoskins	56, 60, 123
Chace <i>v.</i> Sherman	100, 114, 537
Chaddock <i>v.</i> Briggs	66, 93
Chadwick <i>v.</i> Herapath	300, 497
Chalmers <i>v.</i> Payne	27, 251, 252, 253, 552
<i>v.</i> Shackell	170, 172, 306
Chamberlain <i>v.</i> White or Willmore	391
Chamberlin <i>v.</i> Vance	93, 177, 271, 274
Chambers <i>v.</i> White	57
Chandler <i>v.</i> Robison	123
Chantler <i>v.</i> Lindsey	491
Chapin <i>v.</i> White	151
Chaplin <i>v.</i> Cruikshanks	57
Chapman, <i>Ex parte</i>	441
<i>v.</i> Gillett	56, 394
<i>v.</i> Lamphire	79
<i>v.</i> Midland Ry. Co.	342, 343
<i>v.</i> Orday	169
Charges (Sir Thomas) <i>v.</i> Rone	236
Charlter <i>v.</i> Barret	273
Charlton <i>v.</i> Watton	176, 261, 302
Charlton's (Lechmere) Case	430, 434
Charnel's Case	62
Charter <i>v.</i> Peter	121
Chase <i>v.</i> Whitlock	61
Chatfield <i>v.</i> Sedgwick	342
Cheadle <i>v.</i> Buell	480
Cheese <i>v.</i> Lovejoy	551
<i>v.</i> Scales	22, 29, 283
Cheltenham & Swansea Wagon Co. <i>In re</i>	429
Chenery <i>v.</i> Goodrich	100
Chennell, <i>In re</i>	564
Chester <i>v.</i> Wortley	504
Chesterfield Colliery Co. <i>v.</i> Black	515
Child <i>v.</i> Affleck	201
<i>v.</i> Homer	306
Chillingworth <i>v.</i> Grimble	269
Chipman <i>v.</i> Cook	74, 80
Chorlton <i>v.</i> Dickie	529
Christie <i>v.</i> Christie	192
<i>v.</i> Powell	109
Chubb <i>v.</i> Flannagan	160, 387
<i>v.</i> Westley	94, 273, 276
<i>v.</i> Ysell	298
Church <i>v.</i> Barnett	528
<i>v.</i> Bridgman	55, 162
<i>v.</i> Perry	512, 515
Churchill (Lord) <i>v.</i> Hunt	23, 176, 587
<i>v.</i> Kimball	458
Cilley <i>v.</i> Jenness	485
Clare <i>v.</i> Blakesley	432
Clark <i>v.</i> Brown	169, 271, 305, 537
<i>v.</i> Chambers	322
<i>v.</i> Dibble	178
<i>v.</i> Freeman	14, 16, 29, 34, 79

Clark v. Molyneux	142, 214, 219, 266, 269, 274, 278, 280, 472, 541	Commonwealth v. Morgan	6, 151, 157, 177, 271
v. Munsell	479	v. Sharpless	404
v. Newsam	270, 297	v. Snelling	389, 479
Clarke v. Cookson	454	v. Sweeney	373, 574
v. Fitch	94, 100, 106	v. Tarbox	574
v. Jones	100	v. Varney	151, 574
v. Morgan	315, 330	v. Walters	536
v. Taylor	173, 176	v. Wright	22, 574
Clarke's Case	56, 102, 123	Conesby's Case	149
Clarkson v. Lawson	30, 173	Connors v. Justice	77
v. McCarty	291	Conroe v. Conroe	305
Clay v. Brigham	93	Cook v. Batchellor	81, 367
v. People	151	v. Cook	308, 309, 317
v. Roberts	26, 29, 76, 477, 497	v. Dey	460
v. Yates	374	v. Field	178, 291, 319
Clear v. Reasor	291	v. Ward	6, 540, 625
Cleaveland v. Detweiler	84	v. Wingfield	59, 85
Cleaver v. Sarraude	217	Cooke v. Cox	470
Clegg v. Laffer	103, 125, 154	v. Hughes	22, 98, 302, 535
Clement v. Chivis	22	v. Oceanic Steam Co.	501
v. Fisher	123	v. Wildes	228, 269, 281
v. Lewis	29, 99, 172, 256, 291, 486	Coombs v. Rose	22, 237
Clements v. Maloney	6, 292, 298, 536	Coons v. Robinson	123
Clerk v. Dyer	124	Cooper v. Barber	305
Clifton v. Wells	63	v. Francis	298
Clover v. Roydon	15	v. Greeley	22
Clutterbuck v. Chaffers	153, 383, 580	v. Hawkswell	126
Cobham v. Dalton	432	v. Lawson	40, 171, 248, 256
Cochrane, <i>Ex parte, in re Mead</i>	431	v. Marlow	537
Cockaine v. Hopkins	61, 82, 125	v. Smith	121
Cockaine's (Lady) Case v. Witnam	56	v. Stone	40
Cockayne v. Hodgkisson	200, 217	v. Weed	371
Coffin v. Coffin	186	Corbley v. Wilson	1, 178, 274, 490
Colburn v. Patmore	157, 294, 372, 374	Corcoran v. Corcoran	311
Colby v. Reynolds	22	Cornwall v. Richardson	275, 298
Cole v. Firth	342	Cosgrave v. Trade Auxiliary Co.	249, 483
v. Grant	123	Cotes v. Kettle	67, 80
Coleman v. Harcourt	348, 350	Cottrill v. Cramer	40, 100
v. Playsted	271	Counsel v. Garvie	566
v. West Hartlepool Harbor & Ry. Co.	256, 429, 436	Cowan v. Milbourn	374, 399
Coles v. Haveland	111	Coward v. Wellington	311, 349
Collette v. Goode	499	Cowles v. Potts	206
Collins v. Carnegie	69, 76, 81, 531	Cox v. Cooper	25, 100, 112
v. Vestry of Paddington	563	v. Feeney	41, 47
v. Welch	337	v. Humphrey	59, 96
v. Yates	517	v. Lee	22, 23
Colman v. Godwin	56, 121	Coxhead v. Richards	29, 205, 214, 215, 218
Colonial Assurance Co. Limited v. Prosser	496	Cracknall v. Janson	340
Combe v. Edwards	431	Craig v. Catlet	306
Commonwealth v. Blanding	186, 254, 389, 531	v. Phillips	563
v. Bonner	271	Cramer v. Noonan	22
v. Chapman	373	v. Riggs	27, 69, 412
v. Clap	40, 236, 375	Crandall v. Dawson	178
v. Hall	151	Crauden v. Walden	73
v. Harmon	574	Craven v. Smith	334, 337, 464
v. Holmes	404	Crawfoot v. Dale	80
v. Keenan	100	Crawford v. Melton	56
v. Kneeland	159, 394	v. Middleton	163, 265
v. Meeser	412	Crawford's Case	427, 438
		Green v. Wright	338, 560
		Creedy v. Carr	159, 309, 458
		Creighton v. Finlay	303

Cresinger v. Reed	94	Dawkins v. Rokeby (Lord)	193, 194, 195, 196, 536
Crisp v. Gill	79, 80, 227, 236	Day v. Bream	153, 360, 384, 547
Croford v. Blisse	126	v. Brownrigg	15
Croft v. Stevens	237	v. Buller	75
(Sir Herbert) v. Brown	55, 124	v. Robinson	104, 109, 295
Cromwell's (Lord) Case	108, 476	Dayton v. Rockwell	123
Crone v. Angell	56	Dean v. Miller	291
Crookshank v. Gray	123	Dean's Case	444
Cropp v. Tilney	9, 21	De Armond v. Armstrong	94, 100, 177
Crotty v. Morrissey	178, 537	De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone	439
Crowe v. Barnicot	495	De Crespigny v. Wellesley	157, 163, 164, 174, 262
Cucks v. Starre	73	Defries v. Davis	278, 353
Cuddington v. Wilkins	58, 497	Delacroix v. Thevenot	151
Culvertson v. Stanley	537	De La Grange v. McAndrew	467
Cummins v. Butler	123	Delany v. Jones	55, 226, 241, 283
v. Smith	123	Delegal v. Highley	190, 276, 293, 319
Cumming v. Bird	449	Dengate v. Gardiner	319, 325
Curry v. Collins	64	Derry v. Handley	168, 333
v. Walter	244	Desilla v. Schunck & Co.	458
Curtis v. Curtis	55	Desmond v. Brown	98, 151, 537
v. Mussey	40, 157, 198, 236, 271, 362	Detroit Post Co. v. McArthur	157, 302
D.		Deverill v. Hulbert	108
Dacy v. Clinch	59, 62, 119	Dewitt v. Greenfield	305
Daily v. Gaines	537	Dexter v. Spear	387
Daines v. Hartley	111, 538	v. Taber	94
Dale, <i>Ex parte</i>	382, 448	Dial v. Holter	54, 237
v. Harris	201	Dibdin v. Swan	50
Dalrymple v. Lofton	123	Dicas v. Lord Brougham	189
Dalton v. Higgins	123	v. Lawson	253
Daly v. Byrne	271	Dickenson v. Hilliard	196
Dame v. Kenney	169	Dickeson v. Hilliard	212
Dancaster v. Hewson	193, 537	Dickey v. Andros	121, 122, 536
Darby v. Ouseley	99, 272, 297, 302, 551	Dickinson v. Barber	354
Darling v. Banks	178	Dicks v. Brooks	564
Davey v. Pemberton	337, 521	C. A.	144
Davidson v. Gray	339, 342	Dickson v. Combermere	196
(C. A.)	339, 342	v. Wilton (The Earl of)	196, 236, 268
Davies v. Felix (C. A.)	555	Digby v. Thompson	25
v. Snead	215, 219	Dill v. Murphy	425
v. Solomon	311, 316, 324	Dillard v. Collins	196, 267, 305
Davis v. Brown	84	Dioyt v. Tanner	458
v. Cutbush	242, 285, 302, 304	Disney v. Longbourne	501
v. Davis	80, 550	Distin v. Rose	84, 271, 274, 537
v. Duncan	52, 450	Dixon v. Bell	352
v. Gardiner	58, 310, 326	v. Enoch	514, 532
v. Garland	459	v. Holden	13, 14, 15, 16, 17
v. Gray	507	v. Parsons	201
v. Johnston	93	v. Smith	76, 167, 218, 313, 315, 316, 330, 543
v. Lewis	65, 79, 126, 163, 165	v. Stewart	93, 94
v. Mathews	169	Dobede v. Fisher	306, 494
v. Miller	61, 80, 83	Dobson v. Thornistone	79
v. Reeves	211	Dod v. Robinson	66, 72
v. Ruff	78, 81	Dodds v. Henry	28
v. Williams	516	Doe d. Devines v. Wilson	534
Davison v. Duncan	165, 175, 186, 236, 259, 261, 262, 283	Mudd v. Suckermore	533
Daw v. Eley	44, 430, 436	Doherty v. Brown	536, 537
Dawes v. Bolton or Boughton	59	Dole v. Lyon	164
Dawkins v. Paulet (Lord)	194, 195, 199, 484, 497	v. Van Rensselaer	70
v. Penrhyn (Lord)	477, 478	Dollman v. Jones	561
		Dolloway v. Turrell	71
		Donoghue v. Hayes	6, 169

Dorchester (Marquess of) v. Proby	136
Dorland v. Patterson	98
Dorme's Case	55
Dorsett v. Adams	123
Doss v. Jones	274
v. Secretary of State for India	196
Dottarer v. Bushey	84
Douglass v. Towsey	291
Dovaston v. Payne	83
Doveton, <i>Ex parte</i>	382
Dowd v. Winters	537
Dowling v. Browne	354
Downey v. Dillon	123, 298
Downie & Arrindell, <i>Re</i>	439
Downing v. Brown	93, 94, 178, 274
v. Wilson	84
Downs v. Hawley	84, 93, 94, 151, 271,
	537
Doyle v. Kaufmann	460
v. Falconer	425
v. O'Doherty	192
Doyley v. Roberts	66, 74, 75, 293, 311, 541
Drake, <i>Ex parte</i> , <i>In re</i> Ware	431, 457
v. Drake	72, 73
v. Hill	79
Drown v. Allen	305
Drummond v. Leslie	57
Du Bost v. Beresford	8, 13, 22, 24, 374,
	540
Dudley v. Horn	55
Duffy v. Gray	490
Dufort v. Abodie	313
Dufresne v. Weise	54, 305, 537
Dugdale v. Regina	405
Duncan v. Brown	22, 306
v. Thwaites	244, 245, 246, 251,
	486
Duncombe v. Daniell	236, 241, 302, 304
Dunman v. Bigg	235
Dunn v. Hall	6, 157, 271, 291, 362
v. Winters	237
Dunne v. Anderson	43
Dunnell v. Fiske	55, 122
Durrall v. Stilwell	536, 537
Duval v. Davey	84, 151, 274, 305, 350
Dwyer v. Esmonde	52, 168, 230
Dyer v. Morris	84
Dymond v. Croft	462
E.	
Eaden v. Jacobs (C. A.)	506
Eagleton v. Kingston	533
Eames v. Whittaker	204, 220
Easley v. Moss	208, 536
East v. Chapman	302, 304
Eastmead v. Witt	203, 225, 226
Eastwood v. Holmes	32, 51, 127
Eaton v. Allen	56
v. Johns	22, 477
Eccles v. Shannon	56
Eden v. Legare	53
Edgerly v. Swain	55, 122, 537
Edmond's Case	436
Edmunds v. Greenwood	404
Edsall v. Brooks	22
v. Russell	55, 68, 76, 173
Edwards v. Bell	28, 170, 173
v. London & N. W. Ry. Co.	361
Egremont Burial Board v. Egremont Iron Ore Co.	516, 517
Elam v. Badger	84
Elborow v. Allen	140
Elfrank v. Seiler	84
Elliot v. Halmarack	431
Elliott v. Boyles	271
Ellis v. Ambler	501
v. Buzzell	178
v. Lindley	178
v. Munson (C. A.)	495
Ellissen, <i>Ex parte</i>	573
Elmer v. Creasy	510
Else v. Ferris	31
Emblen v. Myers	292
Emery v. Prescott	123
Emmerson v. Marvel	84, 100, 151, 580
Emperor of Austria v. Day	14
Empson v. Fairfax	339
England v. Bourke	549
English v. Tottie	518
Entick v. Carrington	152, 574
Etty v. Wilson	555
Evans v. Gwyn	73
v. Harlow	32, 33, 79, 145, 147
v. Harries	291, 316, 319, 320, 330
v. Rees	335
v. Smith	162
v. Walton	352
Evening News Asso. v. Tryon	6, 292, 299
Eviston v. Cramer	27, 29
F.	
Fairchild v. Adams	237
Fairman v. Ives	222, 224, 245, 287
Falkland (Lord) v. Phipps	136
Falkner v. Cooper	130
Falvey v. Stanford	292, 559
Farley's (Mrs.) Case	429
Farnam v. Childs	274, 480, 485
Farnsworth v. Storrs	237
Farrow v. Hague	569
Faund v. Wallace	557
Fawcett v. Clark	55, 93, 122
Felkin v. Herbert	430
Fellowes v. Hunter	80
Fells, <i>In re</i> , <i>Ex parte</i> Andrews	431
Fenn v. Dixe	79
Fennell v. Tait	526
Fenton v. Hampton	425
Fernandez, <i>Ex parte</i>	435, 437
Field v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co.	338, 560
Figgin's v. Cogswell	79, 81
Filber v. Dautermann	56, 122
Finden v. Westlake	228, 277, 285
Finnerty v. Tipper	273, 296, 307
Finney v. Smith	302
Fisher v. Atkinson	82

Fisher v. Clement	264, 539	Freethy v. Freethy	347
v. Hughes	522	Frescoe v. May	157, 294, 457, 549
v. Owen	505, 509, 510, 511, 512, 519	Friend v. London, Chatham, & Dover Ry. Co.	518
v. Rottereau	122	Frisbie v. Fowler	84
Fisher & Co. v. Appollinaris Co.	15	Fry v. Bennett	177, 298
Fitter v. Veal	295, 317, 320, 552	v. Carne	56, 121
Fitzgerald v. Campbell	278, 484	Fryer v. Gathercole	535
v. Redfield	77	v. Kinnersley	201, 230, 280
v. Robinson	56, 84, 112, 113, 242	Fuller v. Fenner	313
v. Stewart	162, 305		
v. Villiers	463		
Fitzgibbon v. Greer	508		
Fitzpatrick v. Stewart	305		
Flagg v. Roberts	6, 292, 306		
Flamingham v. Boucher	271		
Fleetwood v. Curl or Curley	70, 110, 131		
Fleming v. Newton	13, 14, 248, 436		
Flint v. Pike	176, 253, 256		
Flower's Case	68		
Floyd v. Barker	188, 189		
Folsom v. Brown	177, 178		
Fonville v. Nease	151, 153		
Foot v. Brown	74, 76		
Footman v. Dunn	193		
Forbes v. King	25, 114		
Force v. Warren	231		
Ford v. Primrose	55		
Fores v. Johnes	374		
Forsdike v. Stone	292, 336, 559		
Forshee v. Abrams	178		
Fortescue v. Fortescue	517		
Forward v. Adams	69		
Foss v. Hildreth	169		
Foster v. Browning	55, 119		
v. Lawson	81, 367		
v. Pointer	537		
v. Roberts	502		
v. Scripps	40, 196, 198, 271		
v. Small	536		
Foulger v. Newcomb	25, 67, 77, 115, 120, 474		
Fountain v. Boodle	274, 275, 298		
v. Rogers	121		
v. West	298		
Fowell v. Cowe	71		
Fowler v. Aston	121		
v. Dowdney	58		
v. Gilbert	114, 162, 177, 271, 305		
v. Homer	212, 221, 284		
Fowles v. Bowen	22, 31, 77, 202, 208, 270, 273, 287, 321, 332		
v. Chichester	162, 292, 298		
v. Robbins	56		
Fox v. Broderick	154		
v. Wilson	271		
Francis v. Roose	55, 106		
Franklyn v. Butler	115		
Fray v. Blackburn	189		
v. Fray	23, 94, 544		
Frazier v. McCloskey	271		
Frean v. Sargent	338		
Freeman v. Price	84, 169		
v. Tinsley	274, 291, 306		
		G.	
		Gabe v. McGinnis	6, 22, 94, 100, 291
		Gage v. Robinson	389
		v. Shelton	52, 114
		Gainford v. Tuke	58, 126
		Gale v. Leckie	374
		Gallwey v. Marshall	66, 72, 73, 83, 473
		Gandy v. Humphries	298
		Gants v. Vinard	178
		Garden v. Sedden	183
		Gardiner v. Atwater	127, 165
		Gardner v. Irwin	517
		v. Slade	201
		Garnett v. Bradley	385, 468
		v. Ferrand	442, 443
		Garr v. Selden	74, 191
		Garrels v. Alexander	533
		Garret v. Taylor	149, 359
		Garrett v. Dickerson	185
		Gascoigne v. Ambler	85
		Gaskin v. Balls	15
		Gathercole v. Miall	28, 47, 48, 242, 285, 298, 355
		Gay v. Homer	55
		v. Labouchere	506, 509, 510, 512
		Gazette Co. v. Timberlake	243
		Geary v. Physic	7
		Gee v. Pritchard	13, 14
		Geisler v. Brown	22, 25, 308, 309, 540
		Gelen v. Hall	188
		George v. Goddard	236
		Georgia v. Kepford	55, 84, 122, 178, 321, 323
		Gerard (Sir G.) v. Dickenson	143
		Gerard v. Risk	291, 292
		Getting v. Foss	212
		Gibbons v. London Financial Association	499
		Gibbs v. Dewey	55
		Gibson v. Williams	94, 540
		v. Wilson	84
		Giddens v. Mirk	114
		Gilbert v. People	183, 190, 191, 373
		Giles v. State	2, 25
		Gill v. Bright	55
		Gillett v. Bullivant	168, 327, 332
		Gillis v. Peck	169
		Gilman v. Lowell	305
		Gilpin v. Fowler	242, 268, 280, 535
		Giraud v. Beach	371
		Glass v. Stewart	371
		Glynn v. Houston	605



Goddard v. Gray	439	Grove v. Hart	348, 350
Goddard v. Thompson	560, 564	Guard v. Risk	151
Goddard v. Haselfoot	76	Guerdon v. Winterstud	56
Godfrey v. Owen	59	Gurney v. Longman	14
v. Tucker	477	Gutsole v. Mathers	142, 470
Godson v. Home	209, 265	Guy v. Gregory	298, 325, 350
Golderman v. Stearns	62	Gwynn v. S. E. Rail. Co.	173, 258, 548
Golding v. Wharton Saltworks Co.	499		
Goldstein v. Foss	25, 115, 120, 212	H.	
Gompertz v. Levy	104	Hackett v. Brown	84, 177, 305, 306
Goodale v. Castle	61, 82	Haddon v. Lott	139, 322, 326
Goodbarne v. Fothergill	563	Hadjo v. Gooden	305
Goodbread v. Leadbetter	306	Hahnemannian Life Ins. Co. v. Beebe	367
Goodburne v. Bowman	27, 173, 340, 486	Haines v. Welling	162
Goodrich v. Davis	94, 540	Haire v. Wilson	23, 264, 265
v. Hooper	55	Hake v. Molton	125
v. Warner	151	Hakewell v. Ingram	24, 558
v. Woolcott	84	Haley v. State, 6, 84, 93, 271, 305, 536, 537	
Goodtitle v. Badtitle	464	Hall v. Adkins	121, 122
Gorham v. Ives	122	v. Hollander	352
Gorman v. Sutton	178, 274	v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.	510
Gorton v. Keeler	182, 305	v. Montgomery	123
Goselin v. Cannon	191	v. Nees	458
Goslin v. Corry	311, 317, 320	v. Smith	79, 81
Gosling v. Morgan	84	v. Weedon	123
Gosset v. Howard	423, 435	Hall's (Arthur) Case	423
Gostling v. Brooks	78, 115	Hallinan v. Price	342
Gott v. Pulsifer	39, 40, 138, 271	Halsey v. Brotherhood	144
Gottbehuet v. Hubachek	64, 66, 94	Hamilton v. Eno	6, 40, 185, 198, 236, 292, 302
Gough v. Goldsmith	328	Hamilton & Co. v. Johnson & Co.	556
Gould v. Hulme	191, 237	Hamm v. Wickline	123
Gourley v. Plimsoll	486, 508	Hammersmith Skating Rink Co.	
Gove v. Blethen	64, 123	v. Dublin Skating Rink Co.	15, 144
Grant v. Banque Franco-Egyptienne	563, 564	Hampton v. Wilson	169
v. Gould	195	Hancock v. Guerin	516
v. Holland	556	Hancocks v. Lablache	350
v. Secretary of State for India	196, 257	Hand v. Winton	56, 71, 100
Grater v. Collard	295	Hankinson v. Bilby	93, 94, 106, 107, 109, 548
Graves's Case	126	Hanning v. Bassett	151
Gray v. Pentland	213	Hansborough v. Stinnett	112
v. West	334	Harbison v. Shook	123, 178
Greaves v. Keene	435	Harding v. Brooks	66, 298, 305
Green v. Button	91, 149, 326	v. Greening	361
v. Chapman	50	Hardwick v. Chandler	75
v. Elgie	434	Hargrave v. Le Breton	142, 144, 226, 264
v. Sevin	498	Harker (In re) v. Fothergill	563
v. Telfair	94	Harle v. Catherall	40, 46, 236, 241, 453
Greenfield v. Reay	504	Harman v. Delany	31, 33, 79, 145
Greenfield's Case	80	v. Harmon	271
Greenwood v. Prick	6, 242, 265	Harmon v. Harmon	271, 292
Gregory v. Atkins	94, 177	Harnett v. Vise	216, 307, 336
v. The Queen	575	Harper (Sir J.) v. Beaumont	70
v. Williams	292, 320, 552	Harper v. Harper	177, 208
Greville v. Chapman	24	Harrington v. Miles	122
Griffin v. Moore	56, 84, 113	Harris v. Burley	100
Griffiths v. Hardenburgh	374	v. Dixon	56
v. Lewis	80, 114, 168, 231, 233, 452	v. Fleming	462
Griggs v. Vickroy	84	v. Petherick	338, 560
Grimes v. Coyle	169	v. Purdy	123
v. Lovel	63	v. Thompson	216, 218, 238, 270, 544
Grissell's Case	423		
Groenvelt v. Burwell	189		

Harris v. Warre	101, 424, 470	Hext v. Yeomans	122
Harrison v. Bevington	78, 81, 367	Hey v. Moorhouse	489
v. Bush	198, 222, 224, 287, 339	Heymann v. The Queen	586
v. King	57, 125	Hibbins v. Lee	45
v. Pearce	157, 159, 294, 314, 319, 331, 362, 458, 549	Hibbs v. Wilkinson	52, 230, 271
v. Stratton	57	Hickinbotham v. Leach	111, 178, 485
v. Thornborough	79, 97, 125, 130	Hickley v. Grosjean	110, 537
Hart v. Coy	55, 100, 122	Hicks' (Sir Baptist) Case, R. v. Garret	23, 383
v. Gumpach	194	Higginson v. Flaherty	190
v. Wall	26, 34, 113, 141, 544, 641	Highmore v. Earl of Harrington	64, 73, 558
Hartlepool Original Colliery Co. v. Gibb	495	Highton v. Treherne	560, 562, 563
Hartley v. Dilke	460	Hill v. Campbell	519
v. Herring	72, 310, 311, 316, 320	v. Ward	138
v. Hindmarsh	546	Hill's Executors v. Metropolitan District Asylum	387, 565
Hartsock v. Reddick	193	Hilliard (Sir Christopher) v. Constable	72
Hartwell v. Vesey	238	Hilton v. Muzzy	308
Harvey v. French	24, 99, 106	Hinkle v. Davenport	162, 271, 370
Harwood v. Astley	236	Hinrichs v. Berndes	16
v. Green	29, 215, 288	Hirst v. Goodwin	330
v. Hardwick	324, 348	Hix v. Drury	274, 485
Haselton v. Weare	120	Hixe v. Hollingshed	85
Hasley v. Brooks	298, 306	Hoar v. Ward	84, 121, 189, 183, 188, 190, 313
Hassell v. Capcot	59, 85	Hoare, <i>Ex parte</i>	382
Hastie v. Hastie (C. A.)	564	v. Dickson	545
Hastings v. Lusk	40, 183, 186, 190	v. Silverlock	22, 23, 106, 239, 244, 539, 544, 560
v. Stetson	328	Hobbs v. Bryers	278
Hatch v. Lane	200, 241	Hodges v. State	378, 383
v. Potter	6, 169, 271	Hodgkins v. Corbet	85, 181
Hatfield v. Gapo	55	Hodgson v. Scarlett	190
v. Lasher	305	Hoey v. Felton	322
Haun v. Wilson	298	Hogan v. Wilmoreth	123
Hawkesley v. Bradshaw	481, 492	Hogg v. Dorrah	71
(C. A.)	301, 481, 488, 493	v. Wilson	122
Hawley v. Reade	301, 340, 501	Holland v. Stoner	96
Hawn v. Smith	122	Hollingshead's Case	85
Haws v. Stanford	177	Hollingworth v. Brodrick	466
Hawver v. Hawver	151, 178, 274, 350	v. Shaw	54
Hayes v. Ball	55, 122	Hollis (Sir John) v. Briscow	71
Haylock v. Sparke	574	Holmes v. Catesby	77, 485
Hayner v. Cowden	66, 271, 298	v. Mountstephen	566
Haynes v. Leland	162	Holt, <i>In re</i>	431
v. Ritchey	84	(Sir Thomas) v. Astrigg	119
Hays v. Mitchell	100	v. Parsons	237
Haythorn v. Lawson	32, 319, 324, 365, 367	v. Scholefield	56, 60, 102, 123, 295
Haywood v. Naylor	126	Holton v. Muzzy	100
Hazelton Coal Co. v. Megargel	383	Holwood v. Hopkins	332
Head v. Briscoe	351	Home v. Bentinck	189, 195, 536
Hearne v. Stowell	28, 127, 158, 260, 550, 559	Homer v. Engelhardt	23
Hedley v. Barlow	48, 46, 545	v. Taunton	24, 106, 539
Heilman v. Shanklin	169, 177	Honess v. Stubbs	486
Helsham v. Blackwood	45, 170, 172, 485	Hooker v. Tucker	79
Heming v. Power	55, 62, 123	Hooper v. Martin	114
Hemmings v. Gasson	104, 230, 277	v. Truscott	221, 265, 268
Henderson v. Broomhead	191, 193	Hopkins v. Smith	123, 178
Henry v. Norwood	305	Hopkinson v. Lord Burghley	518
Henwood v. Harrison	44, 211	Hopper v. Warburton	464
Heriot v. Stuart	30, 32, 49	Hopwood v. Thorn	73, 82, 204, 206, 211, 232, 310, 316, 320
Hewetson v. Whittington Life Insurance Society	502	Horn v. Foster	123
Hewitt v. Pioneer Press Co.	162		

Horne v. Hough		507	Ingrams v. Allen		51
Horner v. Marshall's Administratrix		354	Ingram v. Lawson	34, 132, 137, 169, 311,	
v. Oylor		343		319, 320, 455, 543	
Hort v. Reade	177,	483	Inman v. Foster	162, 164, 271	
Horton v. Banner		480	v. Jenkins		504
Horwell v. London General Omnibus Co.		481	International Financial Society v. City of Moscow Gas Co. (C. A.)		563
Hosley v. Brooks	298,	306	Ireland v. Champneys		355
Hotchkiss v. Oliphant		299	Irons v. Field		62, 63
v. Olmstead	55,	94	Irwin v. Brandwood		29, 66
Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse		298	Isaacs, <i>Ex parte</i>		467
Houlden v. Smith		188	Iseley v. Lovejoy		291
House v. House		114	Isham v. York		71
Hovey v. Rubber Pencil Co.		138			
How v. Prin	69, 71, 121,	236		J.	
Howard v. Gosset	423,	435	Jackson v. Adams		62, 273
v. Sexton		271	v. Hopperton	203, 268,	275
v. Stephenson		55	v. Mawby		435
Howe v. Buffalo & Erie Ry. Co.		374	Jacob v. Lawrence		227
Howe Machine Co. v. Souder	94,	368, 540	v. Mills		62
Howell v. Howell		169	Jacobs v. Fyler		123
Hoyt v. McKenzie		15	James v. Boston	217,	223
v. Smith		458	v. Brook	78,	339
Hubbard v. Rutledge	6, 198, 203,	298	v. James		15
Huckle v. Reynolds	56, 131,	351	v. Jolly		212
Huddleson v. Swope		84	Jarman v. Lucas		463
Hudson v. Tooth		431	Jarnigan v. Fleming	9, 94, 162,	164
Huff v. Bennett	151, 157, 271,	362	Jarvis v. Hathaway		287
Huffman v. Shumate		537	Jauch v. Jauch		306
Huggons v. Tweed		500	Jefferies v. Duncombe	8,	22
Hugonson's Case		13	Jekyll v. Sir John Moore		189
Hughes v. Porral		438	Jenkins v. Morris (C. A.)		561
Hugley v. Hugley		93	v. Smith		74
Hull v. Vreeland		54	Jenkinson v. Mayne		55
Hume v. Arrasmith		122	Jenner v. A'Beckett	26, 33, 51, 79,	113
v. Marshall	66, 212,	282	Jennings v. London General Omnibus Co.		566
Humphreys v. Miller	212,	539	v. Paine		190
v. Stanfield		139	Jesson v. Hayes		80, 137
v. Stillwell		236	Joannes v. Bennett	198, 207,	210
Humphries v. Parker		298	Johnasson v. Bonhote		477
Hunt v. Algar	27, 100, 159,	552	Johns v. Gittings		80
v. Bennett		94	v. James		506
v. City of London Real Property Co.		561	Johnson v. Aylmer		119
v. Goodlake	25, 94, 101, 117,	544	v. Brown	55, 183, 187,	191
v. Jones		316	v. Browning		178
Hunter v. Sharpe		51, 102	v. Dicken		54
Huntley v. Ward	199, 205, 227, 229,	264,	v. Evans		193, 220
		279	v. Hudson		158, 535
Hurd v. Moore		151	v. Lemmon		78
Hurst v. Bell		547	v. Palmer		569
Hurtert v. Weines		151	v. Robertson		76
Huson v. Dale	6, 162, 177,	305	v. St. Louis Despatch Co.	93,	
Hutchinson v. Glover	517,	518		121, 122, 162,	368
v. Hartmont		432	v. Shields		54, 55
Hutton v. Harrison		428	v. Simonton		31, 177
Hutts v. Hutts	123, 151, 178,	187	v. Smith		520
			v. Stebbins		22
			Johnston v. Tait		537
			Jolliffe, <i>Ex parte</i> , R. v. Lefroy	412,	446
			Jones, <i>Ex parte</i>	430,	436
			v. Baxter		561
			v. Bewicke		486

Jones v. Broadhurst	489
v. Chapman	56
v. Davers <i>vel</i> Dawkes	110, 130, 471
v. Davis	562
v. Diver	76
v. Edwards	537
v. Herne	55, 60, 86, 122
v. Hough	561
v. Hungerford	114
v. Littler	70, 79, 124, 541
v. McGovern	249
v. Mackie	300, 301, 487
v. Marr	123
v. Monte Video Gas Co.	508, 520
v. Orchard	579
v. Pritchard	466
v. Stevens	177, 305, 531
Jourdain v. Palmer	506
Justice v. Gosling	549
v. Kirlin	298

## K.

K—— v. H——	84
Kain v. Farrer	519, 521, 535
Kane v. Mulvany	35, 187, 253, 259
Karney v. Paisley	298
Kaucher v. Blinn	62
Kean v. McLaughlin	271
Keble v. Hickerlingill	149
Keene v. Ruff	151
Keenholts v. Becker	271, 331, 332, 537
Keesling v. McCall	94, 267
Keighley v. Bell	193, 195
Kelly v. Craig	480
v. Partington	89, 114, 275, 326
v. Sherlock	41, 292, 295, 307, 559
v. Tinning	28, 47
Kemp v. Neville	189
Kendall v. Stone	138
Kendillon v. Maltby	168, 190, 332
Kennedy v. Gifford	84, 93, 94, 121, 122, 169, 271
v. Hilliard	192
Kenney v. McLaughlin	162
Kent v. Bonzey	299
v. David	169, 177
v. Lewis	334
v. Stone	315
Kerr v. Shedden	322
Kerry (Earl of) v. Thorley	5, 22
Kerschbaugher v. Slusser	110, 537
Kershaw v. Bailey	224, 236, 239, 271, 285
Keyworth v. Hill	372
Keyzor v. Newcomb	31, 159
Kielley v. Carson	424, 425
Kiene v. Ruff	110
Kilmore v. Abdoolah	559
Kimball v. Fernandez	22, 40, 236, 305
Kimmis v. Stiles	61, 123
Kincade v. Bradshawe	178
Kine v. Sewell	204, 217, 226, 231, 233, 238

King v. Bagg	123
King v. Davenport	522
v. Hawkesworth	338, 570
v. Hoare	457
v. Lake	5, 74
v. Root	267, 412
v. Waring	168, 232
v. Watts	209, 218
v. Whitley <i>or</i> Whitby	536, 537
v. Wood	25, 53
Kinnahan v. McCullagh	106, 242
Kinney v. Nash	70, 100
Kinyon v. Palmer	100
Kirby v. Simpson	188, 487
Kleizer v. Symmes	237
Klinck v. Colby	185, 204, 274
Klumph v. Dunn	54, 84, 298
Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Ecclesine	367
Knight v. Gibbs	326, 327
v. Lynch	86, 88, 312, 319, 323, 324, 325, 326, 349
v. Purcell	340
v. Sharp	123
Knobell v. Fuller	306
Knowles v. State	404
Koenig v. Ritchie	52, 229
Kramer v. Waymark	355
Krebs v. Oliver	57, 210
Krehl v. Burrell (C. A.)	561
Kynaston v. Mackinder	336

## L.

Lafone v. Smith	300, 301
Lake v. King	152, 187, 222, 242, 245, 284
v. Pooley	517
Lamb v. Walker	317
Lamb's Case	156, 386
Lambert v. Pharis	205
Laming v. Gee (C. A.)	565
Lamos v. Snell	305
Lancaster v. French	67, 80
Landa v. Obert	151
Lane v. Applegate	489
Langdon v. Young	54
Langley, <i>Ex parte</i> ,	432
Langridge v. Campbell	341
Langton v. Hagerty	100, 177, 305, 541
Lanning v. Christy	191
Lanter v. McEwen	178
Large v. Large	569
Larkins v. Tarter	162
Latimer v. Western Morning News	368
Loughton v. Bishop of Sodor	230, 235
Laurenson v. The Dublin Metropolitan Junction Railway Co.	461
Lauretta, The	565
Law v. Harwood	141
Lawler v. Earle	208, 220
Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton & Oil Co.	152, 235, 242, 233, 284, 368, 532

Lawrence v. Smith		374	Long v. Peters		204
v. Woodward		56	Lovejoy v. Murray		458
Lawson v. Hicks	183, 190, 191,	531	Loveland v. Hosmer		169
Lay v. Lawson	241, 246,	283	Lovett v. Willer		143
Lea v. White	183,	191	Lowe v. Harewood		138
Leach's Case		574	v. Lowe		561
Leader v. State	298,	305	Lows, <i>Ex parte</i> ,		564
Lee v. Colyer		494	Lucan (Earl of) v. Smith		483
v. Huson		273	Lucas v. Case		237
v. Kane		93	v. Flinn		61
v. Riley		327	v. Nichols		84
Le Fanu v. Malcomson	32, 129, 130,	319, 324, 365,	Lukehart v. Byerly		100, 305
		367	Lumby v. Allday	66, 78, 84,	293
Lefroy v. Burnside	171, 514,	619	Lumley v. Gye		322, 326
Lehning v. Hewett		169	Luthan v. Berry		169
Leicester (Earl of) v. Walter	305,	306	Luther v. Skeen		305
Lentner v. Merfield		204	Lynam v. Gowing	191,	254
Leonard v. Allen	94, 305,	540	Lynch v. Knight	86, 88, 312, 310,	323,
v. Pope		271		324, 325, 326,	349
Lester v. Thurmond	183, 190,	191	Lyon v. Tweddell		506
Lethbridge v. Cronk		508			
Lettman v. Ritz		110		M.	
Letton v. Young		271			
Leversage v. Smith		56	M. Moxham, The		527
Levet's Case	78, 91,	350	Macaulay v. Shakell		527
Levi v. Milne	105, 130, 550, 552,	558	Macgill's Case		429
Levy v. Lawson		249	Macintosh v. Great Western Railway Co.		510
v. Moylan	443, 446		Mackay v. Ford		190
Lewes v. Walter	131,	165	Mackereth v. Glasgow & South-west- ern Railway Co.		461
(Earl of) v. Barnett		432	Macleod v. Wakley	52, 276,	534
Lewis v. Black		540	McAlece, <i>In re</i>		437
v. Chapman	269,	298	McAlmont v. McClelland		271
v. Clement	29, 99, 172, 256, 291,	486	McAnally v. Williams		123
v. Few	40, 183, 236,	531	McAndrew v. Barker		563
v. Hawley		78	McBee v. Fulton	1, 169, 178, 243,	298,
v. Hudson	84, 93,	100			490
v. Levy	44, 99, 176, 243, 245, 247,	248, 256	McBrayer v. Hill		84
v. Soule		123	McBride v. Ellis		22
v. Walter	45, 163, 164, 176,	253	McCabe v. Foot		57
Lewknor v. Cruchley		55	McCaleb v. Smith	93,	122
Leycroft v. Dunker		79	McCarty v. Barrett		122
Leyman v. Latimer	24, 58, 171, 177, 485,	497, 603	McCauley v. Thorp		525
Liberia (Republic of) v. Roye		431	McClaughray v. Wetmore		123
Lick v. Owen		6	McClintock v. Crick		306
Like v. McKinstry		138	McCombe v. Gray		435
Lincoln v. Chrisman		271	McCombs v. Tuttle		152
(Earl of) v. Fisher		440	McCorckle v. Binns		22
Lindsey v. Smith		71	MC'Corquodale v. Bell	509,	518
Linney v. Maton		84	McCue v. Ferguson	94,	274
Linville v. Earlywine	54,	580	McCurry v. McCurry	122,	305
Lister v. Perryman	214,	278	McDaniel v. Baca		138
v. Wright		54	McDermott, <i>In re</i>		438
Little v. Barlow		57	McDougall v. Claridge		235
v. Thompson	46, 429,	430	McDowell v. Bowles		53
Litton v. Litton		500	M'Elveney v. Connellan		535
Lloyd v. Jones		559	McFadzen v. Mayor & Corporation of Liverpool		505
v. Morley		515	McGlennery v. Keller		271
Logan v. Steele		114	McGough v. Rhodes		123
London v. Eastgate		77	McGregor v. Gregory	24, 169, 176,	244
Long v. Brougher	169, 305		v. Thwaites	165,	193
v. Bakle	6,	167	McIntire v. Young		291
v. Fleming		536			

McIntyre v. McBean	224	Matthews v. Beach	94, 243
McKee v. Ingalls	6, 57, 122, 169	Mawe v. Pigott	26
McLaughlin v. Bascom	93	May v. Brown	29, 297, 307, 537
v. Cowley	183, 188, 190, 191	Maybee v. Fisk	169
v. Russell	94, 151, 540	Mayhew v. Locke	442
M'Loughlin v. Dwyer	483, 515	Maynard v. Beardsley	303
McMillan v. Birch	66	v. Fireman's Ins. Co.	93, 94, 368
McNair v. People	404	Mayne v. Fletcher	6, 154, 159, 387, 531
McNally v. Oldham	249	Mayo v. Sample	220
McNamara v. Shannon	122	Mayrant v. Richardson	40, 65, 71
McNutt v. Young	305	Mead, <i>In re</i>	481
M'Pherson v. Daniels	162, 163, 164, 165, 174, 175, 471	v. Daubigny	272, 276
McStephens v. Carnegie	462	Meagher v. Moore	88, 311
Magrath v. Finn	242	Mears v. Griffin	559
Maguire v. Knox	102, 483	Medhurst v. Balam	312
Maitland v. Bramwell	214, 238	Meggs v. Griffith	127, 165
v. Goldney	163, 367, 537	Mercer v. Sparks	472
Malachy v. Soper	138, 139, 141	v. Whall	530
Malone v. Stewart	53	Mercers Co., <i>Ex parte</i>	335
Maloney v. Bartley	156, 193, 359, 384	Mercier v. Cotton	501, 510
Manby v. Witt	203, 226, 285	Merest v. Harvey	83
Manchester, &c. Railway Co. v. Brooks	370	Merk v. Gelzhaeuser	178
Mann v. Hauts	151	Merrill v. Peaslie	536
Manning v. Avery	140	Merritt v. Dearth	84
v. Clement	547, 549	Merryweather v. Nixan	359, 372
Mansel, <i>In re</i> , Rhodes v. Jenkins	563	Metropolitan Inner Circle Railway Co. v. Metropolitan Railway Co.	523
Mansergh, <i>Re</i>	195	Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawk- ins	2, 32, 178, 368, 369, 516
Mansfield v. Childerhouse	508	Meyer v. Bohlring	271, 392
Mapes v. Weeks	169, 305	v. Schleichter	84
Mapleson v. Masini	495	Michel v. Wilson	474
March v. Davison	76	Mickelthwaite v. Fletcher	436
Markham v. Russell	271	Milam v. Burnside	187
Marlborough (Duke of), <i>Ex parte</i>	381, 440	Miles v. Harrington	306
Marriott v. Marriott	498	v. Oldfield	53
Marsden v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co.	337	v. Vanhorn	55, 298
Marsh v. Ellsworth	183, 190	Millisich v. Lloyds	251, 252, 254, 527
v. Isaacs	557	Miller p. Buckdon	122
Marshall v. Addison	61	v. Butler	94, 540
v. Martin	335	v. David	90, 117, 323, 474
Martano v. Mann	346	v. Graham	480
Martin v. Bannister	446	v. Hope	189
v. Butchard	518	v. Johnson	93, 151, 306
v. Hooker	298	v. Kerr	162, 271
v. Loëi	106, 109, 549	v. Maxwell	93, 121
v. McKonochie	431	v. Miller	121, 537
v. Martin	305	v. Parish	84
v. Stilwell	56	Milligan v. Thorn	540
v. Strong	238, 239, 310	Millison v. Sutton	84
v. Van Schaith	355	Mills v. Spencer	165, 302, 305
v. Wright	14	v. Taylor	55
Martin's Case	429, 434	Milman v. Pratt	141
Martyn v. Burlings	75	Minnehaha	512
v. Williams	537	Minors v. Leeford	109, 119, 122
Marzetti v. Williams	8	Mirchell v. Brown	96
Masham v. Bridges	71	Mix v. Woodward	94, 271, 540
Mason v. Brentini	342	Moberly v. Preston	169
v. Jennings	9	Moises v. Thornton	69, 531
v. Thompson	122	Morongahela Nav. Co. v. Coons	93
Massey v. Allen	356, 467	Montgomery v. Deeley	54
Mathews v. Huntley	178	Moody v. Steward	567, 569
Matthew v. Crass	310	Moon v. Towers	361
		Moore v. Rose	435
		Moor (Sir George) v. Foster	70

Moor v. Roberts	505, 508	Noel v. Noel	467
Moore, <i>In re</i>	426	Nolan v. Traber	6, 100, 151, 292, 350
v. Bond	536	Noonan v. Orton	267, 458, 490
v. Meagher	88, 311	Norman v. Johnson	338
v. Stevenson	271	v. Orton	114
v. Terrell	30, 485	Norris v. Elliot	271
Mordaunt v. Mordaunt	264, 353	v. Smith	453
More v. Bennett	24, 94, 106, 375	North v. Bilton	336
Morgan v. Booth	6, 183, 190, 191	Northampton's (Earl of) Case	127, 162
v. Lingen	28	Nutt's Case	161, 363, 413
v. Livingston	94, 540		
Morris v. Barker	298		
v. Freeman	347, 553	O.	
v. Langdale	79, 81, 111, 326	Oake v. Moorecroft	463
v. Scott	9	Oakley v. Farrington	80
Morrison v. Belcher	50	Oastler v. Henderson	560
v. Harmer	34, 51, 170, 486	O'Brien v. Bryant	172
Mortimer v. McCallan	8, 536	v. Clement	21, 23, 24, 265, 301, 493
Mot v. Butler	122	O'Conner v. O'Conner	177, 305
Mott v. Comstock	78	Oddy v. Lord George Paulet	79, 227, 240
v. Dawson	40, 178, 208		286
Mountney v. Watton	99, 170, 172	Odger v. Mortimer	52, 557
Mower v. Watson	123	Odiorne v. Bacon	61
Muchler v. Mulhollin	123	O'Donoghue v. Hussey	52, 168, 229, 230, 281
Mulkern v. Ward	18, 15, 43	v. McGovern	182, 237
Mull v. McKnight	123, 177	Offutt v. Earlywine	54, 580
Mullett v. Hulton	302	Ogden v. Turner	54, 57, 59, 85
Mulligan v. Cole	26, 117, 228, 544	O'Hanlon v. Myers	54
Mulock, <i>Re</i>	430	O'Keefe v. Cardinal Cullen	487
Munroe v. Pilkington	439	Oldham v. Peake	55, 96, 121, 125, 323
Murdoch v. Warner	454	Oliver v. Bentinck	189, 196, 197, 257
Murphy v. Halpin	52, 229	Olmsted v. Miller	312, 536
Murray v. McAllister	54	Onslow v. Horne	54, 70, 71, 139, 236, 293, 311
Murrey's Case	124	Onslow's Case	447
Musgrave v. Bovey	73	Oraam v. Franklin	64
Myers v. Defries	248, 269, 339	Orme v. Lodge	169
v. Dresden	94	Ormsby v. Douglass	198, 212
		Orpwood v. Barks or Parkes	79, 115, 597
N.		Orr v. Skofield	22, 31
Naden v. Micocke	558	Osborn v. London Dock Co.	504
Napier v. Daniel	553	Ostrom v. Calkins	80
Nash v. Benedict	55	Owens v. Woosman	566
National Funds Ins. Co., <i>In re</i>	563	Oxford v. Cross	59, 85, 86
Neale v. Clark	342		
Nelson v. Borchenius	93, 94	P.	
v. Musgrave	22	Padmore v. Lawrence	220, 221, 274, 284, 285
Neve v. Cross	55	Paine v. Mondford	56
Newbit v. Statuck	56	Pallet v. Sargent	169
New British Co. v. Peed	517	Palmer v. Anderson	122
Newley v. Van Offen	461	v. Boyer	74
Newman v. Bailey	177, 485	v. Cohen	355
v. Zachary	140	v. Concord	40, 185
Newton, <i>Ex parte</i>	537	v. Haight	169
v. Boodle	347, 553	v. Harris	110
v. Chaplin	536	v. Hoskins	298
v. Stubbs	470	v. Roberts	566
Nicholl v. Jones	518	v. Smith	169
Nichols v. Guy	62	Pannell v. Nunn (C. A.)	560
v. Hayes	537		
Nicholson v. Jackson	494		
v. Lyne	72		
Niven v. Munn	123		
Nixon v. Harvey	483		

Paris v. Levy	34, 51, 188, 271	Philips v. Badby	73
Parke v. Piedmont Ins. Co.	55, 100	Phillimore v. Machon	402, 403
Parker v. McQueen	162, 177, 208	Phillips v. Barber	122
v. Meader	55	v. Barnett	162
Parkes v. Prescott	156, 361, 362	v. Barron	507
Parkhurst v. Ketchum	169, 305	v. Hoefler	78
Parkins v. Scott	167, 323, 329, 330, 332	v. Hoyle	313, 318
Parmer v. Anderson	271	v. Jansen	65, 75, 580
Parmiter v. Coupland	27, 28, 40, 43, 95, 550	v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co.	292
Parret v. Carpenter	73	v. Routh	511
Parsons v. Surgey	243, 285	Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Hartmont	432
v. Tinling	335, 469	Pickering v. Stevenson	591
Pashler v. Vincent	432	Picton v. Jackman	206, 211, 279
Pasley v. Kemp	121, 537	Pierce v. Ellis	236, 241, 260
Pasquin's Case	307	Pierpoint v. Cartwright	509
Pater, <i>In re</i>	429	Pierpoint's Case	59
v. Baker	138, 144, 271	Pike v. Van Wormer	63
Paterson's Case	399	Pine's (Hugh) Case	410
Patterson v. Edwards	84	Pinero v. Goodlake	254
v. Wilkinson	84, 123	Pink v. Catanich	298
Pattison v. Jones	202, 209, 287	Pippet v. Hearne	9
Paul v. Halferty	188	Pisani v. Lawson	356, 467
Payne, <i>Ex parte</i> , <i>In re</i> Cross	564	Pitt v. Donovan	142
v. Beuwmorris	72, 310	Pitten v. Chatterburg	508
v. Courthope	487	Pittock v. O'Niell	6, 94
Payson v. Macomber	480, 537	Pitts v. Pace	94
Peacham's Case	411	Platto v. Geilfuss	22, 31
Peake v. Oldham	55, 93, 96, 121, 125, 323	Plum v. Normanton Iron Co.	528
v. Pollard	94	Plunket v. Gilmore	8
Pearce v. Ornsby	99, 296, 539	Plunkett v. Cobbett	274
v. Rogers	471	Pocock v. Nash	73
v. Watts	477	Poe v. Grever	54
Peard v. Jones	39, 68, 74	v. Mondford	76
Pearson v. Lemaitre	99, 272, 274, 276, 296, 303, 551	Poe's Case	122, 124
Pease v. Shippen	305	Polini v. Gray	467
Pegram v. Stolz	123, 537; 580	Pollard, <i>In re</i>	438
Pemberton v. Colls	72, 73, 295	v. Green	452
Penfold v. Westcote	109	v. Lyon	84, 317
Pennington v. Meeks	271, 458, 586, 537	Polston v. Lee	178, 298
Pennyman v. Rabanks	143	Pool v. Devers	274, 298
Penters v. England	371	v. Sacheverel	430
People v. Crosswell	22	Poole v. Whitcomb	552
v. Girardin	404	Popham v. Pickburn	165, 176, 261, 283
v. Ruggles	394	Poplett v. Stockdale	374
v. Wilson	426	Porter v. Botkins	177
Peppiatt v. Smith	506, 507	v. Choen	55, 57, 122
Perdue v. Burnett	54	v. Henderson	306
Perkins v. Mitchell	207	Potter v. Chambers	341
v. Scott	56	v. Cotton	560
Perren v. Monmouthshire Ry. Co.	491	v. Home & Colonial Assur- ance Co.	492
Perry v. Man	57, 94	v. Thompson	537, 580
v. Porter	120, 122, 151, 389	Powell v. Jones	39, 68, 75
Perry's Case	429	Power v. Shaw	85
Perryman v. Lister	214, 278	v. Price	123
Persilly v. Bacon	56	Powers v. Cary	6, 169, 177, 305, 498
Peterborough (Lord) v. Williams	130	v. Presgroves	305, 306
Peters v. Ulmer	480	Pratt, <i>In re</i>	580
Peterson v. Morgan	305	v. Andrews	298
v. Sentman	56, 100, 112	v. Gardner	190
Petrie v. Rose	177	Preston v. Pinder	55, 123
Pettibone v. Simpson	316	Price v. Harris	557
Pharmaceutical Society v. London & Provincial Supply Assoc.	367, 369	v. Hutchison	431
		v. Jenkins	471
		v. Whitely	22



### TABLE OF CASES.

xxvii

Prichard v. Lloyd	122	Reeve v. Holgate	124
Prickett v. Gratrex	445	Rehauser v. Schwarger	537
Pridham v. Tucker	114	Reid v. McLendon	138
Prime v. Eastwood	271, 313, 328	Reignald's Case	77, 124
Prinne v. Howe	71	Remington v. Congdon	237
Prior v. Wilson	80, 225	Rendall v. Hayward	559
Proby v. Marquess of Dorchester	136	Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger	502
Proctor v. Houghtaling	84, 169, 177, 274, 305	Republic of Liberia v. Roze	481
v. Owens	84	Respublica v. Davis	531
Prosser v. Rowe	178	v. Dennie	412
Proud v. Hawes	75	Restell v. Steward	479, 481, 485
Prowse v. Loxdale	545	Revis v. Smith	191, 193
Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott	13, 15, 436, 454	R. v. Abingdon (Lord)	154, 186, 236, 259, 268, 385, 387
Prudhomme v. Fraser	339	v. Aickles	536
Pudsey Coal Gas Co. v. Corporation of Bradford	31	v. Alme	377
Pugh v. McCarty	94, 123, 306	v. Almon	161, 363, 364, 414, 429, 437
v. Neal	123	v. Amphlit	152, 159, 531
Purcell v. Sowler	40, 41, 46, 165, 260, 283	v. Annet	399
Purdey v. Stacey	70	v. Archer	589
Purnell v. G. W. Ry. Co. and Harris	557	v. Aspinall	586
Pybus v. Scudamore	529	v. Atwood	399
Pye v. Wallis	63	v. Auger	593
		v. Baker	440
		v. Baldwin	591, 592
		v. Barker	581
		v. Barnard	387, 540, 593
		v. Bate	534, 592
		v. Baxter	104
		v. Bedford	417, 420
		v. Beere	152, 386, 417, 418, 533, 580
		v. Benfield	587
		v. Bickerton	592
		v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry. Co.	577
		v. Bliss	417
		v. Bolton	443
		v. Boxall	578
		v. Bradlaugh	6, 574, 587
		v. Brewster	420, 421
		v. Brooke	595
		v. Brown (Dr.)	23, 116, 411, 421
		v. Budd	582
		v. Bunts	589
		v. Burdett	154, 386, 388, 398, 417, 419, 574, 575, 581, 589
		v. Burford	441
		v. Burks	575
		v. Burn	441, 593
		v. Canning	581
		v. Canterbury, Archbishop of	403
		v. Carden, Sir Robert	43, 390, 578
		v. Carlile, Mary	250, 351, 384, 399
		v. Carlile, Richard	384, 399, 401, 532
		v. Casey	578
		v. Castro	430, 433
		v. Caudwell	588
		v. Chipping Sodbury	579
		v. Christian	580
		v. Clement	249, 258, 429, 431, 434
		v. Clendon	398
		v. Clerk	130, 359, 387, 413
		v. Cobbett	10, 417, 418
		v. Cockshaw	594
		v. Coghlan	379

R v. Cohen	585	R. v. Hughes	350
v. Collins	415, 416, 417, 418, 419	v. Hunt	417, 579
v. Cooper	25, 155, 333, 361, 363, 386, 581	v. Ilive	399
v. Creevey	186, 236, 250, 259, 268	v. Ingram	351
v. Cripps	573	v. James	434
v. Critchley	376	v. Jaffe	428
v. Cruise	351	v. Jenour	377
v. Cuthell	10, 386	v. Jewell	578
v. Darby	376, 441	v. Johnson	417, 578, 581
v. Davison	429	v. Jolliffe	381
v. Dean of St. Asaph	10, 377, 585, 586	v. Jones	431, 576
v. De Berenger	378	v. Joule	579
v. D'Eon	383	v. Kearsley	414
v. Dewhurst	579	v. Kinnersley	381
v. Dodd	161, 363	v. Knell	359, 387, 413, 617
v. Dover	159	v. Knight	242
v. Drury	587	v. Labouchere	392, 583
v. Duffy	390, 583	v. Lambert	27, 99, 414, 582
v. Dugdale	405	v. Lambri's Case	392, 583
v. Eaton	398	v. Langley	441, 445
v. Edgar	98	v. Larkin	586, 587
v. Enes	226	v. Larrieu	380
v. Evans	424, 435	v. Latimer	590, 595
v. Eve	593, 594	v. Lawrence	417
v. Eyre	584	v. Lawson	381
v. Farr	72, 440	v. Leafe	441
v. Faulkner	429, 437	v. Ledger	50, 399
v. Fisher	255	v. Lee	244, 444
v. Fleet	255	v. Lefroy	441, 442, 446
v. Foulkes	578	v. Liverpool (Mayor of)	591
v. Fowler	588	v. Llanfaethly	586
v. Franceys	531, 591	v. Lofield	253, 255
v. Francis	272	v. Lovett	154, 155, 333, 386, 415, 417, 533
v. Franklin	414, 417	v. Lowe	356
v. Garret	116	v. Mann	585
v. Gathercole	126, 376, 377	v. Marsden	575
v. Girdwood	581, 583	v. Marshall	382, 593
v. Goldsmith	586	v. Martin	582
v. Goldstein	470, 574	v. Matthews	104
v. Gordon	530	v. Mayo	440
v. Gordon, Lord Geo.	383, 427	v. Mein	592
v. Granfield	441	v. Moore	326
v. Grant	584	v. Morton	579
v. Gray	381	v. Moxon	399
v. Gregory	381	v. Newhouse	590
v. Griffin	377	v. Newman	171, 174, 549, 584, 588, 649
v. Gutch	161, 364, 386	v. Nottingham Journal	380
v. Hall	399, 535	v. Nun	441
v. Halpin	589	v. Nutt (Eliz.)	161, 363, 413
v. Harrison	420, 421	v. Nutt (Richard)	421
v. Hart	232, 428	v. Oastler	579
v. Harvey	385, 414, 584	v. Odgers	577
v. Haswell	534, 592	v. Onslow	430, 448
v. Head	24	v. Orme	377
v. Hetherington	399, 588	v. Osborn	377, 381
v. Hickin	6, 250, 399, 404, 407	v. Owen	417, 423
v. Higgins	378	v. Paine, Samuel	6, 154, 387
v. Hobbhouse	424	v. Paine, Thomas	421
v. Hoggan	577	v. Palmer	579
v. Holbrook	159, 363, 364, 365, 385, 583	v. Paty	424, 435
v. Holland	577	v. Peacham	411
v. Holt	384, 582, 584, 587	v. Peltier	357, 383
v. Horne	104, 417, 575, 595, 651		

R. v. Penny	441	R. v. Williams (Sir Wm.)	187
v. Philipps	377	v. Wilson	123, 580, 589
v. Pigott	421, 584	v. Winterbotham	421
v. Plumer	581	v. Withers	585, 589
v. Pocock	441	v. Woodfall	414, 585
v. Pollard	350	v. Woolmer	592
v. Pooley	398	v. Woolston	397, 398, 399
v. Rainer	422	v. World, The	594
v. Rea	443, 447	v. Wrennum	428
v. Redman	379	v. Wright	187, 243, 259, 382
v. Reeves	27, 416, 420, 423	v. Wrightson	440
v. Revel	440, 441	v. Yates	379, 575
v. Rogers	428, 441, 445	Reynolds v. Harris	341
v. Rosenberg	23, 24	v. Ross	57
v. Salisbury	192	Rhinehardt v. Potts	56
v. Saunders	23	Rhodes v. Bryant	465
v. Seton	580	v. Liverpool Investment Co.	569
v. Seymore	179	Rice v. Coolidge	183, 188, 190, 191
v. Shebbeare	377, 413	v. Pidgeon	80
v. Shipley (Dean of St. Asaph)	10,	v. Withers	531
	377, 585, 586	Richards v. Morgan	518
v. Sidney	386, 411	v. Richards	165, 231, 233, 306
v. Skinner	189, 191, 192	Richardson v. Allen	123
v. Skipworth	428, 430, 433	v. Hopkins	151
v. Slaney	534, 580, 581	v. Roberts	84, 169
v. Smithson	594	v. Willis	590
v. Southerton	379	Richmond (Duke of) v. Costelow	136
v. Spencer	579	Ricket v. Stanley	84
v. Spragg	588	Riddell v. Thayer	84, 100, 112
v. Stanger	532, 591, 592	Riding v. Smith	78, 84, 86, 91, 314, 315,
v. Stapleton	350		329, 330, 349, 359
v. Steel	595	Ridley v. Perry	169
v. Steward	534	Riggs v. Denniston	74
v. Stockdale	423	Riley v. Byrne	550
v. Sullivan	27, 45, 415, 421, 427, 585	v. Lewis	85
v. Sutton	582	Risk Allah Bey v. Johnstone	300, 547, 560
v. Taylor	397, 399, 577	v. Whitehurst	45, 252,
v. Templar	579		297
v. Thomas	578	Roach v. Garvan	123, 130, 429, 454
v. Topham	376, 384, 385, 576, 586	Robbins v. Fletcher	271, 537
v. Townsend	390	v. Treadway	412, 426
v. Truelove	406	Roberts v. Brown	177, 255, 528
v. Truscott	392, 534	v. Camden	56, 57, 97, 125
v. Tucker	582	v. Evans	346
v. Tutchin	104, 377, 416, 417, 575	v. Herbert	59, 85
v. Unwin	580	v. Lovell	151
v. Veley	229	v. Roberts	86, 312, 325
v. Vint	383	Robertson v. Lea	123
v. Waddington	378, 587, 398, 401	v. M'Dougall	237, 281
v. Walter	159, 364, 386	v. Wylde	270, 297
v. Ward	379	Robinett v. Ruby	220
v. Watson	97, 381, 428, 535, 581	Robinson v. Drummond	93
v. Watson, James	535	v. Jermyn	25
v. Webster	592	v. Jones	151, 240, 283, 284, 532
v. Wegener	383, 575, 580	v. Marchant	8, 78, 324, 365, 367
v. Weltje	440		399
v. Whalley	430, 448	Robinson's Case	
v. White	45, 381, 427	Robshaw v. Smith	204, 205, 207, 615
v. Whitehouse	588	Rockwell v. Brown	271
v. Wiatt	161, 386	Rodebaugh v. Hollingsworth	100
v. Willett	591	Rodgers v. Kline	6, 75, 76, 93, 94, 271, 305
v. Wilkes	399, 404, 414, 574, 577,	v. Rodgers	55, 84, 122
	595	Rodriguez v. Tadmire	305
v. Williams	6, 381, 397, 399, 401, 411,	Rogers v. Clifton (Sir Gervas)	203, 232,
	414, 589, 592		268, 275
		v. Gravatt	59

Rogers v. Henry	291, 292, 213	Sayre v. Jewett	540
Rolin v. Steward	8	Scarll v. Dixon	211, 223, 224, 239, 271, 287
Rollins v. Hinks	13, 144	Schmisser v. Kreilich	6, 84, 271, 292, 537
Root v. King	40, 236, 291, 305	Schoonover v. Rowe	271
v. Lowndes	271	Schrimer v. Heilman	271
Ross v. Lawrence	470	Schurick v. Kollman	84, 100
v. Rouse	123	Scot v. Hilliar,	55, 123
Rotherham v. Priest	495	Scott v. McKinnish	305
Roupell v. Parsons	553	v. Mackintosh	536
Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co.	564	v. Mortsinger	271
Routh v. Webster	15	v. Peebles	162
Rowcliffe v. Edmonds	56	v. Royal Wax Candle Co.	461
Rowe v. Roach	472	v. Shepherd	329
Ruan v. Perry	298	v. Stansfield	189, 497
Ruckley v. Kiernan	281	Scripps v. Foster	6, 40, 292
Rue v. Mitchell	123	v. Reilly	6, 45, 157, 271, 292, 302, 313
Ruel v. Tatnell	81, 102, 113, 540	Seaman v. Bigg	77
Runkle v. Meyers	164	v. Netherclift	188, 189, 191, 192, 484, 534
Runtz v. Sheffield	499	Seaton v. Cordray	57
Ruohs v. Backer	84, 183, 187	Secor v. Harris	75, 76
Rush v. Cavanaugh	74, 75, 80	Seeley v. Fisher	13
Russell v. Anthony	69, 169	Seely v. Blair	40
v. Corne	348	Self v. Gardner	169
v. Kelly	94, 540	Senior v. Medland	229, 236, 279, 282
(Sir William) v. Ligon	56	Senter v. Carr	305
v. Webster	33, 105, 370	Servatius v. Pichel	242
v. Wilson	57	Seven Bishops' Case	534, 581
Rustell v. Macquister	273	Severance v. Hilton	271
Rutherford v. Evans	23, 69, 329, 330, 471, 531	Sewall v. Catlin	78
v. Wilkie	342	Sewers, Commissioners of, v. Glasse	506
Rutter v. Chapman	551	Seymour v. Butterworth	43, 44
Ryalls v. Leader	248	v. Coulson	569
<b>S.</b>		Shackell v. Rosier	359, 374
St. Nazaire Co., <i>In re</i>	337	Shafer v. Ahalt	84, 313
Salmon v. Isaac	194, 251, 289	Shank v. Case	274
Saltash, Corporation of v. Goodman	563	Sharpe v. Stevenson	169
Salter v. Brown	58, 85	v. Wilhite	123
Sampson v. Mackay	334	Shattuck v. Allen	94
Sanderson v. Caldwell	64, 71, 93, 100	Shaul v. Brown	5
Sandford v. Bennett	355	Shaw v. Hope	562
Sanford v. Gaddis	123, 536, 537	v. Shaw	430
Sands v. Child	359	v. Thompson	56
Saner v. Bilton	342	Sheahan v. Ahearne	90, 474
Sans v. Joeris	162	Sheckell v. Jackson	271
Saul v. Browne	510	Sheehan v. Collins	305
Saunders v. Bate	470, 537	Sheekey v. Cokley	84, 208
v. Baxter	187, 271	Sheffill v. Van Deusen	306
v. Edwards	106, 456	Shelfer v. Gooding	183
v. Jones	506, 512	Shelton v. Nance	22, 237
v. Johnson	291	Shepherd v. Whitaker	7, 31, 153, 362
v. Mills	159, 176, 253, 303	Sheriff of Surrey, <i>In re</i>	431, 433
Savage v. Robery	61, 80	Sheward v. Earl of Lonsdale	508, 533
Savile v. Jardine	61, 80, 82, 295	Shields v. Cunningham	84
Saville v. Sweeny	349	Shinloub v. Ammerman	123
Sawyer v. Erfert	305	Shipley v. Todhunter	154, 235, 281
Saxby v. Easterbrook	13, 16, 454	Shipp v. McCraw	54
Saye & Seale (Viscount) v. Stephens	135, 455	Shirley v. Keathy	274
Sayer v. Begg	232	Shroyer v. Miller	93, 123, 177, 298
Sayles v. Wooden	480	Shurtleff v. Stevens	182, 198, 219, 241
		Sibley v. Tomlins	67, 81, 108
		Sibthorpe's Case	72
		Siddons v. Lawrence	336

Sidnam v. Mayo	125	Snell v. Webling	124
Sidney's (Algernon) Case	386, 411	Snow v. Judson	138
Silver Lead Ore Co., <i>In re</i>	565	v. Witcher	169
Simmonds v. Dunne	200, 242, 279, 484	Snowdon v. Smith	305
Simmons v. Holster	151	Snyder v. Andrews	94, 152
v. Sweete	441	v. Fulton	6, 22, 271, 292
Simpson v. Downs	241	Soane v. Knight	49
v. Fogo	439	Solomon v. Lawson	31, 119, 127, 132, 470, 471
v. Robinson	178, 275, 297, 542	Solomons v. Medex	324, 367
v. Wiley	531	Somers v. Holt	356
Sims v. Prosser	464	v. House	55, 96
Singer Manuf. Co. v. Domestic Sew-		Somerville v. Hawkins	202, 226, 270, 544
ing Machine Co.	13	Sonneborn v. Bernstein	271
Sivier v. Harris	507	Southam v. Allen	79, 205, 206
Skinner v. Grant	169	Southee v. Denny	76
v. Kitch	149	Southey v. Sherwood	14, 674
v. Powers	169	Southwark & Vauxhall Water Co. v.	
v. Shoppee	339	Quick	518
Skipworth's Case	428, 430, 433	Southwick v. Stevens	23, 98, 531
Skull v. Raymond	94	Spackman v. Gibney	484, 535, 607
Slade v. Tucker	518	Spaids v. Barrett	183
Slater v. Franks	111	Spall v. Massey	8
Sloan v. Gilbert	123, 178	Sparling v. Haddon	531
Slocomb v. Kuykendall	536	Sparrow v. Maynard	54
Slocomb's Case, <i>Cro.</i>	119	Speaker of the Legislative Assem-	
Sloman v. Governor of New Zealand	460	bly of Victoria v. Glass	425
Slowman v. Dutton	106	Speaker v. McKenzie	55
Smagley v. Stark	540	Speck v. Phillips	304
Small v. Clewley	123	Spencer v. Amerton	237
Smart v. Blanchard	94, 169, 271, 540	v. McMasters	271, 491
Smawley v. Stark	22, 94	Spiering v. Andrae	64, 65, 71
Smith, <i>Ex parte, In re</i> Bishop	432	Spill v. Maule	235, 271, 280, 282
v. Andrews	75	Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink Co.	527
v. Ashley	157, 159, 387, 617	Spooner v. Keeler	123, 305, 480
v. Berg	515	Sprightly v. Dunch	464
v. Buckecker	169	Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley	13, 14, 15, 149, 358
v. Coe	100	Spruill v. Cooper	178
v. Dobbin	462	Spurr v. Hall	492
v. Flynt	58	Squire v. Johns	126
v. Gaffard	55	Stace v. Griffith	212, 536
v. Harrison	297, 497	Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.	94, 162, 169, 292
v. Higgins	220	Stafford v. Green	123, 486
v. Hodgeskins	221, 267	Stainbank v. Beckett	481
v. Howard	191	Stainton v. Jones	59, 85
v. Kerr	220	Stallings v. Newman	121, 208
v. Knowelden	471, 537	Stamp v. White	62, 96
v. Lakeman	430	Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange	562
v. Mathews	80, 168, 231, 233, 276	Stanhope v. Blith	60, 61, 82, 123
v. Minor	84	Stanley v. Boswell	71
v. Parker	171	v. Webb	99, 243
v. Richardson	499, 549	Stannus v. Finlay	483, 550
v. Scott	248, 304	Stanton v. Smith	70, 78
v. Smith	[ 54, 84, 177	Staples v. Young	342
v. Spooner	141	Stapleton v. Frier	56, 121
v. State	6, 55	Stark v. Chetwood	138
v. Stewart	57, 98	State v. Allen	389
v. Taylor	530	v. Atchison	367
v. Thomas	291, 484	v. Avery	373, 383
v. Ward	109	v. Boogher	367
v. Wood	168, 232	v. Brown	404
v. Youmans	237	v. Brownlow	574
Snag v. Gee	62	v. Burnham	169, 373, 389
v. Gray	74		
Sneesby v. Lanc. & York. Ry. Co.	327		
Snell v. Snow	84, 94, 112, 540		

State v. Butman	162	Street v. Licensed Victuallers' Society	99, 252
v. Chandler	394	Strode v. Holmes	71
v. Farley	22	Stuart v. Lovell	49, 99, 273, 296
v. Gould	94	Stubbs v. Marsh	355
v. Henderson	373, 574	Stuckley v. Bullhead	70
v. Jeandell	531	Studdard v. Trucks	1
v. Lonsdale	204	Sturla v. Freccia	467
v. Riggs	271	Sturton (Lord) v. Chaffin	125
v. White	373	Suegos' Case	76
Stearns v. Cox	271	Sugg v. Silber	523
Stebbing v. Warner	61, 122	Sumner v. Chipman	480, 485
Steele v. Brannan	6, 250, 399, 407, 408	Summers v. City Bank	32, 81, 319
v. Phillips	169	Sumner v. Utley	75
v. Southwick	22	Sunderlin v. Bradstreet	204, 212
Steas v. Kemble	57, 536	Sunman v. Brewin	177, 305
Stein v. Tabor	509	Surman v. Shelleto	80
Steinman v. McWilliams	178	Surrey, <i>Re the Sheriff of</i>	431, 433
Stennel v. Hogg	586	Sutton v. Johnstone	195
Stern v. Katz	94, 122	v. Plumridge	212
v. Sevastopulo	503	Swails v. Butcher	178, 274
Sternau v. Marx	94	Swan v. Tappan	138
Sterry v. Foreman	310, 322	Swann v. Rary	169
Steuart v. Gladstone	527	v. Vines	535
Stevens v. Handley	302	Swansea (Mayor of) v. Quirke	502
v. Hartwell	162, 328	Sweeney v. Baker	40, 177, 236, 271
v. Sampson	186, 194, 209, 257, 269, 276	Sweetapple v. Jesse	114
Steward v. Young	142, 145, 226	Swift v. Dickerman	177, 271, 313
Stewart v. Howe	57, 122	Swindle v. State	383
v. Wilson	93, 100	Swinney v. Nave	177
Stieber v. Wensie	84	Swithin v. Vincent	351, 371
Stiles v. Comstock	169	Sydenham v. Man	537
v. Nokes	24, 46, 176, 255	Sykes v. Sykes	566
Stilwell v. Barter	56	Symmons v. Blake	99, 273, 296
Stirling v. Du Barry	499	Symonds v. Carter	84, 271
Stitzell v. Reynolds	84, 100, 122, 271		
Stober v. Green	80		
Stockdale v. Hansard	187, 423, 424, 425, 435		
v. Onwhyn	374		
v. Tarte	170, 253		
Stocken v. Collin	581		
Stockley v. Clement	127, 226		
Stockton Iron Furnace Co., <i>In re</i>	563		
Stokes v. Arey	57		
v. Grant	477, 496		
Stone v. Clark	122		
v. Cooper	71, 112		
v. Smalcombe	122		
v. Varney	177, 305		
v. Yeovil (Mayor of)	317		
Stoner v. Audeley	124		
Stooke v. Taylor	342		
Storey v. Challands	206, 208, 209, 311		
v. Early	6, 177, 305		
v. People	426		
v. Wallace	157, 191, 243, 271, 291, 299		
Stout v. Wood	54		
Stow v. Converse	22		
Stowell v. Beagle	271, 305, 485		
Strader v. Snyder	100, 155, 305		
Strauss v. Francis	43, 545, 550		
v. Meyer	183		
Street v. Bushnell	536		

## T.

Taaffe v. Downes	189
Tabart v. Tipper	37, 536
Taber v. Hutson	292
Tait v. Culbertson	372
Talbot v. Case	62
Talbutt v. Clark	159, 303
Talmadge v. Baker	169, 305
Tappan v. Wilson	100
Tardrew v. Brook	550
Tarleton v. McGawley	31, 149, 322
Tarpley v. Blabey	155, 276, 307, 361, 533
Tasburgh v. Day	138
Tate v. Humphrey	277
Taylor v. Batten	621
v. Carr	71
v. Cass	337
v. Church	204, 212
v. Hall	63
v. Hawkins	203, 232, 269, 281, 285
v. How	71
v. Jones	499
v. Kneeland	271, 537
v. Moran	271, 536
v. Neri	322
v. Perkins	63, 126

Taylor v. Perr	63, 66	Treat v. Browning	162, 164, 536
v. Short	55	Trenton Insurance Co. v. Perrine	368
v. Starkey	75	Tripp v. Thomas	293, 464, 543
v. State	574	Trotman v. Dunn	191
Taylor's Case	563	Trowell v. Shenton	562
Teacy v. McKenna	23, 94	Trumbull v. Gibbons	152, 153
Teague v. Williams	536	Tryon v. Evening News Asso.	22
Tempest v. Chambers	57, 125	Tuam (Archbishop of) v. Robeson	28
Tenney v. Clement	121	Tucker v. Call	178, 536
Terry v. Hooper	80	Tucker's Case	582
Terwilliger v. Wands	20, 84, 313, 321, 328, 332	Tull v. David	169
Tetley v. Easton	509	Tuncliffe v. Moss	329, 336
Theodor Körner, The	519	Tupling v. Ward	504
Theyer v. Eastwick	59, 85	Turnbull v. Bird	44
Thieman v. Mathews	55	Turner, <i>Ex parte</i>	430
Thomas v. Churton	189	v. Heyland	337, 338, 570
v. Crosswell	22, 254, 271, 412	v. Meryweather	103, 128, 529
v. Fischer	271, 306, 537	v. Ogden	54, 57, 59, 85
v. Jackson	80	v. Stirling	139
v. Rumsey	371, 458	v. Sullivan	251
v. Williams	16, 334, 454	Turpin v. Remy	9
Thompson v. Bernard	109	Tuson v. Evans	227, 281
v. Nye	305	Tutchin's Case	104, 377, 416, 417, 575
v. Shackell	49	Tutty v. Alewin	68, 76
v. Twenge	78	Twycross v. Grant	355, 522
Thorley v. Lord Kerry	5, 22	Tyne Alkali Co. v. Lawson	336
Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Mas-			
sam	15, 16, 148		
Thorn v. Blanchard	193, 213		
v. Moser	220		
Thornton v. Stephen	545		
Thorpe v. Macaulay	516, 527		
Throgmorton v. Davis	271		
Thurman v. Wild	489		
Tibbott v. Haynes	56		
Tibbs v. Browne	347		
v. Smith	122		
Tichborne v. Mostyn	429		
v. Tichborne	429		
Tidman v. Ainslie	165, 174		
Tighe v. Cooper	173, 487		
v. Wicks	66, 73		
Tildesley v. Harper	499		
Tilk v. Parsons	314		
Tillman v. Willis	55, 94, 122		
Tillotson v. Cheetham	298		
Tilson v. Robbins	22		
Titus v. Sumner	94, 271, 331		
Todd v. Hastings	80		
v. Hawkins	212, 235, 268, 484		
v. Rough	54		
Tolleson v. Posey	298		
Tomlinson v. Brittlebank	106		
Tompkins v. Weisse	94		
v. Wisener	94, 540		
Toogood v. Spyring	151, 217, 226, 241, 242, 288		
Tottentham v. Barry	462		
Townshend v. Groves	298		
(Lord) v. Hughes (Dr.)	73, 96, 126, 136, 317, 320, 558		
Tozer v. Mashford	57, 125		
Trabue v. Mays	299		
Trall v. Denham	99		

Villers v. Monsley	22, 63
Vine, <i>Ex parte</i>	354
Vines v. Serell	298
Viney, <i>Ex parte</i>	563
Vivian v. Willet	78, 125

## W.

Wachter v. Quenzer	182	Watson, <i>In re</i>	430
Wadsworth v. Bentley	456	v. Clerke	85
Wagstaffe v. Anderson	519	v. McCann	566
Waithman v. Weaver	305	v. McCarthy	62
Wakelin v. Morris	295	v. Vanderlash	76, 77
Wakley v. Cooke	30, 171, 485	Watt v. Ligertwood	433
v. Healey	22, 29, 69, 126, 130	Watters v. Smoot	169
v. Johnson	307	Watts v. Fraser	152, 159, 307, 362, 532
Walcot v. Walker	374	v. Morgan	151
Waldegrave (Sir William) v. Agas	56, 131	v. Rymes	122
Walden v. Mitchell	58, 70	Waugh v. Waugh	84, 93, 121
Walker v. Brogden	47, 529	Weatherston v. Hawkins	232
Wall v. Hoskins	54	v. Hendrick	267
Wallace, <i>Re</i>	436	Weaver v. Lloyd	169, 170, 545
v. Carroll	204	Web v. Poor	62
v. Dixon	586, 537	Webb v. Cecil	371
v. Young	114	v. East	518, 519
Wallingford v. Mutual Society	522	v. England	477
Wallis v. Hepburn	522	v. Mansel	563
Walls or Watts v. Rymes	60	Webster v. Whewall	516, 520
Walsh v. State	574	Weierbach v. Trone	61
Walsham v. Steinton	518	Weil v. Schmidt	93, 100, 111
Walter v. Beaver	558	Weir v. Hoss	154
v. Brogden	28	Weiss v. Whittemore	31, 320
Walton v. Singleton	84	Welesley's Case	481, 448
Ward v. Clark	93, 94, 123	Welply v. Buhl	566
v. Colyhan	55, 100, 122	Welsh Steam Colliery Co. v. Gaskell	520
v. Dick	271	Wenman v. Ash	152, 264
v. Reynolds	97, 126	Western Counties Manure Co. v.	
v. Sinfield	546	Lawes Chemical Manure Co.	33, 91,
v. Smith	154, 365, 533		138, 145, 148, 476, 634
v. State	305	Westman v. Aktiebolaget, &c. Co.	357
v. Weeks	61, 82, 164, 167, 321, 329, 330	West of England and South Wales	
Warden v. Bailey	195	Bank v. Nicholls	510
Ware, <i>In re</i> , <i>Ex parte</i> Drake	456	Weston v. Beeman	361
v. Curtledge	151, 298	v. Dobniet	193
Warman v. Hine	27, 29, 170, 276	Wetherhead v. Armitage	67, 77, 84
Warmouth v. Cramer	110, 537	Whalley's Case	430, 448
Warne v. Chadwell	273	Wharton v. Brook	77, 84
Warner v. Payne	191	Wheatcroft v. Mousley	529
Warr v. Jolly	168, 232, 333	Wheatley v. Wallis	122
Warren v. Norman	66	Wheeler v. Haynes	104
v. Warren	154, 199, 242, 279, 533	v. Robb	536
Warton v. Gearing	65, 75	Whistler v. Hancock	522
Warwick v. Foulkes	178, 274	v. Ruskin	38, 39, 40, 49
Wason, <i>Ex parte</i>	186	Whitaker v. Carter	169, 237
v. Walter	34, 40, 43, 186, 236, 243, 246, 258, 259, 618	White v. Carroll	64, 65, 71, 183, 191
Waterer v. Freeman	142	v. Harwood	352
Waterfield v. Chichester (Bishop of)	257	v. Nichols	22, 183, 267
Waters v. Jones	114	v. Sayward	94, 540
v. Moore	169, 305	v. Tyrrell	487
v. Waters	460	Whiteley v. Adams	198, 219, 466
Watkin v. Hall	101, 162, 164, 165, 174, 175, 177	Whitesell v. Lennon	123
		Whitfield v. Powel	63
		v. S. E. Ry. Co.	151, 240, 283, 369
		Whitney v. Allen	191
		Whittaker v. Freeman	485
		Whittemore v. Weiss	6, 93, 169, 271, 306
		Whittington v. Gladwin	78, 79
		Wier v. Allen	177, 305
		Wilborn v. Odell	537
		Wilby v. Elston	85
		v. Henman	523
		Wilcox v. Edwards	57



### TABLE OF CASES.

xlv

Wiley v. Campbell	57	Woodard v. Dowling	28, 283
Wilk's Case	108	Woodburn v. Miller	22, 531
Williams v. Beaumont	32, 368, 369	Woodbury v. Thompson	84
v. Bryant	536	Woodfall's Case	588
v. Callender	305	Woodgate v. Ridout	29, 45, 46, 253, 539
v. Cawley	94	Woodruff v. Richardson	169
v. Gardiner	103, 125	v. Weolley	71
v. Gordon	267	Woods v. Pangburn	271, 371
v. Greenwade	84, 177	v. Woods	403
v. Harrison	271, 537	Woodward v. Lander	217, 223, 281
v. Hill	84, 312	Woolmer v. Latimer	305
v. Holdridge	62	Woolnoth v. Meadows	56, 97, 124, 163
v. Johns	431	Wootton v. Wootton	338
v. Karnes	22, 54	Wormouth v. Cramer	110, 537
v. Miner	271	Worth v. Butler	84
v. Stott	55, 62	Worthington v. Houghton	23
Williams's Case	411	Wren v. Weild	138, 144, 496
Williamson v. Freer	151, 240, 283, 235,	Wrennum's Case	428
	532	Wright v. Clements	470
Willis v. MacLachlan	447	v. Goodlake	507
Willover v. Hill	271, 305	v. Moorhouse	71
Wilson, <i>In re, Ex parte</i> Vine	354	v. Woodgate	211, 270, 535
v. Barnett	84, 178, 298	Wyatt v. Buell	191
v. Church	501, 564	v. Gore	538, 549
v. Collins	240, 283, 286		
v. Fitch	22, 40, 169, 177, 305		
v. Goit	21, 84, 313, 325, 328, 350		
v. Harding	123		
v. Nations	170, 274, 537		
v. Noonan	6, 40, 236, 271, 305, 312		
v. Reed	43, 295, 373		
v. Robinson	178, 212, 274		
v. Tatum	57		
Wilson's (Carus) Case	429, 433, 435, 439,		
	443, 444		
Wilton v. Brignell	507, 515		
Windsor v. Oliver	78		
Wing v. Wing	55, 122		
Wingard v. Cox	479		
Winter v. Sumvalt	61		
Wiseman v. Wiseman	130		
Wolbrecht v. Baumgarten	123		
Wolf v. Rodifer	537		
Wolverhampton New Water Works			
Co. v. Hawksford	515		
Wonderly v. Nokes	178		
Wood v. Adam	470		
v. Brown	470		
v. Jones	505		
v. Southwick	56		



# TABLE OF STATUTES CITED.

\* \* *The Statutes marked with an asterisk will be found printed in full in Appendix C, post, pp. 664-683.*

	PAGE		PAGE
*3 Ed. I. Stat. Westminster I. c. 34	133,	7 Geo. II. c. 8, s. 1	81
	135, 417, 422, 427	9 Geo. II. c. 5, s. 3	59
25 Ed. III. c. 2	411	*32 Geo. III. c. 60 (Fox's Libel Act)	12, 94, 667
*2 Rich. II. Stat. 1, c. 5	73, 134, 135, 417, 422, 427	s. 1	585
*12 Rich. II. c. 11	135, 417, 422, 427	3	585
1 Ed. VI. c. 1, s. 1	400	4	586
2 & 3 Ed. VI. c. 1, s. 2	400	36 Geo. III. c. 7	411
3	400	38 Geo. III. c. 71, s. 17	159
1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 13	447	*39 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 29	12, 531, 668
1 Eliz. c. 1, s. 6	402	48 Geo. III. c. 58, s. 1	595
2, s. 2	400	53 Geo. III. c. 127, s. 3	402
3	400	160	401
5 Eliz. c. 4	201	57 Geo. III. c. 6	411
13 Eliz. c. 12, s. 2	401	60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV.	
18 Eliz. c. 3	58	c. 4, s. 1	579, 669
1 Jac. I. c. 11	59	2	579, 670
3 Jac. I. c. 21	401	*8, s. 1	394, 409, 412
21 Jac. I. c. 16	335, 456	2	412
s. 3	455	3	412
19, s. 7	456	4	412
*13 Car. II. Stat. I. c. 1, s. 3	422	3 Geo. IV. c. 40, s. 3	407
13 & 14 Car. II. c. 33	11	*5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 4	407, 670
14 Car. II. c. 4, s. 1	401	6 Geo. IV. c. 50, s. 30	579
17 Car. II. c. 8	355	c. 119	12
29 Car. II. c. 7, s. 6	460	7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 20	582
9, s. 1	402	7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28, s. 2	576
2	402	9 Geo. IV. c. 22, s. 7	248, 255
1 Jac. II. c. 17	11	32, s. 3	171
1 W. & M. Sess. 2, c. 2	186	11 Geo. IV. and 1 Wm. IV. c. 73, s. 1	412
3 W. & M. c. 10	57	2 & 3 Wm. IV. c. 93	447
*9, s. 4	59	3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, s. 7	456
*4 W. & M. c. 18, s. 1	591, 595, 666	40	438
5 & 6 W. & M. c. 11, s. 3	578	6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 76	12
8 & 9 Wm. III. c. 11, s. 6	355	s. 6	531
9 Wm. III. c. 35 [c. 32 in the Statutes at Large]	401	8	531, 532
4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 (al. c. 16), s. 19	456	13	531
5 Anne, c. 8, s. 23	135	*19	513, 514, 515, 532, 671
6 Anne, c. 7 (al. 41), s. 1	411	c. 96, s. 6	178
2	422	7	161
10 Anne, c. 19, s. 113	12	7 Wm. IV. and 1 Vict. c. 23	412
4 Geo. I. c. 11	59	*1 & 2 Vict. c. 28, s. 2	407, 671
6 Geo. I. c. 19, s. 2	444	105, s. 1	396
		*2 & 3 Vict. c. 12, s. 2	12, 672

2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 49	406	16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, s. 6	579
*3 & 4 Vict. c. 9	187, 672		525
Appendix B.	466	17 & 18 Vict. c. 34, s. 1	526
c. 24, s. 2	334, 335	c. 125 (C. L. P. Act,	
86, s. 3	223	1854)	513
5 & 6 Vict. c. 38	404	s. 24	546
s. 1	574	25	546
c. 97, s. 4	453	27	533, 580
122, s. 42	248	51	501
6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 1	401	103	580
14	13	18 Vict. c. 27	12
*Lord Campbell's Act, c. 96, s. 1	299,	*18 & 19 Vict. c. 41	17, 59, 87, 679
465, 568, 674		s. 1	403
s. 2	299,	55, s. 35	425
301, 465, 487, 491, 497, 568		19 & 20 Vict. c. 16, s. 1	579
s. 3	378	47	369
4	379,	97, s. 12	456
572, 573, 580		108, s. 23	453, 565
s. 5	379, 390	20 & 21 Vict. c. 43	407
6	178,	s. 4	407
388, 576, 577, 589		*c. 83	405, 680
s. 7	363,	s. 1	12
364, 365, 385, 583		85, s. 21	346
s. 8	590,	25	351
595, 596		26	351
7 & 8 Vict. c. 84	143	21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 27	531
8 Vict. c. 16, s. 135	461	22 & 23 Vict. c. 17	571
18, s. 134	461	23 & 24 Vict. c. 28	81
20, s. 138	461	90, s. 27	531
*8 & 9 Vict. c. 75, s. 2	300, 487, 677	126, s. 19	370
*9 & 10 Vict. c. 33, s. 1	531, 678	24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 8	576
c. 95, s. 58	325, 453, 565	96, s. 46	379
73	568	47	379
88	343, 563	c. 134 (Bankruptcy Act, 1861)	
113	445	ss. 101, 102	248
cxxvi.	569	25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, s. 62	461
11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, s. 1	411	27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, s. 2	379
*s. 3	410, 412, 678	28 Vict. c. 36, s. 16	446
c. 42, s. 1	573	28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 4	583
11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 9	573	5	583
78, s. 2	586	8	580
5	587	30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 2	571
12 & 13 Vict. c. 101, s. 2	445	3	572
14 & 15 Vict. c. 93, s. 9	446	142	335, 341
100, s. 1	574, 577, 582	s. 5	334, 335, 337
2	577	7	569
3	577	10	300, 343, 468,
24	582		469, 566, 569
25	577, 582, 586	29	570
29	404	31 & 32 Vict. c. 54, s. 5	356
15 & 16 Vict. c. 76 (Common Law		32 & 33 Vict. c. 24	12
Procedure Act, 1852)	325	s. 1	513
s. 11	459	Sched. 1	513, 531
16	461	2	513
29	463	68, s. 4	396
40	325, 347	71, s. 19	437
*61	101, 115, 120, 128, 471, 473,	77	437
	573, 679	33 & 34 Vict. c. 9, ss. 30-34	421
70	491, 492	49, s. 1	397
109	528	77, s. 18	528
112	528	79, s. 20	407
142	354	c. 93 (Married Women's Property	
(Schedule B., form 33)*	103	Act, 1870)	324, 346, 349, 350
16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, s. 4	578	c. 93, s. 1	81, 87, 349
5	578	11	81, 349

33 & 34 Vict. c. 99	12, 513	37 & 38 Vict. c. 50, s. 5	351
34 & 35 Vict. c. 112	546	38 Vict. c. 14, s. 2	421
s. 18	546	38 & 39 Vict. c. 63 (Sale of Food & Drugs Act, 1875)	54
36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (Judicature Act, 1873)	325	c. 77 (Judicature Act, 1875)	344
s. 24, subs. 7	514	s. 22	551, 553, 554
25, subs. 8	15	s. 33	335
11	505, 517	Appendix A., form No. 3	357
39	437	" C., Forms of Pleadings, No. 14	372
46	553	c. 86, s. 17	201
49	562	39 & 40 Vict. c. 59 (Appellate Juris- diction Act, 1876)	565
60	454	s. 17	553, 554
67	325, 334, 468, 570	42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, s. 3	356
37 & 38 Vict. c. 50 (Married Wo- men's Property Act Amendment Act, 1874)	324, 351	*43 & 44 Vict. c. 41 (Burial Laws Amendment Act, 1880), s. 7	401, 682
s. 2	351, 352, 491		

# TABLE OF RULES AND ORDERS CITED.

## JUDICATURE ACT (1875), 38 & 39 VICT. C. 77.

		PAGE			PAGE
Order	II. rule 2	343	Order	XVI. rule	568
"	III. " 2	459	"	" 2	568
"	IV. " 1	459	"	" 3	636, 371, 568
"	" 2	459	"	" 4	371
"	" 2 <sub>a</sub>	459	"	" 6	371
"	" 3 <sub>a</sub>	454, 459	"	" 8	346
"	V. " 1	454, 462	"	" 10	366
"	" 4 <sub>a</sub>	556, 561	"	" 10 <sub>a</sub>	366
"	VI. " 1	460	"	" 13	344
"	VIII. " 1	459	"	" 17	481
"	IX. " 1	460	"	" 18	481
"	" 1 <sub>a</sub>	567	"	" 19	481
"	" 2	460	"	" 20	481
"	" 3	461	"	" 21	481
"	" 4	461	" XVII.	" 1	458, 466
"	" 5	461	"	" 2	366
"	" 6	461	"	" 4	325, 347, 458,
"	" 6 <sub>a</sub>	461	"	" 5	465
"	" 7	461, 568	"	" 6	465
"	" 13	460, 462, 464,	"	" 7	365, 458, 465
"	" 14	567, 568	"	" 8	458, 466
"	X. " 1	460	"	" 9	458, 466
"	XI. " 2	357	" XIX.	" 2	343, 495
"	" 4	460	"	" 3	344, 372,
"	XII. " 1	356	"	" 4	491
"	" 2	463	"	" 5	120, 470,
"	" 3	462	"	" 11	473, 488
"	" 4	462	"	" 14	474
"	" 5	462	"	" 16	482
"	" 5 <sub>a</sub>	567	"	" 17	496
"	" 6 <sub>b</sub>	462, 567	"	" 18	480
"	" 7	463	"	" 20	482, 483
"	" 8	463, 567	"	" 21	484
"	" 9	463	"	" 22	480, 482
"	" 12	463	"	" 23	497
"	" 12 <sub>a</sub>	366, 463	"	" 24	482
"	" 15	366, 463	"	" 28	470
"	XIII. " 1	463	"	" 30	472
"	" 2	853, 354	"	" 31	446
"	" 5 <sub>a</sub>	463	" XX.	" 2	446
"	" 6	462	"	" 3	481, 495, 554
"	XVI. " 1	464, 568	"	" 4	567
		365, 370, 465			567
					300, 568

Order	XXI.	rule 1	469	Order	XXXVI.	rule 8	523
		" 1 <sup>c</sup>	469			" 9	523
"	XXII.	" 1	495			" 10	523
"		" 9	372			" 11	523
"	XXIII.		524			" 12	523
"	XXIV.	" 1	498, 500			" 13	523, 525
		" 2	498			" 14	523
		" 3	498, 500			" 15	523
"	XXV.		522			" 17 <sup>a</sup>	523
"	XXVI.		522			" 18	529
"	XXVII.	" 1	479, 480, 481, 492, 493, 496, 498, 537			" 20	529
		" 2	498			" 21	529
		" 3	498			" 22	552
		" 4	500			" 22 <sup>a</sup>	552, 554
		" 5	500			" 24	552
		" 6	496, 537, 545			" 33	438
		" 7	498	"	XXXVII.	" 1	526
		" 9	500			" 3 <sup>a</sup>	511
		" 10	500			" 3 <sup>b</sup>	511
		" 11	459			" 3 <sup>c</sup>	511
"	XXVIII.		569			" 3 <sup>d</sup>	511
		" 1	477			" 3 <sup>e</sup>	511
		" 2	478			" 3 <sup>f</sup>	511
		" 5	478			" 3 <sup>g</sup>	511
		" 6	479			" 4	526
		" 7	478			" 46	566
		" 8	479	"	XXXIX.		554
		" 9	479			" 1 <sup>a</sup>	557, 560, 561
		" 10	479			" 1 <sup>b</sup>	556
		" 11	479			" 2	557
		" 12	478, 479			" 3	557
		" 13	479	"	XL.	" 5	557
"	XXIX.	" 1	474			" 2	554
		" 4	496			" 3	553
		" 5	496			" 4 <sup>a</sup>	554, 562
		" 12	500			" 9	562
		" 14	465			" 10	554, 556
"	XXX.		301	"	XLI.	" 1	552
		" 1	300, 465			" 6	545
"	XXXI.	" 2	491, 493, 501	"	XLII.	" 2	432
		" 5	343, 503			" 4	432
		" 7	509, 512			" 5	432
		" 8	512			" 8	367
		" 10	509			" 15	552
		" 11	515			" 20	432
		" 12	516			" 22	554
		" 13	516	"	XLIV.	" 2	432, 438
		" 14	517			" 2	433
		" 16	520	"	L.	" 1	355
		" 17	521			" 2	346, 351
		" 18	521		LI.	" 4	466
		" 20	432, 522	"	LII.	" 2	562
		" 21	521			" 3	562
		" 22	432, 521	"	LIII.	" 4	499, 553
		" 23	511, 547	"		" 2	521
"	XXXV.	" 12	455, 466	"	LIV.	" 4	499
		" 13	455, 466			" 6 <sup>a</sup>	499
"	XXXVI.	" 2	569	"	LV.		336, 338
		" 3	500			" 1	334,
			523, 524				469, 553, 570
		" 4	500, 523	"		" 3	467
		" 4 <sup>a</sup>	500, 523	"	LVI.	" 3	499
						" 6 <sup>a</sup>	495
				"	LVII <sup>a</sup> .		553, 554
					LVIII.	" 1	551

TABLE OF RULES AND ORDERS CITED.

Order LVIII. rule 2	562	Order LVIII. rule 10	560
“ 3	563	“ 12	565
“ 4	562, 563	“ 13	565
“ 5	56	“ 15	560, 562
“ 5 $\alpha$	556, 565	“ 16	564
“ 6	564	“ 17	564
“ 7	564	“ LIX. “ 2	537, 545
“ 8	563		



## PART I.

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# THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER.

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## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTORY.

No man may disparage the reputation of another. Every man has a right to have his good name maintained unimpaired. This right is a *jus in rem*, a right absolute and good against all the world. (*a*)

Words which produce any perceptible injury to the reputation of another are called DEFAMATORY.

Defamatory words, if false, are actionable.

False defamatory words, if written and published, constitute a libel; if spoken, a slander.

Words which merely *might tend* to produce injury to the reputation of another are not defamatory, and even though false are not actionable, unless as a matter of fact some appreciable injury has followed from their use.

On the other hand, words which on the face of them *must* be injurious to the reputation of the person to whom they refer, are clearly defamatory, and, if false, are actionable, without proof that any particular damage has followed from their use.

### *Illustrations.*

To say "A. is a coward," or "a liar," (*b*) or "a rascal," is not defamatory, unless it can be proved that some one seriously believed and acted on the \* assertion, to the prejudice of A. Such words, though false, are not actionable

\* 2

(*a*) It is not to be inferred however that judgment against the defendant is in the sense of the English law a judgment *in rem*. Corbley v. Wilson, 71 Ill. 209; McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403.

(*b*) Or that he bears a bad reputation for truth and veracity in his neighborhood, unless published in writing or print. Studdard v. Trucks, 31 Ark. 726.

without some evidence to show that A.'s reputation has as a matter of fact been actually impaired thereby. *De minimis non curat lex*.

To say of B. : — " He forged his master's signature to a cheque for £100," is clearly defamatory, and, if false, actionable. It must injure B.'s reputation to bring such a specific charge against him.

In any given case, the fact that the words employed by the defendant have perceptibly injured the plaintiff's reputation may be either

- (i.) presumed from the nature of the words themselves ; or,
  - (ii.) proved by evidence of their consequences.
- (i.) It will be presumed from the nature of the words themselves,
- (a) If the words, being written and published or printed and published, are in any way disparaging to the plaintiff or tend to bring him into ridicule and contempt.
  - (b) If the words, being spoken,
    - (1.) charge the plaintiff with the commission of some indictable offence ;
    - (2.) impute to the plaintiff a contagious disorder tending to exclude him from society ;
    - (3.) are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade ; or disparage him in an office of public trust.

In all these cases the words are said to be actionable *per se*, because on the face of them they clearly must have injured the plaintiff's reputation.

(ii.) But in all other cases of spoken words, the fact that the plaintiff's reputation has been injured thereby, must be proved at the trial by evidence of the consequences that directly resulted from their utterance. Such evidence is called "*Evidence of special damage*," as distinguished from that *general damage* which the law

\* 3      *age* which the law \* assumes, without express proof, to follow from the employment of words actionable *per se*.

### *Illustrations.*

To say of A. " He is a forger and a felon ; " or " He hath the French pox ; " to call a physician a quack, a tradesman a bankrupt, or a lawyer a knave ; to say of a magistrate that he is a corrupt judge ; is in each case actionable without proof of special damage. *A fortiori*, if the words be written, or printed, and published.

But to call a man a cheat, a rogue, and a swindler, or to call a woman an adulteress, is not actionable, without proof of special damage, if the words be spoken only ; but is actionable *per se*, if the accusation be reduced into writing and published to the world.

Thus the presumption that words are defamatory arises much more easily in cases of libel than in cases of slander. Many words which if printed and published would be presumed to have injured the plaintiff's reputation, will not be actionable *per se*, if merely spoken. The reasons for this distinction are obvious : —

1. *Vox emissa volat ; littera scripta manet.* The written or printed matter is permanent, and no one can tell into whose hands it may come. Every one now can read. The circulation of a newspaper is enormous, especially if it be known to contain libellous matter. And even a private letter may turn up in after years, and reach persons for whom it was never intended, and so do incalculable mischief. Whereas a slander only reaches the immediate bystanders, who can observe the manner and note the tone of the speaker, — who have heard the antecedent conversation which may greatly qualify his assertion, — who probably are acquainted with the speaker, and know what value is to be attached to any charge made by him ; the mischief is thus much less in extent, and the publicity less durable.

2. A slander may be uttered in the heat of a moment, and under a sudden provocation ; the reduction into writing, and the publication, of a libel show greater deliberation and malice.

3. A third reason is sometimes given, that a libel is more likely to lead to a breach of the peace. But I doubt if this is so. A man would be more tempted to personally chastise a \*villain who slandered \* 4 him to his face, than a libeller who lampooned him in the papers. Even if it were so, it would tend to explain why libel is a crime and slander not, rather than to account for the distinction just pointed out between the evidence required in the respective civil actions. For this is a further important difference between Slander and Libel : that for every libel criminal proceedings may be taken by way of information or indictment, if the person defamed does not desire damages : whereas a slander, unless it be blasphemous, seditious, or obscene, is not criminal at all.

Neither do the first two reasons assigned appear any more satisfactory to Mr. Starkie than this last one does to me. He urges with great force in his Commentary prefixed to "Folkard on Slander and Libel," 4th edition, p. 28, that the distinction taken by our law between slander and libel in this respect "must be regarded as an absolute peremptory rule, not founded on any obvious reason or principle. If damage is to be presumed from publishing such a charge in writing, why is not some damage also to be presumed from publishing the fact orally? The extent of publicity,

and quantity of damage to be presumed in the one case rather than in the other, is obviously casual and uncertain, and rather affects the measure and *quantum* of damages than any principle of civil liability." And so again on p. 31, "the extent of mischief merely affects the *quantum* of damages, and not the right of action." But with all deference to the learned author, the mischief complained of is the injury to the plaintiff's reputation and not the pecuniary damage he has suffered; and in discussing whether *any* such injury has been inflicted to *any* appreciable degree, surely the mode and extent of the publication of the defamatory words are relevant matters for enquiry. The expression "*quantum* of damages," when applied to this question, is misleading; for it implies that *some* damages at least are clearly due, and that the only question is how much. Whereas, once grant that even *nominal* damages are due and *cadit quæstio*: there is no longer any distinction between slander and libel, as soon as it is admitted that the action lies. It is precisely where it is not clear that any injury at all has been inflicted, where no pecuniary damage is proved, and the Court is doubting if any right of action exists, that the distinction ad-

\* 5     verted to arises. \*The Courts, in the absence of any evidence of special damage, must either nonsuit the plaintiff, or say, "From the nature of the words used, and the circumstances in which they were uttered or published, we can see that they *must* have injured the plaintiff's reputation." And they are more inclined, and rightly more inclined, to take the latter course when the words are printed and published to the world than where they are merely uttered to a few. Anyhow the distinction has been recognized in English law by Hale, C.B., in *King v. Lake*; <sup>1</sup> by Lord Hardwicke, C.J., in *Bradley v. Methwyn* (1737); <sup>2</sup> and by Lord Mansfield, C.J., in *Thorley v. Lord Kerry*, <sup>3</sup> and in numerous other cases, and is far too well established to be ever shaken.

The intention or motive with which the words were employed is as a rule immaterial. If the defendant has in fact injured the plaintiff's reputation, he is liable, although he did not intend so to do, and had no such purpose in his mind when he spoke or wrote the words. Every man must be presumed to intend and to know the natural and ordinary consequences of his acts: and this presumption (if indeed it is ever rebuttable) is not rebutted merely by proof that at the time he uttered or published the words the defendant did not attend to or think of their natural or probable consequences, or hoped or expected that these consequences would not follow. Such proof can only go to mitigate the damages.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Vent. 28, Hardres, 470.

<sup>2</sup> Selw. N. P. §82.

<sup>3</sup> 4 Taunt. 355, 3 Camp. 214, *n*.

Sometimes, however, it is a man's duty to speak fully and freely, and without thought or fear of the consequences; and then the above rule does not apply. The words are privileged by reason of the occasion on which they were employed; and no action lies therefor, unless it can be proved that the defendant was actuated by some special spite or some wicked and malicious motive.<sup>1</sup> But in all other cases (although the pleader invariably alleges that the words were spoken \* or pub- \* 6  
lished falsely *and maliciously*) malice in fact need never be proved at the trial; the words are actionable, if false and defamatory, although spoken or published accidentally or inadvertently, or with an honest belief in their truth. (a)

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, Chapters VIII. and IX.

(a) No legal term has been the subject of more conflicting views than malice in the law of libel and slander. Until almost within living memory it was common to speak of malice in actions for defamation of character as something real (a *res*, so to speak) in relation to the ground of liability, though with nothing like definition of its meaning. Latterly it has come to be said that malice as a ground of action is nothing of substance, that it is a mere abstraction which we have to deal with as one of the burdensome legacies of an earlier stage of the law; and proceeding to definition, so far as definition can be predicated of what is unreal, it is commonly said (and in a sense it is true) that malice as applied to slander and libel means the absence of legal excuse for the publication. See *post*, p. 265. Now with reference to this conflict it has sometimes been thought that light was to be found in legal history; and as for the actual origin of the use of the term this is no doubt true. It is tolerably clear that the term as used in the law of defamation if not elsewhere has been borrowed from the ecclesiastical law; and it is almost certain that its use in the spiritual courts was primarily jurisdictional. Those courts punished offences which were sinful and *because* they were sinful, the essential element of which was called *malitia*. An illustration may be seen in the early statute (A.D. 1285) of *Circumspecte agatis*, quoted in the appendix to the present

work, p. 665; which statute brings the subject of defamation within the cognizance of the spiritual courts upon this specific ground of sin. But it was no more true in the thirteenth than in the nineteenth century that an imputation upon a man's character was always (not to say necessarily) malicious. Such imputation was however known as matter of common experience if not of consciousness to be malicious in most cases. This raised or rather *was* a ground of presumption; and upon this presumption, though sometimes it was contrary to the fact, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was founded. From being a necessary ground of jurisdiction in the spiritual courts it came afterwards, when the civil courts acquired jurisdiction (probably under the St. of Westm. 2, ch. 24), to be considered that malice was the ground of temporal redress, though of course the jurisdiction of the temporal courts was not based upon malice.

This if true, as the indications suggest, shows indeed that the use of the term malice had in fact an accidental origin; but it does not follow that it would not have found a similar place in the law (that is, as a ground of redress in the first instance) had not the spiritual courts ever existed. The publication of defamation is, as it appeared to the ecclesiastics long ago, commonly malicious; and this fact must naturally have suggested itself as material to liability. If observation had shown that it was commonly innocent and

*Illustrations.*

The Protestant Electoral Union published a book called "The Confessional Unmasked." Their motive in so doing was "not only innocent but praiseworthy," viz.:—to promote the spread of the Protestant religion, by exposing the abuses of the Roman Catholic system; but certain passages in the book were necessarily obscene. *Held*, that

proper for men to speak of each other in terms of (if false) defamation, it is extremely doubtful if an action would ever have been entertained without evidence to overcome the presumption. In other words the injury to reputation while essential to liability could not alone have been a ground of action. The fact that the presumption is the other way, the fact that is to say that men commonly are malicious in speaking ill of each other, can hardly be considered, as having the effect of making malice (the implied malice of the law) an unnecessary factor of liability; though what makes it appear so is undoubtedly the very fact of the presumption. The truth appears to be that malice in the first instance is necessary to liability; but malice (if that is now to be thought a hard saying) is shown by the publication of the supposed defamation. It is shown in the fact that common experience finds malice, actual malice, in it; and unless the inference of experience is overturned as not true to the particular case malice is established, and the defendant is liable. Again, to answer a possible objection, it is in the last analysis malice which gives the publication a natural tendency to harm. With an adequate motive for the publication harm would not generally follow. Hence malice is essential to the plaintiff's case. In this view of the case malice "in law" as it is called and malice in fact are different only in the way in which they are proved; they are in point of substance the same thing. And this view of the term has not been wholly overlooked in the midst of that recent current of thought which has seen in malice as a ground of liability nothing but an abstraction. Thus in one of the most rigidly reasoned cases to be found in the books Mr. Justice Christiancy says that there are not two kinds of malice in the law of defamation. Both the supposed kinds are phases of actual malice, "the

difference being only in the mode of proof. And in both cases the burden of making this proof [of malice] rests upon the plaintiff." *Huson v. Dale*, 19 Mich. 17, 30. So in *Wilson v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321, and in *Townshend, Slander*, § 387. In a sense indeed it is perfectly consistent with this to say that malice is the want of legal excuse; in the sense, that is, that where there is wanting an adequate motive for the publication there is commonly malice, and hence sufficient ground for presuming it in the particular case. But in so far as the term "want of legal excuse" is used as definition seeking to do away with malice from the words alone as a *res* to be proved it is untrue.

Nor is there anything anomalous in this view of malice as a fact shown by mere proof of the publication. Intention is necessary to a civil action for a battery as is shown by the fact that proof of physical compulsion of the stroke would be a defence to such a suit; but the intention is shown by proof of the stroke, since in ordinary cases a blow is intentional.

Upon this view of the so-called implied malice it is not difficult to understand (what would otherwise be an anomaly) how punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded without evidence of malice *aliunde*. Punitive damages are not compensation for deep injury; they are not compensation at all, but are what the word punitive itself declares, punishment, smart money. Now on the words themselves when deemed sufficiently outrageous, whether written or spoken, the jury may award punitive damages. *Evening News Assoc. v. Tryon*, 42 Mich. 549; *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 10; *Scripps v. Foster*, 41 Mich. 742; *Buckley v. Knapp*, 48 Mo. 152; *Clements v. Maloney*, 55 Mo. 352; *Bump v. Betts*, 23 Wend. 85; *Hubbard v. Rutledge*, 52 Miss. 581; *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116, 127; *Schmisser v. Kreilich*, 92 Ill. 347; *Flagg v. Roberts*,

its publication was a misdemeanor. All copies which the defendant had for sale were ordered to be destroyed as obscene books. Neither the law nor the religion of England permits any one to "do evil that good may come." *R. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 371; 37 L. J. M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 801; 18 L. T. 395; 11 Cox C. C. 19; *Steele v. Brannan*, L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 41 L. J. M. C. 85; 20 W. R. 607; 26 L. T. 509. And see *R. v. Bradlaugh & Besant*, 2 Q. B. D. 569; 46 L. J. M. C. 286.

67 Ill. 485; *Storey v. Early*, 86 Ill. 461; *Snyder v. Fulton*, 34 Md. 128; *Nolan v. Traber*, 49 Md. 460. The *special* severity of words actionable without such severity does not in reality make malice; it only shows more malice, or it makes clear the malice which an occasion might otherwise have made legally improbable. All defamation is severe and unendurable; and mere difference of degree of intensity could not therefore create anything.

This disposition of the term malice relieves us in great measure of the need of framing a definition; indeed it relieves us altogether of the need of a definition of the ordinary implied malice of the books. As for that, all has been done when it has been ascertained what words or language are actionable *per se*; the publication of words or language of that character is commonly malicious, and is to be deemed malicious therefore in the particular case unless the natural presumption is overturned in legal manner. That actionable words or language are presumptively malicious, see *Gabe v. McGinnis*, 68 Ind. 538; *Zuckerman v. Sonnenschein*, 62 Ill. 115; *Flagg v. Roberts*, 67 Ill. 485; *Whittemore v. Weiss*, 33 Mich. 348; *Smith v. State*, 32 Texas, 594; *Pittock v. O'Niell*, 63 Penn. St. 253; *Barr v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 385; *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808; *Buckley v. Knapp*, 48 Mo. 152; *Wilson v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321; *Lick v. Owen*, 47 Cal. 252; *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199. And these cases show that there is no difference between the law of libel and the law of slander in this particular. But *Lick v. Owen*, *supra*, is wrong (and justifies, if it be necessary to say that, this discussion of malice) in asserting that the presumption because legal cannot be rebutted; unless that is the effect of statute. Yet that is the natural deduction to be drawn from the ordinary way of treating implied malice. The books declare that such malice is malice in law; and if that expression be used with

precision the jury has no right to find against it. See *Morgan v. Booth*, 13 Bush, 480, which says that *actual* malice is for the jury, as though implied malice were not. But if what we have stated be true, implied malice is not malice as matter of law, but is simply malice in fact and hence capable of being rebutted. It should be stated however that the California court held that evidence of circumstances ("occasion") was admissible to reduce the damages. It has no doubt given color to the impression that implied malice is malice as matter of law, that it is uniformly held that except for the purpose of sustaining a privilege the defendant cannot give evidence of want of malice except as he can find the same in external facts. *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808; *Wilson v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321; *Powers v. Cary*, 64 Maine, 9; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 83, 87; *Whittemore v. Weiss*, 33 Mich. 348; and other cases above cited. But this rule appears to proceed upon grounds of policy; it would be obviously impolitic to permit a party to testify concerning facts of his own sole consciousness in bar of an action when the opposite party would generally have no means of disproving the statements however false. It must be conceded that the fact of a newspaper publisher being liable for defamation published in his paper in his absence and without his knowledge (*Dunn v. Hall*, 1 Ind. 344; see *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199) shows that there is one case in which liability cannot rest on malice in the defendant; but to this it must be replied that the whole law of agency, of which this is only a particular example, is anomalous in imposing upon an innocent man the consequences of an act not his own. But somebody has been malicious presumably even in this case.

It would then be better, it is apprehended, in ordinary cases in which no evidence of malice apart from the publication is introduced, if the courts would say nothing

If a man deliver *by mistake* a paper out of his study where he has just written it; he will, it seems, be liable to an action, if the paper prove libellous, although he never intended to publish that paper, but another innocent one. *Note to Mayne v. Fletcher*, 4 M. & Ry. 312; cf. *R. v. Paine*, 5 Mod. 167.

The plaintiff told a laughable story against himself in company: the defendant published it in the newspaper to amuse his readers, assuming that the plaintiff would not object. The plaintiff recovered damages, £10. *Cook v. Ward*, 6 Bing. 409; 4 M. & P. 99.

For though he told it of himself to his friends, he by no means courted public ridicule. And that the publication was "*only in jest*," has long been held no defence (*a*).

Where a clergyman in a sermon recited a story out of Fox's Martyrology, that one Greenwood being a perjured person and a great persecutor, had great plagues inflicted upon him, and was killed by the hand of God; whereas, in truth, he never was so plagued, and was himself actually present at that discourse, — the words being delivered only as a matter of history, and not with any intention to slander, it was adjudged for the defendant. *Greenwood v. Prick*, Cro. Jac. 91, cited in 1 Camp. 270; and also in *R. v. Williams*, 13 How. St. Tr. 1387.

But Lord Denman and the court of Q. B. said most positively in *Hearne v. Stowell*, 12 A. & E. 726, that this case is not law. Mr. Greenwood would therefore in the present day have recovered at least nominal damages.

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\* A barrister, editing a book on the Law of Attorneys, referred to a case, *Re Blake*, reported in 30 Law Journal Q. B. 32, and stated that Mr. Blake was struck off the rolls for misconduct. He was in fact only suspended for two years, as appeared from the Law Journal report. The publishers were held liable for this carelessness, although of course neither they nor the writer bore Mr. Blake any malice. Damages £100. *Blake v. Stevens and others*, 4 F. & F. 232; 11 L. T. 543.

The printers of a newspaper, by a mistake in setting up in type the announcements

at all to the jury about malice, simply giving the instruction that if the words or language are proved they should find (if it be a civil case) for the plaintiff, and that punitive damages might be awarded if the evidence (i.e. the mere words or language) established an outrageous charge. But the question of what may for convenience be called express malice (*malice aliunde*) often arises. The plaintiff may contend that he has a just claim to ask the infliction of punishment upon the defendant, if not in the mere language proved, at all events in the circumstances attending the publication; or the presumed malice of the publication may have been rebutted by inference derived from the occasion of the publication, and he may wish in turn to show that this inference cannot be accepted in the particular case since there are indications of positive malice (aside from all inference) at variance with it. In regard to these and some other cases to be considered in the note on Express Malice, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of

the meaning of the express malice concerning proof of which the law now speaks. And this would be the proper place to consider the question, What then constitutes evidence of this malice *aliunde*? but the author has in keeping with the plan of his work presented that subject in another place. The question referred to will be reserved for consideration at the same place. See *post*, Chapter IX. The present note should not be closed however without observing that aside from explaining the implied malice of the books malice is important only in one of the two particulars just suggested, to establish the right to punitive damages or to offset a supposed privilege. It may be further added that express malice may be shown though not alleged as such in the declaration. *Wilson v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321.

(*a*) So of cases of slander. *Hatch v. Potter*, 7 Ill. 725; *McKee v. Ingalls*, 4 Scam. 30; *Long v. Eakle*, 4 Md. 454; *Donoghue v. Hayes*, *Hayes* (Ireland), 265.



from the *London Gazette*, placed the name of the plaintiff's firm under the heading "First Meetings under the Bankruptcy Act" instead of under "Dissolutions of Partnership." An ample apology was inserted in the next issue: no damage was proved to have followed to the plaintiff: and there was no suggestion of any malice. In an action for libel against the proprietor of the paper, the jury awarded the plaintiff £50 damages. *Held*, that the publication was libellous, and that the damages awarded were not excessive. *Shepherd v. Whitaker*, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402.

False defamatory words then, if spoken, constitute a slander: if written and published, a libel. The word "written" includes any printed, painted, or any other permanent representation not transient in its nature as are spoken words.

The writing may be on paper, parchment, copper, wood, or stone, or on any kind of substance in fact; and may be made with any instrument, pen and ink, blacklead-pencil,<sup>1</sup> or in chalk, &c. A picture or effigy may also be a libel, or any other mark or sign exposed to view and conveying a defamatory meaning.<sup>2</sup>

A libel is defined in the Civil Code of the State of New York, s. 29, to be a "false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation."

By s. 30 of the same code, a slander is defined to be "a false and unprivileged publication, other than libel, \* which \* 8 . . . by natural consequence causes . . . damage."

### *Illustrations.*

A caricature or scandalous painting is a libel. *Anon.*, 11 Mod. 99; *Austin v. Culpepper*, 2 Show. 313; *Skin.* 123; *Du Bost v. Beresford*, 2 Camp. 511.

A chalk mark on a wall may be a libel, and as the wall cannot conveniently be brought into court, secondary evidence may be given of the inscription. *Mortimer v. M'Callan*, 6 M. & W. 58. See *Spall v. Massey and others*, 2 Stark. 559.

A statue may be a libel; so is fixing up a gallows against a man's door. *Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown*, 8th edition, 542; 5 Rep. 125, *b*.

Hieroglyphics, a rebus, an anagram, or an allegory may be a libel.

Ironical praise may be a libel.

A man's reputation may also be injured by the deed or action of another without his using any words; and for such an injury he has an action on the case; but such cases are not within the scope of the present treatise.

<sup>1</sup> *Geary v. Physic*, 5 B. & C. 238.

<sup>2</sup> 5 Rep. 125.

*Illustrations.*

A banker having in his hands sufficient funds belonging to his customer dishonors his cheque : the customer may recover substantial damages, without proof of any special damage ; for it is clear that such an act must injure the customer's reputation for solvency. *Marzetti v. Williams*, 1 B. & Ad. 415 ; *Robinson v. Marchant*, 7 Q. B. 918 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134 ; 10 Jur. 156 ; *Rolin and another v. Steward P. O.*, 14 C. B. 595 ; 23 L. J. C. P. 148 ; 18 Jur. 576 ; 2 C. L. R. 759.

Defendant caused plaintiff's goods to be seized on an unfounded claim for debt ; the neighbors consequently deemed the plaintiff insolvent. The plaintiff was held entitled to substantial damages. *Brewer v. Dew and another*, 11 M. & W. 625 ; *Bracegirdle v. Orford*, 2 Maule & S. 77.

The defendant set up a lamp on the wall adjoining the plaintiff's dwelling-house and kept it burning in the daytime, thereby inducing the passers-by to believe that plaintiff's house was a brothel. This was held to be a trespass to the wall and being permanent in its nature also a libel in effigy. *Jefferies v. Duncombe*, 2 Camp. 3 ; 11 East, 226 ; *Spall v. Massey*, 2 Stark. 559 ; *Plunket v. Gilmore*, *Fortescue*, 211.

\* 9 \* And so as to "riding Skimmington," "rough music," burning in effigy, and other modes of holding a man up to public obloquy without especial words of defamation. See *Sir William Bolton v. Dean*, cited in *Austin v. Culpepper*, *Skin*. 123 ; 2 Show. 313 ; *Mason v. Jennings*, *Sir T. Raym.* 401 ; *Cropp v. Tilney*, 3 Salk. 226.

So too in actions of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, (a) the jury may award damages for the injury done to the plaintiff's reputation by the charge made against him, and by his being marched in custody through the public streets ; although in the former, the gist of the action is the direct trespass to the *person*, and in the latter the maliciously setting the law in motion without reasonable or probable cause.

In Roman law there are many instances given in which a man's reputation was assailed, not by words, but by acts. *E.g.*

- (i.) By refusing to accept a solvent person as surety for a debt, intending thereby to impute that he is insolvent. (D. 2, 8, 5, 1.)
- (ii.) By claiming a debt that is not due, or seizing a man's goods for a fictitious debt, with intent to injure his credit. (*Gai.* III. 220 ; *Just. Inst.* IV. iv. 1 ; D. 47, 10, 15, 33.)
- (iii.) By claiming a person as your slave, knowing him to be free. (D. 47, 10, 12 & 22.)
- (iv.) By forcing your way into the house of another. (D. 47, 10, 23, & 44.)
- (v.) By persistently following about a matron or young girl respectably dressed, or a youth still wearing the *prætexta*, such constant pursuit being an imputation on their chastity. (*Gai.* III. 220 ; *Just. Inst.* IV. iv. 1 ; D. 47, 10, 15, 15-22.)
- (vi.) By needlessly fleeing for refuge to the statue of the emperor, thereby making it appear that some one was unlawfully oppressing you. (D. 48, 16, 28, 7) ; though it is difficult to see in this case how it was determined who was the right plaintiff.

(a) It is said in *Jarnigan v. Fleming*, 43 Miss. 710, that an action for slander can be brought on account of a malicious prosecution ; but that, it should seem, is wrong except perhaps in cases in which the court of the prosecution had no jurisdiction. See *Braveboy v. Cockfield*, 2 McMull. 270 ;

*Turpin v. Remy*, 3 Blackf. 210 ; *Bodwell v. Osgood*, 3 Pick. 379 ; *Pippet v. Hearne*, 5 Barn. & Ald. 684 ; *Morris v. Scott*, 21 Wend. 281 ; *Shaul v. Brown*, 28 Iowa, 37 ; *Bigelow*, *Torts*, 89 (*Students' series*).

The person defamed has a civil remedy to recover damages, and in some cases he can also proceed criminally by way of information or indictment, and have the defamer punished as an offender against the state. But there is now no method of anticipating or preventing a libel or a slander; there is no longer any censorship of the press in this country. Any man is free to speak or to write and publish whatever he chooses of another, \* subject only to this, that he must take the conse- \* 10 quences, should a jury deem his words defamatory. This is what is meant by "the liberty of the press."

"The liberty of the press," says Lord Mansfield, in *R. v. Dean of St. Asaph*,<sup>1</sup> "consists in printing without any previous licence, subject to the consequences of law." Lord Ellenborough says in *R. v. Cobbett*:<sup>2</sup> "The law of England is a law of liberty, and consistently with this liberty, we have not what is called an *imprimatur*; there is no such preliminary licence necessary; but if a man publish a paper, he is exposed to the penal consequences, as he is in every other act, if it be illegal." Lord Kenyon shortly puts it thus in *R. v. Cuthell*:<sup>3</sup> "A man may publish anything which twelve of his countrymen think is not blamable."

But it was by no means always so in England. It was quickly perceived that the printing press may be as great a power for evil as for good. And whenever any large proportion of any nation is disaffected towards the Government, to allow a free press is almost impossible.

(i.) The first plan adopted by our English monarchs was to keep all the printing presses in their own hands, and allow no one to *print* anything except by special Royal licence. All printing presses were thus kept under the immediate supervision of the King in Council, and regulated by proclamations and decrees of the Star Chamber by virtue of the King's Prerogative. In 1557 the Stationers' Company of London was formed. The exclusive privilege of printing and publishing in the English dominions was thus given to ninety-seven London stationers and their successors by regular apprenticeship, and the Company was empowered to seize all publications by men outside their guild. Later, by a decree of the Star Chamber in 1586, one printing press was allowed to each University.

(ii.) Not content with this government monopoly of the "Art and mysterie of Printing," which continued, in theory at all events, till 1637, Queen Elizabeth, in 1559, determined to have \* all books read over \* 11

<sup>1</sup> 3 T. R. 431, n.

<sup>2</sup> 29 Howell's St. Tr. 49.

<sup>3</sup> 27 Howell's St. Tr. 675.

by loyal bishops and privy councillors before they were allowed to go to the official press. In 1586 the Star Chamber enacted that all books should be read over in manuscript, and licensed by either the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of London, save law books, which were to be read and licensed by the Chief Justice of either Bench or the Lord Chief Baron (a practice which continued down to the middle of the last century; see the prefaces to Burrows' and Douglas' Reports). Subsequently the Master of the Revels usurped the right of revising poems and plays, and the Vice-Chancellors of the Universities were allowed for convenience sake to license books to be printed at the University presses. It was soon found impossible to restrict the number of printing presses in the country, and the Government therefore insisted all the more vehemently that no book should be *published* without a previous licence. By the Star Chamber decree dated July 11th, 1637, all printed books were required to be submitted to the licensers and entered upon the registers of the Stationers' Company before they could be published; if this was not done, the printer was to be fined, and for ever disabled from exercising the art of printing, and his press and all copies of the unlicensed book forfeited to the Crown. The old word "*Imprimatur*" = "let it be *printed*," was still used to denote the consent of the licenser to its *publication*. After the abolition of the Star Chamber, the Long Parliament issued two orders, March 9th, 1642, and June 14th, 1643, very similar in effect to the decree of the Star Chamber last mentioned. Against these orders Milton published his noble but ineffectual protest, the "*Areopagitica*" (November 24th, 1644). The censorship of the press continued in England till 1695, and then its abolition was rather accidental than otherwise.<sup>1</sup>

(iii.) A third plan is to allow any book to be printed and published without any supervision or licence; but as soon as the attention of the Government is called to its harmful tendencies, to seize all the stock at the publishers and booksellers, and prevent the publisher from issuing any further copies. The Lord Lieutenant was till the year 1875 empowered to do this in Ireland, should any work appear to him \*seditious. Magistrates in England may deal thus with books proved to be obscene by virtue of Lord Campbell's Act.<sup>2</sup> The Court of Chancery and the House of Lords have occasionally by injunction forbidden the further publication of libels which they deemed contempts of court. But in all other cases, neither the Crown nor any court of law can restrain the indiscriminate sale or distribution of any work, however pernicious they may deem it to be.

<sup>1</sup> See Macaulay's "History of England," c. xix., vol. iii., pp. 399-405; 13 & 14 Car. II., c. 33; Proclamation of May 17th, 1680; 1 Jac. II., c. 17.

<sup>2</sup> 20 & 21 Vict., c. 83.

(iv.) Our present law permits any one to say, write, and publish what he pleases; but if he make a bad use of this liberty, he must be punished. If he unjustly attack an individual, the person defamed may sue for damages; if, on the other hand, the words be written or printed, or if treason or immorality be thereby inculcated, the offender can be tried for the misdemeanor either by information or indictment. In order that the criminal might be easily detected, it was enacted in 1712 that no person, under a penalty of £20, should sell or expose for sale any pamphlet without the name and place of abode of some known person by or for whom it was printed or published, written or printed thereon.<sup>1</sup> A similar enactment as to newspapers, 6 & 7 Will. IV., c. 76, was also repealed by the 32 & 33 Vict., c. 24. And now every paper or book which is meant to be published or dispersed must bear on it the name and address of the printer;<sup>2</sup> and the printer must for six calendar months carefully preserve at least one copy of each paper printed by him, and write thereon the name and address of the person who employed and paid him to print it.<sup>3</sup> Newspapers were indeed formerly regarded with great jealousy by the Government, and subjected to heavy duties. Under Charles II. and James II. the *London Gazette* (a small sheet appearing twice a week, every Monday and Thursday) was the only paper permitted to publish political news. Even their size was regulated by statute. The 6 Geo. IV., c. 119, first allowed newspapers to be printed on paper of any size. Moreover, till the 18 Vict., c. 27, they had to be printed on stamped paper. But in spite of all such petty restrictions, our press has been, ever since the passing of Fox's Libel Act, 32 Geo. III., c. 60, the freest in the world.

\* The only vestige remaining of such censorship is the \* 13 control of the Lord Chamberlain over plays. By the Theatres Regulation Act, 1843,<sup>4</sup> s. 14, it is enacted that it shall be lawful for the Lord Chamberlain for the time being, whenever he shall be of opinion that it is fitting for the preservation of good manners, decorum, or of the public peace so to do, to forbid the acting or presenting any stage play, or any act, scene, or part thereof, or any prologue or epilogue, or any part thereof, anywhere in Great Britain, or in such theatres as he shall specify, and either absolutely or for such time as he shall think fit.

No injunction can be obtained to prohibit the publication or

<sup>1</sup> 10 Anne, c. 19, s. 113, repealed in 1871 by the 33 & 34 Vict., c. 99.

<sup>2</sup> 2 & 3 Vict., c. 12, s. 2.

<sup>3</sup> 39 Geo. III., c. 79, s. 29.

<sup>4</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68.

republication of any libel, or to restrain its sale.<sup>1</sup> (a) The matter must first go before a jury, who are to decide whether the words complained of are libellous or not. The Crown has no authority to restrain the press; and the courts, whether of Law or of Equity, cannot, till after verdict, issue any injunction in respect of any libels, save such as are contempts of Court.<sup>2</sup>

There has been a strange conflict of authority on this point. As long ago as 1742, it was clearly laid down in *Roach v. Read* and another<sup>3</sup> that Courts of Equity had no jurisdiction over actions of libel and slander, whether public or private, except as contempts of their own Courts. The Courts of Common Law had at that time no power to grant injunctions at all. No doubt in the early days of arbitrary prerogative the Court of Star Chamber occasionally restrained the publication of works alleged to be seditious. But Scroggs was impeached for attempting to introduce the practice into the King's Bench. However, in *Du Bost v. Beresford*,<sup>4</sup> Lord Ellenborough, in deciding that a libellous picture could have no legal value as a work

\* 14 of art, said: "Upon an application to the Lord \* Chancellor, he would have granted an injunction against its exhibition, and the plaintiff was both civilly and criminally liable for having exhibited it." This, however, was a mere *obiter dictum*, and is said to have greatly surprised all practitioners in the Courts of Equity; it was expressly disavowed by Lord Campbell in the case of the Emperor of Austria *v. Day and Kossuth*.<sup>5</sup> It is, however, stated in the note to *Southey v. Sherwood*<sup>6</sup> that in a case of *Burnett v. Chetwood*, Lord Chancellor Parker granted an injunction to restrain the printing and publishing of a translation into English of a book written in Latin, and which he thought had better remain in Latin;

<sup>1</sup> *Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott*, L. R. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192; 23 W. R. 249; 31 L. T. 866.

<sup>2</sup> *Saxby v. Easterbrook*, 3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. R. 188.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Atk. 469; 2 Dick. 794.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Camp. 512.

<sup>5</sup> 3 De G. F. & J. 217, 239; 7 Jur. N. S. 639; 30 L. J. Ch. 690.

<sup>6</sup> 2 Mer. p. 441.

(a) *Singer Manuf. Co. v. Domestic Sewing Machine Co.*, 49 Ga. 70; *Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf. Co.*, 114 Mass. 69, citing *Huggonson's Case*, 2 Atk. 469, 488; *Gee v. Pritchard*, 2 Swanst. 402, 413; *Seeley v. Fisher*, 11 Sim. 581, 583; *Fleming v. Newton*, 1 H. L. Cas. 363, 371; *Austria v. Day*, 3 De G. F. & J. 217, 238; *Mulkern v. Ward*, L. R. 13 Eq. 619, and denying *Springhead Spinning*

*Co. v. Riley*, L. R. 6 Eq. 551; *Dixon v. Holden*, L. R. 7 Eq. 488; *Rollins v. Hinks*, L. R. 13 Eq. 355. Injunction against violating a trade-mark was distinguished in the Massachusetts case as resting on property in the same and an unlawful use of or attempt to use it. The want of jurisdiction to enjoin applies also to slander. See the two cases first cited.

"he looked upon it," he said, "that this Court had a superintendency over all books, and might in a summary way restrain the printing or publishing [of] any that contained reflections on religion or morality." The application was apparently made by an executor in order to protect his copyright in a book written by his testator; but the whole report is of very doubtful authority, being merely a note of the case extracted from a manuscript volume of uncertain authorship.<sup>1</sup> In *Clark v. Freeman*<sup>2</sup> Lord Langdale, M.R., laid it down most clearly that a Court of Equity would not interfere by injunction to prevent the publication of a libel, saying that if it did so it would be "reviving the criminal jurisdiction of the Star Chamber." And in *Fleming v. Newton*<sup>3</sup> Lord Cottenham was most distinctly of opinion that, whatever niceties might be shown to exist in Scotch law, such an interference with the liberty of the press was contrary to every principle of English law. See also the observations of Lord Eldon in *Gee v. Pritchard*,<sup>4</sup> and of Sir L. Shadwell in *Martin v. Wright*.<sup>5</sup>

In this state of the authorities, Malins, V.C., in *Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley*,<sup>6</sup> and *Dixon v. Holden*,<sup>7</sup> introduced an exception to the rule; for he decided that a Court of Equity had jurisdiction to restrain the publication of any document, which tended to the destruction or deterioration of the plaintiff's property, or \* even of the plaintiff's professional reputa- \* 15  
tion by which property is acquired. This decision professed to follow that of Lord Langdale, M.R., in *Routh v. Webster*,<sup>8</sup> in which case an injunction was granted to restrain, not indeed a libel, for there was none, but an improper and unauthorized use by the defendants of the plaintiff's name as a trustee of the defendant's joint-stock company. In a subsequent case, *Mulkern v. Ward*,<sup>9</sup> Wickens, V.C., commented very strongly on the decision in *Dixon v. Holden*, as introducing a "wholly new" rule, and one contrary to the previous decisions; and refused the injunction therein prayed for, as a violation of the liberty of the press.<sup>10</sup>

All doubts on the point were finally set at rest by the Court of Appeal in *Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott*,<sup>11</sup> where a very strong Court (Lord Cairns, L.C., and James and Mellish, L.JJ.), decided that the Court of

<sup>1</sup> See also *Gurney v. Longman*, 13 Ves. 493, 507; *Bathurst v. Kearsley*, *ib.* 494.

<sup>2</sup> 11 Beav. 112; 17 L. J. Ch. 142; 12 Jur. 149.

<sup>3</sup> 1 H. L. C. 363.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Swan. 413.

<sup>5</sup> 6 Sim. 297.

<sup>6</sup> L. R. 6 Eq. 551; 37 L. J. Ch. 889; 16 W. R. 1138; 19 L. T. 64.

<sup>7</sup> L. R. 7 Eq. 488; 17 W. R. 482; 20 L. T. 357.

<sup>8</sup> 10 Beav. 561.

<sup>9</sup> L. R. 13 Eq. 619; 41 L. J. Ch. 464; 26 L. T. 831.

<sup>10</sup> See also *James v. James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; 41 L. J. Ch. 253; 26 L. T. 568; *Clover v. Royden*, L. R. 17 Eq. 190; 43 L. J. Ch. 665; 22 W. R. 254; 29 L. T. 639; and the American cases of *Brandreth v. Lance*, 8 Paige 24; and *Hoyt v. McKenzie*, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 320.

<sup>11</sup> L. R. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192; 23 W. R. 249; 31 L. T. 866.

Chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel as such, even if it is injurious to property ; and expressly overruled *Dixon v. Holden* and *Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley*. This decision was followed by the Court of Appeal in *Fisher and Co. v. Apollinaris Co.*,<sup>1</sup> and in Ireland in *Hammersmith Skating Rink Co. v. Dublin Skating Rink Co.*<sup>2</sup> Vice-Chancellor Malins, however, appears to remain of the same opinion still ; for in *Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam* <sup>3</sup> he decided that the decision of the Court of Appeal was in some way controlled or overruled by sub-s. 8 of s. 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873, which had come into force in the meantime. But it has since been most clearly laid down by James, L.J., that that sub-section in no way alters the principles on which a  
 16 \* Court of Equity should act in granting injunctions.<sup>4</sup> \* And Lord Coleridge, C.J., appears to be of the same opinion.<sup>5</sup> The decision of Malins, V.C., on the interlocutory application in *Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam*, must therefore be considered to be overruled, as well as his previous decision in *Dixon v. Holden* ; and the Master of the Rolls has, according to Lindley, J.,<sup>6</sup> refused to follow it (probably in *Hinrichs v. Berndes*).<sup>7</sup>

But these decisions in no way interfere with what is obviously quite a different matter — the right of the plaintiff to claim an injunction on his writ in addition to damages, such injunction to be granted by the judge only *after* the jury have found the publication complained of to be a libel. Libel or no libel is pre-eminently a question for a jury, but after they have once decided it, the judge may, if he is of opinion that any repetition of the libel would be injurious to the plaintiff's property, grant an injunction restraining any repetition thereof.<sup>8</sup>

As to what libels amount to contempt of Court, see *post*, c. XVII., Seditious Libels.

<sup>1</sup> L. R. 10 Ch. 297 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 500 ; 23 W. R. 460 ; 32 L. T. 628.

<sup>2</sup> 10 Ir. R. Eq. 235.

<sup>3</sup> 6 Ch. D. 582 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 713.

<sup>4</sup> *Day v. Brownrigg*, 10 Ch. D. 307 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 173 ; 27 W. R. 217 ; 39 L. T. 226, 553 ; *Gaskin v. Balls*, 13 Ch. D. 324 ; 28 W. R. 552.

<sup>5</sup> 3 C. P. D. 343.

<sup>6</sup> 3 C. P. D. 342.

<sup>7</sup> Weekly Notes for 1878, p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> *Saxby v. Easterbrook*, 3 C. P. D. 339 ; 27 W. R. 188. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam*, 28 W. R. 295 ; 41 L. T. 542 ; (C. A.) 14 Ch. D. 763 ; 28 W. R. 966 ; 42 L. T. 851 ; *Thomas v. Williams*, 14 Ch. D. 864 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 605 ; 28 W. R. 983 ; 43 L. T. 91. See also the remarks of Lord Langdale, M.R., in *Clark v. Freeman*, 11 Beav. 117, 8 ; and of the present Master of the Rolls in *Hinrichs v. Berndes*, Weekly Notes for 1878, p. 11.



## CHAPTER II.

### DEFAMATORY WORDS.

WORDS which produce any appreciable injury to the reputation of another are called DEFAMATORY.

*Diffamare est in malâ famâ ponere* (Bartol). The question in each case therefore is: Has the reputation of this individual plaintiff been appreciably impaired in consequence of the words employed by the defendant? No general rule can be laid down stating absolutely and beforehand what words are defamatory and what not. Words which would seriously injure A.'s reputation might do B.'s no harm. Each case must be decided on its own facts.

Defamation was formerly an ecclesiastical offence, cognizable only in the spiritual court; and then defamatory words would be such as the ecclesiastical court would punish. But all such suits were abolished by the<sup>\*</sup> 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41. So now it is convenient to use the word "Defamation" as a general term embracing both "Slander" and "Libel."

If in any given case the words employed by the defendant have appreciably injured the plaintiff's reputation, then the plaintiff has suffered an *injuria*, which is actionable without proof of any damage. Every man has a right to be protected from defamation, as much as from assault or bodily harm. "His reputation is his property, and if possible more valuable than other property;"<sup>1</sup> and just as \*any invasion of a man's \*18 property is actionable without proof of any pecuniary loss, so is any disparagement of his reputation. Every man has a right to his good name, a right which no one may violate. And such a right is a *real* right; all men are bound to forbear from all such imputations against him as would amount to injuries to his reputation.<sup>2</sup> "It was the rule of Holt, C.J., to make words

<sup>1</sup> Per Malins, V.C., in *Dixon v. Holden*, L. R. 7 Eq. 492; 17 W. R. 482; 20 L. T. 357.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Austin's Jurisprudence, p. 51.

actionable whenever they *sound to the disreputation of the person* of whom they were spoken, and this was also Hale's and Twisden's rule, and I think it a very good rule." <sup>1</sup>

Whenever these words clearly "sound to the disreputation" of the plaintiff, there is no need of further proof, they are defamatory on the face of them, and actionable *per se*. The injury to the reputation is the gist of the action, and wherever that is clear, there is no need to inquire whether there is any injury to the pocket as well. But where it is by no means clear from the words themselves that they *must* have injured the plaintiff's reputation, there the Court requires proof of some special damage to show that as a matter of fact the words have in this case impaired the plaintiff's good name. Proof of this kind is, as we have seen, required more frequently in actions of slander than of libel. Words which are merely uncivil, words of idle abuse, are clearly no ground for an action, unless it can be shown that in fact some appreciable damage to the plaintiff has followed from their use. *De minimis non curat lex*.

Mr. Townshend, the author of a learned American treatise on Slander and Libel, appears to me to fall into an error on this point. He devotes a whole chapter to maintaining "that pecuniary loss to the plaintiff \* 19 is the gist of the action for slander \* or libel. If the language published has not occasioned the plaintiff pecuniary loss (actual or implied), then no action can be maintained."<sup>2</sup>(a) Surely he might as well contend that the gist of an action of assault and battery was the doctor's bill the plaintiff had to pay. Is it not clear that injury to the plaintiff's reputation is the gist of the action, and special damage is but evidence of that injury? Every man has an absolute right to have his person, his property, and his reputation preserved inviolate. Bacon commences his tract on the Use of the Law by this express declaration:—"The Use of the Law consisteth principally in these three things:

"1. To secure men's persons from death and violence.

"2. To dispose the property of their goods and lands.

<sup>1</sup> Per Fortescue, J., in *Button v. Heyward*, 8 Mod. 24, referring perhaps to *Baker v. Pierce*, 6 Mod. 24.

<sup>2</sup> C. iv. § 57.

(a) The question raised by Mr. Townshend is not a barren one. If his view be correct, no person holding an office of mere honor or trust can maintain an action for words touching him solely therein, though the same words would be actionable if the

office were one of emolument. This appears to be in the face of the settled English doctrine concerning words spoken of justices of the peace, barristers, and others whose vocation is merely honorary in law. See *post*, pp. 64, 70, 74.

“ 3. For preservation of their good names from shame and infamy. . . .

“ If any man beat, wound or maime another, or give false scandalous words that may touch his credit, the Law giveth thereupon an action of the case, for the slander of his good name ; and an action of Battery, or an appeal of Maime, by which recompence shall be recovered, to the value of the hurt, damage or danger.” Mr. Townshend would reduce Bacon’s three uses of the law to two ; for he implies that the law will not redress a mere injury to the reputation unless it be accompanied by an injury to the person or the property of the plaintiff. Bacon merely requires that the words should “ touch the plaintiff’s credit ;” where it is not obvious that the words must have that result, then the plaintiff must bring evidence of some material loss which will show that his credit has in fact been touched.

And how does Mr. Townshend get over the fact that in nine cases of defamation out of every ten the plaintiff is never called on to prove that “ pecuniary loss ” which he maintains to be the gist of the action ? He has recourse to that time-honored expedient, a legal fiction. He insists “ that, where the law does protect reputation, it does so indirectly, by means of a fiction—an assumption of pecuniary loss. In theory, the action for slander or libel is always for the pecuniary injury, and not for the injury to the reputation. There are many such fictions introduced into the administration of the law, by means of which, without changing the rule of law, the law is, in effect, changed.” \* That \* 20 there be many such fictions is surely no ground for increasing their number by inventing a fresh one. And what an absurdity such a fiction would be ! If I assert that the Prime Minister stole a penny bun, the law will solemnly presume, says Mr. Townshend, that the Prime Minister thereupon instantly incurred a money loss of, say, £50. And how capricious is this fiction. For had I been content with calling the Prime Minister a liar, the law would not presume the loss of a farthing. Such a fiction also is opposed to the history of our law ; for we know that in Anglo-Saxon and in Norman times an exaggerated value was set on a man’s reputation. Evidence of a prisoner’s good character would insure his acquittal of any crime. In short, all that is required by our common law is that the injury to a man’s reputation should be appreciable, *i.e.*, capable of being assessed by a jury. And so no action lies for mere words of vulgar abuse, or for words which have inflicted no substantial injury on the plaintiff’s reputation, on the principle *De minimis non curat lex*.

It is the more strange that Mr. Townshend should have made such an error ; because the language of the Judges in his own country is clear and express. Thus the Court of Appeals in New York lays down the law most distinctly in the following words : “ The action for slander is given by the law as a remedy for ‘ injuries affecting a man’s reputation or good name by

malicious, scandalous, and slanderous words tending to his damage and derogation.’<sup>1</sup> It is injuries affecting the reputation only which are the subject of the action.” And then, after referring to some examples of special damage, the Court continues: “These instances are sufficient to illustrate the kind of special damage that must result from defamatory words not otherwise actionable to make them so; they are damages produced by, or through, impairing the reputation. . . . The words must be defamatory in their nature; and must in fact disparage the character; and this disparagement must be evidenced by some positive loss arising therefrom directly and legitimately as a fair and natural result. . . . The special damages must flow from impaired reputation. . . . The loss of character must be a substantive loss, one which has actually taken  
 \* 21 place.”<sup>2</sup> It is clear from these expressions and also from \* the judgment in *Wilson v. Goit*, in the same volume, p. 443, that the Court of Appeals in New York considered that the loss of reputation was the gist of the action, and that special damage is but evidence of loss of reputation, and is necessary only where without some such evidence it would not be clear that the plaintiff’s reputation had in fact been impaired.

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## PART I.

### LIBEL.

IN cases of libel, any words will be presumed defamatory which expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, which tend to injure him in his profession or trade, or cause him to be shunned or avoided by his neighbors.

“Everything, printed or written, which reflects on the character of another, and is published without lawful justification or excuse, is a libel, whatever the intention may have been.”<sup>3</sup> The words need not necessarily impute disgraceful conduct to the plaintiff; it is sufficient if they render him contemptible or ridiculous.<sup>4</sup>

Any written words are defamatory which impute to the plain-

<sup>1</sup> 3 Bl. Com. 123.

<sup>2</sup> *Terwilliger v. Wands*, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.) 59, 63.

<sup>3</sup> Per Parke, B., in *O’Brien v. Clement*, 15 M. & W. 435.

<sup>4</sup> *Cropp v. Tilney*, 3 Salk. 226; *Villers v. Monsley*, 2 Wils. 403.

tiff that he has been guilty of any crime, fraud, dishonesty, immorality, vice, or dishonorable conduct, or has been accused or suspected of any such misconduct; or which suggest that the plaintiff is suffering from any infectious disorder; or which have a tendency to injure him in his office, profession, calling, or trade. And so too are all words which hold the plaintiff up to contempt, hatred, scorn, or ridicule, and which, by thus engendering an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking men, tend to deprive him of friendly intercourse and society.

\* A libel need not necessarily be in writing or printing. \* 22  
Any caricature or scandalous printing, or effigy, will constitute a libel.<sup>1</sup> But it must be something permanent in its nature, not fleeting, as are spoken words.

It appears to be impossible to define a libel with any greater precision or lucidity. I proceed at once therefore to give instances. (a)

<sup>1</sup> 5 Rep. 125*b*; Anon. 11 Mod. 99; Austin v. Culpepper, 2 Show. 313; Skin. 123; Jefferies v. Duncombe, 11 East, 226; Du Bost v. Beresford, 2 Camp. 511.

(a) The following definition of libel proposed by Mr. Hamilton in *People v. Crosswell*, 3 Johns. Cas. 354, is often found in the books: A censorious or ridiculing writing, picture, or sign, made with a mischievous and malicious intent, towards government, magistrates, or individuals. *Steele v. Southwick*, 9 Johns. 214; *Cooper v. Greeley*, 1 Denio, 347; *State v. Farley*, 4 McCord, 317. But this is somewhat labored, and it is more common at the present time to say that any false writing, print, or sign likely to bring a man into disgrace, hatred, ridicule, or contempt, is a libel. *Price v. Whitely*, 50 Mo. 439; *Nelson v. Musgrave*, 10 Mo. 648; *Atwill v. Mackintosh*, 120 Mass. 177; *Tillson v. Robbins*, 68 Maine, 295; *White v. Nichols*, 3 How. 266; *Barr v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 385; *Gabe v. McGinnis*, 68 Ind. 538; *Cary v. Allen*, 39 Wis. 481; *Wilson v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 363; *Adams v. Lawson*, 17 Gratt. 250; *Geisler v. Brown*, 6 Neb. 254. But the last case is a remarkable instance of a disregard of the definition adopted in it. The words of the definition are doubtless to be taken in the disjunctive. It is not necessary to charge a crime though the particular case would not amount to actionable slander

were it an oral publication. *Snyder v. Fulton*, 34 Md. 128; *Gabe v. McGinnis*, *supra*; *Johnson v. Stebbins*, 5 Ind. 364; *Smawley v. Stark*, 9 Ind. 386; *Steele v. Southwick*, 9 Johns. 214; *Tryon v. Evening News Assoc.*, 39 Mich. 636; *Stow v. Converse*, 3 Conn. 325; *Commonwealth v. Wright*, 1 Cush. 46. The following are examples of libellous language: "A drunkard, a cuckold, and a tory." *Giles v. State*, 6 Ga. 276. "A report raised by A. B. against brother C., stating that he made him pay a note twice, and proved by A. B. to be false." *Shelton v. Nance*, 7 B. Mon. 128. "B. would put his name to anything that T. would request him to sign that would prejudice D.'s character." *Duncan v. Brown*, 15 B. Mon. 186. "He is thought no more of than a horse thief and a counterfeiter." *Nelson v. Musgrave*, 10 Mo. 648. The plaintiff will not sue in a certain county "because he is known there." *Cooper v. Greeley*, 1 Denio, 347. That a person has been deprived of the chief ordinance of a church to which he belongs. *McCorekile v. Binns*, 5 Binn. 340. Obituary notice of a living person. *McBride v. Ellis*, 9 Rich. 313. "I look upon him as a rascal, and have watched him many years." *Williams v.*

*Illustrations.*

It is libellous to write and publish of a man that he is —

- "an infernal villain," *Bell v. Stone*, 1 B. & P. 331 ;
  - "an impostor," *Cooke v. Hughes*, R. & M. 112 ; *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, 3 B. & S. 769 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1069 ; 11 W. R. 569 ; 8 L. T. 201 ;
  - "a hypocrite," *Thorley v. Lord Kerry*, 4 Taunt. 355 ; 3 Camp. 214 n. ;
  - "a frozen snake," *Hoare v. Silverlock* (No. 1, 1848), 12 Q. B. 624 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 306 ; 12 Jur. 695 ;
  - "a rogue and a rascal," per Gould, J., in *Villers v. Monsley*, 2 Wils. 403 ;
  - "a dishonest man," per cur. in *Austin v. Culpepper*, Skin. 124 ; 2 Show. 314 ; (a)
  - "a mere man of straw," *Eaton v. Johns*, 1 Dowl. (N. S.) 602 ;
  - "an itchy old toad," *Villers v. Monsley*, 2 Wils. 403 ;
  - "a desperate adventurer," association with whom "would inevitably cover" gentlemen "with ridicule and disrepute," *Wakley v. Healey*, 7 C. B. 591 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 241 ;
  - that "he grossly insulted two ladies," *Clement v. Chivis*, 9 B. & C. 172 ; 4 M. & R. 127 ;
  - that "he is unfit to be trusted with money," *Cheese v. Scales*, 10 M. & W. 488 ; 12 L. J. Ex. 13 ; 6 Jur. 958 ;
  - that "he is insolvent and cannot pay his debts," *Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins*, 4 H. & N. 146 ; 28 L. J. Ex. 201 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 226 ; 7 W. R. 265 ; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281 ;
  - that "he was once in difficulties," though it is stated that such difficulties are now at an end, *Cox v. Lee*, L. R. 4 Ex. 284 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 219 ;
- \* 23      \* that he is "the most artful scoundrel that ever existed," "is in every person's debt," and that "his ruin cannot be long delayed," and that "he is not deserving of the slightest commiseration," *Rutherford v. Evans*, 6 Bing. 451 ; 8 L. J. (Old S.) C. P. 86 ;

*Karnes*, 4 Humph. 9. That the plaintiff has put in circulation a false, scandalous, and scurrilous report. *Colby v. Reynolds*, 6 Vt. 489. "He is a miserable fellow, and it is impossible for a newspaper article to injure him ; the community could hardly despise him worse than now." *Brown v. Remington*, 7 Wis. 462. "Refusing to correct G. C. as a witness, when I believe he knew his statement was not true." *Coombs v. Rose*, 8 Blackf. 155. "He is a fawning sycophant, a misrepresentative in Congress, and a grovelling office-seeker ; he has abandoned his post in Congress in pursuit of an office." *Thomas v. Croswell*, 7 Johns. 264. "'Our army swore terribly in Flanders,' said Uncle Toby ; and if Toby were here now he might say the same of some modern swearers. The man at the sign of the Bible is no slouch at swearing." *Steele v. Southwick*, 9 Johns. 214. "Blackmailing," *Edsall v. Brooks*,

2 Robt. 29 ; s. c. 3 Robt. 284. "A report has gone abroad through S. W. that R. M. had a load of falsely packed cotton ; which is false." *Woodburn v. Miller*, Cheves, 194.

(a) Dishonesty charged against an individual in his business is clearly actionable *per se*. *Orr v. Skofield*, 56 Maine, 483 ; *Fowles v. Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 20. So of a written imputation of want of integrity in a tradesman. *Platto v. Geilfuss*, 47 Wis. 491, citing a series of Wisconsin cases from *Cramer v. Noonan*, 4 Wis. 231 to *Kimball v. Fernandez*, 41 Wis. 329. But it was held in *Platto v. Geilfuss* that it was no libel for the cashier of a bank to inform the drawer of a check that the drawee, who had agreed to honor the same, "pays no attention to notices," though the check had not been presented to him for payment. The words were taken as referring only to the particular check.

that he is "at the head of a gang of swindlers," that he is "a common informer, and has been guilty of deceiving and defrauding divers persons with whom he had dealings," *I'Anson v. Stuart*, 1 T. R. 748 ; 2 Smith's L. C. 6th ed. 57 ; *R. v. Saunders*, Sir Thos. Raym. 201 ; (a)

that the plaintiff sought admission to a club and was black-balled, and bolted the next morning without paying his debts, *O'Brien v. Clement*, 16 M. & W. 159 ; 16 L. J. Ex. 76 ; 4 D. & L. 343.

So it is libellous to write and publish of a landlord that he put in a distress in order to help his insolvent tenant to defraud his creditors. *Haire v. Wilson*, 9 B. & C. 643 ; 4 M. & R. 605.

It is libellous for a defendant to write a letter charging his sister with having unnecessarily made him a party to a Chancery suit, and adding "it is a pleasure to her to put me to all the expense she can." *Fray v. Fray*, 17 C. B. N. S. 603 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 45 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1153. (b)

It is libellous to write of a lady applying for relief from a charitable society, that her claims are unworthy, and that she spends all the money given her by the benevolent in printing circulars filled with abuse of the society's secretary. *Hoare v. Silverlock* (No. 1, 1848), 12 Q. B. 624 ; 17 L. J. Q. B. 306 ; 12 Jur. 695.

To state in writing that the plaintiff is insane, or that her mind is affected, is libellous, if false. *Morgan v. Lingen*, 8 L. T. 800. (c)

Ironical praise may be a libel ; e.g., calling an attorney "an honest lawyer." *Boydell v. Jones*, 4 M. & W. 446 ; 7 Dowl. 210 ; 1 H. & H. 408 ; *R. v. Brown*, 11 Mod. 86 ; *Holt*, 425 ; *Sir Baptist Hicks' Case*, Hob. 215 ; Poph. 139.

It is libellous to impute to a Presbyterian "gross intolerance" in not allowing his hearse to be used at the funeral of his Roman Catholic servant. *Teacy v. McKenna*, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 374.

It is *prima facie* libellous to charge the plaintiff with ingratitude even though the facts on which the charge is based be stated, and they do not bear it out. *Cox v. Lee*, L. R. 4 Ex. 284 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 219.

It is libellous to state in a newspaper of a young nobleman that he drove over a lady and killed her and yet attended a public ball that very evening (although this only amounts to a charge of unfeeling conduct). *Churchill v. Hunt*, 1 Chit. 480 ; 2 B. & A. 685.

It is libellous to write and publish of a lady of high rank that she has her photograph taken incessantly, morning, noon, and night, and receives a commission on the sale of such photographs. *R. v. Rosenberg*, *Times* for Oct. 27th, 28th, 1879.

\* It is a libel to impute or imply that a grand jury have found a true bill \* 24 against the plaintiff for any crime. *Harvey v. French*, 1 Cr. & M. 11.

It is libellous to publish a highly colored account of judicial proceedings, mixed with the reporter's own observations and conclusions upon what passed in Court, containing an insinuation that the plaintiff had committed perjury. *Stiles v. Nokes*, 7 East, 493 ; same case *sub nomine Carr v. Jones*, 3 Smith, 491.

It is libellous to write and publish of the editor of a paper that he is "a convicted felon" and "a felon editor ;" even although the fact is that he was convicted of felony,

(a) It is not libellous to publish in a newspaper that the plaintiff has in answer to an action set up a defence assumed by the writer and regarded by those addressed as odious, the defence being one allowed by law. *Homer v. Engelhardt*, 117 Mass. 539.

(b) So to charge one (though a foreigner) with attempting to evade and defraud the revenue laws of the United States. *Worthington v. Houghton*, 109 Mass. 481.

(c) *Southwick v. Stevens*, 10 Johns. 443.

and underwent a term of imprisonment with hard labor. *Leyman v. Latimer and others*, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; 46 L. J. Ex. 765; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 25 W. R. 751; 26 W. R. 305; 37 L. T. 360, 819.

It is libellous to write about the plaintiff's "defalcations." *Bruton v. Downes*, 1 F. & F. 668.

It is libellous to write and publish of a man that a certain notorious prostitute is "under his patronage or protection." *More v. Bennett* (1872), 48 N. Y. R. (3 Sickel), 472.

Or of a married man that his conduct towards his wife is so cruel that she was compelled to summon him before the magistrates. *Hakewell v. Ingram*, 2 C. L. Rep. (1854), p. 1397.

It is libellous "to paint a man playing at cudgels with his wife." Per Lord Holt, C.J., in *Anon.* 11 Mod. 99: see *Du Bost v. Beresford*, 2 Camp. 511.

It is a libel on a married lady to assert that her husband is petitioning for a divorce from her. *R. v. Rosenberg*, *R. v. Head & Marks*, *Times* for Oct. 27th, 28th, 1879.

It is libellous to call a manufacturer a "truckmaster," for this implies that he has been guilty of practices in contravention of the Truck Act. *Homer v. Taunton*, 5 H. & N. 661; 29 L. J. Ex. 318; 8 W. R. 499; 2 L. T. 512.

It is libellous to charge in writing a man with having cheated at dice or on the turf, although all gambling and horse-racing transactions are illegal or at least void. *Greville v. Chapman*, 5 Q. B. 731; 13 L. J. Q. B. 172; 8 Jur. 189; D. & M. 553; *Yrisarri v. Clement*, 3 Bing. 432; 11 Moore, 308; 2 C. & P. 223.

It is libellous to call a man a "black-leg" or a "black-sheep." But there should be an averment that these words mean a person guilty of habitually cheating and defrauding others. *McGregor v. Gregory*, 11 M. & W. 287; 12 L. J. Ex. 204; 2 D. N. S. 769; *O'Brien v. Clement*, 16 M. & W. 166; 16 L. J. Ex. 77; and see *Barnett v. Allen*, 1 F. & F. 125; 27 L. J. Ex. 412; 4 Jur. N. S. 488; 3 H. & N. 376.

\* 25 \* It is libellous to write and publish of the plaintiff the following words: "Digby has had a tolerable run of luck. He keeps a well-spread sideboard, but I always consider myself in a family hotel when my legs are under his table, for the bill is sure to come in sooner or later, though I rarely dabble in the mysteries of écarté or any other game. The fellow is as deep as Crockford, and as knowing as the Marquis. I do dislike this leg-al profession." *Digby v. Thompson and another*, 4 B. & Ad. 821; 1 N. & M. 485.

It is libellous to write and publish of a clergyman that he poisoned foxes on the estate of Sir M. S., in a fox-hunting county, and had been hung up in effigy in consequence of such "dastardly behavior." *R. v. Cooper*, 8 Q. B. 533; 15 L. J. Q. B. 206; *Foulger v. Newcomb*, L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 15 W. R. 1181; 16 L. T. 595.

It is libellous to publish in a newspaper a story of the plaintiff calculated to make him ludicrous, though he had previously told the same story of himself. *Cook v. Ward*, 6 Bing. 409; 4 M. & P. 99.

But it is not defamatory to write of another that he is "Man Friday." *Forbes v. King*, 1 Dowl. 672; 2 L. J. Ex. 109. For, as Lord Denman, C.J., observes in *Hoare v. Silverlock* (No. 1, 1848), 12 Q. B. 626; 17 L. J. Q. B. 308: "That imputed no crime at all. The 'Man Friday,' we all know, was a very respectable man, although a black man, and black men have not been denounced as criminals yet." The law is otherwise in the United States. *King v. Wood*, 1 N. & M. (South Car.) 184.

Where the defendants posted up in a public club-room the following notice: "The Rev. J. Robinson and Mr. J. K., inhabitants of this town, not being persons that the



proprietors and annual subscribers think it proper to associate with, are excluded this room ;" this was held no libel. *Robinson v. Jermyn*, 1 Price, 11.

It is not libellous to publish in a newspaper that the plaintiff has sued his mother-in-law in the County Court. *Cox v. Cooper*, 12 W. R. 75 ; 9 L. T. 329. (a)

The following words are no libel (in their obvious and natural meaning at all events) : — "Society of Guardians for the Protection of Trade against Swindlers and Sharpers. I am directed to inform you that the persons using the firm of Goldstein & Co. are reported to this Society as improper to be proposed to be balloted for as members thereof." The judgment would have been otherwise, had there been an averment that it was the custom of the society to designate swindlers and sharpers by the term "improper persons to be members of this society." *Goldstein v. Foss*, 6 B. & C. 154 (in Ex. Ch.) ; 4 Bing. 489 ; 2 C. & P. 252 ; 2 Y. & J. 146 ; 1 M. & P. 402.

It is not a libel to write and publish in the *Times* : — "We are requested to state that the honorary secretary of the Tichborne Defence Fund is not and never was a captain in the Royal Artillery as he has been erroneously described," for these words do not impute that the plaintiff had so represented himself. *Hunt v. Goodlake*, 43 L. J. C. P. 54 ; 29 L. T. 472.

\* It is not defamatory to write and publish of the plaintiff words implying \* 26 that he endeavored to suppress dissension and discourage sedition in Ireland ; for, though such words might injure him in the minds of criminals and rebels, they would not tend to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking men. *Mawe v. Pigott*, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 54. And see *Clay v. Roberts*, 9 Jur. N. S. 580 ; 11 W. R. 649 ; 8 L. T. 397.

So a notice sent by a landlord to his tenants : — "Messrs. Henty & Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment any cheques drawn on any of the branches of the Capital and Counties Bank," is not defamatory. *Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty & Sons*, 28 W. R. 490 ; 42 L. T. 314 ; (C. A.) 5 C. P. D. 514 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 830 ; 28 W. R. 851.

The plaintiff was a certificated art master, and had been master at the Walsall Science and Art Institute. His engagement there ceased in June, 1874, and he then started, and became master of, another school, which was called "The Walsall Government School of Art," and was opened in August. In September the following advertisement appeared in the Walsall Observer, signed by the defendants as chairman, treasurer, and secretary of the Institute respectively : — "Walsall Science and Art Institute. The public are informed that Mr. Mulligan's connection with the institute has ceased, and that he is not authorised to receive subscriptions on its behalf." Held that this was no libel ; and that no innuendo could make it so : for the words were not capable of a defamatory meaning. *Mulligan v. Cole* and others, L. R. 10 Q. B. 549 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153 ; 33 L. T. 12.

If the words are not reasonably susceptible of any defamatory meaning, the Court will hold the statement of claim bad on demurrer ; or if there be no demurrer, the judge at the trial will stop the case. But if the words are reasonably susceptible of two constructions, the one an innocent, the other a libellous construction, then it is a question for the jury which construc-

(a) But it has been thought that to publish in a newspaper of a woman that she is "an inhuman stepmother. She beats her child over the head with a club," is not actionable *per se* ; a shocking doctrine. *Geisler v. Brown*, 6 Neb. 254.

tion is the proper one; and in such a case if the defendant demurs, his demurrer will be overruled;<sup>1</sup> if the judge at the trial nonsuits, the Court will order a new trial.<sup>2</sup>

The jury should always read the alleged libel through \* 27 before deciding that its tendency is injurious. A word \* at the end may alter the whole meaning.<sup>3</sup> So if in one part appears something to the plaintiff's discredit, in another something to his credit, "the bane" and "the antidote" should be taken together. The jury should not dwell on isolated passages, but judge of the publication as a whole.<sup>4</sup>

### *Illustration.*

The report of a trial for libel contained some strong observations against the plaintiff, which were indeed a necessary part of the report, as the defendant had justified. At the end it was stated that the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for £30. *Held* that the publication taken as a whole was not injurious to the plaintiff. *Chalmers v. Payne*, 2 C. M. & R. 156; 5 Tyrw. 766; 1 Gale, 69.

It is libellous to impute to any one holding an office that he has been guilty of improper conduct in that office or has been actuated by wicked, corrupt, or selfish motives, or is incompetent for the post. So it is libellous to impute to a member of any of the learned professions that he does not possess the technical knowledge necessary for the proper practice of such profession, or that he has been guilty of professional misconduct. And it is not necessary (as it is in cases of slander, *post*, p. 69) that the person libelled should at the time still hold that office or exercise that profession: it is actionable to impute past misconduct when in office.<sup>5</sup> (a)

<sup>1</sup> *Jenner and another v. A'Beckett*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464.

<sup>2</sup> *Hart and another v. Wall*, 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373.

<sup>3</sup> See *Hunt v. Algar*, 6 C. & P. 245; *post*, p. 100.

<sup>4</sup> Per Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in *R. v. Lambert & Perry*, 2 Camp. 398; 31 How. St. Tr. 340; per Lord Kenyon, C. J., in *R. v. Reeves*, Peake Add. Cas. 84; per Fitzgerald, J., in *R. v. Sullivan*, 11 Cox C. C. 58.

<sup>5</sup> *Parmiter v. Coupland*, 6 M. & W. 108; *Boydell v. Jones*, 4 M. & W. 446; *Warman v. Hine*, 1 Jur. 820; *Goodburne v. Bowman*, 9 Bing. 532.

(a) See *Cramer v. Riggs*, 17 Wend. 209; *Eviston v. Cramer*, 47 Wis. 659. But should be such as to expose the individual to disgrace or reproach irrespective of his late office. *Post*, p. 69, note.

In cases of slander there is a curious distinction drawn between offices of profit merely and offices of honor, such as that \* of justice \* 28 of the peace; and it has been held that merely to impute incompetency or want of ability (as distinct from a want of integrity or impartiality) to a justice of the peace is not actionable, see p. 70. There is no authority, however, for supposing that an action of libel would not lie, if such words were printed and published.

### *Illustrations.*

It is libellous to write and publish of a Protestant archbishop that he attempted to convert a Catholic priest by offers of money and of preferment in the Church of England and Ireland. *Archbishop of Tuam v. Robeson* and another, 5 Bing. 17; 2 M. & P. 32.

It is libellous to write and publish of an ex-mayor and a justice of the peace that during his mayoralty he was guilty of partiality and corruption and displayed ignorance of his duties; and this notwithstanding the public nature of the offices he held. *Parmiter v. Coupland*, 6 M. & W. 105; 9 L. J. Ex. 202; 4 Jur. 701; *Goodburne v. Bowman*, 9 Bing. 532.

It is libellous to write and publish of a clergyman that he came to the performance of divine service in a towering passion, and that his conduct is calculated to make infidels of his congregation. *Walter v. Brogden*, 19 C. B. N. S. 65; *Gathercole v. Miall*, 15 M. & W. 319; 10 Jur. 337; 15 L. J. Ex. 179. But see *Kelly v. Tinling*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699; 35 L. J. Q. B. 231; 12 Jur. N. S. 940; 14 W. R. 51; 13 L. T. 255.

It is libellous to write and publish of a dissenting minister:—"A serious misunderstanding has recently taken place amongst the independent dissenters of Great Marlow and their pastor, in consequence of some personal invectives publicly thrown from the pulpit by the latter against a young lady of distinguished merit and spotless reputation. We understand, however, that the matter is to be taken up seriously."—*Buck's Chronicle*. *Edwards v. Bell* and others, 1 Bing. 403.

As to a Roman Catholic priest, see *Hearne v. Stowell*, 12 A. & E. 719; 4 P. & D. 696; 6 Jur. 458.

A body of trustees of a certain charity can sue jointly for a libellous letter published in the *Wisbeach Chronicle* imputing to them improper management of the charity funds. *Booth v. Briscoe* (C. A.), 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. R. 838.

### *Parish Officers, &c.*

It is libellous to charge an overseer of a parish with "oppressive conduct" towards the paupers. *Woodard v. Dowsing*, 2 M. & Ry. 74.

\* A placard stating of a certain overseer that when out of office he advocated \* 29 low rates, when in office he advocated high rates, and that the defendant would not trust him with £5 of his property, is a libel. *Cheese v. Scales*, 10 M. & W. 488.

It is libellous to accuse a vestry clerk with having in any way misapplied the money of the parish. *May v. Brown*, 3 B. & C. 113.

It is libellous to charge a guardian of the poor with having been during the preceding year "a great defaulter" in his account. *Warman v. Hine*, 1 Jur. 820.

It is libellous to charge the clerk to the justices of a borough with corruption. *Blagg v. Sturt*, 10 Q. B. 899; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39; 11 Jur. 101. (α)

(α) So to charge a late sealer of weights "doctoring" such weights. *Eviston v. Cramer*, 47 Wis. 659.

It is libellous to impute habitual drunkenness and neglect of his duties to a certificated master mariner. *Coxhead v. Richards*, 2 C. B. 569; 15 L. J. C. P. 278; 10 Jur. 984; *Harwood v. Green*, 2 C. & P. 141; *Irwin v. Brandwood*, 2 H. & C. 960; 33 L. J. Ex. 257; 9 L. T. 772; 10 Jur. N. S. 370; 12 W. R. 438.

*Medical Men.*

To advertise falsely that certain quack medicines were prepared by a physician of eminence is a libel upon such physician. *Clark v. Freeman*, 11 Beav. 112; 17 L. J. Ch. 142; 12 Jur. 149.

But it is no libel to write and publish of a physician that he has met homœopathists in consultation; although it be averred in the declaration that to do so would be a breach of professional etiquette. *Clay v. Roberts*, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 580; 11 W. R. 649; 8 L. T. 397.

*Barristers.*

To write and publish falsely of a barrister that he edited the third edition of a law-book is actionable, if the book is proved to be full of inaccuracies which would seriously prejudice the plaintiff's reputation. *Archbold v. Sweet*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 162; 5 C. & P. 219.

To write and publish of a barrister that he is "a quack lawyer and a mountebank" and "an impostor" is actionable. *Wakley v. Healey*, 7 C. B. 591; 18 L. J. C. P. 241.

*Solicitors and Attorneys.*

It is libellous to compare the conduct of an attorney in a particular case to that of the celebrated firm of Quirk, Gammon & Snap in "Ten Thousand a Year."<sup>(a)</sup> *Woodgate v. Ridout*, 4 F. & F. 202.

A correct report in the *Observer* of certain legal proceedings was headed "Shameful conduct of an attorney." Held that the heading was a libel, even though all that followed was protected. *Clement v. Lewis*, 3 Br. & Bing. 297; 3 B. & Ald. 702; 7 Moore, 200.

\* 30      \* The libel complained of was headed — "How Lawyer B. treats his clients," followed by a report of a particular case in which one client of Lawyer B.'s had been badly treated. That particular case was proved to be correctly reported, but this was held insufficient to justify the heading which implied that Lawyer B. *generally* treated his clients badly. *Bishop v. Latimer*, 4 L. T. 775.

Libel complained of, that the plaintiff, a proctor, had three times been suspended from practice for extortion. Proof that he had once been so suspended was held insufficient. *Clarkson v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. 266, 587; 3 M. & P. 605; 4 M. & P. 356; *Blake v. Stevens and others*, 4 F. & F. 232; 11 L. T. 543.

It is libellous to impute to a solicitor "disgraceful conduct" in having at an election disclosed confidential communications made to him professionally. *Moore v. Terrell and others*, 4 B. & Ad. 870; 1 N. & M. 559.

*Journalists.*

It is libellous to impute to the editor and proprietor of a newspaper that in advocating the sacred cause of the dissemination of Christianity among the Chinese, he was an

(a) So to call a man a "pettifogging shyster" in a newspaper. *Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co.*, 40 Mich. 251.

impostor, anxious only to put money into his own pocket by extending the circulation of his paper ; and that he had published a fictitious subscription list with a view to induce people to contribute. *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, 3 B. & S. 769 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 9 Jur. N.S. 1069 ; 11 W. R. 569 ; 8 L. T. 201.

It is libellous to call the editor of a newspaper "a libellous journalist." *Wakley v. Cooke & Healey*, 4 Exch. 511 ; 19 L. J. Ex. 91.

It is libellous to write and publish that a newspaper has a separate page devoted to the advertisements of usurers and quack doctors, and that the editor takes respectable advertisements at a cheaper rate if the advertisers will consent to their appearing in that page. *Russell and another v. Webster*, 23 W. R. 59.

It is not libellous for one newspaper to call another "the most vulgar, ignorant and scurrilous journal ever published in Great Britain ;" but it is libellous to add "it is the lowest now in circulation ; and we submit the fact to the consideration of advertisers ;" for that affects the sale of the paper and the profits to be made by advertising. — (Lord Kenyon, C.J.) *Heriot v. Stuart*, 1 Esp. 437.

Any written words are libellous which impeach the credit of any merchant or trader by imputing to him bankruptcy, insolvency, or even embarrassment either past, present, or future, or which impute to him fraud or dishonesty or any mean and dishonourable trickery in the conduct of his business, or which in any other \* method are prejudicial to him in the way of \* 31 his employment or trade. (a)

"The law has always been very tender of the reputation of tradesmen, and therefore words spoken of them in the way of their trade will bear an action that will not be actionable in the case of another person, and if bare words are so, it will be stronger in the case of a libel in a public newspaper which is so diffusive."<sup>1</sup> (b)

Competition between rival traders is allowed to any extent, so long as only lawful means are resorted to.<sup>2</sup> But force and violence must not be used,<sup>3</sup> nor threats,<sup>4</sup> nor imputations of fraud or dishonesty.

### *Illustrations.*

The printers of a newspaper, by a mistake in setting up in type the announcements from the *London Gazette*, placed the name of the plaintiff's firm under the heading

<sup>1</sup> *Per curiam* in *Harman v. Delany*, 2 Str. 898 ; 1 Barnard. 289 ; Fitz. 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Pudsey Coal Gas Co. v. Corporation of Bradford*, L. R. 15 Eq. 167 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 293 ; 21 W. R. 286 ; 28 L. T. 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Young v. Hickens*, 6 Q. B. 606.

<sup>4</sup> *Tarleton and others v. McGawley, Peake*, 270.

(a) But the business should be lawful. *v. Skofield*, 56 Maine, 483 ; *Fowles v. Johnson v. Simonton*, 43 Cal. 242. *Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 20 ; *Else v. Ferris*, Anth.

(b) *Weiss v. Whittemore*, 28 Mich. 23.  
366 ; *Platto v. Geilfuss*, 47 Wis. 491 ; *Orr*

"First Meetings under the Bankruptcy Act" instead of under "Dissolutions of Partnerships." An ample apology was inserted in the next issue: no damage was proved to have followed to the plaintiff: and there was no suggestion of any malice. In an action for libel against the proprietors of the paper, the jury awarded the plaintiff £50 damages. *Held* that the publication was libellous, and that the damages awarded were not excessive. *Shepherd v. Whitaker*, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402.

[N.B.—The chief clerk thought £10 sufficient in a very similar case, *Stubbs v. Marsh*, 15 L. T. 312.]

It is libellous to advertise that a certain optician is "a licensed hawker" and "a quack in spectacle secrets." *Keyzor and another v. Newcomb*, 1 F. & F. 559.

It is a libel to write and publish of a licensed victualler that his licence has been refused; as it suggests that he had committed some breach of the licensing laws. *Big-nell v. Buzzard*, 3 H. & N. 217; 27 L. J. Ex. 355.

It is libellous to write and publish of the defendant that he regularly supplies bad and unwholesome water to ships, whereby the passengers are made ill. *Solomon v. Lawson*, 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796.

\* 32 \* But for one tradesman merely to puff up his own goods, and decry those of his rival, is no libel; unless fraud or dishonesty be imputed. *Evans v. Harlow*, 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; 8 Jur. 571; D. & M. 507. *Heriot v. Stuart*, 1 Esp. 437, *ante*, p. 30.

Partners may sue jointly for a libel defamatory of the partnership. *Le Fanu v. Malcolmson*, 1 H. L. C. 637; 8 Ir. L. R. 418. *Haythorn v. Lawson*, 3 C. & P. 196. *Ward v. Smith*, 6 Bing. 749; 4 C. & P. 302; 4 M. & P. 595.

So a company or corporation can sue even one of their own members for a libel relating to their management of their business. *Williams v. Beaumont*, 10 Bing. 260; 3 Moore & Sc. 705. *Eastwood v. Holmes*, 1 F. & F. 347. *Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins*, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281.

A married woman trading under her own name according to the custom of London may sue as a trader, without joining her husband, for a libel on her in the way of her trade. Per Brett, J., in *Summers v. City Bank*, L. R. 9 C. P. 583; 43 L. J. C. P. 261.

Sometimes also an attack upon a thing may be defamatory of the owner of that thing, or of others immediately connected with it. But this is only so where an attack upon the thing is also an indirect attack upon the individual. If the words do not touch the personal character or professional conduct of the individual, they are not defamatory of *him*, and no action lies (unless the words fall within the rules relating to *Slander of Title*; see *post*, e. V.). But to impute that the goods which the defendant sells or manufactures are adulterated to his knowledge, is a distinct charge against the defendant of fraud and dishonesty in his trade.

A declaration alleged that the plaintiffs were manufacturers of bags, and had manufactured a bag which they called the "Bag of Bags," and the defendant printed and published, concerning the plaintiffs in their business, the words following:— "As we have not seen the Bag of Bags, we cannot say that it is useful, or that it is portable, or that it is elegant. All these it may be, but the only point we can deal with is the title,

which we think very silly, very slangy, and very vulgar; and which has been forced upon the notice \* of the public *ad nauseam*." On demurrer, Lush, J., \* 33 held that the words could not be deemed libellous, either upon the plaintiffs or upon their mode of conducting their business. But Mellor and Hannen, JJ., thought that it was a question for the jury whether the words went beyond the limits of fair criticism, and whether or not they were intended to disparage the plaintiffs in the conduct of their business. *Jenner and another v. A'Beckett*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464.

The defendant published an advertisement in these words:—"Whereas there was an account in the *Craftsman* of John Harman, gunsmith, making guns of two feet six inches to exceed any made by others of a foot longer (with whom it is supposed he is in fee), this is to advise all gentlemen to be cautious, the said gunsmith *not daring to engage with any artist in town*, nor ever did make such an experiment (except out of a leather gun), as any gentleman may be satisfied of at the Cross Guns in Longacre." Held a libel on the plaintiff in the way of his trade. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages £50. *Harman v. Delany*, 2 Stra. 898; 1 Barnard. 289, 438; Fitz. 121.

A declaration alleged that the plaintiff carried on the trade of an engineer, and sold in the way of his trade goods called "self-acting tallow syphons or lubricators," and that the defendant published of the plaintiff in his said trade and as such inventor as follows:—"This is to caution parties employing steam power from a person, offering what he calls self-acting tallow syphons or lubricators, stating that he is the sole inventor, manufacturer and patentee, thereby monopolizing high prices at the expense of the public. R. Harlow (the defendant) takes this opportunity of saying that such a patent does not exist, and that he has to offer an improved lubricator, which dispenses with the necessity of using more than one to a steam engine, thereby constituting a saving of 50 per cent. over every other kind yet offered to the public. Those who have already adopted the lubricators against which R. H. would caution, will find that the tallow is wasted instead of being effectually employed as professed." Held no libel on the plaintiff, either generally, or in the way of his trade, but only a libel on the lubricators, and therefore not actionable without proof of special damage. *Evans v. Harlow*, 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; 8 Jur. 571; D. & M. 507.

So where one tradesman merely asserts that his own goods are superior to those of some other tradesman, no action lies unless the words be published falsely and maliciously and special damage has ensued. *Young and others v. Macrae*, 3 B. & S. 264; 32 L. J. Q. B. 6; 11 W. R. 63; 9 Jur. N. S. 539; 7 L. T. 354. *Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co.*, L. R. 9 Ex. 218; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 23 W. R. 5.

A libel on the management of a newspaper is a libel on its proprietors, jointly, in the way of their trade, and therefore actionable without special damage. *Russell and another v. Webster*, 23 W. R. 59.

\* To write and publish that a ship is unseaworthy may be a libel on its cap- \* 34 tain. "It is like saying of an innkeeper that his wine or his tea is poisoned." *Ingram v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Sc. 471, 478; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326.

To advertise falsely that certain quack medicines were prepared by an eminent physician, is a libel upon such physician. *Clark v. Freeman*, 11 Beav. 112; 17 L. J. Ch. 142; 12 Jur. 149.

It is libellous falsely to impute to a bookseller that he publishes immoral or absurd poems. *Tabart v. Tipper*, 1 Camp. 350.

It is libellous falsely to write and publish of professional vocalists that they had advertised themselves to sing at certain music-halls songs which they had no right to

sing in public. *Hart and another v. Wall*, 2 C. P. D. 146 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 227 ; 25 W. R. 373.

But comments, however severe, on the advertisements or handbills of a tradesman, will not be libellous, if the jury find that they are fair and temperate comments not wholly undeserved on a matter to which public attention was expressly invited by the plaintiff. *Paris v. Levy*, 9 C. B. N. S. 342 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 11 ; 9 W. R. 71 ; 3 L. T. 324 ; 2 F. & F. 71. *Morrison and another v. Harmer and another*, 3 Bing. N. C. 759 ; 4 Scott, 524 ; 3 Hodges, 108.

*Fair and bonâ fide Comment.*

Every one has a right to comment on matters of public interest and general concern, provided he does so fairly and with an honest purpose. Such comments are not libellous, however severe in their terms, unless they are written intemperately and maliciously. Every citizen has full freedom of speech on such subjects, but he must not abuse it.

This branch of the law is of but recent growth. Cockburn, C.J., says in *Wason v. Walter* :<sup>1</sup>—

“ Our law of libel has, in many respects, only gradually developed itself into anything like a satisfactory and settled form. The full liberty of public writers to comment on the conduct and motives of public men has only in very recent times been recognised. Comments on government,  
\* 35 on ministers and officers \* of state, on members of both Houses of Parliament, on judges and other public functionaries, are now made every day, which half a century ago would have been the subject of actions or ex-officio informations, and would have brought down fine and imprisonment on publishers and authors. Yet who can doubt that the public are gainers by the change, and that, though injustice may often be done, and though public men may often have to smart under the keen sense of wrong inflicted by hostile criticism, the nation profits by public opinion being thus freely brought to bear on the discharge of public duties ? ”

The right to comment upon the public acts of public men is the right of every citizen, and is not the peculiar privilege of the press.<sup>2</sup> But newspaper writers, though in strict law they stand in no better position than any other person, are generally allowed greater latitude by juries. For it is in some measure the duty of the press to watch narrowly the conduct of all government officials, and the working of all public institutions, to comment freely on all matters of general concern to the nation, and to fearlessly expose abuses.

<sup>1</sup> L. R. 4 Q. B. 93, 94.

<sup>2</sup> *Kane v. Mulvany*, Ir. R. 2 C. L. 402.



It has often been said in *nisi prius* cases, that fair and honest criticism in matters of public concern is "*privileged*." But this does not mean that such words are "privileged by reason of the occasion" in the strict legal sense of that term. The defence really is, that the words are not defamatory ; that criticism is no libel. This is very clearly pointed out by Blackburn, J., in *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*.<sup>1</sup>

If such criticism was privileged in the strict sense of the word, it would in every case be necessary for the plaintiff to prove actual malice, however false and however injurious the strictures may have been ; while the defendant would only have to prove that he honestly believed the charges himself in order to escape all liability ; and this clearly is not the law. Comment and criticism on matters of public interest stand on a different \* footing from reports of judicial or Parliamentary pro- \* 36 ceedings. Such reports are privileged, so long as they are fair and accurate *reports* and nothing more. But so soon as there is any attempt at comment, the privilege is lost. In short, report and comment are two distinct and separate things. Fair reports are privileged, while fair comments on matters of public interest are no libels at all.

### *Illustrations.*

Condemnation of the foreign policy of the Government, however sweeping, is no libel.

*Animadversions*, however severe, on the use made by the vestry of the money of the ratepayers, is not libellous, unless corruption or embezzlement be imputed to individual vestrymen.

Criticism, however trenchant, on any new poem or novel, or on any picture exhibited in a public gallery, is no libel.

But to maliciously pry into the private life of any poet, novelist, artist, or statesman, is indefensible.

### *Criticism.*

Every one of the public is entitled to pass an opinion on everything which in any way invites public attention. Those of the public whose opinion on such matters is best worth having are called critics. From their education, ability, or experience, they can judge with precision (which is the true meaning of the word to *criticize*), and their opinion, therefore, is entitled to respect. Their criticism may be commendatory, but it is, perhaps, more generally unfavorable. Still, so long as it continues to be criticism at all, it is not defamatory. Where defamation commences, true criticism ends.

<sup>1</sup> 3 B. & S. 769 ; 32 L. J. Q. B. 185 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 1069 ; 11 W. R. 569 ; 8 L. T. 201.

True criticism differs from defamation in the following particulars:—

1. Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention, or call for public comment.

2. Criticism never attacks the individual, but only his *work*.

Such work may be either the policy of a government, the  
 \* 37 action of a member of Parliament, a public \* entertainment, a book published, or a picture exhibited. In every case the attack is on a man's *acts*, or on some *thing*, and not upon the man himself. A true critic never indulges in personalities.

3. True criticism never imputes or insinuates dishonorable motives (unless justice absolutely requires it, and then only on the clearest proofs).

4. The critic never takes advantage of the occasion to gratify private malice, or to attain any other object beyond the fair discussion of matters of public interest, and the judicious guidance of the public taste.

Every one has a right to publish such fair and candid criticism, even "although the author may suffer loss from it. Such a loss the law does not consider as an injury, because it is a loss which the party ought to sustain. It is, in short, the loss of fame and profits to which he was never entitled." . . . "Reflection upon personal character is another thing. Show me an attack upon the moral character of the plaintiff, or any attack upon his character unconnected with his authorship, and I should be as ready as any judge who ever sat here to protect him. But I cannot hear of malice on account of turning his works into ridicule."<sup>1</sup> So in *Tabart v. Tipper*,<sup>2</sup> the same learned Judge says: "Liberty of criticism must be allowed, or we should neither have purity of taste nor of morals. Fair discussion is essentially necessary to the truth of history and the advancement of science. That publication, therefore, I shall never consider as a libel, which has for its object, not to injure the reputation of any individual, but to correct misrepresentations of fact, to refute sophistical reasoning, to expose a vicious taste in literature, or to  
 \* 38 censure what is hostile to morality." "God forbid," \* exclaims Alderson, B., in *Gathercole v. Miall*,<sup>3</sup> "God forbid that you should not be allowed to comment on the acts of all

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Ellenborough in the celebrated case of *Sir John Carr v. Hood*, 1 Camp. 355, n.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Camp. 351.

<sup>3</sup> 15 M. & W. 340.

mankind, provided you do it justly and truly." "A critic must confine himself to criticism, and not make it the veil for personal censure, nor allow himself to run into reckless and unfair attacks merely from the love of exercising his power of denunciation."<sup>1</sup>

But all comments must be fair and honest. Matters of public interest must be discussed temperately. Wicked and corrupt motives should never be wantonly assigned. And it will be no defence that the writer, at the time he wrote, honestly believed in the truth of the charges he was making, if such charges be made recklessly, unreasonably, and without any foundation in fact.<sup>2</sup> Some people are very credulous, especially in politics; and can readily believe any evil of their opponents. There must therefore be some foundation in fact for the charges made; the writer must bring to his task some degree of moderation and judgment.

Slight unintentional errors, on the other hand, will be excused. If a writer in the course of temperate and legitimate criticism falls into error as to some detail, or draws an incorrect inference from the facts before him, and thus goes beyond the limits of strict truth, such inaccuracies will not cause judgment to go against him, if the jury are satisfied, after reading the whole publication, that it was written honestly, fairly, and with regard to what truth and justice require. "It is not to be expected that a public journalist will always be infallible."<sup>3</sup>

\* But the critic must confine himself to the merits of \* 39 the work before him. He must not follow the plaintiff into his domestic life, or attack his private character. He must carefully examine the production before him, and then honestly state his true opinion of it.

So long as a writer confines himself to comments on the public conduct of public men, the mere fact that motives have been unjustly assigned for such conduct is not of itself sufficient to destroy this defence, though of course it will tell strongly in favor of the plaintiff. "A line must be drawn," says Cockburn, C.J., in *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*,<sup>4</sup> "between criticism upon public conduct and the imputation of motives by which that conduct

<sup>1</sup> Per Huddleston, B., in *Whistler v. Ruskin*; *Times* for Nov. 27th, 1878.

<sup>2</sup> *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, 3 F. & F. 421; 3 B. & S. 769; 32 L. J. Q. B. 185; 11 W. R. 569; 9 Jur. N. S. 1069; 8 L. T. 201.

<sup>3</sup> Per Cockburn, C.J., 2 F. & F. 216.

<sup>4</sup> 3 B. & S. 776, 7; 32 L. J. Q. B. 199; 8 L. T. 201.

may be supposed to be actuated; one man has no right to impute to another, whose conduct may be fairly open to ridicule or disapprobation, base, sordid, and wicked motives, unless there is so much ground for the imputation that a jury shall find, not only that he had an honest belief in the truth of his statements, but that his belief was not without foundation . . . ." "I think the fair position in which the law may be settled is this: That where the public conduct of a public man is open to animadversion, and the writer who is commenting upon it makes imputations on his motives, which arise fairly and legitimately out of his conduct, so that a jury shall say that the criticism was not only honest but also well founded, an action is not maintainable. But it is not because a public writer fancies that the conduct of a public man is open to the suspicion of dishonesty, he is therefore justified in assailing his character as dishonest." (a)

(a) The author has done well to point out the fact generally overlooked that criticism, when not actionable (the author would not say that criticism as such might not in certain cases be actionable) is so, not in reality because of privilege in the technical sense, so much as because it is not defamation. It seldom has the quality (when not actionable) of defamation in the ordinary sense, in that it rarely touches moral character. Privilege on the other hand relates to what otherwise, in ordinary cases, would be defamation of character. The only exception appears to be in that class of cases in which a charge is held actionable which (being false) touches a man in his office, profession, or occupation. It is with this special class of cases that the law of criticism is generally concerned; and it is only in a special sense that defamation can be predicated of such cases. But criticism may also in the true sense of the term touch moral character; a point to which we shall again advert.

While however criticism does not necessarily concern moral character, it may still be actionable after the manner of ordinary defamation. Thus it has been held that to say of a lawyer, "He is a dunce," is actionable *per se*, supposing, it is to be assumed, that the charge was not made and understood with reference to a particular cause in which the person making it

had some interest, or that there was not some other justification of it. *Peard v. Jones*, Cooke, Car. 382. See *Baker v. Morfue* (or *Morphew*), Sid. 327; s. c. 2 Keb. 202; *Powell v. Jones*, 1 Lev. 297. But that is criticism or may be such in a legitimate sense of the word; while to call a man a thief would, if false, be defamation and not criticism at all. On the other hand to say of a lawyer, with reference at least to a criminal prosecution or a cause in which the party speaking was personally interested, "He managed the case like one devoid of legal knowledge," or "He displayed profound ignorance of law," would not in general be actionable, as it seems. So (to take a clearer case of criticism) for an art critic to say of a painter, with reference to one or many of his productions, "His work shows that he is ignorant of the first principles of art," or perhaps, if clearly understood to refer to his actual works, "He knows nothing of art," would not ordinarily be actionable *per se*, though other art critics of standing might entirely differ from him. But to say of him, "He is an impostor," though said of his art, would ordinarily afford a ground of action. The recent familiar case of *Whistler v. Ruskin*, referred to by the author on p. 49, may be cited in confirmation. See also *Reade v. Sweetzer*, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9, note. The distinction between the two cases is obvious.

*Illustrations.*

An article in the *Saturday Review* imputed to the plaintiff, the editor and part proprietor of the *British Ensign*, that in advocating the propagation of \*Chris- \* 40 tianity among the Chinese his purpose was merely to increase the circulation of his own paper, and so put money into his own pocket ; that he was an impostor, and that he put forth a list of fictitious subscribers in order to delude others into sub-

Both may be criticism, but one is broad and sweeping and fails of justification in not connecting itself with any ground for the hearer or reader to consider. It will be apt to be understood as vituperation ; nor will the fact that the speaker or writer was a man above the use of such weapons go for anything. Evidence of the kind would not be admissible. The other charge is based upon grounds ; and thus, so far as the mere language goes, no inference of vituperation will be conveyed.

Now it matters not, as has been already stated, that others equally competent would pronounce the criticism unsound. It would be different perhaps if there were a known established ideal in every case by which judgment was to be pronounced ; but there is not. Agreement is confined in matters of criticism to a few fundamental propositions, whatever the subject ; beyond this critics differ both as to principles and as to the question whether particular productions conform to principles actually agreed upon. And the law with good sense recognizes and justifies this state of things. Does it follow then that no action can be maintained where criticism of the productions of men is expressed or understood to be founded upon particular grounds ? The cases unfortunately are not precise upon this point ; but indications are not wanting that the right to criticise, even in this way, is not unlimited. It has lately been laid down in Massachusetts that "fair and reasonable" comment upon the property of a person who presents the same for public exhibition is proper (however severe), unless such comment is attended with actual malice. *Gott v. Pulsifer*, 122 Mass. 235. See also *Reade v. Sweetzer*, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9, note. The plain inference is that if the comment or criticism be not fair and reasonable, or if it be actually malicious, there may be ground for an action.

What makes criticism "fair and reasonable" ? We have seen that there is no established ideal to serve for a test, and we have also seen that the law permits the finding of the test in the conception of the speaker or writer. Fairness and reasonableness must therefore in principle presuppose some ideal of truth founded upon a rational basis (that is, a basis *capable* of existence in reason) ; and hence if none such exist in the party, it is impossible to speak of criticism, though stated with reference to particular productions, as fair and reasonable. It is idle talk, or if malicious and injurious in tendency, actionable language. But supposing the qualification of criticism to exist in the individual (by being based upon a rational ideal), the fairness and reasonableness of the language in question must in principle (for there is no definite authority upon the point) depend upon the question whether that language is truly based or reasonably supposed by the speaker or writer to be based upon that ideal. If not, the criticism is unreasonable, and in a legitimate sense it is false, and ought so far to be actionable. It might be interesting to inquire concerning the burden of proof of this fairness ; but it would probably be upon the defendant. Judging from ordinary cases, the severity of the language would make a *prima facie* case for the plaintiff, and it would then devolve upon the defendant to prove the criticism true by proving it to be fair and reasonable (in the manner suggested).

But the criticism must also have been malicious ; and the burden of proof as to this is doubtless always on the plaintiff. See *Gott v. Pulsifer*, 122 Mass. 235 ; also the discussion of implied malice, *ante*, p. 5. Malice may be shown by evidence that the defendant knew that his criticism was not founded upon his own ideal ; a fact to be proved in most cases by an ad-

scribing. The jury found that the writer honestly believed the imputations contained in the article to be well founded, but the Court held that the limits of fair criticism had been undoubtedly exceeded. *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, 3 F. & F. 421; 32 L. J. Q. B. 185; 3 B. & S. 769; 9 Jur. N. S. 1069; 11 W. R. 569; 8 L. T. 201.

Two sureties were proposed for the Berwick election petition: neither of whom had any connection with the borough. Affidavits were put in to show that one of them was an insufficient surety, being embarrassed in his affairs. The *Times* set out these affidavits and added the remarks, "But why, it may be asked, does this cockney

mission. Or as stated in *Gott v. Pulsifer*, *supra*, it may be shown by the excessive severity of the language, provided (it is safe to assume) there is evidence that the criticism was unsound as judged from the principles (the ideal) of the speaker or writer. Severity of criticism, though deemed by others excessive, could not be sufficient to justify an action when based on rational principles, as explained above. It should be stated, before concluding this part of the present note, that the action in *Gott v. Pulsifer* was for slander of title, so called, the language being not criticism of an individual professionally, but criticism upon a particular article of property on exhibition; but this fact, though it involved requiring proof of special damage, would have no bearing against the doctrine of this note.

All this of course assumes that the criticism does not touch moral character. When the critic goes outside of the subject of criticism and strikes at the character of the person whose productions he professes alone to criticise and calls him, for example, an impostor, then he renders himself liable to an action; unless indeed he can show that the imputation is true. *Whistler v. Ruskin*; *Cooper v. Stone*, 24 Wend. 434; *Reade v. Sweetzer*, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9, note. Acting honestly upon his own conceptions of truth as already explained, the critic may say what he will of the merits or demerits of the particular production; thus acting he may, *e.g.*, pronounce an author's style "execrable," or a painter's picture a "daub and an abortion;" but he must not animadvert in disparaging language upon the person's moral character, or impute to him unworthy motives or evil designs upon society, unless he is prepared to justify the same by showing its truth. *Reade v. Sweetzer*, *supra*. And to justify unworthy motives or evil designs, the party's produc-

tions should in a reasonable interpretation warrant the imputation; as by presenting vice as an object of attraction or not to be shunned. *Id.*

This brings us to criticism of moral character generally, in regard to which the English doctrine appears to be that one who offers his character to the public (or perhaps to an individual) as one of the elements going to make up qualification for position, thereby consents to having the same laid before those who are expected to engage his services; and by this consent he is deemed to be barred from complaining of wrong estimates and false imputations thereon, if it appear that the permission granted has not been abused. In other words the offer justifies any imputation upon his character that is made in good faith and with reasonable belief in its truth. See *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, 3 Best & S. 776; *supra*, p. 39. The rule appears therefore to be an exemplification of the maxim *volenti non fit injuria*. Though this seems to be a perfectly sound doctrine, it is not everywhere or generally held in this country. Thus it is laid down by the courts of New York that no privilege exists to attack the character of a public officer, though the publication relate to a public act of the party done in his official capacity. *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116; *Lewis v. Few*, 5 Johns. 1; *Root v. King*, 7 Cowen, 613; s. c. 4 Wend. 113. Nor is it permitted in New York to make false imputations upon the character of a candidate for public office; and belief in the truth of the imputation makes the defendant's case no better except by way of mitigation. *Hamilton v. Eno* and *Root v. King*, *supra*. It would seem that the case could not be different in that State where the imputation was made in the course of an attempt to secure the removal of the individual from office, unless the language was used in the course of a judicial or legislative

tailor take all this trouble, and subject himself to all this exposure of his difficulties and embarrassments? He has nothing to do with the borough of Berwick-upon-Tweed or its members. How comes it then that he should take so much interest in the job? There can be but one answer to these very natural and reasonable queries: *he is hired for the occasion.* The affair in fact is a foul job throughout, and it is only by such aid that it can possibly be supported." In an action brought on the whole article, the defendant pleaded that the publication was a correct report of certain legal proceedings, "together with a fair and *bona fide* commentary thereon." But the jury thought the comment was not fair, and gave the plaintiff damages £100. *Cooper v. Lawson*, 8 A. & E. 746; 1 P. & D. 15; 1 W. W. & H. 601; 2 Jur. 919.

The plaintiff was ex-mayor of Winchester. The *Hampshire Advertiser* imputed to him partiality and corruption and ignorance of his duties as mayor and justice of the

proceeding. In such a case as that it would doubtless be absolutely privileged if relevant. *Hastings v. Lusk*, 22 Wend. 410. The New York rule against imputations upon the moral character of public men is followed in West Virginia. *Sweeney v. Baker*, 13 W. Va. 158. Perhaps so in Michigan. *Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co.*, 40 Mich. 251. And in Massachusetts. *Commonwealth v. Clap*, 4 Mass. 103; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 261. And in other States. See cases next cited. And the same would no doubt be generally true where the imputation was not made with the purpose of securing the rejection of a candidate for office or the removal of a person actually in office. See *Commonwealth v. Clap*, 4 Mass. 163; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 261; *Mayrant v. Richardson*, 1 Nott & McC. 347; *Aldrich v. Press Printing Co.*, 9 Minn. 133; *Seely v. Blair, Wright*, 358, 683; *Barr v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 385; *Kimball v. Fernandez*, 41 Wis. 329; *Wilson v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321; s. c. 27 Wis. 598, and 23 Wis. 105; *Cottrill v. Cramer*, 43 Wis. 242; *Scripps v. Foster*, 41 Mich. 742. Some of our cases however appear to justify the converse proposition, and to sustain the English doctrine where the purpose is that suggested, and it is properly pursued in good faith and upon reasonable grounds. Thus in New Hampshire it is held that newspapers may in good faith (*i.e.*, it seems, without malice) on reasonable grounds believed to be true, affirm a maladministration of public office by an individual. *Palmer v. Concord*, 48 N. H. 211. And in Iowa candidates for office cannot complain of false charges affecting their moral character made in the like manner. *Mott v. Dawson*, 46 Iowa,

533. See also *Scripps v. Foster*, 41 Mich. 742. And public policy seems to justify this view when the medium used is a proper one to accomplish the purpose of securing rejection or removal; a purpose which should be of the essence of the privilege. The newspapers should not be resorted to when not the necessary or natural medium for securing such purpose; the proper authorities, and they alone, should be communicated with. See *Foster v. Scripps*, 39 Mich. 376; s. c. 41 Mich. 742. In this case it was held that a city physician not elected by the people but appointed to office by a municipal board could not be made the subject of defamatory imputations through the press, though the imputations were made in good faith and honestly believed to be true. See also *Purcell v. Sowler*, 1 C. P. D. 781; s. c. 2 C. P. D. 218, where in a similar case it was held that the privilege arose only in proceedings against the physician. Nor is a trustee of a private corporation a public officer so as to justify the publishers of a newspaper in using defamatory language of him as trustee. *Wilson v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 363. As is held also in England, the mere fact that the subject is one of interest to the public does not make the communication privileged, though it was published in good faith without malice and from laudable motives. *Ib.*; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 261. The New York and West Virginia cases above referred to, it may be observed, do not proceed upon the ground that a wrong medium has been employed and the wrong persons addressed, but on the broad ground that there is no distinction in attacks upon moral character between public men and private citizens.

peace for the borough. *Held* that though some words which are clearly libellous of a private person may not amount to a libel when spoken of a person holding a public capacity, still any imputation of unjust or corrupt motives is equally libellous in either case. *Parmiter v. Coupland*, 6 M. & W. 105; 9 L. J. Ex. 202; 4 Jur. 701.

But when an attack is made on the policy of Her Majesty's Government or on the public conduct of any high officer of State, it appears now that wicked, or at least selfish, motives *may* be imputed, so long as they are not recklessly and maliciously imputed. Per Martin, B., in *Harle v. Catherall*, 14 L. T. 801; per Cockburn, C. J., in *Wason v. Walter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 93; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 416; 8 B. & S. 730. And in *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, *ante*, p. 39.

The defendants, the printers and publishers of the *Manchester Courier*, published in their paper a report of the proceedings at a meeting of the board of guardians for the

\* 41 Altrincham Poor-Law Union, at which charges were made against the medical officer of the union workhouse at Knutsford, \* of neglecting to attend the pauper patients when sent for. Such charges proved to be utterly unfounded; they were made in the absence of the medical officer, without any notice having been given him. *Held* that the matter was one of public interest; but that the report was not privileged by the occasion, although it was admitted to be a correct account of what passed at the meeting; that it was obviously unfair to the plaintiff that such *ex parte* statements should be published in the local papers; that the editor should therefore have exercised his discretion and excluded the report altogether; and the plaintiff recovered 40s. damages and costs. *Purcell v. Sowler* (C. A.), 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 W. R. 362; 36 L. T. 416.

What are matters of public interest?

The public conduct of every public man is a matter of public concern:—

“A clergyman with his flock, an admiral with his fleet, a general with his army, and a judge with his jury, are all subjects of public discussion. Whoever fills a public position renders himself open thereto. He must accept an attack as a necessary, though unpleasant, appendage to his office.”<sup>1</sup>

All political, legal, and ecclesiastical matters therefore are matters of public concern. So is the conduct of every vestry, town council, board of guardians, &c. For, although these may be matters of *local* interest principally, still this rule applies, so long as they are not *private* matters. Anything that is a public concern to the inhabitants of Birmingham or Manchester is a matter of public interest within the meaning of the rule. See the remarks of Cockburn, C. J., in *Cox v. Feeney*.<sup>2</sup> And again in *Purcell v. Sowler*,<sup>3</sup> the same learned judge says: “But it seems to me that whatever is matter of public con-

<sup>1</sup> Per Bramwell, B., in *Kelly v. Sherlock*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 689; 35 L. J. Q. B. 209; 12 Jur. N. S. 937.

<sup>2</sup> 4 F. & F. 13.

<sup>3</sup> 2 C. P. D. 218.



cern when administered in one of the government departments, is matter of public concern when administered by the subordinate authorities of a particular district. It is one of the \* characteristic features of the government of this \* 42 country that, instead of being centralized, many important branches of it are committed to the conduct of local authorities. Thus the business of counties, and that of cities and boroughs, is, to a great extent, conducted by local and municipal government. It is not, therefore, because the matter under consideration is one which in its immediate consequences affects only a particular neighborhood that it is not a matter of public concern. The management of the poor and the administration of the poor-law in each local district are matters of public interest. In this management the medical attendance on the poor is matter of infinite moment, and consequently the conduct of a medical officer of the district may be of the greatest importance in that particular district, and so may concern the public in general."

Matters of public interest may be conveniently grouped under the following heads :—

1. Affairs of state ;
2. The administration of justice ;
3. Public institutions and local authorities ;
4. Ecclesiastical matters ;
5. Books, pictures, and architecture ;
6. Theatres, concerts, and other public entertainments ;
7. Other appeals to the public.

### 1. *Affairs of State.*

The conduct of all public servants, the policy of the Government, our relations with foreign countries, all suggestions of reforms in the existing laws, all bills before Parliament, the adjustment and collection of taxes, and all other matters which touch the public welfare, are clearly matters of public interest, which come within the preceding rule. "Every subject has a \* right to comment on those acts of public men \* 43 which concern him as a subject of the realm, if he do not make his commentary a cloak for malice and slander."<sup>1</sup> Those who fill "a public position must not be too thin-skinned in refer-

<sup>1</sup> Per Parke, B., in *Parmiter v. Coupland*, 6 M. & W. 108.

ence to comments made upon them. It would often happen that observations would be made upon public men which they knew from the bottom of their hearts were undeserved and unjust; yet they must bear with them, and submit to be misunderstood for a time, because all knew that the criticism of the press was the best security for the proper discharge of public duties.”<sup>1</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

The presentation of a petition to Parliament impugning the character of one of Her Majesty’s judges, and praying for an inquiry, and for his removal from office should the charge prove true, is a matter of high public concern, on which all newspapers may comment, and in severe terms. So is the debate in the House on the subject of such petition. *Wason v. Walter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 409; 8 B. & S. 730.

A writer in a newspaper may comment on the fact that corrupt practices extensively prevailed at a parliamentary election; but may not give the names of individuals as guilty of bribery, unless he can prove the truth of the charge to the letter. *Wilson v. Reed and others*, 2 F. & F. 149.

The presentation of a petition to Parliament against quack doctors is matter for public comment. *Dunne v. Anderson*, 3 Bing. 88; Ry. & Moo. 287; 10 Moore, 407.

Evidence given before a Royal Commission is matter *publici juris*, and everyone has a perfect right to criticise it. Per Wickens, V.C., in *Mulkern v. Ward*, L. R. 13 Eq. 622; 41 L. J. Ch. 464; 26 L. T. 831.

So is evidence taken before a Parliamentary Committee on a local gas bill. *Hedley v. Barlow*, 4 F. & F. 224.

A report of the Board of Admiralty upon the plans of a naval architect,  
\* 44 \* submitted to the Lords of the Admiralty for their consideration, is a matter of national interest. *Henwood v. Harrison*, L. R. 7 C. P. 606; 41 L. J. C. P. 206; 20 W. R. 1000; 26 L. T. 938.

The appointment of a Roman Catholic to be Calendarer of State Papers is a matter of public concern. *Turnbull v. Bird*, 2 F. & F. 508.

The plaintiff, who was a Q. C. and a Member of Parliament, was appointed Recorder of Newcastle. The defendant’s paper, the *Law Magazine and Review*, thereupon discussed the desirability of giving such an appointment to a member of the House of Commons, and declared that it was a reward for his having steadily voted with his party. Cockburn, C.J., directed the jury that a public writer was fairly entitled to comment on the distribution of Government patronage; but that he was not entitled to assert that there had been a corrupt promise or understanding that the plaintiff would be thus rewarded, if he always voted according to order. Verdict for the plaintiff; damages 40s. *Seymour v. Butterworth*, 3 F. & F. 372.

<sup>1</sup> Per Cockburn, C.J., in *Seymour v. Butterworth*, 3 F. & F. 376, 7; and see the *dicta* of the judges in *R. v. Sir R. Carden*, 5 Q. B. D. 1; 49 L. J. (M. C.) 1; 28 W. R. 133; 41 L. T. 504.

## 2. *Administration of Justice.*

The administration of the law, the verdicts of juries, the conduct of suitors and their witnesses, are all matters of lawful comment as soon as the trial is over. Any comment pending action is a contempt of court, by whomsoever made; it is especially so where the comment is supplied by one of the litigants or his solicitor or counsel.<sup>1</sup>

In former days, where a trial lasted more than one day, newspapers were sometimes forbidden to publish any report of the trial from day to day; they were ordered to reserve their whole report till the case was ended. But it is now clear that daily reports of the progress of the trial are unobjectionable, if fair and impartial.<sup>2</sup> But report is very different from comment. No observations on the case are permitted during its progress, lest the minds of the jury (and indeed of the judge) should be thereby biassed.

\* But as soon as the case is over, every one has “a right \* 45 to discuss fairly and *bonâ fide* the administration of justice as evidenced at this trial. It is open to him to show that error was committed on the part of the judge or jury; nay, further, for myself I will say that the judges invite discussion of their acts in the administration of the law, and it is a relief to them to see error pointed out, if it is committed; yet, whilst they invite the freest discussion, it is not open to a journalist to impute corruption.”<sup>3</sup> “That the administration of justice should be made a subject for the exercise of public discussion is a matter of the most essential importance. But, on the other hand, it behoves those who pass judgment, and call upon the public to pass judgment, on those who are suitors to, or witnesses in, courts of justice, not to give reckless vent to harsh and uncharitable views of the conduct of others; but to remember that they are bound to exercise a fair and honest and an impartial judgment upon those whom they hold up to public obloquy.”<sup>4</sup> (a)

<sup>1</sup> *Daw v. Eley*, L. R. 7 Eq. 49; 38 L. J. Ch. 113; 17 W. R. 245.

<sup>2</sup> *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 537; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. N. S. 970.

<sup>3</sup> Per Fitzgerald, J., in *R. v. Sullivan*, 11 Cox C. C. 57.

<sup>4</sup> Cockburn, C.J., in *Woodgate v. Ridout*, 4 F. & F. 223.

*Illustrations.*

It is not a fair comment on a criminal trial, to suggest that the prisoner, though acquitted, was really guilty. *Lewis v. Walter*, 4 B. & Ald. 605; *Risk Allah Bey v. Whitehurst and others*, 18 L. T. 615.

A newspaper may comment upon the hearing of a charge of felony and the evidence produced thereat, and discuss the conduct of the magistrates in dismissing the charge without hearing the whole of the evidence; but it may not proceed to disclose "evidence which might have been adduced" and thus argue from facts not in evidence before the magistrates that the accused was really guilty of the felony. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages £25. *Hibbins v. Lee*, 4 F. & F. 243; 11 L. T. 541. And see *Helsham v. Blackwood*, 11 C. B. 111; 20 L. J. C. P. 187; 15 Jur. 861; *R. v. White* and another, 1 Camp. 359.

\* 46 \* It is not a fair comment on any legal proceedings to insinuate that a particular witness committed perjury in the course of them. *Roberts v. Brown*, 10 Bing. 519; 4 Moo. & S. 407; *Stiles v. Nokes*, S. C. Carr v. Jones, 7 East, 493; 3 Smith, 491; *Littler v. Thompson*, 2 Beav. 129; *Felkin v. Herbert*, 33 L. J. Ch. 294; 10 Jur. N. S. 62; 12 W. R. 241, 332; 9 L. T. 635.

A newspaper may comment on the evidence given by any particular witness in any inquiry on a matter of public interest; but may not go the length of declaring such evidence to be "maliciously or recklessly false." Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages £250. *Hedley v. Barlow*, 4 F. & F. 224.

The *Morning Post* published an article on a trial which had greatly excited public attention; giving a highly colored account of the conduct of the attorneys on one side, concluding with the sweeping condemnation:—"Messrs. Quirk, Gammon, and Snap were fairly equalled, if not outdone," alluding to the notorious firm of pettifoggers in "Ten Thousand a Year." This account of plaintiff's conduct was taken almost verbatim from the speech of counsel on the other side, and no allusion was made to the evidence subsequently produced to rebut his statements. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages £1000. *Woodgate v. Ridout*, 4 F. & F. 202.

### 3. *Public Institutions and Local Authorities.*

The working of all public institutions, such as colleges, hospitals, asylums, homes, is a matter of public interest, especially where such institutions appeal to the public for subscriptions, or are supported by the rates, or are, like our five Universities, national property. The management of local affairs by the various local authorities, *e.g.*, town-councils, schoolboards, vestries, boards of guardians, boards of health, &c., is a matter of public, though it may not be of universal, concern.

*Illustrations.*

"The management of the poor and the administration of the poor-law in each local district are matters of public interest." Per Cockburn, C.J., in *Purcell v. Sowler*, 2 C. P. D. 218; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 W. R. 362; 36 L. T. 416.

The official conduct of a way-warden may be freely criticized in the local press. *Harle v. Catherall*, 14 L. T. 801.

\* The Charity Commissioners sent an inspector to inquire into the working \* 47 of a medical college at Birmingham. He made a report containing passages defamatory of the plaintiff, one of the professors. The mismanagement of the college continued, and increased. The warden at last filed a bill to administer the funds in Chancery. Thereupon the defendant, the proprietor of a local paper, procured an official copy of the report of the inspector, and published it *verbatim* in his paper. This was nearly three years after the report had been written. The plaintiff contended that this was a wanton revival of stale matter which could not be required for public information; but Cockburn, C.J., left it to the jury to say whether public interest in the matter had not rather increased than declined in the interval. Verdict for the defendant. *Cox v. Feeney*, 4 F. & F. 13.

#### 4. *Ecclesiastical Affairs.*

A bishop's government of his diocese, a rector's management of his parish, or of the parochial school, are matters of public interest. So is the manner in which "public worship" is celebrated in the Established Church. But an unobtrusive charitable organization privately established by the rector in the parish is not a fit subject for public comment.

#### *Illustrations.*

The press may comment on the fact that the incumbent of a parish has, contrary to the wishes of the churchwarden, allowed books to be sold in the church during service, and cooked a chop in the vestry after the service was over. *Kelly v. Tinling*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699; 356 L. J. Q. B. 231; 14 W. R. 51; 13 L. T. 255; 12 Jur. N. S. 940.

But where a vicar started a clothing society in his parish, expressly excluding all Dissenters from its benefits, it was held that this was essentially a private society, the members of which might manage it as they pleased, without being called to account by any one outside; and that therefore a Dissenting organ was not justified in commenting on the limits which the vicar had imposed on the desire of his parishioners to clothe the poor. *Gathercole v. Miall*, 15 M. & W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337; and see *Walker v. Brogden*, 19 C. B. N. S. 65; 11 Jur. N. S. 671; 13 W. R. 809; 12 L. T. 495; *Booth v. Briscoe*, (C. A.) 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. R. 838.

The court in *Gathercole v. Miall* were equally divided on the question whether sermons preached in open church, but not printed and published,\* were \* 48 matter for public comment. If the sermon itself dealt with matters of public interest, I apprehend it might be.

#### 5. *Books, Pictures, &c.*

"A man who publishes a book challenges criticism."<sup>1</sup> Therefore all fair and honest criticism on any published book is not libellous, unless the critic goes out of his way to attack the pri-

<sup>1</sup> *Per* Cockburn, C.J., in *Strauss v. Francis*, 4 F. & F. 1114; 15 L. T. 675.

vate character of the author. So too it is not libellous fairly and honestly to criticise a painting publicly exhibited, or the architecture of any public building, however strong the terms of censure used may be.

### *Illustrations.*

The *Athenæum* published a critique on a novel written by the plaintiff, describing it as "the very worst attempt at a novel that has ever been perpetrated," and commenting severely on "its insanity, self-complacency, and vulgarity, its profanity, its indelicacy (to use no stronger word), its display of bad Latin, bad French, bad German, and bad English," and its abuse of persons living and dead. After Erle, C.J., had summed up the case, the plaintiff withdrew a juror. *Strauss v. Francis* (No. 1), 4 F. & F. 939; see *Sir John Carr v. Hood*, 1 Camp. 355, n.

The *Athenæum* thereupon published another article stating their reason for consenting to the withdrawal of a juror, which was in fact that they considered the plaintiff would have been unable to have paid them their costs, had they gained a verdict. The plaintiff thereupon brought another action which was tried before Cockburn, C.J., and the jury found a verdict for the defendants. *Strauss v. Francis* (No. 2), 4 F. & F. 1107; 15 L. T. 674.

It is doubtful how far a book printed for private circulation only, may be criticized. Per Pollock, C. B., in *Gatherecole v. Miall*, 15 M. & W. 334; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337.

A comic picture of the author of a book, *as author*, bowing beneath the weight of his volume, is no libel; though a personal caricature of him as he appeared in private life would be. *Sir John Carr v. Hood*, 1 Camp. 355, n.

The articles which appear in a newspaper and its general tone and style may \* 49 be the subject of adverse criticism, as well as any other literary \* production; but no attack should be made on the private character of any writer on its staff. *Heriot v. Stuart*, 1 Esp. 437; *Stuart v. Lovell*, 2 Stark. 93; *Campbell v. Spottiswoode*, 3 F. & F. 421; 32 L. J. Q. B. 185; 3 B. & S. 769; 9 Jur. N. S. 1069; 11 W. R. 569; 8 L. T. 201.

The greatest art critic of the day wrote and published in *Fors Clavigera* an article on the pictures in the Grosvenor Gallery, in which the following passage occurred: "Lastly, the mannerisms and errors of these pictures (alluding to the pictures of Mr. Burne Jones), whatever may be their extent, are never affected or indolent. The work is natural to the painter, however strange to us, and is wrought with the utmost conscience of care, however far to his own or our desire the result may yet be incomplete. Scarcely as much can be said for any other pictures of the modern school; their eccentricities are almost always in some degree forced, and their imperfections gratuitously, if not impertinently, indulged. For Mr. Whistler's own sake, no less than for the protection of the purchaser, Sir Coutts Lindsay ought not to have admitted works into the gallery in which the ill-educated conceit of the artist so nearly approached the aspect of wilful imposture. I have seen and heard much of cockney impudence before now, but never expected to hear a coxcomb ask 200 guineas for flinging a pot of paint in the public's face." The jury considered the words "wilful imposture" as just overstepping the line of fair criticism, and found a verdict for the plaintiff; damages one farthing. Each party had to pay his own costs. *Whistler v. Ruskin*. *Times* for Nov. 26th and 27th, 1878; *Thompson v. Shackell*, Moo. & Mal. 187.

The plaintiff was a professor of architecture in the Royal Academy. The defendant

published an account of a new order of architecture called "the Bœotian," said to be invented by the plaintiff, whom he termed "the Bœotian professor." He set forth several absurd principles as the rules of this new order, illustrating them by examples of buildings all of which were the works of the plaintiff. The jury, under the direction of Lord Tenterden, C. J., found a verdict for the defendant. *Soane v. Knight*, Moo. & Mal. 74.

## 6. *Theatres, Concerts, and Public Entertainments.*

All theatrical and musical performances, flower-shows, public balls, &c., may be freely criticized, provided that the comments be not malevolent or flagrantly unjust.

### *Illustrations.*

A gentleman wholly unconnected with the stage got up what he called "a Dramatic Ball." The company was disorderly and far from select. No actor or actress of any reputation was present at the ball, or took any share in the arrangements. The *Era*, the special organ of the theatrical profession, published an indignant article, commenting severely on the conduct of the prosecutor in starting such a ball for his own profit, and particularly in calling such an assembly "a Dramatic Ball." Criminal proceedings were taken against the editor of the *Era*, but the jury found him Not guilty. *R. v. Ledger*, *Times* for Jan. 14th, 1880. And see *Dibdin v. Swan and Bostock*, 1 Esp. 28.

A newspaper, commenting on a flower-show, denounced one exhibitor by name as "a beggarly soul," "famous in all sorts of dirty work," and spoke of "the tricks by which he and a few like him used to secure prizes" as being now "broken in upon by some judges more honest than usual." Such remarks are clearly *not* fair criticism on the flower-show. *Green v. Chapman*, 4 Bing. N. C. 92; 5 Scott, 340.

The plaintiff, the proprietor of Zadkiel's Almanac, had a ball of crystal by means of which he pretended to tell what was going on in the other world. The *Daily Telegraph* published a letter which stated that the plaintiff had "gulled" many of the nobility with this crystal ball, that he took money for "these profane acts, and made a good thing of it." Cockburn, C. J., directed the jury that a newspaper might expose what it deemed an imposition on the public; but that this letter amounted to a charge that the plaintiff had made money by wilful and fraudulent misrepresentations, a charge which should not be made without fair grounds. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages one farthing. *Morrison v. Belcher*, 3 F. & F. 614.

## 7. *Other Appeals to the Public.*

Whenever a medical man brings forward some new method of treatment, and advertises it largely as the best or only cure for some particular disease, or for all diseases at once, he may be said to invite public attention. So when a tradesman distributes handbills or circulars, he challenges public criticism. A newspaper writer is justified in warning the public against such advertisers, and in exposing the absurdity of their professions,

provided he does so fairly and with reasonable moderation and judgment.

Again, where a man appeals to the public by writing letters to the newspaper, either to expose what he deems abuses, or to call attention to his own particular grievances, he cannot \* 51 complain if the editor inserts other \* letters in answer to his own, refuting his charges, and denying his facts. A man who has commenced a newspaper warfare, cannot complain if he gets the worst of it. But if such answer goes further, and touches on fresh matter in no way connected with the plaintiff's original letter, or unnecessarily assails the plaintiff's private character, then it ceases to be an *answer*; it becomes a counter-charge, and if defamatory will be deemed a libel.

So, too, when a man comes prominently forward in any way, and acquires for a time a *quasi*-public position, he cannot escape the necessary consequence, the free expression of public opinion. Whoever seeks notoriety, or invites public attention, is said to challenge public criticism; and he cannot resort to the law courts, if that criticism be less favorable than he anticipated.

### *Illustrations.*

A medical man who had obtained a diploma and the degree of M.D. from America advertised most extensively a new and infallible cure for consumption. The *Pall Mall Gazette* published a leading article on the subject of such advertisements, in which they called the advertiser a quack and an impostor, and compared him to "scoundrels who pass bad coin." The jury gave the plaintiff one farthing damages. *Hunter v. Sharpe*, 4 F. & F. 983; 15 L. T. 421. And see *Morrison* and another *v. Harmer* and another, 3 Bing. N. C. 759; 4 Scott, 524; 3 Hodges, 108.

A marine store dealer extensively circulated a handbill setting forth the high prices he was prepared to give for kitchen stuff, rags, bones, oilcloth, brass, copper, lead, plated metals, horsehair, and old clothes. An alderman sitting as magistrate at Guildhall denounced this handbill as offering great inducements to servants to rob their masters. The alderman's remarks, together with the handbill itself *verbatim*, were published in the *Daily Telegraph*, with a heading "Encouraging Servants to Rob their Masters;" and also a leading article in the same strain. The jury under the direction of Erle, C.J., found a verdict for the defendant. *Paris v. Levy*, 9 C. B. N. S. 342; 30 L. J. C. P. 11; 3 L. T. 324; 9 W. R. 71; 7 Jur. N. S. 289; and (at Nisi Prius) 2 F. & F. 71. And see *Eastwood v. Holmes*, 1 F. & F. 347; *Jenner* and another *v. A'Beckett*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464.

Two clergymen were engaged in a controversy; one, the plaintiff, wrote \* 52 \* a pamphlet; subsequently he published a "collection of opinions of the press" on his own pamphlet, including an inaccurate or garbled extract from an article which had appeared in the defendant's newspaper. The defendant thereupon felt it his duty in justice to the other clergyman to publish an article in his newspaper



exposing the inaccuracy of the extract as given by the plaintiff, and accusing him of purposely adding some passages and suppressing others, so as to entirely alter the sense. Erle, C.J., pointed out to the jury that the defendant was maintaining the truth, and that although he was led into exaggerated language, the plaintiff had also used exaggerated language himself. Verdict for the defendant. *Hibbs v. Wilkinson*, 1 F. & F. 608.

But where the editor of the *Lancet* attacked the editor of a rival paper, *The London Medical and Physical Journal*, by rancorous aspersions on his private character, the plaintiff recovered a verdict, damages £5. *Macleod v. Wakley*, 3 C. & P. 311.

So wherever a man calls public attention to his own grievances or those of his class, whether by letters in a newspaper, by speeches at public meetings, or by the publication of pamphlets, he must expect to have his assertions challenged, the existence of his grievances denied, and himself ridiculed and denounced. *Odger v. Mortimer*, 28 L. T. 472; *Kœnig v. Ritchie*, 3 F. & F. 413; *R. v. Velej*, 4 F. & F. 1117; *O'Donoghue v. Hussey*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 124; *Dwyer v. Esmonde*, 2 L. R. (Ir.) 243.

But where the defendant in answering a letter which the plaintiff has sent to the paper, does not confine himself to rebutting the plaintiff's assertions, but retorts upon the plaintiff by inquiring into his antecedents, and indulging in other uncalled for personalities, the defendant will be held liable; for such imputations are neither a proper answer to, nor a fair comment on, the plaintiff's speech or letter. *Murphy v. Halpin*, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 127.

Three clergymen of the Church of England residing near Swansea, being Conservatives, chose to attend a meeting of the supporters of the Liberal candidate for Swansea; they behaved in an excited manner, hissed and interrupted the speakers, and had eventually to be removed from the room by two policemen. *Held* that such conduct might fairly be commented on in the local newspapers; and that even a remark that "appearances were certainly consistent with the belief that they had imbibed rather freely of the cup that inebriates" was not, under the circumstances, a libel. *Davis v. Duncan*, L. R. 9 C. P. 396; 43 L. J. C. P. 185; 22 W. R. 575; 30 L. T. 464.

## \* PART II.

\* 53

### SLANDER.

WORDS which are clearly defamatory when written and published may not be actionable when merely spoken; for then other considerations apply. The reasons for the distinction have been already discussed.<sup>1</sup> Spoken words are defamatory whenever special damage has in fact resulted from their use. Spoken words are also defamatory when the imputation cast by them on the plaintiff is on the face of it so injurious that the Court will presume, without any proof, that his reputation must be impaired thereby. And the Court will so presume in three cases:—

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 3-5, c. 1.

- I. Where the words charge the plaintiff with the commission of some indictable offence ; or,
- II. Impute to him a contagious or infectious disease tending to exclude him from society ; or,
- III. Are spoken of him in the way of his office, profession, or trade.

In no other case are spoken words defamatory, unless they have caused some special damage to the plaintiff. (a)

\* 54 \* I. *Where the words impute an indictable offence.*

Spoken words, which impute that the plaintiff has been guilty of an indictable offence, are actionable without proof of special damage. (b) If the offence imputed be not indictable, but only punishable summarily before a magistrate by penalty or fine, the words will not be actionable *per se*. (c)

If, however, there be any offences which are not indictable, but for which a magistrate can inflict imprisonment with hard labor in the first instance (not merely in default of payment of a fine imposed), I apprehend that to impute such an offence to the plaintiff would be actionable *per se*. Words imputing to a licensed victualler that he had been guilty of an

(a) In South Carolina it has been actionable to call a white man or his wife a mulatto. *Eden v. Legare*, 1 Bay, 171 ; *Atkinson v. Hartley*, 1 McCord, 203 ; *King v. Wood*, 1 Nott & M. 184. *Secus* in North Carolina : *McDowell v. Bowles*, 8 Jones, 184. And in Ohio : *Barret v. Jarvis*, 1 Ohio, 83, note ; and see *Castleberry v. Kelly*, 26 Ga. 606. In Pennsylvania it has been held actionable to charge a man with being a vagrant. *Miles v. Oldfield*, 4 Yeates, 423. So in Ohio to call a woman a hermaphrodite. *Malone v. Stewart*, 15 Ohio, 319.

(b) If the words are that the plaintiff "or somebody else" has committed the offence, it is said that they are not actionable *per se*. *Ingalls v. Allen*, 1 Breese, 233 (*sed quære*).

(c) See *post*, p. 84, note. Words published in the State of the forum which impute the commission of a common law indictable offence in another State are *prima facie* actionable *per se*, and it need not be shown that the offence is indictable in the sister State. *Stout v. Wood*, 1 Blackf. 71 ; *Hull v. Vreeland*, 42 Barb. 543 ; *Lister*

*v. Wright*, 2 Hill, 320 ; *Klumph v. Dunn*, 66 Penn. St. 141 ; *Montgomery v. Deeley*, 3 Wis. 709 ; *Johnson v. Dicken*, 25 Mo. 580 ; *Poe v. Grever*, 3 Sneed, 664 ; *Shipp v. McCraw*, 3 Murph. 403. See *Wall v. Hoskins*, 5 Ired. 177. But see *Bundy v. Hart*, 46 Mo. 460. So too if the words be actionable where spoken they are actionable everywhere. *Dufresne v. Weise*, 46 Wis. 290. And it matters not that redress in the foreign State in which the offence is stated to have been committed has become barred by limitation. *Van Ankin v. Westfall*, 14 Johns. 233. But words published in another State of an offence not indictable there are not actionable elsewhere though the offence be elsewhere indictable. *Klumph v. Dunn*, *supra* ; *Barclay v. Thompson*, 2 Penn. 148 ; *Stout v. Wood*, 1 Blackf. 71 ; *Offutt v. Earlywine*, 4 Blackf. 460 ; *Linville v. Earlywine*, *ib.* 469 ; *Langdon v. Young*, 33 Vt. 136 ; *Sparrow v. Maynard*, 8 Jones, 195 (*sed quære* if this case does not go too far). Words imputing a purely military offence are not actionable without special damage. *Hollingsworth v. Shaw*, 19 Ohio St. 430.

offence against the Licensing Acts would be actionable as spoken of him in the way of his trade: and so would words spoken of a dairyman or grocer falsely alleging that he had been convicted under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875. Holt, C.J., in *Ogden v. Turner*,<sup>1</sup> lays it down that every charge of treason or felony is actionable, but not every charge of misdemeanor, only of such as entail a "scandalous" and "infamous" punishment. But what misdemeanors are included in the terms "scandalous" or "infamous," or, rather, what misdemeanors are *not* included? (a) The epithets appear to me to mean nothing more than that the charge must be of such a nature that, if believed, it would impair the reputation of the person accused. If so, this would include all indictable misdemeanors, except, perhaps, such semi-civil proceedings as an indictment for the obstruction or non-repair of a highway. The word "infamous" clearly cannot now be taken in its strictest legal sense to signify a punishment which renders the person convicted incapable of giving evidence in the law courts.<sup>2</sup> In *Lady Cockaine's case*<sup>3</sup> the argument of the judge seems to imply that words are actionable which impute to the plaintiff an act which would be cause to bind her over to good behavior: but I can find no other authority for such a doctrine.

\* *Illustrations.*

\* 55

A general charge of felony is actionable, though it does not specify any particular felony. *E.g.* :

"If you had had your deserts, you would have been hanged before now." *Donne's Case*, Cro. Eliz. 62.

"He deserves to have his ears nailed to the pillory." *Jenkinson v. Mayne*, Cro. Eliz. 384; 1 Vin. Abr. 415.

"You have committed an act for which I can transport you." *Curtis v. Curtis*, 10 Bing. 477; 3 M. & Scott, 819; 4 M. & Scott, 337.

"You have done many things for which you ought to be hanged, and I will have you hanged." *Francis v. Roose*, 3 M. & W. 191; 1 H. & H. 36.

So are all charges of specific felonies. *E.g.* : ( )

<sup>1</sup> 6 Mod. 104; Holt, 40; 2 Salk. 696.

<sup>2</sup> See the remarks of Grey, C.J., in *Onslow v. Horne*, 3 Wils. 186; 2 W. Bl. 753.

<sup>3</sup> Cro. Eliz. 49.

(a) It is actionable falsely to charge upon the plaintiff a removal of defendant's landmarks. *Young v. Miller*, 3 Hill, 21; *Todd v. Rough*, 10 Serg. & R. 18. And see *Dial v. Holter*, 6 Ohio St. 228; *Williams v. Karnes*, 4 Humph. 9. For other cases in which misdemeanors falsely imputed are held actionable, see *Perdue v. Burnett*, Minor, 138; *Alexander v. Alexander*, 9 Wend. 141; *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Sneed, 473; *Johnson v. Shields*, 1 Dutch. 116. It is held not actionable in South Carolina falsely to charge one with having

burnt, destroyed, and suppressed a will. *O'Hanlon v. Myers*, 10 Rich. 128. To charge a town clerk falsely with destroying votes is actionable *per se* in Massachusetts. *Dodds v. Henry*, 9 Mass. 262. So to charge one with girdling and destroying apple-trees. *Murray v. McAllister*, 38 Vt. 167.

(b) Abortion. *Miles v. Vanhorn*, 17 Ind. 245 (charged upon unmarried female); *Bissell v. Cornell*, 24 Wend. 354. But see *Smith v. Gaffard*, 31 Ala. 45; *Hatfield v. Gano*, 15 Iowa, 177.

Assault with intent to rob : (a) — *Lewknor v. Cruchley and wife*, Cro. Car. 140.  
 Attempt to murder : — *Scot et ux. v. Hilliar, Lane*, 98 ; 1 Vin. Abr. 440 ; *Preston v. Pinder*, Cro. Eliz. 308.

Attempt to rob : — *Sir Harbert Croft v. Brown*, 3 Buls. 167.

Bigamy : (b) — *Heming et ux. v. Power*, 10 M. & W. 564 ; *Delany v. Jones*, 4 Esp. 190.

Burglary : — *Somers v. House, Holt*, 39. (c)

Demanding money with menaces : — *Neve v. Cross*, Sty. 350.

Embezzlement : (d) — *Williams v. Stott*, 1 C. & M. 675 ; 3 Tyrw. 688.

Forgery : (e) — *Baal v. Baggerley*, Cro. Car. 326 ; *Jones v. Herne*, 2 Wils. 87. (f)

Larceny : — *Foster v. Browning*, Cro. Jac. 688 ; *Baker v. Pierce*, 2 Ld. Raym. 959 ; *Holt*, 654 ; 6 Mod. 23 ; 2 Salk. 695 ; *Slowman v. Dutton*, 10 Bing. 402 ; *Tomlinson v. Brittlebank*, 4 B. & Ad. 630 ; 1 N. & M. 455. (g)

Manslaughter : — *Ford v. Primrose*, 5 D. & R. 287 ; *Edsall v. Russell*, 4 M. & G. 1090 ; 5 Scott, N. R. 801 ; 2 D. N. S. 641 ; 12 L. J. C. P. 4 ; 6 Jur. 996.

Murder : — *Peake v. Oldham*, Cowp. 275 ; s. c. *sub nom. Oldham v. Peake*, 2 W. Bl. 959 ; *Button v. Hayward*, 8 Mod. 24. (h)

\* 56 \* Receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen : — *Brigg's Case*, God. 157. *Clarke's Case de Dorchester*, 2 Rolle's Rep. 136 ; *Alfred v. Farlow*, 8 Q. B. 854 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 10 Jur. 714.

Robbery : (i) — *Lawrence v. Woodward*, Cro. Car. 277 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 74 ; *Rowcliffe v. Edmonds et ux.*, 7 M. & W. 12 ; 4 Jur. 684. (j)

Treason : — *Sir William Waldegrave v. Ralph Agas*, Cro. Eliz. 191 ; *Stapleton v. Frier*, Cro. Eliz. 251 ; *Fry v. Carne*, 8 Mod. 283.

(a) *Secus* of a charge of assault and battery, though of an aggravated nature. *Dudley v. Horn*, 21 Ala. 379 ; *Billings v. Wing*, 7 Vt. 439 ; *Andres v. Koppenheaver*, 3 Serg. & R. 255 ; *Speaker v. McKenzie*, 26 Mo. 255 ; *Birch v. Benton*, Ib. 153.

(b) *Parker v. Meader*, 32 Vt. 300. *Bribery* ; *Gibbs v. Dewey*, 5 Cowen, 503.

(c) Counterfeiting. *Thirman v. Matthews*, 1 Stewt. 384 ; *Church v. Bridgman*, 6 Mo. 190 ; *Howard v. Stephenson*, 2 Mill, 408.

(d) What amounts to a charge of embezzlement, see *Parke v. Piedmont Ins. Co.*, 51 Ga. 511 ; *Taylor v. Short*, 40 Ind. 506 ; *Johnson v. Brown*, 13 W. Va. 71, 107 ; *Johnson v. Shields*, 1 Dutch. 116 ; *Goodrich v. Hooper*, 97 Mass. 1. A charge of embezzlement of goods was held not actionable in *Caldwell v. Abbey*, Hard. 529. As to a charge of felonious breach of trust, see *Allen v. Hillman*, 12 Pick. 101 ; *Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 11 Heisk. 757 ; *Gill v. Bright*, 6 T. B. Mon. 130. "Pilfering." *Beckett v. Sterrett*, 4 Blackf. 499.

(e) *Hotchkiss v. Olmstead*, 37 Ind. 74 ; *Atkinson v. Reding*, 5 Blackf. 39 ; *Alex-*

*ander v. Alexander*, 9 Wend. 141. What constitutes a charge of forgery. *Ib.* ; *Arnold v. Cost*, 3 Gill & J. 219 ; *Gay v. Homer*, 13 Pick. 535. To charge with having no authority to sign his name to a note is not actionable if the charge was made to the payee. *Andrews v. Woodmansee*, 15 Wend. 232. See also *Mills v. Taylor*, 3 Bibb, 469. (f) Kidnapping. *Nash v. Benedict*, 25 Wend. 645.

(g) *Porter v. Choen*, 60 Ind. 338 ; *Hart v. Coy*, 40 Ind. 553 ; *Ward v. Colyhan*, 30 Ind. 395 ; *Fawsett v. Clark*, 48 Md. 494 ; *Hayes v. Ball*, 72 N. Y. 418 ; *Georgia v. Kepford*, 45 Iowa, 48 ; *Wing v. Wing*, 66 Maine, 62 ; *Allen v. Hillman*, 12 Pick. 101 ; *Dunnell v. Fiske*, 11 Met. 551 ; *Edgerly v. Swain*, 32 N. H. 478 ; *Tillman v. Willis*, 61 Ga. 433 ; *Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 11 Heisk. 757. See *post*, p. 122, note.

(h) "Hireling murderer" in writing. *Smith v. State*, 32 Texas, 594.

(i) *Filber v. Dantermann*, 28 Wis. 134. Of the mail. *Jones v. Chapman*, 5 Blackf. 88.

(j) Smuggling. *Stillwell v. Barter*, 19 Wend. 487.

Unnatural offences : — *Woolnoth v. Meadows*, 5 East, 463 ; 2 Smith, 28 ; *Colman v. Godwin*, 3 Dougl. 90 ; 2 B. & C. 285 (n).

So it is actionable without proof of special damage to charge another with the commission of the following misdemeanors : —

Bribery and corruption : — *Bendish v. Lindsay*, 11 Mod. 194. (a)

Conspiracy : — *Tibbott v. Haynes*, Cro. Eliz. 191.

Keeping a bawdy-house : — Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 643 ; *Brayne v. Cooper*, 5 M. & W. 249 ; *Huckle v. Reynolds*, 7 C. B. N. S. 114. (b)

Libel : — *Sir William Russell v. Ligon*, 1 Roll. Abr. 46 ; 1 Vin. Abr. 423. (c)

Perjury : — *Ceeley v. Hoskins*, Cro. Car. 509 ; *Holt v. Scholefield*, 6 T. R. 691 ; *Roberts v. Camden*, 9 East, 93. (d) Even in an Ecclesiastical Court, *Shaw v. Thompson*, Cro. Eliz. 609. (e)

Soliciting another to commit a crime : — *Sir Thomas Cockaine and wife v. Witnam*, Cro. Eliz. 49 ; *Leversage v. Smith*, Cro. Eliz. 710 ; *Tibbott v. Haynes*, Cro. Eliz. 191 ; *Passie v. Mondford*, Cro. Eliz. 747. But see *Eaton v. Allen*, 4 Rep. 16 ; Cro. Eliz. 684.

Subornation of perjury : — *Guerdon v. Winterstud*, Cro. Eliz. 308 ; *Harris v. Dixon*, Cro. Jac. 158 ; *Bridges v. Playdel*, Brownl. & Golds. 2 ; *Harrison v. Thornborough*, 10 Mod. 196 ; *Gilbert's Cases in Law and Eq.* 114.

Where the words impute merely a trespass in pursuit of game, punishable primarily by fine alone, no action lies without proof of special damage,\* although \* 57 imprisonment in the pillory may be inflicted in default of payment of the fine (3 Wm. & M. c. 10). *Ogden v. Turner* (1705), 6 Mod. 104 ; *Salk*. 696 ; *Holt*, 40. (f)

[Certain *dicta* in this case which appear to go further, were disapproved of by Grey, C.J., in 3 Wils. 186, and must be now considered as bad law.]

Where the words imputed an offence against the Fishery Acts, punishable only by fine and forfeiture of the nets and instruments used: *Held* that no action lay without proof of special damage. *McCabe v. Foot*, 18 Ir. Jur. (Vol. xi. N. S.) 287 ; 15 L. T. 115.

To state that criminal proceedings are about to be taken against the plaintiff (*e.g.* that the Attorney-General had directed a certain attorney to prosecute him for perjury) is actionable, although the speaker does not expressly assert that the plaintiff is guilty of the charge. *Roberts v. Camden*, 9 East, 93 ; *Tempest v. Chambers*, 1 Stark. 67 ; *contra*, *Harrison v. King*, 4 Price, 46 ; 7 Taunt. 431 ; 1 B. & Ald. 161.

Words which merely impute a criminal intention, not yet put into action, are not actionable. (g) Guilty thoughts are not a crime. But as soon as any step is taken to

(a) *Hand v. Winton*, 9 Vroom, 122, bribery charged upon a politician for offering a certain resolution in a political meeting. *Post*, p. 71.

(b) *Griffin v. Moore*, 43 Md. 246 ; *Perkins v. Scott*, 1 Hurl. & C. 153 ; *Martin v. Stilwell*, 13 Johns. 275. *Secus* of charge of keeping a "bad house" without proper colloquium or equivalent. *Peterson v. Sentman*, 37 Md. 140. But see *Fitzgerald v. Robinson*, 112 Mass. 371.

(c) *Andres v. Koppenheaver*, 3 Serg. & R. 255.

(d) *Newbit v. Statuck*, 35 Maine, 305 ; *Rhinehardt v. Potts*, 7 Ired. 403 ; *Eccles v. Shannon*, 4 Harr. (Del.) 193 ; *Ramey v. Thornberry*, 7 B. Mon. 475 ; *Fowle v.*

*Robbins*, 12 Mass. 498 ; *Wood v. Southwick*, 97 Mass. 354 ; *Crone v. Angell*, 14 Mich. 340 ; *Crawford v. Melton*, 20 Miss. 328 ; *Persilly v. Bacon*, 20 Mo. 330. See further, p. 123, note. \*

(e) See *Chapman v. Gillett*, 2 Conn. 40.

(f) *Secus* of malicious trespass. *Wilcox v. Edwards*, 5 Blackf. 183 ; *Yearley v. Ashley*, 4 Har. & J. 314 ; *Burton v. Burton*, 3 Greene (Iowa), 316. But see *Gage v. Shelton*, 3 Rich. 242 ; *Chaplin v. Cruikshanks*, 2 Har. & J. 247.

(g) *Perry v. Man*, 1 R. I. 263 ; *McKee v. Ingalls*, 4 Scam. 30 ; *Wilson v. Tatum*, 8 Jones, 300 ; *Seaton v. Cordray*, Wright, 101.

carry out such intention, as soon as any overt act is done, an *attempt* to commit a crime has been made: and every attempt to commit an indictable offence is at common law a misdemeanor, and in itself indictable. To impute such an attempt is therefore clearly actionable. *Harrison v. Stratton*, 4 Esp. 217. (a)

Words which merely disclose a suspicion that is in the speaker's mind, and which the bystanders could not understand as conveying any definite charge of felony, are not actionable. *Tozer v. Mashford*, 6 Ex. 539; 20 L. J. Ex. 225. (b)

It is not necessary that the words should accuse the plaintiff of some fresh, undiscovered crime, so as to put him in jeopardy or cause his arrest. Of course, if such consequences have followed, they may be alleged as special damage; but where such consequences are impossible, the words are still actionable. Thus, to call a man a returned convict, or otherwise to falsely impute that he has been tried and convicted of a criminal offence, is actionable without special damage. (c)

For it is at least quite as injurious to the plaintiff's reputation, to say that he has in fact been convicted, as to say that he will be, or  
 \* 58 ought to be, convicted. Many think that such statements \*should be actionable, even when *true*, if they are maliciously or unnecessarily volunteered. See *post*, p. 179, c. VII.

### Illustrations.

It is actionable without proof of special damage to say of the plaintiff—that he had been in Launceston gaol and was burnt in the hand for coining. *Gainford v. Tuke*, Cro. Jac. 536;

that he “was in Winchester gaol, and tried for his life, and would have been hanged, had it not been for Leggatt, for breaking open the granary of farmer A. and stealing his bacon.” [Note that here the speaker appears to admit that the plaintiff was acquitted, but still asserts that he was in fact guilty.] *Carpenter v. Tarrant*, Cas. temp. Hardwicke, 339.

“He was a thief and stole my gold.” It was argued here that “was” denotes time

(a) *Berdeaux v. Davis*, 58 Ala. 611. But see *Russell v. Wilson*, 7 B. Mon. 261. So to charge one with being a “*thieving son of a bitch*.” *Reynolds v. Ross*, 42 Ind. 387. The word “*thieving*” is considered to import offence committed and not a mere propensity. *Ib.*; *Alley v. Neely*, 5 Blackf. 200; *Little v. Barlow*, 26 Ga. 423. To say “You as good as stole the canoe” is held not actionable. *Stokes v. Arey*, 8 Jones, 66. So to say “A man that would do that would steal.” *Stees v. Kemble*, 27 Penn. St. 112. *Secus* of a charge of willingness to commit perjury. *Porter v. Choen*, 60 Ind. 338.

(b) But if the words be such as to lead the hearers to suspect the plaintiff guilty of a crime, they are actionable *per se*. *Drummond v. Leslie*, 5 Blackf. 453.

(c) *Krebs v. Oliver*, 12 Gray, 239; *Wiley v. Campbell*, 5 T. B. Mon. 396; *Smith v. Stewart*, 5 Barr, 372. So to accuse a young child falsely of larceny, though he could not be guilty thereof. *Stewart v. Howe*, 17 Ill. 71. Nor is physical ability to commit the crime important. *Chambers v. White*, 2 Jones, 383.

past; so that it may have been when he was a child, and therefore no larceny; or in the time of Queen Elizabeth, since when there had been divers general pardons: *Sed per cur.*: "it is a great scandal to be once a thief; for *pæna potest redimi, culpa perennis erit.*" *Boston v. Tatam*, Cro. Jac. 623.

It is actionable to call a man "thief" or "felon," even though he once committed larceny, if after conviction he was pardoned either under the Great Seal or by some general statute of pardon. *Cuddington v. Wilkins*, Hobart, 67, 81; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 37, s. 48; *Leyman v. Latimer and others*, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; 46 L. J. Ex. 765; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 25 W. R. 751; 26 W. R. 305; 37 L. T. 360, 819. (a)

It is actionable to call a man falsely "a returned convict." *Fowler v. Dowdney*, 2 M. & Rob. 119.

In dealing with old cases on this point, care must be taken to remember the state of the criminal law as it existed at the date of publication.

### *Illustrations.*

So long as the 18 Eliz. c. 3 was in force, it was actionable to charge a woman with being the mother, a man with being the putative father, of a bastard child, chargeable to the parish. *Anne Davis's Case*, 4 Rep. 17; 2 Salk. 694; 1 Roll. Abr. 38; *Salter v. Browne*, Cro. Car. 436; 1 Roll. Abr. 37.

So long as the penal statutes against Roman Catholics were in force it was actionable to say "He goes to mass," or "He harbored his son, knowing him to be a Romish priest." *Walden v. Mitchell*, 2 Ventr. 265; *Smith v. Flynt*, Cro. Jac. 300.

\* *Secus*, before such statutes were passed. *Pierepoint's Case*, Cro. Eliz. \* 59 308.

So in many old cases such words as "She is a witch" were held actionable, the statute, 1 Jac. I. c. 11, being then in force. But that statute is now repealed by the 9 Geo. II. c. 5, s. 3, which also expressly provides that no action shall lie for charging another with witchcraft, sorcery, or any such offence. *Rogers v. Gravat*, Cro. Eliz. 571; *Dacy v. Clinch*, Sid. 53.

It was formerly the custom of the City of London, of the borough of Southwark, and also, it is said, of the city of Bristol, to cart whores. Hence to call a woman "whore" or "strumpet" in one of those cities is actionable, if the action be brought in the City Courts, which take notice of their own customs without proof. But no action will lie in the Superior Courts of Westminster for such words, because such custom has never been certified by the Recorder, and will now be difficult to prove. *Oxford et ux. v. Cross* (1599), 4 Rep. 18; *Hassell v. Capcot* (1639), 1 Vin. Abr. 395; 1 Roll. Abr. 36; *Cooke v. Wingfield*, 1 Str. 555; *Roberts v. Herbert*, Sid. 97; 1 Keble, 418; *Stainton et ux. v. Jones*, 2 Selw. N. P. 1205 (13th edn.); 1 Dougl. 380, n.; *Theyer v. Eastwick*, 4 Burr. 2032; *Brand and wife v. Roberts and wife*, 4 Burr. 2418; *Vicars v. Worth*, 1 Str. 471.

So it was in 1602 held not actionable to say:—"Thou hast received stolen swine, and thou knowest they were stolen;" for receiving is not a common law offence, unless it amounts to comforting and assisting the felon as an accessory after the fact. But ever since 3 Wm. & Mary, c. 9, s. 4, and 4 Geo. I. c. 11, such words would be clearly actionable. *Dawes v. Bolton or Boughton*, Cro. Eliz. 888; 1 Roll. Abr. 68; *Cox v. Humphrey*, Cro. Eliz. 889.

A charge of deer stealing would be actionable now, though in 1705 it was held not

(a) *Baum v. Clause*, 5 Hill, 196.

actionable, because it was subject only to a penalty of £30. *Ogden v. Turner*, Salk. 696; Holt, 40; 6 Mod. 104.

So now it would of course be actionable to accuse a man of secreting a will; though such an accusation was held not actionable in *Godfrey v. Owen*, Palm. 21; 3 Salk. 327.

Where a vicar of a parish falsely declared that the plaintiff, a parishioner, was excommunicated, it was held an action lay; possibly because the person excommunicated was at that date liable to imprisonment under the writ *de excommunicato capiendo*; but there seems to have been some allegation of special damage in the declaration. *Barnabas v. Traunter*, 1 Vin. Abr. 396.

But an accusation of adultery, fornication, &c., was never ground for an action in the civil courts. The person accused had a remedy in the spiritual courts till the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41; now he has none. (a)

\* 60      \* The charge must be clearly that of an indictable offence, although it need not be stated with all the precision of an indictment. If merely fraud, dishonesty, immorality, or vice, be imputed, no action lies without proof of special damage. And even where words of specific import are employed (such as "thief" or "traitor"), still, if the defendant can satisfy the jury that they were not intended to impute any specific crime, but merely as general terms of abuse, and meant no more than "rogue" or "scoundrel," and were so understood by all who heard the conversation, no action lies. But if the bystanders reasonably understand the words as definitely charging the plaintiff with the commission of some specific crime, an action lies.

### *Illustrations.*

"You forged my name:" these words are actionable, although it is not stated to what deed or instrument. *Jones v. Herne*, 2 Wils. 87, overruling *Anon.*, 3 Leon. 231; 1 Roll. Abr. 65.

To say that a man is "forsworn" or "has taken a false oath" is not a sufficiently definite charge of perjury; for there is no reference to any judicial proceeding. But to say "Thou art forsworn in a Court of record" is a sufficient charge of perjury; for this will be taken to mean that he was forsworn while giving evidence in a Court of record before the lawfully appointed judge thereof on some point material to the issue before him. *Stanhope v. Blith* (1585), 4 Rep. 15; *Holt v. Scholefield*, 6 T. R. 691; *Ceely v. Hoskins*, Cro. Car. 509.

To say "I have been robbed of three dozen winches; you bought two, one at 3s., one at 2s.; you knew well when you bought them that they cost me three times as much making as you gave for them, and that they could not have been honestly come by," is a sufficient charge of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been *stolen*. [An indictment which merely alleged that the prisoner knew the goods were not honestly come by would be bad. *R. v. Wilson*, 2 Mood. C. C. 52;] *Alfred v. Farlow*, 8 Q. B. 854; 15 L. J. Q. B. 258; 10 Jur. 714.

"He is a pick-pocket; he picked my pocket of my money," was once held an insufficient charge of larceny. *Walls or Watts v. Rymes*, 2 Lev. 51; 1 Vent. 213; 3 Salk. 325.

(a) See *post*, p. 85.



\* But now this would clearly be held sufficient. *Baker v. Pierce*, 2 Ld. Raym. 959; *Holt*, 654; 6 Mod. 23; 2 Salk. 695; *Stebbing v. Warner*, 11 Mod. 255. \* 61

"He has defrauded a mealman of a roan horse" held not to imply a criminal act of fraud; as it is not stated that the mealman was induced to part with his property by means of any false pretence. *Richardson v. Allen*, 2 Chit. 657.

So none of the following words are actionable without proof of special damage:—

"Cheat:"—*Savage v. Robery*, 2 Salk. 694; 5 Mod. 398; *Davis v. Miller et ux.*, 2 Str. 1169. (a)

"Swindler:"—*Savile v. Jardine*, 2 H. Bl. 531; *Black v. Hunt*, 2 L. R. Ir. 10; *Ward v. Weeks*, 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796. (b)

"Rogue," "rascal," "villain," &c.:—*Stanhope v. Blith*, 4 Rep. 15. (c)

"Runagate:"—*Cockaine v. Hopkins*, 2 Lev. 214.

"Cozener:"—*Brunkard v. Segar*, Cro. Jac. 427; *Hutt*, 13; 1 Vin. Abr. 427.

"Common-filcher:"—*Goodale v. Castle*, Cro. Eliz. 554.

"Welcher:"—*Blackman v. Bryant*, 27 L. T. 491.

Nor are the words "gambler," (d) "black-leg," "black-sheep," unless it can be shown that the bystanders understood the words to imply "a cheating gambler punishable by the criminal law." *Barnett v. Allen*, 3 H. & N. 376; 27 L. J. Ex. 412; 1 F. & F. 125; 4 Jur. N. S. 488.

If the crime imputed be one of which the plaintiff could not by any possibility be guilty, and all who heard the imputation knew that he could not by any possibility be guilty thereof, no action lies, for the plaintiff is never in jeopardy, nor is his reputation in any way impaired.<sup>1</sup> (e)

### Illustrations.

Words complained of:—"Thou hast killed my wife." Everyone who heard the words knew at the time that defendant's wife was still \* alive: they could not therefore understand the word "kill" to mean "murder." *Snag v. Gee*, 4 Rep. 16, as explained by Parke, B., in *Heming v. Power*, 10 M. & W. 569. And see *Web v. Poor*, Cro. Eliz. 569; *Talbot v. Case*, Cro. Eliz. 823; *Dacy v. Clinch*, Sid. 53; *Jacob v. Mills*, 1 Vent. 117; Cro. Jac. 343. \* 62

It is no slander to say of a churchwarden that he stole the bell-ropes of his parish church; for they are officially his property; and a man cannot steal his own goods. *Jackson v. Adams*, 2 Bing. N. C. 402; 2 Scott, 599; 1 Hodges, 339.

So it is not actionable for A. to charge a man who is not A.'s clerk or servant with embezzling A.'s money; for no indictment for embezzlement would lie. [But surely

<sup>1</sup> Buller's N. P. 5.

(a) *Weierbach v. Trone*, 2 Watts & S. 408. "You are a cheat and a swindler, and you defrauded me," orally charged, is not actionable *per se*. *Lucas v. Flinn*, 35 Iowa, 9; *Winter v. Sumvalt*, 3 Har. & J. 68. But see *Marshall v. Addison*, 4 Har. & M. 537. So "You are a liar." *Kimmis v. Stiles*, 44 Vt. 351.

(b) *Chase v. Whitlock*, 3 Hill, 139; *Odiorne v. Bacon*, 6 Cush. 185.

(c) *Idol v. Jones*, 2 Dev. 162.

(d) But *secus* of "He keeps a gambling place." *Buckley v. O'Niel*, 113 Mass. 193.

(e) See *ante*, p. 55, note.

this can only be the case where the bystanders are aware of the exact relationship between A. and the plaintiff.] *Williams v. Stott*, 1 C. & M. 675 ; 3 Tyrw. 688.

But where a married woman said, "You stole my faggots," and it was argued for the defendant that a married woman could not own faggots, and therefore no one could steal faggots of hers : the Court construed the words according to common sense and ordinary usage to mean, "You stole my husband's faggots." *Stamp and wife v. White and wife*, Cro. Jac. 600 ; *Charnel's Case*, Cro. Eliz. 279.

When the charge is made *bond fide* while giving the plaintiff into custody or prosecuting him according to law, it will be privileged ; see *post*, c. VIII., pp. 220, 221.

## II. *Where the words impute a contagious disease.*

Words imputing to the plaintiff that he has an infectious or contagious disease are actionable without proof of special  
 \* 63 damage. (a) For the effect of such an \*imputation is naturally to exclude the plaintiff from society. Such disease may be either leprosy, venereal disease, or, it seems, the plague ;<sup>1</sup> but not the itch, the falling sickness, or the small-pox ; there is not such terror of infection in the latter cases. The words must distinctly impute that the plaintiff has the disease at the time of publication : an assertion that he *has had* such a disease would clearly be no ground for his being shunned.<sup>2</sup> (b)

Any words which the hearers would naturally understand as conveying that the plaintiff then has such a disease are sufficient. Many distinctions are drawn in old cases about the pox, a word which may imply either the actionable syphilis, or the more harmless small-pox. It has been decided that "he has the pox" (*simpliciter*) shall be taken to mean "he has the small-pox ;" but that if any other words be used referring to the effects of the disease, or the way in which it was caught, or even the medicine taken to cure it, these may be referred to as determining which pox was meant.

<sup>1</sup> *Villers v. Monsley*, 2 Wils. 403.

<sup>2</sup> *Carslake v. Mapledoram*, 2 T. R. 473 ; *Taylor v. Hall*, 2 Str. 1189.

(a) *Bruce v. Soule*, 69 Maine, 562 ; 57. The cases show that it is not material  
*Irons v. Field*, 9 R. I. 216 ; *Kaucher v. Blinn*, 29 Ohio St. 62 ; *Golderman v. Stearns*, 7 Gray, 181 ; *Williams v. Hold-ridge*, 22 Barb. 398 ; *Nichols v. Guy*, 2 Ind. 82 ; *Watson v. McCarthy*, 2 Kelly, whether the charge is that of having the pox, syphilis, or gonorrhœa.

(b) *Bruce v. Soule*, 69 Maine, 562 ;  
*Irons v. Field*, 9 R. I. 216 ; *Pike v. Van Wormer*, 5 How. Pr. 171.

*Illustrations.*

To say of a person, "He hath the falling sickness" is not actionable unless it be spoken of him in the way of his profession or trade. *Taylor v. Perr* (1607), Rolle's Abr. 44.

To say to the plaintiff, "Thou art a leprous knave," is actionable. *Taylor v. Perkins* (1607), Cro. Jac. 144; Rolle's Abr. 44.

To say of the plaintiff that "He hath the pox" is actionable, (a) whenever the word "wench" or "whore" occurs in the same sentence. *Brook v. Wise* (1601), Cro. Eliz. 878; *Pye v. Wallis* (1658), Carter, 55; *Grimes v. Lovel*, 12 Mod. 242; *Whitfield v. Powel*, 12 Mod. 248; *Clifton v. Wells*, 12 Mod. 634; *Bloodworth v. Grey*, 7 M. & Gr. 334; 8 Scott, N. R. 9.

\* III. *Words which are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade; or disparage him in an office of public trust.* \* 64

Such words are actionable without proof of any special damage. (b) It *must* injure the plaintiff's reputation to disparage him in his very means of livelihood. Where the Court sees that the words spoken affect the plaintiff in his office, profession, or trade, and directly tend to prejudice him therein, they ask for no further proof of damage. But it must always be averred on the record that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in relation to his office, profession, and trade, and that he held such office, or was actively engaged in such profession or trade, at the time the words were spoken.<sup>1</sup>

The office held by the plaintiff need not be one of profit; it may be merely confidential and honorary, as that of a justice of the peace. Which is a fresh proof that the gist of an action of slander is the injury to the plaintiff's reputation, and not any presumed pecuniary loss. It would be

<sup>1</sup> *Bellamy v. Burch*, 16 M. & W. 590.

(a) *Irons v. Field*, *supra*. Secus if in past tense. *Id.*

(b) *Van Epps v. Jones*, 50 Ga. 238; *Spiering v. Andrae*, 45 Wis. 330; *Gottbuehuet v. Hubachek*, 36 Wis. 515; *Gove v. Blethen*, 21 Minn. 80; *Sanderson v. Caldwell*, 45 N. Y. 398; *White v. Carroll*, 42 N. Y. 161. The contrary rule in *Curry v. Collins*, 37 Mo. 324, and in *Rammell v. Otis*, 60 Mo. 365, unless intended as a repudiation of all the authorities (which does not appear), is probably founded in mistake as

to what has been decided. It is no doubt true that where the words, not being spoken of the plaintiff in his vocation or necessarily affecting him therein, are in fact sued for as injuring his business, special damage must be alleged and proved. But that is another thing. The words, though oral, need not impute crime. *Gove v. Blethen*, *supra*. When it need not be alleged that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in his occupation, see *Sanderson v. Caldwell*, *supra*.

impossible to presume that a justice of the peace loses any money by being falsely charged with corruption or extortion; for there is no emolument attached to his office: yet he may recover heavy damages for the slander. So, too, a physician or a barrister may sue for any slander imputing professional misconduct, although in contemplation of law their fees are mere gratuities.

### *Illustrations.*

It is actionable without proof of special damage:—

To say that a judge gives corrupt sentences. *Cæsar v. Curseny*, Cro. Eliz. 305. (a)

To say that a clergyman had been guilty of gross immorality and had appropriated the sacrament money. *Highmore v. Earl and Countess of Harrington*, 3 C. B. N. S. 142.

\* 65      \* To say of an attorney that he deserved to be struck off the roll. *Phillips v. Jansen*, 2 Esp. 624; *Warton v. Gearing*, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 122.

To say of a watchmaker, "he is a bungler, and knows not how to make a good watch." *Redman v. Pyne*, 1 Mod. 19.

To in any way impute insolvency or bankruptcy to any merchant or trader. *Arne v. Johnson*, 10 Mod. 111; *Davis v. Lewis*, 7 T. R. 17.

But it by no means follows that *any* words spoken to the disparagement of an officer, professional man, or trader, will *ipso facto* be actionable *per se*. Words to be actionable on this ground, "must touch the plaintiff in his office, profession, or trade:" that is, they must be shown to have been spoken of the plaintiff in relation thereto, and to be such as would prejudice him therein. They must impeach either his skill or knowledge, (b) or his official or professional conduct. It is true that his special office or situation need not be expressly referred to, if the charge made be such as must necessarily affect it. And in determining whether the words used would necessarily affect the plaintiff in his office, profession, or trade, regard must be had to the rank and position of the plaintiff, and to the mental and moral requirements of the office he holds. Words may be actionable if spoken of a clergyman or a barrister, which would not be actionable of a trader or a clerk.

Thus, where integrity and ability are essential to the due conduct of plaintiff's office, words impugning the integrity or ability of the plaintiff are clearly actionable without any express mention of that office; for they distinctly imply that he is unfit to

(a) But he should have jurisdiction. *per se*. *Spiering v. Andrae*, 45 Wis. 330  
*Oraam v. Franklin*, 5 Blackf. 42. (denying *Mayrant v. Richardson*, 1 Nott

(b) To charge an officer falsely with gross ignorance of his duties is actionable. *& McC. 347*). See *White v. Carroll*, 42 N. Y. 161.

continue therein. But where the plaintiff does not hold any situation of trust or confidence, words which merely convey a general imputation of dishonesty, or charge \* him \* 66 with some misconduct not connected with his special profession or trade, will not be actionable.

### *Illustrations.*

To impute immorality (a) or adultery to a beneficed clergyman is actionable; for it is ground of deprivation. *Gallwey v. Marshall*, 9 Exch. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78; 2 C. L. R. 399.

Not so in the case of a physician. *Ayre v. Craven*, 2 A. & E. 2; 4 Nev. & M. 220.

Or a staymaker. *Brayne v. Cooper*, 5 M. & W. 249.

Or a clerk to a gas company. *Lumby v. Allday*, 1 C. & J. 301; 1 Tyrw. 217.

To say of a superintendent of police that "he has been guilty of conduct unfit for publication" is not actionable, unless the words were spoken of him with reference to his office. *James v. Brook*, 9 Q. B. 7; 16 L. J. Q. B. 17; 10 Jur. 541.

It is actionable to impute *habitual* drunkenness to a beneficed clergyman. *Dod v. Robinson*, Al. 63.

Or to a master mariner in command of a vessel. *Irwin v. Brandwood*, 2 H. & C. 960; 33 L. J. Ex. 257; 9 L. T. 772; 10 Jur. N. S. 370; 12 W. R. 438.

Or to a schoolmaster. *Brandrick v. Johnson*, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 306.

It would not be actionable where sobriety was not an essential qualification for the post. And to state that a clergyman or a schoolmaster was drunk on one particular occasion, and that neither in church nor in school, would not be actionable; as that alone would not necessitate his removal from his office. *Tighe v. Wicks*, 33 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep. 470. *Brandrick v. Johnson*, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 306. And see *Hume v. Marshall*, *Times*, Nov. 26th, 1877. (b)

To say of an attorney that "he hath the falling sickness" is actionable, without special damages, because that disables him in his profession. *Taylor v. Perr* (1607), 1 Roll. Abr. 44.

But it is not actionable to say of an attorney, "He has defrauded his creditors and has been horsewhipped off the course at Doncaster;" for it is no part of his professional duties to attend horse-races. *Doyley v. Roberts*, 3 Bing. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 154.

To say of a livery-stable-keeper, "You are a regular prover under bankruptcies, a regular bankrupt-maker," is not actionable; for it is not a charge against him in the way of his trade. *Angle v. Alexander*, 7 Bing. 119; 1 Cr. & J. 143; 4 M. & P. 870; 1 Tyrw. 9.

(a) As to charge a clergyman with being a knave. *Harding v. Brooks*, 5 Pick. 244.

(b) *Contra*, in this country. *Chaddock v. Briggs*, 13 Mass. 248; *Hayner v. Cowden*, 27 Ohio St. 292. And a false charge of being drunk once is actionable in Massachusetts in the case of a woman. *Brown v. Nickerson*, 5 Gray, 1. Not so in the case of a man in Mississippi. *Warren*

*v. Norman*, Walk. (Miss.) 387. Nor in Maine. *Buck v. Hersey*, 31 Maine, 558. To call a clergyman a drunkard is of course actionable. *McMillan v. Birch*, 1 Binn. 178. But see *Anonymous*, 1 Ohio, 83, note. So to charge the chief engineer of a fire department with being drunk at a fire which he ought to try to put out is actionable *per se*. *Gottbuehuet v. Hubachek*, 36 Wis. 515.

But it is actionable without proof of special damage to say of a game-  
 \* 67 \* keeper that "he trapped three foxes;" for that would be misconduct in a gamekeeper. *Foulger v. Newcomb*, L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 15 W. R. 1181; 16 L. T. 595.

So to say of an auctioneer, "You are a deceitful rascal, a villain, and a liar. I would not trust you with an auctioneer's licence. You robbed a man you called your friend; and, not satisfied with £10, you robbed him of £20 a fortnight ago," was held actionable by Cockburn, C.J., in *Ramsdale v. Greenacre*, 1 F. & F. 61. And see *Bryant v. Loxton*, 11 Moore, 344.

But to say of a land speculator, "He cheated me of 100 acres of land," was held in Canada not to touch him in his trade and therefore not actionable. *Fellowes v. Hunter*, 20 Up. Can. Q. B. 382. See *Sibley v. Tomlins*, 4 Tyrw. 90, *post*, p. 80.

To call a dancing mistress "an hermaphrodite" is not actionable; for girls are taught dancing by men as often as by women. *Wetherhead v. Armitage*, 2 Lev. 233; 3 Salk. 328; *Freem.* 277; 2 Show. 18.

To say of the keeper of a restaurant, "You are an infernal rogue and swindler," was held not to be actionable without proof of special damage; as not of themselves necessarily injurious to a restaurant keeper; for, as the Supreme Court of Victoria remarked, "in fact there might be very successful restaurant-keepers, who were both rogues and swindlers." *Brady v. Youlden*, Kerferd and Box's Digest of Victoria Cases, 709; *Melbourne Argus Reports*, 6 Sept. 1867.

So to call a carpenter "a rogue," or a cooper "a varlet and a knave," is clearly not actionable *per se*; for the words do not touch them in their trades. *Lancaster v. French*, 2 Str. 797. *Cotes v. Kettle*, Cro. Jac. 204.

A declaration alleged that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke of the plaintiff, a working stone-mason, "He was the ringleader of the nine hours' system," and "He has ruined the town by bringing about the nine hours' system," and "He has stopped several good jobs from being carried out, by being the ringleader of the system at Llanelly," whereby the plaintiff was prevented from obtaining employment in his trade at Llanelly:—*Held*, on demurrer, that, the words not being in themselves defamatory, nor connected by averment or by implication with the plaintiff's trade, and the alleged damage not being the natural or reasonable consequence of the speaking of them, the action could not be sustained. *Miller v. David*, L. R. 9 C. P. 118; 43 L. J. C. P. 84; 22 W. R. 332; 30 L. T. 58.

Again, where a special kind of knowledge is essential to the proper conduct of a particular profession, denying that the  
 \* 68 plaintiff possesses such special knowledge will \* be actionable, if the plaintiff belongs to that particular profession, but not otherwise.

### *Illustrations.*

It has been held actionable without special damage:—

To say of a barrister, "He is a dunce, and will get little by the law" [though here it was argued for the defendant that Duns Scotus was "a great learned man;" that though to call a man "a dunce" might, in ordinary parlance, imply that he was dull and heavy of wit, yet it did not deny him a solid judgment; and that to say, "he will get little by the law" might only mean that he did not wish to practise]. *Peard v. Jones* (1635), Cro. Car. 382.

To say of an attorney, "He has no more law than Master Cheyny's bull," or "He has no more law than a goose." *Baker v. Morfue*, *vel Morphey*, Sid. 327; 2 Keble, 202.

[According to the report in Keble, an objection was taken in this case on behalf of the defendant, that it was not averred in the declaration, "that Cheyny had a bull, *sed non allocatur*, for the scandal is the greater, if he had none." And the Court adds a solemn *quære* as to saying "He has no more law than the man in the moon," feeling no doubt a difficulty as to ascertaining the precise extent of that individual's legal acquirements. But see *Day v. Buller*, 3 Wils. 59, *post*, p. 75, where the Court strangely decides that it is defamatory to say of an attorney that "he is no more a lawyer than the devil!"]

To say of an attorney, — "He cannot read a declaration." *Powell v. Jones*, 1 Lev. 297.

To say of a physician that "he is no scholar," "because no man can be a good physician, unless he be a scholar." *Cawdrey v. Highley*, *al. Tythay*, Cro. Car. 270; Godb. 441.

To say of the deputy of Clarendieux, king-at-arms, "He is a scrivener and no herald." *Brooke v. Clarke*, Cro. Eliz. 328; 1 Vin. Abr. 464.

To say of a midwife, "Many have perished for her want of skill." *Flowers' Case*, Cro. Car. 211.

To charge an apothecary, with having caused the death of a child by administering to it improper medicines. *Edsall v. Russell*, 4 M. & Gr. 1090; 5 Scott, N. R. 801; 2 Dowl. N. S. 641; 12 L. J. C. P. 4; 6 Jur. 996. *Tutty v. Alewin*, 11 Mod. 221.

Where an architect is engaged to execute certain work, it is a libel upon him in the way of his profession to write to his employers asserting that he has no experience in that particular kind of work, and is therefore unfit to be entrusted with it. *Botterill and another v. Whytehead*, 41 L. T. 588.

But since no special learning or ability is expected of a justice of the peace it is not actionable to call him "fool," "ass," "blockhead," or any \* other \* 69 words merely imputing want of natural cleverness or ignorance of law. But words which impute to him corruption, dishonesty, extortion, or sedition are actionable of course. *Bill v. Neal*, 1 Lev. 52; *How v. Prin*, Holt, 652; 2 Salk. 694; 2 Ld. Raym. 812; 7 Mod. 107; 1 Bro. Parl. C. 64; *Aston v. Blagrave*, 1 Str. 617; 8 Mod. 270; Fort. 206; 2 Ld. Raym. 1369.

The plaintiff must always aver on the pleadings that he was carrying on the profession or trade, or holding the office, at the time the words were spoken. (a) Sometimes this is admitted by the slander itself, and if so, evidence is of course unnecessary in proof of this averment.<sup>1</sup> But in other cases, unless it is admitted on the pleadings, evidence must be given at the trial of the special character in which plaintiff sues. As a rule, it is sufficient for plaintiff to prove that he was acting in the office or actively en-

<sup>1</sup> *Yrisarri v. Clement*, 2 C. & P. 223; 3 Bing. 432.

(a) *Forward v. Adams*, 7 Wend. 204. libel. *Cramer v. Riggs*, 17 Wend. 209; *Secus* where the publication was by writing or print, if calculated to bring the plaintiff into ridicule or disgrace; for it is then a *Russell v. Anthony*, 21 Kans. 450; *ante*, p. 27.

gaged in the profession or trade without proving any appointment thereto, or producing a diploma or other formal qualification. *Omnia presumuntur rite esse acta*.<sup>1</sup> But there is an exception to this rule where the very slander complained of imputes to a medical or legal practitioner that he is a quack or impostor, not legally qualified for practice: here the plaintiff must be prepared to prove his qualification strictly by producing diplomas or certificates duly sealed, signed, and stamped.<sup>2</sup>

Whether or no the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his business, is a question for the jury to determine at the trial.<sup>3</sup> There should always be an averment in the statement of claim that the words \*were so spoken; (a) though, where \* 70 the words are clearly of such a nature as necessarily to affect the plaintiff in his office or business, the omission of such an averment will not be fatal.<sup>4</sup>

It will be well to deal more particularly with certain special offices and professions.

*Persons holding any Office of Confidence and Trust.*

Words which impute a want of integrity to any one holding an office of confidence or trust, whether an office of profit or not, are clearly actionable *per se*. (b) So if the words employed have a natural tendency to cause the plaintiff to be removed from his office, as by imputing insufficiency or gross incompetency, or habitual negligence of his duties. But where the words merely impute want of ability, without ascribing to the plaintiff any wicked or dishonest conduct; there no action lies (at all events, where the office is honorary as in the case of a justice of the peace).<sup>5</sup>

As the danger of plaintiff's losing his office is the gist of the action, it is essential that plaintiff should hold the office at the time the words were spoken.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rutherford v. Evans, 4 C. & P. 79; 6 Bing. 451; Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366; Cannell v. Curtis, 2 Bing. N. C. 228.

<sup>2</sup> Collins v. Carnegie, 3 N. & M. 703; 1 Ad. & E. 695; Moises v. Thornton, 8 T. R. 303; Wakley v. Healey & Cooke, 4 Exch. 53; 18 L. J. Ex. 426.

<sup>3</sup> Per Cockburn C.J., in Ramsdale v. Greenacre, 1 F. & F. 61.

<sup>4</sup> Stanton v. Smith, 2 Ld. Raym. 1480; 2 Str. 762; Jones v. Littler, 7 M. & W. 423; 10 L. J. Ex. 171.

<sup>5</sup> Per Holt, C.J., in Howe v. Prin, Holt, 653; 2 Salk. 694.

<sup>6</sup> Per De Grey, C.J., in Onslow v. Horne, 3 Wils. 188; 2 W. Bl. 753, overruling the *dictum* of Pollexfen, C.J., in Walden v. Mitchell, 2 Vent. 266.

(a) Van Tassel v. Capron, 1 Denio, iff as such. Dole v. Van Rensselaer, 1 250; Kinney v. Nash, 3 Comst. 177. Johns. Cas. 330.

(b) As misfeasance charged upon a sher-



*Illustrations.*

It is actionable without proof of special damage:—

To accuse a Royal Commissioner of taking bribes. *Moor v. Foster*, Cro. Jac. 65; *Purdy v. Stacey*, Burr. 2698.

To say of a justice of the peace, “Mr. Stuckley covereth and hideth felonies, and is not worthy to be a Justice of the Peace;” “for it is against his oath and the office of a Justice of Peace, and a good cause to put him out of the commission.” *Stuckley v. Bullhead*, 4 Rep. 16; and see *Sir John Harper v. Beamond*, Cro. Jac. 56; *Sir Miles Fleetwood v. Curl*, Cro. Jac. 557; *Hob. 268*.

To say of a justice of the peace that “he is a Jacobite and for bringing in the Prince of Wales and Popery;” for this implies that he is disaffected \* to \* 71 the established Government and should be removed from office immediately. *How v. Prin* (1702), Holt, 652; 7 Mod. 107; 2 Ld. Raym. 812; 2 Salk. 694. Affirmed in House of Lords *sub nom. Prinne v. Howe*, 1 Brown’s Parly. Cases, 64.

To insinuate that a justice of the peace takes bribes or “perverts justice to serve his own turn.” *Cæsar v. Curseny*, Cro. Eliz. 305; *Carn v. Osgood*, 1 Lev. 280; *Alleston v. Moor*, Hetl. 167; *Masham v. Bridges*, Cro. Car. 223; *Isham v. York*, Cro. Car. 15; *Beamond v. Hastings*, Cro. Jac. 240; *Aston v. Blagrove*, 1 Str. 617; 8 Mod. 270; 2 Ld. Raym. 1369; *Fort. 206. (a)*

To say to a churchwarden, “Thou art a cheating knave and hast cheated the parish of £40.” *Strode v. Holmes* (1651), Styles, 338; 1 Roll. Abr. 58; *Woodruff v. Weolley*, 1 Vin. Abr. 463.

To call an escheator, attorney, or other officer of a Court of Record, an “extortioner.” *Stanley v. Boswell*, 1 Roll. Abr. 55.

To say of a town-clerk that he hath not performed his office according to law. *Fowell v. Cowe*, Rolle’s Abr. 56; *Wright v. Moorhouse*, Cro. Eliz. 358.

To say of a Constable:—“He is not worthy the office of constable.” *Taylor v. How*, Cro. Eliz. 861; 1 Vin. Abr. 464.

In America it has been held actionable to charge a member of a nominating convention of a political party with having been influenced by a bribe. *Hand v. Winton*, 38 N. Y. 122; and see *Sanderson v. Caldwell*, 45 N. Y. 398; *Dolloway v. Turrell*, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 383; *Stone v. Cooper*, 2 Denio (N. Y.), 293. (b)

So too in Canada, where the plaintiff was charged with being a public robber—innuendo, that he, plaintiff, had defrauded the public in his dealings with them; it was held not necessary for plaintiff to aver that he is in any office, trade, or employment in which he could have defrauded the public. *Taylor v. Carr*, 3 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep. 306.

But it is *not* actionable without proof of special damage:—

To impute insincerity to a Member of Parliament. *Onslow v. Horne*, 3 Wils. 177; 2 W. Bl. 750. (c)

To say of a justice of the peace. “He is a fool, an ass, and a beetle-headed justice;” for these are but general terms of abuse and disclose no ground for removing the plain-

(a) *Lindsey v. Smith*, 7 Johns. 359.

(b) *Hand v. Winton*, 9 Vroom, 122.

(c) It has been held not actionable to say of a member of the Legislature with regard to *future* conduct, “he is a corrupt old tory.” *Hogg v. Dorrah*, 2 Port. (Ala.) 212. So to impute weakness of under-

standing to a candidate for Congress. *Mayrant v. Richardson*, 1 Nott & M. 347. But see *Spiering v. Andrae*, 45 Wis. 330; *White v. Carroll*, 42 N. Y. 161. On the subject of criticism of public men, see *ante*, p. 40, note.

tiff from office. *Bill v. Neal*, 1 Lev. 52; *Sir John Hollis v. Briscow et ux.*, Cro. Jac. 58.

\* 72 \* To say of a justice of the peace, "He is a logger-headed, a slouch-headed, bursen-bellied hound." *R. v. Farre*, 1 Keb. 629.

To say of a justice of the peace, "He is a blood-sucker and sucketh blood;" "for it cannot be intended what blood he sucketh." *Sir Christopher Hilliard v. Constable*, Cro. Eliz. 306.

### *Clergymen and Ministers.*

Words are actionable if spoken of a beneficed clergyman which would not be actionable if spoken of one without cure of souls.<sup>1</sup> But it does not follow that all words which tend to bring a beneficed clergyman into disrepute, or which merely impute that he has done something wrong, are actionable without special damage. The reason always assigned for this distinction between beneficed clergymen and others is that the charge, if true, would be ground of degradation or deprivation.<sup>2</sup> The imputation must therefore be such as, if true, would tend to prove the plaintiff unfit to continue in his office, and therefore tend more or less directly to proceedings being taken by the Bishop. If the plaintiff holds any chaplaincy, lectureship, or readership, from which he might be removed, he will come within the same rules as a beneficed clergyman.<sup>3</sup> But a clergyman without any preferment or office stands on the same footing as a dissenting minister, and must prove that some pecuniary damage has followed from the speaking of the words.<sup>4</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

It is actionable without proof of special damage:—

To say of a parson that "he had two wives;" for though bigamy was not made felony till 1603, still in 1588 it was "cause of deprivation." *Nicholson v. Lyne*, Cro. Eliz. 94.

To say that "he is a drunkard, a whoremaster, a common swearer, a common liar, and hath preached false doctrine, and deserves to be degraded;" for "the matters charged are good cause to have him degraded, whereby he should lose his freehold." *Dod v. Robinson* (1648), Aleyn, 63; *Dr. Sibthorpe's Case*, W. Jones, 366; *Rolle's Abr.* 58.

\* 73 \* To say "He preacheth lyes in the pulpit;" "*car ceo est bon cause de deprivation.*" *Drake v. Drake* (1652), Roll. Abr. 58; 1 Vin. Abr. 463.

[These cases clearly overrule *Parret v. Carpenter*, Noy, 64; 2 Cro. Eliz. 502, wherein it was held that an action could lie only in the spiritual court for saying of a parson:—"Parret is an adulterer, and hath had two children by the wife of J. S., and I will cause him to be deprived for it." See the remarks of Pollock, C.B., 23 L. J. Ex. 80.]

<sup>1</sup> *Gallwey v. Marshall*, 9 Ex. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78; 2 C. L. R. 399.

<sup>2</sup> *Drake v. Drake*, 1 Roll. Abr. 58; *Dod v. Robinson* (1648), Aleyn, 63; *Pemberton v. Colls*, 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403; 11 Jur. 1011.

<sup>3</sup> *Payne v. Beuwmorris*, 1 Lev. 248.

<sup>4</sup> See *Hartley v. Herring*, 8 T. R. 130.

To say to a parson, "Thou hast made a seditious sermon and moved the people to sedition to-day." *Philips, B.D. v. Badby* (1582), cited in *Bittridge's Case*, 4 Rep. 19.

To say of a parson, "He preacheth nothing but lies and malice in the pulpit;" for the words are clearly spoken of him in the way of his profession. *Crauden v. Walden*, 3 Lev. 17. And see *Pocock v. Nash*, Comb. 253; *Musgrave v. Bovey*, Str. 946.

To say to a clergyman, "Thou art a drunkard," is not of itself actionable; but it is submitted that to impute to a clergyman habitual drunkenness, or drunkenness whilst engaged in the discharge of his official duties, would be actionable. *Cucks v. Starre*, Cro. Car. 285; *Tighe v. Wicks*, 33 Upper Canada Q. B. Rep. 470.

To charge a clergyman with immorality and misappropriation of the sacrament money is clearly actionable. *Damages £750. Highmore v. Earl and Countess of Harrington*, 3 C. B. N. S. 142.

And of course to charge a clergyman with having indecently assaulted a woman on the highway is actionable. *Evans v. Gwyn*, 5 Q. B. 844.

To say of a beneficed clergyman that he drugged the wine he gave the speaker and so fraudulently induced him to sign a bill of exchange for a large amount is actionable without proof of special damage; but it is not actionable merely to say of a beneficed clergyman "he pigeoned me." *Pemberton v. Colls*, 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403; 11 Jur. 1011.

To charge a clergyman with incontinence is not actionable, unless he hold some benefice or preferment, or some post of emolument, such as preacher, curate, chaplain, or lecturer. *Gallwey v. Marshall*, 23 L. J. Ex. 78; 9 Exch. 294; 2 C. L. R. 399.

To say of one who had been a linendraper, but at time of publication was a dissenting minister, that he was guilty of fraud and cheating when a linendraper, is no slander of the plaintiff in his office of dissenting minister. *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87.

To say of a bishop that "he is a wicked man" is actionable without special damage. *Per Scroggs, J., in Townshend v. Dr. Hughes*, 2 Mod. 160. \* But \* 74 this is only because the Statute of Scandalum Magnatum, 2 Rich. II. st. 1, c. 5, expressly mentions "prelates." See *post*, p. 134, and note to 10 Q. B. p. 469.

### *Barristers-at-Law.*

It is quite clear that barristers and physicians may sue for words touching them in their profession, (a) although their fees are honorary. [The loss of a gratuity is special damage: see *post*, c. X.]

### *Illustrations.*

The plaintiff was a barrister and gave counsel to divers of the king's subjects. The defendant said to J. S. (the plaintiff's father-in-law), concerning the plaintiff: — "He is a dunce and will get little by the law." J. S. replied, "Others have a better opinion of him." The defendant answered, "He was never but accounted a dunce in the Middle Temple." *Held* that the words were actionable, though no special damage was alleged. *Damages*, one hundred marks. *Peard v. Jones*, Cro. Car. 382.

(a) As to charge an attorney with disclosing confidential communications of his client. *Garr v. Selden*, 6 Barb. 416; s. c. 4 Comst. 91. See *Riggs v. Denniston*, 3 Johns. Cas. 198. Or to call him a cheat. *Rush v. Cavanaugh*, 2 Barr, 187; *Chipman v. Cook*, 2 Tyler, 456. See further *Foot v. Brown*, 8 Johns. 64.

So it is actionable to say of a barrister :—

“Thou art no lawyer ; thou canst not make a lease ; thou hast that degree without desert ; they are fools who come to thee for law.” *Banks v. Allen*, Rolle’s Abr. 54.

Or, “He hath as much law as a Jackanapes.” (N. B. — The words are not “*no more law than* a Jackanapes.”) *Palmer v. Boyer*, Owen, 17 ; Cro. Eliz. 342, cited with approval in *Broke’s Case*, Moore, 409. [And see *Cawdrey v. Tetley*, Godb. 441, where it is said that had the words been, “He has no more *wit* than a Jackanapes,” no action would have lain ; wit not being essential to success at the bar, according to F. Pollock, 2 Ad. & E. 4].

Or, “He has deceived his client, and revealed the secrets of his cause.” *Snag v. Gray*, 1 Roll. Abr. 57 ; Co. Entr. 22.

Or, “He will give vexatious and ill counsel, and stir up a suit and milk her purse, and fill his own large pockets.” *King v. Lake*, 2 Vent. 28 ; *Hardres*, 470.

#### *Solicitors and Attorneys.*

It is actionable without special damage :—

To say of an attorney, “He is a very base rogue and a cheating knave, and doth maintain himself, his wife and children by his cheating.” Anon. (1638), Cro. Car. 516. See *Jenkins v. Smith*, Cro. Jac. 586. (a)

To say of an attorney that “he hath the falling sickness ;” for that disables him in his profession. *Taylor v. Perr* (1607), 1 Rolle’s Abr. 44.

To say of an attorney, “What, does he pretend to be a lawyer ? He is no \* 75 \* more a lawyer than the devil ;” or any other words imputing gross ignorance of law. *Day v. Buller*, 3 Wils. 59 ; *Baker v. Morfue*, Sid. 327 ; 2 Keb. 202 ; *ante*, p. 68 ; *Powell v. Jones*, 1 Lev. 297, *ante*, p. 68.

To say of an attorney, “He is only an attorney’s clerk, and a rogue ; he is no attorney,” or any words imputing that he is not a fully qualified practitioner. *Hardwick v. Chandler*, Stra. 1138.

To say of an attorney, “He is an *ambidexter*,” i.e., one who being retained by one party in a cause, and having learnt all his secrets, goes over to the other side, and acts for the adversary. Such conduct was subject for a *qui tam* action under an old penal statute : see *Rastell’s Entries*, p. 2, Action sur le case vers Attorney, 3 ; *Annison v. Blofield*, Carter, 214 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 55.

To impute that he will betray his clients’ secrets and overthrow their cause. *Martyn v. Burlings*, Cro. Eliz. 589.

To charge an attorney with barratry, champerty, or maintenance. *Boxe v. Barnaby*, 1 Roll. Abr. 55 ; *Hob. 117* ; *Proud v. Hawes*, Cro. Eliz. 171 ; *Hob. 140* ; *Taylor v. Starkey*, Cro. Car. 192.

To say of an attorney :— “He stirreth up suits, and once promised me, that if he did not recover in a cause for me, he would take no charges of me ;” “because stirring up suits is barratry, and undertaking a suit, no purchase no pay, is maintenance.” *Smith v. Andrews*, 1 Roll. Abr. 54 ; *Hob. 117*.

To assert that an attorney has been guilty of professional misconduct and ought to be struck off the rolls. *Byrchley’s Case*, 4 Rep. 16 ; *Phillips v. Jansen*, 2 Esp. 624 ; *Warton v. Gearing*, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 122.

But it is not actionable to say of an attorney, “He has defrauded his creditors and has been horsewhipped off the course at Doncaster ;” for it is no part of his professional duties to attend horse-races, and his creditors are not his clients. *Doyley v. Roberts*, 3 Bing. N. C. 835 ; 5 Scott, 40 ; 3 Hodges, 154.

(a) *Rush v. Cavanaugh*, 2 Barr, 187.

Nor to abuse him in general terms, such as "cheat," "rogue," or "knave;" though to say, "You cheat your clients," would be actionable. *Alleston v. Moor*, Het. 167. And see *Bishop v. Latimer*, 4 L. T. 775. (a)

### *Physicians and Surgeons.*

Any words imputing to a practising medical man misconduct or incapacity in the discharge of his professional duties is actionable *per se*. (b)

#### \* *Illustrations.*

\* 76

Thus it is actionable without proof of special damage :—

To accuse any physician, surgeon, accoucheur, midwife, or apothecary, with having caused the death of any patient through his ignorance or culpable negligence. *Poe v. Mondford*, Cro. Eliz. 620; *Tutty v. Alewin*, 11 Mod. 221; *Watson v. Vanderlash*, Hetl. 71; *Southee v. Denny*, 1 Exch. 196; 17 L. J. Ex. 151; *Edsall v. Russell*, 4 M. & Gr. 1090; 12 L. J. C. P. 4; 5 Scott, N. R. 801; 2 Dowl. N. S. 641; 6 Jur. 996. (c)

To call a practising medical man "a quack-salver," or "an empiric," or a "mountebank." *Allen v. Eaton*, 1 Roll. Abr. 54; *Goddart v. Haselfoot*, 1 Viner's Abr. (S. a.), pl. 12; 1 Roll. Abr. 54.

To say that "his character is so bad, that none of the medical men here will meet him." *Southee v. Denny*, 1 Exch. 196. But see *Clay v. Roberts*, 9 Jur. N. S. 580; 11 W. R. 649; 8 L. T. 397; *Ramadge v. Ryan*, 9 Bing. 333; 2 M. & Sc. 421.

But it is not actionable :—

To say of a surgeon, "He did poison the wound of his patient;" without some averment that this was improper treatment of the wound; for else "it might be for the cure of it." *Suegoe's Case*, Hetl. 175. (d)

Nor to call a person who practises medicine, or surgeon, without full legal qualification, "a quack," or "an impostor;" for the law only protects *lawful* employments. *Collins v. Carnegie*, 1 A. & E. 695; 3 N. & M. 703.

Nor to charge a physician with adultery unconnected with his professional conduct. It would be otherwise if he had been accused of seducing, or committing adultery with, one of his patients. *Ayre v. Craven*, 2 A. & E. 2; 4 N. & M. 220.

(a) *Rush v. Cavenaugh*, 2 Barr. 187.

(b) *Sumner v. Utley*, 7 Conn. 258; *Camp v. Martin*, 23 Conn. 86; *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808. See *Secor v. Harris*, 18 Barb. 425; *Carroll v. White*, 33 Barb. 615; s. c. 42 N. Y. 161.

(c) *Johnson v. Robertson*, 8 Port. (Ala.) 486. To charge a physician or surgeon with "malpractice" is not actionable if it appear that the word was not used or understood in a technical sense. *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808. But the technical is probably the primary and *prima facie* sense of the term. It is also said in the case just cited that to charge a physician

or surgeon with mere want of skill or with ignorance or neglect is not actionable *per se* though untrue, unless the charge be of gross want of skill or the like, so as to imply general unfitness. See also *Camp v. Martin*, 23 Conn. 86; *Jones v. Diver*, 22 Ind. 184; *Foot v. Brown*, 8 Johns. 64 (of an attorney).

(d) *Jones v. Diver*, 22 Ind. 184. But to say "Dr. A. killed my children. He gave them teaspoonful doses of calomel. They died right off," is actionable. *Secor v. Harris*, 18 Barb. 425. See *Carroll v. White*, 33 Barb. 615; s. c. 42 N. Y. 161; *March v. Davison*, 9 Paige, 580.

Dawes intended to employ the plaintiff, a surgeon and accoucheur, at his wife's approaching confinement; but the defendant told Dawes that the plaintiff's female servant had had a child by the plaintiff: Dawes consequently decided not to employ the plaintiff: Dawes told his mother and his wife's sister what defendant had said; and consequently the plaintiff's practice fell off considerably among Dawes' friends and acquaintance and others. The fee for one confinement was a guinea. *Held* that the action lay, special damage being proved; that the plaintiff was entitled to more than the one guinea damages; that the jury should give him such sum as they considered Dawes' custom was worth to him; but that the jury clearly could not in this action give him anything for the general decline of his business. *Dixon v. Smith*, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125.

\* 77      \* So, to impute incompetency to any one practising an art, as a dentist, a schoolmaster, a land surveyor, or an architect, is actionable *per se*.

### *Illustrations.*

Thus it is actionable without proof of special damage:—

To say of a schoolmaster, "Put not your son to him, for he will come away as very a dunce as he went." *Watson v. Vanderlash*, Hetl. 71.

Or to accuse a schoolmaster of *habitual* drunkenness. *Brandrick v. Johnson*, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 306.

Or to say of an architect engaged to restore a church, that he has no experience in church work. *Botterill and another v. Whytehead*, 41 L. T. 588.

Or to say of a land surveyor, in the way of his trade, "Thou art a cozenor and a cheating knave, and that I can prove." *London v. Eastgate*, 2 Rolle's Rep. 72.

But it has actually been held not actionable to impute prostitution to a school-mistress. *Wetherhead v. Armitage*, 2 Lev. 233; 2 Show. 18; *Freem*. 277; 3 Salk. 328; *per Twisden, J.*, in *Wharton v. Brook*, Vent. 21; but see the remarks of Lord Denman, C.J., in *Ayre v. Craven*, 2 A. & E. 2; 4 N. & M. 220.

### *Traders.*

So if the plaintiff carry on any trade recognised by the law, or be engaged in any lawful employment, however humble, an action lies for any words which affect him in the way of such trade or employment, and prejudice him therein. (a) But the words must relate to his employment, and "touch" him therein.

### *Illustrations.*

Thus, it is actionable without proof of special damage:—

To say of a clerk or servant that he had "cozened his master." *Seaman v. Bigg*, Cro. Car. 480; *Reignald's Case* (1640), Cro. Car. 563. (b)

To say of a servant girl that she had had a miscarriage, and had lost her place in consequence. *Connors v. Justice*, 13 Ir. C. L. R. 451.

(a) As in the case of a mechanic. *Fitzgerald v. Redfield*, 51 Barb. 484.      no confidence could be placed in him. *Fowles v. Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 20.

(b) Or that he was such a notorious liar

To say of a gamekeeper that he trapped three foxes ; for that would be clearly a breach of his duties as gamekeeper. *Foulger v. Newcomb*, L. R. 2 Ex. 327 ; 36 L. J. Ex. 169 ; 15 W. R. 1181 ; 16 L. T. 595.

\* To say to an innkeeper : — “Thy house is infected with the pox, and thy wife was laid of the pox ;” for even if small-pox only was meant, still “it was a discredit to the plaintiff, and guests would not resort” to his house. *Damages* £50. *Levet’s Case*, Cro. Eliz. 289. And see the remarks of Kelly, C.B., in *Riding v. Smith*, 1 Ex. D. 94 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 281 ; 24 W. R. 487 ; 34 L. T. 500.

But it is not actionable *per se* : —

To say of a livery-stable keeper : — “You are a regular prover under bankruptcies, a regular bankrupt maker ;” for it is not a charge against him in the way of his trade. *Angle v. Alexander*, 7 Bing. 119 ; 1 Cr. & J. 143 ; 4 M. & P. 870 ; 1 Tyrw. 9.

Nor to say to a clerk to a gas-company : — “You are a fellow, a disgrace to the town, unfit to hold your situation for your conduct with whores.” *Lumby v. Allday*, 1 C. & J. 301 ; 1 Tyrw. 217. And see *James v. Brook*, 9 Q. B. 7 ; 16 L. J. Q. B. 17 ; 10 Jur. 541.

Nor to impute to a staymaker that his trade is maintained by the prostitution of his shopwoman. *Brayne v. Cooper*, 5 M. & W. 249. But see *Riding v. Smith*, 1 Ex. D. 91 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 281 ; 24 W. R. 487 ; 34 L. T. 500.

The law guards most carefully the credit of all merchants and traders ; any imputation on their solvency, any suggestion that they are in pecuniary difficulties, or are attempting to evade the operation of any Bankruptcy Act, is therefore actionable *per se*. (a)

### Illustrations.

Thus it is actionable without proof of special damage : —

To impeach the credit of any merchant or tradesman by imputing to him bankruptcy or insolvency, either past, present or future. *Johnson v. Lemmon*, 2 Rolle’s Rep. 144 ; *Thompson v. Twenge*, 2 Rolle’s Rep. 433 ; *Vivian v. Willet*, Sir Thomas Raymond, 207 ; 3 Salk. 326 ; *Stanton v. Smith, Ltd.* Raymond, 1480 ; 2 Str. 762 ; *Whittington v. Gladwin*, 5 B. & C. 180 ; 2 C. & P. 146 ; *Robinson v. Marchant*, 7 Q. B. 918 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134 ; 10 Jur. 156 ; *Harrison v. Bevington*, 8 C. & P. 708 ; *Gostling v. Brooks*, 2 F. & F. 76 ; *Brown v. Smith*, 13 C. B. 596 ; 22 L. J. C. P. 151 ; 17 Jur. 807 ; 1 C. L. R. 4.

\* To say to a tailor, “I heard you were run away,” *sc.* from your creditors. \* 79 *Davis v. Lewis*, 7 T. R. 17. And see *Dobson v. Thornistone*, 3 Mod. 112 ; *Chapman v. Lamphire*, 3 Mod. 155 ; *Arne v. Johnson*, 10 Mod. 111 ; *Harrison v. Thornborough*, 10 Mod. 196 ; *Gilb. Cas.* 114.

To say of a brewer that he had been arrested for debt. And this although no express reference to his trade was made at time of publication, for such words must necessarily affect his credit therein. *Jones v. Littler*, 7 M. & W. 423 ; 10 L. J. Ex. 171.

To assert that the plaintiff had once been bankrupt in another place, when carrying

(a) *Lewis v. Hawley*, 2 Day, 495 ; *Mott v. Comstock*, 7 Cowen, 654 ; *Sewall v. Catlin*, 3 Wend. 291 ; *Davis v. Ruff*, Cheves, 17 ; *Carpenter v. Dennis*, 3 Sandf. 305. It has been held in Pennsylvania that to

say of a farmer, “The sheriff will sell him out one of these days, and claims against him not sued will be lost,” is actionable. *Phillips v. Hoefer*, 1 Barr, 62. But see *Windsor v. Oliver*, 41 Ga. 538.

on another trade ; for that may still affect him here in his present trade. *Leycroft v. Dunker*, Cro. Car. 317 ; *Hall v. Smith*, 1 M. & S. 287 ; *Figgins v. Cogswell*, 3 M. & S. 369.

To say of any trader : — “ He is not able to pay his debts.” *Drake v. Hill*, Sir T. Raym. 184 ; 2 Keble, 549 ; 1 Lev. 276 ; Sid. 424 ; *Hooker v. Tucker*, Holt, 39 ; *Morris v. Langdale*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 284 ; *Orpwood v. Barks* (vel *Parkes*), 4 Bing. 261 ; 12 Moore, 492.

To impute insolvency to an innkeeper, even though at that date innkeepers were not subject to the bankruptcy laws. *Whittington v. Gladwin*, 5 B. & C. 180 ; 2 C. & P. 146 ; *Southam v. Allen*, Sir T. Raym. 231.

So if the defendant's words impute to the plaintiff dishonesty and fraud in the conduct of his trade, such as knowingly selling inferior articles as superior, or wilfully adulterating his wares ; they will be actionable *per se*. Though all *bonâ fide* complaints by a customer of the goods supplied to him are of course privileged.<sup>1</sup> If the words merely impugn the goods the plaintiff sells, they are not actionable unless they fall within the rules relating to Slander of Title, *post*, c. V. ; for they are but an attack on a thing, not on a person.<sup>2</sup> But often an attack on a commodity may be also an indirect attack upon its vendor ; *e.g.*, if fraud or dishonesty be imputed to him in offering it for sale.<sup>3</sup>

Thus it is actionable without proof of special damage : —

To say of a trader : — “ He is a cheating knave, and keeps a false debt-book.” *Crawfoot v. Dale*, 1 Vent. 263 ; 3 Salk. 327. Overruling *Todd v. Hastings*, 2 Saund. 307. (a)

Or that he uses false weights or measures. *Griffiths v. Lewis*, 7 Q. B. 61 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 197 ; 9 Jur. 370 ; 8 Q. B. 841 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 249 ; 10 Jur. 711 ; *Gray v. Ham*, 1 Brownlow & Golds. 4 ; *Stober v. Green*, *ib.* 5 ; *Prior v. Wilson*, 1 C. B. N. S. 95.

To say to a cornfactor, “ You are a rogue and a swindling rascal, you delivered me 100 bushels of oats, worse by 6s. a bushel than I bargained for.” *Thomas v. Jackson*, 3 Bing. 104 ; 10 Moore, 425.

To say of a tradesman that he adulterates the goods he sells. *Jesson v. Hayes* (1636), Roll. Abr. 63.

<sup>1</sup> *Crisp v. Gill*, 29 L. T. (Old S.), 82 ; *Oddy v. Lord Geo. Paulet*, 4 F. & F. 1009.

<sup>2</sup> *Fenn v. Dixie* (1638), 1 Roll. Abr. 58 ; *Evans v. Harlow*, 5 Q. B. 624 ; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120 ; *Harman v. Delany*, 2 Str. 898 ; *Fitz.* 121 ; 1 Barnard. 289, 438.

<sup>3</sup> See *Jenner v. A'Beckett*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11 ; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14 ; 20 W. R. 181 ; 25 L. T. 464 ; *Burnet v. Wells* (1700), 12 Mod. 420 ; *Clark v. Freeman*, 11 Beav. 112 ; 17 L. J. Ch. 142 ; 12 Jur. 149.

(a) Or keeping false books. *Burtch v. Nickerson*, 17 Johns. 217 ; *Rathbun v. Emigh*, 6 Wend. 407. It should however appear that the keeping of books is a natural incident of the plaintiff's business to make the words actionable *per se*. *Rathbun v. Emigh*, *supra*.



To say of a contractor: — “He used the old materials,” when his contract was for new, is actionable, with proper innuendoes. *Baboneau v. Farrell*, 15 C. B. 360; 24 L. J. C. P. 9; 1 Jur. N. S. 114; 3 C. L. R. 142; *Sir R. Greenfield’s Case*, Mar. 82; 1 *Viner’s Abr.* 465. See *Smith v. Mathews*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 151.

To say of an auctioneer or appraiser who had valued goods for the defendant, “He is a damned rascal, he has cheated me out of £100 on the valuation.” *Bryant v. Loxton*, 11 Moore, 344; *Ramsdale v. Greenacre*, 1 F. & F. 61, *ante*, p. 67.

To say of a butcher that he changed the lamb bought of him for a coarse piece of mutton. *Crisp v. Gill*, 29 L. T. Old Series, 82; *Rice v. Pigeon*, Comb. 161.

But to call a tradesman “a rogue,” or “a cheat,” or “a cozenor,” is *not* actionable, unless it can be shown that the words refer to his trade. (a) To impute distinctly that he cheats or cozens *in his trade* is actionable. *Johns v. Gittings*, Cro. Eliz. 239; *Cotes v. Kettle*, Cro. Jac. 204; *Terry v. Hooper*, 1 Lev. 115; *Savage v. Robery*, 5 Mod. 398; 2 Salk. 694; *Surman v. Shelleto*, 3 Burr. 1688; *Bromefield v. Snoke*, 12 Mod. 307; *Savile v. Jardine*, 2 H. Bl. 531; *Lancaster v. French*, 2 Stra. 797; *Davis v. Miller et ux.*, 2 Stra. 1169; *Fellowes v. Hunter*, 20 Up. Can. Q. B. 382; *Brady v. Youlden*, Melbourne Argus R., *an.*

\* [N. B. — *Lancaster v. French* appears to go a little further than the other \* 81 cases cited: but, if so, it must be taken to be so far overruled by them.]

So to say to a pork butcher, “Who stole Fraser’s pigs? You did, you bloody thief, and I can prove it — you poisoned them with mustard and brimstone,” was held not actionable (the jury having found that the words were not intended to impute felony); for there was nothing to show that they were spoken of the plaintiff in relation to his trade. *Sibley v. Tomlins*, 4 Tyrwhitt, 90.

So to say of a grocer, “His shop is in the market,” is not actionable, in the primary sense of the words at all events. *Ruel v. Tatnell*, 29 W. R. 172; 43 L. T. 507.

It must be averred and proved that the plaintiff carried on his trade at the time the words were spoken; else the words cannot be spoken of him in the way of such trade.<sup>1</sup> Moreover the trade or employment must be one recognised by the law as a legitimate means of earning one’s living.

### Illustrations.

A stock-jobber could not sue for words spoken of him in the way of his trade, so long as that trade was illegal within the 7 Geo. II. c. 8, s. 1 (*Sir John Barnard’s Act*; now repealed by 23 & 24 Vict. c. 28). *Morris v. Langdale*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 284; *Collins v. Carnegie*, 1 A. & E. 695; 3 N. & M. 703.

If the plaintiff avers that he carries on two trades, it will be sufficient to prove that he carries on *one*, if the words can affect him in that one. *Figgins v. Cogswell*, 3 M. & S. 369; *Hall v. Smith*, 1 M. & S. 287.

Where insolvency is imputed to one member of a firm, either he *or* the firm may sue, for it is a reflection on the credit of both. *Harrison v. Bevington*, 8 C. & P. 708; *Cook and another v. Batchellor*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 150; *Foster and others v. Lawson*, 3 Bing. 452; 11 Moore, 360. (b)

<sup>1</sup> *Bellamy v. Burch*, 16 M. & W. 590.

(a) Or office. *Oakley v. Farrington*, & M. 290; *Ostrom v. Calkins*, 5 Wend. 1 Johns. Cas. 129. Or occupation. *Rush* 263; *Chipman v. Cook*, 2 Tyler, 456.  
*v. Cavanaugh*, 2 Barr, 187; *Brown v.* (b) *Contra*, *Davis v. Ruff*, Cheves, 17,  
*Mims*, 2 Mill, 235; *Davis v. Davis*, 1 Nott holding that only the individual slandered  
can sue.

A married woman, carrying on a separate trade according to the custom of London, or within the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, s. 1, may by s. 11 sue without joining her husband for any tort affecting such separate trade or her credit therein. *Summers v. City Bank*, L. R. 9 C. P. 580; 43 L. J. C. P. 261.

\* 82 \* IV. *Words actionable only by reason of special damage.*

No other words are actionable without proof of special damage. Thus, to accuse a man of fraud, dishonesty, immorality, or any vicious and dishonorable (but not criminal) conduct, is not actionable, unless it has produced as its natural and necessary consequence some pecuniary loss to the plaintiff.

*Illustrations.*

Thus the following words are not actionable without proof of special damage:—

"Thou art a scurvy bad fellow." *Fisher v. Atkinson*, 1 Roll. Abr. 43.

"A rogue, a villain, and a varlet" (for these, and words of the like kind, are to be considered as "words of heat"). *Per Cur.* in *Stanhope v. Blith*, 4 Rep. 15.

"A runagate rogue." *Cockaine v. Hopkins*, 2 Lev. 214.

"A common filcher." *Goodale v. Castle*, Cro. Eliz. 554.

"A cozening knave." *Brunkard v. Segar*, Cro. Jac. 427; Hutt. 13; 1 Vin. Abr. 427.

"Welcher." *Blackman v. Bryant*, 27 L. T. 491.

"You are a swindler." *Savile v. Jardine*, 2 H. & Bl. 531; *Black v. Hunt*, 2 L. R. Ir. 10.

"He is a rogue and a swindler; I know enough about him to hang him." *Ward v. Weeks*, 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796.

"He is a rogue, and has cheated his brother-in-law of upwards of £2000." *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87.

To say "You cheat everybody, you cheated me, you cheated Mr. Saunders," is not actionable unless it be spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade. *Davis v. Miller et ux.*, 2 Str. 1169.

To call a man a "blackleg" is not actionable, unless it can be shown that word was understood by the bystanders to mean "a cheating gambler liable to be prosecuted as such." *Barnett v. Allen*, 3 H. & N. 376; 4 Jur. N. S. 488; 27 L. J. Ex. 412; 1 F. & F. 125.

In an American case the difficulty caused by absence of special damage was surmounted by suing in trespass:—A man who, instead of walking along the street, stops on the pavement opposite the plaintiff's freehold shop using insulting and abusive language towards the plaintiff, and persists in such conduct though requested to move on, is a trespasser, and the jury in an action of trespass may award substantial damages, though no special damages be proved, and although the abusive words be not actionable *per se*; *Adams v. Rivers*, 11 Barbour (New York) Reports, 390. For as one of the public he was only entitled to use the highway for passing and repassing. *Dovaston v. Payne*, 2 Sm. Lg. Cas. (8th ed.), p. 142. And evidence of his language while committing a trespass is properly admitted to show in what spirit the act was done. *Merest v. Harvey*, 5 Taunt. 442. "Where a wrongful act is accompanied by words of con-

tumely and abuse, the jury are warranted in taking that into consideration and giving retributory damages." Per Byles, J., in *Bell v. Midland Ry. Co.*, 10 C. B. N. S. 287, 308; 30 L. J. C. P. 273; 9 W. R. 612; 4 L. T. 293.

Words imputing immoral conduct, profligacy, adultery, &c., even when spoken of one holding an office or carrying on a profession or business, will not be actionable, unless they "touch him" in that office, profession, or business. Thus, if alleged of a beneficed clergyman they will be actionable, because if the charge were true it would be ground for degradation or deprivation, as it would prove him unfit to hold his benefice or to continue in the active duties of his profession.<sup>1</sup> But if the same words were spoken of a trader, or even of a physician or a schoolmistress, they would not be actionable without proof of special damage, as they do not necessarily affect the plaintiff in relation to his trade or profession. The imputation must be connected with the professional duties of the plaintiff.

\* *Illustrations.*

\* 84

Words imputing adultery to a physician were laid to have been spoken "of him in his profession," but there was nothing in the declaration to connect the imputation with the plaintiff's professional conduct. *Held* that the words were not actionable without special damage. *Ayre v. Craven*, 2 A. & E. 2; 4 N. & M. 220.

To impute prostitution to a schoolmistress is not actionable. Per Twisden, J., in *Wharton v. Brook*, Vent. 21; *Wetherhead v. Armitage*, 2 Lev. 233; 2 Show. 18; Freem. 277; 3 Salk. 328.

And words imputing immorality to a trader or his clerk are not actionable without special damage. *Lumby v. Allday*, 1 Cr. & J. 301; 1 Tyrwh. 217.

Nor are words imputing to a staymaker that his trade is maintained by the prostitution of his shopwoman. *Brayne v. Cooper*, 5 M. & W. 249. But now see *Riding v. Smith*, 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500.

Words imputing unchastity or adultery to a woman, married or unmarried, however gross and injurious they may be, are not actionable; unless she can prove that they have directly caused her special damage. (a)

<sup>1</sup> *Gallwey v. Marshall*, 9 Ex. 294; 23 L. J. Ex. 78.

(a) This is held in *Pollard v. Lyon*, 91 U. S. 225, to be true at common law in this country, so far as it refers to imputations short of adultery upon unmarried women; following the doctrine especially of *Brooker v. Coffin*, 5 Johns. 188. The rule in these and in some other cases is declared to be that only where the charge if

true would subject the accused to an indictment and punishment for crime involving moral turpitude, or subject him to an infamous punishment, is the same actionable *per se*. See also *Berry v. Carter*, 4 Stewt. & P. 387; *Bassell v. Elmore*, 48 N. Y. 561; *Terwilliger v. Wands*, 17 N. Y. 54; *Wilson v. Goit*, *ib.* 442; *Williams*

As to what constitutes special damage, see the stringent rules laid down in c. X., *post*, pp. 308-333.

*v. Hill*, 19 Wend. 305; *Woodbury v. Thompson*, 3 N. H. 194; *Underhill v. Welton*, 32 Vt. 40; *Davis v. Brown*, 27 Ohio St. 326; *Stitzell v. Reynolds*, 67 Penn. St. 54; s. c. 59 Penn. St. 488; *Dotterer v. Bushey*, 16 Penn. St. 204; *Gosling v. Morgan*, 32 Penn. St. 273; *Linney v. Maton*, 13 Texas, 449. Other courts, proceeding also without statute, have refused to accept the rule in this form, and one of them has thus stated it: Whenever an offence is charged which if proved may subject the accused to a punishment, though not ignominious, which brings disgrace upon him, the same is actionable *per se*. *Miller v. Parish*, 8 Pick. 384. See further *Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 11 Heisk. 757; *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Sneed, 473; *Freeman v. Price*, 2 Bailey, 115. In like manner in Georgia it is actionable falsely to impute to another the commission of a crime punishable by law, or any debasing act which has a manifest tendency to exclude him from society. *Lewis v. Hudson*, 44 Ga. 568. And so far at least as the imputation of unchastity to an unmarried female is concerned, this is now generally the law in the United States by statute. *Distin v. Rose*, 69 N. Y. 122; *Griffin v. Moore*, 43 Md. 246; *Frisbie v. Fowler*, 2 Conn. 707; *Gibson v. Wilson*, 43 Wis. 23; *Meyer v. Schleichter*, 29 Wis. 646; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 83; *Downing v. Wilson*, 36 Ala. 717; *Schmisseur v. Krellich*, 92 Ill. 347; *Wilson v. Barnett*, 45 Ind. 163; *Emmerson v. Marvel*, 55 Ind. 265; *Cleaveland v. Detweiler*, 18 Iowa, 299; *Haynes v. Ritchey*, 30 Iowa, 76; *Sheehy v. Cokley*, 43 Iowa, 183; *Richardson v. Roberts*, 23 Ga. 215; *Williams v. Greenwade*, 3 Dana, 432; *Ruohs v. Backer*, 6 Heisk. 395 (libel); *Hackett v. Brown*, 2 Heisk. 264 (even of a man, *ib.*); *Duval v. Davey*, 32 Ohio St. 604; *Burt v. McBain*, 29 Mich. 260; *Elfrank v. Seiler*, 54 Mo. 134; *McBrayer v. Hill*, 4 Ired. 136; *Smith v. Minor*, 1 Coxe, 16; *Riddell v. Thayer*, 127 Mass. 487; California Civil Code, § 48, 1; *Adams v. Rankin*, 1 Duval, 58 (man); *Patterson v. Wilkinson*, 55 Maine, 42; *Symonds v. Carter*, 32 N. H. 458. In Alabama to charge a female falsely with unchastity, though by oral publication, is

indictable. *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 83, 89. It may be remarked in this connection that there is probably no such thing at the present day as an "infamous" punishment in the sense in which the term was employed when it was started. As formerly used it probably referred to the peculiarly humiliating punishment of the pillory, the stocks, the ducking-stool, the gag for brawling women, the punishment of Hester Prynne (in the *Scarlet Letter*), and the like. The only survival, perhaps, is the whipping-post of Delaware. The word "infamous," if still to be used, is now applicable only to the offence charged. See, *e.g.*, where the term is so used, *Klumph v. Dunn*, 66 Penn. St. 141 (charge of adultery).

Except perhaps in Maryland, it is apprehended that a false imputation of the commission of adultery is actionable *per se* throughout the United States. *Proctor v. Houghtaling*, 37 Mich. 41; *Georgia v. Kepford*, 45 Iowa, 48; *Waugh v. Waugh*, 47 Ind. 580; *Stieber v. Wensil*, 19 Mo. 513; *Walton v. Singleton*, 7 Serg. & R. 449; *Klumph v. Dunn*, 66 Penn. St. 141; *Hoar v. Ward*, 47 Vt. 657; *Merritt v. Dearth*, 48 Vt. 65; *Huddleson v. Swope*, 71 Ind. 430. In Maryland it is considered that such an imputation is not actionable because the offence of adultery is in that State punishable only by fine; a survival apparently of the old distinction based upon the nature of the punishment. *Shafer v. Ahalt*, 48 Md. 171; *Griffin v. Moore*, 43 Md. 246.

To charge a woman with "getting fat" (*Emmerson v. Marvel*, 55 Ind. 265), or of being a "bitch" (*Schurick v. Kollman*, 50 Ind. 336; *K— v. H—*, 20 Wis. 252), or with being a "bad woman" (*Riddell v. Thayer*, 127 Mass. 487), or with being a "bad girl" (*Snell v. Snow*, 13 Met. 278; *Fitzgerald v. Robinson*, 112 Mass. 371, 382), or to charge a man with having "intercourse with" the female plaintiff (*Merritt v. Dearth*, 48 Vt. 65); such charges, though false if taken in a defamatory sense, have been treated as wanting the actionable quality, unless explained by the circumstances as intended

The only exception is in the case of actions brought in the local Courts of the city of London, the borough of Southwark,<sup>1</sup> and it is said of the city of Bristol, for words spoken within the jurisdiction of those Courts. It was formerly the custom in those localities to cart and whip whores, tinging a basin before them. Hence to call a woman "whore" or "strumpet"<sup>2</sup> or "bawd"<sup>3</sup> or her husband a "cuckold"<sup>4</sup> was supposed to be an imputation of a criminal offence to the female plaintiff, and therefore actionable. But no action will lie in any of the superior Courts at Westminster for such words, since the custom has never been certified by the Recorder and must therefore be strictly proved. It was found impossible to prove such a custom in 1782, and it would \* be still more difficult to do \* 85 so in the present day. The City Courts used formerly to take judicial notice of their own custom; but I doubt if they would do so now, the custom being entirely extinct.<sup>5</sup>

### Illustrations.

To say of a young woman that she had a bastard is not actionable without proof of special damage; "because it is a spiritual defamation, punishable in the spiritual court." *Per Holt, C.J., in Ogden v. Turner*, Holt, 40; 6 Mod. 104; 2 Salk. 696.

To call a woman "a whore," or "a strumpet" is not actionable, except by special

<sup>1</sup> Sid. 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Cook v. Wingfield*, 1 Str. 555.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Vin. Abr. 396.

<sup>4</sup> *Vicars v. Worth*, 1 Str. 471.

<sup>5</sup> See *Oxford et ux. v. Cross* (1599), 4 Rep. 18; *Hassell v. Capcot* (1639), 1 Vin. Abr. 395; 1 Roll. Abr. 36; *Cook v. Wingfield*, 1 Str. 555; *Watson v. Clerke*, Comb. 138, 139; *Stainton et ux. v. Jones*, 2 Selw. N. P. 1205 (13th ed.); notes [14] and [96] to 1 Dougl. by Frere, p. 380; *Theyer v. Eastwick*, 4 Burr. 2032; *Brand and wife v. Roberts and wife*, 4 Burr. 2418; *Rily v. Lewis*, 1 Vin. Abr. 396; *Vicars v. Worth*, 1 Str. 471; *Hodgkins et ux. v. Corbet et ux.* 1 Str. 545; *Roberts v. Herbert*, Sid. 97; s. c. *nom. Cans v. Roberts*, 1 Keble, 418.

in a defamatory sense. So too to charge a woman with having a wanton and lascivious disposition is held not actionable. *Lucas v. Nichols*, 7 Jones, 32. Further, what constitutes an imputation of adultery or fornication, see *Waugh v. Waugh*, *supra*; *Hoar v. Ward*, *supra*; *Patterson v. Edwards*, 7 Ill. 720; *Elam v. Badger*, 23 Ill. 498; *Shields v. Cunningham*, 1 Blackf. 86; *Ricket v. Stanley*, 6 Blackf. 169; *Worth v. Butler*, 7 Blackf. 251; *Proctor v. Owens*, 18 Ind. 21; *Blickenstaff v. Perrin*, 27 Ind. 527; *Patterson v. Wilkinson*, 55 Maine, 42; *Dyer v. Morris*, 4 Mo. 214; *Vanderlip v. Roe*, 23 Penn. St. 82 ("she is a bad character, a loose character"); *K—— v. H——*, 20 Wis. 239 (charging desire to commit adultery

not enough). A false imputation that the plaintiff has committed incest is actionable *per se*. *Griggs v. Vickroy*, 12 Ind. 549; *Millison v. Sutton*, 1 Ind. 508.

It may be added that the charge of sodomy is actionable *per se* in Massachusetts, in New York, in Indiana, and in Iowa. *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237; *Kennedy v. Gifford*, 19 Wend. 296; *Goodrich v. Woolcott*, 3 Cowen, 231; s. c. 5 Cowen, 714; *Ausman v. Veal*, 10 Ind. 355; *Haynes v. Ritchey*, 30 Iowa, 76. *Contra* in Ohio. *Davis v. Brown*, 27 Ohio St. 326. It is not actionable *per se* in New York to falsely charge a female with committing masturbation. *Anonymous*, 60 N. Y. 262.

custom if the action be tried in the cities of London and Bristol. "To maintain actions for such brabbling words is against law." Oxford *et ux. v. Cross* (1599), 4 Rep. 18; Gascoigne *et ux. v. Ambler*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1004; *Power v. Shaw*, 1 Wils. 62.

It is not actionable to call a woman a "bawd." Hollingshead's Case (1632), Cro. Car. 229; *Hixe v. Hollingshed* (1632), Cro. Car. 261. Unless it be in the City of London. *Rily v. Lewis* (1640), 1 Vin. Abr. 396.

The words "You are living by imposture; you used to walk St. Paul's Churchyard for a living,"—spoken of a woman with the intention of imputing that she was a swindler and a prostitute,—are not actionable without special damage. *Wilby v. Elston*, 8 C. B. 142; 18 L. J. C. P. 320; 13 Jur. 706; 7 D. & L. 143.

So to say of a married man that he has "had two bastards and should have kept them" is not actionable, though it is averred that by reason of such words "discord arose between him and his wife, and they were likely to have been divorced." *Barmund's Case*, Cro. Jac. 473; *Salter v. Browne*, Cro. Car. 436; 1 Roll. Abr. 397.

\* 86 \*The defendant told a married man that his wife was "a notorious liar" and "an infamous wretch," and had been all but seduced by Dr. C. of Roscommon before her marriage. The husband consequently refused to live with her any longer. *Held*, no action lay. *Lynch v. Knight and wife*, 9 H. L. C. 577; 8 Jur. N. S. 724; 5 L. T. 291.

Where the defendant asserted that a married woman was guilty of adultery, and she was consequently expelled from the congregation and bible society of her religious sect, and was thus prevented from obtaining a certificate, without which she could not become a member of any similar society. *Held*, no action lay. *Roberts and wife v. Roberts*, 5 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Jur. N. S. 1027; 12 W. R. 909; 10 L. T. 602.

[It does not appear that the case as to excommunication, *Barnabas v. Traunter*, 1 Vin. Abr. 396, *ante*, p. 59, was cited to the Court.]

The defendant falsely imputed incontinence to a married woman. In consequence of his words she lost the society and friendship of her neighbors, and became seriously ill and unable to attend to her affairs and business, and her husband incurred expense in curing her, and lost the society and assistance of his wife in his domestic affairs. *Held* that neither husband nor wife had any cause of action. *Allsop and wife v. Allsop*, 5 H. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; 8 W. R. 449; 6 Jur. N. S. 433; 36 L. T. O. S. 290; *Riding v. Smith*, 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500.

Our law on this point has often been denounced by learned Judges. "I may lament the unsatisfactory state of our law according to which the imputation by words however gross, on an occasion however public, upon the chastity of a modest matron or a pure virgin, is not actionable without proof that it has actually produced special temporal damage to her," says Lord Campbell, L.C., in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*.<sup>1</sup> "Instead of the word 'unsatisfactory' I should substitute the word 'barbarous,'" says Lord Brougham, p. 594. See also the remarks of Willes, C.J., in *Jones v. Herne*; <sup>2</sup> and of Cockburn, C.J., *Compton and Blackburn, JJ.*, in *Roberts and wife v. Roberts*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 9 H. L. C. 593; 5 L. T. 291.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Wils. 87.

<sup>3</sup> 5 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Jur. N. S. 1027; 12 W. R. 909; 10 L. T. 602.

Two explanations may be assigned for the undesirable state of our law on this point. (1) In the days when our common law was formed, every one was much more accustomed than \* they are at present \* 87 to such gross language, and epithets such as "whore" were freely used as general terms of abuse without seriously imputing any specific act of unchastity. (2) The spiritual Courts had jurisdiction over such charges, and though they could not award damages to the plaintiff, they could punish the defendant for the benefit of his soul; but all actions in the ecclesiastical Courts for defamatory words were abolished by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41, and no attempt was made to substitute any remedy in the ordinary courts of law. In Scotland and in many of the States of America a verbal imputation of unchastity is actionable without proof of special damage.

The hardship is increased by the rules relating to special damage, which are peculiarly stringent in the case of a married woman. That her husband has sustained special damage in consequence of the words will not avail for her. And unless she carry on a separate trade or business of her own under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, it is almost impossible for her to sustain any special damage to herself, for all her property is in law her husband's. That she loses the society of her friends is no special damage; and in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*,<sup>1</sup> Lord Wensleydale denied that the loss of the *consortium* of her husband could constitute special damage. The only object of insisting on proof of special damage is to secure that the plaintiff's reputation has in fact been seriously impaired. And in many of these cases it is clear that this was so. What more convincing proof of loss of reputation could be adduced than the fact proved by Mrs. Roberts that she was expelled from the congregation, and not allowed to continue a member of her religious sect. Yet in that case it was held no action lay. Surely it is high time that some alteration should be made in our law on this point.

All words, if published without lawful occasion, are actionable, if they have in fact produced special damage to the plaintiff, such as the law does not deem too remote. "Any words by which a party has a special damage" are actionable.<sup>2</sup> "Undoubtedly all \* words are actionable, if a special dam- \* 88 age follows."<sup>3</sup>

It is usual to qualify the generality of the above rule by adding a proviso, "provided the words themselves be in their nature defamatory." But

<sup>1</sup> 9 H. L. C. 577.

<sup>2</sup> Comyn's Digest, Action upon the Case for Defamation, D. 30.

<sup>3</sup> Per Heath, J., in *Moore v. Meagher*, 1 Taunt. 44.

as "defamatory words" have at the commencement of this chapter been defined as "words which in any given case have appreciably injured the plaintiff's reputation," I do not like to use the phrase "words in their nature defamatory." It is not defamatory to say of a pork butcher, "he knows no law : he cannot draw a lease ;" it is defamatory so to speak of a solicitor. You cannot therefore lay down *a priori* any hard and fast rule as to which words are in their nature defamatory, and which are not so. Each case must depend on its own circumstances.

No doubt in an action of defamation the words must be defamatory. If that be all that is meant by the above proviso, I will gladly incorporate it into the above rule together with my definition of words defamatory : when the rule would run thus :— "All words, if published without lawful occasion, are actionable, if it be proved, by evidence of special damage not too remote, that they have in fact injured the plaintiff's reputation ; and in such cases the action is called an action of defamation" (using that phrase to include both libel and slander). The converse of this rule will be "No words can be the subject of an action of defamation, however maliciously published, and although they have caused actual damage to the plaintiff, unless it is also proved that the plaintiff's reputation has in fact been thereby injured."

But though an action of defamation will not lie, it by no means follows that some other action will not lie. Wherever a defendant speaks words of whatever nature, maliciously intending to do some injury to the plaintiff thereby, and the words have their desired effect and do actually produce damage to the plaintiff, here there is that actionable "concurrence of loss and injury," spoken of by Lord Campbell, L.C., in *Lynch v. Knight and wife* ;<sup>1</sup> and an ordinary action on the case will lie, if not an action of libel or slander.

\* 89      \* The head-note in *Kelly v. Partington*<sup>2</sup> is the direct traverse of the above proposition :— "*Held* that the words were not defamatory in their nature, and therefore not actionable, even though followed by special damage." But *Kelly v. Partington* is, if I may say so, a silly case. It turned on a slip in the pleadings. The defendant said of the plaintiff, "She secreted 1*s.* 6*d.* under the till," and then added significantly "These are not times to be robbed." This was clearly an insinuation of felony. Verdict for the plaintiff, damages 1*s.* On taxation the master declined to allow the plaintiff more costs than damages. The plaintiff's counsel, Sir John Campbell, S.G., thereupon argued that the second count was not actionable without proof of special damage ; and succeeded in getting a rule for his costs. For it turned out that the pleader had run the words together so that it appeared on the record that the

<sup>1</sup> 9 H. L. C. 589.

<sup>2</sup> 5 B. & Ad. 645.



charge against the plaintiff was this: "She secreted 1s. 6d. under the till; stating, these are not times to be robbed." There was no innuendo stating whose money it was, but there was an allegation of special damage that in consequence one Stenning had refused to take the plaintiff into his service. The Court was therefore pleased to take the words as spoken in praise of the plaintiff, *i.e.*, as importing merely that the plaintiff exercised great caution and was very careful of her own money, even of small amounts of it. Sir James Scarlett took advantage of this flaw and succeeded in arresting judgment. For it followed, of course, that Stenning's refusal to take the plaintiff into his service, because the defendant had praised her, was unreasonable, and *not* the natural or necessary consequence of the defendant's words. And the only *decision* in the case was that the special damage was too remote; and a very harsh decision this seems to be, in these days when pleadings are so easily amended. The Solicitor General could not now go back and argue that the words amounted to a charge of felony and were actionable *per se*; for on the argument of the previous rule he had been only too successful in proving that the words were not actionable without proof of special damage. He was driven therefore to contend that, if praise produced special damage, praise was actionable; an argument with which the Court appeared much amused. Littledale, J., \* puts him a case (p. 648), "Suppose a \* 90 man had a relation of a penurious disposition, and a third person knowing that it would injure him in the opinion of that relation, tells the latter a generous act which the first had done, by which he induces the relation not to leave him money, would that be actionable?" And Sir John Campbell answers, "If the words were spoken falsely with intent to injure, they would be actionable." And surely he is right; though one sees the strange position the plaintiff would be compelled to adopt. He would have to come forward in Court and declare, "I am not generous, I am really very mean." It would be difficult also to prove the intent with which the words were spoken. But if a malicious intent be clear, the damage is not too remote, for the defendant contemplated it; and the speaking of the words was wrongful because done maliciously, falsely, and with intent to injure the plaintiff; so here is *et damnum et injuria*. Lord Denman's judgment, be it observed, turned almost entirely on the absence of any innuendo; that of Taunton, J., on the remoteness of the damage; while Littledale and Patteson, JJ., concurred in a proposition, which, with all submission, I cannot understand, that "to make the speaking of the words wrongful, they must in their nature be defamatory," p. 651. If in a small country town where political or religious feeling runs very high, I maliciously disseminate a report, false to my knowledge, that a certain tradesman is a radical or a dissenter, knowing that the result will be to drive away his customers, and intending and desiring that result, then, if

such result follows, surely I am liable for damages in an action on the case, if not in an action of slander. And yet such words are not in their nature defamatory; for many, I understand, glory in such titles. This decision (or *dictum*) in *Kelly v. Partington*, was approved and adopted in *Sheahan v. Ahearne*.<sup>1</sup> But there, too, this was not the real ground of the judgment of the Court; their decision turned on a variance between the words as pleaded and the evidence at the trial. In *Miller v. David*,<sup>2</sup> on the other hand, the Court treat the point as still, at least, an open question:—"It is not necessary to consider the ques-

\* 91 tion which was suggested on the argument, \* whether words not in themselves actionable or defamatory, spoken under circumstances and to persons likely to create damage to the subject of the words, are, when the damage follows, ground of action. The judgment of Lord Wensleydale in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*,<sup>3</sup> appears in favor of the affirmative of this question. But it is not necessary for us, for the reasons given, to express any opinion upon it." Again, in *Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co.*,<sup>4</sup> Pollock, B., cites with approval and acts upon "the general rule laid down as to such actions in Comyns' Digest, where it is said that an action lies when special damage is shown." So, too, in *Riding v. Smith*,<sup>5</sup> Huddleston, B., says, "The declaration when amended would stand thus: that the plaintiff carried on business as a grocer and draper, and was assisted in the conduct of his business by his wife, and that the defendant falsely and maliciously published of the plaintiff's wife in relation to the business that she had committed adultery, whereby the plaintiff was injured in his business and sustained special damage. I think it clear that on a declaration so framed an action might be maintained." The name of the wife as a party to the action had been previously struck out; and the words were not defamatory of the husband, for they in no way refer to him. And in the same case (p. 94), Kelly, C.B., says, "Here the statement was that the wife of the plaintiff was guilty of adultery, and it is the natural consequence of such a statement that persons should cease to resort to the shop. Supposing the statement made not to be slander, but something else calculated to injure the shopkeeper in the way of his trade, as for instance a statement that one of his shopmen was suffering from an infectious disease, such as scarlet fever, this would operate to prevent people coming to the shop; and whether it be slander or some other statement which has the effect I have mentioned, an action can, in my opinion, be maintained on the ground that it is a statement made to the public which would have the effect of preventing their

<sup>1</sup> 9 Ir. Rep. C. L. 412 (1875).

<sup>2</sup> L. R. 9 C. P. 126; 43 L. J. C. P. 84; 22 W. R. 332; 30 L. T. 58.

<sup>3</sup> 9 H. L. C. 600.

<sup>4</sup> L. R. 9 Exch. 223; 43 L. J. Ex. 171.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Ex. Div. 96.

resorting to the shop and buying goods of the owner." And see *Levet's case*,<sup>1</sup> and *Green v. Button*.<sup>2</sup>

I conclude, therefore, that if a defendant either knows or \* ought \* 92 to know that certain special damage will follow from his words, and speaks those words, desiring and intending that such damage shall follow, or recklessly indifferent whether such damage follows or not therefrom, then if the words be false, and if such damage does in fact follow directly from their use, an action on the case will lie against him for such damage, whatever be the nature of the words.

<sup>1</sup> Cro. Eliz. 289, *ante*, p. 77.

<sup>2</sup> 2 C. M. & R. 707, *post*, p. 149.

## CONSTRUCTION AND CERTAINTY.

CONSTRUCTION is the correct interpretation of words, the giving them their true meaning, the method of ascertaining the sense in which they were understood by those who first heard or read them.

What meaning the speaker *intended* to convey is immaterial in all actions of defamation. He may have spoken without any intention of injuring the plaintiff's reputation, but if he has in fact done so, he must compensate the plaintiff. He may have meant one thing and said another: if so, he is answerable for so inadequately expressing his meaning. Or he may have used ambiguous language which to his mind was harmless, but to which the bystanders attributed a most injurious meaning: if so he is liable for the injudicious phrase he selected. What was passing in his own mind is immaterial, save in so far as his hearers could perceive it at the time. Words cannot be construed according to the *secret* intent of the speaker.<sup>1</sup>

The question is always: How would ordinary Englishmen, previously unacquainted with the matter, fairly understand the words? (a) We must assume that they give to ordinary English

<sup>1</sup> Hankinson v. Bilby, 16 M. & W. 445; 2 C. & K. 440.

(a) See Fawsett v. Clark, 48 Md. 494; Lewis v. Hudson, 44 Ga. 568; Desmond v. Brown, 33 Iowa, 13; McCaleb v. Smith, 22 Iowa, 242; Dixon v. Stewart, 33 Iowa, 125; McLaughlin v. Bascom, 38 Iowa, 660; Barton v. Holmes, 16 Iowa, 252; Downing v. Brown, 3 Col. 571; Nelson v. Borchenius, 52 Ill. 236; Miller v. Johnson, 79 Ill. 58; Barnes v. Hamon, 71 Ill. 609; Weil v. Schmidt, 28 Wis. 137; Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 808; Stewart v. Wilson, 23 Minn. 449; Downs v. Hawley, 112 Mass. 237; Brettun v. Anthony, 103

Mass. 37; Whittemore v. Weiss, 33 Mich. 348. These cases show that the presumptive meaning of words in common use is the ordinary popular meaning as distinguished from any secondary (such as a technical) meaning. See Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 808. This doubtless proceeds upon the assumption that the hearers or readers addressed are not persons of some special training; if the words are addressed to specialists in some particular department of knowledge, *e.g.* to physicians, and among such the technical is the common

words their ordinary English meaning, to local or technical phrases their local and technical meaning. That being done, what meaning \* would the whole passage convey to an unbiassed \* 94 mind?

This is clearly rather a question for the jury than for the

meaning, that will doubtless be presumptively the meaning to be given the language.

But this brings us to a difficulty. When it is said that a popular or a technical meaning is under the circumstances the one presumptively to be applied, it is implied that another meaning may be shown to have been intended or understood; how this shall be done is not entirely agreed. In the first place there is some difference of authority as to the province of the court and the jury in such cases even in questions of slander, not to mention cases of libel; which will be considered later. It has been said in a recent case upon the authority of *Button v. Heywood*, 8 Mod. 24, that when the words are ambiguous, as they would be where *e.g.* they have both a popular and a technical meaning, they are to be construed *mitiori sensu*. *Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co.*, 65 Mo. 539. But this doctrine, as the author shows (pp. 95, 96), was long since exploded in England; the most pointed declaration against it being found perhaps in *Peake v. Oldham*, 1 Cowp. 275, by Lord Mansfield. See *s. c.* *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 73. The doctrine never really obtained a foothold in this country. See *e.g.* *Davis v. Johnston*, 2 Bailey, 579; *Hugley v. Hugley*, Ib. 592; *Chaddock v. Briggs*, 13 Mass. 248, 254. The universal doctrine now is that the meaning of ambiguous words is to be left to the jury, with the right of course to find, if the facts justify, that they were intended or reasonably understood to have been used in a sense to make them actionable *per se*. See the cases above cited; and especially *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808; *Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coons*, 6 Watts & S. 101, 114; *Sanderson v. Caldwell*, 45 N. Y. 398; *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 89; *Robinson v. Drummond*, 24 Ala. 174; *Chamberlin v. Vance*, 51 Cal. 75; *Maynard v. Fireman's Ins. Co.*, 34 Cal. 48, 59; *Waugh v. Waugh*, 47 Ind. 580.

So far as there may be decisions really opposed to this proposition (and there may be one or two), they are certainly to be treated as wanting in authority. There are however some apparent exceptions to the rule in question, but the exceptions are only apparent. When a question concerning the words alleged arises upon demurrer, it must appear upon the whole declaration that they are clearly defamatory. The facts are then to be taken, and properly taken, most strongly against the pleader; and if to the court they thus seem ambiguous, they cannot be pronounced defamatory. *Kennedy v. Gifford*, 19 Wend. 296; *Miller v. Maxwell*, 16 Wend. 9. See *Ward v. Clark*, 2 Johns. 10; *Shreyer v. Miller*, 13 W. Va. 158. But this is simply because the court is compelled to judge without reference to the real facts. If upon the same declaration (no demurrer having been interposed) the facts were found and the words shown to have been used in an actionable sense, the court would not refuse to accept the finding upon any notion that they were to be taken *mitiori sensu*, so long as there was no variance. *Kennedy v. Gifford*, *supra*; *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237. See *Lee v. Kane*, 6 Gray, 495; *Clay v. Brigham*, 8 Gray, 161. As for *Ward v. Clark*, *supra*, there is nothing to show that evidence was produced sufficient to make good the deficiency of the declaration. The verdict was general, and the case was carried up on a writ of error to rulings below. The effect of the case is the same as that of a ruling upon demurrer.

There is another apparent exception somewhat more obscure. According to the general current of authority an allegation that the plaintiff has been falsely charged by the defendant with the commission of a crime, such for example as larceny or perjury, is not supported either upon demurrer or upon the evidence by words which in point of law fall short of charging the crime in question; though most

judge. And accordingly by the 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (Fox's Libel Act), it is expressly provided that in all criminal proceedings for libel, the jury are to decide the question of libel or no libel, subject to the direction of the judge. In civil proceedings for libel, the practice is the same,<sup>1</sup> save that here if the judge thinks that

<sup>1</sup> Baylis v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 920 ; 3 Perry & D. 526, 4 Jur. 652.

people might suppose that the language charged an actual crime. See the note on larceny, *post*, p. 122 ; and see *Ward v. Clark*, 2 Johns. 10 ; s. c. *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 81 ; *Hotchkiss v. Olmstead*, 37 Ind. 74 ; *Abrams v. Smith*, 8 Blackf. 95 ; *Carmichael v. Shiel*, 21 Ind. 66 ; *Dexter v. Taber*, 12 Johns. 239. This appears to be true though there may have been a clear intent to defame the plaintiff, and though the plaintiff may well have suffered in reputation from the language. But while this appears to be the settled view of most of the courts, some of the courts have hesitated to go so far. See *Tillman v. Willis*, 61 Ga. 433 ; *Stern v. Katz*, 38 Wis. 136 ; *Kennedy v. Gifford*, 19 Wend. 296 ; *post*, p. 122, note. The last-named case indeed, proceeding apparently upon the ground of taking the sense of the language from the test of actual defamation, declares that words supposed by the uninstructed bystanders to charge indictable crime are actionable though in law they fall short of it. But if cases of this kind are not to be considered as supported by the current of authority, it may then be enough to say that the exception found in this rule that the words must charge a crime in law proceeds perhaps upon the notion that the hearers with the facts stated or before them are supposed to know the law, and (knowing that) to know that no crime is imputed. Further than this however the words are to be left to the jury when ambiguous ; if on the other hand no question of their meaning arises, it is for the court to say (in a case of slander) whether they are defamatory or not. It is no objection indeed that the words are peculiar ; if they have a general and notorious meaning the court will not ask the jury what that is. *Clarke v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 472. See to the same effect *Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co.*, 40 Mich. 251, 256, in regard to knowledge of current phrases. Nor is it any objection that the court may need to

look into a dictionary to ascertain their meaning. Such fact does not necessarily indicate that the words are ambiguous. *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808. (The dictionary rather than an expert should be examined when the words are popular. *Ib.*)

The next difficulty is concerning the mode of proving the sense to be applied to the words where no question arises of the right to show the same in some way. The precise difficulty is whether a bystander or a reader shall be permitted to state how he understood the language. It is in substance generally said with reference to unambiguous words, and sometimes even with reference to words of double import, that to permit evidence of this kind is to permit evidence of opinion or impression when facts only should be adduced. *Snell v. Snow*, 13 Met. 278 ; *Barnes v. Hamon*, 71 Ill. 609 ; *Van Vechten v. Hopkins*, 5 Johns. 211 ; *Gibson v. Williams*, 4 Wend. 320 ; *White v. Sayward*, 33 Maine, 322 ; *Sternau v. Marx*, 58 Ala. 608 ; *Downing v. Brown*, 3 Col. 571 ; *Cresinger v. Reed*, 25 Mich. 450 ; *Briggs v. Byrd*, 11 Ind. 353 ; *Skull v. Raymond*, 23 Minn. 66 ; *Pitts v. Pace*, 7 Jones, 558 ; *McCue v. Ferguson*, 73 Penn. St. 333 ; *Rangler v. Hummel*, 37 Penn. St. 133. See *Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.*, 68 Maine, 279 ; *Jarnigan v. Fleming*, 43 Miss. 710 ; *Titus v. Sumner*, 44 N. Y. 266. Refusal of the witnesses' understanding however is to be confined, according to *Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.*, *Jarnigan v. Fleming*, and the authorities generally, to cases where the words are in themselves free from ambiguity, their defamatory sense being found directly in the words (*Sternau v. Marx*, 58 Ala. 608 ; *Nelson v. Borchenius*, 52 Ill. 236) ; and it was held in the first of these cases, *Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.*, upon the authority of *Leonard v. Allen*, 11 Cush. 241, that when the speaker's meaning was conveyed not in direct terms but by incomplete ex-

the words cannot possibly bear a defamatory meaning, he may shorten the proceedings by a nonsuit. "It is only when the judge is satisfied that the publication *cannot* be a libel, and that, if it is found by the jury to be such, their verdict will be set

pressions, or by signs or gestures, or tones of the voice, witnesses might state what they understood thereby. Probably all of the authorities would now agree upon both of these propositions. Where the words are defamatory on their face, and no evidence drawn from the circumstances of publication is offered in explanation, it cannot be permitted a person to state that he did not understand the language to have been used in a defamatory sense. In such a case the test is, what the hearers as men of average intelligence *would* understand, not what they did understand. See *Hankinson v. Bilby*, 16 Mees. & W. 442; *Perry v. Man*, 1 R. I. 263; *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237; *Brettun v. Anthony*, 103 Mass. 37; *Nelson v. Borchenius*, 52 Ill. 236; *Dix v. Stewart*, 33 Iowa, 125; *More v. Bennett*, 48 N. Y. 472. As to the other part of the rule in *Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.*, that part implies that evidence of the incomplete expressions, the signs, gestures, or tones of voice has been given; and when the facts, being of doubtful import in themselves, are shown, there can be no very strong objection to permit a hearer to state what he understood from such facts. *Leonard v. Allen*, 11 Cush. 241; *Goodrich v. Davis*, 11 Met. 484; *Miller v. Butler*, 6 Cush. 71; *Smart v. Blanchard*, 42 N. H. 137; *Mix v. Woodward*, 12 Conn. 262; *Tompkins v. Wisener*, 1 Sneed, 558; *Morgan v. Livingston*, 2 Rich. 573; *McLaughlin v. Russell*, 17 Ohio, 475; *Smawley v. Stark*, 9 Ind. 388; *Tompkins v. Weisse*, 1 Sandf. 457. But *Snell v. Snow*, 13 Met. 278, is perhaps in principle opposed to this view, though distinguished in *Leonard v. Allen*, *supra*, in that it was a case of naked conversation, the whole language being capable of statement to the jury. It is doubtful however even within these limits if *Snell v. Snow* would now be generally followed. It should further be observed that the Pennsylvania case cited *supra*, *McCue v. Ferguson*, 73 Penn. St. 333, drew a distinction concerning opinions regarding the

person intended by defamatory language between language in the third person, as "He is a thief," and language in the second person, as "You are a thief." It was held that witnesses could not state who was meant in the first case, but could so state in the second case. Other cases however take the broad position that where the language does not show who was intended, hearers may state the facts and their understanding of them; as, *e.g.* that they knew the parties and were familiar with their relations towards each other, and understood that the words referred (or did not refer) to the plaintiff, the witness being subject of course to cross-examination concerning the facts. *Russell v. Kelly*, 44 Cal. 641; *Howe Machine Co. v. Souder*, 58 Ga. 64; *Miller v. Butler*, 6 Cush. 71; *Smawley v. Stark*, 9 Ind. 386; *Keesling v. McCall*, 36 Ind. 321; *De Armond v. Armstrong*, 37 Ind. 35. To this rule, as has already been intimated, there can be little objection. The distinction between opinion or understanding and fact nearly fades out in such cases; and it is almost if not quite tantamount to saying that a witness may detail the facts to say that he may state who in his view was meant. In detailing the facts upon such a question it would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible for a witness to refrain from showing his understanding of the person intended; and if the rule of excluding evidence of understanding were to be really adopted, it should be carried out by excluding evidence of all but direct facts such as admissions. A rule of this kind would sacrifice the substance of things for a mere abstraction. However, the opinion or understanding of the witness should not be admitted without a statement of the facts upon which he bases the same.

The result then appears to be this: (1) Where the words are unambiguous the court will not permit hearers or readers to say how they understood them; though evidence of the circumstances under which

aside, that he is justified in withdrawing the question from their cognizance."<sup>1</sup> (a)

If, however, the judge considers that words are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning as well as an innocent one, it will then be a question for the jury which meaning the words would convey to ordinary Englishmen who heard or read them without any previous knowledge of the circumstances to which

<sup>1</sup> Per Kelly, C.B., L. R. 4 Exch. 288; and see *Fray v. Fray*, 17 C. B. N. S. 603; 34 L. J. C. P. 45; 10 Jur. N. S. 1153; *Teacy v. McKenna*, Ir. R. 4 C. L. 374; *Hunt v. Goodlake*, 43 L. J. C. P. 54; 29 L. T. 472.

the publication was made may be shown for the purpose of proving the words defamatory when apparently they are not, or the contrary when apparently they are defamatory. *Myers v. Dresden*, 40 Iowa, 660; *Sternau v. Marx*, 58 Ala. 608; *Williams v. Cawley*, 18 Ala. 208; *Young v. Gilbert*, 93 Ill. 595. (2) Where the words are ambiguous either in respect of the charge or of the person intended, the hearers may upon detailing the facts, but not otherwise, state their understanding of the words or of their intended object. It may be added that subsequent publications of the same defamation by the defendant in which he refers to the plaintiff by name are held admissible to show that the plaintiff was intended by the language in suit. *Russell v. Kelly*, 44 Cal. 641; *Chubb v. Westly*, 6 Car. & P. 436; *White v. Sayward*, 33 Maine, 323.

(a) The authorities in this country are divided in regard to the province of the court and jury in questions of libel. It is of course agreed that the court may always be required to pass upon the effect of the language by a demurrer to the declaration or to a particular count, and also to say whether the language is ambiguous and capable of a libellous meaning. *Van Vactor v. Walkup*, 46 Cal. 124. But whether the court has the right in other cases (except upon a question whether the verdict is contrary to the evidence) to do more than define the term libel and then leave it wholly to the jury to decide if the language proved comes within the definition, is not agreed. The English practice is followed both in criminal and in civil cases in several of the States. *Shattuck*

*v. Allen*, 4 Gray, 540; *Van Vactor v. Walkup*, 46 Cal. 124; *State v. Gould*, 62 Maine, 509.

In other States the English practice, at least in regard to civil cases, is not followed; the court pronouncing, when the words are free from ambiguity and from evidence tending to change their natural meaning, whether they are libellous or not and instructing the jury accordingly as matter of law. *Snyder v. Andrews*, 6 Barb. 43; *Matthews v. Beach*, 5 Sandf. 256; *Green v. Telfair*, 20 Barb. 11; *Hunt v. Bennett*, 19 N. Y. 173; *More v. Bennett*, 43 N. Y. 472; *Pitcock v. O'Niell*, 63 Penn. St. 253; *Pugh v. McCarty*, 44 Ga. 383; s. c. 40 Ga. 444; *Gabe v. McGinnis*, 68 Ind. 538; *Gregory v. Atkins*, 42 Vt. 237; *Gottbehuet v. Hubachek*, 36 Wis. 515. In criminal cases the rule in Pennsylvania and probably generally is otherwise. *Pitcock v. O'Niell*, *supra*. So too it must be left to the jury to say whether the language is libellous or not where the question depends upon evidence to be adduced in connection with the publication; the same rule prevailing as in similar cases of slander. *Matthews v. Beach*, 5 Sandf. 256. See *ante*, p. 93, note. Written language apparently defamatory or not is in law capable of the same sort of modification by explanatory evidence as oral language. *Maynard v. Fireman's Ins. Co.*, 47 Cal. 207. Of course the whole publication must be considered together where it is urged that the language complained of is modified by other language of the same publication taking away the supposed libellous sense of that sued for. *Van Vactor v. Walkup*, 46 Cal. 124.



they relate.<sup>1</sup> The judge is in no way bound to state to the jury his own opinion on the point; it would, in fact, be wrong for him to lay down as a matter of law, that the publication complained of was, or was not, a libel.<sup>2</sup> The proper course is for the judge to define what is a libel in point of law, and to leave it to the jury to say whether the publication \*in question \* 95 falls within that definition.<sup>3</sup> And this is a question pre-eminently for the jury; whichever way they find, the Court will not disturb the verdict, if the question was properly left to them.

So too in cases of slander, the judge usually decides whether the words are, or are not, actionable *per se*, and whether the special damage assigned is, or is not, too remote. If the defendant's words cannot reasonably bear the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo, and the judge thinks the words without that meaning are not actionable, he will stop the case. So, too, if the words even with the alleged meaning are not actionable (though pleaders seldom err on that side). But in all other cases, where there is any reasonable doubt as to the true construction of the words, the judge leaves the question to the jury. All circumstances which were apparent to the bystanders at the time the words were uttered should be put in evidence, so as to place the jury as much as possible in the position of such bystanders; and then it is for the jury to say what meaning such words would fairly have conveyed to their minds. And their finding is final and conclusive on the point; the Court will not disturb the verdict, unless it be plainly perverse.

Formerly, however, the practice was very different. After a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant constantly moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that a defamatory meaning was not shown on the record with sufficient precision; or, as it soon came to be, on the ground that it was just possible, in spite of the record, to give the words an innocent construction. For it was said to be a maxim that words were to be taken *in mitiori sensu*, whenever there were two senses in which they could be taken. And in these early times the Courts thought it their \*duty to discourage ac- \* 96 tions of slander. They would therefore give an innocent meaning to the words complained of, if by any amount of legal ingenuity such a meaning could be put upon them; and would altogether disregard the plain and obvious signification which must have been conveyed to bystanders ignorant of

<sup>1</sup> *Hankinson v. Bilby*, 16 M. & W. 442; 2 C. & K. 440.

<sup>2</sup> *Baylis v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 920.

<sup>3</sup> *Parmiter v. Coupland and another*, 6 M. & W. 105; 9 L. J. Ex. 202; 4 Jur. 701.

legal technicalities. Thus where a married woman falsely said, "You have stolen my goods," and the jury found a verdict for the defendant, the Court entered judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that a married woman could have no goods of her own, and that therefore the words conveyed no charge of felony.<sup>1</sup> Again, where the words complained of were, "He hath delivered false evidence and untruths in his answer to a bill in Chancery," it was held that no action lay; for though every answer to a bill in Chancery was on oath, and was a judicial proceeding, still in most Chancery pleadings "some things are not material to what is in dispute between the parties," and "it is no perjury, although such things are not truly answered!"<sup>2</sup>

But in the days of Charles II., the Court of Common Pleas decided in a case of *scandalum magnatum* \* that "words should not be construed either in a rigid or mild sense, but according to the general and natural meaning, and agreeable to the common understanding of all men." And this decision soon became law.<sup>4</sup> In 1722, Fortescue, J., declared:<sup>5</sup>—"The maxim for expounding words *in mitiori sensu*, has for a great while been exploded, near fifty or sixty years." In *Peake v. Oldham*,<sup>6</sup> Lord Mansfield commented severely on the constant practice of moving in arrest of judgment after verdict found:—"What? After verdict, shall the Court be guessing and inventing a mode in which it might be barely possible for these words

to have been spoken by the defendant, without meaning to charge the  
\* 97 plaintiff with being guilty of murder? Certainly not. Where \* it is clear that words are defectively laid, a verdict will not cure them. But where, from their general import, they appear to have been spoken with a view to defame a party, the Court ought not to be industrious in putting a construction upon them, different from what they bear in the common acceptance and meaning of them." And his Lordship quoted a *dictum* of Parker, C.J.,<sup>7</sup> to the same effect. So in *Harrison v. Thornborough*,<sup>8</sup> the Court says:—"The rule that has now prevailed is that words are to be taken in that sense that is most natural and obvious, and in which those to whom they are spoken will be sure to understand them."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Anon. Pasch. 11 Jac. I.; 1 Roll. Abr. 746; now overruled by *Stamp and wife v. White and wife*, Cro. Jac. 600.

<sup>2</sup> *Mitchell v. Brown*, 3 Inst. 167; 1 Roll. Abr. 70. For further instances of such refinements, see *Peake v. Pollard*, Cro. Eliz. 214; *Cox v. Humphrey*, *ib.* 889; and *Holland v. Stoner*, Cro. Jac. 315.

<sup>3</sup> *Lord Townshend v. Dr. Hughes*, 2 Mod. 159.

<sup>4</sup> See *Somers v. House*, Holt. 39; and *Burges v. Bracher*, 8 Mod. 238.

<sup>5</sup> In *Button v. Hayward et ux.*, 8 Mod. 24.

<sup>6</sup> Cowper, 277, 8.

<sup>7</sup> In *Ward v. Reynolds*, Pasch. 12 Anne B. R.

<sup>8</sup> 10 Mod. 197.

<sup>9</sup> See also the remarks of De Grey, C.J., in *R. v. Horne*, 2 Cowp. 682-689; of Buller, J., in *R. v. Watson and others*, 2 T. R. 206; and the judgments in *Woolnoth v. Meadows*, 5 East, 463; 2 Smith, 28.

And such is now the law. The Courts no longer strain to find an innocent meaning for words *prima facie* defamatory, neither will they put a forced construction on words which may fairly be deemed harmless. "Formerly," says Lord Ellenborough,<sup>1</sup> "it was the practice to say that words were to be taken in the more lenient sense; but that doctrine is now exploded: they are not to be taken in the more lenient or more severe sense, but in the sense which fairly belongs to them."

And, again, in *Roberts v. Camden*,<sup>2</sup> the same learned judge says:—"The rule which once prevailed that words are to be understood *in mitiori sensu* has been long ago superseded; and words are now to be construed by Courts, as they always ought to have been, in the plain and popular sense in which the rest of the world naturally understand them." Now, therefore, the only question for the judge or the Court is whether the words are *capable* of the defamatory meaning attributed to them; if they are, then it is for the jury to decide what is in fact the true construction.

So long as the defendant's words are not absolutely unintelligible, a jury will judge of the meaning as well as other readers or hearers. All perplexity and obscurity will disappear under the narrow examination which the \* words will receive in \* 98 a court of law. It matters not whether the defamatory words be in English or in any other language that is understood in England, whether they be spelt correctly or incorrectly, whether the phrase be grammatical or not, whether cant or slang terms be employed or the most elegant and refined diction.<sup>3</sup> The insinuation may be indirect, and the allusion obscure; it may be put as a question or as an "on dit"; the language may be ironical, figurative, or allegorical. (a) Still, if there be a meaning in the words at all, the Court will find it out, even though it be disguised in a riddle or in hieroglyphics. In all such cases it will be a question for the jury what meaning would the bystanders put upon the words.

And before answering that question the jury should well weigh all the circumstances of the case, the occasion of speaking, the relationship between the parties, &c. Especially they should consider the words as a whole, not dwelling on isolated passages, but giving its proper weight to every part. The sting of a libel

<sup>1</sup> In 2 Camp. 403.

<sup>2</sup> 9 East, 95.

<sup>3</sup> R. v. Edgar, 2 Sess. Cas. 29; 5 Bac. Abr. 199.

(a) *Southwick v. Stevens*, 10 Johns. 443; *Dorland v. Patterson*, 23 Wend. 422; *Smith v. Stewart*, 5 Barr, 372.

may sometimes be contained in a word or sentence placed as a heading to it. The defendant will often be held liable merely in consequence of such prefix, where, without it, he would have had a perfect answer to the action. So, too, a word added to the end may altogether vary the sense of the preceding passage. The defendant is, therefore, entitled to have the whole of the alleged libel read as part of plaintiff's case.<sup>1</sup> (a) And for the purpose of showing that the publication is no libel, the defendant in his turn may give in evidence other passages in the same publication plainly referring to the subject of the libel, and fairly connected with it, in order to prove that his intention was not such as was imputed to him, and that the expressions in dispute

\* 99 \* will not bear the construction sought to be given them.<sup>2</sup>

But according to Pollock, C.B., in *Darby v. Ouseley*,<sup>3</sup> it is essential that such other passages should be connected with, construe, modify, control, qualify, or explain the alleged libellous statements, and be entirely relevant to them.

So, too, with a slander ; very often the words immediately preceding or following may much modify those relied on by the plaintiff.<sup>4</sup> (b) Evidence may even be given of other libels or slanders published by the defendant of the plaintiff, when the language sued on is ambiguous, and some extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain it; but such evidence is not admissible where the meaning of the words is clear and undisputed.<sup>5</sup> (c) And when such evidence is admitted, the jury should always be cautioned not to give any damages in respect of it.<sup>6</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

The *Observer* gave a correct account of some proceedings in the Insolvent Debtor's Court, but it was headed "Shameful Conduct of an Attorney." The rest of the re

<sup>1</sup> *Cooke v. Hughes*, R. & M. 112.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Lambert and Perry*, 2 Camp. 400 ; 31 Howell St. Tr. 340.

<sup>3</sup> 25 L. J. Ex. 229 ; 1 H. & N. 1 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 497.

<sup>4</sup> *Bittridge's Case*, 4 Rep. 19; *Thomson v. Bernard*, 1 Camp. 48.

<sup>5</sup> *Stuart v. Lovell*, 2 Stark, 93; *Pearce v. Ornsby*, 1 M. & Rob. 455; *Symmons v. Blake*, *ib.* 477; 2 C. M. & R. 416; 4 D. P. C. 263; 1 Gale, 182; *Traill v. Denham*, *Times* for May 4th, 1880.

<sup>6</sup> Per *Tindal, C.J.*, in *Pearson v. Lemaitre*, 5 M. & Gr. 720; 12 L. J. Q. B. 253; 7 Jur. 748; 6 Scott, N. R. 607.

(a) *Van Vactor v. Walkup*, 46 Cal. 124.

(c) See *ante*, p. 88, note (bottom page).

(b) See *Abrams v. Smith*, 8 Blackf. 453. ing).

was held privileged; but the plaintiff recovered damages for the heading. *Clement v. Lewis*, 3 Br. & B. 297; 7 Moore, 200; 3 B. & Ald. 702. And see *Mountney v. Watton*, 2 B. & Ad. 673; *Bishop v. Latimer*, 4 L. T. 775; *Boydell v. Jones*, 4 M. & W. 446; 7 D. P. C. 210; 1 H. & H. 408; *Harvey v. French*, 1 Cr. & M. 11; 2 M. & Scott, 591; 2 Tyr. 585; *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 537; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. N. S. 970; *Street v. Licensed Victuallers' Society*, 22 W. R. 553; *Stanley v. Webb*, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 21.

\* An action was brought for an alleged libel, published in the *True Sun* \* 100 newspaper: — "Riot at Preston. — From the *Liverpool Courier*. — It appears that Hunt pointed out Counsellor Seager to the mob, and said, 'There is one of the black sheep.' The mob fell upon him and murdered him. In the affray Hunt had his nose cut off. The coroner's inquest have brought in a verdict of wilful murder against Hunt, who is committed to gaol. — Fudge." The plaintiff contended that the word "Fudge" was merely introduced with reference to the future, in order that the defendants might afterwards, if the paragraph were complained of, be able to refer to it, as showing that they intended to discredit the statement. Lord Lyndhurst, C.B., told the jury that the question was, with what motive the publication was made. It was not disputed that if the paragraph, which was copied from another paper, stood without the word "Fudge," it would be a libel. If they were of opinion that the object of the paragraph was to vindicate the plaintiff's character from an unfounded charge, the action could not be maintained; but if the word "Fudge" was only added for the purpose of making an argument at a future day, then it would not take away the effect of the libel. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, one farthing. *Hunt v. Algar*, 6 C. & P. 245.

### *Of the Innuendo.*

In arriving at the meaning of the defendant's words, the Court and jury are often materially assisted by an averment in the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, called an *innuendo*. This is a statement by the plaintiff of the construction which he puts upon the words himself, and which he will endeavor to induce the jury to adopt at the trial. Where a defamatory meaning is apparent on the face of the libel itself, no innuendo is necessary: though even there the pleader occasionally inserts one to heighten the effect of the words. But where the words *primâ facie* are not actionable, an innuendo is essential to the action. It is necessary to bring out the latent injurious meaning of the defendant's words; and such innuendo must distinctly aver that the words bear a specific actionable meaning.<sup>1</sup> (a)

<sup>1</sup> *Cox v. Cooper*, 12 W. R. 75; 9 L. T. 329.

(a) What the author here says about the office of an innuendo belongs to what formerly in England was and still quite generally in this country is called the colloquium; a thing quite distinct from the innuendo. The colloquium is a statement

of facts going to make language defamatory which in itself is either innocent or in its ordinary sense not clearly defamatory; while the innuendo serves to remove an obscurity, as by pointing the application of language shown by the colloquium to be

It is the office of an innuendo to define the defamatory meaning which the plaintiff sets on the words; to show  
 \* 101 \* how they come to have that defamatory meaning; and also to show how they relate to the plaintiff, whenever that is not clear on the face of them. But an innuendo may not

defamatory or defamatory in its own terms. Apart from statute the two are never to be confounded; that is, unless statute authorize, the short innuendo cannot be made to serve the purpose of a colloquium. In other words under the mere term "meaning" or its equivalent, language which is not *ex vi termini* defamatory cannot be alleged to be defamatory or to mean something that it does not of itself naturally mean; or again in technical phrase the meaning of words cannot be enlarged by mere innuendo. *Nolan v. Traber*, 49 Md. 460; *Peterson v. Sentman*, 37 Md. 140; *Gabe v. McGinnis*, 68 Ind. 538; *Hays v. Mitchell*, 7 Blackf. 117; *Ward v. Colyhan*, 30 Ind. 395; *Hart v. Coy*, 40 Ind. 553; *De Armon v. Armstrong*, 37 Ind. 35; *Schurick v. Kollman*, 50 Ind. 336; *Brown v. Piner*, 6 Bush. 518; *Commonwealth v. Keenan*, 67 Penn. 203; *Lukehart v. Byerly*, 53 Penn. St. 418; *Stitzell v. Reynolds*, 59 Penn. St. 488; *Holton v. Muzzy*, 30 Vt. 365; *Harris v. Burley*, 8 N. H. 256; *Sanderson v. Caldwell*, 45 N. Y. 398; *Cottrill v. Cramer*, 43 Wis. 242; *Weil v. Schmidt*, 28 Wis. 137; *Clarke v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 363; *Tappan v. Wilson*, 7 Ohio, 190; *Parke v. Piedmont Ins. Co.*, 51 Ga. 510.

The reason of this is not far to seek. According to common law principles of pleading the declaration should state facts and never inferences (unless direct and obvious) without the facts upon which they are based. A contrary doctrine would permit the plaintiff to go to the jury, escaping the rightful result of a demurrer, when he had no case; he would only have to draw his own inferences. However recent changes in the law of pleading, following similar ones in England, have in many States gone nearly or quite the length of permitting the plaintiff to do this, in allowing him directly to allege that words apparently not defamatory were used in a defamatory sense, thus doing away with the necessity of a colloquium or modifying

its character. *Clarke v. Jones*, 49 Iowa, 474; *Kinyon v. Palmer*, 18 Iowa, 377; *Hand v. Winton*, 9 Vroom, 122. See *Chenery v. Goodrich*, 98 Mass. 224, 228; *Riddell v. Thayer*, 127 Mass. 487. And in some States, as in Massachusetts, innuendoes are no longer necessary. See the two cases just cited. But it is apprehended that in most of the States it is still required of the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to divert the meaning of language not naturally defamatory. *Chenery v. Goodrich*, and *Riddell v. Thayer*, *supra*; *Chace v. Sherman*, 119 Mass. 387; *Brettun v. Anthony*, 103 Mass. 37; *York v. Johnson*, 116 Mass. 482; *Rumerson v. Marvel*, 55 Ind. 265; *Hart v. Coy*, 40 Ind. 553; *Stewart v. Wilson*, 23 Minn. 449; *Smith v. Coe*, 22 Minn. 276; *Kinney v. Nash*, 3 Comst. 177, 182; *Cary v. Allen*, 39 Wis. 481. But inasmuch as the purpose of the colloquium is to divert the meaning of language not apparently defamatory, and that of the innuendo to remove an obscurity upon the face of the language, it follows that even at common law it may be unnecessary to make use of either in certain cases. This will be true where the language is of itself defamatory and names the plaintiff. See *Langton v. Hagerty*, 35 Wis. 150; *Lewis v. Hudson*, 44 Ga. 568; *Gabe v. McGinnis*, 68 Ind. 538; *Rodebaugh v. Hollingsworth*, 6 Ind. 339. In such a case the use of colloquium or innuendo is mere surplusage. *Id.* But when either is needed the plaintiff must abide by his pleading, at least in regard to the innuendo. *Strader v. Snyder*, 67 Ill. 404. Again if when an innuendo being necessary is pleaded there is anything on the face of the language to give it color the case must go to the jury. *Commonwealth v. Keenan*, 67 Penn. St. 203. And if some of the innuendoes extend the meaning too far while others are proper the latter only are to be regarded. *Id.*

introduce new matter, or enlarge the natural meaning of words. It must not put upon the defendant's words a construction which they will not bear. If the words are *incapable* of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo, and are *primâ facie* not actionable, the declaration will be held bad on demurrer; or if there be no demurrer, the judge at the trial will stop the case. If, however, the Court or the judge think the words are *capable* of the meaning ascribed to them, however improbable it may appear that they were in fact so understood, then it must be left to the jury to say whether such is or is not their true meaning.<sup>1</sup>

An innuendo now requires no prefatory averment to support it.<sup>2</sup> The libel or slander sued on must of course be set out *verbatim* in the Statement of Claim.<sup>3</sup> The innuendo usually follows it immediately. And such a declaration is to be considered as two counts under the old system of pleading, one with an innuendo and one without. And if the plaintiff can show a good cause of action, either with or without the alleged meaning, his statement of claim will be sufficient.<sup>4</sup>

The defendant is in no way embarrassed by the presence of the innuendo in the Statement of Claim: in fact it is to him an advantage. He can either deny that he ever spoke the words, or he can admit that he spoke them, but deny that they conveyed that meaning. He can also assert that the words he spoke were true, either \*with or without the alleged meaning. \* 102 It will then be for the jury to say whether the plaintiff's construction of the words is borne out by the evidence. If not, the plaintiff may fall back upon the words themselves, and urge that, taken in their natural and obvious signification, they are actionable *per se* without the alleged meaning, and that therefore his unproved innuendo may be rejected as surplusage.<sup>5</sup> But he cannot at the close of the trial resort to another construction of the words different both from their *primâ facie* meaning and from that pointed by the innuendo; if he win a verdict in

<sup>1</sup> Hunt v. Goodlake, 43 L. J. C. P. 54; 29 L. T. 472; Broome v. Gosden, 1 C. B. 728.

<sup>2</sup> Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 61.

<sup>3</sup> Harris v. Warre, 4 C. P. D. 125; 48 L. J. C. P. 310; 27 W. R. 461; 40 L. T. 429.

<sup>4</sup> Per Blackburn, J., in Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 402; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561.

<sup>5</sup> Harvey v. French, 1 Cr. & M. 11; 2 M. & Scott, 591; 2 Tyrw. 585.

this way, the Court will grant a new trial on the ground of surprise.<sup>1</sup>

The plaintiff cannot in the middle of the case start a fresh innuendo not on the record; he must abide by the construction he put on the words in the Statement of Claim, or else rely on their natural and obvious import. If the jury negative his innuendo, and the words are not actionable in their natural and primary sense, judgment must be for the defendant.<sup>2</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

"He hath forsworn himself." These words are not in themselves a sufficient imputation of perjury, because he is not said to have sworn falsely while giving evidence in Court. But an innuendo "before the justice of assize" is clearly bad; for it is not an *explanation* of defendant's words, but an *addition* to them. *Anon.* 1 Roll. Abr. 82; *Holt v. Scholefield*, 6 T. R. 691.

A libel alleged that a gentleman was on a certain night hocussed and robbed of £40, in the plaintiff's public-house. An innuendo "meaning thereby that the said public-house was the resort of, and frequented by, felons, thieves, and depraved and bad characters," after verdict for the defendant, was held too wide. *Broome v. Gosden*, 1 C. B. 728; *Clarke's Case de Dorchester* (1619), 2 Rolle's Rep. 136.

\* 103 \* "There is strong reason for believing that a considerable sum of money was transferred by power of attorney obtained by undue influence;" an innuendo "meaning as a fact that the plaintiff had by undue influence procured the money to be transferred," was held not too wide; for such would be the meaning conveyed to readers by the defendant's insinuation. *Turner v. Meryweather*, 7 C. B. 251; 18 L. J. C. P. 155; 13 Jur. 683; 19 L. J. C. P. 10; *Williams v. Gardiner*, 1 M. & W. 245; 1 Tyrw. & Gr. 578.

Libel complained of: — "He has become so inflated with self-importance by the few hundreds made in my service—God only knows whether honestly or otherwise—that," &c. Innuendo, "meaning thereby to insinuate that the plaintiff had conducted himself in a dishonest manner in the service of the defendant." The Court refused to disturb a verdict for the plaintiff. *Clegg v. Laffer*, 3 Moore & Sc. 727; 10 Bing. 250.

The defendant said, "Master Barham did burn my barn with his own hands, and none but he." At that date it was not felony to burn a barn, unless it were either full of corn or parcel of a mansion-house. An innuendo, "a barn full of corn," was held too wide. "That is not," says De Grey, C.J., commenting on this case in Cowp. 684, "an *explanation* of what was said before, but an *addition* to it. But if in the introduction it had been averred, that the defendant had a barn full of corn, and that in a discourse about the barn, the defendant had spoken the words charged in the libel of the plaintiff; an innuendo of its being the barn full of corn would have been good. For by coupling the innuendo in the libel with the introductory averment, 'his barn full of corn,' it would have made it compleat." *Barham's Case*, 4 Rep. 20; *Yelv.* 21.

<sup>1</sup> *Hunter v. Sharpe*, 4 F. & F. 983; 15 L. T. 421; *Ruel v. Tatnell*, 29 W. R. 172; 43 L. T. 507.

<sup>2</sup> *Brembridge v. Latimer*, 12 W. R. 878; 10 L. T. 816; *Maguire v. Knox*, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 408.



See *Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons*, 28 W. R. 490; 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 42 L. T. 314; (C. A.) 28 W. R. 851.

Words complained of:—“He is a regular prover under bankruptcies.” An innuendo, “the defendant meaning thereby that the plaintiff had proved and was in the habit of proving fictitious debts against the estates of bankrupts, with the knowledge that such debts were fictitious,” is now all that is necessary. C. L. P. Act, 1852, Sched. B., form 33.

Not so formerly. *Angle v. Alexander*, 7 Bing. 119; 1 Cr. & J. 143; 1 Tyrw. 9; 4 M. & P. 870, *ante*, p. 78.

The alleged libel was as follows:—“Notice,—any person giving information where any property may be found belonging to H. G. (meaning the plaintiff), a prisoner in the King’s Bench prison, but residing within the rules thereof, shall receive five per cent. upon the goods recovered, for their trouble, by applying at Mr. L.,” &c. Innuendo, that the plaintiff had been and was guilty of concealing his property with a fraudulent and unlawful intention. *Held*, on general demurrer, that the innuendo, unsupported \* by any prefatory averment, was too large; and that \* 104 the words, in themselves, were not actionable. *Gompertz v. Levy*, 9 A. & E. 282; 2 Jur. 1013; 1 P. & D. 214; 1 W. W. & H. 728; *Wheeler v. Haynes*, 9 A. & E. 286, note; 1 W. W. & H. 645; 1 P. & D. 55; *Capel and others v. Jones*, 4 C. B. 259; 11 Jur. 396; *Day v. Robinson*, 1 A. & E. 554; 4 N. & M. 884; *Adams v. Meredew*, 2 Y. & J. 417; 3 Y. & J. 219.

But all these cases are overruled by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 61, as interpreted in *Hemmings v. Gasson*, E. B. & E. 346; 27 L. J. Q. B. 252; 4 Jur. N. S. 834.

An information was filed against a Nonconformist minister for a libel upon “the bishops” contained in a book, called “A Paraphrase upon the New Testament.” An innuendo, “the bishops of England,” was held to be allowable, if from the nature of the libel this was clearly what was meant. *R. v. Baxter* (1685), 3 Mod. 69.

The libel accused a gentleman of saying, “He could see no probability of the war’s ending with France, until the little gentleman on the other side of the water was restored to his rights.” Innuendo, “the Prince of Wales,” allowed to be good; in fact the Court thought the meaning was clear without any innuendo. *Anon.* (1707) 11 Mod. 99; *R. v. Matthews* (1719), 15 How. St. Tr. 1323.

Libel:—“The mismanagements of the navy have been a greater tax upon the merchants than the duties raised by government.” An innuendo, “the royal navy of this kingdom,” held not too wide. *R. v. Tutchin* (1704), 14 How. St. Tr. 1095; 5 St. Tr. 527; 2 Ld. Raym. 1061; Salk. 50; 6 Mod. 268; *R. v. Horne* (1777), Cowp. 672; 11 St. Tr. 264; 20 How. St. Tr. 651.

Words may be:—

- (1) obviously defamatory;
- (2) ambiguous: that is, words which, though *primâ facie* defamatory, are still on the face of them susceptible of an innocent meaning;
- (3) neutral; *i.e.*, words which are meaningless till some explanation is given; such are slang expressions, words in a foreign language, words used in some special, local, technical, or customary sense;

- \* (4) *primâ facie* innocent; but capable of a de- \* 105  
famatory meaning;

(5) obviously innocent; words which *cannot* be construed so as to convey any imputation on the plaintiff.

To these different classes of words special rules of pleading, evidence, and construction apply.

### 1. *Words obviously defamatory.*

Here no innuendo is necessary. No parol evidence is admissible at the trial to explain the meaning of the words. The judge will direct the jury as a matter of law that the words are actionable, and that they must find for the plaintiff. The defendant cannot be heard to say that he did not intend to injure the plaintiff's reputation, if he has in fact done so. Should the jury perversely refuse to follow the judge's direction, a new trial will be granted.<sup>1</sup>

But the defendant may plead circumstances which made it clear at the time he spoke or wrote that the words were not used in their ordinary signification. He may thus take the words out of this class into class 2, words *prima facie* defamatory. It will then be a question for the jury how the bystanders understood the words. But such question only arises where the words are susceptible of the innocent meaning which the defendant seeks to place on them, and where also the circumstances which qualify the injurious words were known to the bystanders at the time.

### *Illustrations.*

It is libellous, without any innuendo, to write and publish that a newspaper has a separate page devoted to the advertisements of usurers and quack doctors, and that the editor takes respectable advertisements at a cheaper rate if the advertisers will consent to their appearing in that page. The Court, however, expressed surprise at the absence of some such innuendo as "meaning thereby that the plaintiff's paper was an ill-conducted and low-class journal." *Russell and another v. Webster*, 23 W. R. 59.

\* 106      \* Where a libel called the plaintiff a "truckmaster," and the defendant justified; but no evidence was given at the trial as to the meaning of the word; the Court held after some hesitation that, though the word was not to be found in any English dictionary, its meaning was sufficiently clear to sustain the action, there being a statute called "The Truck Act." *Homer v. Taunton*, 5 H. & N. 661; 29 L. J. Ex. 318; 8 W. R. 499; 2 L. T. 512.

To write and publish that a certain woman is a prostitute, and that "she is, I understand, under the patronage or protection of" the plaintiff, was held actionable in the Court of Appeals in New York, although there was no innuendo averring that she was under the plaintiff's protection for immoral purposes. *More v. Bennett* (1872), 48 N.

<sup>1</sup> *Levi v. Milne*, 4 Bing. 195; 12 Moore, 418.

Y. R. (3 Sickel), 472; reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court below, reported, 33 How. Pr. R. 180; 48 Barbour, N. Y. 229.

It is libellous to write and publish these words:—"Threatening letters. The Middlesex grand jury have returned a true bill against a gentleman of some property named French." And no innuendo is necessary to explain the meaning of the words; for they can only import that the grand jury had found a true bill against French for the misdemeanor of sending threatening letters. *Harvey v. French*, 1 Cr. & M. 11; 2 M. & Scott, 591; 2 Tyrw. 585.

Allegorical terms of well-known import are libellous *per se*, without innuendoes to explain their meaning; (a) *e.g.* imputing to a person the qualities of the "frozen snake," or calling him "Judas." *Hoare v. Silverlock* (No. 1, 1848), 12 Q. B. 624; 17 L. J. Q. B. 306; 12 Jur. 695.

Words complained of:—"Thou art a thief:" no innuendo at all is necessary, as larceny is clearly imputed. *Blumley v. Rose*, 1 Roll. Abr. 73; *Slowman v. Dutton*, 10 Bing. 402.

If the words can be understood as imputing an indictable offence, no innuendo is necessary. And, if it were, an innuendo, "meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been guilty of an indictable offence," is sufficient without specifying what particular indictable offence is meant. *Kinnahan v. McCullagh, Ir. R.* 11 C. L. 1; *Saunders v. Edwards*, Sid. 95; *Francis v. Roose*, 3 M. & W. 191; 1 H. & H. 36.

To say, "He robbed John White," is *prima facie* clearly actionable. But the defendant may show, if he can, that that is not the sense in which they were fairly understood by bystanders who listened to the whole conversation, though previously unacquainted with the matter to which the words sued on relate. *Tomlinson v. Brittlebank*, 4 B. & Adol. 630; 1 Nev. & Man. 455; *Hankinson v. Bilby*, 16 M. & W. 442; 2 C. & K. 440; *Martin v. Loei*, 2 F. & F. 654.

## \* 2. Words *prima facie* defamatory.

\* 107

Here, too, no innuendo is necessary, and no parol evidence is admissible at the trial to explain the meaning of the words. The judge will direct the jury that the words are *prima facie* actionable.

But the defendant may plead circumstances which made it clear at the time that the words were not used by him in their ordinary signification. He may plead that the words were uttered merely in a joke, and were so understood by all who heard them; or that the words were part of a longer conversation, the rest of which limits and explains the words sued on; or any other facts which tend to show that they were uttered with an innocent meaning, and so understood by the bystanders. And if such a defence be pleaded, parol evidence may be given of the facts alleged. And then it becomes a question for the jury whether the facts as pleaded are substantially proved, and whether

(a) See *Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co.*, 40 Mich. 256; *Clarke v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 472.

they do put on the words a color different from what they would *primâ facie* bear. It is generally difficult, however, to induce the jury to adopt the defendant's harmless view of his own language.

But the defendant may not plead or give in evidence any facts which were not known to the bystanders at the time the words were uttered. The defendant's secret intent in uttering the words is immaterial.<sup>1</sup>

The defendant is allowed thus to give evidence of all "the surrounding circumstances," in order to place the jury so far as possible in the position of bystanders, that they may judge how the words would be understood on the particular occasion. But though evidence of such extrinsic facts is admitted, parol evidence merely to explain away the words used, to show

that they did not for once bear their ordinary signification, is inad-  
\* 108 missible. A witness cannot be called to say "*I should not*" \* have understood defendant to make any imputation whatever on the plaintiff." The jury know what ordinary English means, and need no witness to inform them.

The leading case on this point is one cited in the Lord Cromwell's Case.<sup>2</sup> (At least, it appears to be a decided case, not a mere illustration.) "If a man brings an action on the case for calling the plaintiff murderer, the defendant will say, that he was talking with the plaintiff concerning unlawful hunting, and the plaintiff confessed that he killed several hares with certain engines; to which the defendant answered and said, "Thou art a murderer" (innuendo the killing of the said hares). . . . Resolved by the whole Court, that the justification was good. For in case of slander by words, the sense of the words ought to be taken, and the sense of them appears by the cause and occasion of speaking of them; for *sensus verborum ex causâ dicendi accipiendus est et sermones semper accipiendi sunt secundum subjectam*. . . . And it was said, God forbid that a man's words should be by such strict and grammatical construction taken by parcels against the manifest intent of the party upon consideration of all the words, which import the true cause and occasion which manifest the true sense of them; *quia quæ ad unum finem loquuta sunt, non debent ad alium detorqueri*: and, therefore, in the said case of murder, the Court held the justification good; and that the defendant should never be put to the general issue, when he confesses the words and justifies them, or confesses the words, and by special matter shows that they are not actionable."

<sup>1</sup> *Hankinson v. Bilby*, 16 M. & W. 445; 2 C. & K. 440.

<sup>2</sup> 1578, 4 Rep. 13, 14.

*Illustrations.*

Words complained of :—“You stole my apples.” The defendant cannot be allowed to state that he only meant to say, “You have tortiously removed my apples under an unfounded claim of right.” The bystanders could not possibly have understood from the word used that a civil trespass only was imputed. *Deverill v. Hulbert* (Jan. 25th, 1878), *ex relatione med.*

But where the words complained of are, “Thou art a thief; for thou tookest my beasts by reason of an execution, and I will hang thee,” no action lies, for it is clear that the whole sentence taken together imports only a charge of trespass. *Wilk’s Case*, 1 Roll. Abr. 51; *Sibley v. Tomlins*, 4 Tyrw. 90.

\* Where words are used which clearly import a criminal charge (as, “You \* 109 thief,” or “You traitor,”) it is still open to the defendant to show if he can that he used them merely as vague terms of general abuse, and that the bystanders must have understood him as meaning nothing more than “You rascal,” or “You scoundrel.” When such words occur in a string of non-actionable epithets, or in a torrent of general vulgar abuse, the jury may reasonably infer that no felony was seriously imputed. If, however, the jury put the harsher construction on defendant’s language, no new trial will be granted; for it is a question entirely for them. *Minors v. Leeford*, Cro. Jac. 114; *Smith v. Ward*, Cro. Jac. 674; *Penfold v. Westcote*, 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 335.

Where the defendant said to the plaintiff in the presence of others, “You are a thief, a rogue, and a swindler,” it was held that the defendant could not call a witness to explain the particular transaction which he had in his mind at the time, since he did not in any way expressly refer to it in the presence of his hearers. *Martin v. Loei*, 2 F. & F. 654; *Read v. Ambridge*, 6 C. & P. 308; *Hankinson v. Bilby*, 16 M. & W. 442; 2 C. & K. 440.

But where the defendant said :—“Thomson is a damned thief; and so was his father before him, and I can prove it;” but added, “Thomson received the earnings of the ship, and ought to pay the wages,” Lord Ellenborough held that the latter words qualified the former and showed no felony was imputed; the person to whom the words were spoken being the master of the ship and acquainted with all the circumstances referred to. *Thomson v. Bernard*, 1 Camp. 48; *Bittridge’s Case*, 4 Rep. 19; *Cristie v. Cowell*, Peake, 4; *Day v. Robinson*, 1 A. & E. 554; 4 N. & M. 884.

*3. Neutral Words.*

Where the defendant has used only ordinary English words, the judge can decide at once whether they are *primâ facie* actionable or not. But where the words are in a foreign language, or are technical or provincial terms, an innuendo is absolutely necessary to disclose an actionable meaning. So, too, an innuendo is essential where ordinary English words are not in the particular instance used in their ordinary English signification, but in some peculiar sense.

Where the words are spoken in a foreign language \* the \* 110 original words should be set out in the Statement of Claim,

and then an exact translation should be added.<sup>1</sup> (a) In the case of slander an averment was formerly required to the effect that those who were present understood that language.<sup>2</sup> And though such an averment is no longer necessary, the fact must still be proved at the trial. For if words be spoken in a tongue altogether unknown to the hearers, no action lies;<sup>3</sup> for no injury is done to the plaintiff's reputation. But if a single bystander understood them, that is enough. Where, however, the words are spoken in the vernacular of the place of publication (as Welsh words spoken in Wales) it will be presumed that the bystanders understood them. (b) At the trial the correctness of the translation must be proved by a sworn interpreter.

So at the trial whenever the words used are not ordinary English, but local, technical, provincial, or obsolete expressions, or slang or cant terms, evidence is admissible to explain their meaning, provided such meaning has been properly alleged in the Statement of Claim. But when the words are well-known and perfectly intelligible English, the Court will give them their ordinary English meaning, unless it is in some way shown that that meaning is inapplicable. This may appear from the words themselves; for in some cases to give them their ordinary English meaning would make nonsense of them. But if in their ordinary English meaning the words would be intelligible, facts must be given in evidence to show that they may have been used in a particular sense on this particular occasion. After that has been done a bystander may be asked, "What did you understand by the expression used?" But without such a founda-

\* 111 tion \* being first laid, the question is not allowable.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Zenobio v. Axtell*, 6 T. R. 162; 3 M. & S. 116.

<sup>2</sup> *Fleetwood v. Curl*, Cro. Jac. 557; Hob. 268.

<sup>3</sup> *Jones v. Davers (vel Dawkes)* (1597), Cro. Eliz. 496; 1 Roll. Abr. 74.

<sup>4</sup> *Daines v. Hartley*, 3 Exch. 200; 18 L. J. Ex. 81; 12 Jur. 1093.

(a) *Wormouth v. Cramer*, 3 Wend. 394; *Kerschbaugher v. Slusser*, 12 Ind. 453. See *Lettman v. Ritz*, 3 Sandf. 734; *Hickley v. Grosjean*, 6 Blackf. 351.

(b) But see *Palmer v. Harris*, 60 Penn.

St. 156, where a distinction is made between slander and libel on this point. See also *Kiene v. Ruff*, 1 Iowa, 482; *Bechtell v. Shatler*, Wright, 107.

*Illustrations.*

Words complained of:—"You are a bunter." No innuendo: Willes, J., nonsuited the plaintiff, on the ground that the word had no meaning at all, and could not therefore be defamatory in ordinary acceptance; and he refused to allow the plaintiff to be asked, what the word "bunter" meant. *Aliter*, had there been an innuendo averring a defamatory sense to the word "bunter." *Rawlings et ux. v. Norbury*, 1 F. & F. 341.

Words spoken to an attorney:—"Thou art a daffidowndilly." Innuendo, meaning thereby that he is an "ambidexter," *i.e.*, one who takes a fee from both sides, and betrays the secrets of his client. *Held* that an action lay; 1 Roll. Abr. 55; *Annison v. Blofield, Carter*, 214; 1 Roll. Abr. 55.

It is actionable to say of a stockjobber that, "He is a lame duck;" innuendo, "meaning thereby that the plaintiff had not fulfilled his contracts in respect of the said stocks and funds," (stockjobbing being now legalised by the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 23). *Morris and Langdale*, 2 Bos. & Pull. 284.

The word "Welcher" requires an innuendo to explain its meaning. *Blackman v. Bryant*, 27 L. T. 491.

The defendant charged the plaintiff, a pawnbroker and silversmith, with the unfair and dishonorable practice of "duffing;" innuendo, furbishing up damaged goods and pledging them with other pawnbrokers as new. *Hickinbotham v. Leach*, 10 M. & W. 361; 2 Dowl. N. S. 270.

The words, "He is mainsworn," were spoken in one of the northern counties where "mainsworn" is equivalent to "perjured," (forsworn with his *hand* on the book). *Held* actionable. *Slater v. Franks*, Hob. 126. And see *Coles v. Haveland*, Cro. Eliz. 250; Hob. 12.

A. and B. were partners, and were conversing with the defendant. A. said they held some bills on the plaintiff's firm; the defendant said:—"You must look out sharp that they are met by them." At the trial, B. was called as a witness, and stated these facts. The counsel for the plaintiff then proposed to ask B.:—"What did you understand by that?" But the question was objected to, and disallowed by the judge (Pollock, C. B.) in that form, and the counsel would put it in no other shape. The jury found a verdict for the defendant; and the Court of Exchequer refused to grant a new trial. *Daines and another v. Hartley*, 3 Exch. 200; 18 L. J. Ex. 81; 12 Jur. 1093.

The defendant, the editor of a newspaper, owed plaintiff money under an \*award; and wrote and published in his newspaper these words:—"The \* 112 money will be forthcoming on the last day allowed by the award, but we are not disposed to allow him to put it into Wall-street for shaving purposes before that period." "Shaving" in New York means, (i.) discounting bills or notes; (ii.) fleecing men of their goods or money by overreaching, extortion, and oppression. The declaration contained no innuendo alleging that the words were used in the second defamatory sense. *Held* no libel, on demurrer. *Stone v. Cooper* (1845), 2 Denio (N. Y.), 293.

#### 4. Words primâ facie innocent, but capable of a defamatory meaning.

Wherever the defendant's words are capable both of a harmless and an injurious meaning, it will be a question for the jury to decide which meaning the hearers or readers would on the occa-

sion in question have reasonably given to the words. (a) Here an innuendo is essential to show the latent injurious meaning. Without an innuendo, there would be no cause of action shown on the record. And such innuendo should be carefully drafted; for on it the plaintiff must take his stand at the trial. He cannot during the course of the case adopt a fresh construction. He may, it is true, fall back on the natural and obvious meaning of the words: but that we assume here not to be actionable. And such innuendo must be specific; it must distinctly aver a definite actionable meaning. A general averment, such as, "using the words in a defamatory sense," or "for the purpose of creating an impression unfavorable to the plaintiff," would be insufficient.<sup>1</sup>

The words, too, must be reasonably susceptible of the defamatory meaning put upon them by the innuendo, or the Statement of Claim will be demurrable; or if there be no demurrer, \* 113 the judge at the trial should stop the \* case. In fact, the words in that case belong rather to Class 5, for they are *incapable* of a defamatory meaning.

If, however, the words, though *primâ facie* innocent, are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, then it is a question for the jury in which meaning would bystanders or readers have reasonably understood them. In such a case, if the defendant demurs to the Statement of Claim, his demurrer will be overruled;<sup>2</sup> if the judge at the trial nonsuits the plaintiff, the Court will order a new trial.<sup>3</sup>

When it is clear that the words complained of are not defamatory in their primary sense, there will still be a further question: — Were there any facts known both to speaker and hearer which would reasonably lead the latter to understand the words in a secondary and a defamatory sense? And this is a question for the jury, if there be any evidence to go to them of such facts.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cox v. Cooper, 12 W. R. 75; 9 L. T. 329.

<sup>2</sup> Jenner and another v. A'Beckett, L. R. 7 Q. B. 11; 41 L. J. Q. B. 14; 20 W. R. 181; 25 L. T. 464.

<sup>3</sup> Hart and another v. Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373.

<sup>4</sup> Capital & Counties Bank v. Henty & Sons (C. A.), 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 28 W. R. 851; Ruel v. Tatnell, 29 W. R. 172; 43 L. T. 507.

(a) Hansborough v. Stinnett, 25 Gratt. Mass. 371, 382 ("she is a bad girl"); 495 ("D. killed my beef"); Snell v. Snow, Riddell v. Thayer, 127 Mass. 487 ("bad 13 Met. 278; Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 woman"); Peterson v. Sentman, 37 Md.



It will be of no avail for the defendant to urge (except in mitigation of damages) that he meant the words in the innocent sense, if the jury are satisfied that ordinary readers or bystanders would have certainly understood them in the other sense. The jury will consider the whole of the circumstances of the case, the occasion of publication, the relationship between the parties, &c. Also whenever the words of a libel are ambiguous, or the intention of the writer equivocal, subsequent libels are admissible in evidence to explain the meaning of the first, or to prove the innuendoes, even although such subsequent libel be written after action brought. The \* decision of the \* 114 jury on the question is final and conclusive.

The plaintiff may also aver in his Statement of Claim that the words were spoken ironically; and it will then be a question for the jury *quo animo* the words were used.

### Illustrations.

"He is a healer of felons;" innuendo, a concealer of felons. *Held* actionable. *Pridham v. Tucker*, Yelv. 153; Hob. 126; Cart. 214.

"He has set his own premises on fire." These words are *prima facie* innocent; but may become actionable, if it be averred that the house was insured, and that the words were intended to convey to the hearers that the plaintiff had purposely set fire to his own premises with intent to defraud the insurance office. *Sweetapple v. Jesse*, 5 B. & Ad. 27; 2 N. & M. 36. (a)

"She secreted one and sixpence under the till, stating, 'These are not times to be robbed.'" No innuendo. There being nothing to show that the 1s. 6d. was not her own money, the Court arrested judgment; for, though special damage was alleged, it was not the necessary and natural consequence of the words, as set out in the declaration. *Kelly v. Partington*, 5 B. & Ad. 645; 3 N. & M. 116.

The plaintiff, Mary Griffiths, was a butcher and had a son Matthew. Words spoken by defendant:—"Matthew uses two balls to his mother's steelyard;" innuendo, "meaning that plaintiff by Matthew, her agent and servant, used improper and fraudulent weights in her said trade, and defrauded and cheated in her said trade." After verdict for the plaintiff, *held* that the words, as stated and explained, were actionable. *Griffiths v. Lewis*, 7 Q. B. 61; 8 Q. B. 841; 14 L. J. Q. B. 197; 15 L. J. Q. B. 249; 9 Jur. 370; 10 Jur. 711.

140 ("bad house." But see *Fitzgerald v. Robinson*, *supra*. Secus of "bawdy house." *Griffin v. Moore*, 43 Md. 246).

(a) See *Chace v. Sherman*, 119 Mass. 387; *Brettun v. Anthony*, 103 Mass. 37; *Waters v. Jones*, 3 Port. (Ala.) 442; *Giddens v. Mirk*, 4 Ga. 364; *Logan v. Steele*, 1 Bibb, 593; *Wallace v. Young*, 5 T. B. Mon. 155; *House v. House*, 5 Har. & J. 125; *Jones v. Hungerford*, 4 Gill & J. 402;

*Brady v. Wilson*, 4 Hawks, 93; *Gage v. Shelton*, 3 Rich. 242; *Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292; *Norman v. Orton*, 32 Wis. 106; *Weil v. Schmidt*, 28 Wis. 137. To charge A. with an attempt at arson, and to add, "When I drove him (A.) off I saw B. . . . holding a torch for him" is to charge B. with participation; and the charge if false is actionable *per se* by B. *Hooper v. Martin*, 54 Ga. 648.

To say that the plaintiff is "Man Friday" to another is not actionable, without an innuendo averring that the term imputed undue subserviency and self-humiliation. *Forbes v. King*, 2 L. J. Ex. 109; 1 Dowl. 672. See *Woodgate v. Ridout*, 4 F. & F. 202.

Words complained of:—"The old materials have been relaid by you in the asphalte work executed in the front of the Ordnance Office, and I have seen the work done." Innuendo, "that the plaintiff had been guilty of dishonesty in his trade by laying down again the old asphalte which had before been used at the entrance of the Ordnance Office, instead of new asphalte according to his contract;" and this innuendo was held not too large. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, 40s. *Baboneau v. Farrell*, 15 C. B. 360; 24 L. J. C. P. 9; 3 C. L. R. 42; 1 Jur. N. S. 114.

\* 115

\* An action was brought for the following libel on the plaintiff in the way of his trade:—"Society of Guardians for the Protection of Trade against Swindlers and Sharpers. I am directed to inform you that the persons using the firm of Goldstein and Co. are reported to this Society as improper to be proposed to be balloted for as members thereof." After verdict for the plaintiff, the Court arrested judgment, because there was no averment that it was the custom of the Society to designate swindlers and sharpers by the term "improper persons to be members of this Society." [There was an innuendo, "meaning thereby that the plaintiff was a swindler and a sharper," &c., which would be sufficient now; but before the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 61, an innuendo required a prefatory averment to support it.] The words in their natural and obvious meaning were held to be no libel. *Goldstein v. Foss*, 6 B. & C. 154; 1 M. & P. 402; 2 Y. & J. 146; 9 D. & R. 197; (in Ex. Ch.) 4 Bing. 489; 2 C. & P. 252; *Capel and others v. Jones*, 4 C. B. 259; 11 Jur. 396.

To say of a merchant, "He hath eaten a spider," Mr. Justice Wild said was "actionable with a proper averment what the meaning is." But the report does not vouchsafe any explanation as to what the meaning was. *Franklyn v. Butler*, Pasch. 11 Car. I., cited in *Annison v. Blofield*, Carter, 214.

The words, "Ware hawk there; mind what you are about," will, with proper averments, amount to a charge of insolvency against the plaintiff, a trader; and be therefore actionable. *Orpwood v. Barks (vel Parkes)*, 4 Bing. 261; 12 Moore, 492.

The defendant said to an upholsterer:—"You are a soldier; I saw you in your red coat doing duty; your word is not to be taken." These words are *prima facie* not actionable; but it was explained that there was then a common practice for tradesmen to sham enlisting so as to avoid being arrested for debt. The words were therefore held actionable as damaging the credit of a trader. *Arne v. Johnson*, 10 Mod. 111; *Gostling v. Brooks*, 2 F. & F. 76.

The defendant said of the plaintiff:—"Foulger trapped three foxes in Ridler's wood." These words are *prima facie* not actionable. But the declaration averred that the plaintiff was a gamekeeper, that it is the duty of a gamekeeper not to kill foxes, that the plaintiff was employed expressly on the terms that he would not kill foxes, and that no one who killed foxes would be employed as a gamekeeper. Held, on demurrer, a good declaration; for the words, so explained, clearly imputed to the plaintiff misconduct in his office or occupation, and were therefore actionable without proof of special damage. *Foulger v. Newcomb*, L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 15 W. R. 1181; 16 L. T. 595.

A landlord sent to his tenants a notice:—"Messrs. Henty & Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment any cheques drawn on any of the branches of the Capital and Counties Bank." Innuendo, "meaning thereby that the plaintiffs were not to be relied upon to meet the cheques drawn upon them, and that their position was such that they \* were not to be trusted to cash the cheques of their customers." Held that the words in their primary sense were not libellous;

\* 116

and that as no evidence was offered of facts known to the tenants which could reasonably induce them to understand the words in the defamatory sense ascribed to them by the innuendo, there was no question for the jury, and the judge should have stopped the case. *Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons* (C. A.), 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 28 W. R. 851 [reversing the decision of the C. P. D., 28 W. R. 490; 42 L. T. 314].

Ironical praise may be a libel; *e.g.*, calling an attorney "an honest lawyer." *Boydell v. Jones*, 4 M. & W. 446; 1 H. & H. 408; 7 Dowl. 210.

It is actionable to say ironically: — "*You will not play the Jew or the hypocrite.*" *R. v. Garret* (Sir Baptist Hicks' Case), Hob. 215; Popham, 139.

Ironical advice to the Lord Keeper by a country parson, "to be as wise as Lord Somerset, to manage as well as Lord Haversham, to love the church as well as the Bishop of Salisbury," &c., is actionable. *R. v. Dr. Brown*, 11 Mod. 86; Holt, 425.

### 5. *Words incapable of a defamatory meaning.*

But where the words can bear but one meaning, and that is obviously not defamatory, then no innuendo or other allegation on the pleadings can make the words defamatory; the Statement of Claim is demurrable; and should the defendant not see fit to demur, still the judge at the trial will nonsuit the plaintiff and not permit the case to go to the jury. No parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of ordinary English words, in the absence of special circumstances showing that in the case before the Court the words do not bear their usual signification. "It is not right to say that a judge is to affect not to know what everybody else knows — the ordinary use of the English language."<sup>1</sup> The fact that actual damage has in fact followed from the publication is immaterial in considering what is the true construction of the libel.<sup>2</sup>

### \* *Illustrations.*

### \* 117

Words complained of: — "He was the ringleader of the nine hours' system." "He has ruined the town by bringing about the nine hours' system," &c. The declaration contained no innuendo, and no sufficient averment that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his trade, and on demurrer, was held bad. *Miller v. David*, L. R. 9 C. P. 118; 43 L. J. C. P. 84; 22 W. R. 332; 30 L. T. 58.

Words complained of: — "We are requested to state that the honorary secretary of the Tichborne Defence Fund is not and never was a captain in the Royal Artillery as he has been erroneously described." Innuendo, that the plaintiff was an impostor, and had falsely and fraudulently represented himself to be a captain in Royal Artillery. *Bovill, C.J.*, held that the words were not reasonably capable of the defamatory mean-

<sup>1</sup> Per Brett, J., 1 C. P. D. 572.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Coleridge, C.J., 2 C. P. D. 150.

ing ascribed to them by the innuendo, and nonsuited the plaintiff. *Held* that the nonsuit was right. *Hunt v. Goodlake*, 43 L. J. C. P. 54; 29 L. T. 472.

The plaintiff was a certificated art master, and had been master at the Walsall Science and Art Institute. His engagement there ceased in June, 1874, and he then started, and became master of, another school which was called "The Walsall Government School of Art," and was opened in August. In September the following advertisement appeared in the *Walsall Observer*, signed by the defendants as chairman, treasurer and secretary of the Institute respectively:—"Walsall Science and Art Institute. The public are informed that Mr. Mulligan's connection with the Institute has ceased, and that he is not authorized to receive subscriptions on its behalf." The declaration set out this advertisement with an innuendo,—"meaning thereby that the plaintiff falsely assumed and pretended to be authorized to receive subscriptions on behalf of the said Institute." At the trial Quain, J., directed a nonsuit on the ground that the advertisement was not capable of the defamatory meaning attributed by the innuendo:—*Held* that the nonsuit was right; that the advertisement was not capable of any defamatory meaning. *Mulligan v. Cole and others*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 549; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153; 33 L. T. 12.

But even where the meaning of the defendant's words is clear or has been ascertained, the question remains:—Has he said enough? Was the imputation sufficiently definite to injure the plaintiff's reputation? Is it clear that it is the plaintiff to whom he referred? Unless these questions can be answered in the affirmative, no action lies. There must be a specific imputation cast on the person suing.

This is clearly only a part of the construction of the words; but it is convenient to collect the cases under a separate head, which may be denoted by the well-known pleading phrase Certainty. Often the only question of construction arising in a case may be one of certainty.

The Court formerly expected to be assisted in dealing with these questions by a variety of minute averments in the plaintiff's declaration. Thus, it was necessary that there should be a *colloquium*, an averment that the defendant was speaking of the plaintiff, as well as constant innuendoes in the statement of the words themselves, "he (meaning thereby the plaintiff)." So, too, many other allegations were required describing the locality, the relationship between the various persons mentioned, and all the surrounding circumstances necessary to fully understand the defendant's words. And these matters could not properly be proved at the trial unless they were set out on the record; or if they were, and the plaintiff had a verdict, the Court would subsequently arrest judgment, on the ground that it did not appear clearly on the face of the record that the words were actionable. And this technicality was carried to an absurd extent. Thus, where the defendant said, "Thou art a murderer, for thou art the fellow that didst

kill Mr. Sydnam's man," the Court of Exchequer Chamber, on error brought, arrested judgment, because there was no averment that any man of Mr. Sydnam's had in fact been killed.<sup>1</sup> (Had the words been "*and thou art,*" \* instead of "*for thou art,*" the plaintiff would probably \* 119 have been allowed to recover.<sup>2</sup>) Again, in *Ball v. Roane*,<sup>3</sup> the words were:—"There was never a robbery committed within forty miles of Wellingborough, but thou hadst thy part in it." After a verdict for the plaintiff, the Court arrested judgment, "because it was not averred that there *was* any robbery committed within forty miles, &c., for otherwise it is no slander." So in *Foster v. Browning*,<sup>4</sup> where the words were, "Thou art as arrant a thief as any is in England," the Court arrested judgment, because the plaintiff had not averred "that there was any thief in England."<sup>5</sup> But the climax was reached in a case cited in *Dacy v. Clinch*,<sup>6</sup> where the defendant had said to the plaintiff, "As sure as God governs the world, or King James this kingdom, you are a thief." After verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that there was no averment on the record that God did govern the world, or King James this kingdom. But here the Court drew the line, and held that "these things were so apparent," that neither of them need be averred. And even in the present century, instances of similar technicality are not wanting, though their absurdity is not so flagrant. Thus, in *Solomon v. Lawson*,<sup>7</sup> the libel consisted of two letters to the *Times*; the first made a charge generally on "the authorities" at St. Helena; and the second letter brought it home to the plaintiff in particular. Neither letter was thus a complete libel in itself. In the first count of the declaration the first letter was fully set out; in the second count *both* letters were set out *verbatim*. The first count was held bad, because it set out only half the libel. The second count was also held bad, because the pleader in setting out the first letter for the second time had introduced it with the words "in *substance* as follows." The Court decided that it ought to have been set out *verbatim*: so it was; but because the pleader *said* he had only set out the substance, judgment was arrested. Lord Denman would, it seems, have given judgment for the plaintiff, had the pleader used the word "*tenor*," instead of "*substance*." So, \* too, in *Angle v. Alexander*,<sup>8</sup> the words \* 120 were thus set out with innuendoes in the declaration, "You

<sup>1</sup> *Barrons v. Ball* (1614), Cro. Jac. 331. See *Ratcliff v. Michael*, *ib.*, and *Upton v. Pinfold*, Comyn, 267.

<sup>2</sup> See *Minors v. Leeford*, Cro. Jac. 114.

<sup>3</sup> (1593), Cro. Eliz. 308.

<sup>4</sup> (1625), Cro. Jac. 688.

<sup>5</sup> See also *Johnson v. Sir John Aylmer*, Cro. Jac. 126; *Sir Thomas Holt v. Astrigg*, Cro. Jac. 184; *Slocomb's Case*, Cro. Car. 442.

<sup>6</sup> (1661), Sid. 53.

<sup>7</sup> 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796.

<sup>8</sup> 7 Bing. 119; 1 Cr. & J. 143; 4 M. & P. 870; 1 Tyrw. 9.

(meaning the said plaintiff) are a regular prover under bankruptcy (meaning that the said plaintiff was accustomed to prove fictitious debts under commissions of bankruptcy); you are a regular bankrupt maker; if it was not for some of your neighbors, your shop would look queer." And the Court arrested judgment because there was no prefatory averment that the defendant had been accustomed to employ the words "prover under bankruptcy," in the meaning set out in the innuendo.<sup>1</sup>

But now, by s. 61 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, the *colloquium* and all other such frivolous averments are rendered unnecessary; and Order XIX. r. 4, requires that only material facts need be stated in the pleadings. The pleader must judge what facts are material; and he will also insert averments, which, though not essential, will help to make the case clear, by explaining what is to follow.<sup>2</sup> But where the plaintiff is suing for words spoken of him in the way of his office, profession, or trade, there it is absolutely necessary to aver that at the time when the words were spoken the plaintiff held such office or carried on such profession or trade. And there should also be an averment that the words were spoken by the defendant with reference to such office, profession, or trade.

### 1. *Certainty of the imputation.*

Where words are sought to be made actionable, as charging the plaintiff with the commission of a crime, we have seen that an indictable offence must be specifically imputed. (a) It will not be sufficient to prove words which only amount to an accusation of fraudulent, dishonest, vicious, or immoral conduct, so long as it is not criminal; (b) or of a mere intention to commit a \* 121 crime, not evidenced \* by any overt act. But still it is not necessary that the alleged crime should be stated with all the technicality or precision of an indictment; if the crime be imputed in the ordinary language usually employed to denote it in lay conversation. (c) All that is requisite is that the bystanders

<sup>1</sup> See also *Goldstein v. Foss* and another, 6 B. & C. 154; 4 Bing. 489; 9 D. & R. 197; 2 C. & P. 252; 1 M. & P. 402; 2 Y. & J. 146; and other cases cited, *ante*, p. 104.

<sup>2</sup> As in *Foulger v. Newcomb*, L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 15 W. R. 1181; 16 L. T. 595.

(a) The words used and not merely their supposed effect should be alleged. *Haselton v. Weare*, 8 Vt. 484; *Yundt v. Yundt*, 12 Serg. & R. 427.

(b) *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338.

(c) See *Hoar v. Ward*, 47 Vt. 657; *Waugh v. Waugh*, 47 Ind. 580; *Miller v.*

*Miller*, 8 Johns. 74. But there is doubtless a distinction as to certainty between the effect of an allegation on demurrer and evidence in support of a charge, especially after verdict. *Kennedy v. Gifford*, 19 Wend. 276; *Miller v. Maxwell*, 16 Wend. 9.

should clearly understand that the plaintiff is charged with the commission of a specific crime. "The meaning of the words is to be gathered from the vulgar import, and not from any technical legal sense."<sup>1</sup> (a)

### Illustrations.

#### Treason.

The following words have been held sufficiently definite to constitute a charge of treason, or at least of sedition, and therefore actionable : —

Thy master is "no true subject." *Waldegrave v. Agas*, Cro. Eliz. 191. *Sed quære*, *Fowler v. Aston*, Cro. Eliz. 268 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 43.

"He consented to the late rebels in the North." *Stapleton v. Frier*, Cro. Eliz. 251.

"Thou art a rebel, and all that keep thee company are rebels, and thou art not the Queen's friend." *Redston v. Eliot*, Cro. Eliz. 638 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 49.

"Thou art an enemy to the State." *Charter v. Peter*, Cro. Eliz. 602.

"He has the Pretender's picture in his room, and I saw him drink his health. And he said he had a right to the Crown." *Fry v. Carne* (1724), 8 Mod. 283. *How v. Prin* (1702), Holt, 652 ; 7 Mod. 107 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 812 ; 2 Salk. 694 ; 1 Brown Py. C. 64.

But to say merely "Thou art a rebel," was adjudged not actionable. *Fountain v. Rogers* (1601), Cro. Eliz. 878.

#### Murder.

So it is a sufficient charge of murder to say : (b) —

"Thou hast killed thy master's cook." *Cooper v. Smith*, Cro. Jac. 423 ; 1 Roll. Abr. 77.

"I am thoroughly convinced that you are guilty of the death of Daniel Dolly, and rather than you should want a hangman, I will be your executioner." *Peake v. Oldham*, Cowp. 275 ; 2 Wm. Bl. 959.

\* But it is not sufficient to say : —

\* 122

"Hext seeks my life." "Because he may seek his life lawfully upon just cause." *Hext v. Yeomans*, 4 Rep. 15.

"He was the cause of the death of Dowland's child," because a man might innocently cause the death of another by accident or misfortune. *Miller v. Buckdon*, 2 Buls. 10.

"Thou wouldst have killed me," for here a murderous *intention* only is imputed. *Dr. Poe's Case*, 1 Vin. Abr. 440, cited in 2 Buls. 206.

<sup>1</sup> Per Buller, J., in *Colman v. Godwin*, 3 Dougl. 91 ; 2 B. & C. 285 (n.).

(a) It must not be supposed from this that to affirm in terms one's mere belief that the plaintiff has committed a crime is not actionable. It matters not in such a case that the defendant did believe the charge true and spoke the words in good faith, except as affecting the damages. *Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co.*, 1 Mo. App. 565 ; s. c. 65 Mo. 539 ; *Dickey v.*

*Andros*, 32 Vt. 55. But to make an honest charge of crime upon a mistaken view of the law, stating the facts at the same time, is not actionable. *Hall v. Adkins*, 59 Mo. 144 ; *Pasley v. Kemp*, 22 Mo. 407. See *ante*, page 94, note.

(b) It is not necessary to allege that the person is dead. *Stallings v. Newman*, 26 Ala. 300 ; *Tenney v. Clement*, 10 N. H. 52.

*Forgery.*

The following words have been held a sufficient charge of forgery : (a) —

"This is a counterfeit warrant made by Mr. Stone." *Stone v. Smalcombe*, Cro. Jac. 648.

"Thou hast forged a privy seal, and a commission." *Per cur.* "'A commission' shall be intended the king's commission, under the privy seal." *Baal v. Baggerley*, Cro. Car. 326.

"You forged my name," although it is not stated to what deed or instrument. *Jones v. Herne*, 2 Wils. 87. Overruling *Anon.*, 3 Leon. 231; 1 Roll. Abr. 65.

*Larceny.*

The following words are a sufficient charge of larceny : (b) —

"Baker stole my box-wood, and I will prove it." It was argued that it did not appear from the words that the box-wood was not growing; and that to cut down and

(a) See *ante*, p. 55.

(b) Even to say, "You are no thief" may be actionable, for it may be ironically said. *Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co.*, 1 Mo. App. 565; s. c. 65 Mo. 539. Further what amounts to a charge of larceny see *Porter v. Choen*, 60 Ind. 338; *Prichard v. Lloyd*, 2 Ind. 154; *Hart v. Coy*, 40 Ind. 553; *Ward v. Colyhan*, 30 Ind. 395; *Fawsett v. Clark*, 48 Md. 494; *Hayes v. Ball*, 72 N. Y. 418; *Georgia v. Kepford*, 45 Iowa, 48; *Wing v. Wing*, 66 Maine, 62; *Allen v. Hillman*, 12 Pick. 101; *Dunnell v. Fiske*, 11 Met. 551; *Edgerly v. Swain*, 32 N. H. 478; *Harrington v. Miles*, 11 Kans. 480; *Hume v. Arrasmith*, 1 Bibb, 165; *Hawn v. Smith*, 4 B. Mon. 85; *Tillman v. Willis*, 61 Ga. 433; *Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 11 Heisk. 757; *Stern v. Katz*, 38 Wis. 136; *Fibber v. Daubermann*, 28 Wis. 134; *Dickey v. Andros*, 32 Vt. 55; *Gorham v. Ives*, 2 Wend. 534; *Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co.*, 1 Mo. App. 565; s. c. 65 Mo. 539; *Hall v. Adkins*, 59 Mo. 144; *Stitzell v. Reynolds*, 67 Penn. St. 54; s. c. 59 Penn. 488; *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338; *Wheatley v. Wallis*, 3 Har. & J. 1; *McCurry v. McCurry*, 82 N. Car. 296. To charge one with stealing under circumstances included in the charge or obvious to all the hearers (*Hayes v. Ball*, 72 N. Y. 418) such as to show that a felony could not in law have been committed is not actionable *per se*. *Wing v. Wing*, 66 Maine, 62 (on demurrer); *Allen v. Hillman*, 12 Pick. 101; *Dunnell v. Fiske*, 11 Met. 551; *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338; *Stitzell v. Reynolds*, 67 Penn. St. 54; s. c.

59 Penn. St. 488; *Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co.*, 1 Mo. App. 565; s. c. 65 Mo. 539; *Hall v. Adkins*, 59 Mo. 144; *Hayes v. Ball*, 72 N. Y. 418; *Fawsett v. Clark*, 48 Md. 494; *McCaleb v. Smith*, 22 Iowa, 242; *Brite v. Gill*, 2 T. B. Mon. 65. But see *Tillman v. Willis*, 61 Ga. 433, where a direct charge of theft with circumstances stated which showed that larceny could not be committed was deemed (being false) actionable *per se*, except perhaps where the charge imputed theft to the plaintiff *because* he had done the particular thing. A written charge even of the latter kind however would be libel, and therefore actionable *per se*. Further than this the case would not probably be elsewhere accepted except of course as to the qualifying part of it. In one of the cases above cited it was indeed laid down that the mere fact that the charge *probably* related to that of which larceny could not be committed would not excuse the defendant if an actual charge of theft in terms had been made. *Stern v. Katz*, 38 Wis. 136. It was however considered that if the facts showed that larceny could not have been committed and the language related in terms to such facts the plaintiff could not recover as upon words actionable *per se*. In another case it was held that defamatory words imputing to unlearned bystanders a crime were actionable though in law the words did not impute it. *Kennedy v. Gifford*, 19 Wend. 296. See *Palmer v. Anderson*, 33 Ala. 78; *Carter v. Andrews*, 16 Pick. 1; *Phillips v. Barber*, 7 Wend. 439. This clearly is as much as



remove growing timber is a trespass only, not a larceny. But Holt, C.J., gave judgment for the plaintiff. *Baker v. Pierce*, 6 Mod. 234 ; 2 Salk. 695 ; Holt, 654 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 959. Overruling *Mason v. Thompson*, Hutt, 38.

"Thou hast stolen our bees, and thou art a thief." After verdict it was contended that larceny cannot be committed of bees, unless they be hived ; but the Court held that the subsequent words "thou art a thief" showed that the larceny imputed was of such bees as could be stolen. *Tibbs v. Smith*, 3 Salk. 325 ; Sir Thos. Raym. 33. *Minors v. Leeford*, Cro. Jac. 114.

So a charge of being "privy and consenting to" a larceny is actionable. *Mot et ux. v. Butler*, Cro. Car. 236.

"He is a pickpocket ; he picked my pocket of my money," was once held an insufficient charge of larceny. *Watts v. Rymes*, 2 Lev. 51 ; 1 Ventr. 213 ; 3 Salk. 325.

But now this would clearly be held sufficient. *Baker v. Pierce*, *supra*. *Stebbing v. Warner*, 11 Mod. 255.

\* *Receiving Stolen Goods.*

\* 123

To say "I have been robbed of three dozen winches ; you bought two, one at 3s., one at 2s. ; you knew well when you bought them that they cost me three times as much making as you gave for them, and that they could not have been honestly come by," is a sufficient charge of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been *stolen*.

[An indictment which merely alleged that the prisoner knew the goods were not honestly come by would be bad. *R. v. Wilson*, 2 Mood. C. C. 52.] *Alfred v. Farlow*, 8 Q. B. 854 ; 15 L. J. Q. B. 258 ; 10 Jur. 714 ; *Clarke's Case de Dorchester*, 2 Rolle's Rep. 136 ; *King v. Bagg*, Cro. Jac. 331.

*Bigamy.*

Mrs. Heming was sister to Mr. Alleyne. The defendant said :— "It has been ascertained beyond all doubt that Mr. Alleyne and Mrs. Heming are not brother and sister, but man and wife." Held that it was open to the jury to construe this as a charge of bigamy, as well as of incest. *Heming and wife v. Power*, 10 M. & W. 564.

can be said, so far as authority is concerned, though there is good sense in it. Thus then to charge theft of the common property upon a known co-tenant is held not actionable *per se* ; there could not be larceny in such a case. *Carter v. Andrew*, 16 Pick. 1 ; *Stone v. Clark*, 21 Pick. 51, 53 ; *Rodgers v. Rodgers*, 11 Heisk. 757. So of charging a person with stealing windows from a house. *Wing v. Wing*, 66 Maine, 62. Or with robbing a town. *McCarty v. Barrett*, 12 Minn. 494. But the fact that the person charged could not be punished is no excuse. *Stewart v. Howe*, 17 Ill. 71. Evidence of a charge of deception and fraud will not support an allegation of a charge of larceny. *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338. To charge one with belonging to a "gang of thieves," or with "always keeping a set of thieves about him to steal for him" however is actionable *per se*. *Porter v. Choen*, 60 Ind. 338. On the

other hand it is held by the same court that the words "I have seen women steal yarn before" are not actionable *per se* without a colloquium or its equivalent. *Hart v. Coy*, 40 Ind. 553. It is not necessary to charge a particular theft. *McNamara v. Shannon*, 8 Bush, 557 ; *Hogg v. Wilson*, 1 Nott & M. 216 ; *Fisher v. Rottereau*, 2 McCord, 189. And a charge of larceny in law is of course to be taken as *prima facie* defamatory. *Hayes v. Ball*, 72 N. Y. 418 ; *Philips v. Barber*, 7 Wend. 439. It may however be so explained as to show that it was not intended or understood in a defamatory sense. *Quinn v. O'Gara*, 2 E. D. Smith, 388 ; *Ayres v. Grider*, 15 Ill. 37 ; *McKee v. Ingalls*, 5 Ill. 30. That the charge is of the theft of something of small value appears to be immaterial on the question of liability. See *Redway v. Gray*, 31 Vt. 292.

*Perjury.*

"You are forsworn" without more, is insufficient. (*a*) *Stanhope v. Blith* (1585), 4 Rep. 15; *Holt v. Scholefield*, 6 T. R. 691; *Hall v. Weedon*, 8 D. & R. 140.

But to say they "did not scruple to turn affidavit-men," is sufficient. *Roach v. Reed and Huggonson* (1742), 2 Atk. 469; 2 Dick. 794.

(*a*) To impute the crime of perjury the offence must in this country as well as in England be charged in the legal sense. It is not enough for example to say "You swore a lie;" that alone does not charge perjury in contemplation of law. *Kimmis v. Stiles*, 44 Vt. 351; *Hutts v. Hutts*, 62 Ind. 21; *Dorsett v. Adams*, 50 Ind. 129; *Cummins v. Butler*, 3 Blackf. 190; *Shinloub v. Ammernan*, 7 Ind. 347; *Barger v. Barger*, 18 Penn. St. 489; *Knight v. Sharp*, 24 Ark. 602; *Horn v. Foster*, 19 Ark. 346; *Small v. Clewley*, 60 Maine, 262; *Patterson v. Wilkinson*, 55 Maine, 42; *Emery v. Prescott*, 54 Maine, 389; *Robertson v. Lea*, 1 Stewt. 141; *Shroyer v. Miller*, 3 W. Va. 158; *Hogan v. Wilmoreth*, 16 Gratt. 82; *McAnally v. Williams*, 3 Sneed, 26; *Ward v. Clark*, 2 Johns. 10; *Stafford v. Green*, 1 Johns. 505; *Muchler v. Mulhollin*, Hill & D. 263; *Dayton v. Rockwell*, 11 Wend. 140; *Lewis v. Soule*, 3 Mich. 514. See however *Brace v. Brink*, 33 Mich. 91; *Rue v. Mitchell*, 2 Dall. 58. Nor is it enough to say "You swore a false oath against me in Squire Jamison's court." *Ward v. Clark*, *supra*. But see *Brown v. Hanson*, 53 Ga. 632. That is, such words alone are not sufficient to constitute an imputation of perjury. With suitable averments however they and even the first-mentioned words may be made sufficient. *Cannon v. Phillips*, 2 Sneed, 185; *Ward v. Clark*, *supra*; *Spooner v. Keeler*, 51 N. Y. 527; *McClaghry v. Wetmore*, 6 Johns. 82; *Mower v. Watson*, 11 Vt. 536; *Cole v. Grant*, 18 N. J. 327.

In those cases in which perjury in terms is charged, as "You have committed perjury," or in which by reasonable interpretation perjury in contemplation of law is charged, as "You swore falsely on the trial of A. B., and you knew you did," it is only necessary for the plaintiff to allege the publication of the words to make out a *prima facie* case; he need not allege the jurisdiction of the court even when an inferior tribunal, or the materiality of the

evidence. Perjury in the legal sense implies both. *Power v. Price*, 16 Wend. 500; *Coons v. Robinson*, 3 Barb. 625; *Hopkins v. Smith*, *ib.* 599; *Jacobs v. Fyler*, 3 Hill, 572; *Bullock v. Koon*, 9 Cowen, 30; *Spooner v. Keeler*, 51 N. Y. 527; *Niven v. Munn*, 13 Johns. 48; *Dalrymple v. Lofton*, 2 McMull. 112; *Pugh v. Neal*, 4 Jones, 367; *Hall v. Montgomery*, 8 Ala. 510. See *Cass v. Anderson*, 33 Vt. 182; *Cummins v. Smith*, 2 Serg. & R. 440; *Whitell v. Lennon*, 13 Ind. 535; *Dorsett v. Adams*, 50 Ind. 129; *Wilson v. Harding*, 2 Blackf. 241; *Canterbury v. Hill*, 4 Stewt. & P. 224; *Harris v. Purdy*, 1 Stewt. 231; *Crookshank v. Gray*, 20 Johns. 344; *Jones v. Marr*, 11 Humph. 214; *Sharpe v. White*, 2 Humph. 434. Where however the words of themselves do not constitute a charge of perjury in law the plaintiff must aver and prove such facts as make them constitute perjury (unless he can prove special damage); and this will perhaps require him to allege and prove that the words were spoken in the course of the trial of a cause (as before the grand jury) pending in a court of competent jurisdiction. *Dorsett v. Adams*, 50 Ind. 129; *Cannon v. Phillips*, 2 Sneed, 185. *Secus* by statute in Illinois. *Harbison v. Shook*, 41 Ill. 141; *Sanford v. Gaddis*, 13 Ill. 329; *Wolbrecht v. Baumgarten*, 26 Ill. 291. In reality the burden rests always upon the plaintiff of showing jurisdiction and materiality, since these are necessary to constitute perjury, but he sustains that burden by proving a charge of perjury. And perhaps it will be enough even in other cases to prove that the words were spoken of a cause in a judicial tribunal, for then it may reasonably be presumed *prima facie* that the court had jurisdiction though it be an inferior tribunal. See *Niven v. Munn*, 13 Johns. 48; *Dalrymple v. Lofton*, 2 McMull. 112; *Harris v. Purdy*, 1 Stewt. 231. It appears at all events to be unnecessary in such cases as those just mentioned (where special averments are required) to allege that the evidence given

"Thou art forsworn in a court of record, and that I will prove!" was held sufficient; though it was argued after verdict that he might only have been talking in the

was material, even though the trial was before an inferior court. The fact that evidence given in court is generally material is enough to raise a presumption that it was material in the particular case. *Spooner v. Keeler*, 51 N. Y. 527; *Dorsett v. Adams*, 50 Ind. 129; *Whitsell v. Lennon*, 13 Ind. 535; *Wilson v. Harding*, 2 Blackf. 241. But see *Ross v. Rouse*, 1 Wend. 475. The presumption of materiality may however be overcome by the defendant. *Horn v. Foster*, 19 Ark. 340. This is implied if not stated in all of the cases. So too in regard to the presumption that the words were spoken in a court of competent jurisdiction where the words charge perjury in terms or in legal contemplation. *Hamm v. Wickline*, 26 Ohio St. 81. So also it may be shown that the oath was illegally imposed. *Burkett v. McCarty*, 10 Bush, 758. Or that the tribunal was not one possessed of judicial functions. *Pegram v. Stoltz*, 76 N. Car. 349; *Dalton v. Higgins*, 34 Ga. 433; *Hall v. Montgomery*, 8 Ala. 510. A distinction has sometimes been taken between a general charge of perjury and a charge of perjury as to a particular fact; the plaintiff being thought bound in a case of the latter kind to prove expressly the materiality of the statement. *Power v. Price*, 12 Wend. 500; *Cannon v. Phillips*, 2 Sneed, 185. But the distinction is not well founded. *Power v. Price*, 16 Wend. 450. The question of the materiality of the evidence, it may be noticed, is a question of law. *Ib.* Of course even the word "perjury" or its legal equivalent may be shown to have been used in a non-actionable way. *Pugh v. McCarty*, 40 Ga. 444.

With regard to justifications of the truth of the charge it has sometimes been held that inasmuch as the defendant now declares that his charge is true he must as in the case of an indictment prove all facts necessary to make out a case of perjury in the legal sense; a judicial proceeding, an oath administered, materiality of the evidence and its falsity. *Hopkins v. Smith*, 3 Barb. 599. See *Downey v. Dillon*, 52 Ind. 442, 449; *Mull v. McKnight*,

67 Ind. 535, 538; *McGough v. Rhodes*, 12 Ark. 625; *Bullock v. Koon*, 9 Cowen, 30. The sufficient answer to this is that the plaintiff has himself already proved all of that except of course the falsity of the evidence. If the words are actionable of themselves, that is, if standing alone they impute perjury in law, it is shown *prima facie*, as we have seen, that they were spoken (on oath) before a court of competent jurisdiction and were material; and if the words were not actionable *per se* the plaintiff must have expressly averred and proved *aliunde* all the facts necessary to make the charge one of perjury in the legal sense. It cannot be necessary for the defendant to go over the ground again in either of these cases. It is enough for him to show that the charge was true; that is, that those words which the plaintiff has already shown to have been sworn before a court in the manner stated *supra* were true. All that remains therefore for the defendant to prove is that the evidence in question was corruptly given, *i.e.* with knowledge of its falsity. *Comp. Chandler v. Robison*, 7 Ired. 480; *Sloan v. Gilbert*, 12 Bush, 51; *Spooner v. Keeler*, 51 N. Y. 527. In *Hopkins v. Smith*, 3 Barb. 599, it is held unnecessary to prove that the evidence was known to be false; to prove it false was thought enough. *Sed quare*. There is no proper analogy between the situation of a defendant justifying a charge of perjury and the State prosecuting the person charged. The State must prove everything necessary to constitute perjury, because the facts have not yet appeared to the court. Whether the defendant in justifying must establish the truth beyond a reasonable doubt, as he is required to do by some of the courts (*Hutts v. Hutts*, 62 Ind. 214; *contra*, *Sloan v. Gilbert*, 12 Bush, 51), is another question altogether; concerning which, see *post*, p. 178, note.

A justice of the peace may have an action of slander for being charged with perjury in deciding a case before him. *Gove v. Blethen*, 21 Minn. 80. And it cannot be necessary for him to allege his own jurisdiction in the cause where the charge amounts to perjury in law.

court-house and so forsworn himself; but the Court held that the words would naturally mean forsworn while giving evidence in some judicial proceeding in a court of record. *Ceely v. Hoskins*, Cro. Car. 509.

*False Pretences.*

The words "He has defrauded a mealman of a roan horse," held not to imply a criminal act of fraud; as it is not stated that the mealman was induced to part with his property by means of any false pretence. *Richardson v. Allen*, 2 Chit. 657.

*Attempt to Commit a Felony.*

The following words were held sufficient:—

"He sought to murder me and I can prove it." *Preston v. Pinder*, Cro. Eliz. 308.

"She would have cut her husband's throat and did attempt it." *Scot et ux. v. Hilliar*, Lane, 98; 1 Vin. Abr. 440.

\* 124 \* The following insufficient:—

"Thou wouldst have killed me." *Dr. Poe's Case*, cited in *Murrey's Case*, 2 Buls. 206; 1 Vin. Abr. 440.

"Sir Harbert Croft keepeth men to rob me." *Sir Harbert Croft v. Brown*, 3 Buls. 167.

"He would have robbed me." *Stoner v. Audely*, Cro. Eliz. 250.

For here no overt act is charged, and mere intention is not criminal.

Other instances of a criminal charge indirectly made will be found in *Snell v. Webbing*, 2 Lev. 150; 1 Vent. 276; *Clerk v. Dyer*, 8 Mod. 290; *Woolnoth v. Meadows*, 5 East, 463; 2 Smith, 28.

Where words clearly refer to the plaintiff's office and his conduct therein, or otherwise clearly touch and injure him therein, it is unnecessary that the defendant should expressly name his office or restrict his words thereto; it shall be intended that he was speaking of him in the way of his office or trade.

*Illustrations.*

To say of a clerk, "He cozened his master" is actionable, though the defendant did not expressly state that the cozening was done in the execution of the clerk's official duties; that will be intended. *Reignald's Case* (1640), Cro. Car. 563; *Reeve v. Holgate* (1672), 2 Lev. 62.

To say of a trader, "he has been arrested for debt" is actionable, though no express reference be made to his trade at the time of publication; for such words must necessarily affect his credit in his trade. *Jones v. Littler*, 7 M. & W. 423; 10 L. J. Ex. 171.

It is not necessary that the defendant should in so many words expressly state the plaintiff has committed a particular crime. So, where a charge is made against a trader, it need not be conveyed in positive and direct language. Any words which distinctly assume or imply the plaintiff's guilt, or raise a strong

suspicion of it in the minds of the hearers, are sufficient. But words merely imputing to the plaintiff a criminal intention or \* design are not actionable, so long as no criminal act \* 125 is directly or indirectly assigned. So, too, words of mere suspicion, not amounting to a charge of felony, are not actionable.

### *Illustrations.*

The following words have been held to convey an imputation with sufficient certainty and precision :—

“I believe all is not well with Daniel Vivian; there be many merchants who have lately failed, and I expect no otherwise of Daniel Vivian;” for this is a charge of present pecuniary embarrassment. *Vivian v. Willet*, 3 Salk. 326; Sir Thos. Raym. 207.

“Two dyers are gone off, and for aught I know Harrison will be so too within this twelvemonth.” *Harrison v. Thornborough*, 10 Mod. 196; Gilb. Cas. 114.

“He has become so inflated with self-importance by the few hundreds made in my service—God only knows whether honestly or otherwise;” for this is an insinuation of embezzlement. *Clegg v. Laffer*, 3 Moore & Sc. 727; 10 Bing. 250.

“I think in my conscience if Sir John might have his will, he would kill the king;” for this is a charge of compassing the king's death. *Sidnam v. Mayo*, 1 Roll. Rep. 427; Cro. Jac. 407; *Peake v. Oldham*, Cowp. 275; 2 Wm. Bl. 959, *ante*, p. 121.

To state that criminal proceedings are about to be taken against the plaintiff (*e.g.* that the Attorney-General had directed a certain attorney to prosecute him for perjury), is actionable, although the speaker does not expressly assert that the plaintiff is guilty of the charge. *Roberts v. Camden*, 9 East, 93; *Tempest v. Chambers*, 1 Stark. 67; *Bell v. Byrne*, 13 East, 554; *Contra Harrison v. King*, 4 Price, 46; 7 Taunt. 431; 1 B. & Ald. 161.

So where the defendant on hearing that his barns were burnt down, said, “I cannot imagine who it should be but the Lord Sturton.” *Lord Sturton v. Chaffin* (1563), Moore, 142.

But where the defendant said, “I have a suspicion that you and B. have robbed my house, and therefore I take you into custody,” the jury found that the words did not amount to a direct charge of felony, but only indicated what was passing in defendant's mind. *Tozer v. Mashford*, 6 Ex. 539; 20 L. J. Ex. 225; *Williams v. Gardiner*, 1 M. & W. 245; 1 Tyr. & Gr. 578.

No action lies for such words as “Thou deservest to be hanged,” for here no fact is asserted against the plaintiff. *Hake v. Molton*, Roll. Abr. 43; *Cockaine v. Hopkins*, 2 Lev. 214.

But it is actionable to say:—“I am of opinion that such a Privy Councillor \* is a traitor;” or “I think such a judge is corrupt.” Per Wyndham and Seroggs, \* 126 JJ., and North, C.J., in *Lord Townshend v. Dr. Hughes*, 2 Mod. 166.

So too if the charge incidentally slips into a conversation on another matter, an action lies; as where the defendant said:—“Mr. Wingfield, you never thought well of me since Graves did steal my lamb;” and it was held that Graves could sue. *Graves' Case*, Cro. Eliz. 289.

Or, “I dealt not so unkindly with you, when you stole my sack of corn.” *Cooper v. Hawkeswell*, 2 Mod. 58.

A libellous charge may be insinuated in a question: *e.g.*, “We should be glad to know how many popish priests enter the nunneries at Scorton and Darlington each week ?

and also how many infants are born in them every year, and what becomes of them? whether the holy fathers bring them up or not, or whether the innocents are murdered out of hand or not." Alderson, B., directed the jury that if they thought the defendant by asking the question meant to *assert* the facts insinuated, the passage was a libel. *R. v. Gathercole*, 2 Lew. C. C. 255.

So a slander may be conveyed in a question and answer or in a series of questions and answers. *Gainford v. Tuke* (1620), Cro. Jac. 536; *Haywood v. Nayler* (1636), 1 Roll. Abr. 50; *Ward v. Reynolds* (1714), cited Cowp. 278.

A libellous charge may be sufficiently conveyed by a mere adjective.

"Thou art a leprous knave." *Taylor v. Perkins*, Cro. Jac. 144; 1 Roll. Abr. 44.

"He is a bankrupt knave," spoken of a trader. *Squire v. Johns*, Cro. Jac. 585.

"Thou art a broken fellow." Anon., Holt, 652.

"He is perjured," or "mainsworn." *Croford v. Blisse*, 2 Buls. 150.

"A libellous journalist," a phrase which will be taken to mean that the plaintiff *habitually* publishes libels in his paper, not that he *once* published *one* libel merely. *Wakley v. Cooke and Healey*, 4 Exch. 511; 19 L. J. Ex. 91.

So, if the plaintiff is obviously only repeating gossip, not asserting the charge as a fact within his own knowledge.

"I heard you had run away" (*sc.* from your creditors). *Davis v. Lewis*, 7 T. R. 17.

\* 127 \* "Thou art a sheep-stealing rogue, and Farmer Parker told me so." *Gardiner v. Atwater, Sayer*, 265.

"One told me that he heard say that Mistress Meggs had poisoned her first husband." *Meggs v. Griffith (vel Griffin)*, Cro. Eliz. 400; Moore, 408; *Read's Case*, Cro. Eliz. 645.

"Did you not hear that C. is guilty of treason." *Per cur.* in *Earl of Northampton's Case*, 12 Rep. 134.

## 2. Certainty as to the Person Defamed.

The defamatory words must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that person must be the plaintiff.

If the words used really contain no reflection on any particular individual, no averment or innuendo can make them defamatory.

### Illustrations.

"Suppose the words to be 'a murder was committed in A.'s house last night;' no introduction can warrant the innuendo 'meaning that B. committed the said murder;' nor would it be helped by the finding of the jury for the plaintiff. For the Court must see that the words do not and cannot mean it, and would arrest the judgment accordingly. *Id certum est, quod certum reddi potest.*" *Per Lord Denman, C.J., in Solomon v. Lawson*, 8 Q. B. 837; 15 L. J. Q. B. 257; 10 Jur. 796.

"If a man wrote that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him, unless there is something to point to the particular individual." *Per Willes, J., in Eastwood v. Holmes*, 1 F. & F. 349.

To assert that an acceptance is a forgery is no libel on the drawer, unless it somehow

appear that it was he who was charged with forging it. *Stockley v. Clement*, 4 Bing. 162; 12 Moore, 376.

The defendant in a speech commented severely on the discipline of the Roman Catholic church, and the degrading punishments imposed on penitents. He read from a paper an account given by three policemen of the severe penance imposed on a poor Irishman. It appeared incidentally from this report that the Irishman had told the policemen that his priest would not administer the Sacrament to him till the penance was performed. The plaintiff averred that he was the Irishman's priest, but it did not appear how enjoining such a penance on an Irishman would affect the character of a Roman Catholic priest. The alleged libel was in no other way connected with the plaintiff. *Held* no libel, and no slander, of the plaintiff. *Hearne v. Stowell*, 12 A. & E. 719; 6 Jur. 458; 4 P. & D. 696.

\* Though the words used may at first sight appear only \* 128 to apply to a class of individuals, and not to be specially defamatory of any particular member of that class, still an action may be maintained by any one individual of that class who can satisfy the jury that the words referred especially to himself. The words must be capable of bearing such special application, or the judge should stop the case. And there must be an averment in the Statement of Claim, that the words were spoken of the plaintiff. The plaintiff may also aver extraneous facts, if any, showing that he was the person expressly referred to.

Formerly it was absolutely necessary, as we have seen, to overload the pleadings with averments, such as, that the defendant was talking to J. S. about the plaintiff and about the plaintiff's conduct in and about a certain matter; and that in the course of such conversation he spoke of and concerning the plaintiff, and of and concerning the said matter, the words following — that is to say, &c. A great many other details had to be formally set out in order to support the subsequent brief innuendo, "he (meaning the plaintiff)." And then, too, the introductory averments had to be properly connected with the innuendo; or their presence was of no avail.<sup>1</sup> But now all such pitfalls are removed by Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 61. No such averments are any longer necessary; the innuendo alone is sufficient. "The old decisions which support the argument that an innuendo cannot be allowed to make persons certain who were uncertain before, are not now sustainable."<sup>2</sup> And the decision of the jury on the point is final. After a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant can no longer argue that it does not sufficiently appear to whom the words relate.

And this is no breach of the rule that the office of the innuendo is to

<sup>1</sup> *Clement v. Fisher*, 7 B. & C. 459; 1 M. & R. 281.

<sup>2</sup> Per Coltman, J., in *Turner v. Meryweather*, 7 C. B. 251; 18 L. J. C. P. 155; 13 Jur. 683; and in error, 19 L. J. C. P. 10.

explain and not to extend the sense of the defamatory matter. For  
 \* 129 here the innuendo does not extend \*the meaning, it only points  
 out the particular individual to whom the matter in itself defamatory  
 does in fact apply.

So, if the words spoken or written, though plain in themselves, apply equally well to more persons than one, evidence may be given both of the cause and occasion of publication, and of all the surrounding circumstances affecting the relation between the parties, and also of any statement or declaration made by the defendant as to the person referred to. The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or those acquainted with the circumstances, to state that on reading the libel they at once concluded that it was aimed at the plaintiff.<sup>1</sup> If the application to a particular individual can be generally perceived, the publication is a libel on him, however general its language may be. "Whether a man is called by one name, or whether he is called by another, or whether he is described by a pretended description of a class to which he is known to belong, if those who look on know well who is aimed at, the very same injury is inflicted, the very same thing is in fact done, as would be done if his name and Christian name were ten times repeated."<sup>2</sup>

Where the libel consists of an effigy, picture, or caricature, care should be taken to show by proper innuendoes and averments, the libellous nature of the representation and its especial reference to the plaintiff. It is often in such cases difficult for the plaintiff to prove that he is the person caricatured.

### *Illustrations.*

Words complained of: — "We would exhort the medical officers to avoid the traps set for them by desperate adventurers, (innuendo, thereby meaning the plaintiff among others,) who, participating in their efforts, would inevitably cover them with  
 \* 130 ridicule and disrepute." The jury \*found that the words were intended to apply to the plaintiff. Judgment accordingly for the plaintiff. *Wakley v. Healey*, 7 C. B. 591; 18 L. J. C. P. 241.

A newspaper article imputed that "in some of the Irish factories" cruelties were practised upon the workpeople. Innuendo "in the factory of the plaintiffs" who were manufacturers. The jury were satisfied that the newspaper was referring especially to the plaintiffs' factory, and found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the House of Lords held the declaration good. *Le Fanu and another v. Malcolmson*, 1 H. L. C. 637; 13 L. T. 61; 8 Ir. L. R. 418.

If asterisks be put instead of the name of the party libelled, it is sufficient that those

<sup>1</sup> *Bourke v. Warren*, 2 C. & P. 307; *Broome v. Gosden*, 1 C. B. 728.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in *Le Fanu and another v. Malcolmson*, 1 H. L. C. 668.



who know the plaintiff should be able to gather from the libel that he is the person meant; it is not necessary that all the world should understand it, so long as the meaning of the paragraph is clear to the plaintiff's acquaintances. *Bourke v. Warren*, 2 C. & P. 307.

Some libellous verses were written about "L—y, the Bum;" the Court was satisfied in spite of the finding of the jury that the words related to the plaintiff, a sheriff's officer. *Levi v. Milne*, 4 Bing. 195; 12 Moore, 418.

"All the libellers of the kingdom know now that printing initial letters will not serve the turn, for that objection has been long got over." Per Ld. Hardwicke in *Roach v. Read and Huggonson* (1742), 2 Atk. 470; 2 Dick. 794.

There appeared in *Mist's Weekly Journal* an account professedly of certain intrigues, &c. at the Persian Court, really, at the English. The late King George I. was described under the name of "Merewits," George II. appeared as "Esreff," the Queen as "Sultana," whilst a most engaging portrait was drawn of the Pretender under the name of "Sophi." It was objected on behalf of the prisoner that there was no evidence that the author intended his seemingly harmless tale to be thus interpreted and applied: but the Court held that they must give it the same meaning as the generality of readers would undoubtedly put upon it. *R. v. Clerk* (1729), 1 Barnard, 304.

If the defendant says "A. or B." committed such a felony, both A. and B., or either of them can sue, for both are brought into suspicion. *Anon.*, 1 Roll. Abr. 81.

In *Falkner v. Cooper* (1678), Carter, 55, the Court was divided on this point. "You or Harrison hired one Bell to forswear himself." Harrison can sue. *Harrison v. Thornborough*, 10 Mod. 196; Gilb. Cas. in Law and Eq. 114.

If a man says "My brother," or "my enemy," is perjured, and hath only one brother or one enemy, such brother or enemy can sue; but if he says "One of my brothers is perjured," and he hath several brothers, no one of them can sue [without special circumstances to shew to which one he referred]. *Jones v. Davers*, Cro. Eliz. 497; 1 Roll. Abr. 74; *Wiseman v. Wiseman*, Cro. Jac. 107.

\* So if a man says to the plaintiff's servant, "Thy master Brown hath \* 131 robbed me," Brown can sue; for it shall not be intended that the person addressed had more than one master of the name of Brown. So if the defendant had said, "Thy master," *simpliciter*; or to a son, "Thy father," to a wife, "Thy husband." Per Houghton, J., in *Lewes v. Walter* (1617), 3 Bulstr. 226; *Brown v. Low or Lane*, Cro. Jac. 443; 1 Roll. Abr. 79; *Waldegrave v. Agas*, Cro. Eliz. 191.

But if the defendant said to a master, "One of thy servants hath robbed me," in the absence of special circumstances no one could sue; for it is not apparent who is the person slandered. So where a party in a cause said to three men who had just given evidence against him: "One of you three is perjured," no action lies. *Sir John Bourn's Case*, cited Cro. Eliz. 497.

Where the defendant said to his companion B.:—"He that goeth before thee is perjured," the plaintiff can sue, if he aver and prove that he was at that moment walking before B. *Aish v. Gerish*, 1 Roll. Abr. 81.

A libel was published on a "diabolical character," who, "like Polyphemus, the man-eater, has but one eye, and is well known to all persons acquainted with the name of a certain noble circumnavigator." The plaintiff had but one eye, and his name was I'Anson; so it was clear that he was the person referred to. *I'Anson v. Stuart*, 1 T. R. 748; 2 Smith's Lg. Cas. (6th ed.), 57, [omitted in 7th and 8th eds.]; *Fleetwood v. Curl*, Cro. Jac. 557; Hob. 268.

Words defamatory of A. may in some cases be also indirectly defamatory of B.

*Illustrations.*

Where a married man was called "cuckold" in the City of London, his wife could sue; for it was tantamount to calling her "whore." *Vicars v. Worth*, 1 Stra. 471; *Hodgkins et ux. v. Corbet et ux.*, 1 Stra. 545.

Slander addressed to the plaintiff's wife:—"You are a nuisance to live beside of. You are a bawd; and your house is no better than a bawdy-house." *Held* that the plaintiff could maintain the action without joining his wife, and without proving special damage; because if in fact his wife did keep a bawdy-house, the plaintiff could be indicted for it. *Huckle v. Reynolds*, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 114.

Where the words *prima facie* apply only to a *thing*, and  
 \* 132 not to a person, still if the owner of the thing can \* show  
 that the words substantially reflect upon him, he may sue,  
 without giving proof of special damage and without proving  
 express malice.

*Illustration.*

To write and publish that plaintiff's ship is unseaworthy and has been sold to the Jews to carry convicts, is a libel upon the plaintiff in the way of his business, as well as upon his ship. *Ingram v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326; 8 Scott, 471; *Solomon v. Lawson*, 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796, and other cases cited, *ante*, pp. 32-34.

SCANDALUM MAGNATUM.

BY virtue of certain ancient statutes, words which would not be actionable, if spoken of an ordinary subject, are actionable, if spoken of a peer of the realm, or of a judge, of any of the great officers of the Crown, even without proof of any special damage. (*a*)

It has been maintained that this privilege existed at the common law, independently of any statute ; and passages are generally cited from Reports in support of this opinion. But in the passages relied on, Lord Coke appears to me to be referring to criminal, and not to civil proceedings. And such a distinction between nobles and commoners appears to me alien to the spirit of our common law.

The following are the statutes referred to : — “ Forasmuch as there have been oftentimes found in the country devisors of tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord, hath many times arisen between the King and his people, or great men of this realm ; for the damage that hath and may thereof ensue ; it is commanded, that from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish any false news or tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander, may grow between the King and his people, or the great men of the realm ; and he that doth so, shall be taken and kept in prison, until he hath brought him into the court, which was the first author of the tale.” <sup>1</sup>

\* “ Item, of devisors of false news, and of horrible and \* 134 false lyes, of prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other nobles and great men of the realm, and also of the chancellor, treasurer, clerk of the privy seal, steward of the King’s house, justices of the one bench or of the other, and of other great officers of the realm, of things which by the said prelates, lords, nobles and officers aforesaid, were never spoken, done, nor

<sup>1</sup> 3 Edw. I. Stat. Westminster I. c. 34.

(*a*) Apart from treasonable language is no law of this kind in the United States.

thought, in great slander of the said prelates, lords, nobles, and officers, whereby debates and discords might arise betwixt the said lords, or between the lords and the commons, which God forbid, and whereof great peril and mischief might come to all the realm, and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm, if due remedy be not provided: It is straitly defended upon grievous pain, for to eschew the said damages and perils, that from henceforth none be so hardy to devise, speak, or to tell any false news, lyes, or such other false things, of prelates, lords, and of other aforesaid, whereof discord or any slander might rise within the same realm; and he that doth the same shall incur and have the pain another time ordained thereof by the Statute of Westminster the First, which will, that he be taken and imprisoned till he have found him of whom the word was moved.”<sup>1</sup>

“Item, whereas it is contained, as well in the Statute of Westminster the First, as in the statute made at Gloucester, the second year of the reign of our lord the King that now is, that none be so hardy to invent, to say, or to tell any false news, lies, or such other false things, of the prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other nobles and great men of the realm, and also of the chancellor, treasurer, clerk of the privy seal, the steward of the King’s house, the justice of the one bench or of the other, and other

\* 135 great officers of the realm, and he that \* doth so shall be taken and imprisoned, till he hath found him of whom the speech shall be moved: It is accorded and agreed in this Parliament, that when any such is taken and imprisoned, and cannot find him by whom the speech be moved, as before is said, that he be punished by the advice of the council, notwithstanding the said statutes.”<sup>2</sup>

Although by these statutes no *civil* remedy is expressly given, yet the violation of these provisions entitles the great men of the realm to sue for damages, on the well-known principle, that if A. does an act expressly prohibited by statute, whereby B. is prejudiced, A. must compensate B. for such private injury. A. will also be liable to imprisonment for contempt on the information of the Attorney-General.

All peers, whether of Great Britain or of Scotland,<sup>3</sup> are within the statute; including a viscount, though such a title of honor

<sup>1</sup> 2 Rich. II. St. I. c. 5.

<sup>2</sup> 12 Rich. II. c. 11.

<sup>3</sup> 5 Anne, c. 8, s. 23.

was unknown when the statute was passed.<sup>1</sup> The King himself is within the 3 Edw. I. c. 34 ;<sup>2</sup> but not within 2 Rich. II. st. 1, c. 5, not being "a great man" of his own realm.<sup>3</sup> A peeress is not within either statute.<sup>4</sup> A baron of the Exchequer (and now any judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature) is within the statutes. Of course the rank or dignity which entitles the plaintiff to sue in *Scandalum Magnatum* must have been attained before the words complained of were published.

Although the words of the statute are "horrible and false lies," yet they have been strained to cover words which in no way affect the life or dignity of the peer, but which are merely uncivil expressions, expressing general disesteem for his lordship. For it is alleged that such expressions, though not likely to result in general discord, and the "quick subversion of the \* realm," yet impugn and vilify the honor of the nobles, and \* 136 tend to provoke to a breach of the peace.<sup>5</sup> The words also were supposed to echo through the kingdom, being spoken of a peer of the realm ; and the plaintiff, therefore, had this further privilege that he could lay the venue where he pleased, and was not bound like an ordinary plaintiff to try in the county where the words were spoken.

### *Illustration.*

Words complained of : — "I value my Lord Marquess of Dorchester no more than I value the dog at my foot." Held that the action was well laid in *Scandalum Magnatum*, the plaintiff being a Marquess. But a private person would have had no action for such words without proof of special damage, as they merely show the esteem in which the defendant held him. *Proby v. Marquess of Dorchester* (in error), 1 Levinz, 148 ; *Lord Falkland v. Phipps*, 2 Comyns, 439 ; 1 Vin. Abr. 549.

But the civil proceeding under these statutes is now quite obsolete. This may be, as alleged in *Russell on Crimes*,<sup>6</sup> because the nobility prefer "to waive their privileges in any action of slander, and to stand upon the same footing, with respect to civil remedies, as their fellow subjects." Or it may possibly be due to the decision in *Lord Peterborough v. Williams*,<sup>7</sup> that in *scandalum magnatum* no costs are to be given to the plaintiff, though the verdict be for him. I believe no such action has been brought since 1710.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Viscount Say & Seal *v.* Stephens, Cro. Car. 135 ; Ley, 82.

<sup>2</sup> 12 Rep. 133.

<sup>3</sup> Crompt. Author. 19, 35.

<sup>4</sup> Crompt. Author. 34.

<sup>5</sup> But see the remarks of Atkins, J., in 2 Mod. 161-165. *Lord Townshend v. Dr. Hughes*.

<sup>6</sup> 5th ed., vol. iii., p. 203, n.

<sup>7</sup> 2 Shower, 506, or in Butt's ed., p. 650.

<sup>8</sup> *The Duke of Richmond v. Costelow*, 11 Mod. 235.

## SLANDER OF TITLE, OR WORDS CONCERNING THINGS.

WORDS cannot be defamatory unless they directly affect some *person*; either in his individual capacity, or in his office, profession, or trade. Sometimes no doubt an attack on a thing may be an indirect attack upon an individual; and may therefore be actionable, as defamatory of him. Thus where the defendant said of the plaintiff; "He is a cheat; he has nothing but rotten goods in his shop;" this was rightly held a slander on the plaintiff in the way of his trade;<sup>1</sup> for the words clearly imputed that the defendant was aware of the unsatisfactory nature of his wares, and yet continued to foist them on the public. So to charge a tradesman with wilfully adulterating the goods he sells is clearly an attack on *him* as well as on his goods, and would therefore be actionable without special damage.<sup>2</sup>

But wholly apart from these cases there is a branch of the law (generally known by the inappropriate but convenient name — Slander of Title) which permits an action to be brought against any one who maliciously decries the plaintiff's goods or some

other thing belonging to him, and thereby produces special \* 138 damage to the \* plaintiff. This is obviously no part of the

law of defamation, for the plaintiff's reputation remains uninjured; it is really an action on the case for maliciously acting in such a way as to inflict loss upon the plaintiff. All the preceding rules dispensing with proof of malice and special damage are therefore wholly inapplicable to cases of this kind. Here, as in all other actions on the case, there must be *et damnum et injuria*. The *injuria* consists in the unlawful words maliciously spoken, and the *damnum* is the consequent money loss to the plaintiff.

<sup>1</sup> Burnet v. Wells (1700), 12 Mod. 420.

<sup>2</sup> Jesson v. Hayes (1636), Roll. Abr. 63. See also Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 478, and other cases cited, *ante*, pp. 32-34.

I. *Slander of title proper.*

Where the plaintiff possesses an estate or interest in any real or personal property, an action lies against any one who maliciously comes forward and falsely denies or impugns the plaintiff's title thereto, if thereby damage follows to the plaintiff.<sup>1</sup> (a)

The statement must be *false*; if there be such a flaw in the title as the defendant asserted, no action lies. And the statement must be *malicious*; if it be made in the *bonâ fide* assertion of defendant's own right, real or supposed, to the property, no action lies. But whenever a man unnecessarily intermeddles with the affairs of others with which he is wholly unconcerned, such officious interference will be deemed malicious and he will be liable, if damage follow. Lastly, *special damage* must be proved, and shown to have arisen from defendant's words. And for this it is

<sup>1</sup> *Pater v. Baker*, 3 C. B. 869; 16 L. J. C. P. 124; 11 Jur. 370.

(a) The law of slander of title, the law that is to say relating to false statements concerning one's title to property or the quality thereof, belongs properly to the law of deceit rather than to the law of defamation; as the author and others have pointed out. See for a consideration of the subject Bigelow's L. C. Torts, 54, note. Unlike defamation false statements of this kind are not in common experience found to be so generally inspired of malice as to raise a natural presumption that they are malicious; and it therefore devolves upon the plaintiff, as in the action of deceit, to prove the *animus* (malice; called intent in deceit) of the defendant by express evidence. The words alone are not (in ordinary cases at least) enough. *Hovey v. Rubber Pencil Co.*, 57 N. Y. 119, explaining *Snow v. Judson*, 38 Barb. 210, and following *Wren v. Weild*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 70; *Kendall v. Stone*, 2 Sandf. 269 (reversed in 5 N. Y. 14, but not on this point); *McDaniel v. Baca*, 2 Cal. 326; *Stark v. Chetwood*, 5 Kans. 141; *Reid v. McLendon*, 44 Georgia, 156; *Townshend, Slander*, § 130. Knowledge of the falsity of the statement will undoubtedly establish malice as in the ordinary action of slander (*post*, p. 145); and there are probably cases in slander of title as in deceit in which the defendant would be held bound

to know of the truth of his statements. In such cases proof of the mere falsity of the representation made would by establishing knowledge thereof establish malice; unless malice is to be treated as something peculiar. Concerning the law of deceit upon this point see Bigelow, Torts, 19-22 (Students' series). Again malice may be shown by evidence of want of any reasonable ground for making the statement. *Western Manure Co. v. Lawes Manure Co.*, L. R. 9 Ex. 218; *post*, p. 145. It should be noticed in this connection that the law of slander of title differs from the law of slander and corresponds with the law of deceit in another particular not often pointed out; to wit, in the requirement (for it appears to be necessary) that the plaintiff should by express evidence prove the defendant's statement false. The law of slander of title accords further with the law of deceit in requiring the plaintiff to prove that he has sustained special damage by reason of the defendant's publication. *Gott v. Pulsifer*, 122 Mass. 235; *Swan v. Tappan*, 5 Cush. 104; *Malachy v. Soper*, 3 Bing. N. C. 371; s. c. Bigelow's L. C. Torts, 42. See further *Like v. McKinstry*, 4 Keyes, 397; *Hill v. Ward*, 13 Ala. 310; *Paull v. Halferty*, 63 Penn. St. 46.

generally necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he was in act of selling his property either by public auction or private treaty, and that the defendant by his words prevented an intending purchaser from bidding or competing.<sup>1</sup> So proof that plaintiff

\* 139 \* wished to let his lands and that the defendant prevented an intending tenant from taking the lease will be sufficient.

But a mere apprehension that plaintiff's title might be drawn in question, or that the neighbors placed a lower value on plaintiff's lands in their own minds in consequence, the same not being offered for sale, will not be sufficient evidence of damage. "This action lieth not but by reason of the prejudice in the sale."<sup>2</sup> The special damage must always be such as naturally or reasonably arises from the use of the words.<sup>3</sup>

It makes no difference whether the defendant's words be spoken or written or printed; save as affecting the damages, which should be larger where the publication is more permanent or extensive, as by advertisement.<sup>4</sup>

The property may be either real or personal; and the plaintiff's interest therein may be either in possession or reversion. It need not be even a *vested* interest, so long as it is anything that is saleable or that has a market value.

In one or two old cases it seems to have been held that no actual present damage need be proved. "The law gives an action for but a possibility of damage, as an action lies for calling an heir-apparent 'bastard.'"<sup>5</sup> (a) But even in *Turner v. Sterling*, Vaughan, C.J., says:—"I take it that 'tis not actionable to call a man bastard while his father is alive; the books are cross in it."<sup>6</sup> Both *dicta* were merely *obiter*. And in *Onslow v.*

\* 140 *Horne*,<sup>7</sup> De Grey, C.J., \* says:—"I know of no case where ever an action for words was grounded upon eventual damages which may possibly happen to a man in a future situation." There is no case precisely in point since 1638; but the tendency of all modern decisions is

<sup>1</sup> *Tasburgh v. Day*, Cro. Jac. 484; *Lowe v. Harewood*; Sir W. Jones, 196; Cro. Car. 140.

<sup>2</sup> Per Fenner, J., in *Bold v. Bacon*, Cro. Eliz. 346.

<sup>3</sup> *Haddon v. Lott*, 15 C. B. 411; 24 L. J. C. P. 49; see *post*, c. X.

<sup>4</sup> *Malachy v. Soper & another*, 3 Bing. N. C. 371; 3 Scott, 723; 2 Hodges, 217.

<sup>5</sup> Per Wylde, J., in *Turner v. Sterling* (1671), 2 Vent. 26; Anon., 1 Roll. Abr. 37. See *Humfreys v. Stanfield or Stridfield* (1638), Cro. Car. 469; Godb. 451; Sir Wm. Jones, 388; 1 Roll. Abr. 38; *Banister v. Banister*, 4 Rep. 17.

<sup>6</sup> 2 Vent. 28.

<sup>7</sup> 3 Wils. 188; 2 W. Bl. 753.

(a) *Contra*, *Hoar v. Ward*, 47 Vt. 657.



against the view of Wylde, J., which must now, I think, be deemed obsolete.

There is clearly no reason why a man who has no estate in the lands, but only a mere expectancy, should be allowed an action, whilst he in whom an estate is vested must prove special damage or be nonsuited. Of course, if the heir-apparent has in fact been disinherited in consequence of defendant's words, the special damage is clear and the action lies.

### *Illustrations.*

Lands were settled on D. in tail, remainder to the plaintiff in fee. D. being an old man and childless, plaintiff was about to sell his remainder to A., when the defendant interfered and asserted that D. had issue. A. consequently refused to buy. *Held* that the action lay. *Bliss v. Stafford, Owen, 37; Moore, 188; Jenk. 247.*

The plaintiff's father being tenant-in-tail of certain lands, which he was about to sell, the purchaser offered the plaintiff a sum of money to join in the assurance so as to estop him from attempting to set aside the deed, should he ever succeed to the estate tail; but the defendant told the purchaser that the plaintiff was a bastard, wherefore he refused to give the plaintiff anything for his signature. *Held* that the plaintiff had a cause of action, though he was the youngest son of his father, and his chance of succeeding therefore remote. *Vaughan v. Ellis, Cro. Jac. 213.*

Plaintiff succeeded to certain lands as heir-at-law; the defendant asserted that he was a bastard; plaintiff was in consequence put to great expense to defend his title. *Elborow v. Allen, Cro. Jac. 642.*

The defendant falsely represented to the bailiff of a manor that a sheep of the plaintiff was an estray, in consequence of which it was wrongfully seized. *Held* that an action on the case lay against him. *Newman v. Zachary, Aleyn, 3.*

The plaintiff was desirous to sell his lands to any one who would buy them, when the defendant said that the plaintiff had mortgaged all his lands for £100, and that he had no power to sell or let the same. No special damage being shown, judgment was stayed. It was not proved that any one intending to buy plaintiff's lands heard defendant speak the words. *Manning v. Avery (1674), 3 Keb. 153; 1 Vin. Abr. 553.*

The plaintiff was possessed of tithes which he desired to sell; the defendant falsely and maliciously said:—“His right and title thereunto is nought, and I have a better title than he.” As special damage it was \* alleged that the plaintiff \* 141 “was likely to sell, and was injured by the words; and that by reason of the defendant's speaking the words, the plaintiff could not recover his tithes.” *Held* insufficient. *Cane v. Golding (1649), Style, 169, 176; Law v. Harwood (1629), Sir Wm. Jones, 196; Palm. 529; Cro. Car. 140.*

The plaintiff was the assignee of a beneficial lease, which he expected would realize £100. But the defendant, the superior landlord, came to the sale, and stated publicly:—“The whole of the covenants of this lease are broken, and I have served notice of ejectment; the premises will cost £70 to put them in repair.” In consequence of this statement the property fetched only 35 guineas. Rolfe, B., left to the jury only one question, Was the defendant's statement true or false? and they found a verdict for the plaintiff; damages, £40. But the Court of Exchequer granted a new trial on the ground that two other questions ought to have been left to the jury as well:—Was the statement or any part of it made maliciously? and, Did the special damage arise from such malicious statement or from such part of it as was malicious? *Brook v. Rawl, 4 Exch.*

521; 19 L. J. Ex. 114. And see *Smith v. Spooner*, 3 Taunt. 246; *Milman v. Pratt*, 2 B. & C. 486; 3 D. & R. 728.

The plaintiff held 160 shares in a silver mine in Cornwall, which he said were worth £100,000. Tollervey and Hayward each filed a bill in Chancery against the plaintiff and others claiming certain shares in the mine, and praying for an account and an injunction, and for the appointment of a receiver. To these bills plaintiff demurred. Before the demurrers came on for hearing, a paragraph appeared in the defendant's newspaper to the effect that the demurrers had been overruled, that an injunction had been granted, that a receiver had been duly appointed, and had actually arrived at the mine; all of which was quite untrue. A verdict having been obtained for the plaintiff, damages £5; the Court of Common Pleas arrested judgment on the ground that there was no sufficient allegation of special damage, and this, although the declaration contained averments to the effect that "the plaintiff is injured in his rights; and the shares so possessed by him, and in which he is interested, have been and are much depreciated and lessened in value; and divers persons have believed and do believe that he has little or no right to the shares, and that the mine cannot be lawfully worked or used for his benefit; and that he hath been hindered and prevented from selling or disposing of his said shares in the said mine, and from working and using the same in so ample and beneficial a manner as he otherwise would have done." *Malachy v. Soper* and another, 3 Bing. N. C. 383; 3 Scott, 723; 2 Hodges, 217. And see *Hart and another v. Wall*, 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373, *ante*, p. 34.

It is not actionable for any man to assert his own  
\* 142 \* rights at any time. And even where the defendant fails to prove such right on investigation, still if at the time he spoke he *bond fide* supposed such right to exist, no action lies.<sup>1</sup> Hence, whenever a man claims a right or title in himself, it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove that he had no such right; he must also give evidence of express malice;<sup>2</sup> that is, he must also attempt to show that the defendant could not honestly have believed in the existence of the right he claimed, or at least that he had no reasonable or probable cause for so believing. If there appear no reasonable or probable cause for his claim of title, still the jury are not bound to find malice; the defendant may have acted stupidly, yet from an innocent motive.<sup>3</sup> But in all cases where it appears that the defendant at the time he spoke knew that what he said was false, the jury should certainly find malice; lies which injure another cannot be told *bond fide*.<sup>4</sup>

The law is the same where the defendant is an agent or attorney, and claims for his principal or client a title which he hon-

<sup>1</sup> *Carr v. Duckett*, 5 H. & N. 783; 29 L. J. Ex. 468.

<sup>2</sup> *Smith v. Spooner*, 3 Taunt. 246.

<sup>3</sup> *Pitt v. Donovan*, 1 M. & S. 648; *Steward v. Young*, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168; *Clark v. Molyneux*, 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 37 L. T. 694.

<sup>4</sup> *Waterer v. Freeman*, Hob. 266.

estly believes him to possess.<sup>1</sup> So where a man *bonâ fide* asserts a title in his father or other near relative to whom he or his wife is heir apparent.<sup>2</sup> But where the defendant makes no claim at all for himself or any connection of his, but \* asserts a \* 143 title in some one who is a stranger to him; here he clearly is meddling in a matter which is no concern of his; and such officious and unnecessary interference will be deemed malicious.<sup>3</sup>

“If some portions of the statement which a person makes are *bonâ fide*, but others are *malâ fide*, and occasion injury to another, the injured party cannot recover damages unless he can distinctly trace the damage as resulting from that part which is made *malâ fide*.”<sup>4</sup> So if part be true and part false.<sup>5</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

Plaintiff had purchased the manor and castle of H. in fee from Lord Audley, and was about to demise them to Ralph Egerton for a term of twenty-two years, when the defendant, a widow, said, “I have a lease of the castle and manor of H. for ninety years;” and she showed him what purported to be a lease from a former Lord Audley to her husband for a term of ninety years. This lease was a forgery; but the defendant was not aware of it. *Held* that no action lay for slander of title; for the defendant had claimed a right to the property herself. It would have been otherwise had she known the lease was a forgery. *Sir G. Gerard v. Dickenson*, 4 Rep. 18; *Cro. Eliz.* 197. And see *Fitzh. Nat. Brev.* 116 B. & D.; *Lovett v. Weller*, 1 Roll. 409.

If the defendant asserts that plaintiff is a bastard, and that he himself is the next heir, no action lies. *Banister v. Banister* (1683), 4 Rep. 17; *Cane v. Golding* (1649), *Styles*, 169, 176.

The plaintiff put up for sale by public auction eight unfinished houses in Agar Town. The defendant, a surveyor of roads appointed under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 84, had previously insisted that these houses were not being built by the plaintiff in conformity with the Act. He now attended the sale and stated publicly, “My object in attending the sale is, to inform purchasers, if there are any present, that I shall not allow the houses to be finished until the roads are made good. I have no power to compel the purchasers to complete the roads; but I have power to prevent them from completing the houses until the roads are made good.” In consequence only two of the carcasses were sold; and they realized only £35 each, instead of £65. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for £18 12s. But the Court of C. P. held that there was no evidence of malice to go to the jury. For malice is not to be inferred from the circumstance of the \* defendant having acted upon an incorrect view of his duty, \* 144 founded upon an erroneous construction of the statute. *Pater v. Baker*, 3 C. B. 831; 16 L. J. C. P. 124; 11 Jur. 370; *Hargrave v. Le Breton*, 4 Burr. 2422.

<sup>1</sup> *Hargrave v. Le Breton*, 4 Burr. 2422; *Steward v. Young*, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168.

<sup>2</sup> *Pitt v. Donovan*, 1 M. & S. 639; *Gutsole v. Mathers*, 1 M. & W. 495; 5 Dowl. 69; 2 Gale, 64; 1 Tyrw. & Gr. 694.

<sup>3</sup> *Pennyman v. Rabanks*, *Cro. Eliz.* 427; 1 Vin. Abr. 551. See *Jenkins's Centuries*, 247. <sup>4</sup> *Per Parke, B.*, in *Brook v. Rawl*, 4 Ex. 524. <sup>5</sup> *Ib.* 523.

The plaintiff was the widow and administratrix of her deceased husband, and advertised a sale of some of his property. Defendant, an old friend of the husband, thereupon put an advertisement in the papers offering a reward for the production of the will of the deceased. The defendant subsequently called on the solicitor of the deceased, and was assured by him there was no will; but, in spite of this, the defendant attended at the sale and made statements which effectually prevented any person present from bidding. After waiting twelve months, the plaintiff again put the same property up for sale, and defendant again stopped the auction. Cockburn, C.J., left it to the jury to say whether, after the interview with the plaintiff's solicitor, defendant could still possess an honest and reasonable belief that the deceased had left a will. The jury found that he had not that belief. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, £54 7s. *Atkins v. Perrin*, 3 F. & F. 179.

The defendant had a subsisting patent for the manufacture of spooling machines; so had the plaintiff. The defendant wrote to certain manufacturers, customers of the plaintiff, warning them against using the plaintiff's machine, on the ground that it was an infringement of the defendant's patent. *Held* that "the action could not lie unless the plaintiff affirmatively proved that the defendant's claim was not a *bona fide* claim in support of a right which, with or without cause, he fancied he had, but a *malâ fide* and malicious attempt to injure the plaintiff by asserting a claim of right against his own knowledge that it was without any foundation." Evidence to show that the defendant's patent, though subsisting, was void for want of novelty, was not admitted, as being irrelevant in this action. *Wren v. Weild*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730, 737; 10 B. & S. 51; 38 L. J. Q. B. 88, 327; 20 L. T. 277. And see *Dicks v. Brooks*, 15 Ch. D. 22; 49 L. J. Ch. 812; 29 W. R. 87; 40 L. T. 710; 43 L. T. 71; *Hammersmith Skating Rink Co. v. Dublin Skating Rink Co.*, 10 Ir. R. Eq. 235.

But a patentee is not entitled to publish statements that he intends to institute legal proceedings in order to deter persons from purchasing alleged infringements of his patent, unless he does honestly intend to follow up such threats by really taking such proceedings. *Rollins v. Hinks*, L. R. 13 Eq. 355; 41 L. J. Ch. 358; 20 W. R. 287; 26 L. T. 56; *Axmann v. Lund*, L. R. 18 Eq. 330; 43 L. J. Ch. 655; 22 W. R. 789; *Halsey v. Brotherhood*, 15 Ch. D. 514; 49 L. J. Ch. 786; 29 W. R. 9; 43 L. T. 366.

A. died possessed of furniture in a beer-shop. His widow, without taking out administration, continued in possession of the beer-shop for three or four years,  
 \* 145 and then died, having whilst so in possession conveyed \*all the furniture by bill of sale to her landlords by way of security for a debt she had contracted with them. After the widow's death, the plaintiff took out letters of administration to the estate of A., and informed the defendant, the landlords' agent, that the bill of sale was invalid, as the widow had no title to the furniture. Subsequently the plaintiff was about to sell the furniture by auction, when the defendant interposed to forbid the sale, and said that he claimed the goods for his principals under a bill of sale. On proof of these facts, in an action for slander of title, the plaintiff was nonsuited. *Held* that the mere fact of the defendant's having been told before the sale that the bill of sale was invalid, was no evidence of malice to be left to the jury, and that the plaintiff was therefore properly nonsuited. *Steward v. Young*, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168. And see *Blackham v. Pugh*, 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P. 290.

## II. *Slander of Goods manufactured or sold by another.*

“An untrue statement, disparaging a man’s goods, published without lawful occasion, and causing him special damage, is actionable.” This is laid down as a general principle by Bramwell, B., in *Western Counties Manure Company v. Lawes Chemical Manure Company*;<sup>1</sup> and it applies although no imputation is cast on the plaintiff’s private or professional character. Nor in the opinion of the same learned Judge is it necessary to prove actual malice; it is sufficient if it be made “without reasonable cause.”

At the same time it is not actionable for a man to commend his own goods; or to advertise that he can make as good articles as any other person in the trade.<sup>2</sup>

In *Evans v. Harlow* (1844),<sup>3</sup> which appears to be the earliest case of this kind, no special damage was alleged; and the only point decided was that the words were not a libel on the plaintiff in the way of his trade, and that therefore no action lay. The Court did not expressly decide that, had special damage been \*alleged, the declaration would \*146 have been good, though Patteson, J., was clearly of that opinion, as appears from his remarks on p. 633. These remarks were cited to the Court in the next case of the kind.<sup>4</sup> But there the libel did not impute that the plaintiff’s oil was bad in itself, but merely alleged that it was inferior to that of the defendant; and, again, it was held that no action lay. Blackburn, J., asks:<sup>5</sup>—“Is there any case where an action has been maintained for slander, written or verbal of *goods*, unless where the slander is of the *title* to them, and special damage has resulted?” But the *dicta* of the other judges fully bear out the head-note:—“*Seem*, that if a person falsely and maliciously disparages an article which another manufactures or vends, and special damage results therefrom, an action will lie, although in so doing no imputation was cast on the personal or professional character of the manufacturer or vendor.” And this *seem* may now, I think, be considered as settled law, since the decision in *Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co.*, *supra*.

It is unfortunate that in the report of *Young v. Macrae*, in the *Law Journal*,<sup>6</sup> Cockburn, C.J., is represented as stating:—“I am very far from

<sup>1</sup> L. R. 9 Ex. 218, 222; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 23 W. R. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Harman v. Delany*, 2 Str. 898; 1 Barnard. 289; Fitz. 121.

<sup>3</sup> 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; Dav. & M. 507.

<sup>4</sup> *Young v. Macrae*, 3 B. & S. 264; 32 L. J. Q. B. 6; 11 W. R. 63; 9 Jur. N. S. 539; 7 L. T. 354.

<sup>5</sup> 3 B. & S. 269.

<sup>6</sup> 32 Q. B. p. 8.

saying that if a trader maliciously, and falsely to *his own knowledge*, publishes matter disparaging an article manufactured or sold by another, even if he makes no reflection upon the character, trade, or profession of that other, and if special damage followed, that there would not be an actionable libel; for a most grievous wrong might be done in that way, and the person injured ought to have a remedy by an action." The words "falsely to his own knowledge" seem to imply that fraud or misrepresentation is essential to the cause of action; and it is on the authority of this passage, no doubt, that I find it stated in Addison on Torts:<sup>1</sup> "Disparaging criticisms by one tradesman upon the goods of a rival tradesman are not actionable, unless it is proved that they have been *maliciously and fraudulently made, and were false to the knowledge of the party at the time they were made.*" But in no other place in the Law Journal Report is there any hint

that a *scienter* must be proved, although the Lord Chief Justice \* 147 \* gives several instances during the argument and later in his judgment, in which in his opinion an action would lie. That the statement was false to the knowledge of the defendant is cogent evidence of malice; but surely any other evidence of malice would be sufficient. In Best & Smith, the passage cited above is given as follows:—"I am far from saying that if a man falsely and maliciously makes a statement disparaging an article which another manufactures or vends, although in so doing he casts no imputation on his personal or professional character, and thereby causes an injury, and special damage is averred, an action might not be maintained. For although none of us are familiar with such actions, still we can see that a most grievous wrong might be done in that way, and it ought not to be without remedy."<sup>2</sup> And so in the Law Times Reports<sup>3</sup> the words are merely "falsely and maliciously;" in the Jurist<sup>4</sup> merely "a disparaging notice;" though the Weekly Reporter<sup>5</sup> contains in addition to "falsely and maliciously," the words "by statements he knows to be false." In Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Manure Co., the declaration before the Court did not contain any averment "as the defendants well knew." See the whole pleadings in the Appendix. I conclude, therefore, in spite of the passage cited above from Addison on Torts, that the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of his statements at the time he makes them, is immaterial in this action, save as aggravating the damages.

In Thomas v. Williams,<sup>6</sup> Fry, J., decided that to entitle a plaintiff to an injunction to restrain a libel injurious to trade it was not necessary that he should prove actual damage.

<sup>1</sup> 3d ed., p. 787; 4th ed., p. 796; 5th ed., p. 184.

<sup>2</sup> 3 B. & S. 269.

<sup>3</sup> 7 L. T. 355.

<sup>4</sup> 9 Jur. N. S. 539.

<sup>5</sup> 11 W. R. 63.

<sup>6</sup> 14 Ch. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 28 W. R. 983; 43 L. T. 91.

*Illustrations.*

The defendant published an advertisement, denying that the plaintiff held any patent for the manufacture of "self-acting tallow syphons or lubricators," and cautioning the public against such lubricators as wasting the tallow. No special damage was alleged. *Held* that the words were not a libel on the plaintiff either generally, or in the way of his trade, but were only a reflection upon the goods sold by him, which was not actionable without special damage. *Evans v. Harlow*, 5 Q. B. 624; 13 L. J. Q. B. 120; *Dav. & M.* 507; 8 *Jur.* 571; *ante*, p. 33.

\* "If a man makes a false statement with respect to the goods of A., in \* 148 comparing his own goods with those of A., and A. suffers special damage, will not an action lie?" Per Cockburn, C.J., in *Young and others v. Macrae*, 32 L. J. Q. B. 8; and counsel answers, "Certainly it would."

"If a man were to write falsely that what another man sold as Turkish rhubarb was three parts brickdust, and special damage could be proved, it might be actionable." Per Cockburn, C.J., in *Young and others v. Macrae*, 32 L. J. Q. B. 7.

The defendant published a certificate by a Dr. Muspratt, who had compared the plaintiff's oil with the defendant's, and deemed it inferior to the defendant's. It was alleged that the certificate was false, and that divers customers of the plaintiff's after reading it had ceased to deal with the plaintiff and gone over to the defendant. *Held* that the plaintiff's oil, even if inferior to the defendant's, might still be very good; and that the falsity was alleged too generally, and that therefore no action lay. It was consistent with the declaration that every word said about the plaintiff's oil should be true, and the only falsehood the assertion that defendant's was superior to it, which would not be actionable. "It is not averred that the defendant falsely represented that the oil of the plaintiffs had a reddish-brown tinge, was much thicker, and that it had a more disagreeable odor. If that had been falsely represented, and special damage had ensued, an action might have been maintained." *Young and others v. Macrae*, 3 B. & S. 264; 32 L. J. Q. B. 6; 11 W. R. 63; 9 *Jur. N. S.* 539; 7 L. T. 354.

The defendants falsely and without lawful occasion published a detailed analysis of the plaintiffs' artificial manure and of their own, in which the plaintiffs' manure was much disparaged and their own extolled. Special damage having resulted, *held* that the action lay. *Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co.*, L. R. 9 Ex. 218; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 23 W. R. 5. See *Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam*, 6 Ch. D. 582; 46 L. J. Ch. 713; 14 Ch. D. 763; 28 W. R. 295, 966; 41 L. T. 542; 42 L. T. 851.

The defendant stated in Ireland that the plaintiff's ship was unseaworthy, consequently her crew refused to proceed to sea in her, and a negotiation for the sale of her fell through. The ship was in England. But it was held that this fact would not give an English Court jurisdiction. *Casey v. Arnott*, 2 C. P. D. 24; 46 L. J. C. P. 3; 25 W. R. 46; 35 L. T. 424.

There are many other cases in which words produce special damage to the plaintiff without in any way affecting his reputation; and for such words if spoken without lawful occasion an action on the case will lie, provided the damage be the necessary or probable consequence \* of the words, within \* 149 the meaning of the strict rules laid down in c. X., pp. 321-333. But as such cases are clearly beyond the scope of the present treatise, I merely subjoin a few instances.

*Illustrations.*

If a man menace my tenants at will, of life and member, *per quod* they depart from their tenures, an action upon the case will lie against him, but the menace without their departure is no cause of action. *Conesby's Case*, Year Book, 9 Hen. VII., pp. 7, 8; 1 Roll. Abr. 108.

If defendant threatens the plaintiff's workmen, so that they do not dare to go on with their work, whereby the plaintiff loses the selling of his goods, an action lies. *Garret v. Taylor* (1621), Cro. Jac. 567; 1 Roll. Abr. 108; *Tarleton and others v. McGawley, Peake*, 270. And see *Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley*, L. R. 6 Eq. 551; 37 L. J. Ch. 889; 16 W. R. 1138; 19 L. T. 64; *Skinner v. Kitch*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 393; 36 L. J. M. C. 322; 15 W. R. 830; 16 L. T. 413.

"If a man should lie in wait and fright the boys from going to school, that school-master might have an action for the loss of his scholars." Per Holt, C.J., in *Keble v. Hickinggill*, 11 East, 576, n.

The defendant wrongfully and maliciously caused certain persons who had agreed to sell goods to the plaintiff to refuse to deliver them, by asserting that he had a lien upon them, and ordering those persons to retain the goods until further orders from him, he well knowing at the time that he had no lien. Held that the action was maintainable, though the persons who had the goods were under no legal obligation to obey the orders of the defendant, and their refusal was their own spontaneous act. *Green v. Button*, 2 C. M. & R. 707.



## PUBLICATION.

PUBLICATION is the communication of the defamatory words to some third person. It is essential to the plaintiff's case that the defendant's words should be *expressed*; the law permits us to think as badly as we please of our neighbors so long as we keep our uncharitable thoughts to ourselves. Merely composing a libel is not actionable unless it be published. And it is no publication when the words are only communicated to the person defamed; for that cannot injure his reputation. A man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him; not the opinion which he has of himself. The attempt to diminish our friend's good opinion of himself, though possibly unpleasant to him, is yet generally ineffectual, and is certainly not actionable, unless some one else overhears. There must be a communication by the defendant to some third person, other than the plaintiff.<sup>1</sup> And the communication, whether it be in words, or by signs, gestures, or caricature, must be *intelligible* to such third person. If the words used be in the vernacular of the place of publication, it will be presumed that such third persons understood them, until the contrary be proved. And it will be presumed that they understood them in the sense which such words properly bear in their ordinary signification, unless any reason appear for assigning \* them a different meaning. Making it known \* 151 to *one* individual is a sufficient "publishing," provided that that one is not the person defamed. Such publication must of course be prior to the date of the issuing of the writ. (a)

<sup>1</sup> Barrow v. Lewellin, Hob. 62.

(a) In some of the States it is made unnecessary by statute to allege technically the publication of words actionable *per se*. *Emmerson v. Marvel*, 55 Ind. 265; *Guard v. Risk*, 11 Ind. 156; *Hutts v. Hutts*, 51 Ind. 581; *Atwinger v. Fellner*, 46 Mo.

276. See *Watts v. Morgan*, 50 Ind. 318; *Mann v. Hauts*, 40 Ind. 122, that there should however be a general averment. How widely a mere general averment of publication instead of the technical allegation that the words (if oral) were "spoken

*Illustrations.*

To shout defamatory words on a desert moor where no one can hear you is not a publication; but if any one chances to hear you, it is a publication, although you thought no one was by.

in the presence and hearing of divers good citizens of the State" or the like is permitted does not appear; but no doubt some allegation of publication is always necessary. See *Hanning v. Bassett*, 12 Bush, 361; *Watts v. Morgan*, 50 Ind. 318; *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338; *Chapin v. White*, 102 Mass. 139; *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237; *Benedict v. Westover*, 44 Wis. 404; *Roberts v. Lovell*, 38 Wis. 211; *Ware v. Cartledge*, 24 Ala. 622; *Burbank v. Horn*, 39 Maine, 233; *Brown v. Brashier*, 2 Penn. 114; *Hurd v. Moore*, 2 Oreg. 85. Publication is of course of the essence of the plaintiff's case, and must be proved by him. See the cases above cited, and further *Desmond v. Brown*, 33 Iowa, 13; *Hurtert v. Weines*, 27 Iowa, 134; *Bent v. Mink*, 46 Iowa, 576; *Simmons v. Holster*, 13 Minn. 249; *McLaughlin v. Russel*, 17 Ohio, 475; *Duval v. Davey*, 32 Ohio St. 604; *Huff v. Bennett*, 4 Sandf. 120; *Landa v. Obert*, 45 Texas, 540; *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199; *Commonwealth v. Hall*, 97 Mass. 570; *Miller v. Johnson*, 79 Ill. 58; *Clay v. People*, 86 Ill. 147.

The act consists in the making known by the defendant the defamation to a person other than the plaintiff, though the plaintiff may of course be present. Within this rule husband and wife are not to be treated as one person, so that defamation of either in the presence of the other is published. *Post*, p. 153. See *Nolan v. Traber*, 49 Md. 460; *Hawver v. Hawver*, 78 Ill. 412; *Duval v. Davey*, 32 Ohio St. 604; the Illinois and Ohio cases holding the husband a competent witness to prove publication of words slandering the wife. Publication is also made of course by using the language before the plaintiff's family as well as before strangers. *Miller v. Johnson*, 79 Ill. 58. But if the only person present besides the plaintiff when defamatory words were spoken was a foreigner who did not understand what was said, there cannot be a publication. See *Hurtert v. Weines*, 27 Iowa, 134. Indeed the mere

fact that a third person is present who does understand the language is not necessarily sufficient to make a case of publication, since he may not be addressed and it may be proper to charge the plaintiff before another under the circumstances. *Toogood v. Spyryng*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 139; s. c. *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 139. But this is dangerous doctrine, and it should clearly appear to have been proper to speak the words before the third person. It seems indeed publication may be effected through negligence, though in fact there were no actual intention to publish. This will be true when (and only when) the negligence of the defendant had an obvious tendency to produce the result. If the result came about as the natural effect of the defendant's negligence, he must as a man of average intelligence have foreseen the result (the careful man, in other words, would have foreseen it); and foreseeing the result and permitting it, he therefore intended it. *A fortiori* one who being informed by a newspaper reporter that certain statements supposed to have been made by him are to be sent to the paper for publication says "let them go," thereby publishes them when the paper appears. *Clay v. People*, 86 Ill. 147. So too it is said that a *prima facie* case of publication is made out by evidence that the defendant threatened to publish the defamation. *Bent v. Mink*, 46 Iowa, 576, two judges dissenting.

With regard to the mode of proving publication, it is held that in the case of a newspaper the fact may be shown by producing a copy of the paper not actually published, in connection with evidence that similar copies were published. *Simmons v. Holster*, 13 Minn. 249; *McLaughlin v. Russel*, 17 Ohio, 475; *Huff v. Bennett*, 4 Sandf. 120. Indeed mere printing of the particular number would doubtless be presumptive evidence of publication. General reputation is not admissible to show publication. *Landa v. Obert*, 45 Texas, 540.

Publication again may be alleged gen-

To utter defamatory words in a foreign language is not a publication, if no one present understands their meaning; but if defamatory words be written in a foreign language, there will be a publication as soon as ever the writing comes into the hands of any one who does understand that language, or who gets them explained or translated to him.

Sending a letter through the post to the plaintiff, properly addressed to him, and fastened in the usual way, is no publication; and the defendant is not answerable for anything the plaintiff may choose to do with the letter after it has once safely reached his hands. *Barrow v. Lewellin*, Hob. 62.

In an American case the plaintiff, after so receiving a libellous letter from the defendant, sent for a friend of his and also for the defendant; he then repeated the contents of the letter in their presence, and asked the defendant if he wrote that letter; the defendant, in the presence of the plaintiff's friend, admitted that he had written it. *Held*, no publication *by the defendant* to the plaintiff's friend. *Fonville v. Nease*, *Dudley*, S. C. 303.

But it is otherwise if a message be sent to the plaintiff by telegraph; the contents of the telegram are necessarily communicated to all the clerks through whose hands it passes. So with a postcard. *Whitfield and others v. S. E. Ry. Co.*, E. B. & E. 115; 27 L. J. Q. B. 229; 4 Jur. N. S. 688; *Williamson v. Freer*, L. R. 9 C. P. 393; 43 L. J. C. P. 161; 22 W. R. 878; 30 L. T. 332; *Robinson v. Jones*, 4 L. R. Ir. 391.

So where the defendant knew that the plaintiff's letters were always opened by his clerk in the morning, and yet sent a libellous letter addressed to the plaintiff, which was opened and read by the plaintiff's clerk lawfully and in the usual course of business. *Held*, a publication by the defendant to the plaintiff's clerk. *Delacroix v. Thevenot*, 2 Stark. 63.

So where the defendant, before posting the letter to the plaintiff, had it copied. *Held*, a publication by the defendant to his own clerk who copied it. *Keene v. Ruff*, 1 Clarke (Iowa), 482.

\* So where the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff himself, but read it \* 152 to a friend before posting it. *Snyder v. Andrews*, 6 Barbour (New York), 43; *McCombs v. Tuttle*, 5 Blackford (Indiana), 431.

The delivery of a newspaper containing the libel to the proper officer of the Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes for revenue purposes is a sufficient publication of the libel; although the proprietor of the paper was required by law so to deliver it; for the stamp officer "would at all events have an opportunity of reading" the libel. *R. v. Amphlit*, 4 B. & C. 35; 6 D. & R. 125.

So the delivery of a manuscript to be printed is a sufficient publication; even though

erally, and then the fact may be proved by any one who heard or read the defamation. *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338; *Ware v. Cartledge*, 24 Ala. 622. But if publication to a particular person or body alone be alleged, then it is held that the allegation must be precisely proved, and publication to that person or body established. *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338; *Chapin v. White*, 102 Mass. 139; *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237. But see *Goodrich v. Warner*, 21 Conn. 432. And see *Richardson v. Hopkins*, 7 Blackf. 116. Nor where the allegation is that the publication was made to a certain corporation is it deemed suf-

ficient to show that it was made to one or two members, or perhaps to any number of members, of the corporation individually. *Perry v. Porter*, *supra*. Indeed it is laid down in broader terms in criminal cases that publication must be proved as alleged except when the question relates to the identity of the subject-matter. It is enough in Massachusetts that that is clearly established, though not precisely as alleged. *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199; *Commonwealth v. Hall*, 97 Mass. 570. The rule so made by statute was formerly different. *Commonwealth v. Varney*, 10 Cush. 462.

the author repent and suppress all the printed copies. For the compositor must hear it read. *Baldwin v. Elphinston*, 2 W. Bl. 1037. [This may be considered a somewhat harsh decision, as the compositor does not attend to the substance of the manuscript, but sets it up in copy mechanically; but it has recently been acted on in America. *Trumbull v. Gibbons*, 3 City Hall Recorder, 97. And see *Watts v. Fraser* and another, 7 Ad. & E. 223; 7 C. & P. 369; 1 M. & Rob. 449; 2 N. & P. 157; 1 Jur. 671; W. W. & D. 451; *Lawless v. The Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498; *Lake v. King*, 1 Lev. 241; 1 Saund. 131; Sid. 414; 1 Mod. 58.]

But merely to be in possession of a copy of a libel is no crime, unless some publication thereof ensue. *R. v. Beere*, Carth. 409; 12 Mod. 219; Holt, 422; Salk. 417; 1 Ray. 414. And see 11 Hargrave's St. Tr. 322, sub *Entick v. Carrington*.

Although husband and wife are generally to be considered one person in actions of tort as well as of contract,<sup>1</sup> still the plaintiff's wife is sufficiently a third person to make a communication to her of words defamatory of her husband, a publication in law.<sup>2</sup> And it is submitted that similarly a communication to the husband of a charge against his wife is a sufficient publication. The doubt suggested by Jervis, C.J., in *Wenman v. Ash*, must mean that he considered a communication to the husband of a report prejudicial to his wife was *primâ facie* privileged as being a friendly act; not that it was no publication. The converse case of the defendant and his

wife has never been decided in England. Is it a publication if a  
 \* 153 man tells his wife \* what he thinks of his neighbors? Possibly such a communication would be deemed to enjoy the same privilege as that which is supposed to attach to matters divulged by a Roman Catholic to his priest under the seal of confession. The question seems never to have arisen in England; probably because in every such case there has been an immediate and undoubted publication of the same slander, or an exaggerated version thereof, by the wife to some third person; for which the husband would be equally answerable in damages, and which would be easier to prove. In America there is a *dictum*, that the delivery of a libel by the author to his wife "in confidence" is privileged.<sup>3</sup>

The plaintiff must prove a publication by the defendant *in fact*. That the third person had the opportunity of reading the libel is not sufficient, if the jury are satisfied that he did not in fact avail himself thereof. Even though it is clear that the defendant desired and intended publication.

<sup>1</sup> *Phillips v. Barnet*, 1 Q. B. D. 436.

<sup>2</sup> *Wenman v. Ash*, 13 C. B. 836; 22 L. J. C. P. 190; 1 C. L. R. 592; 17 Jurist, 579.

<sup>3</sup> *Trumbull v. Gibbons*, 3 City Hall Recorder, 97.

*Illustrations.*

The defendant wrote a letter and gave it to B. to deliver to the plaintiff. It was folded, but not sealed. B. did not read it; but conveyed it direct to the plaintiff. *Held*, no publication. *Clutterbuck v. Chaffers*, 1 Stark. 471; *Day v. Bream*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 54.

The defendant threw a sealed letter addressed to the plaintiff, "or C.," into M.'s enclosure. M. picked it up and delivered it unopened to the plaintiff himself, who alone was libelled. No publication. *Fonville v. Nease*, Dudley, S. C. 303 (American).

Posting up a libellous placard and taking it down again before any one could read it, is no publication; but if it was exhibited long enough for any one to read it, then it is a question of fact for the jury whether any one actually did read it.

So it is no defence that the third person was not intended to overhear the slander or to read the libel, if in fact he has done so. An accidental or inadvertent communication is quite sufficient.<sup>1</sup>

*\* Illustrations.*

\* 154

The defendant by mistake directed and posted a libellous letter to the plaintiff's employer instead of to the plaintiff himself. *Held* a publication. *Fox v. Broderick*, 14 Ir. C. L. Rep. 453.

Rev. Samuel Paine sent his servant to his study for a certain paper which he wished to show to Brereton; the servant by mistake brought a libellous epitaph on Queen Mary, which Paine inadvertently handed to Brereton, supposing it to be the paper for which he sent; and Brereton read it aloud to Dr. Hoyle. This would probably be deemed a publication by Paine to Brereton in a civil case — (Note to *Mayne v. Fletcher*, 4 Man. & Ry. 312); but would not be sufficient in a criminal case. *R. v. Paine* (1695), 5 Mod. 163. For in a criminal case it is essential that there should be a guilty intention. *R. v. Lord Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 228. See also *Brett v. Watson*, 20 W. R. 723; *Blake v. Stevens*, 4 F. & F. 232; 11 L. T. 543.

But if I compose or copy a libel, and keep the manuscript in my study, intending to show it to no one, and it is *stolen* by a burglar and published by him; it is submitted that there is no publication by me, either in civil or criminal proceedings. See *Weir v. Hoss*, 6 Alabama, 881. But it would be a publication by me, if through any default of mine it got abroad, whether through my negligence or folly.

As soon as the manuscript of a libel has passed out of the defendant's possession and control, it is deemed to be published, so far as the defendant is concerned;<sup>2</sup> provided it does not pass immediately and unread into the possession and control of the plaintiff.

<sup>1</sup> See *Shepherd v. Whitaker*, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402; c. I. *ante*, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Per *Holroyd, J.*, in *R. v. Burdett*, 4 B. & Ald. 143.

*Illustrations.*

A letter is published as soon as posted, and in the place where it is posted, if it is ever opened anywhere by any third person. *Ward v. Smith*, 6 Bing. 749 ; 4 M. & P. 595 ; 4 C. & P. 302 ; *Clegg v. Laffer*, 3 Moore & Scott, 727 ; 10 Bing. 250 ; *Warren v. Warren*, 4 Tyr. 850 ; 1 C. M. & R. 250 ; *Shipley v. Todhunter*, 7 C. & P. 680.

So "if I send a manuscript to the printer of a periodical publication, and do not restrain the printing and publishing of it, and he does print and publish it in that publication, I am the publisher," and as such liable to an action. Per Lord Erskine in *Burdett v. Abbot*, 5 Dow. H. L. 201 ; 14 East, 1. See also *R. v. Lovett*, 9 C. & P. 462.

\* 155      \* Every one who requests, procures, or commands another to publish a libel is answerable as though he published it himself. And such request need not be express, but may be inferred from the defendant's conduct in sending his manuscript to the editor of a magazine, or making a statement to the reporter of a newspaper, with the knowledge that they will be sure to publish it, and without any effort to restrain their so doing. And it is not necessary that the defendant's communication be inserted *verbatim* ; so long as the sense and substance of it appear in print. (a)

This rule is of great value in cases where the words employed are not actionable when spoken ; but are so if written. Here though the proprietor of the newspaper is of course liable for printing them, still it is more satisfactory if possible to make the author of the scandal defendant. An action of slander will not lie ; but if he spoke the words under such circumstances as would ensure their being printed, or if in any other way he requested or contrived their publication in the paper, he is liable in an action of libel as the actual publisher. *Qui facit per alium facit per se*.

*Illustrations.*

If a manuscript in the handwriting of the defendant be sent to the printer or publisher of a magazine, who prints and publishes it, the defendant will be liable for the full damages caused by such publication, although there is no proof offered that he expressly directed the printing and publishing of such manuscript. *Bond v. Douglas*, 7 C. & P. 626 ; *R. v. Lovett*, 9 C. & P. 462 ; *Burdett v. Abbot*, 5 Dow. H. L. 201 ; 14 East, 1.

And this is so, although the editor has cut the article up, omitting the most libellous passages and only publishing the remainder. *Tarpley v. Blabey*, 2 Bing. N. C. 437 ; 2 Scott, 642 ; 1 Hodges, 414.

(a) Mere verbal alteration in printing that the manuscript should be produced is not enough to exempt the writer. *Strader v. Snyder*, 67 Ill. 404. Still it is said *Id.* at the trial or its absence accounted for.

So where Cooper told the editor several good stories against the Rev. J. K. and asked the editor to "show Mr. K. up;" and subsequently the editor published the substance of them in the newspaper; this was held a publication by Cooper, although the editor knew of the facts from other quarters as well. *R. v. Cooper*, 15 L. J. Q. B. 206; 8 Q. B. 533. And see *Adams v. Kelly*, Ry. & Moo. 157; and the judgments of Byles and Mellor, JJ., in the next case, L. R. 4 Ex. 181-186.

\* At the meeting of the board of guardians, at which reporters were present, \* 156 it was stated that the plaintiff had turned his daughter out of doors, and that she consequently had been admitted into the workhouse and had become chargeable to the parish. Ellis, one of the guardians, said, "I hope the local press will take notice of this very scandalous case," and requested the chairman, Prescott, to give an outline of it. This Prescott did, remarking, "I am glad gentlemen of the press are in the room, and I hope they will give publicity to the matter." Ellis added, "And so do I." From the notes taken in the room the reporters prepared a condensed account which appeared in the local newspapers, and which, though partly in the reporters' own language, was substantially a correct report of what took place at the meeting. *Held* by the majority of the Court of Exchequer Chamber (Montague Smith, Keating and Han-  
 nen, JJ., Byles and Mellor, JJ., dissenting) that Martin, B., was wrong in directing the jury that there was no evidence to go to the jury that Prescott and Ellis had directed the publication of the account which appeared in the papers. [N. B. — Of the six judges concerned, three were of one opinion, three of the other.] *Parkes v. Prescott* and another, L. R. 4 Ex. 169; 38 L. J. Ex. 105; 17 W. R. 773; 20 L. T. 537.

But though merely composing a libel without publishing it is not actionable, merely publishing it, not having composed it, is actionable. "The mere delivery of a libel to a third person by one conscious of its contents amounts to a publication and is an indictable offence."<sup>1</sup> "If one reads a libel, that is no publication of it; or if he hears it read, it is no publication of it; for before he reads or hears it, he cannot know it to be a libel; or if he hears or reads it, and laughs at it, it is no publication of it; or if he writes a copy of it, and does not publish it to others, it is no publication of the libel; but if after he has read or heard it, he repeats it, or any part of it, in the hearing of others, or after that he knows it to be a libel he reads it to others, that is an unlawful publication of it."<sup>2</sup>

Every one who prints or publishes a libel may be sued by the person defamed; and to such an action it is no defence that another wrote it; it is no defence that it was printed or published by the desire or procurement \* of another, whether \* 157 that other be made a defendant to the action or not. All concerned in publishing the libel or in procuring it to be pub-

<sup>1</sup> Per Wood, B., in *Maloney v. Bartley*, 3 Camp. 213.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Coke in *John Lamb's Case*, 9 Rep. 60.

lished are equally responsible with the author. And printing the libel or causing it to be printed is *prima facie* evidence of publication.<sup>1</sup> If the libel appear in a newspaper, the proprietor, the editor, the printer, and the author, are all liable to be sued, either separately or together. (a) And that one has been already sued is no defence to an action brought against any of the others in respect of the same libel.<sup>2</sup> Nor should the fact that such actions are pending be taken into consideration by the jury in assessing the damage arising from the publication by the present defendant.<sup>3</sup> In all cases of joint publication each defendant is liable for all the ensuing damage. And there is no contribution between tort-feasors. So that the proprietor of a paper sued jointly with his careless editor or with the actual composer of the libel cannot compel either of his co-defendants to recoup him the damages, which he has been compelled to pay the plaintiff.<sup>4</sup>

But if there be two distinct and separate publications of the same libel, a defendant who was concerned in the first publication, but wholly unconnected with the second, would not be liable for any damages which he could prove to have been the consequence of the second publication and in no way due to the first.

And here I will cite the remarks of Best, C.J., in *De Crespigny v. Wellesley*, 5 Bing. pp. 402-406. "If a man receives a letter with authority from the author to publish it, the person receiving it will not be justified, if it contains libellous matter, in inserting it in the newspapers. No \* 158 authority from a third \*person will defend a man against an action brought by a person who has suffered from an unlawful act. If the receiver of a letter publish it without authority, he is, from his own motion, the wilful circulator of slander. . . . If the person receiving a libel may

<sup>1</sup> *Burdett v. Abbot*, 5 Dow, H. L. 201 ; *Baldwin v. Elphinston*, 2 W. Bl. 1037.

<sup>2</sup> *Frescoe v. May*, 2 F. & F. 123.

<sup>3</sup> *Harrison v. Pearce*, 1 F. & F. 567 ; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

<sup>4</sup> *Colburn v. Patmore*, 1 C. M. & R. 73 ; 4 Tyr. 677.

(a) The newspaper publisher is liable though he was ignorant of and forbade the publication. *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51 ; *Detroit Post Co. v. McArthur*, 16 Mich. 447 ; *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 10 ; *Dunn v. Hall*, 1 Ind. 344 ; *Huff v. Bennett*, 4 Sandf. 120 ; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 261 ; *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199. It would perhaps be otherwise if the nature of the article were

such that the publication could not be known to be defamatory at the newspaper office. *Smith v. Ashley*, 11 Met. 367. And punitive damages cannot be given though the publication is libellous if it was published without the defendant's knowledge and without negligence on his part. *Scripps v. Reilly*, *supra*. *Secus*, if he was negligent. *Ib.* See *post*, p. 302, note.



publish it at all, he may publish it in whatever manner he pleases ; he may insert it in all the journals, and thus circulate the calumny through every region of the globe. The effect of this is very different from that of the repetition of oral slander. In the latter case, what has been said is known only to a few persons, and if the statement be untrue, the imputation cast upon any one may be got rid of ; the report is not heard of beyond the circle in which all the parties are known, and the veracity of the accuser, and the previous character of the accused, will be properly estimated. But if the report is to be spread over the world by means of the press, the malignant falsehoods of the vilest of mankind, which would not receive the least credit where the author is known, would make an impression which it would require much time and trouble to erase, and which it might be difficult, if not impossible, ever completely to remove. . . . Before he gave it general notoriety by circulating it in print, he should have been prepared to prove its truth to the letter ; for he had no more right to take away the character of the plaintiff, without being able to prove the truth of the charge that he had made against him, than to take his property without being able to justify the act by which he possessed himself of it. Indeed, if we reflect on the degree of suffering occasioned by loss of character, and compare it with that occasioned by loss of property, the amount of the former injury far exceeds that of the latter.”

### *Illustrations.*

A man may thus be guilty both of libel and of slander at the same moment and by the same act ; as, by reading to a public meeting a defamatory paper written by another. *Hearne v. Stowell*, 12 A. & E. 719 ; 6 Jur. 458 ; 4 P. & D. 696.

Hudson brought the manuscript of a libellous song to Morgan to have 1000 copies printed ; Morgan printed 1000 and sent 300 to Hudson's shop. Hudson gave several copies to a witness who sung it about the streets. It did not appear in whose writing the manuscript was ; but probably not in Hudson's. *Held* that both Hudson and Morgan had published the libel. *Johnson v. Hudson and Morgan*, 7 A. & E. 233 ; 1 H. & W. 680.

\* By the 38 Geo. III., c. 71, s. 17 (now repealed), the proprietor of every \* 159 newspaper was required to send a copy of every issue to the Stamp Office for Revenue purposes ; *held* that the delivery of a copy to the officer at the Stamp Office was a sufficient publication of a libel contained in it to render the proprietor liable to an action, “as the officer of the Stamp Office would at all events have an opportunity of reading the libel himself. *R. v. Amphlit*, 4 B. & C. 35 ; 6 D. & R. 125 ; *Mayne v. Fletcher*, 9 B. & C. 382 ; 4 Man. & Ry. 312.

The proprietor of a newspaper is always liable for whatever appears in its columns ; although the publication may have been made without his knowledge and in his absence. *R. v. Walter*, 3 Esp. 21.

But now in criminal cases, see 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7 ; *R. v. Holbrook* and others, 3 Q. B. D. 60 ; 4 Q. B. D. 42 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 26 W. R. 144 ; 27 W. R. 313 ; 37 L. T. 530 ; 39 L. T. 536.

So is the master printer. *R. v. Dover*, 6 How. St. Tr. 547.

So, in England, the acting editor is always held liable. *Watts v. Fraser* and another, 7 C. & P. 369; 7 Ad. & E. 223; 1 M. & Rob. 449; 2 N. & P. 157; 1 Jur. 671; *W. W. & D.* 451.

In America, however, though the proprietor and printer of a paper are always held liable, the editor is, it would seem, allowed to plead as a defence that the libel was inserted without his orders and against his will. *The Commonwealth v. Kneeland*, Thacher's C. C. 346.

Or without any knowledge on his part that the article was a libel on any particular individual. *Smith v. Ashley* (1846), 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 367.

The proprietor of a newspaper is liable even for an advertisement inserted and paid for by Bingham; although the plaintiff is bringing another action against Bingham at the same time. *Harrison v. Pearce*, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

"If you look upon the editor as a person who has published a libellous advertisement incautiously, of course he is liable." Per Pollock, C.B., in *Keyzor* and another v. Newcomb, 1 F. & F. 559.

If a country newspaper copy and publish a libellous article from a London newspaper, the country paper makes the article its own, and is liable for all damages resulting from its publication in the country. The fact that it had previously appeared in the London paper is no defence, though it may tend to mitigate the damages. *Saunders v. Mills*, 3 M. & P. 520; 6 Bing. 213; *Talbutt v. Clark*, 2 M. & Rob. 312.

Evidence that the plaintiff had in a previous action recovered damages against the London paper for the same article is altogether inadmissible; as in that action damages were given only for the publication of the libel in London. *Creedy v. Carr*, 7 C. & P. 64; and see *Hunt v. Algar* and others, 6 C. & P. 245.

\* 160 \* If I compose a libel and leave it in my desk among my papers, and my clerk surreptitiously takes a copy and sends it to the newspapers, it is submitted that he alone is liable for the damage caused thereby. I am liable only to such damages as the jury may award for the negligent though unintentional publication to my clerk. For although he could not have taken a copy, had I not first written the libel, still the subsequent republication of it is my clerk's own independent act, for the consequences of which he alone is liable. *Secus*, if I in any way encouraged or contrived his taking a copy, knowing that he would be sure to publish it in the newspapers.

So again every sale or delivery of a written or printed copy of a libel is a fresh publication; and every person who sells or gives away a written or printed copy of a libel may be made a defendant, unless, indeed, he can satisfy the jury that he was ignorant of the contents. The *onus* of proving this lies on the defendant, and where he has made a large profit by selling a great many copies of a libel, it will be very difficult to persuade the jury that he was not aware of its libellous nature.<sup>1</sup> In every other respect it makes no difference in law whether the delivery of the copy was by public sale or merely by confidentially showing the libel

<sup>1</sup> *Chubb v. Flannagan*, 6 C. & P. 431.

to a friend. Each is equally a publication. But the jury will, in estimating the damages, attach great importance to the mode of publication: as an indiscriminate public sale of the libel must inflict much more serious injury on the plaintiff's reputation. The defendant could not afterwards recall or contradict his statements, did he desire to do so.<sup>1</sup>

*Illustrations.*

The plaintiff's agent, with a view to the action, called at the office of the defendant's newspaper, and made them find for him a copy of the paper that had appeared seventeen years previously, and bought it. *Held* that this was a fresh publication by the defendant, and that the action lay in spite of the Statute of Limitations. *Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer*, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10.

\* A porter who, in the course of business, delivers parcels containing libellous hand-bills, is not liable in an action for libel, if shown to be ignorant of the contents of the parcel, *Day v. Bream*, 2 M. & Rob. 54, for he is but doing his duty in the ordinary way. \* 161

A servant carries a libellous letter for his master, addressed to C. It is his duty not to read it. If he does read it, that is a publication by his master to him, although he was never intended to read it. If after reading it he delivers it to C. then this is a publication by the servant to C., for which the person libelled, not being C., can sue either the master, or the servant, or both. If the servant never reads it, but simply delivers it as he was bidden, then he is not liable to any action, unless he either knew or ought to have known that he was being employed illegally. If he either knew or ought to have known, then it is no defence for him to plead "I was only obeying orders."

The defendant kept a pamphlet shop; she was sick and upstairs in bed; a libel was brought into the shop without her knowledge, and subsequently sold by her servant on her account. She was held criminally liable for the act of her servant, on the ground that "the law presumes that the master is acquainted with what his servant does in the course of his business." *R. v. Dodd*, 2 Sess. Cas. 33; *Nutt's Case*, Fitzg. 47; 1 Barnard, 306.

But later judges would not be so strict; the sickness upstairs, if properly proved by the defendant, would now be held an excuse. *R. v. Almon*, 5 Burr. 2686; *R. v. Gutch*, Fisher, and Alexander, Moo. & Mal. 433. And in *criminal* cases, see 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7.

A rule was granted calling on Wiatt to show cause why he should not be attached for selling a book containing a libel on the Court of King's Bench. The book was in Latin. On filing an affidavit that he did not understand Latin, and on giving up the name of the printer from whom he obtained it, and the name of the author, the rule was discharged. *R. v. Wiatt* (1722), 8 Mod. 123.

Every repetition of a slander is a wilful publication of it, rendering the speaker liable to an action. "Tale-bearers are as bad

<sup>1</sup> See per Lord Denman, C.J., 9 A. & E. 149.

as tale-makers.”<sup>1</sup> It is no defence that the speaker did  
 \* 162 not originate the scandal, but heard \* it from another, even  
 though it was a current rumor and he *bond fide* believed  
 it to be true.<sup>2</sup> It is no defence that the speaker at the time  
 named the person from whom he heard the scandal.<sup>3</sup> (a)

This proposition, it is submitted, correctly states the existing law on the point; but it would certainly not have been accepted as clear law in the last century. Great difficulty was presented by the fourth resolution in Lord Northampton's Case (in the Star Chamber, 1613),<sup>4</sup> which runs as follows:—“In a private action for slander of a common person, if J. S. publish that he hath heard J. N. say, that J. G. was a traitor or thief; in an action of the case, if the truth be such, he may justify. But if J. S. publish that he hath heard generally without a certain author, that J. G. was a traitor or thief, there an action *sur le case* lieth against J. S. for this, that he hath not given to the party grieved any cause of action against any, but against himself who published the words, although that in truth he might hear them; for otherwise this might tend to a great slander of an innocent; for if one who hath *læsam phantasiam*, or who is a drunkard, or of no estimation, speak scandalous words, if it should be lawful for a man

<sup>1</sup> MRS. CAN. “But surely you would not be quite so severe on those who only repeat what they hear?”

SIR PET. “Yes, Madam, I would have law merchant for them too; and in all cases of slander currency whenever the drawer of the lie was not to be found, the injured parties should have a right to come on any of the indorsers.”—*The School for Scandal*.

<sup>2</sup> *Watkin v. Hall*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561.

<sup>3</sup> *M'Pherson v. Daniels*, 10 B. & C. 270; 5 M. & R. 251.

<sup>4</sup> 12 Rep. 134.

(a) The contrary rule prevails in Maine and possibly in some other states, if the repetition is without malice and is stated as such and not by direct charge. *Haynes v. Leland*, 29 Maine, 233; *Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.*, 68 Maine, 279; *Church v. Bridgman*, 6 Mo. 190; *Jarnigan v. Fleming*, 43 Miss. 710. The last case requires the party who repeats to do so in the same words as the original and to give the author's name, and even then the author should be pecuniarily responsible. See also *Scott v. Peebles*, 2 Smedes & M. 546; *Miller v. Kerr*, 2 M'Cord, 285; *Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co.*, 65 Mo. 539; *Larkins v. Tarter*, 3 Sneed, 681. But Northampton's Case is not generally followed

in this country. *Fowler v. Chichester*, 26 Ohio St. 9; *Haines v. Welling*, 7 Ohio, 253; *Kenney v. McLaughlin*, 5 Gray, 3; *Stevens v. Hartwells*, 11 Met. 542; *Inman v. Foster*, 8 Wend. 602; *Treat v. Browning*, 4 Conn. 408; *Sans v. Joeris*, 14 Wis. 663; *State v. Butman*, 15 La. An. 166; *Evans v. Smith*, 5 T. B. Mon. 363; *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, 53 Penn. St. 343. But that the defendant merely repeated what he had heard may be shown in mitigation. *Hinkle v. Davenport*, 38 Iowa, 355; *Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292; *Huson v. Dale*, 19 Mich. 17; *Hewitt v. Pioneer Press Co.*, 23 Minn. 178; *Parker v. McQueen*, 8 B. Mon. 16; *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, *supra*.

of credit to report them generally that he had heard scandalous words, without mentioning of his author, that would give greater color and probability that the words were true in respect of the credit of the reporter, than if the author himself should be mentioned."

Now, in the first place, the reason here assigned for the distinction obviously applies only to cases in which the originator of the scandal is of less credit than the retailer of it, and is known to be so by those to whom it is retailed. If those who hear the tale repeated know nothing of the person cited as the authority for it, it is to them precisely as if the name were omitted altogether, and it had been told as an *on dit*. If, on the other hand, the person named as the author of the assertion is of greater credit and respectability than the reporter, vouching his authority clearly does the plaintiff's reputation a greater \* injury than if no \* 163 name had been given at all. And even in the case where the author of the story is well known to be a person of no credit, how does that excuse the defendant's act in repeating it? It appears to me to make it all the worse; he cannot even plead:—"I had it on good authority and reasonably believed it true." By the mere repetition of it the defendant endorses and gives credit to the tale, although he states that he heard it from A. B. Moreover, it is the defendant who sets the tale in circulation, and those who hear it from him will repeat it everywhere, and cite as their authority, not A. B., but the defendant whom we presume to be of greater respectability and credit. And generally, on principle, "because one man does an unlawful act to any person, another is not to be permitted to do a similar act to the same person. Wrong is not to be justified, or even excused, by wrong."<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the twelfth volume of Reports is a book of questionable authority; it was issued after Lord Coke's death, compiled by some one else from papers which Lord Coke had neither digested nor intended for the press.<sup>2</sup>

The fourth resolution, as reported, appears inconsistent with the preceding resolution, the third; and also with the many decisions in the case. And even if it be correctly reported, it is but an *obiter dictum*, for the Star Chamber had no jurisdiction over private slander, and the case before them was one of *scandalum magnatum*, which branch of the law is governed by special statutes of its own.<sup>3</sup>

Still so great was the weight justly given to every word of my Lord

<sup>1</sup> Per Best, C.J., in *De Crespigny v. Wellesley*, 5 Bing. 404.

<sup>2</sup> See the remarks of Mr. Hargrave, 11 St. Tr. 301; of Holroyd, J., in *Lewis v. Walter*, 4 B. & Ald. 614; and of Parke, J., in *M'Pherson v. Daniels*, 10 B. & C. 275; 5 M. & R. 251.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, pp. 133-136.

Coke, that this resolution was assumed to be law in *Crawford v. Middleton*,<sup>1</sup> *Davis v. Lewis*,<sup>2</sup> and *Woolnoth v. Meadows*.<sup>3</sup> The last two cases decided that at all events it is too late to name the author of the report for the first time in the plea of justification; he must be named at time of publication to raise any ground of defence under this resolution.

In *Maitland v. Goldney* (1802),<sup>4</sup> Lord Ellenborough intimated \* 164 that the doctrine did not apply where the \*reporter knew that his informant, whom he named, had *retracted* the charge since making it, or where for any other reason the reporter at the time of repeating the tale knew it was false, and unfounded. Next, in *Lewis v. Walter* (1821),<sup>5</sup> Holroyd and Best, J.J., expressed an opinion that the rule had been laid down too largely in the Earl of Northampton's Case, and ought to be qualified by confining it to cases where there is a fair and just reason for the repetition of the slander (that is, I presume, to cases where the repetition is privileged). Then, in February, 1829, the Court of Common Pleas decided that in actions of *libel* there was no such rule. *De Crespigny v. Wellesley*,<sup>6</sup> in which case Best, C.J., says:—"Of what use is it to send the name of the author with a libel that is to pass into a country where he is entirely unknown: the name of the author of a statement will not inform those who do not know his character, whether he is a person entitled to credit for veracity or not; whether his statement was made in earnest or by way of joke; whether it contains a charge made by a man of sound mind or the delusion of a lunatic." And lastly, in *M'Pherson v. Daniels*,<sup>7</sup> the rule in Lord Northampton's Case was directly challenged and expressly overruled; and it was held that for a defendant to prove that he said at the time that he heard the tale from A., and that A. did in fact tell it to the defendant, was no justification. It must be proved that the defendant repeated the story on a justifiable occasion, and in the *bona fide* belief in its truth [and that is a defence of privilege, see *Bromage v. Prosser*, 4 B. & C. 247; 6 D. & R. 296; 1 C. & P. 475; *post*, c. VIII.]. This decision has been approved of and followed in *Ward v. Weeks*,<sup>8</sup> and in *Watkin v. Hall*.<sup>9</sup>

And in America the law appears to be the same.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 1 Lev. 82.

<sup>2</sup> 7 T. R. 17.

<sup>3</sup> 5 East, 463; 2 Smith, 28.

<sup>4</sup> 2 East, 426.

<sup>5</sup> 4 B. & Ald. 615.

<sup>6</sup> 5 Bing. 392.

<sup>7</sup> 10 B. & C. 263; 5 M. & R. 251 (Michaelmas, 1829).

<sup>8</sup> 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796.

<sup>9</sup> L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561.

<sup>10</sup> *Jarnigan v. Fleming*, 43 Miss. 711; *Treat v. Browning*, 4 Connecticut, 408; *Runkle v. Meyers*, 3 Yeates (Pennsylvania) 518; *Dole v. Lyon*, 10 Johns. (New York) 447; *Inman v. Foster*, 8 Wend. 602. (a)

(a) *Ante*, p. 162, note.

*Illustrations.*

Woor told Daniels that M'Pherson's horses had been seized from the coach on the road, that he had been arrested, and that the bailiffs were in \* his \* 165 house. Daniels went about telling every one "Woor says that M'Pherson's horses have been seized from the coach on the road, that he himself has been arrested, and that the bailiffs are in his house." *Held* that Daniels was liable to an action by M'Pherson for the slander, although he named Woor at the time as the person from whom he had heard it; that it was no justification to prove that Woor did in fact say so: defendant must go further and prove that what Woor said was true. *M'Pherson v. Daniels*, 10 B. & C. 263; 5 M. & R. 251.

The defendant said to the plaintiff in the presence of others:—"Thou art a sheep-stealing rogue, and Farmer Parker told me so." *Held* that an action lay. *Gardiner v. Atwater*, Say. 265; *Lewes v. Walter* (1617), 3 Bulstr. 225; *Cro. Jac.* 406, 413; *Rolle's Rep.* 444; *Meggs v. Griffith*, *Cro. Eliz.* 400; *Moore*, 408.

The defendant said to the plaintiff, a tailor, in the presence of others:—"I heard you were run away," *scilicet*, from your creditors. *Held* that an action lay. *Davis v. Lewis*, 7 T. R. 17.

Mr. and Mrs. Davies wrote a libellous letter to the Directors of the London Missionary Society, and sent a copy to the defendant, who published extracts from it in a pamphlet. The defendant stated that the letter was written by Mr. and Mrs. Davies, and at the time he wrote the pamphlet he believed all the statements made in the letter to be true. *Held* no justification for his publishing it. *Tidman v. Ainslie* (1854), 10 Exch. 63. And see *Mills and wife v. Spencer and wife* (1817), *Holt*, N. P. 533; *McGregor v. Thwaites* (1824), 3 B. & C. 24; 4 D. & R. 695.

A rumor was current on the Stock Exchange that the chairman of the S. E. Ry. Co. had failed; and the shares in the company consequently fell; thereupon the defendant said, "You have heard what has caused the fall—I mean, the rumor about the S. Eastern chairman having failed?" *Held* that a plea that there was in fact such a rumor was no answer to the action. *Watkin v. Hall*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561. See *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 557.

If at a meeting of a board of guardians charges were made against the plaintiff, this does not justify the owner of a newspaper in publishing them to the world: it is no justification to plead that such charges were in fact made, and that the alleged libel was an impartial and accurate report of what took place at such meeting. *Purcell v. Sowler*, 1 C. P. D. 781; 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 W. R. 362; 36 L. T. 416; *Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 229; 26 L. J. Q. B. 104; 3 Jur. N. S. 613; 5 W. R. 253; 28 L. T. (Old S.) 265; *Popham v. Pickburn*, 7 H. & N. 891; 31 L. J. Ex. 133; 8 Jur. N. S. 179; 10 W. R. 324; 5 L. T. 846.

\* And here note a great distinction between libel and \* 166 slander. The actual publisher of a libel may be an innocent porter or messenger, a mere hand, unconscious of the nature of his act; and for which therefore his employers shall be held liable, and not he. Whereas in every case of the republication of a slander, the publisher acts consciously and voluntarily; the repetition is his own act. Therefore if I am in any way concerned in the making or publishing of a libel, I am liable for all the

damage that ensues to the plaintiff from its publication. But if I slander A., I am only liable for such damages as result directly from that one utterance by my own lips. If B. hears me and chooses to carry the tale to A.'s master, that is B.'s own act; and should A.'s master in consequence dismiss him from his employment, B. alone is answerable for that, and not I. In an action against me such special damage would be too remote. For each publication of a slander is a distinct and separate act, and every person repeating it becomes an independent slanderer, and he alone is answerable for the consequences of his own unlawful act.

Thus, by the law of England as it at present stands, the person who invents a lie and maliciously sets it in circulation may sometimes escape punishment altogether, while a person who is merely injudicious may be liable to an action through repeating a story which he believed to be the truth, as he heard it told frequently in good society. For if I originate a slander against you of such a nature that the words are not actionable *per se*, the utterance of them is no ground of action, unless special damage follows. If I myself tell the story to your employer, who thereupon dismisses you, you have an action against me; but if I only tell it to your friends and relations and no pecuniary damage ensues from my own communication of it to any one, then no action lies against me; although the story is sure to get round to your master sooner or later. The unfortunate man whose lips

\* 167 actually utter the slander to your master, is the \* only person that can be made defendant; for it is his publication alone which is actionable as causing special damage.<sup>1</sup> But this apparent hardship only arises where the words are not actionable without proof of special damage. Where the words are actionable *per se*, the jury find the damages *generally*, and will judge from the circumstances which of the various defendants is most to blame.

There are two apparent exceptions to this rule:—

I. Where by communicating a slander to A., the defendant puts A. under a moral necessity to repeat it to some other person immediately concerned; here, if the defendant knew the relation in which A. stood to this other person, he will be taken to have contemplated this result when he spoke to A. In fact, here A.'s repetition is the natural and necessary consequence of the defendant's communication to A.

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, c. X., Special Damage.



II. Where there is evidence that the defendant though he spoke only to A., intended and desired that A. should repeat his words, or expressly requested him to do so : here the defendant is liable for all the consequences of A.'s repetition of the slander ; for A. thus becomes the agent of the defendant.<sup>1</sup>

### Illustrations.

Weeks was speaking to Bryce of the plaintiff and said, " He is a rogue and a swindler ; I know enough about him to hang him." Bryce repeated this to Bryer as Weeks's statement. Bryer consequently refused to trust the plaintiff. *Held* that the judge was right in nonsuiting the plaintiff : for the words were not actionable *per se* ; and the damage was too remote. *Ward v. Weeks*, 7 Bing. 211 ; 4 M. & P. 796.

The defendant's wife charged Mrs. Parkins with adultery. She indignantly told her husband, her natural protector : he was unreasonable enough to insist upon a separation in consequence. *Held*, that for the separation the defendant was not liable. *Parkins et ux. v. Scott et ux.* 1 H. & C. 153 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 331 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 593 ; 10 W. R. 562 ; 6 L. T. 394. See *Dixon v. Smith*, 5 H. & N. 450 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 125.

H. told Mr. Watkins that the plaintiff, his wife's dressmaker, was a \* woman of immoral character ; Mr. Watkins naturally informed his wife of \* 168 this charge, and she ceased to employ the plaintiff. *Held* that the plaintiff's loss of Mrs. Watkins's custom was the natural and necessary consequence of the defendant's communication to Mr. Watkins. *Derry v. Handley*, 16 L. T. 263. See *Gillett v. Bullivant*, 7 L. T. (Old S.) 490 ; *Kendillon v. Maltby*, 1 Car. & Marsh. 402.

It has sometimes been held on the principle of *Volenti non fit injuria*, that if the only publication proved at the trial be one brought about by the plaintiff's own contrivance, the action must fail. Thus, in *King v. Waring et ux.*,<sup>2</sup> Lord Alvanley decided, that if a servant, knowing the character which his master will give him, procures a letter to be written, not with a fair view of inquiring the character, but to procure an answer upon which to ground an action for a libel, no such action can be maintained. So in *Smith v. Wood*,<sup>3</sup> where the plaintiff, hearing that defendant had in his possession a copy of a libellous caricature of the plaintiff, sent an agent who asked to see the picture, and the defendant showed it him at his request, Lord Ellenborough ruled that this was no sufficient evidence of publication and nonsuited the plaintiff.

But these cases so far as the question of *publication* merely is concerned, must be taken to be overruled by *The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer*.<sup>4</sup> Whether or no the plaintiff's conduct in himself provoking or inviting the publication on which he afterwards bases his action may amount to a ground of privilege as excusing the publication made, is a different question, which

<sup>1</sup> As to Principal and Agent, see Law of Persons, c. XII., *post*, pp. 360-365.

<sup>2</sup> 5 Esp. 15.

<sup>3</sup> 3 Camp. 323.

<sup>4</sup> 14 Q. B. 185 ; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20 ; 14 Jur. 110 ; 3 C. & K. 10.

will be discussed *post*, pp. 230-233.<sup>1</sup> And indeed in many of the older cases the judges say, "there is no sufficient publication to support an action for a libel," when they mean in modern parlance that the publication was privileged by reason of the occasion. See judgment of Best, J., in *Fairman v. Ives*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Warr v. Jolly*, 6 C. & P. 497; *Smith v. Mathews*, 1 M. & Rob. 151; *Griffiths v. Lewis*, 7 Q. B. 61; 14 L. J. Q. B. 197; 9 Jur. 370; 8 Q. B. 841; 15 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Jur. 711; *Force v. Warren*, 15 C. B. N. S. 806; *O'Donoghue v. Hussey*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 124; *Dwyer v. Esmonde*, 2 L. R. Ir. 243.

<sup>2</sup> 5 B. & Ald. 646; 1 D. & R. 252; 1 Chit. 85.

## JUSTIFICATION.

THE truth of any defamatory words is, if pleaded, a complete defence to any action of libel or slander (though alone it is not a defence in a criminal trial). The *onus*, however, of proving that the words are true lies on the defendant. (a) The falsehood of all defamatory words is presumed in the plaintiff's favor, and he need give no evidence to show they are false; (b) but the defendant can rebut this presumption by giving evidence in support of his plea that the words are true in substance and in fact. If the jury are satisfied that the words are true, they must find for the defendant, though they feel sure that he spoke the words spitefully and maliciously. (c) On the other hand, if the words are false, the jury must find for the plaintiff, although they are satisfied that the defendant *bonâ fide* and reasonably believed the words to be true at the time he uttered them. (d)

(a) The result is that the defendant is entitled to open and close. *Ransone v. Christian*, 56 Ga. 351; s. c. 49 Ga. 491; *Heilman v. Shanklin*, 60 Ind. 424, 445; *Tull v. David*, 27 Ind. 377. *Secus* in Missouri. *Buckley v. Knapp*, 48 Mo. 152. And probably in Massachusetts.

(b) *Proctor v. Houghtaling*, 37 Mich. 41; *Russell v. Anthony*, 21 Kans. 450.

(c) *Foss v. Hildreth*, 10 Allen, 76; *McBee v. Fulton*, 47 Md. 403, 428. The truth is a defence to a civil action, regardless too of the occasion. So far as *Carpenter v. Bailey*, 56 N. H. 283; s. c. 53 N. H. 590, may suggest a different rule it is misleading unless founded upon statute. The occasion (as rebutting malice) in addition to the truth may be important in criminal cases; and that is all that *State v. Burnham*, 9 N. H. 45, which was followed in *Carpenter v. Bailey*, can be taken to decide.

(d) *Powers v. Cary*, 64 Maine, 9;

*Smart v. Blanchard*, 42 N. H. 137; *Woodruff v. Richardson*, 20 Conn. 238; *Wilson v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 363; *Grimes v. Coyle*, 6 B. Mon. 301. Belief in the truth of the charge is no justification, though such belief may have been induced by misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, if that fall short of what the defendant has charged. *Clark v. Brown*, 116 Mass. 504; *Parkhurst v. Ketchum*, 6 Allen, 406; *Watson v. Moore*, 2 Cush. 133; *Gillis v. Peck*, 20 Conn. 228. It follows that reports of the truth of the charge are not admissible in justification. *Richardson v. Roberts*, 23 Ga. 215; *Lehning v. Hewett*, 45 Ill. 23; *Moberly v. Preston*, 8 Mo. 462; *Dame v. Kenney*, 25 N. H. 318; *Mapes v. Weeks*, 4 Wend. 659; *Kennedy v. Giffard*, 19 Wend. 296; *Hampton v. Wilson*, 4 Dev. 468; *Freeman v. Price*, 2 Bailey, 115. Upon the question of mitigation, see *post*, p. 305, note. Nor can the defendant show that the plaintiff has been

But the whole (*a*) libel must be proved true, not a part merely. The justification must be as broad as the charge, and must justify the precise charge. (*b*) If any material part be not proved true, the plaintiff will recover damages in respect of such \* 170 part.<sup>1</sup> (*c*) Thus where \* a libellous paragraph in a newspaper is introduced by a libellous heading, it is not enough to prove the truth of the facts stated in the paragraph, defendant must also prove the truth of the heading.<sup>2</sup>

But where the gist of the libel consists of one specific charge which is proved to be true, defendant need not justify every expression which he has used in commenting on the plaintiff's

<sup>1</sup> *Weaver v. Lloyd*, 1 C. & P. 295; 2 B. & C. 678; 4 D. & R. 230; *Ingram v. Lawson*, 5 Bing. N. C. 66; 6 Scott, 775; 7 Dowl. 125; 1 Arn. 387; 3 Jur. 73; 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326.

<sup>2</sup> *Mountney v. Watton*, 2 B. & Ad. 673; *Chalmers v. Shackell*, 6 C. & P. 475.

guilty of another or of the same offence at another time than that charged, especially after the words were spoken. *Beggarly v. Craft*, 31 Ga. 309; *Sharpe v. Stephenson*, 12 Ired. 348; *Burford v. Wible*, 32 Penn. St. 95; *Ridley v. Perry*, 16 Maine, 21; *Pallet v. Sargent*, 36 N. H. 496; *Whitaker v. Carter*, 4 Ired. 461; *Self v. Gardner*, 15 Mo. 480; *Stiles v. Comstock*, 9 How. Pr. 48; *Palmer v. Haight*, 2 Barb. 210; *Watters v. Smoot*, 11 Ired. 315; *Smith v. Buckecker*, 4 Rawle, 295; *Long v. Brougher*, 5 Watts, 439. Further, in regard to evidence inadmissible to support a plea of the truth, see *Luthan v. Berry*, 1 Porter (Ala.), 110; *Chapman v. Ordway*, 5 Allen, 593; *Bisbey v. Shaw*, 15 Barb. 578; *Maybee v. Fisk*, 42 Barb. 326; *Barfield v. Britt*, 2 Jones, 41; *Anonymous*, 1 Hill (S. Car.), 251; *Skinner v. Grant*, 12 Vt. 456. Of course drunkenness is no excuse. *McKee v. Ingalls*, 4 Scam. 30; *Reed v. Harper*, 25 Iowa, 87. Though it may be ground for mitigation. *Howell v. Howell*, 10 Ired. 84. Nor is it a justification that the words were spoken in jest. *Hatch v. Potter*, 2 Gilm. 725; *McKee v. Ingalls*, *supra*; *Long v. Eakle*, 4 Md. 454; *Donoghue v. Hayes*, *Hayes* (Ireland), 265. Unless of course they were both so intended and so understood by all present; no attempt being made to stab the plaintiff's character. *Donoghue v. Hayes*.

(*a*) That is, all that is material; and the same is true of slander. If a habit of committing a particular crime be charged, particular instances may be proved. *Tal-madge v. Baker*, 22 Wis. 625.

(*b*) *Skinner v. Powers*, 1 Wend. 451; *Stiles v. Comstock*, 9 How. Pr. 48; *Burford v. Wible*, 32 Penn. St. 95; *Heilman v. Shanklin*, 60 Ind. 424, 441; *Whittemore v. Weiss*, 33 Mich. 348; *Palmer v. Smith*, 21 Minn. 419; *McGregor v. Gregory*, 11 Mees. & W. 287; *Carpenter v. Bailey*, 56 N. H. 283; s. c. 53 N. H. 590.

(*c*) *Loveland v. Hosmer*, 8 How. Pr. 215; *Heilman v. Shanklin*, *supra*; *Tull v. David*, 27 Ind. 377; *Whittemore v. Weiss*, *supra*. See *Clark v. Brown*, 116 Mass. 504. But a justification may go to part of the charge, if that be severable, for the purpose of reducing the damages. *Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.*, 68 Maine, 279. The justification should state the facts in detail, so far as they are material. *Van Ness v. Hamilton*, 19 Johns. 349; *Andrews v. Van Duzer*, 11 Johns. 38; *Billings v. Waller*, 28 How. Pr. 97; *Swann v. Rary*, 3 Blackf. 298; *Snow v. Witcher*, 9 Ired. 346; *Kent v. David*, 3 Blackf. 301; *Steele v. Phillips*, 10 Humph. 461; *Orme v. Lodge*, 3 Har. & J. 83. *Post*, p. 177, note 2. The plea should admit the speaking of the words. *Davis v. Mathews*, 2 Ohio, 257; *Anibal v. Hunter*, 6 How. 255.

conduct. Nor, if the substantial imputation be proved true, will a slight inaccuracy in one of its details prevent defendant's succeeding, provided such inaccuracy in no way alters the complexion of the affair, and would have no different effect on the reader than that which the literal truth would produce.<sup>1</sup> If epithets or terms of general abuse be used which do not add to the sting of the charge, they need not be justified;<sup>2</sup> but if they insinuate some further charge in addition to the main imputation, or imply some circumstance substantially aggravating such main imputation, then they must be justified as well as the rest.<sup>3</sup> In such a case it will be a question for *the jury* whether the *substance* (a) of the libellous statement has been proved true to their satisfaction, or whether the fact not justified amounts to a separate charge or imputation against the plaintiff, substantially distinct from the main charge or gist of the libel, or at least amounts to a material aggravation of such main charge.<sup>4</sup>

\* "It would be extravagant," says Lord Denman,<sup>5</sup> "to say \* 171 that in cases of libel *every* comment upon facts requires a justification. But a comment may introduce independent facts, a justification of which is necessary. A comment may be the mere shadow of the previous imputation; but if it infers a new fact, the defendant must abide by that inference of fact, and the fairness of the comments must be decided upon by the jury."<sup>6</sup>

So in criminal cases, if the whole of the plea of justification be not proved, the Crown will be entitled to a verdict.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Alexander v. N.E. Rail. Co.*, 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 11 Jur. N. S. 619; 13 W. R. 651; 6 B. & S. 340; cf. *Stockdale v. Tarte*, 4 A. & E. 1016; *Blake v. Stevens*, 4 F. & F. 239; 11 L. T. 544.

<sup>2</sup> *Edwards v. Bell*, 1 Bing. 403; *Morrison v. Harmer*, 3 Bing. N. C. 767; 4 Scott, 533; 3 Hodges, 108.

<sup>3</sup> Per Maule, J., in *Helsham v. Blackwood*, 11 C. B. 129; 20 L. J. C. P. 192; 15 Jur. 861.

<sup>4</sup> *Warman v. Hine*, 1 Jur. 820; *Weaver v. Lloyd*, 2 B. & C. 678; 4 D. & R. 230; 1 C. & P. 295; *Behrens v. Allen*, 8 Jur. N. S. 118; 3 F. & F. 135.

<sup>5</sup> In *Cooper v. Lawson*, 8 Ad. & E. 753; 1 P. & D. 15; 1 W. W. & H. 601; 2 Jur. 919.

<sup>6</sup> And see *Lefroy v. Burnside*, 4 L. R. Ir. 556.

<sup>7</sup> *R. v. Newman*, 1 E. & B. 268, 558; 22 L. J. Q. B. 156; *Dears. C. C.* 85; 17 Jur. 617; 3 C. & K. 252.

(a) *Wilson v. Nations*, 5 Yerg. 211.

*Illustrations.*

The editor of one newspaper called the editor of another "a felon editor." Justification that the plaintiff had been convicted of felony and sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeal held the plea bad for not averring that the plaintiff was still enduring the punishment when the words were uttered; for that by the 9 Geo. IV. c. 32, s. 3, a person who has been convicted of felony and who has undergone the full punishment is in law no longer a felon. *Leyman v. Latimer*, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 25 W. R. 751; 26 W. R. 305; 37 L. T. 360, 819; 14 Cox, C. C. 51.

Words complained of that the plaintiff was a "libellous journalist." Proof that he had libelled one man, who had recovered from him damages £100, held insufficient. *Wakley v. Cooke and Healey*, 4 Ex. 511; 19 L. J. Ex. 91.

Libel complained of:—that no boys had for the last seven years received instruction in the Free Grammar School at Lichfield of which plaintiff was head master, and that the decay of the school seemed mainly attributable to the plaintiff's violent conduct. Plea of justification that no boys had in fact received instruction in the school for the last seven years, and that the plaintiff had been guilty of violent conduct towards several of his scholars, was held bad on special demurrer, because it wholly omitted to connect the decay of the school with the alleged violence, and therefore left the second part of the libel unjustified. *Smith v. Parker*, 13 M. & W. 459; 14 L. J. Ex. 52; 2 D. & L. 394.

\* 172 \* The plaintiff, an architect, had been employed by a certain committee to superintend and carry out the restoration of Skirlaugh Church; thereupon the defendant, who had no manner of interest in the question of the employment of plaintiff to execute the work, wrote a letter to a member of the committee saying: "I see that the restoration of Skirlaugh Church has fallen into the hands of an architect who is a Wesleyan and can have no experience in church work. Can you not do something to avert the irreparable loss which must be caused if any of the masonry of this ancient gem of art be ignorantly tampered with?" In an action for libel the defendant by way of justification alleged "that the facts contained in the letter are true, and the opinions expressed in it, whether right or wrong, were honestly held and expressed by the defendant," and in his particulars under this plea "that the plaintiff cannot show experience in church work, *i.e.*, of the kind which in the opinion of the defendant was requisite."

*Held*, that the letter was a libel on the plaintiff in the way of his profession or calling.

That the justification set up was no justification at all, because the letter obviously meant that the plaintiff could show no experience in the work which he had been employed by the committee to execute. Verdict for the plaintiffs. Damages, £50. *Botterill and another v. Whytehead*, 41 L. T. 588.

Libel complained of:—that the plaintiff had "*bolled*," leaving some of the tradesmen of the town to lament the fashionable character of his entertainment. Proof that he had *quitted* the town leaving some of his bills unpaid, held insufficient. *O'Brien v. Bryant*, 16 M. & W. 168; 16 L. J. Ex. 77; 4 D. & L. 341.

Libel complained of:—that the plaintiff, having challenged his opponent to a duel, spent the whole of the night preceding in practising with his pistol, and killed his opponent, and was therefore guilty of murder. Proof that the plaintiff had killed his opponent, and had been tried for murder, held insufficient. For the charge of pistol

practising was considered a separate and substantial charge, and it was not justified. *Helsham v. Blackwood*, 11 C. B. 128; 20 L. J. C. P. 187; 15 Jur. 861.

The libel complained of was headed — “How Lawyer B. treats his clients,” followed by a report of a particular case in which *one* client of Lawyer B. had been badly treated. That particular case was proved to be correctly reported, but this was held insufficient to justify the heading, which implied that Lawyer B. *generally* treated his clients badly. *Bishop v. Latimer*, 4 L. T. 775. See also *Mountney v. Walton*, 2 B. & Ad. 673; *Chalmers v. Shackell*, 6 C. & P. 475; *Clement v. Lewis and others*, 3 Brod. & Bing. 297; 7 Moore, 200; 3 B. & Ald. 702.

Libel complained of: — that the plaintiff, a proctor, had three times been \* suspended from practice, for extortion. Proof that he had *once* been so sus- \* 173 pended, was held insufficient. *Clarkson v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. 266; 3 M. & P. 605; 6 Bing. 587; 4 M. & P. 356. See also *Johns v. Gittings*, Cro. Eliz. 239; *Goodburne v. Bowman and others*, 9 Bing. 532; *Clarke v. Taylor*, 2 Bing. N. C. 654; 3 Scott, 95; 2 Hodges, 65; *Blake v. Stevens and others*, 4 F. & F. 232; 11 L. T. 543.

But when the libel complained of exposed the “homicidal tricks of those impudent and ignorant scamps who had the audacity to pretend to cure all diseases with one kind of pill” — asserted that “several of the rotgut rascals had been convicted of manslaughter and fined and imprisoned for killing people with enormous doses of their universal vegetable boluses,” and characterised the plaintiffs’ system as “one of wholesale poisoning;” and it was proved at the trial “that the plaintiff’s pills when taken in large doses, as recommended by the plaintiffs, were highly dangerous, deadly and poisonous,” and “that two persons had died in consequence of taking large quantities of them; and that the people who had administered these pills were tried, convicted, and imprisoned for the manslaughter of these two persons,” — this was held a sufficient justification, although the expressions “scamps,” “rascals,” and “wholesale poisoning” had not been fully substantiated: the main charge and gist of the libel being amply sustained. *Morrison v. Harmer*, 3 Bing. N. C. 767; 4 Scott, 533; 3 Hodges, 108; *Edsall v. Russell*, 4 M. & Gr. 1090; 5 Scott, N. R. 801; 2 Dowl. N. S. 641; 12 L. J. C. P. 4; 6 Jur. 996.

The libel complained of was a notice published by a railway company to the effect that the plaintiff had been convicted of riding in a train for which his ticket was not available, and was sentenced to be fined £1, or to three weeks’ imprisonment in default of payment. Proof that he had been so convicted and fined £1, and sentenced to a fortnight’s imprisonment in default of payment, held sufficient; as the error could not have made any difference in the effect which the notice would produce on the mind of the public. *Alexander v. N. E. R. Co.*, 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 11 Jur. N. S. 619; 13 W. R. 651; 6 B. & S. 340. But see *Gwynn v. S. E. R. Co.*, 18 L. T. 738; *Biggs v. G. E. R. Co.*, 16 W. R. 708; 18 L. T. 482. See also *Lay v. Lawson*, 4 Ad. & E. 795; *Edwards v. Bell and others*, 1 Bing. 403; *Tighe v. Cooper*, 7 E. & B. 639; 26 L. J. Q. B. 215; 3 Jur. N. S. 716.

This rule that the whole of the libel must be justified to enable the defendant to succeed applies to all cases of reported speeches or repetitions of slander. Thus, if the libel complained of be, “A.B. said that the plaintiff \* had been guilty of fraud, \* 174 etc.,” it is of no avail to plead that A.B. did in fact make that statement on the occasion specified. Each repetition is a fresh defamation, and the defendant by repeating A.B.’s words

has made them his own, and is legally as liable as if he had invented the story himself. The only plea of justification which will be an answer to the action must not merely allege that A.B. did in fact say so, but must go on to aver with all necessary particularity that every word which A.B. is reported to have said is true in substance and in fact. In short, a previous publication by another of the same defamatory words is no justification for their repetition.<sup>1</sup> Still less is it any evidence of their truth.<sup>2</sup>

The opposite doctrine was laid down in the Earl of Northampton's case, but the fourth resolution in that case never professed to apply to actions of libel, but to actions for slander only; and even in actions of slander it must now be taken not to be law.<sup>3</sup>

This rule sometimes works an apparent hardship upon newspaper proprietors who, in the ordinary course of their business have presented to the public a full, true, and impartial account of what really took place at a public meeting, considering no doubt that thereby they were merely doing their duty. But the consequence of publishing in the papers calumnies uttered at some political meeting, or at a vestry board, might be most injurious to the person calumniated. The original slander might not be actionable *per se*, or the communication may be privileged, so that no action lies against the speaker; moreover the meeting may have been thinly attended, and the audience may have known that the speaker was not worthy of credit. But it would be a terrible thing for the person defamed

\* 175 \* if such words could therefore be printed and published to all the world, and remain in a permanent form recorded against him, without any remedy being permitted him for the injury caused by their extended circulation. See the remarks of Lord Campbell in *Davison v. Duncan*; <sup>4</sup> and the recommendation of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, discussed *post*, pp. 261-263.

### *Illustrations.*

Woor told Daniels that M'Pherson was insolvent; Daniels went about telling his friends "Woor says M'Pherson is insolvent." Proof that Woor had in fact said so was held no answer to the action. Daniels was liable in damages unless he could also

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, c. VI., Publication, pp. 161-168.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Newman*, 1 E. & B. 268, 558; 3 C. & K. 252; *Dears*, C. C. 85; 22 L. J. Q. B. 156; 17 Jur. 617.

<sup>3</sup> See *De Crespigny v. Wellesley*, 5 Bing. 392; 2 M. & P. 695; *Tidman v. Ainslie*, 10 Ex. 66; *M'Pherson v. Daniels*, 10 B. & C. 270; 5 M. & R. 251; *Watkin v. Hall*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561.

<sup>4</sup> 7 E. & B. 231; 26 L. J. Q. B. 106; 3 Jur. N. S. 613; 5 W. R. 253; 28 L. T. (Old S.) 265.



prove the truth of Woor's assertion. *M'Pherson v. Daniels*, 10 B. & C. 263 ; 5 M. & R. 251.

A rumor was current on the Stock Exchange that the chairman of the S. E. R. Co. had failed ; and the shares of the company consequently fell ; thereupon the defendant said, " You have heard what has caused the fall — I mean, the rumor about the S. Eastern chairman having failed ? " *Held* that a plea that there was in fact such a rumor was no answer to the action. *Watkin v. Hall*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396 ; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125 ; 16 W. R. 857 ; 18 L. T. 561 ; *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 557.

At a meeting of the West Hartlepool Improvement Commissioners, one of the commissioners made some defamatory remarks as to the conduct of the former secretary of the Bishop of Durham in procuring from the Bishop a licence for the chaplain of the West Hartlepool cemetery. These remarks were reported in the local newspaper ; and the secretary brought an action against the owner of the newspaper for libel. A plea of justification, alleging that such remarks were in fact made at a public meeting of the commissioners, and that the alleged libel was an impartial and accurate report of what took place at such meeting, was held bad on demurrer. *Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 229 ; 26 L. J. Q. B. 104 ; 3 Jur. N. S. 613 ; 5 W. R. 253 ; 28 L. T. (Old S.) 265.

The defendants, the printers and publishers of the *Manchester Courier*, published in their paper a report of the proceedings at a meeting of the Board of Guardians for the Altrincham Poor-Law Union, at which *ex parte* charges were made against the medical officer of the Union Workhouse at Knutsford, of neglecting to attend the pauper patients when sent for. *Held* that the matter was one of public interest ; but that the report was not privileged by the occasion, although it was admitted to be a *bona fide* and a correct account of what passed at the meeting ; and the plaintiff recovered 40s. damages and costs. *Purcell v. Sowler*, 1 C. P. D. 781 ; affirmed on appeal, 2 C. P. D. 215 ; 46 L. J. C. P. 308 ; 25 W. R. 362 ; 36 L. T. 416. See also *Pierce v. Ellis*, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 64.

\* So also a newspaper proprietor will be held liable for publishing a report \* 176 made to the vestry by their medical officer of health, even although the vestry are required by Act of Parliament sooner or later to publish such report themselves. *Popham v. Pickburn*, 7 H. & N. 891 ; 31 L. J. Ex. 133 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 179 ; 10 W. R. 324 ; 5 L. T. 846. See also *Charlton v. Watton*, 6 C. & P. 385.

So even in reports of judicial proceedings, which are generally held privileged, if the reporter merely sets out the facts as stated by counsel for one party, and does not give the evidence, or merely says that all that counsel stated was proved, a justification that counsel did in fact say so, and that all he stated was in fact proved, is insufficient ; the evidence should be set out, and the charges made in the counsel's speech should also be justified. *Lewis v. Walter*, 4 B. & Ald. 605 ; *Saunders v. Mills*, 3 M. & P. 520 ; 6 Bing. 218. See also *Flint v. Pike*, 4 B. & C. 473 ; 6 D. & R. 528 ; and the remarks of Lord Campbell in *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 544 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 970 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282.

It is libellous to publish a highly-colored account of judicial proceedings, mixed with the reporter's own observations and conclusions upon what passed in Court, containing an insinuation that the plaintiff had committed perjury : and it is no justification to pick out such parts of the libel as contain an account of the trial, and to plead that such parts are true and accurate, leaving the extraneous matter altogether unjustified. *Stiles v. Nokes*, 7 East, 493 ; same case *sub nomine Carr v. Jones*, 3 Smith, 491.

At the same time a defendant may in mitigation of damages justify as to one particular part of the libel, provided such part

contains imputations distinct from the rest.<sup>1</sup> So he may justify as to one part, and demur or plead privilege to the rest, or deny that he ever spoke or published the rest of the words. But in all these cases the part selected must be severable from the rest so as to be intelligible by itself, and must also convey a distinct and separate imputation against the plaintiff.<sup>2</sup>

\* 177 \* Again, where the words are laid with an innuendo in the Statement of Claim, the defendant may justify the words, either with or without the meaning alleged in such innuendo; or he may do both.<sup>3</sup> That is, he may deny that the plaintiff puts the true construction on his words, and assert that, if taken in their natural and ordinary meaning, his words will be found to be true; or he may boldly allege that the words are true, even in the worst signification that can be put upon them. But it seems that a defendant may not put a meaning of his own on the words, and say that in that sense they are true; for if he deny that the meaning assigned to his words in the Statement of Claim is the correct one, he must be content to leave it to the jury at the trial to determine what meaning the words naturally bear.<sup>4</sup> In Ireland the defendant must justify the innuendo as well as the words.<sup>5</sup>

A justification must always be specially pleaded, (a) and it

<sup>1</sup> Per Tindal, C.J., in *Clarke v. Taylor*, 2 Bing. N. C. 668; 3 Scott, 95; 2 Hodges, 65.

<sup>2</sup> *McGregor v. Gregory*, 11 M. & W. 287; 12 L. J. Ex. 204; 2 D. N. S. 769; *Churchill v. Hunt*, 2 B. & Ald. 685; 1 Chit. 480; *Roberts v. Brown*, 10 Bing. 519; 4 M. & Scott, 407; *Biddulph v. Chamberlayne*, 17 Q. B. 351.

<sup>3</sup> *Watkin v. Hall*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. Q. B. 125; 16 W. R. 857; 18 L. T. 561.

<sup>4</sup> *Brembridge v. Latimer*, 12 W. R. 878; 10 L. T. 816.

<sup>5</sup> *Hort v. Reade*, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 551.

(a) The truth is not admissible under a plea of the general issue even as mitigation. *Swift v. Dickerman*, 31 Conn. 285; *Storey v. Early*, 86 Ill. 461; *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199; *Harper v. Harper*, 10 Bush, 447; *Williams v. Greenwade*, 3 Dana, 432; *Parker v. McQueen*, 8 B. Mon. 16; *Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292; *Huson v. Dale*, 19 Mich. 17; *Wier v. Allen*, 51 N. H. 177; *Porter v. Botkins*, 59 Penn. St. 484; *Langton v. Hagerty*, 35 Wis. 150; *Haws v. Stanford*, 4 Sneed, 520; *Sweeney v. Baker*, 13 W. Va. 158. But see *Hackett v. Brown*, 2 Heisk. 264, 272. Still it matters not that the facts offered in evidence under the

general issue may have a tendency to prove the truth, if they are not offered for such a purpose, but are offered merely to rebut or cut down malice. *Huson v. Dale*, 19 Mich. 17 (where the conflict of authority upon this subject growing out of *Underwood v. Parks*, 2 Strange, 1200, is critically examined); *Swift v. Dickerman*, 31 Conn. 285; *Sweeney v. Baker*, 13 W. Va. 158. See *Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292. See however *Porter v. Botkins*, 59 Penn. St. 484; *Petrie v. Rose*, 5 Watts & S. 364; *Smith v. Smith*, 39 Penn. St. 441. On the other hand it is held that facts in mitigation are not admissible under a plea of

must be pleaded with sufficient particularity to enable plaintiff to know precisely what is the charge he will have to meet.<sup>1</sup> (a) A plea, which professes to justify the whole libel, but in effect justifies only a part, is a bad plea, and demurrable. A plea of justification is always construed strictly,<sup>2</sup> and it must set forth issuable facts.<sup>3</sup>

"The plea ought to state the charge with the same precision as in an indictment."<sup>4</sup> (b) \* And at the trial it must \* 178 be proved as strictly as an indictment for the offence it imputes. Indeed, it is said that if words amount to a charge of felony, and the defendant justifies and the jury find the plea proved, the plaintiff may at once be put upon his trial before a petty jury, without the necessity of any bill being found by a grand jury.<sup>5</sup> (c)

<sup>1</sup> *I'Anson v. Stuart*, 1 T. R. 748; 2 Sm. Lg. Cases, 6th ed. 57 (omitted in last edition).

<sup>2</sup> *Leyman v. Latimer*, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352.

<sup>3</sup> *Jones v. Stevens*, 11 Price, 235; *Newman v. Bailey*, 2 Chit. 665; *Holmes v. Catesby*, 1 Taunt. 543.

<sup>4</sup> Per Alderson, B., in *Hickinbotham v. Leach*, 10 M. & W. 363; 2 D. N. S. 270.

<sup>5</sup> Per Lord Kenyon in *Cook v. Field*, 3 Esp. 134. See the note to *Prosser v. Rowe*, 2 C. & P. 422; *Johnson v. Browning*, 6 Mod. 217.

the truth alone. *Buckley v. Knapp*, 48 Mo. 152; *Proctor v. Houghtaling*, 37 Mich. 41; *Gregory v. Atkins*, 42 Vt. 237; *Powers v. Cary*, 64 Maine, 9; *Stone v. Varney*, 7 Met. 86, 93; *Chamberlain v. Vance*, 51 Cal. 79; *Wilson v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 384. *Secus* in Indiana. *Heilman v. Shanklin*, 60 Ind. 424, 446; *Swinney v. Nave*, 22 Ind. 178; *O'Conner v. O'Conner*, 27 Ind. 69.

(a) See *Fry v. Bennett*, 5 Sandf. 54; *Ames v. Hazard*, 8 R. I. 143; *Sweeney v. Baker*, 13 W. Va. 158; *Mull v. McKnight*, 67 Ind. 535; *De Armond v. Armstrong*, 37 Ind. 35; *Sunman v. Brewin*, 52 Ind. 140. *Ante*, p. 169, note. But it is sufficient to prove the justification substantially as alleged. *Carpenter v. Bailey*, 56 N. H. 283; s. c. 53 N. H. 590. In some cases the facts on which the charge is justified as true are beyond dispute, as where a person justifies under a city ordinance. In such a case it cannot be shown that the ordinance was founded upon mistaken facts. *Johnson v. Simonton*, 43 Cal. 242.

(b) That is probably not true in this country. *Kent v. David*, 3 Blackf. 301; *Folsom v. Brown*, 25 N. H. 114; *Shroyer*

*v. Miller*, 3 W. Va. 158. But see the following note.

(c) Many of our American courts follow this doctrine as to charges of crime, though the reason upon which it is said *supra* to proceed is nowhere true in this country. *Mott v. Dawson*, 46 Iowa, 533; *Georgia v. Kepford*, 45 Iowa, 48 (confession out of court not enough); *Ellis v. Lindley*, 38 Iowa, 461; *Forshee v. Abrams*, 2 Iowa, 571; *Merk v. Gelzhaeuser*, 50 Cal. 631; *Polston v. See*, 54 Mo. 291, one judge dissenting; *Corbley v. Wilson*, 71 Ill. 209; *Darling v. Banks*, 14 Ill. 46; *Crotty v. Morrison*, 40 Ill. 480; *Harbison v. Shook*, 41 Ill. 147; *Tucker v. Call*, 45 Ind. 31; *Hutts v. Hutts*, 62 Ind. 214; *Byrket v. Monohon*, 7 Blackf. 83; *Lanter v. McEwen*, 8 Blackf. 495; *Wonderly v. Nokes*, *ib.* 589; *Gants v. Vinard*, 1 Ind. 476; *Swails v. Butcher*, 2 Ind. 84; *Wilson v. Barnett*, 45 Ind. 163; *Clark v. Dible*, 16 Wend. 601; *Gorman v. Sutton*, 32 Penn. St. 247. But perhaps the more general rule (certainly the better rule) is that it is sufficient that a preponderance of evidence supports the plea. *Ellis v. Buzzell*,

And the Court will not assist the defendant to obtain evidence in support of his plea of justification.<sup>1</sup> For the defendant has no right to take away the character of the plaintiff, unless he is in a position to prove the truth of the charge he has made.

Placing such a plea on the record is evidence of malice on the part of the defendant, and may be relied upon as such by the plaintiff in aggravation of damages, if the defendant either abandons the plea at the trial or fails to prove it.<sup>2</sup>

In a criminal case it is not sufficient to prove the truth of the libel; the defendant must also prove that it was for the public benefit that the matters charged should be published.<sup>3</sup> And indeed before 1843 the truth of the libel was no defence at all to an indictment; the maxim prevailed, "the greater the truth, the greater the libel." Yet it was always otherwise with a civil action; there the truth was always a complete bar to the action.

The benefit or detriment to the public, it was said, is in no way in \* 179 issue in a civil trial; \* the plaintiff is seeking to recover damages to put in his own pocket — damages for injury done to a character to which he had no right or title. And no doubt in the vast majority of cases there is great force in this argument. It is right that culprits should appear in their true colors, lest honest men be beguiled, "*peccata enim nocentium nota esse et oportere et expedire.*"<sup>4</sup> And some men may be deterred from committing an act of dishonesty or immorality by the knowledge

<sup>1</sup> Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87, 146; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281; 5 Jur. N. S. 226.

<sup>2</sup> Warwick v. Foulkes, 12 M. & W. 508; Wilson v. Robinson, 7 Q. B. 68; 14 L. J. Q. B. 196; 9 Jur. 726; Simpson v. Robinson, 12 Q. B. 511; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73; 13 Jur. 187. <sup>3</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6, *post*, p. 389. <sup>4</sup> Paulus.

60 Maine, 209; Sloan v. Gilbert, 12 Bush, 51; McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403; Kincaide v. Bradshawe, 3 Hawks, 63; Barfield v. Britt, 2 Jones, 41; Mathews v. Huntley, 9 N. H. 150; Folsom v. Brown, 25 N. H. 114, 122; Spruill v. Cooper, 16 Ala. 791; Downing v. Brown, 3 Col. 571; Hawver v. Hawver, 78 Ill. 412.

The strict rule of the criminal law applies at all events only to charges of crime. Wilson v. Barnett, 45 Ind. 163. And evidence short of that required upon an indictment would perhaps be admissible in an action for slander by way of mitigation. Tucker v. Call, 45 Ind. 31. On the other hand an important distinction is noticed in McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, to wit, that even under the rule of preponderating evidence the defendant must still prove all

the elements of the crime charged in act and in intent; and he must overcome the presumption of innocence and the opposing evidence. But it is said in the same case that the decisions which require more than this are mostly cases of charges of perjury, and refer to the mode rather than to the amount of evidence required; in regard to which last point the rule in some States concerning the need of two witnesses or one witness with corroborating evidence upon a plea of the truth of a charge of perjury may be referred to. Downing v. Brown, 3 Col. 571; Spruill v. Cooper, 16 Ala. 791; Ransone v. Christian, 56 Ga. 351; s. c. 49 Ga. 491; Steinman v. McWilliams, 6 Barr, 170; Hopkins v. Smith, 3 Barb. 599; Crandall v. Dawson, 1 Gilm. 556.

that, if discovered, it may always be brought up against them, wherever they go, to the end of their lives. But in other cases where a man has retrieved his character by long years of good behavior, it is clearly *morally* wrong for one who knows of his early delinquencies to come and blast the reputation which he has fairly earned. Should not an action lie, where the plaintiff's antecedents have been maliciously raked up and wantonly published to the world, without any benefit to society? Prisoners constantly complain that it is impossible for them to earn a livelihood by honest labor on coming out of prison, because as soon as they obtain employment anywhere, the police inform their master of the fact of their previous conviction, and they are at once discharged. And in a recent case,<sup>1</sup> counsel intimated that it was the rule in the West of England for policemen so to do. But Mr. Justice Hawkins at once "expressed his opinion that it was not the duty of the police to do so. The police, he considered, ought to be the friends of released criminals and help them to return to an honest life. That they should go and inform those who had given a convict employment of the fact of his having been convicted was simply to drive the convict into crime again. He was aware that this was done in many parts of the country, but he for his part thought that it should not be. It was an unnecessary, an officious, and a cruel act; and the result of it was that once a man was convicted he was branded for the rest of his life, and a return to honesty was made most difficult for him."<sup>2</sup> No doubt it is part of the punishment of a criminal that he can never escape from his misdeeds; but, nevertheless, to unduly proclaim them is malicious and uncharitable. Railway companies used formerly to placard the names and addresses of offenders against their bye-laws; but lately they have adopted a more merciful but equally \*deterrent form of announcement: — "*A passenger was convicted,*" &c. On the whole, however, I do not advocate any change in the law in this respect. No law can be framed which cannot be made to press harshly on individuals under exceptional circumstances and in the hands of uncharitable persons. And as a rule the strictness with which a defendant is made to prove his plea of justification, is a sufficient protection to a plaintiff: for if a man is really malicious in making a statement, he is almost sure to go beyond the truth, and say too much.

In Rome the truth of the libel was undoubtedly a defence both to criminal and to civil proceedings. "*Eum qui nocentem infamavit non esse bonum æquum ob eam rem condemnari.*"<sup>3</sup> So in Horace:<sup>4</sup> —

"bona [carmina] si quis  
Judice condiderit laudatur Cæsare: si quis  
Opprobriis dignum laceraverit, integer ipse."

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Seymore*, Winchester Spring Assizes, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> *Times*, for April 23d, 1880.

<sup>3</sup> *Pauli Sent. V. 4.*

<sup>4</sup> *Sat. II. 1. 83, 5.*

The rescript of Diocletian and Maximian to Victorinus is sometimes cited as an authority against this view ; but it appears to me to have nothing to do with the subject. It seems that Victorinus had in the course of his official duty charged a man with homicide, and he writes to know if he had thereby made himself liable to an action when his term of office had expired. The emperor's reply is as follows : — “ Impp. Diocletianus et Maximianus A.A. Victorino. Si non convicii consilio te aliquid injuriosum dixisse probare potes, *fides veri* a calumniâ te defendit. Si autem in rixam inconsulto calore prolapsus homicidii convicium objecisti, et ex eo die annus excessit, cum injuriarum actio annuo tempore prescripta sit ob injuriæ admissum conveniri non potes.”<sup>1</sup> Here the words *fides veri* have generally been understood by the commentators to mean “proof of the truth of the charge ;” and hence they have inferred that the truth was not of itself a defence ; the defendant had to prove something more, viz., that the imputation was made *sine animo conviciandi*. The ingenious author of the note to Star-  
kie's Commentary, p. 20, however, translates the passage thus : — If you really

spoke the words *non convicii consilio*, then proof of the truth of this  
\* 181 will \* exculpate you ; *this* being the fact that you spoke *non convicii consilio*, so that the passage would mean merely : — “proof that you spoke without malicious intent is a bar to the action.”<sup>2</sup> But it is very harsh to make *probare potes* and *fides veri* refer to the same piece of proof. I venture to think that Victorinus had heard on good authority that the man had been guilty of homicide, and, believing the charge to be true, objected to his promotion to some higher office ; and I would translate the passage : — “If you spoke without any malicious intent, your own honest belief in the truth of the charge will be a good defence ; but if in a sudden quarrel, and in the heat of the moment you called him homicide without any ground for the accusation (*inconsulto calore*), why, then, you must rely on the Statute of Limitations.” If I am right, then, this rescript does not refer to Justification, but rather comes under the defence of Privilege, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

<sup>1</sup> P. P. vi. Id. Jul. ipsis iv. et iii. A. A. conss. (A. D. 290). Krueger's Codex (ed. 1877), p. 855.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, p. 184.

## PRIVILEGED OCCASIONS.

It is a defence to an action of libel or slander to prove that the circumstances under which the defamatory words were written or spoken afforded an excuse for their employment. (*a*) And this is so, even though the words be proved or be admitted to be false. Circumstances will afford an excuse for writing or speaking defamatory words, whenever the occasion is such as to cast upon the defendant a duty, whether legal or moral, of stating what he honestly believes to be the plaintiff's character, and of speaking his mind fully and freely concerning him. In such a case the occasion is said to be *privileged*, and the employment of defamatory words on such privileged occasion is, in the interest of the public, excused. Again, the circumstances will afford an excuse for writing or speaking defamatory words, whenever such words form part of a confidential communication, made by the defendant to his partner or friend on a matter in which they have a common interest and concern; provided such communication is made honestly in furtherance of such common interest, not recklessly or maliciously. Here too the occasion is said to be "privileged," and though the statement may prove, or be admitted, to be false, still its utterance on such privileged occasion is excused for the sake of common convenience, and for the welfare of society.

\* *Illustrations.*

I am called as a witness, and sworn to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I may do so without fear of any legal liability, even though I am thus compelled to defame my neighbor.

I am asked for a character of my late servant by one to whom he has applied for a

(*a*) Privilege should of course be pleaded if the privilege be qualified, requires the plaintiff to show express malice. *Shurtleff v. Stevens*, 51 Vt. 501; *O'Donaghue v. McGovern*, 23 Wend. 26.

ed. *Quinn v. Scott*, 22 Minn. 456; *Gorton v. Keeler*, 51 Barb. 475; *Wachter v. Quenzer*, 29 N. Y. 547, 553. This then,

situation. I may state in reply all I know against him without being liable to an action; provided I do so honestly and truthfully to the best of my ability.

A friend recently come to live in the town privately asks my opinion as to such and such a lawyer, doctor, tradesman, workman, &c. I may tell him in answer all I know concerning each of them; both as to their skill and ability in their business and also as to their private character, their integrity, or immorality.

Privileged occasions are of two kinds: —

- (i.) Those absolutely privileged. (a)
- (ii.) Those in which the privilege is but qualified.

In the first class of cases it is so much to the public interest that the defendant should speak out his mind fully and freely, that all actions in respect of words spoken thereon are absolutely forbidden, even though it be alleged that the words were spoken falsely, knowingly, and with express malice. But this complete immunity is confined to cases where the public service, or the due administration of justice, requires it, *e.g.*, words spoken in Parliament; reports of military officers on military matters to their military superiors; everything said by a judge on the bench, by a witness in the box, &c., &c. In all these cases the privilege afforded by the occasion is an absolute bar to any action.

In less important matters, however, where the interests of the public do not demand that the speaker should be freed from *all* responsibility, but merely require that he should be protected so far as he is speaking honestly for the common good, in these the privilege is said not to be *absolute* but *qualified* only; and

\* 184 the \* plaintiff will recover damages in spite of the privilege, if he can prove that the words were not used *bonâ fide* but that the defendant availed himself of the privileged occasion willfully and knowingly to defame the plaintiff.

(a) It has sometimes been doubted whether there exists in the law of this country any absolute privilege protecting the publication of defamatory language. *White v. Nicholls*, 3 How. 266. Language in *Lawson v. Hicks*, 38 Ala. 279, in regard to communications of counsel and parties in legal causes "without proof of actual malice" may also be noticed. See also *Lester v. Thumond*, 51 Ga. 118; *post*, p. 190, note. But the doubt has been disregarded. *Hastings v. Lusk*, 22 Wend. 410; *s. c.* *Bigelow's L. C. Torts*, 121; *Shelfer v. Gooding*, 2 Jones, 175; *Lewis v. Few*, 5

*Johns*, 13; *White v. Carroll*, 42 N. Y. 161; *Marsh v. Ellsworth*, 50 N. Y. 309; *Gilbert v. People*, 1 Denio, 41; *Allen v. Crofoot*, 2 Wend. 515; *Garden v. Sedden*, 4 Comst. 91; *Ruohs v. Backer*, 6 Heisk. 395; *Lea v. White*, 4 Sneed, 111; *Calkins v. Sumner*, 13 Wis. 193; *Morgan v. Booth*, 13 Bush, 480; *Spaids v. Barrett*, 57 Ill. 289; *Strauss v. Meyer*, 48 Ill. 385; *Rice v. Coolidge*, 121 Mass. 393; *McLaughlin v. Cowley*, 127 Mass. 316; *Hoar v. Wood*, 3 Met. 193; *Johnson v. Brown*, 13 W. Va. 71.



*Illustrations.*

If a witness in the box volunteers a defamatory remark, quite irrelevant to the cause in which he is sworn, with a view of gratifying his own vanity, and of injuring the professional reputation of the plaintiff, still no action lies against such witness; the words are still absolutely privileged; for they were spoken in the box. *Seaman v. Netherclift*, 1 C. P. D. 540; 45 L. J. C. P. D. 798; 24 W. R. 884; 34 L. T. 878; 2 C. P. D. 53; 46 L. J. C. P. 128; 25 W. R. 159; 35 L. T. 784.

But if I maliciously give a good servant a bad character in order to prevent her "bettering herself," and so to compel her to return to my own service, the case is thereby taken out of the privilege, and the servant may recover heavy damages.

In Roman law an intention to injure the plaintiff was essential to the action for *injuria*.<sup>1</sup> Hence they never presumed malice; the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant expressly intended to impair his good name. Thus if an astrologer or soothsayer in the *bonâ fide* practice of his art, denounces A. as a thief when he is an honest man, A. has no action; for the astrologer only committed an honest mistake. But it would be otherwise if the soothsayer did not really believe in his art, but pretended, after some jugglery, to arrive at A.'s name from motives of private enmity.<sup>2</sup> That being so, it was unnecessary for the Romans to have any law as to *qualified* privilege; unless there was some evidence of malice the plaintiff was in every case non-suited. But neither did they allow any *absolute* privilege; on express malice proved the plaintiff recovered. Even the fact that the libel was contained in a petition sent to the Emperor was no protection.<sup>3</sup> Two adversaries in litigation were of course allowed great latitude; a certain amount of mutual defamation being essential to the conduct of the case and so not malicious: but even here moderation had to be observed.<sup>4</sup> The Roman plan had at least the merit of simplicity.

\* Whether the communication is, or is not, privileged \* 185  
by reason of the occasion, is a question for the judge alone, where there is no dispute as to the circumstances under which it was made.<sup>5</sup> If there be any doubt as to these circumstances, the jury must find what the circumstances in fact were, or what the defendant honestly believed them to be, if that be the point to be determined; and then, on their findings, the judge decides whether the occasion was privileged or not. (a) If the occasion

<sup>1</sup> D. 47. 10. 3. 3 & 4.<sup>2</sup> D. 47. 10. 15. 13.<sup>3</sup> D. 47. 10. 15. 29.<sup>4</sup> Pauli Sent. V. iv. 15.<sup>5</sup> *Stace v. Griffith*, L. R. 2 P. C. 420; 6 *Moore*, P. C. C. N. S. 18; 20 L. T. 197.

(a) *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116; *Palmer v. Concord*, 48 N. H. 217. *Klinck v. Colby*, 46 N. Y. 427; *Garrett v. Bailey* is not of course to be taken as meaning anything different. See *Bailey*, 56 N. H. 283; s. c. 53 N. H. 590; *post*, p. 215.

was not privileged, and the words are defamatory and false, the judge will direct a verdict for the plaintiff. If the occasion was absolutely privileged, judgment will at once be given for the defendant. If, however, the judge decides that the occasion was one of qualified privilege only, the plaintiff must then, if he can, give evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant. If he gives no such evidence, it is the duty of the judge to nonsuit him, or to direct a verdict for the defendant. If he does give any evidence of malice sufficient to go to the jury, then it is a question for the jury whether or no the defendant was actuated by malicious motives.<sup>1</sup>

## PART I.

### I. OCCASIONS ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED.

As a rule, when words are published on a privileged occasion, the privilege given them by the occasion is only *qualified*, that is the plaintiff can still be heard to say that the defendant did not act under the privilege, that he did not intend honestly to discharge a duty, but maliciously availed himself of the privileged occasion to injure the plaintiff's reputation. But in certain cases the privilege is absolute, and no action lies for words uttered on such an occasion. There are not many such cases, nor is it desirable that there should be many. The Courts refuse to extend their number.<sup>2</sup> In all of them the immunity is afforded on the ground that it is "advantageous for the public interests that such persons should not in any way be fettered in their statements."

#### (i.) *Parliamentary Proceedings.*

No member of either House of Parliament is in any way responsible in a court of justice for anything said in the House.<sup>3</sup> (a)

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, c. IX. Malice.

<sup>2</sup> *Stevens v. Sampson*, 5 Exch. D. 53; 49 L. J. Q. B. 120; 28 W. R. 87; 41 L. T. 782.

<sup>3</sup> Bill of Rights, 1 Wm. & Mary, st. 2, c. 2.

(a) *Coffin v. Coffin*, 4 Mass. 1; *Hastings v. Lusk*, 22 Wend. 410, 417; *Commonwealth v. Blanding*, 3 Pick. 304, 314.

But the words should be spoken officially. *Coffin v. Coffin*, 4 Mass. 31.

And no indictment will lie for an alleged conspiracy by members of either House to make speeches defamatory of the plaintiff.<sup>1</sup> But this privilege does not extend outside the walls of the House. Therefore, if a member publishes to the world the speech he delivered in his place in the House, he will be liable to an action as any private individual would be.<sup>2</sup> Though no doubt if a member of the House of Commons merely printed his speech for private circulation among his constituents there might be a conditional privilege attaching to it, in the absence of any malicious intent to injure the plaintiff.<sup>3</sup>

\* But at common law, even if the whole House ordered \* 187 the publication of parliamentary reports and papers, no privilege attached.<sup>4</sup> But now, by Stat. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9, all reports, papers, votes, and proceedings, ordered to be published by either House of Parliament, are made absolutely privileged, and all proceedings at law, civil or criminal, will be stayed at once on the production of a certificate that they were published by order of either House.<sup>5</sup> The only case under the Act is the second case of *Stockdale v. Hansard*.<sup>6</sup>

Reports in the newspapers of Parliamentary proceedings are conditionally, not absolutely privileged.<sup>7</sup>

A petition to Parliament is absolutely privileged, although it contain false and defamatory statements.<sup>8</sup> So is a petition to a committee of either House.<sup>9</sup> But a publication of such a petition to others not members of the House is of course not privileged.

## (ii.) *Judicial Proceedings.*

No action will lie for defamatory statements made or sworn in the course of a judicial proceeding before any Court of competent

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte Wason*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 573; 38 L. J. Q. B. 302; 40 L. J. (M. C.) 168; 17 W. R. 881.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Lord Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 226; *R. v. Creevey*, 1 M. & S. 273.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lord Campbell in *Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 233; 26 L. J. Q. B. 107, and Cockburn, C.J., in *Wason v. Walter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 95; 8 B. & S. 730; 38 L. J. Q. B. 42; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 416.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Williams* (1686), 2 Shower, 471; Comb. 18 (see, however, the comments on this case in *R. v. Wright* (1799), 8 T. R. 293); *Stockdale v. Hansard* (1839), 2 Moo. & Rob. 9; 7 C. & P. 731; 9 A. & E. 1-243; 2 P. & D. 1; 3 Jur. 905; 8 Dowl. 148, 522.

<sup>6</sup> (1840), 11 A. & E. 253, 297.

<sup>5</sup> See the Act in Appendix.

<sup>7</sup> See *post*, p. 257.

<sup>8</sup> *Lake v. King*, 1 Saund. 131; 1 Lev. 240; 1 Mod. 53; Sid. 414.

<sup>9</sup> See *Kane v. Mulvany*, Ir. R. 2 C. L. 402.

jurisdiction. (a) Everything that a judge says on the bench, or a witness in the box, or counsel in arguing, is absolutely privileged, so long as it is in any way connected with the enquiry. So

\* 188 are all \* documents necessary to the conduct of the cause, such as pleadings, affidavits, and instructions to counsel. This immunity rests on obvious grounds of public policy and convenience.

A judge of a superior Court has an absolute immunity, and no action can be maintained against him, even though it be alleged that he spoke maliciously, knowing his words to be false, and also that his words were irrelevant to the matter in issue before him, and wholly unwarranted by the evidence. It is essential to the highest interests of public policy to secure the free and fearless discharge of high judicial functions.<sup>1</sup> (b)

The judge of an inferior Court of record enjoys the same immunity in this respect as the judge of a superior Court, so long as he has jurisdiction over the matter before him. For any act done in any proceeding in which he either knows, or ought to know, that he is without jurisdiction, he is liable as an ordinary subject.<sup>2</sup> And so he would be for words spoken after the cause is at an end.<sup>3</sup> A justice of the peace, however, does not enjoy quite so wide an immunity. An action will lie against him for defamatory words irrelevant to the matter in issue before him if they be spoken maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause.<sup>4</sup> But if the conduct of the plaintiff be a matter relevant to the enquiry, and the proceedings are within the jurisdiction of

<sup>1</sup> *Floyd v. Barker*, 12 Rep. 24.

<sup>2</sup> *Houlden v. Smith*, 14 Q. B. 841; *Calder v. Halket*, 3 Moo. P. C. C. 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Paris v. Levy*, 9 C. B. N. S. 342; 30 L. J. C. P. 11; 7 Jur. N. S. 289; 9 W.R. 562; 3 L. T. 324; 6 L. T. 394.

<sup>4</sup> See *Kirby v. Simpson*, 10 Exch. 358; *Gelen v. Hall*, 2 H. & N. 379.

(a) In *Ruohs v. Backer*, 6 Heisk. 395, a distinction is taken between statements affecting parties to the record and statements affecting strangers; and it is held that in cases of the latter kind the privilege is conditional and not absolute. See also *Saunders v. Baxter*, 6 Heisk. 369. But that distinction is repudiated in *Johnson v. Brown*, 13 W. Va. 71, and it is not elsewhere taken. It seems however that to make the privilege absolute the court must have had jurisdiction. *Johnson v.*

*Brown*, *supra*; *Milam v. Burnside*, 1 Brev. 295. Still though it had not, or though the statements were not relevant, there is deemed to exist a qualified privilege requiring the plaintiff to prove express malice. *Id.* Pertinency is a question of law. *Id.* A proceeding to try the sanity of a person is judicial. *Hutts v. Hutts*, 62 Ind. 214.

(b) *McLaughlin v. Cowley*, 127 Mass. 316; *Rice v. Coolidge*, 121 Mass. 393; *Hoar v. Wood*, 3 Met. 193.

the magistrate, he may express his opinion of such conduct with the utmost freedom and no action will lie.<sup>1</sup>

\* *Illustrations.*

\* 189

No action will lie against a judge of one of the superior Courts for any judicial act, though it be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly. *Fray v. Blackburn*, 3 B. & S. 576. See *Floyd v. Barker*, 12 Rep. 24; *Groenvelt v. Burwell*, 1 Ld. Raym. 454, 468; 12 Mod. 388; *Dicas v. Lord Brougham*, 6 C. & P. 249; 1 M. & R. 309; *Taafe v. Downes*, 3 Moo. P. C. C. 36, n.; *Kemp v. Neville*, 10 C. B. N. S. 523; 31 L. J. C. P. 158; 4 L. T. 640.

No action lies against a judge for unjustly censuring and denouncing a counsel then engaged in the cause before him, even although it be alleged that it was done from motives of private malice. *Miller v. Hope*, 2 Shaw, Sc. App. Cas. 125.

A County Court judge, while sitting in Court and trying an action in which the plaintiff was defendant, said to him: — "You are a harpy, preying on the vitals of the poor." The plaintiff was an accountant and scrivener. *Held*, that no action lay for words so spoken by the defendant in his capacity as County Court judge, although they were alleged to have been spoken falsely and maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause or any foundation whatever, and to have been wholly irrelevant to the case before him. *Scott v. Stansfield*, L. R. 3 Ex. 220; 37 L. J. Ex. 155; 16 W. R. 911; 18 L. T. 572.

No action lies against a coroner for anything he says in his address to the jury impanelled before him, however defamatory, false, or malicious it may be; unless the plaintiff can prove that the statement was wholly irrelevant to the inquisition and not warranted by the occasion, the Coroner's Court being "a Court of Record of very high authority." *Thomas v. Churton*, 2 B. & S. 475; 31 L. J. Q. B. 139; 8 Jur. N. S. 795. See also *Yates v. Lansing*, 5 Johns. 283; 9 Johns. 395 (American).

A chairman of Quarter Sessions may denounce the grand jury as "a seditious, scandalous, corrupt, and perjured jury." *R. v. Skinner*, Lofft, 55.

The judgment of a court-martial containing defamatory matter is absolutely privileged, though it is not a court of record. *Jekyll v. Sir John Moore*, 2 B. & P. N. R. 341; 6 Esp. 63; *Home v. Bentinck*, 2 B. & B. 130; 4 Moore, 563; *Oliver v. Bentinck*, 3 Taunt. 456.

A magistrate commented severely on the conduct of a policeman which came under his judicial notice, and in consequence the policeman was dismissed from the force. *Held*, that no action lay, unless there was clear \* proof both of \* 190 express malice and of the absence of all reasonable and probable cause. Per Lord Denman, C.J., in *Kendillon v. Maltby*, 2 M. & Rob. 438; Car. & Mar. 402; 1 Dow. & Clark, 495. See also *Allardice v. Robertson*, 1 Dow. N. S. 514; 1 Dow. & Clark, 495; 6 Shaw & Dun. 242; 7 Shaw & Dun. 691; 4 Wil. & Shaw, App. Cas. 102; *Pratt v. Gardner*, 2 Cushing (Massachusetts), 63.

But a magistrate's clerk has no right to make any observation on the conduct of the parties before the court; and no such observation will be privileged. *Delegal v. Highley*, 3 Bing. N. C. 950; 5 Scott, 154; 3 Hodges, 158; 8 C. & P. 444.

<sup>1</sup> See the remarks of Lord Coleridge, C.J., in *Seaman v. Netherclift*, 1 C. P. D. 544; 45 L. J. C. P. 798; 24 W. R. 884; 34 L. T. 878.

Counsel engaged in a cause are privileged to speak any words, however defamatory, that are in accordance with their instructions and are pertinent to the matter in question. (a) They may draw any inferences from the facts given in evidence, and make any imputations, however calumnious: but they ought not to make reckless charges of which they can give no evidence. For strong and exaggerated words they cannot be called in question, unless the charge conveyed by such words be wholly unjustified by the evidence before the Court.<sup>1</sup> The law, in fact, trusts a barrister "with a privilege in respect of liberty of speech which is in practice bounded only by his own sense of duty."<sup>2</sup>

An attorney acting as an advocate in a county court enjoys the same immunity as counsel.<sup>3</sup> So with a proctor in an ecclesiastical court.<sup>4</sup> The party himself, because of his ignorance of the proper mode of conducting a case, is allowed even greater \* 191 latitude.<sup>5</sup> \* Any observation made by one of the jury during the trial is equally privileged, provided it is pertinent to the enquiry.<sup>6</sup> And so is any presentment by a grand jury.

A witness in the box is absolutely privileged in answering all the questions asked him by the counsel on either side; and even if he volunteers an observation (a practice much to be discouraged) still if it has reference to the matter in issue, or fairly arises out of any question asked him by counsel, though only going to his credit, such observation will also be privileged.<sup>7</sup> (b) But a re-

<sup>1</sup> Brook v. Sir Henry Montague (1606), Cro. Jac. 90; Mackay v. Ford, 5 H. & N. 792; 29 L. J. Ex. 404; 6 Jur. N. S. 587; 8 W. R. 586; Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 232.

<sup>2</sup> Per Erle, C.J., 32 L. J. C. P. 147, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Mackay v. Ford, 5 H. & N. 792.

<sup>4</sup> Higginson v. Flaherty, 4 Ir. C. L. R. 125.

<sup>5</sup> Per Holroyd, J., in Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 244.

<sup>6</sup> R. v. Skinner, Lofft, 55.

<sup>7</sup> Seaman v. Netherclift, 1 C. P. D. 540; 2 C. P. D. 53; 46 L. J. C. P. 123.

(a) Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Marsh v. Ellsworth, 50 N. Y. 309; Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio, 41; McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316; Rice v. Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393; Hoar v. Wood, 3 Met. 193; Morgan v. Booth, 13 Bush, 480; Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 358. In Lester v. Thurmond, 51 Ga. 118, the privilege of an attorney was treated as *prima facie*, but the only question in the case was

whether there was a privilege at all. See also Lawson v. Hicks, 38 Ala. 279.

(b) The privilege of a witness is not so broad in this country. What he says must be pertinent or believed so by him. White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161; Allen v. Crofoot, 2 Wend. 515; Barnes v. McCrate, 32 Maine, 442; Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193; Lea v. White, 4 Sneed, 111; McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316; York

mark made by a witness in the box, wholly irrelevant to the matter of enquiry, uncalled for by any question of counsel, and introduced by the witness maliciously for his own purposes, would not be privileged, and would also probably be a contempt of court. So, of course an observation made by a witness while waiting about the Court, before or after he has given his evidence, is not privileged.<sup>1</sup> Nor is a private letter written to the judge to influence his decision.<sup>2</sup> Such a letter is strictly a contempt of court.

Every affidavit sworn in the course of a judicial proceeding before a Court of competent jurisdiction is absolutely privileged, and no action lies therefor, however false and malicious may be the statements made therein.<sup>3</sup> (a) So are all pleadings, and instructions to counsel.<sup>4</sup> So are articles of the peace exhibited against the plaintiff. The only exception is where an affidavit is sworn recklessly \* and maliciously before a Court \* 192 that has no jurisdiction in the matter, and no power to entertain the proceeding.<sup>5</sup> In all other cases the plaintiff's only remedy is to indict the deponent for perjury, if he dare.<sup>6</sup> The Court will, however, sometimes order scandalous matter in such

<sup>1</sup> *Trotman v. Dunn*, 4 Camp. 211; *Lynam v. Gowing*, 6 L. R. Ir. 259.

<sup>2</sup> *Gould v. Hume*, 3 C. & P. 625.

<sup>3</sup> *Revis v. Smith*, 18 C. B. 126; 25 L. J. C. P. 195; *Henderson v. Broomhead*, 4 H. & N. 569; 28 L. J. Ex. 360; 5 Jur. N. S. 1175.

<sup>4</sup> See *Bank of British North America v. Strong*, 1 App. Cas. 307; 34 L. T. 627.

<sup>5</sup> *Buckley v. Wood*, 4 Rep. 14; *Cro. Eliz.* 230; *R. v. Salisbury*, 1 Ld. Raym. 341; *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 554; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. N. S. 490.

<sup>6</sup> *Doyle v. O'Doherty*, Car. & Mar. 418; *Astley v. Younge*, 2 Burr. 807.

*v. Rose*, 2 Gray, 282; *Smith v. Howard*, 28 Iowa, 51; *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51; *Morgan v. Booth*, 3 Bush, 480. See *Lawson v. Hicks*, 38 Ala. 279. It matters not that the words are spoken to the judge; though if they amount to contempt the party may of course be punished. *Goselin v. Cannon*, 1 Harr. (Del.) 3. While a witness is not liable to an action for defamation when his testimony is relevant, one who suborns a witness to commit perjury may be liable for the charge made by the witness at his instigation, and this without special damage if the charge amount to technical defamation. *Rice v. Coolidge*, 121 Mass. 393.

(a) So of the pleadings generally, pro-

vided the statements are pertinent or honestly believed so, and provided no doubt the cause as regards the pleader is a real one. *Wyatt v. Buell*, 47 Cal. 624; *Townshend, Slander*, § 221; *Garr v. Selden*, 4 Comst. 91; *Gilbert v. People*, 1 Denio, 41; *Warner v. Payne*, 2 Sandf. 195; *Johnson v. Brown*, 13 W. Va. 71; *McLaughlin v. Cowley*, 127 Mass. 316. See also *Lanning v. Christy*, 30 Ohio St. 115; *Whitney v. Allen*, 62 Ill. 472. Without an allegation that the statements were pertinent or reasonably believed pertinent the plea must deny malice or it will be bad. *Johnson v. Brown*, *supra*. But if pertinency is pleaded malice need not be denied, the privilege being absolute. *Id.*

an affidavit to be expunged.<sup>1</sup> But even for matter thus expunged, no action can be brought.<sup>2</sup>

In short, "neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or judge can be put to answer civilly or criminally for *words spoken in office*."<sup>3</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

Defendant, an expert in handwriting, gave evidence in the Probate Court in the trial of *Davies v. May*, that, in his opinion, the signature to the will in question was a forgery. The jury found in favor of the will, and the presiding judge made some very disparaging remarks on defendant's evidence. Soon afterwards defendant was called as a witness in favor of the genuineness of another document, on a charge of forgery before a magistrate. In cross-examination he was asked whether he had given evidence in the suit of *Davies v. May*, and whether he had read the judge's remarks on his evidence. He answered, "Yes." Counsel asked no more questions, and defendant insisted on adding, though told by the magistrate not to make any further statement as to *Davies v. May*: "I believe that will to be a rank forgery, and shall believe so to the day of my death." An action of slander for these words having been brought by one of the attesting witnesses to the will: *held*, that the words were spoken by defendant as a witness, and had reference to the enquiry before the magistrate, as they tended to justify the defendant, whose credit as a witness had been impugned; and that the defendant was therefore absolutely privileged. *Seaman v. Netherclift*, 1 C. P. D. 540; 45 L. J. C. P. 798; 24 W. R. 884; 34 L. T. 878; (C. A.) 2 C. P. D. 53; 46 L. J. C. P. 128; 25 W. R. 159; 35 L. T. 784.

A servant summoned his master before a Court of Conscience for a week's \* 193 \* wages. The master said: "He has been transported before, and ought to be transported again. He has been robbing me of nine quartern loaves a week." Lord Ellenborough held the remark absolutely privileged, if the master spoke them in opening his defence to the Court; but otherwise if he spoke them while waiting about the room and not for the purpose of his defence. *Trotman v. Dunn*, 4 Camp. 211. [N.B. — The latter part of the head-note to this case is misleading.]

A charge of felony made by the defendant when applying in due course to a justice of the peace for a warrant to apprehend the plaintiff on that charge is absolutely privileged. *Ram v. Lamley*, Hutt. 113. See *Johnson v. Evans*, 3 Esp. 32; *Weston v. Dobniet*, Cro. Jac. 432; *Dan caster v. Hewson*, 2 Man. & R. 176.

Defamatory communications made by witnesses or officials to a Court-martial, or to a Court of Inquiry instituted under articles of war, are absolutely privileged. *Keighley v. Bell*, 4 F. & F. 763; *Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 255; 42 L. J. Q. B. 63; 21 W. R. 544; 4 F. & F. 806; 28 L. T. 134; L. R. 7 H. L. 744; 45 L. J. Q. B. 8; 23 W. R. 931; 33 L. T. 196.

No action will lie for defamatory expressions against a third party, contained in an affidavit made and used in the proceedings in a cause, though such statements be false, to the knowledge of the party making them, and introduced out of malice. *Henderson v. Broomhead*, 28 L. J. Ex. 360; 4 H. & N. 569; 5 Jur. N. S. 1175; *Astley v.*

<sup>1</sup> *Christie v. Christie*, L. R. 8 Ch. 499; 42 L. J. Ch. 544; 21 W. R. 493; 28 L. T. 607.

<sup>2</sup> *Kennedy v. Hilliard*, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 195; 1 L. T. 578.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lord Mansfield in *R. v. Skinner*, Lofft, 55.



Younge, 2 Burr. 807; 2 Ld. Kenyon, 536; *Revis v. Smith*, 18 C. B. 126; 25 L. J. C. P. 195; 2 Jur. N. S. 614; *Hartsock v. Reddick*, 6 Blackf. (Indiana), 255.

If application be *bond fide* made to a Court which the defendant by a pardonable error honestly believes to have a jurisdiction which it has not, the privilege will not be lost merely by reason of this error. *Buckley v. Wood*, 4 Rep. 14; *Cro. Eliz.* 230; *McGregor v. Thwaites*, 3 B. & C. 24; 4 D. & R. 695; *Thorn v. Blanchard*, 5 Johns. 508.

But in other cases an affidavit made voluntarily when no cause is pending, or made *coram non judice*, is not privileged as a judicial proceeding. *Maloney v. Bartley*, 3 Camp. 210.

An attorney's bill of costs is in no sense a judicial proceeding, though delivered under a judge's order, and can claim no privilege. *Bruton v. Downes*, 1 F. & F. 668.

Reports of judicial proceedings are not *absolutely* privileged, however fair \*and accurate they may be; the plaintiff may still prove that the reporter \* 194 acted maliciously in sending the report to the newspaper. *Stevens v. Sampson*, 5 Exch. D. 53; 49 L. J. Q. B. 120; 28 W. R. 87; 41 L. T. 782; *Salmon v. Isaac*, 20 L. T. 885.

### (iii.) *Naval and Military affairs, &c.*

A similar immunity, resting also on obvious grounds of public policy, is accorded to all reports made by a military officer to his military superiors in the course of his duty, and to evidence given by any military man to a court martial or other military court of inquiry; it being essential to the welfare and safety of the State that military discipline should be maintained without any interference by civil tribunals. In short, "all acts done in the honest exercise of military authority are privileged." The law is, of course, the same as to the navy. Naval and military matters are for naval and military tribunals to determine, and not the ordinary civil courts.<sup>1</sup> A similarly absolute privilege extends to all acts of State, and to the official notification thereof in the *London Gazette*, to all State papers, and to all advice given to the Crown by its ministers.

### *Illustrations.*

A military Court of Inquiry may not be strictly a judicial tribunal, but where such Court has been assembled under the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief in conformity with the Queen's Regulations for the government of the army, a witness who gives evidence thereat stands in the same situation as a witness giving evidence before a judicial tribunal, and \*all statements made by him thereat, \* 195 whether orally or in writing, having reference to the subject of the inquiry,

<sup>1</sup> *Hart v. Gumpach*, L. R. 4 P. C. 439; 9 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 241; 42 L. J. P. C. 25; 21 W. R. 365; *Dawkins v. Lord Paulet*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53; 18 W. R. 336; 21 L. T. 584; *Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby*, L. R. 7 H. L. 744; 45 L. J. Q. B. 8; 23 W. R. 931; 33 L. T. 196; 4 F. & F. 806.

are absolutely privileged. *Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby*, L. R. 7 H. L. 744; 45 L. J. Q. B. 8; 23 W. R. 931; 33 L. T. 196; in the Exch. Ch. L. R. 8 Q. B. 255. And see *Keighley v. Bell*, 4 F. & F. 763; *Home v. Bentinck*, 2 B. & B. 130; 4 Moore, 563.

The defendant, being the plaintiff's superior officer, in the course of his military duty forwarded to the Adjutant-General certain letters written by the plaintiff, and at the same time, also in accordance with his military duty, reported to the Commander-in-Chief on the contents of such letters, using words defamatory of the plaintiff. It was alleged that the defendant did so maliciously, and without any reasonable, probable, or justifiable cause, and not in the *bond fide* discharge of his duty as the plaintiff's superior officer. *Held*, on demurrer, by the majority of the Court of Q. B. (Mellor and Lush, JJ.), that such reports being made in the course of military duty were absolutely privileged, and that the civil courts had no jurisdiction over such purely military matters. Cockburn, C.J., dissented on the grounds that it never could be the duty of a military officer falsely, maliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause to libel his fellow-officer, that the courts of common law have jurisdiction over all wilful and unjust abuse of military authority, and that it would not in any way be destructive of military discipline or of the efficiency of the army to submit questions of malicious oppression to the opinion of a jury. *Dawkins v. Lord Paulet*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53; 18 W. R. 336; 21 L. T. 584.

[N.B. — There was no appeal in this case. The arguments of Cockburn, C.J., deserve the most careful attention. In *Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby*, *supra*, the decision of the House of Lords turned entirely on the fact that the defendant was a witness. Neither Kelly, C.B., nor any of the Law Lords (except perhaps Lord Penzance), rest their judgment on the incompetency of a court of common law to inquire into purely military matters. The Court of Exchequer Chamber no doubt express an opinion that "questions of military discipline and military duty alone are cognisable only by a military court, and not by a court of law" (L. R. 8 Q. B. 271). But after referring to "the eloquent and powerful reasoning of L.C.J. Cockburn in *Dawkins v. Lord F. Paulet*," the Court goes on to express its satisfaction that the question "is yet open to final consideration before a court of the last resort." However in a court of first instance, at all events, it must now be taken to be the law that the civil courts of common law can take no cognisance of *purely* military or *purely* naval matters (*Sutton v. Johnstone* (1785), 1 T. R. 493; *Grant v. Gould* (1792), 2 Hen. Bl. 69; *Barwiss v. Keppel* (1766), 2 Wils. 314); but wherever the *civil* rights of a person in the military or naval service are affected by any alleged oppression or injustice at the hands of his superior officers or any illegal action on the part of a military or naval tribunal, there the civil courts may interfere. *Re Mansergh*, 1 B. & S. 400; 30 L. J. (Q. B.) 296; *Warden v. Bailey*, 4 Taunt. 67.

\* 196 \*But *private letters* written by the commanding officer of the regiment to his immediate superior on military matters, as distinct from his official reports, are *not* absolutely privileged; but the question of malice should be left to the jury. *Dickson v. Earl of Wilton*, 1 F. & F. 419; *Dickson v. Combermere*, 3 F. & F. 527.

[N.B. — If this be not the distinction, these cases must be taken to be overruled by the cases cited above. See L. R. 8 Q. B. 272-3.]

By a general order it was declared that all unemployed Indian officers ineligible for public employment by reason of misconduct or physical or mental inefficiency should be removed to the pension list. Under this order the plaintiff was removed to the pension list and a notification of such removal was published in the *Indian Gazette*. *Held*, on demurrer, that no action lay either for the removal of the plaintiff, or for the official publication of the fact: although special damage was alleged. *Grant v. Secre-*

tary of State for India, 2 C. P. D. 445; 25 W. R. 848; 37 L. T. 188. See *Doss v. Secretary of State for India in Council*, L. R. 19 Eq. 509; 23 W. R. 773; 32 L. T. 294; and *Oliver v. Lord Wm. Bentinck*, 3 Taunt. 456.

## PART II.

### II. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE.

CASES of qualified privilege may be grouped under three heads:

- I. Where circumstances cast upon the defendant the duty of making a communication to a certain other person, to whom he makes such communication in the *bonâ fide* performance of such duty.
- II. Where the defendant has an interest in the subject matter of the communication, and the person to whom he communicates it has a corresponding interest.
- III. Fair and impartial reports of the proceedings of any Court of Justice or of Parliament. (a)

\* In all these instances, if the communication has been \* 197 made fairly, impartially, without exaggeration or the introduction of irrelevant calumnious matter, the communication is held privileged. The first two classes are often stated as one, and cases may frequently occur, which may seem to fall in either or both of them. But the distinction which I propose to draw between them is this:—in the first class of cases, the defendant makes the communication, perhaps to an entire stranger, generally to one with whom he has had no previous concern; and he does so because he feels it to be his duty so to do. The person to whom he makes the communication is under no corresponding obligation; and generally has no common interest with the defendant in the matter. The defendant's duty would be the same to whomsoever the communication had to be made.

In the second class of cases, however, there must have been an intimate relationship or connexion already established between

(a) Upon the division of qualified privilege see *Foster v. Scripps*, 39 Mich. 376, following the division in *Dickenson v. Hilliard*, L. R. 9 Ex. 79; *Dillard v. Collins*, 25 Gratt. 343.

the defendant and the person to whom he makes the communication, and it is because of this relationship that the communication is privileged. The same words, if uttered to another person with whom the defendant had no such connexion, would not be privileged.

The third class of cases might be included in either of the two preceding, for it is the duty of a newspaper reporter to present to the public fair and impartial reports of such proceedings, while on the other hand, as one of the public, he has a common interest with the public in ensuring that such proceedings should be reported with accuracy and uniformity.

*Bonâ fide* comments on matters of public interest, which are sometimes treated as a fourth class of privileged communications, have been dealt with under the head of Defamatory Words.<sup>1</sup>

\* 198 \* I. WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST, OR ARE REASONABLY BELIEVED BY THE DEFENDANT TO EXIST, WHICH CAST UPON HIM THE DUTY OF MAKING A COMMUNICATION TO A CERTAIN OTHER PERSON, TO WHOM HE MAKES SUCH COMMUNICATION IN THE *BONA FIDE* PERFORMANCE OF SUCH DUTY.

The duty may either be one which the defendant owes to society or one which he owes to his family or to himself. It will be convenient therefore to treat these cases in the following order:—

A. Communications made in pursuance of a duty owed to society.

- (i.) Characters of servants.
- (ii.) Other confidential communications of a private nature.
- (iii.) Information given to any public officer imputing crime or misconduct to others.

B. Communications made in self-defence.

- (iv.) Statements necessary to protect the defendant's private interests.
- (v.) Statements provoked or invited by previous words or acts of the plaintiff.

In all these cases the duty referred to need not be one binding at law: any "moral or social duty of imperfect obligation" will

<sup>1</sup> Chap. II., *ante*, pp. 34-52.

be sufficient.<sup>1</sup> (a) And it is sufficient that the defendant should honestly believe that he has a duty to perform in the matter, although it may turn out that the circumstances were not such as he reasonably concluded them to be.<sup>2</sup> \*It is a \*199 question of *bona fides*, in determining which the Court will look at the circumstances as they presented themselves to the mind of the defendant at the time of publication; supposing of course that he is guilty of no laches, and does not wilfully shut his eyes to any source of information. If indeed there were means at hand for ascertaining the truth of the matter, of which the defendant neglects to avail himself and chooses rather to remain in ignorance when he might have obtained full information, there will be no pretence for any claim of privilege.

Above all, the defendant must at the date of the communication, implicitly believe in its truth. If a man knowingly makes a false charge against his neighbor, he cannot claim privilege. It never can be his duty to circulate lies.

"For, to entitle matter, otherwise libellous, to the protection which attaches to communications made in the fulfilment of a duty, *bona fides*, or, to use our own equivalent, honesty of purpose, is essential; and to this, again, two things are necessary; 1, that the communication be made not merely in the course of duty, that is, on an occasion which would justify the making it, but also from a sense of duty; 2, that it be made with a belief of its truth."<sup>3</sup>

And even where the defendant, acting under a strong sense of duty, makes a communication which he reasonably believes to be true, still he must be careful not to be led away by his honest indignation into exaggerated or unwarrantable expressions. For the privilege extends to nothing which is not justified by the oc-

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Campbell in *Harrison v. Bush*, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Whiteley v. Adams*, 15 C. B. N. S. 392; 33 L. J. C. P. 89; 12 W. R. 153; 9 L. T. 483; 10 Jur. N. S. 470.

<sup>3</sup> Per Cockburn, C.J., in *Dawkins v. Lord Paulet*, L. R. 5 Q. B. at p. 102.

(a) *Shurtleff v. Stevens*, 51 Vt. 501, 512; *Hubbard v. Rutledge*, 57 Miss. 7; *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116; *Ormsby v. Douglass*, 37 N. Y. 477; *VanWyck v. Aspinwall*, 17 N. Y. 190; *Joannes v. Bennett*, 5 Allen, 169. But newspapers cannot conceive that they have a duty to

the public to publish defamatory charges against individuals,\* though the public may have an interest in the matter. *Foster v. Scripps*, 39 Mich. 376; S. C. 41 Mich. 742; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 281. See *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116.

casation. Thus a letter may be privileged as to one part and not as to the rest.<sup>1</sup>

\* 200 \* And even where the expressions employed are allowable in all respects, still the mode of publication may take them out of the privilege. Confidential communications should not be shouted across the street for all passers-by to hear. Nor should they be committed to a post card or a telegram, which others will read. They should be sent in a letter properly sealed and fastened. If the words be spoken, the defendant must be careful in whose presence he speaks. He should choose a time when no one else is by except those to whom it is his duty to make the statement. It is true that the accidental presence of some third person, unsought by the defendant, will not take the case out of the privilege; (a) but it would be otherwise if the defendant purposely sought an opportunity of making a communication *primâ facie* privileged in the presence of the very persons who were most likely to act upon it to the prejudice of the plaintiff.<sup>2</sup>

#### A. COMMUNICATIONS MADE IN PURSUANCE OF A DUTY OWED TO SOCIETY.

##### (i.) *Characters of servants.*

The instance that occurs most frequently in ordinary life of this first class of privileged communications is where the defendant is asked as to the character of his former servant, by one to whom he or she has applied for a situation. A duty is thereby cast upon the former master to state fully and honestly all that he knows either for or against the servant; and any communication, made in the performance of this duty, is clearly privileged for the sake of the common convenience of society, even though it should turn out that the former master was mistaken in some of his statements. (b) But if the master, knowing that the servant deserves a good character, yet, having some grudge against him, or from some other malicious motive, deliber-

<sup>1</sup> Warren v. Warren, 1 C. M. & R. 251; 4 Tyr. 850; Huntley v. Ward, 6 C. B. N. S. 514; 1 F. & F. 552; 6 Jur. N. S. 18; Simmonds v. Dunne, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 353.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, c. IX. Malice.

(a) Hatch v. Lane, 105 Mass. 394; Brow v. Hathaway, 13 Allen, 239.

(b) Dale v. Harris, 109 Mass. 193.

ately states what he knows to be false, and gives his late servant a bad character, then such a communication is not a performance of the duty, and therefore is not privileged. There is, in fact, in such a case, evidence of express malice which "takes the case out of the privilege."

No one is bound to give a character to his servant when asked for it.<sup>1</sup> The old statute 5 Eliz. c. 4, which required a master in certain cases to satisfy two justices of the peace that he had reasonable and sufficient cause for putting away his servant, has long been obsolete, and now is wholly repealed by the 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86, s. 17. But if any character is given, it must be one fully warranted by the facts, and not prompted by unworthy motives.

If, after a favorable character has been given, facts come to the knowledge of the former master which induce him to alter his opinion, it is his duty to inform the person to whom he gave the character of his altered opinion. Hence a letter written to retract a favorable character previously given, will also be privileged.<sup>2</sup>

So again if I take a servant with a good character given her by B., and am sadly disappointed in her, I may write and inform B. that she does not deserve the character he gave her, so that he may refrain from recommending her to others; and such a letter would be privileged.<sup>3</sup> \* A master may also warn \* 202 his present servants against associating with a former servant whom he has discharged, and state his reasons for dismissing him.<sup>5</sup>

But if I happen to hear that a discharged servant of mine is about to enter the service of B., it may be questioned whether it is my duty to write off at once and inform B. of the servant's misconduct. It is certainly safer to wait till B. applies to me for the servant's character. Eagerness to prevent a former servant obtaining another place has the appearance of malice, and if it were found that I wrote systematically to every one to whom the plaintiff applied for work, the jury would probably give damages

<sup>1</sup> *Carrol v. Bird*, 3 Esp. 201.

<sup>2</sup> *Gardner v. Slade*, 13 Q. B. 796; 18 L. J. Q. B. 334; 13 Jur. 826; *Child v. Affleck & wife*, 9 B. & C. 403; 4 M. & R. 338.

<sup>3</sup> *Dixon v. Parsons*, 1 F. & F. 24. But see the dicta in *Fryer v. Kinnersley*, 15 C. B. N. S. 429; 33 L. J. C. P. 96; 10 Jur. N. S. 441.

<sup>5</sup> *Somerville v. Hawkins*, 10 C. B. 590; 20 L. J. C. P. 131; 15 Jur. 450.

against me. On the other hand, if B. was an intimate friend or a relation of mine, and there was no other evidence of malice except that I *volunteered* the information, the occasion would still be privileged. In short when a master "volunteers to give the character, stronger evidence will be required that he acted *bonâ fide*, than in the case where he has given the character after being required so to do."<sup>1</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

After a mercantile firm has given to one of its clerks a general recommendation by means of which he obtains a situation, if a partner subsequently discover facts which alter his opinion of that clerk's character, it is his duty to communicate the new facts and his change of opinion to the new employer of that clerk, in order to guard against his being misled by the previous recommendation of the firm. *Fowles v. Bowen*, 3 Tiffany (30 N. Y. R.), 20.

Sir Gervas Clifton never made any complaint of his butler's conduct while he was with him; but he suddenly dismissed him without notice and without a month's wages. The butler (naturally, but illegally) refused to leave the house without a month's wages; a violent altercation took place, and eventually a policeman was sent for who forcibly ejected the butler. Sir Gervas subsequently gave the butler

\* 203 a very bad character, in too strong \* terms, and making some charges against him which were wholly unfounded. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, £20. New trial refused. *Rogers v. Clifton*, 3 B. & P. 587.

The defendant on being applied to for the character of the plaintiff, who had been his saleswoman, charged her with theft. He had never made such a charge against her till then; he told her that he would say nothing about it if she resumed her employment at his house; subsequently he said that if she would acknowledge the theft he would give her a character. *Held*, that there was abundant evidence that the charge of theft was made *malâ fide*, with the intention of compelling plaintiff to return to defendant's service. Damages, £60. *Jackson v. Hopperton*, 16 C. B. N. S. 829; 12 W. R. 913; 10 L. T. 529.

If a master about to dismiss his servant for dishonesty calls in a friend to hear what passes, the presence of such third person does not take away privilege from words which the master then uses, imputing dishonesty. *Taylor v. Hawkins*, 16 Q. B. 308; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313; 15 Jur. 746.

Where a master discharged his footman and cook, and they asked him his reason for doing so, and he told the footman, in the absence of the cook, that "he and the cook had been robbing him;" and told the cook, in the absence of the footman, that he had discharged her "because she and the footman had been robbing him." *Held*, that these were privileged communications as respected the absent parties, as well as those to whom they were respectively made. *Manby v. Witt*, 18 C. B. 544; 25 L. J. C. P. 294; 2 Jur. N. S. 1004; *Eastmead v. Witt*, *ib.*

<sup>1</sup> Per Littledale, J., in *Pattison v. Jones*, 8 B. & Cr. p. 586.



(ii.) *Other confidential communications of a private nature.*'(a) *Answers to confidential inquiries.*

The principles which apply to characters given to servants, govern also all other answers to private and confidential inquiries. (a)

If the owner of a vacant farm ask me as to the character of a person applying to become his tenant, my answer would be privileged. So if a friend of mine comes down into the country to live near me, and asks my advice as to the tradesmen, or doctor, he shall employ, I may tell him my opinion of the various tradesmen, \* or doctors, in the locality, without fear of an \* 204 action for slander.

In short, whenever in answering an inquiry the defendant is acting *bonâ fide* in the discharge of any legal, moral, or social duty, his answer will be privileged. (b) "Every one owes it as a duty to his fellow men to state what he knows about a person, when inquiry is made."<sup>1</sup>

So too it is a duty every one owes to society to assist in the discovery of a criminal, and to afford all information which will lead to his conviction. "It is a perfectly privileged communication, if a party who is interested in discovering a wrong doer, comes and makes inquiries and a person in answer makes a discovery, or a *bonâ fide* communication which he knows, or believes to be true, although it may possibly affect the character of a third person."<sup>2</sup> (c)

<sup>1</sup> Per Grove, J., in *Robshaw v. Smith*, 38 L. T. 423. And see *Lentner v. Merfield* (C. A.); *Times* for May 6th, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> Per Parke, B., in *Kine v. Sewell*, 3 M. & W. 302.

(a) To translate slanderous language used by another in a foreign tongue is privileged *primâ facie* if done at the request of an advising lawyer. *Zuckerman v. Sonnenschein*, 62 Ill. 115. But privilege does not arise from mere inquiry. The inquirer should have an interest, or the person giving the communication a duty towards him. *York v. Johnson*, 116 Mass. 482.

(b) *Long v. Peters*, 47 Iowa, 239; *State v. Lonsdale*, 48 Wis. 348; *Sunderlin*

*v. Bradstreet*, 46 N. Y. 188; *Taylor v. Church*, 4 Seld. 452.

(c) *Eames v. Whittaker*, 123 Mass. 342. So traders who have been defrauded by the plaintiff among others may join in a paper asserting that they have been "robbed and swindled" by the plaintiff among others, promising therein to aid in prosecuting the parties named, if signed in good faith and believed true on reasonable grounds. *Klinck v. Colby*, 46 N. Y. 427.

And when once such a confidential inquiry is set on foot, all subsequent interviews between the parties will be privileged, so long as what takes place thereat is still relevant to the original inquiry.<sup>1</sup>

Of course the defendant must honestly believe in the truth of the charge he makes at the time he makes it. And this implies that he must have *some* ground for the assertion: it need not be a conclusive or convincing ground: but no charge should ever be made recklessly and wantonly, even in confidence. The inquirer should be put in possession of all you know, and of your means of knowledge; if your only means of knowledge is hear-

\* 205 say, \* tell him so: do not state a rumor as a fact; and in repeating a rumor, be careful not to heighten its color or exaggerate its extent. If the only information you possess is contained in a letter, it is best to give him the letter and leave him to draw his own conclusions.<sup>2</sup> Do not speak with the air of knowing of your own knowledge every word you say to be the fact, when you are merely repeating gossip or hazarding a series of reckless assertions. If time allows, and means of inquiry exist, you should make some attempt to sift the charge, before you spread it. In short, confidential advice should be given seriously and conscientiously: it should be manifest that you do not take a pleasure in maligning the plaintiff, but are compelled to do so in the honest discharge of a painful duty.

And, above all, the answer must be pertinent to the inquiry. If I am asked the plaintiff's name or address, I must not commence to disparage the plaintiff's credit, conduct, family or wares. In fact, the reply must be an answer to the question or reasonably induced thereby and not irrelevant information gratuitously volunteered.<sup>3</sup> It is for the jury in each case to determine whether what passed was or was not relevant to the inquiry, and whether or no the information was given confidentially.

<sup>1</sup> *Beatson v. Skene*, 5 H. & N. 838; 29 L. J. Ex. 430; 6 Jur. N. S. 780; 2 L. T. 378; *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87; *Wallace v. Carroll*, 11 Ir. C. L. R. 485.

<sup>2</sup> *Coxhead v. Richards*, 2 C. B. 569; 15 L. J. C. P. 278; 10 Jur. 984; *Robshaw v. Smith*, 38 L. T. 423.

<sup>3</sup> *Southam v. Allen*, Sir T. Raym. 231; *Huntley v. Ward*, 6 C. B. N. S. 514.

*Illustrations.*

If a friend tells me he wants a good solicitor to act for him and asks my opinion of Smith, I am justified in telling him all I know for or against Smith. But if a stranger asked me in the train: "Is not that gentleman a solicitor?" I should not, it is submitted, be privileged in replying: "Yes, but he ought to have been struck off the rolls long ago."

If A. is about to have dealings with B., but first comes to C. and confidentially asks him his opinion of B., C.'s answer is privileged. "Every one \* is quite at liberty to state his opinion *bonâ fide* of the respectability of a \* 206 party thus inquired about." Per Lord Denman in *Storey v. Challands*, 8 C. & P. 234.

Plaintiff had been tenant to the defendant; a wine-broker went to defendant to ask him plaintiff's present address. Defendant commenced to abuse the plaintiff. The broker said: "I don't come to inquire about his character, but only for his address; I have done business with him before." But the defendant continued to denounce the plaintiff as a swindler, adding however, "I speak in confidence." The broker thanked defendant for his remarks and declined in future to trust the plaintiff. *Held*, that it was rightly left to the jury to say if defendant spoke *bonâ fide* or maliciously. *Picton v. Jackman*, 4 C. & P. 257; *Southam v. Allen*, Sir T. Raymond, 231.

Watkins met the defendant in Brecon, and addressing him said, "I hear that you say the bank of Bromage and Snead at Monmouth has stopped. Is it true?" Defendant answered, "Yes, it is. 'I was told so. It was so reported at Cricklewell, and nobody would take their bills, and I came to town in consequence of it myself.'" *Held*, that if the defendant understood Watkins to be asking for information by which to regulate his conduct, and spoke the words merely by way of honest advice, they were *primâ facie* privileged. *Bromage v. Prosser*, 4 B. & Cr. 247; 1 C. & P. 475; 6 D. & R. 296.

The defendant was asked to sign a memorial, the object of which was to retain the plaintiff as trustee of a charity from which office he was about to be removed. The defendant refused to sign, and on being pressed for his reasons, stated them explicitly. *Held*, a privileged communication. *Cowles v. Potts*, 34 L. J. Q. B. 247; 11 Jur. N. S. 946; 13 W. R. 858.

The plaintiff had been a Major-General commanding a corps of irregular troops during the war in the Crimea. Complaint having been made of the insubordination of the troops, the corps commanded by the plaintiff was placed under the superior command of General Vivian. The plaintiff then resigned his command, and General Vivian directed General Shirley to inquire and report on the state of the corps, and particularly referred him for information on the matter to the defendant, who was General Vivian's private secretary and civil commissioner. All communications made by the defendant to General Shirley touching the corps and the plaintiff's management of it are privileged, if the jury find that the defendant at the time honestly believed that he was acting within the scope of his duty in making them. *Beatson v. Skene*, 5 H. & N. 838; 29 L. J. Ex. 430; 6 Jur. N. S. 780; 2 L. T. 378; *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87.

A., B., and C. are brother officers in the same regiment. A. meets B. and says, "I have learned that C. has been guilty of an atrocious offence: I wish to consult you whether I should divulge it—whether I should speak \* of it to the com- \* 207 manding officer." Such remark and the discussion that ensued would be

privileged, if *bond fide*. Per Pigot, C.B., in *Bell v. Parke*, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 284. [The decision in the case turned on the language of the plea.]

The plaintiff was a London merchant who had had business relations with the London and Yorkshire Bank (Limited). The defendant, the manager of that bank, on being applied to by one Hudson for information about the plaintiff, showed Hudson an anonymous letter which the bank had received about the plaintiff, and which contained the libel in question. *Held*, that handing Hudson the letter in confidence was a privileged communication. Grove, J., in refusing a rule for a new trial made the following remarks:—“The defendant did not act as a volunteer, but was applied to for information. When applied to he did give such information as he possessed. He might have refused to give that information. He had no legal duty cast upon him to give any opinion. But he was entitled to give his opinion when asked, and *à fortiori*, as it seems to me, to show any letters he had received bearing on the subject. If one man shows another a letter, he leaves him to estimate what value attaches to it; whereas any opinion he gives might be based on very insufficient grounds. It is better to state facts than to give an opinion. Every one owes it as a duty to his fellow-men to state what he knows about a person, when inquiry is made; otherwise no one would be able to discern honest men from dishonest men. It is highly desirable, therefore, that a privilege of this sort should be maintained. An anonymous letter is usually a very despicable thing. But anonymous letters may be very important, not by reason of what they say, but because they lead to inquiry, which may substantiate what they have said. It seems to me, therefore, that he was fully entitled to show this anonymous letter for what it was worth.” *Robshaw v. Smith*, 28 L. T. 423.

(b) *Confidential communications not in answer to a previous inquiry.*

In the cases just quoted stress is laid on the fact that the defendant did not volunteer the information, but was expressly applied to for it. This is always no doubt a very material fact in the defendant's favor; but it is never alone decisive. Many occasions are privileged in which no application is made to the defendant, but he himself takes the initiative; while, on the other hand, as we have seen, many answers to inquiries will not necessarily be privileged, even if given confidentially. (a) The question in every case is this:—Were the circumstances  
 \* 208 \* such that an honest man might reasonably suppose it his duty to act as the defendant has done in this case? And the circumstances may be such that it is clearly the duty of a good citizen to go at once to the person most concerned and tell him everything, without waiting for him to come and inquire.

(a) *York v. Johnson*, 116 Mass. 482. For the confidential or other justifying relation should actually exist, and that between the defendant and the person to

whom the statement is made. See *e.g.* *Alpin v. Morton*, 21 Ohio St. 536; *Joannes v. Bennett*, 5 Allen, 169; *Perkins v. Mitchell*, 31 Barb. 461.

It may well be that he has no suspicions, and never would inquire into the matter unless warned.<sup>1</sup> (a)

But in cases where neither life nor property is in imminent and obvious peril, there the circumstance that the defendant was applied to for the information, and did not volunteer it, will materially affect the issue. Where the matter is not of great or immediate importance, interference on my part may be considered officious and meddlesome; although, under the same circumstances, every one would at once admit that it would have been my duty to give all the information in my power, had I been applied to for it. An answer to a confidential inquiry may be privileged where the same information if volunteered would be actionable. Thus I am not justified in standing at the door of a tradesman's shop and voluntarily defaming his character to his intending customers. But if an intending customer comes to me and inquires as to the respectability or credit of that tradesman, it is my duty to tell him all I know.<sup>2</sup>

In cases then in which there can be a doubt as to the defendant's duty to speak, the fact that he was applied to for the information will tell strongly in his favor. In cases where his duty to speak was clear without that, the fact that he was applied to is immaterial.

### *Illustrations.*

Both the Marquis of Anglesey and his agent told the defendant, the tenant of Haywood Park Farm, to inform them if he saw or heard anything \* wrong \* 209 respecting the game. The defendant heard that the gamekeeper was selling the game, and believing the fact to be so, wrote and informed the Marquis. *Held*, that the letter was privileged; but Parke, J., intimated that if the defendant had not been previously directed to communicate anything he thought going wrong, the letter would have been unauthorized and libellous. *Cockayne v. Hodgkisson*, 5 C. & P. 543. See *King v. Watts*, 8 C. & P. 615.

If a master, hearing that a discharged servant is seeking to enter M.'s service, writes to M. of his own accord to give the servant a bad character, and thus forestalls any inquiry by M.; it will at all events require stronger evidence to prove that he acted *bonâ fide* than it would had he waited for M. to write and inquire. *Pattison v. Jones*, 8 B. & C. 578; 3 M. & R. 101.

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, pp. 213-219.

<sup>2</sup> *Storey v. Challands*, 8 C. & P. 234.

(a) *Fowles v. Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 20; interests. *Easley v. Moss*, 9 Ala. 266; *Mott v. Dawson*, 46 Iowa, 533; *Harper v. Lawler v. Earle*, 5 Allen, 22. Confidential communications in a case of privilege should be liberally viewed by the jury. *Harper*, 10 Bush, 447; *Parker v. McQueen*, 8 B. Mon. 16; *Hubbard v. Rutledge*, 57 Miss. 7. The communication may of course be made to protect the speaker's *Stallings v. Newman*, 26 Ala. 300.

Horsford was about to deal with the plaintiff, when he met the defendant who said at once, without his opinion being asked at all, "If you have anything to do with Storey, you will live to repent it; he is a most unprincipled man," &c. Lord Denman directed a verdict for the plaintiff, because the defendant began by making the statement, without waiting to be asked. *Storey v. Challands*, 8 C. & P. 234.

Nash selected plaintiff to be his attorney in an action. Defendant, apparently a total stranger, wrote to Nash to deprecate his so employing the plaintiff. This was held to be clearly *not* a confidential communication. *Damages*, 1s. *Godson v. Home*, 1 B. & B. 7; 3 Moore, 223.

At the hearing of a County Court case, *Nettlefold v. Fulcher*, Fulcher's solicitor commented severely on the conduct of the plaintiff, Nettlefold's debt collector. Not content with that, Fulcher's solicitor sent a full report of the case to the *Marylebone Gazette*, including his remarks on the plaintiff. The jury found that this report was substantially fair and accurate, but that it was sent to the newspaper "with a certain amount of malice." The Court upheld this finding, laying especial stress upon the fact that the defendant was a volunteer, and not an ordinary reporter for that paper. *Stevens v. Sampson*, 5 Ex. D. 53; 49 L. J. Q. B. 120; 28 W. R. 87; 41 L. T. 782.

(c) *Communications made in discharge of a duty arising from a confidential relationship existing between the parties.*

In what cases then will a defendant be privileged in going of his own accord to the person concerned, and giving him information which he has not asked for? This is often a difficult

\* 210 question to answer. But in one \* class of cases it is clear that it is not only excusable, but that it is imperative on the defendant so to do; and that is where there exists between the parties such a confidential relation as to throw on the defendant the duty of protecting the interests of the person concerned.

Thus it is clearly the duty of my steward, bailiff, foreman, or housekeeper, to whom I have entrusted the management of my lands, business, or house, to come and tell me if they think anything is going wrong, and not to wait till my own suspicions are aroused, and I myself begin asking questions. So my family solicitor may voluntarily write and inform me of anything which he thinks it is to my advantage to know, without waiting for me to come down to his office and inquire. But it would be dangerous for another solicitor, whom I had never employed, to volunteer the same information; for till I retain him in the matter, there is no confidential relation existing between us. So a father, guardian, or an intimate friend may warn a young man against associating with a particular individual; or may warn a

lady not to marry a particular suitor; though in the same circumstances it might be considered officious and meddlesome, if a mere stranger gave such a warning. (a) So if the defendant is in the army or in a government office, it would be his duty to inform his official superiors of any serious misconduct on the part of his subordinates; for the defendant is in some degree answerable for the faults of those immediately under his control. But it does not follow that, if A. and B. are officers or clerks of equal rank and standing, it is the duty of A. to tell tales of B., except in self-defence; for A.'s superiors expect him to do his own work merely and have not invested him with any authority or control over B.<sup>1</sup>

A *confidential relationship* then clearly exists where the \* parties are principal and agent, solicitor and client, \* 211 guardian and ward, partners, or even intimate friends: in short wherever any trust or confidence is reposed by the one in the other. (b) Or, changing the point of view, we may say that it will be the duty of A. to volunteer information to B., whenever B. could justly reproach A. for his silence if he did not volunteer such information.

Merely labelling a letter "*Private and confidential*," or merely stating "*I speak in confidence*," will not make a communication confidential in the legal sense of that term, if there be in fact no relationship between the parties which the law deems confidential.<sup>2</sup> (c)

### *Illustrations.*

My regular solicitor may unasked give me any information concerning third persons of which he thinks it to my interest that I should be informed, even although he is not at the moment conducting any legal proceedings for me. *Davis v. Reeves*, 5 Ir. C. L. R. 79.

<sup>1</sup> See *Bell v. Parke*, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 284; 11 Ir. C. L. R. 413.

<sup>2</sup> *Picton v. Jackman*, 4 C. & P. 257.

(a) See *Joannes v. Bennett*, 5 Allen, 169; *Krebs v. Oliver*, 12 Gray, 239. So a father may employ a person to make inquiry concerning the character and standing of his daughter's husband, whom she had left, and his report made in good faith and reasonably believed true will be privileged. *Atwill v. Mackintosh*, 120 Mass. 177.

(b) It does not exist between members

of the same church merely as such. *York v. Johnson*, 116 Mass. 482.

(c) Nor will it exempt a newspaper editor or publisher that he has a contract of indemnity against the author of a libellous article. *Atkins v. Johnson*, 43 Vt. 78. Of course the fact that the "editor or publisher" disclaims responsibility for the articles published will not help him.

A solicitor who is conducting a case for a minor may inform his next friend of the minor's misconduct. *Wright v. Woodgate*, 2 C. M. & R. 573; 1 Tyr. & G. 12; 1 Gale, 329.

Rumors being in circulation prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, a dissenting minister, he courted inquiry, and appointed A. to sift the matter thoroughly. It was agreed that the defendant should represent the malcontent portion of the congregation, and state the case against the plaintiff to A. A confidential relationship being thus established between the defendant and A., all that took place between them, whether by word of mouth or in writing, so long as the inquiry lasted, and relative thereto, was held to be privileged. *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87.

A report by the Comptroller of the Navy to the Board of Admiralty upon the plans and proposals of a naval architect is clearly privileged. *Per Grove, J., in Henwood v. Harrison*, L. R. 7 C. P. 606; 41 L. J. C. P. 206; 20 W. R. 1000; 26 L. T. 938.

A timekeeper employed on public works, on behalf of a public department, wrote a letter to the secretary of the department, imputing fraud to the contractor. *Blackburn, J.*, directed the jury that if they thought the letter was written in good faith and in the discharge of the defendant's duty to his employers, it was privileged, although written to the wrong person. *Scarll v. Dixon*, 4 F. & F. 250.

\* 212 \* A relation or intimate friend may confidentially advise a lady not to marry a particular suitor, and assign reasons, provided he really believes in the truth of the statements he makes. *Todd v. Hawkins*, 2 M. & Rob. 20; 8 C. & P. 888.

The defendant and Tinmouth were joint owners of *The Robinson*, and engaged the plaintiff as master; in April, 1843, defendant purchased Tinmouth's share; in August, 1843, defendant wrote a business letter to Tinmouth, claiming a return of £150, and incidentally libelled the plaintiff. *Held*, a privileged communication, as the defendant and Tinmouth were still in confidential relationship. *Wilson v. Robinson*, 7 Q. B. 68; 14 L. J. Q. B. 196; 9 Jur. 726.

The defendant, a linendraper, dismissed his apprentice without sufficient legal excuse: he wrote a letter to her parents, informing them that the girl would be sent home, and giving his reasons for her dismissal. *Cockburn, C.J.*, held this letter privileged; as there was clearly a confidential relationship between the girl's master and her parents. *James v. Jolly*, Bristol Summer Assizes, 1879, *ex relatione med.* See *Fowler and wife v. Homer*, 3 Camp. 294.

The officers and men of the garrison of St. Helena gave an entertainment at the theatre, at which considerable noise and disturbance took place. The commanding officer was informed that this was caused by the plaintiff, who was said to have been drunk. The plaintiff was an assistant master in the Government School. The commanding officer reported the circumstances to the colonial secretary of the island, and the plaintiff was in consequence suspended from his appointment. Verdict for the plaintiff disapproved and set aside, and judgment arrested. *Stace v. Griffith*, L. R. 2 P. C. 420; 6 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 18; 20 L. T. 197; *Sutton v. Plumridge*, 16 L. T. 741.

It is the duty of an under-master in a College School to inform the head-master that reports have been for some time in circulation imputing habits of drunkenness to the second-master. *Hume v. Marshall* (*Cockburn, C.J.*), *Times* of Nov. 26, 1877.

But where, after an election, the agent of the defeated candidate wrote a letter to the agent of the successful candidate, asserting that the plaintiff and another (both members of the successful candidate's committee) had bribed a particular voter, the letter was held not to be privileged, as there was no confidential relation existing



between the two agents. *Dickeson v. Hilliard* and another, L. R. 9 Exch. 79 ; 43 L. J. Ex. 37 ; 22 W. R. 372 ; 30 L. T. 196.

A circular letter sent by the secretary to the members of a society for the protection of trade against sharpers and swindlers, is not a privileged communication. *Getting v. Foss*, 3 C. & P. 160. See *Goldstein v. Foss*, 2 C. & P. 252 ; 6 B. & C. 154 ; 4 Bing. 489 ; 2 Y. & J. 146 ; 4 D. & R. 197 ; 1 M. & P. 402 ; *Humphreys v. Miller*, 4 C. & P. 7. (a)

\* (d) *Information volunteered when there is no confidential* \* 213  
*relationship existing between the parties.*

Where neither the defendant himself, nor any one with whom he has confidential relations, is interested in the subject matter of the communication, it is very difficult to define what circumstances will be sufficient to impose on him the duty of volunteering information to the prejudice of the plaintiff. There is no rule of law on the point. It is a question rather of moral or social ethics. (b) Unless the judge is clearly of opinion that there are no circumstances to raise a suggestion of privilege, he will in every such case leave it to the jury to determine whether the defendant acted *bonâ fide* in the execution of what he honestly believed to be his duty. The jury must not ask themselves merely — “Should we have acted as the defendant has done in such circumstances ?” for different people act differently in similar perplexities. Moreover the matter has been thoroughly investigated before it comes before the jury, and what to the defendant at the time seemed matter of serious suspicion has all been explained away in court. The jury must place themselves in the position of the defendant at the time these suspicious circumstances were brought to his knowledge, when first the question arose in his mind : — “Ought I not to inform A. of these matters which so nearly concern him ?” It may well be that another man would have said, “It is no concern of mine,” and would do nothing (which is always the safer course). But if the defendant honestly felt that he could not conscientiously allow A. to continue in secure ignorance, that he *must* communicate to him the rumor he had heard, and if he had reasonable grounds for so

(a) *Sunderlin v. Bradstreet*, 46 N. Y. 188 ; *Taylor v. Church*, 4 Seld. 452 ; *Beardsley v. Tappan*, 5 Blatchf. 497. But *secus* if the communication is made upon inquiry to a person interested. *Id.* ; *Ormsby v. Douglass*, 37 N. Y. 477.

(b) See *e.g.* *Van Wyck v. Aspinwall*, 17 N. Y. 190 ; *Vanderzee v. McGregor*, 12 Wend. 545 ; *Thorn v. Blanchard*, 5 Johns. 508 ; *Gray v. Pentland*, 4 Serg. & R. 420.

feeling, that is sufficient. It is not necessary that the  
 \* 214 reports which reach the defendant should be true, or \* that  
 he should thoroughly investigate them. Hearsay is sufficient reasonable and probable cause in the absence of malice;<sup>1</sup> unless the defendant ought for any reason to have known that his informant was unreliable, and his story undeserving of belief.

The defendant is entitled to judgment if the jury find that he reasonably acted under an honest sense of duty, desiring to serve the person most concerned, and not from any self-seeking motive. But there must be some circumstances proved before them, showing that such a sense of duty was reasonably possible. It is not sufficient for the defendant merely to swear: "I acted under a sense of duty." The defendant is not to be punished for merely being over-conscientious; but on the other hand it is clear law that a man is not justified in repeating information he has received prejudicial to the plaintiff, merely because he sincerely believes it to be true.<sup>2</sup>

It might be argued that in using the words "*reasonably*" and "if he had *reasonable* grounds for so feeling," I am running counter to *Clark v. Molyneux*.<sup>3</sup> But I think that decision is confined to cases of clear privilege, where the only question is as to evidence of express malice. Here we are dealing with the previous question, privilege or no privilege.

The law on the point cannot be better expressed than in the following passage:— "Where a person is so situated that it becomes right in the interests of society that he should tell to a third person certain facts, then if he *bonâ fide* and without malice does tell them it is a privileged communication."<sup>4</sup>

\* 215 \* The only difficulty is in any given case to determine whether it had or had not become right in the interests of society that the defendant should act as he did.

In some cases the judge decides this point without the help of the jury by ruling that no *primâ facie* case of privilege has at all

<sup>1</sup> *Maitland v. Bramwell*, 2 F. & F. 623; *Coxhead v. Richards*, 2 C. B. 569; 15 L. J. C. P. 278; *Lister v. Perryman*, L. R. 4 H. L. 521; 39 L. J. Ex. 177; 23 L. T. 269.

<sup>2</sup> *Botterill v. Whytehead*, 41 L. T. 588.

<sup>3</sup> 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 36 L. T. 466; 37 L. T. 694.

<sup>4</sup> Per Blackburn, J., in *Davies v. Snead*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 611; 39 L. J. Q. B. 202; 23 L. T. 609.

been established. And undoubtedly it is the province of the judge to decide whether a communication is privileged or not, when the facts are undisputed. But it is submitted that in cases where the defendant alleges that he acted under an honest, though mistaken, sense of duty, the judge should take the opinion of the jury on the question of *bona fides*, unless he feels certain that no other reasonable man, *except* the defendant, would have felt it his duty to act as the defendant did in similar circumstances. (a)

In *Bennett v. Deacon*,<sup>1</sup> the Court of Common Pleas were equally divided on the question whether the judge was right in ruling that the communication could not be privileged, and leaving no question to the jury as to the defendant's *bona fides*. In *Coxhead v. Richards*,<sup>2</sup> the judge *had* left the question to the jury, and the same Court was equally divided as to whether he was right in so doing. In each case, therefore, the rule dropped, and the verdict stood, and, as in the former case the verdict had necessarily been for the plaintiff, owing to the judge's ruling, and in the latter case it was for the defendant, the law now stands in this somewhat contradictory state:—A man may not give a tradesman a *bona fide* caution not to trust the plaintiff, though the facts stated be within defendant's own knowledge; he must wait till the tradesman applies to him for his advice; but, on the other hand, a man may inform a shipowner of his captain's misconduct, though he does not know it of his own knowledge but only through others. The very similar case of *Harwood v. Green*<sup>3</sup> \* was not \* 216 cited in the argument of *Coxhead v. Richards*; in that case it was decided that a letter written to *Lloyd's* by a lieutenant in the navy as to the misconduct of the captain of a transport ship on board which the lieutenant had been superintendent was *not* a privileged communication. So too it is difficult to distinguish *Brooks v. Blanshard*<sup>4</sup> from *Harris v. Thompson*.<sup>5</sup> In both cases the communication appears to have been volunteered. In *Harnett v. Vise and wife*,<sup>6</sup> the judge and the jury took opposite views of the defendants' conduct.

If such differences of opinion appear in the reported decisions of the Law Courts, how much greater must be the perplexity of a defendant uneducated in casuistry who suddenly finds himself called upon to solve a doubtful problem in social morality.

<sup>1</sup> 2 C. B. 628; 15 L. J. C. P. 289.

<sup>2</sup> 2 C. B. 569; 15 L. J. C. P. 278; 10 Jur. 984.

<sup>3</sup> 3 C. & P. 141, *post*, p. 288.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Cr. & Mees. 779; 3 Tyrw. 844.

<sup>5</sup> 13 C. B. 333.

<sup>6</sup> 5 Ex. D. 307; 29 W. R. 7.

(a) See *ante*, p. 185.

It appears to be clear that if the defendant reasonably supposes that human life would be seriously imperilled by his remaining silent he may volunteer information to those thus endangered, or to their master, though he be not himself personally concerned.<sup>1</sup> So if the money or goods of the person to whom he speaks would be in great and obvious danger of being stolen or destroyed. So too it appears that the defendant may, without being applied to for the information, acquaint a master with the misconduct of his servants, if instances thereof have come under the especial notice of the defendant and have been concealed from the master's eye. But in most other cases the defendant runs a great risk in volunteering statements which afterwards turn out to be inaccurate, unless indeed he is himself personally interested in the matter, or compelled to interfere by the fiduciary relationship in which he stands to some person concerned. Although the defendant may feel sure that if he were in his neighbor's place,

he should be most grateful for the information conveyed,  
 \* 217 still he must recollect that it may \*eventually turn out, that in endeavoring to avert a fancied injury to that neighbor, he has really inflicted an undoubted and undeserved injury on the plaintiff.

#### *Illustrations.*

A. and B. are tenants to the same landlord with similar clauses in their respective leases. A. has reason to believe that B. is breaking his covenants, committing waste, violating the rotation of crops, &c. The landlord is away abroad. It is submitted on the authority of *Cockayne v. Hodgkisson*, 5 C. & P. 543, *ante*, p. 208, that it is *not* the duty of A. to write and inform the landlord of his suspicions, and that therefore such a letter would not be privileged; unless the landlord had in some way set A. in authority over B.

A housemaid thinks the cook is robbing their master. It is not her duty to speak at once on bare suspicion merely; but as soon as she sees something which reasonably appears to her inconsistent with the cook's innocence, she will be privileged, it is submitted, in giving information thereof to her master.

Communications confidentially made to a master as to the conduct of his servants, by one who has had an opportunity of noticing certain malpractices on their part, are privileged. *Cleaver v. Sarraude*, 1 Camp. 268; *Kine v. Sewell*, 3 M. & W. 297; *Amann v. Damm*, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 W. R. 470.

The occupier of a house may complain to the landlord of the workmen he has sent to repair the house. *Toogood v. Spyring*, 1 C. M. & R. 181; 4 Tyrw. 582.

If a report be current in a parish as to the disgraceful conduct of the incumbent, bringing scandal on the church, a good churchman may inform the Bishop of the dio-

<sup>1</sup> See per Cresswell, J., 2 C. B. 605.

cese thereof, although he does not reside in the district and is not personally interested. *James v. Boston*, 2 C. & K. 4.

A letter written by a private individual to the chief secretary of the Post-Master General complaining of the misconduct of an official under the authority of the Post-Master General, is privileged, if made *bonâ fide* and without malice, even though some of the charges made in the letter may not be true, and though the defendant stood in no relation, past or present, either to the plaintiff or to the Post Office authorities. *Blake v. Pilfold*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 198; *Woodward v. Lander*, 6 C. & P. 548.

The first mate of a merchant ship wrote a letter to the defendant, an old and intimate friend, stating that he was placed in a very awkward position owing to the drunken habits, &c., of the captain, and saying:—“How shall I act? \* 218 It is my duty to write to Mr. Ward (the owner of the ship), but my doing so would ruin” the captain and his wife and family. The defendant, after much deliberation and consultation with other nautical friends, thought it his duty to show the letter to Ward, who thereupon dismissed the captain. The defendant knew nothing of the matter except from the mate's letter. The Court of C. P. was equally divided on the question whether so showing the letter was privileged; and therefore the verdict for the defendant stood. *Coxhead v. Richards*, 2 C. B. 569; 15 L. J. C. P. 278; 10 Jur. 984. Approved by Willes, J., in *Amann v. Damm*, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313. And see *Harwood v. Green*, 3 C. & P. 141; *post*, p. 288.

Defendant met Clark in the road, and asked him if he had sold his timber yet. Clark replied that Bennett (plaintiff) was going to have it. Defendant asked if he was going to pay ready-money for it, and being answered in the negative, said, “Then you'll lose your timber; for Bennett owes me about £25, and I am going to arrest him next week for my money, and your timber will help to pay my debt.” Clark consequently declined to sell the timber to the plaintiff. Plaintiff really did owe defendant about £23. Coltman, J., directed the jury that the caution was altogether unprivileged because *volunteered*: and they therefore found a verdict for the plaintiff, damages 40s. The Court of C. P. were equally divided on the question whether the judge was right in his direction, and therefore the verdict for the plaintiff stood. *Bennett v. Deacon*, 2 C. B. 628; 15 L. J. C. P. 289. See *King v. Watts*, 8 C. & P. 615.

A. and B. were shareholders in the same railway company. B. was also a River Commissioner. The plaintiff had been engineer to the railway company and was seeking to be elected engineer to the River Commissioners. Shortly before the election, A. voluntarily wrote to B. that the plaintiff's mismanagement or ignorance had cost the railway company several thousand pounds. The plaintiff lost the appointment in consequence. *Held not a privileged communication*. *Brooks v. Blanshard*, 1 Cr. & Mees. 779; 3 Tyrw. 844.

The defendant was a director of two companies; of one of which the plaintiff was secretary, of the other auditor. The plaintiff was dismissed from his post as secretary of the first company for alleged misconduct. Thereupon the defendant, at the next meeting of the board of the second company, informed his co-directors of this fact, and proposed that he should also be dismissed from his post of auditor of the second company. *Held a privileged communication*. *Harris v. Thompson*, 13 C. B. 333.

Dawes told the defendant that he intended to employ the plaintiff as surgeon and accoucheur at his wife's approaching confinement; the defendant thereupon advised him not to do so, on account of the plaintiff's alleged immorality. Martin, B., thought this was a privileged communication, though it was volunteered. *Dixon v. Smith*, 29 L. J. Ex. 125; 5 H. & N. 450.

\* The defendant, a parishioner, mentioned to her rector a report, widely current in the parish, that the rector and his solicitor were grossly mismanaging

a trust estate, and defrauding the widow and orphans, &c. The solicitor brought an action for the slander. The jury found that she did so in the honest belief that it was a benefit to the rector to inform him of the report in order that he might clear his character. The Court held that the statement was clearly privileged so far as the rector was concerned, and that as the statement was not divisible it must also be privileged with regard to the plaintiff. *Davies v. Snead*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 611; 39 L. J. Q. B. 202; 23 L. T. 609.

Information given to a vicar absent on the continent as to rumors affecting the moral character of the curate he has left in charge is privileged: so is similar information given verbally to the absent vicar's solicitor, with a view to his informing the vicar, should he think it right to do so: so is similar information given to a neighboring vicar who has asked the curate in charge to preach for him. *Clark v. Molyneux*, 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 36 L. T. 466; 37 L. T. 694; 14 Cox, C. C. 10. (a)

The plaintiff, an architect, had been employed by a certain committee to superintend and carry out the restoration of Skirlaugh Church; thereupon the defendant, who was a clergyman residing in the county, but who had no manner of interest in the question of the employment of the plaintiff to execute the work, wrote a letter to a member of the committee saying, "I see that the restoration of Skirlaugh Church has fallen into the hands of an architect who is a Wesleyan and can have no experience in church work. Can you not do something to avert the irreparable loss which must be caused if any of the masonry of this ancient gem of art be ignorantly tampered with?" The letter was clearly a libel on the plaintiff in the way of his profession or calling. *Bramwell, L.J.*, thought it was privileged, because the restoration was a matter of public interest, and one in which a neighboring clergyman would be especially interested; but a special jury found that there was evidence of malice in the unfair expressions employed and gave the plaintiffs £50 damages. But *Kelly, C.B.*, on a motion for a new trial, declared that he was "at a loss to see what privilege the defendant possessed, under the circumstances of the case, to interfere between the committee and the plaintiff in respect of the contract between them; the defendant being neither the patron, nor the minister of the church, nor a member of the committee appointed to effect its restoration, nor even a parishioner."

[It did not appear that the defendant was even a subscriber to the restoration fund.] *Botterill and another v. Whytehead*, 41 L. T. 588.

\* 220 \* (iii.) *Information given to any public officer imputing crime or misconduct to others.*

It is a duty which every one owes to society and to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct, and to promote the detection of any crime. (b) And this duty does not

(a) How far communications concerning fellow clergymen are privileged, see also *Shurtleff v. Stevens*, 51 Vt. 501; *Whitely v. Adams*, 15 C. B. N. S. 417.

(b) See *Eames v. Whittaker*, 123 Mass. 342; *Lawler v. Earle*, 5 Allen, 22; *Brow v. Hathaway*, 13 Allen, 239; *Smith v. Kerr*, Edm. Sel. Cas. 190; *Allen v. Crofoot*, 2 Wend. 515; *Thorn v. Moser*, 1

*Denio*, 488; *Mayo v. Sample*, 18 Iowa, 306; *Robinett v. Ruby*, 13 Md. 95; *Briggs v. Byrd*, 12 Ired. 377. See also *Smith v. Higgins*, 16 Gray, 251, where in a town meeting the town assessors were charged with having perjured themselves in a suit against them in their official capacity. The charge was held privileged.

arise merely when confidential inquiries are made. If facts come under my knowledge which lead me reasonably to conclude that a crime has been, or is about to be, committed, it is my duty at once to give information to the police. "For the sake of public justice, charges and communications which would otherwise be slanderous, are protected if *bonâ fide* made in the prosecution of an inquiry into a suspected crime."<sup>1</sup> But such charges must be made in the honest desire to promote the ends of justice, and not with any spiteful or malicious feeling against the person accused, nor with the purpose of obtaining any indirect advantage to the accuser. Nor should serious accusations be made recklessly or wantonly; they must always be warranted by some circumstances reasonably arousing suspicion. And they should not be made before more persons, nor in stronger language, than necessary.

### *Illustrations.*

Mensel sent his servant, the plaintiff, to the defendant's shop on business; while there, the plaintiff had occasion to go into an inner room. Shortly after he left, a box was missed from that inner room. No one else had been in the room except the plaintiff. The defendant thereupon went round to Mr. Mensel's, and calling him aside into a private room, told him what had happened, adding that the plaintiff must have taken the box. Later on, the plaintiff came to the defendant's house, and the defendant repeated the accusation to him; but, an English girl being present, defendant was careful to speak in German. Both communications were held privileged, if made without actual malice and in the *bonâ fide* belief of their truth. *Amann v. Damm*, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 W. R. 470.

\* Defendant accused the plaintiff, in the presence of a third person, of \* 221 stealing his wife's brooch; plaintiff wished to be searched; defendant repeated the accusation to two women, who searched the plaintiff and found nothing. Subsequently it was discovered that defendant's wife had left the brooch at a friend's house. *Held*, that the mere publication to the two women did not destroy the privilege attaching to charges, if made *bonâ fide*; but that all the circumstances should have been left to the jury who should determine whether or no the charge was made recklessly and unwarrantably, and repeated before more persons than necessary. *Padmore v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 380; 4 Jur. 458; 3 P. & D. 209; *Fowler and Wife v. Homer*, 3 Camp. 294. Plaintiff assaulted the defendant on the highway; defendant, meeting a constable, requested him to take charge of the plaintiff, and the constable refusing to arrest the plaintiff unless the defendant would charge him with felony, the defendant did so; *held*, on demurrer to the defendant's plea setting up these circumstances, that they did not render the charge of felony a privileged publication. *Smith v. Hodgeskins*, Cro. Car. 276.

Plaintiff was defendant's shopman in Plymouth till Nov. 5th, 1834, when he left and went to London, receiving from the plaintiff a good character for steadiness, hon-

<sup>1</sup> Per Coleridge, J., in *Padmore v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 382. See *Johnson v. Evans*, 3 Esp. 32.

esty and industry. Early in December defendant found one of his female servants in possession of some of his goods. When charged with stealing them, she said that the plaintiff gave them to her. Thereupon the defendant, though he knew the girl was of bad character, went to the plaintiff's relations in Plymouth and charged him with felony, and eventually induced them to give him fifty pounds to say no more about the matter. *Held* that the charge of felony was not made *bonâ fide*, with a just intention to promote investigation or prosecution, but with a view to a compromise, and was altogether unprivileged; and that no question as to malice in fact should have been left to the jury. *Hooper v. Truscott*, 2 Bing. N. C. 457; 2 Scott, 672.

So, too, it is the duty of all who witness any misconduct on the part of a magistrate or any public officer to bring such misconduct to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish it; and, therefore, all petitions and memorials complaining of such misconduct, if prepared *bonâ fide* and forwarded to the proper authorities, are privileged. And it is not necessary that the informant or memorialist should be in any way personally aggrieved or injured: for all persons have an interest in the pure  
 \* 222 administration of justice and the efficiency of \* our public offices in all departments of the State. So with ecclesiastical matters; all good churchmen are concerned to prevent any scandal attaching to the Church. If, however, the informant be the person immediately affected by the misconduct complained of, he can claim privilege also on the ground that he is acting in self-defence.<sup>1</sup> Every communication is privileged which is made "*bonâ fide* with a view to obtain redress for some injury received, or to prevent or punish some public abuse. . . . This privilege, however, must not be abused; for if such a communication be made maliciously and without probable cause, the pretence under which it is made, instead of furnishing a defence, will aggravate the case of the defendant."<sup>2</sup> And a defendant will be taken to have acted maliciously, if he eagerly seizes on some slight and frivolous matter, and without any inquiry into the merits, without even satisfying himself that the account of the matter that has reached him is correct, hastily concludes that a great public scandal has been brought to light which calls for the immediate intervention of the Crown.

### *Illustrations.*

A memorial to the Home Secretary or to the Lord Chancellor, complaining of misconduct on the part of a county magistrate and praying for his removal from the commission

<sup>1</sup> See the next class of cases, p. 225.

<sup>2</sup> Per Best, J., in *Fairman v. Ives*, 5 B. & Ald. 647, 8.



of the peace, is privileged. *Harrison v. Bush*, 5 E. & B. 344 ; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25, 99 ; 1 Jur. N. S. 846 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 90.

So is a petition to the House of Commons charging the plaintiff with oppression and extortion in his office of Vicar-General to the Bishop of Lincoln, although the petition was printed, and copies distributed amongst the members. *Lake v. King*, 1 Lev. 240 ; 1 Saund. 131 ; Sid. 414 ; 1 Mod. 58.

The defendant deemed it his duty as a churchman to write to the Bishop of London informing him that a report was current in the parish of Bethnal Green that a stand-up fight had occurred in the schoolroom of St. James the Great between the plaintiff, the incumbent, and the \* schoolmaster, during school hours. The \* 223 letter was held privileged under the Church Discipline Act, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, s. 3 ; although the defendant did not live in the district of which the plaintiff was incumbent but in an adjoining district of the same parish. *James v. Boston*, 2 C. & K. 4.

A letter written to the Postmaster-General, or to the Secretary to the General Post-Office, complaining of misconduct in a postmaster, is not a libel, if it was written as a *bond fide* complaint, to obtain redress for a grievance that the party really believed he had suffered ; and particular expressions are not to be too strictly scrutinized, if the intention of the defendant was good. *Woodward v. Lander*, 6 C. & P. 548 ; *Blake v. Pilfold*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 198.

But in seeking redress, the defendant must be careful to apply to some person who has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, or power to redress the grievance. Statements made to some stranger who has nothing to do with the matter cannot be privileged. But still if the defendant applies to the wrong person, through some natural and honest mistake, as to the respective functions of various state officials, such slight and unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.<sup>1</sup> If however he recklessly makes statements to some one whom he ought to have known was altogether unconcerned with the matter, the privilege is lost. The person whose aid is invoked must have some jurisdiction, direct or indirect, to redress the grievance or some duty or interest in connection therewith.

So too where the informant is himself the person aggrieved, he should be very careful not to be led away by his just indignation into misstating facts, or employing language which is clearly too violent for the occasion.

### *Illustrations.*

"A petition to the king upon matters in which the Crown cannot directly interfere," is privileged. Per Best, J., 5 B. & Ald. 648.

\* An elector of Frome petitioned the Home Secretary, stating that the \* 224 plaintiff, a magistrate of the borough, had made speeches inciting to a breach of the peace, and praying an inquiry and that the Home Secretary should advise Her

<sup>1</sup> *Scarll v. Dixon*, 4 F. & F. 250.

Majesty to remove the plaintiff from the commission of the peace, — such petition was held to be privileged, although it should more properly have been addressed to the Lord Chancellor. *Harrison v. Bush*, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25, 99; 1 Jur. N. S. 846; 2 Jur. N. S. 90; *Scarl v. Dixon*, 4 F. & F. 250, *ante*, p. 211.

The plaintiff was about to be sworn in as a paid constable, by the justices, when the defendant, a parishioner, made a statement against the plaintiff's character in the hearing of several bystanders. *Held* that even if such statement ought rather to have been made to the vestry, who drew up the list of constables whom the justices were to swear in, still it was privileged, if made *bonâ fide* in furtherance of the ends of justice. *Kershaw v. Bailey*, 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129.

A letter to the Secretary at War, with the intent to prevail on him to exert his authority to compel the plaintiff (an officer in the army) to pay a debt due from him to defendant, was held privileged, although the Secretary at War had no *direct* power or authority to order the plaintiff to pay his debt. "It was an application," says Best, J., "for the redress of a grievance, made to one of the king's ministers, who, as the defendant honestly thought, had authority to afford him redress." *Fairman v. Ives*, 5 B. & Ald. 642; 1 Chit. 85; 1 D. & R. 252.

But where the defendant wrote a letter to the Home Secretary complaining of the conduct of the plaintiff, a solicitor, as clerk to the borough magistrates, this was held not to be privileged, because Sir James Graham had no power or jurisdiction whatever over the plaintiff. There was moreover evidence of malice. *Blagg v. Sturt*, 10 Q. B. 899; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39; 8 L. T. (Old S.) 135; 11 Jur. 101.

The plaintiff was a teacher in a district school; the inhabitants of the district prepared a memorial charging the plaintiff with drunkenness and immorality, which they sent to the local superintendent of Schools. It ought strictly to have been sent to the trustees of that particular school in the first instance, and such trustees would then, if they thought fit, in due course forward it to the local superintendent for him to take action upon it. *Held* that the publication was still *primâ facie* privileged, although, by a mistake easily made, it had been sent to the wrong quarter in the first instance. *McIntyre v. McBean*, 13 Up. Canada Q. B. Rep. 534.

#### \* 225 \*(B.) COMMUNICATIONS MADE IN SELF-DEFENCE.

##### (iv.) *Statements necessary to protect defendant's private interests.*

The duty which compels the defendant to make the communication may in special circumstances be a duty which he owes to himself, or which a due regard to his own interest renders necessary. But in such cases it must clearly appear not only that some such communication was necessary, but also that the defendant was compelled to employ the libellous words complained of. If he could have done all that his duty or interest demanded without libelling or slandering the plaintiff, then the words were not uttered in the due performance of any duty and are therefore not privileged. Thus, it is very seldom necessary in self-defence to impute evil motives to others. Above all, the defendant

should never charge his adversary with fraud, unless prepared with the most conclusive evidence; for once a charge of fraud is made, it must be proved to the letter.<sup>1</sup>

So too in cases where some such communication is necessary and proper in the protection of the defendant's interests, the privilege may be lost if the extent of its publication be excessive. I am not entitled to write to the *Times* because some one has cast a slur on me at a private meeting of the board of guardians; in fact by so doing I take the surest method of disseminating the charge against myself. So with an advertisement inserted in a newspaper, defamatory of the plaintiff; if such advertisement be necessary to protect the defendant's interest, or if advertising was the only way of effecting the defendant's object, and such object is a lawful one, then the circumstances excuse the extensive \* publication. But if it was not necessary to advertise at \* 226 all, or if the defendant's object could have been equally well effected by an advertisement which did not contain the words defamatory of the plaintiff, then the extent given to the announcement is evidence of malice to go to the jury.<sup>2</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

The plaintiff, a trader, employed an auctioneer to sell off his goods, and otherwise conducted himself in such a way that his creditors reasonably concluded that he had committed an act of bankruptcy. One of them, the defendant, thereupon sent the auctioneer a notice not to pay over the proceeds of the sale to the plaintiff, "he having committed an act of bankruptcy." Held by the majority of the Court of C. P. that this notice was privileged, as being made in the honest defence of defendant's own interests. *Blackham v. Pugh*, 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P. 290.

So where an agent in temperate language claims a right for his principal, or a solicitor for his client. *Hargrave v. Le Breton*, Burr. 2422; *Steward v. Young*, L. R. 5 C. P. 122; 39 L. J. C. P. 85; 18 W. R. 492; 22 L. T. 168.

The defendant had dismissed the plaintiff from his service on suspicion of theft, and, upon the plaintiff coming to his counting-house for his wages, called in two other of his servants, and addressing them in the presence of the plaintiff, said — "I have dismissed that man for robbing me: do not speak to him any more, in public or in private, or I shall think you as bad as him." — Held a privileged communication, on the ground that it was the duty, and also the interest, of the defendant to prevent his servants from associating with such a person. *Somerville v. Hawkins*, 10 C. B. 583;

<sup>1</sup> *Prior & another v. Wilson*, 1 C. B. N. S. 95.

<sup>2</sup> *Brown v. Croome*, 2 Stark. 297; and *Lay v. Lawson*, 4 A. & E. 795, overruling, or at least explaining *Delany v. Jones*, 4 Esp. 191. And see *Stockley v. Clement*, 4 Bing. 162; 12 Moore, 376, and *R. v. Enes* (1732), Andr. 229; *Bacon's Abr. Libel A.* (2), p. 452.

20 L. J. C. P. 131; 16 L. T. (Old S.) 283; 5 Jur. 450. And see *Manby v. Witt*, *Eastmead v. Witt*, 18 C. B. 544; 25 L. J. C. P. 294; 2 Jur. N. S. 1004.

The occupier of a house may complain to the landlord or his agent of the workmen he has sent to repair the house. *Toogood v. Spyring*, 1 C. M. & R. 181; 4 Tyrw. 582; *Kine v. Sewell*, 3 M. & W. 297.

\* 227 A customer may call and complain to a tradesman of the goods he \* supplies and the manner in which he conducts his business: but he should be careful to make the complaint in the hearing of as few persons as possible, and in moderate language. *Oddy v. Ld. Geo. Paulett*, 4 F. & F. 1009; *Crisp v. Gill*, 29 L. T. (Old S.) 82.

Defendant claimed rent of plaintiff; plaintiff's agent told defendant that plaintiff denied his liability; defendant thereupon wrote to the agent, alleging facts in support of his claim, and adding, "this attempt to defraud me of the produce of the land is as mean as it is dishonest." *Held* that the publication, in these terms, was not privileged, for one can claim a debt without imputing fraud, and that the judge was justified in directing the jury that it was a libel. *Tuson v. Evans*, 12 A. & E. 733.

Lord Denman in delivering the judgment of the Court, said, "Some remark from the defendant on the refusal to pay the rent was perfectly justifiable, because his entire silence might have been construed into an acquiescence in that refusal, and so might have prejudiced his case upon any future claim; and the defendant would, therefore, have been privileged in denying the truth of the plaintiff's statement. But, upon consideration, we are of opinion that the learned Judge was quite right in considering the language actually used as not justified by the occasion. Any one, in the transaction of business with another, has a right to use language *bonâ fide*, which is relevant to that business, and which a due regard to his own interest makes necessary, even if it should directly, or by its consequences, be injurious or painful to another; and this is the principle on which privileged communication rests; but defamatory comments on the motives or conduct of the party with whom he is dealing do not fall within that rule. It was enough for the defendant's interest, in the present case, to deny the truth of the plaintiff's assertion: to characterize that assertion as an attempt to defraud, and as mean and dishonest, was wholly unnecessary." And see *Robertson v. McDougall*, 4 Bing. 670; 1 M. & P. 692; 3 C. & P. 259; *Jacob v. Lawrence*, 4 L. R. Ir. 579; 14 Cox, C. C. 321.

The defendant owed the plaintiff £6 10s.; the plaintiff told his attorney to write and demand the money, and threaten proceedings. The defendant in reply wrote to the attorney denouncing the proceeding as a "miserable attempt at imposition," and proceeded to discuss the plaintiff's "transactions in business matters generally," asserting that "his disgusting tricks are looked upon by all respectable men with scorn." *Williams, J.*, ruled that the letter was not privileged and the Court of C. P. upheld this ruling. Damages one farthing; the jury expressly found that there was no malice; but the judge certified for costs on the express ground that there was. *Huntley v. Ward*, 1 F. & F. 552; 6 C. B. N. S. 514; 6 Jur. N. S. 18.

The defendant was Clerk of the Peace of the County of Kent, and as such \* 228 it was his duty to have the register of county voters printed, \* the expense of such printing being allowed by the justices in Quarter Sessions. In 1854 the defendant employed a new printer, who charged less for the job; the defendant wrote a letter to the Finance Committee of the justices stating his reasons for the change, and added that to continue to pay the charges made by his former printer, the plaintiff, would be "to submit to what appears to have been an attempt to extort money by misrepresentation." *Held* that the rest of the letter was privileged, as it was proper and necessary for the defendant to explain to the Finance Committee what he had

done; but that the words imputing improper motives to the plaintiff were uncalled for and malicious. Damages £50. *Cooke v. Wildes*, 5 E. & B. 328; 24 L. J. Q. B. 367; 1 Jur. N. S. 610; 3 C. L. R. 1090.

Defendant having lost certain bills of exchange, published a handbill, offering a reward for their recovery, and adding that he believed they had been embezzled by his clerk. His clerk at that time still attended regularly at his office. *Held* that the concluding words of the handbill were quite unnecessary to defendant's object, and were a gratuitous libel on the plaintiff. Damages £200. *Finden v. Westlake*, Moo. & Malk. 461. See *Mulligan v. Cole*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 549; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153; 33 L. T. 12; *Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons* (in C. P. D.), 28 W. R. 490; 42 L. T. 314; (C. A.) 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 28 W. R. 851.

Delivery to a third person for service on the plaintiff of a statutory notice under the Insolvent Act of 1869 (Nova Scotia) is *prima facie* privileged, being in the nature of a legal proceeding. *Bank of British North America v. Strong*, 1 App. Cas. 307; 34 L. T. 627.

(v.) *Statements provoked by a previous attack by plaintiff on defendant.*

Every man has a right to defend his character against false aspersion. It may be said that this is one of the duties which he owes to himself and to his family. Therefore communications made in fair self-defence are privileged. If I am attacked in a newspaper, I may write to that paper to rebut the charges, and I may at the same time retort upon my assailant, where such retort is a necessary part of my defence or fairly arises

\* out of the charges he has made against me.<sup>1</sup> A man who \* 229 himself commenced a newspaper war cannot subsequently come to the Court as a plaintiff, to complain that he has had the worst of the fray. But even in rebutting an accusation, the defendant may not of course state what he knows at the time to be untrue, or intrude unnecessarily into the private life or character of his assailant. The privilege extends only to such retorts as the plaintiff has himself provoked.<sup>2</sup>

*Illustrations.*

At a vestry meeting called to elect fresh overseers, the plaintiff accused the defendant, one of the outgoing overseers, of neglecting the interests of the vestry, and not collecting the rates; the defendant retorted that the plaintiff had been bribed by a railway company. *Held* that the retort was a mere *tu quoque*, in no way connected with the charge made against him by the plaintiff, and was therefore not privileged; for it was not made in self-defence. *Senior v. Medland*, 4 Jur. N. S. 1039; and see

<sup>1</sup> *O'Donoghue v. Hussey*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 124.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, p. 306.

Huntley v. Ward, 6 C. B. N. S. 514; 6 Jur. N. S. 18; 1 F. & F. 552; Murphy v. Halpin, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 127.

The plaintiff was a policy-holder in an insurance company, and published a pamphlet accusing the directors of that company of fraud. The directors published a pamphlet in reply, declaring the charges contained in the plaintiff's pamphlet to be false and calumnious, and also asserting that in a suit he had instituted he had sworn in support of those charges, in opposition to his own handwriting. Cockburn, C.J., held the directors' pamphlet *prima facie* privileged; and directed the jury in the following words:—"If you are of opinion that it was published *bona fide* for the purpose of the defence of the company, and in order to prevent these charges from operating to their prejudice, and with a view to vindicate the character of the directors, and not with a view to injure or lower the character of the plaintiff—if you are of that opinion and think that the publication did not go beyond the occasion, then you ought to find for the defendants on the general issue." Verdict for the defendants. Koenig v. Ritchie, 3 F. & F. 413; R. v. Veley, 4 F. & F. 1117.

The defendant was a candidate for the County of Waterford. Shortly before the election the Kilkenny Tenant Farmers' Association published in *Freeman's Journal* an address to the constituency describing the defendant as "a true type of a bad Irish landlord—the scourge of the country," and charging him with various acts  
\* 230 of tyranny and oppression towards his \*tenants, and especially towards the plaintiff, one of his former tenants. The defendant, thereupon, published, also in *Freeman's Journal*, an address to the constituency, answering the charges thus brought against him, and in so doing necessarily libelled the plaintiff. Held that such an address, being an answer to an attack, was *prima facie* privileged. Dwyer v. Esmonde, 2 L. R. (Ir.) 243, reversing the decision of the Court below; Ir. R. 11 C. L. 542. See also O'Donoghue v. Hussey, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 124.

The plaintiff, a barrister, attacked the Bishop of Sodor and Man before the House of Keys in an argument against a private bill, imputing to the bishop improper motives in his exercise of church patronage. The bishop wrote a charge to his clergy refuting these insinuations, and sent it to the newspapers for publication. Held that under the circumstances the bishop was justified in sending the charge to the newspaper, for an attack made in public required a public answer. Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor and Man, L. R. 4 P. C. 495; 42 L. J. P. C. 11; 9 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 318; 21 W. R. 204; 28 L. T. 377. See Hibbs v. Wilkinson, 1 F. & F. 608; Hemmings v. Gasson, E. B. & E. 346; 27 L. J. Q. B. 252; 4 Jur. N. S. 834.

Such previous attacks might also be matter for a counterclaim. Quin v. Hession, 40 L. T. 70; 4 L. R. (Ir.) 35.

### *Statements invited by the plaintiff.*

Closely akin to retorts provoked by the plaintiff's own attack, are communications procured by the plaintiff's own contrivance. If the only publication that can be proved is one made by the defendant to the plaintiff or to some agent of the plaintiff, and it is clear that such publication was procured *malâ fide* with a view to the action, and not in the ordinary course of business or of social intercourse, then such a publication will be held privileged; for the plaintiff brought it on himself. But this rule only applies

to cases in which there had been no previous publication by the defendant of the same words or libel.<sup>1</sup>

It makes a great difference if the report originated with the defendant, and what he has himself previously said produces the \* plain- \* 231  
tiff's inquiry.<sup>2</sup> If in answer to such an inquiry the defendant does  
no more than acknowledge having uttered the words, no action can be  
brought for the acknowledgment: the party injured must sue for the words  
previously spoken, and use the acknowledgment as proof that those words  
had been spoken. But if besides saying "Yes" to the question asked, he  
repeats the words in the presence of a third person, asserting his belief in  
the accusation and that he can prove it; such a statement is slanderous  
and is not privileged, although elicited by the plaintiff's question. See  
*Griffiths v. Lewis*,<sup>3</sup> in which case Lord Denman remarks: "Injurious words  
having been uttered by the defendant respecting the plaintiff, the plaintiff  
was bound to make inquiry on the subject. When she did so, instead of  
any satisfaction from the defendant, she gets only a repetition of the slan-  
der. The real question comes to this, does the utterance of slander once  
give the privilege to the slanderer to utter it again whenever he is asked  
for an explanation? It is the constant course, when a person hears that he  
has been calumniated, to go, with a witness, to the party who, he is in-  
formed, has uttered the injurious words, and say, 'Do you mean in the  
presence of witnesses to persist in the charge you have made?' And it is  
never wise to bring an action for slander unless some such course has been  
taken. But it never has been supposed, that the persisting in and repeat-  
ing the calumny, in answer to such a question, which is an aggravation of  
the slander, can be a privileged communication; and in none of the cases  
cited has it ever been so decided."<sup>4</sup> If, however, the second occasion on  
which the words were spoken is clearly privileged and justifiable, the mere  
fact that defendant had previously spoken them will not of itself destroy  
the privilege; the plaintiff must rely on the first utterance: that *may* be  
privileged as well.<sup>5</sup> This rule is sometimes cited as an instance of the  
maxim "*Volenti non fit injuria*," and is then not classed as a ground of  
privilege, but would rather be stated thus:—That if the only publication  
proved at the trial be one brought about by the plaintiff's own con-  
trivance, this is no sufficient evidence of \* publication, and the \* 232  
plaintiff must be nonsuited. Such was the ruling of Lord Ellen-

<sup>1</sup> *Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer*, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Lyndhurst in *Smith v. Mathews*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 151.

<sup>3</sup> 7 Q. B. 61; 14 L. J. Q. B. 199.

<sup>4</sup> And see *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 557; *Force v. Warren*, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 806.

<sup>5</sup> *Kine v. Sewell*, 3 M. & W. 297.

borough in *Smith v. Wood* ;<sup>1</sup> but this is inconsistent with *Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer* ;<sup>2</sup> and in *Warr v. Jolly*,<sup>3</sup> it was expressly held that a communication purposely procured by the plaintiff *was privileged*.

### Illustrations.

"If a servant, knowing the character which his master will give of him, procures a letter to be written, not with a fair view of inquiring the character, but to procure an answer upon which to ground an action for a libel, no action can be maintained." Per Lord Alvanley in *King v. Waring et ux.*, 5 Esp. 15.

The defendant discharged the plaintiff, his servant, and when applied to by another gentleman, gave him a bad character. The plaintiff's brother-in-law, Collier, thereupon repeatedly called on the defendant to inquire why he had dismissed the plaintiff : and at last the defendant wrote to Collier stating his reasons specifically. The plaintiff sued out a writ the same day the letter was written. *Held*, by Lord Mansfield, C.J., and Butler, J., that no action lay on such letter, as the defendant was evidently entrapped into writing it. *Weatherston v. Hawkins*, 1 T. R. 110. See also *Taylor v. Hawkins*, 16 Q. B. 308 ; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313 ; *R. v. Hart*, 1 Wm. Black, 386 ; and the remarks of Lord Alvanley, C.J., in *Rogers v. Clifton*, 3 B. & P. 592.

A witness (whom we must presume to have been an agent of the plaintiff's, though it is not so stated in the report) heard that the defendant had a copy of a libellous print, went to defendant's house, and asked to see it ; the defendant thereupon produced it, and pointed out the figure of the plaintiff and the other persons caricatured. Lord Ellenborough nonsuited the plaintiff, as there was no other publication proved. *Smith v. Wood*, 3 Camp. 323.

The plaintiff had been in partnership with his brother-in-law, Pinhorn, as a linen-draper at Southampton ; but gave up business and became a dissenting minister. Rumors reached his congregation that he had cheated his brother-in-law in the settlement of the accounts on his retirement from the partnership. The plaintiff challenged inquiry and invited the malcontents in the congregation to appoint some one to thoroughly sift the matter. The malcontents appointed the defendant, and the plaintiff appointed the Rev. Robert Ainslie. *Held*, that all communications between the defendant and Ainslie relative to the matter were privileged, as being made with the sanction and concurrence of the plaintiff. *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293 ; 19 L. J.

C. P. 94 ; 14 Jur. 87. And see *Sayer v. Begg*, 15 Ir. C. L. R. 458.

\* 233 \* In answer to plaintiff's inquiry as to a rumor against himself, defendant told him, in the presence of a third party, what some one had said to his (defendant's) wife. There was no proof that the defendant had ever uttered a word on the subject till he was applied to by the plaintiff. *Held* that the answer was privileged. *Warr v. Jolly*, 6 Car. & P. 497, as explained by Lord Denman in *Griffiths v. Lewis*, 7 Q. B. 67 ; 14 L. J. Q. B. 199 ; 9 Jur. 370. And see *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 557.

The plaintiff was a builder and contracted to build certain schoolrooms at Bermondsey. The defendant started a false report that in the building the plaintiff had used inferior timber ; the report reached the plaintiff, who thereupon suspended the work and demanded an inquiry ; and the committee of the school employed defendant to survey the work and report. He reported falsely that inferior timber was used. Lord Lyndhurst directed the jury that if they believed that the reports which pro-

<sup>1</sup> 3 Camp. 323.

<sup>2</sup> 14 Q. B. 185.

<sup>3</sup> 6 Car. & P. 497.



duced the inquiry originated with the defendant, the defendant's report to the committee was not privileged. Verdict for the plaintiff. *Smith v. Mathews*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 151.

Barton, a friend of the defendant, employed a builder, the plaintiff's master, to build a house for him : the defendant informed Barton that the plaintiff while at work on his house had stolen some quarterings. Barton complained to the master builder, who came down to the defendant's to inquire into the circumstances. A repetition of the charge made then to the plaintiff's master without malice was held privileged, and as the plaintiff had not called Barton to prove the original remark, the jury found for the defendant, and a new trial was refused. *Kine v. Sewell*, 3 M. & W. 297. But note that the statement made to Barton would, if proved, have been privileged also, although voluntary, as he was the owner of the property alleged to have been stolen.

**\* II. WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN \* 234  
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE COMMUNICATION,  
AND THE PERSON TO WHOM THE COMMUNICATION IS  
MADE, HAS A CORRESPONDING INTEREST.**

In such a case every communication honestly made in order to protect such common interest is privileged by reason of the occasion.

Such common interest is generally a *pecuniary* one ; as that of two customers of the same bank, two directors of the same company, two creditors of the same debtor. But it may also be *professional*, as in the case of two officers in the same corps, or masters in the same school, anxious to preserve the dignity and reputation of the body to which they both belong. In short, it may be any interest arising from the joint exercise of any legal right or privilege, or from the joint performance of any duty imposed or recognized by the law. Thus two executors of the same will, two trustees of the same settlement, have a common interest, though not a pecuniary one, in the management of the trust estate. So the ratepayers of a parish have a common interest in the selection of fit and proper constables to serve in the parish, their salary being paid out of the rates. So relations by blood or marriage have a common interest in their family concerns. But beyond this there is no privilege. The "common interest" must be one which the law recognizes and appreciates. No privilege attaches to gossip, however interesting it may be to both speaker and hearers. The law never sanctions mere vulgar curiosity or officious intermeddling in the concerns of others. To be within the privilege, the statement must be

such as the occasion warrants, and must be made *bonâ fide*

\* 235 to protect the private interests \* both of the speaker and of the person addressed. If in fact the defendant had no other interest in the matter beyond that which any other educated person would naturally feel, interference on his part would be officious and unprivileged.<sup>1</sup>

### Illustrations.

The defendant and Messrs. Wright and Co., his bankers, were both interested in a concern, the management of which the bankers had intrusted to the plaintiff, their solicitor. A confidential letter written by the defendant to Messrs. Wright and Co., charging the plaintiff with professional misconduct in the management of such concern was held privileged by Lord Ellenborough. *McDougall v. Claridge*, 1 Camp. 267.

A creditor of the plaintiff may comment on the plaintiff's mode of conducting his business to the man who is surety to that creditor for the plaintiff's trade debts. *Dunman v. Bigg*, 1 Camp. 269, n.

Where A. & B. have a joint interest in a matter, a letter, written by A. to induce B. to become a party to a suit relating thereto, is privileged though it may refer to the plaintiff in angry terms. *Shipley v. Todhunter*, 7 C. & P. 680.

A creditor was appointed trustee in liquidation of the debtor's estate, the debtor continuing to manage his former business for the benefit of the estate. A letter written by the trustee to another creditor, commenting in very severe terms on the debtor's conduct, is privileged. *Spill v. Maule*, L. R. 4 Exch. 232; 38 L. J. Ex. 138; 17 W. R. 805; 20 L. T. 675.

A person interested in the proceeds of a sale may give notice to the auctioneer not to part with them to the plaintiff, who ordered the sale, on the ground that he has committed an act of bankruptcy. *Blackham v. Pugh*, 2 C. B. 611; 15 L. J. C. P. 290.

So the son-in-law of a lady has sufficient interest in whom she marries to justify him in warning her not to marry the plaintiff, if he honestly believes him, however erroneously, to be of bad character. *Todd v. Hawkins*, 8 C. & P. 88; 2 M. & Rob. 20.

So, too, a bishop's charge to his clergy is *primâ facie* privileged, although it contain calumnious matter. *Laughton v. Bishop of Sodor and Man*, L. R. 4 P. C. 495; 42 L. J. P. C. 11; 21 W. R. 204; 28 L. T. 377; 9 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 318.

So the reports of the directors and auditors of a company printed and circulated among the shareholders are privileged. *Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498.

A communication from a firm of brewers to the tenants of their public-  
 \* 236 \* houses, refusing to accept any longer in payment cheques drawn on a particular bank is *primâ facie* privileged. *Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons* (in C. P. D.); 28 W. R. 490; 42 L. T. 314; (C. A.) 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 28 W. R. 851.

Defendant was a life governor of a public school to which the plaintiff supplied butchers' meat; defendant told the steward of the school, whose duty it was to examine the meat, that plaintiff had been known to sell bad meat. *Held* a privileged communication. *Humphreys v. Stillwell*, 2 F. & F. 590. And see *Crisp v. Gill*, 29 L. T. (Old S.) 82.

<sup>1</sup> *Botterill & another v. Whytehead*, 41 L. T. 588.

A Member of Parliament gave notice that he would ask in the House of Commons why the plaintiff, a colonel in the army, had been dismissed; thereupon the defendant, the plaintiff's superior officer, who had been instrumental in procuring his discharge, called on the member, whom he knew well, to explain the true facts of the case. Lord Campbell considered the occasion *prima facie* privileged; but the jury found it was done maliciously, and awarded the plaintiff £200 damages. *Dickson v. Earl of Wilton*, 1 F. & F. 419.

A *bond fide* communication between a Member of Parliament and his constituents on a matter of political or local interest is privileged; such as a report of any speech of his, circulated privately among his constituents for their information. Per Lord Campbell, C.J., and Crompton, J., in *Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 233; 26 L. J. Q. B. 107. And Cockburn, C.J., in *Wason v. Walter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 95; 8 B. & S. 730; 38 L. J. Q. B. 42; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 416.

But it would be otherwise if a member of Parliament published his speech to all the world with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff. *R. v. Lord Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 226; *R. v. Creevey*, 1 M. & S. 273.

If a parish officer seek re-election, charges made against him at the parish meeting for the nomination of officers as to his previous conduct in the office, are privileged, if made *bond fide*. *George v. Goddard*, 2 F. & F. 689; *Kershaw v. Bailey*, 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129. See *Senior v. Medland*, 4 Jur. N. S. 1039; *Pierce v. Ellis*, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 55; *Bennett v. Barry*, 8 L. T. 857; *Harle v. Catherall*, 14 L. T. 801.

But as to a personal attack on the private character of a candidate at parliamentary election, see *Duncombe v. Daniell*, 8 C. & P. 222; 2 Jur. 32; 1 W. W. & H. 101; *Sir Thomas Charges v. Roue*, 3 Lev. 30. *How v. Prin*, Holt, 652; 7 Mod. 107; 2 Salk. 694; 2 Ld. Raym. 812; affirmed in the House of Lords, *sub nomine Prin v. Howe*, 1 Brown's Parly. Cas. 64. *Onslow v. Horne*, 3 Wils. 177; 2 W. Bl. 750; *Harwood v. Sir J. Astley*, 1 N. R. 47. (a)

\* A parish meeting was called to investigate the accounts of the parish constable; one ratepayer was unable to attend, so he wrote a letter to be read to the meeting concerning the constable and his accounts. This letter was held *prima facie* privileged. For had he attended the meeting and made the same charge orally, such speech would have been privileged. (b) *Spencer v. Amerton*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 470.

Several fictitious orders for goods had been sent in the defendant's name to a trades-

(a) See also *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116; *Lewis v. Few*, 5 Johns. 1; *Root v. King*, 7 Cowen, 613; s. c. 4 Wend. 113; *Kimball v. Fernandez*, 41 Wis. 329; *Wilson v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321; s. c. 27 Wis. 610 and 23 Wis. 105; *Barr v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 385; *Sweeney v. Baker*, 13 W. Va. 158; *Commonwealth v. Clap*, 4 Mass. 163; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 281; *ante*, p. 40, note.

(b) Words spoken or written in the regular course of church discipline to or of members of the church are among the members themselves privileged unless express malice is shown. *Kleizer v. Symmes*, 40 Ind. 562; *Coombs v. Rose*, 8 Blackf. 155; *Jarvis v. Hathaway*, 3 Johns. 180; *O'Donoghue v. McGovern*, 23 Wend. 26;

*Lucas v. Case*, 9 Bush, 297; *York v. Pease*, 2 Gray, 282; *Farnsworth v. Storrs*, 5 Cush. 412; *Dunn v. Winters*, 2 Humph. 512; *Smith v. Youmans*, 3 Hill (S. Car.), 85. But an accusation made by a member of a church, though in the regular course of discipline against a person not a member, is not privileged. *Coombs v. Rose*, *supra*. See further *Remington v. Congdon*, 2 Pick. 310; *Jarvis v. Hathaway*, 3 Johns. 180; *O'Donoghue v. McGovern*, 23 Wend. 26; *Dial v. Holter*, 6 Ohio St. 228; *Whitaker v. Carter*, 4 Ired. 461; *Farnsworth v. Storrs*, 5 Cush. 412; *Fairchild v. Adams*, 11 Cush. 549; *Shelton v. Nance*, 7 B. Mon. 128; *Holt v. Parsons*, 23 Texas, 9; *Bradley v. Heath*, 12 Pick. 163; *Smith v. Youmans*, 3 Hill (S. Car.), 85.

man, who thereupon delivered the goods to the defendant. The defendant returned the goods, and being shown the letters ordering them, wrote to the tradesman that in his opinion the letter was in the plaintiff's handwriting. *Held* that this expression of opinion was privileged, as both defendant and the tradesman were interested in discovering the culprit. *Croft v. Stevens*, 7 H. & N. 570; 31 L. J. Ex. 143; 10 W. R. 272; 5 L. T. 683.

The defendant had a dispute with the Newry Mineral Water Company, which they agreed to refer to "some respectable printer who should be indifferent between the parties," as arbitrator. The manager of the company nominated the plaintiff, a printer's commercial traveller. The defendant declined to accept him as arbitrator, and when pressed for his reason, wrote a letter to the manager stating that the plaintiff had formerly been in the defendant's employment, and had been dismissed for drunkenness. The plaintiff, thereupon, brought an action on the letter as a libel concerning him in the way of his trade. *Held* that the letter was privileged, as both parties were interested in the selection of a proper arbitrator. *Hobbs v. Bryers*, 2 L. R. Ir. 496.

But a judge of the Bankruptcy Court and an opposing creditor have no such common interest in the case of an insolvent debtor as to render privileged a letter written by the creditor to the judge previously to the hearing of the case. Writing such a letter is indeed a contempt of Court. *Gould v. Hulme*, 3 C. & P. 625.

But where a large number of persons have an interest more or less remote in the matter, defendant will not be privileged in informing them all by circular or otherwise, unless there was no other way of effecting his object. Thus in the case of most societies there is a council, or a managing committee, or a manager, or a body of trustees; and communications made confidentially to them will be privileged which would not be privileged, if addressed in the first instance to the whole body of subscribers. "Such a communication as the present (a charge against the medical officer of a Poor Law Union) ought to be confined  
\* 238 in the first instance to \* those whose duty it is to investigate the charges."<sup>1</sup>

A communication can scarcely be called confidential which is addressed to some two or three hundred people at once. Thus the mere fact that I subscribe to a charity does not entitle me to canvass the private character, and discuss the private concerns, of the medical man employed by the charity, and so cause his past life to become a topic of general conversation in the town; although any representation made to the managing committee would be privileged; and if absolutely necessary to the success of the charity, I might after due notice given to the medical man, appeal from the decision of the committee to the general body of subscribers.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Per Mellish, L.J., in *Purcell v. Sowler*, 2 C. P. D. at p. 221.

<sup>2</sup> *Martin v. Strong*, 5 A. & E. 535, as explained in *Kine v. Sewell*, 3 M. & W. 297.

*Illustrations.*

A letter written by a subscriber to a charity to the committee of management of the charity concerning the conduct of their secretary in the management of the funds of the charity is *prima facie* privileged. *Maitland v. Bramwell*, 2 F. & F. 623. See also *Hartwell v. Vesey*, 3 L. T. 275.

Any statement made by a director of a company to his fellow directors, as to the conduct and character of their auditor, is privileged, though it relates to his conduct with reference to another company, of which he was secretary and not auditor. *Harris v. Thompson*, 13 C. B. 333.

But it would seem that a similar statement, if made by one private shareholder in the company to another, would not be privileged. *Brooks v. Blanshard*, 1 Cr. & Mees. 779; 3 Tyrw. 844.

Defendant, who was a sergeant in a volunteer corps, of which plaintiff also was a member, represented to the committee by whom the general business of the corps was conducted, that plaintiff was an unfit person to be permitted to continue a member of the corps; that he was the executioner of the French king, &c. Lord Ellenborough held the communication privileged. *Barbaud v. Hookham*, 5 Esp. 109. See *Bell v. Parke*, 10 Ir. C. L. R. 284; 11 Ir. C. L. R. 413.

But for one member of a charitable institution to send round to all the subscribers \* a circular calling on them "to reject the unworthy claims of Miss \* 239 Hoare," and stating that "she squandered away the money which she did obtain from the benevolent in printing circulars abusive of Commander Dickson," the secretary of the institution, is libellous, and not privileged. *Hoare v. Silverlock* (No. 1; 1848), 12 Q. B. 624; 17 L. J. Q. B. 306; 12 Jur. 695.

"There may be a thousand subscribers to a charity," observes Lord Denman in *Martin v. Strong*, 5 Ad. & E. 538. "Such a claim of privilege is too large."

And *a fortiori*, if the words be spoken in the presence of strangers wholly uninterested in the matter, the communication loses all privilege. The defendant in all these cases must be careful that the publication "does not go beyond the occasion," that is, that his words should be confined to those who are concerned to hear them. Words of admonition or of confidential advice should be given privately. It is true that the accidental presence of some third person will not alone take the case out of the privilege, if it was unavoidable or happened in the usual course of business affairs. But if the defendant purposely contrives that a stranger should be present, who has no right to be present, and who in the natural course of things would not be present, all privilege is lost.<sup>1</sup>

So too in making a communication which is only privileged by reason of its being made to a person interested in the subject-matter thereof, the defendant must be careful not to branch out

<sup>1</sup> *Kershaw v. Bailey*, 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129; *Scarll v. Dixon*, 4 F. & F. 250.

into extraneous matters with which such person is unconcerned. The privilege only extends to that portion of the communication in respect of which the parties have a common interest or duty.

The defendant must also be careful to avoid the use of exaggerated expressions; for the privilege may be lost by the use of violent language when it is clearly uncalled for.<sup>1</sup>

\* 240 \* And especially in cases where a rumor reaches the defendant, of which he feels it his duty to inform others who are equally interested with himself in its subject-matter, he should be very careful to report it precisely as he heard it, without any addition or exaggeration.<sup>2</sup>

In short whenever the mode and extent of a privileged publication are more injurious to the plaintiff than necessary, this may be evidence of malice in the publisher. Though the words themselves would be privileged if addressed only to the few individuals concerned, yet the privilege may be lost if the defendant deliberately chooses to publish them to the general public, or to any one who had no corresponding interest in the communication. Confidential communications should not be shouted across the street for all the world to hear.<sup>3</sup> Defamatory remarks, if written at all, should be sent in a private letter properly sealed and fastened up: not written on a postcard, or sent by telegram; for two strangers at least read every telegram, many more most postcards.<sup>4</sup>

Letters as to the plaintiff's private affairs should not be published in the newspaper, however meritorious the writer's purpose may be: unless indeed there is no other way in which the writer can efficiently effect his purpose and discharge the duty which the law has cast upon him. So with an advertisement inserted in a newspaper, defamatory of the plaintiff; if such advertisement be necessary to protect the defendant's interest, or if advertising was the only way of effecting the defendant's

\* 241 \* object, and such object is a legal one, then the circumstances excuse the extensive publication. But if it was not necessary to advertise at all, or if the defendant's object could have been equally well effected by an advertisement which did

<sup>1</sup> *Fryer v. Kinnersley*, 15 C. B. N. S. 422; 33 L. J. C. P. 96; 10 Jur. N. S. 441; 12 W. R. 155; 9 L. T. 415; *Senior v. Medland*, 4 H. & N. 843; 4 Jur. N. S. 1039.

<sup>2</sup> *Bromage v. Prosser*, 4 B. & Cr. 247; 6 Dowl. & R. 296.

<sup>3</sup> *Wilson v. Collins*, 5 C. & P. 373; *Oddy v. Lord George Paulet*, 4 F. & F. 1009.

<sup>4</sup> *Williamson v. Freer*, L. R. 9 C. P. 393; 43 L. J. C. P. 161; *Whitfield v. S. E. R. Co.*, E. B. & E. 115; *Robinson v. Jones*, 4 L. R. Ir. 391.

not contain the words defamatory of the plaintiff, then the extent given to the announcement is evidence of malice to go to the jury.<sup>1</sup> To deliberately give any unnecessary publicity to statements defamatory of another, raises at least a suspicion of malice. (a)

### *Illustrations.*

Defendant made a speech at a public meeting called to petition Parliament, and subsequently handed a copy of what he had said to the reporters for publication in the newspapers; such publication was held to be in excess of the privilege. *Pierce v. Ellis*, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 55.

A personal attack on the private life and character of a candidate at a parliamentary election, published by a voter in the newspapers, is not privileged. "However large the privilege of electors may be," said Lord Denman, C.J., "it is extravagant to suppose that it can justify the publication to all the world of facts injurious to a person who happens to stand in the situation of a candidate." *Duncombe v. Daniell*, 8 C. & P. 222; 2 Jur. 32; 1 W. W. & H. 101.

A letter sent to a newspaper by members of the Town Council and published therein, charging certain contractors for the erection of the Borough Gaol with "scamping" their work, is not privileged; although preferring the same charge at a meeting of the Town Council probably would have been. *Simpson v. Downs*, 16 L. T. 391. But see *Harle v. Catherall*, 14 L. T. 801.

The defendant, the tenant of a farm, required some repairs to be done at his house; the landlord's agent sent up two workmen, the plaintiff and Taylor. They made a bad job of it; the plaintiff undoubtedly got drunk while on the premises; and the defendant was convinced from what he heard that the plaintiff had broken open his cellar-door and drunk his cider. Two days afterwards the defendant met the plaintiff and Taylor together, and charged the plaintiff with breaking open the cellar-door, getting drunk, and spoiling the job. He repeated this charge later in the same day to Taylor alone in the absence of the plaintiff, and also to the landlord's agent. Held, that the communication to the landlord's agent was clearly privileged, as both were interested in the repairs being properly done; that the statement made to the plaintiff in Taylor's presence was also privileged, if not malicious; but \*that the repeti- \* 242 tion of the statement to Taylor in the absence of the plaintiff was unauthorized and officious, and therefore not protected, although made in the belief of its truth. *Toogood v. Spyring*, 1 C. M. & R. 181; 4 Tyrw. 582.

Proof that defendant industriously circulated the libel will be some evidence of malice. *Gathercole v. Miall*, 15 M. & W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337.

A shareholder in a railway company summoned a meeting of shareholders, and also invited reporters for the press to attend. Charges which he made at such meeting against one of the directors for his conduct of the affairs of the company, held *not* privileged, because persons not shareholders were present. *Parsons v. Surgey*, 4 F. & F. 247.

<sup>1</sup> *Brown v. Croome*, 2 Stark, 297; and *Lay v. Lawson*, 4 A. & E. 795, overruling *Delany v. Jones*, 4 Esp. 191.

(a) But the fact that the statement was published before some who were not interested in it, as in the case of a notice in a newspaper, does not necessarily take away

the privilege. *Hatch v. Lane*, 105 Mass. 394; *Brow v. Hathaway*, 13 Allen, 239; *Toogood v. Spyring*, 1 Crompt. M. & R. 181; *Shurtleff v. Stevens*, 51 Vt. 501, 510.

But where the auditors of a company reported that the manager's accounts were badly kept, and that there was a large deficiency not accounted for; and at the general meeting this report with others was submitted to the shareholders, and the meeting resolved that they should be printed and circulated among the shareholders, which was done. *Held* that the privilege attaching to such reports was not lost merely by the necessary publication of them to the compositors, &c., in the ordinary course of printing. *Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498. And see *Davis v. Cutbush and others*, 1 F. & F. 487; *Lake v. King*, 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 131; Sid. 414; 1 Mod. 58.

The plaintiff and defendant were jointly interested in property in Scotland, to the manager of which the defendant wrote a letter principally about the property and the conduct of the plaintiff with reference thereto, but also containing a charge against the plaintiff with reference to his conduct to his mother and aunt. *Held* that though the part of the letter about the defendant's conduct as to the property might be confidential and privileged, such privilege could not extend to the part of the letter about the plaintiff's conduct to his mother and aunt. *Warren v. Warren*, 1 C. M. & R. 250; 4 Tyr. 850; *Simmonds v. Dunne*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 358.

If a clergyman or parish priest, in the course of a sermon, "make an example" of a member of his flock by commenting on his misconduct, and either naming him, or alluding to him in unmistakable terms, his words will not be privileged, although they were uttered *bonâ fide* in the honest desire to reform the culprit and to warn the rest of his hearers; and although the congregation would probably be more interested in this part of the discourse than in any other. If the words be actionable, the clergyman must justify. (a) *Magrath v. Finn*, Ir. R. 11 C. L. 152; *Kinnahan v. McCullagh*, ib. 1; *R. v. Knight* (1736), Bacon's Abr. A. 2 (Libel); *Gilpin v. Fowler*, 9 Ex. 615; 23 L. J. Ex. 152; 18 Jur. 293. And see *Greenwood v. Prick*, Cro. Jac. 91, as overruled by Lord Denman, 12 A. & E. 726, *ante*, p. 6.

### (i.) *Reports of Judicial Proceedings.*

Every impartial and accurate report of any proceeding in a public law court is privileged, unless the court has itself prohibited the publication, or the subject-matter of the trial be unfit for publication. (b)

This rule applies to all proceedings in any court of justice, superior or inferior, of record or not of record. "For this purpose no distinction can be made between a court of *piepoudre* and the

(a) As for the public anathema and excommunication of a parishioner by a catholic priest see *Fitzgerald v. Robinson*, 112 Mass. 371; *Servatius v. Pichel*, 34 Wis. 292.

(b) *McBee v. Fulton*, 47 Md. 403; *Stanly v. Webb*, 4 Sandf. 21; *Matthews v. Beach*, 5 Sandf. 256; *Gazette Co. v. Tim-*

*berlake*, 10 Ohio St. 548; *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51. This is true in the United States of reports of proceedings before inferior courts, according to *McBee v. Fulton*, *supra*, denying *Stanly v. Webb*, *Matthews v. Beach*, and *Gazette Co. v. Timberlake*, *supra*; perhaps not of coroner's courts. See *Storey v. Wallace*, *supra*.



House of Lords sitting as a court of justice.”<sup>1</sup> And in the case of a magistrate or of justices sitting in petty session, it is immaterial whether the application be made to them *ex parte* or not. It appears to be also immaterial whether the matter be one over which they have jurisdiction or not, and whether they dispose of the case finally or send it for trial to the assizes.

The reason for this privilege is thus stated by Lawrence, J., in *R. v. Wright*.<sup>2</sup> “The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the inconvenience to private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings.” Cockburn, C.J., uses language almost identical in *Wason v. Walter*.<sup>3</sup>

It is only since 1878 that the law has extended so wide an im- \* 244  
munity to reports of proceedings before police magistrates or justices of the peace. Thus, while *Lewis v. Levy* decided that a report of a preliminary investigation before a magistrate was privileged if the result was that the summons was dismissed and the person accused discharged, still *Duncan v. Thwaites*,<sup>4</sup> is an express authority for holding such a report unprivileged, if the accused be ultimately sent to take his trial before a jury. The reason for the distinction is that in the former case the decision is final, and the investigation at an end; in the latter the examination was preliminary merely, and the minds of the future jury might be influenced by the publication.

Again, there is an obvious distinction between an *ex parte* application, where the accused has no opportunity of defending himself, and a full trial where both parties address the court by their counsel or solicitors, and call what witnesses they please. There are even *dicta* of certain eminent judges which would seem to deny any privilege to fair and accurate reports of *ex parte* proceedings in the superior Courts.<sup>5</sup> But *Curry v. Walter*<sup>6</sup> is an express decision that such reports *are* privileged, a case which was at one time doubted, but is now clear law. And now the decision in *Usill v. Hales* settles the law, and extends immunity to all *bona fide* and correct reports of all proceedings in a magistrate's court, whether *ex parte* or otherwise; and such cases as *R. v. Lee*<sup>7</sup> must be considered to be overruled, in

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Campbell in *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 537; 27 L. J. Q. B. 287; 4 Jur. N. S. 970.

<sup>2</sup> 8 T. R. 298.

<sup>3</sup> L. R. 4 Q. B. 87; 8 B. & S. 730; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 418.

<sup>4</sup> 3 B. & C. 556; 5 D. & R. 447.

<sup>5</sup> Per Maule, J., in *Hoare v. Silverlock* (No. 2, 1850), 9 C. B. 23; 19 L. J. C. P. 215; and Abbott, C.J., in *Duncan v. Thwaites*, 3 B. & C. 556.

<sup>6</sup> 1 Bos. & P. 525; 1 Esp. 456.

<sup>7</sup> 5 Esp. 123.

so far at all events as they lay down any general rule to the effect that it is unlawful to publish any report of *ex parte* proceedings.

A third distinction was as to matters *coram non judice*. It might well be contended that where a magistrate listens to a slanderous complaint, and gives some advice as to a matter wholly outside his jurisdiction, he is not discharging any magisterial function nor acting in any judicial capacity. It is as though the conversation took place in some private citizen's drawing-room. And to this effect was the decision in *McGregor v. Thwaites*.<sup>1</sup> But

this decision is practically overruled by *Usill v. Hales*, in which case \* 245 Lord Coleridge took \* a distinction<sup>2</sup> between "inherent want of jurisdiction on account of the nature of the complaint" and "what may be called resulting want of jurisdiction because the facts do not make out the charge." His Lordship assumed that the application was for a summons or order under the Masters and Workmen's Act, an application, that is, which the magistrate would have had jurisdiction to grant, had the facts when investigated proved to warrant such a course. On that assumption, it follows, of course, that the magistrate had jurisdiction to listen to the application, until the facts stated to him made it clear that he had no power to grant the redress applied for. But in the libel there is no word as to the Masters and Workmen's Act; it would seem rather that the applicants were desirous of inverting the usual order of things, and of prosecuting their employer for embezzlement. No doubt in this case it was the duty of the magistrate to listen to the applicant until it became clear from what he said that the magistrate had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaint. But surely it is equally the duty of the magistrate so far to listen to every applicant. And an ordinary newspaper reporter can hardly be expected to accurately distinguish between a magistrate's "inherent want of jurisdiction" and that which is merely "resulting." Lopes, J., on the other hand, takes a broader ground:—"The cases," he says,<sup>3</sup> "are clear to show that want of jurisdiction will not take away the privilege, if it is maintainable on other grounds."<sup>4</sup> I think we may conclude that newspapers may safely report in future everything that takes place in open court, even though the magistrate should prove to have no jurisdiction.

It is not clear, however, that the case of *Usill v. Hales* disposes of the first distinction taken in *Duncan v. Thwaites*,<sup>5</sup> that a fair report of a magistrate's decision is privileged when it finally disposes of the matter of the application, but is not privileged where the inquiry is but a preliminary one, and the

<sup>1</sup> 3 B. & C. 24; 4 D. & R. 695.

<sup>2</sup> 3 C. P. D. 324.

<sup>3</sup> 3 C. P. D. 329.

<sup>4</sup> *Buckley v. Wood*, 4 Rep. 146; *Cro. Eliz.* 230; *Lake v. King*, 1 Saund. 131; *Fairman v. Ives*, 5 B. & Ald. 642.

<sup>5</sup> 3 B. & C. 556.

prisoner is committed to take his trial at the Assizes or the Central Criminal Court. Lord Campbell<sup>1</sup> appears anxious not to overrule *Duncan v. Thwaites*, on this point at \* all events : for he is careful to lay down \* 246 the rule that the privilege attaching to fair and correct reports of proceedings taking place in a public Court of Justice, “ extends to proceedings taking place publicly before a magistrate on the preliminary investigation of a criminal charge *terminating in the discharge by the magistrate of the party charged.*” In *Usill and Hales* the matter was *finally* disposed of by the magistrate ; it was unnecessary therefore for the Court to decide the point. But the whole spirit of the decision is against this time-honored distinction. Lord Coleridge frankly admits (p. 325) : — “ I do not doubt for my own part that if this argument had been addressed to a Court some sixty or seventy years ago, it might have met with a different result from that which it is about to meet with to-day.” And then after referring to *R. v. Fleet*<sup>2</sup> and *Duncan v. Thwaites*, the learned judge continues : — “ But we are not now living, so to say, within the shadow of those cases.” And his Lordship quotes a passage from the judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench, in the case of *Wason v. Walter*,<sup>3</sup> as “ a passage which upon the whole I should desire to adopt and adhere to : — ‘ Whatever disadvantages attach to a system of unwritten law, — and of these we are fully sensible, — it has at least this advantage, that its elasticity enables those who administer it to adapt it to the varying conditions of society and to the requirements and habits of the age in which we live, so as to avoid the inconveniences and injustice which arise where the law is no longer in harmony with the wants and usages and interests of the generation to which it is immediately applied. Our law of libel has in many respects only gradually developed itself into anything like satisfactory and settled form. The full liberty of public writers to comment on the conduct and motives of public men has only in very recent times been recognized. . . . Even in quite recent days judges, in holding the publication of the proceedings of Courts of Justice lawful, have thought it necessary to distinguish what we call *ex parte* proceedings as a probable exception from the operation of the rule. Yet *ex parte* proceedings before magistrates, and even before this Court, as, for instance, on applications for criminal informations, are published every day ; but such a thing as an action or indictment founded on a report of such an *ex parte* proceeding is unheard of ; and \* if any such action or indictment should be brought, it would \* 247 probably be held that the true criterion of the privilege is not whether the report was or was not *ex parte*, but whether it was a fair and honest report of what had taken place, published simply with a view to the

<sup>1</sup> In *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 561 ; 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 290.

<sup>2</sup> 1 B. & Ald. 379.

<sup>3</sup> L. R. 4 Q. B. 93.

information of the public, and innocent of all intention to do injury to the reputation of the party affected.”<sup>1</sup> Applying a similar argument, we know that reports of all proceedings before magistrates are published daily with impunity, whether such proceedings are finally disposed of by the magistrate, or whether the case is hereafter to come before a jury. Lopes, J., intimates that he thinks it doubtful how far the old authorities on this point might be followed in the present day.<sup>2</sup> I think, therefore, that if it is not already the law, it soon will be the law, that a newspaper reporter may report everything that occurs publicly in open court without fear of any action, provided only that his reports are fair and accurate, and not interspersed with comments of his own. “The law upon such a subject must bend to the approved usages of society, though still resting upon the same principle, that what is hurtful and indicates malice should be punished, and that what is beneficial and *bond fide* should be protected.”<sup>3</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

The following passage appeared in the *Daily News*, the *Standard*, and the *Morning Advertiser*, on the same morning:—“Three gentlemen, civil engineers, were among the applicants to the magistrate yesterday, and they applied for criminal process against Mr. Usill, a civil engineer of Great Queen Street, Westminster. The spokesman stated that they had been engaged in the survey of an Irish railway by Mr. Usill, and had not been paid what they had earned in their various capacities, although from time to time they had received small sums on account; and, as the person complained of had been paid, they considered that he had been guilty of a criminal offence in withholding their money. Mr. Woolrych said it was a matter of contract between the parties; and, although on the face of the application, they had been badly treated, he must refer them to the County Court.” Mr. Usill thereupon brought an action against the proprietor of each newspaper. The three actions were tried together before Cockburn, C.J., at Westminster, on November 15th, 1877. The learned judge told the jury that the only question for their consideration was whether or not the publication com-

\* 248 plained of was a fair and impartial report of what took place before the magistrate; and that, if they found that it was so, the publication was privileged. The jury found that it was a fair report of what occurred, and accordingly returned a verdict for the defendant in each case. *Held* that the report was privileged, although the proceedings were *ex parte*, and although the magistrate decided that he had no jurisdiction over the matter. *Usill v. Hales*, 3 C. P. D. 319; 47 L. J. C. P. 323; 26 W. R. 371; 38 L. T. 63; *Usill v. Brearley*, *ib.*; *Usill v. Clarke*, *ib.* See *McGregor v. Thwaites*, 3 B. & C. 24.

Where judicial proceedings last more than one day, and their publication is not expressly forbidden by the Court, a report published in a newspaper every morning of the proceedings of the preceding day, is privileged, if fair and accurate; but all com-

<sup>1</sup> L. R. 4 Q. B. 94; 3 C. P. D. 326.

<sup>2</sup> 3 C. P. D. 329.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 560; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. N. S. 970.

ment on the case must be suspended till the proceedings terminate. *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 537; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. N. S. 970.

A report of proceedings before a judge at chambers on an application under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 122, s. 42, to discharge a bankrupt out of custody, is privileged. *Smith v. Scott*, 2 C. & K. 580.

Proceedings held in gaol before a registrar in bankruptcy, under the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, ss. 101, 102, upon the examination of a debtor in custody, are judicial and in a public Court. A fair report, therefore, of those proceedings is protected. *Ryalls v. Leader and others*, L. R. 1 Ex. 296; 12 Jur. N. S. 503; 4 H. & C. 555; 35 L. J. Ex. 185; 14 W. R. 838; 14 L. T. 563.

A fair and accurate report of proceedings before the examiners appointed under 9 Geo. IV. c. 22, s. 7, to inquire into the sufficiency of the sureties offered on the trial of an election petition, was held privileged. *Cooper v. Lawson*, 8 A. & E. 746; 1 W. W. & H. 601; 2 Jur. 919; 1 P. & D. 15.

The defendants presented a petition in the Croydon County Court to adjudicate the plaintiff a bankrupt; and to set aside a bill of sale which they alleged to be fraudulent. The County Court judge did not hear the case in open Court, but in his own room; the public, however, could walk in and out of the room at their pleasure during the hearing. *Held*, by Cockburn, C.J., at Nisi Prius that a fair report of what took place before the County Court judge in his room was *prima facie* privileged. *Myers v. Defries*, *Times*, July 23rd, 1877.

In Scotland there exists a public register of protested bills of exchange, established by statute, and the registration of such protests has by statute the effect of a "decret," or final judgment of the Court of Session. The contents of this register being public property, the defendant published an accurate transcript thereof for the benefit of merchants. This was held privileged, as being but a list of judgments of the Court. *Fleming v. Newton*, 1 H. L. C. 363.

\* But where the publisher of such a "Black List" left in it, as a still \* 249 existing liability, a judgment which had been annulled and satisfied by payment, the Irish Court of Queen's Bench held that this inaccuracy destroyed all privilege. *McNally v. Oldham*, 16 Ir. C. L. R. 298; 8 L. T. 604. And see *Jones v. McGovern*, Ir. R. 1 C. L. 681; *Cosgrave v. Trade Auxiliary Co.*, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 349.

There are however two cases in which reports of judicial proceedings, although fair and accurate, are not privileged, and are indeed illegal.

(i.) The first is where the Court has itself prohibited the publication, as it frequently did in former days. "Every court has the power of preventing the publication of its proceedings pending litigation."<sup>1</sup> But such a prohibition now is rare.<sup>2</sup>

(ii.) The second is where the subject-matter of the trial is an obscene or blasphemous libel, or where for any other reason the proceedings are unfit for publication. It is not justifiable to publish even a fair and accurate report of such proceedings: for such report may itself be indictable as a criminal libel.

<sup>1</sup> Per Turner, L. J., in *Brook v. Evans*, 29 L. J. Ch. 616; 6 Jur. N. S. 1025; 8 W. R. 688.

<sup>2</sup> And see *Levy v. Lawson*, E. B. & E. 560; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282.

*Illustrations.*

On the trial of Thistlewood and others for treason, in 1820, Abbott, C.J., announced in open court that he prohibited the publication of any of the proceedings until the trial of all the prisoners should be concluded. In spite of this prohibition, the *Observer* published a report of the trial of the first two prisoners tried. The proprietor of the *Observer* was summoned for the contempt, and failing to appear, was fined £500. *R. v. Clement*, 4 B. & Ald. 218.

Richard Carlile on his trial read over to the jury the whole of Paine's "Age of Reason," for selling which he was indicted. After his conviction, his wife published a full, true, and accurate account of his trial, entitled "The Mock Trial of Mr. Carlile," and in so doing republished the whole of the "Age of Reason" as a part of the proceedings at the trial. *Held* that the privilege usually attaching to fair

\* 250 reports of judicial proceedings did \* not extend to such a colorable reproduction of a blasphemous book; and that it is unlawful to publish even a correct account of the proceedings in a court of justice, if such an account contain matter of a scandalous, blasphemous, or indecent nature. *R. v. Mary Carlile* (1819), 3 B. & Ald. 167. See also the remarks of Bayley, J., in *R. v. Creevey*, 1 M. & S. 281.

The Protestant Electoral Union published a book, called "The Confessional Unmasked," intended to show the pernicious influence exercised by Roman Catholic priests in the confessional over the minds and consciences of the laity. This was condemned as obscene in *R. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360; 37 L. J. M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 801; 18 L. T. 395; 11 Cox, C. C. 19. The Union thereupon issued an expurgated edition, for selling which one George Mackey was tried at the Winchester Quarter Sessions on Oct. 19th, 1870, when the jury, being unable to agree as to the obscenity of the book, were discharged without giving any verdict. The Union thereupon published "A Report of the Trial of George Mackey," in which they set out the full text of the second edition of "The Confessional Unmasked;" although it had not been read in open court, but only taken as read, and certain passages in it referred to. A police magistrate thereupon ordered all copies of this "Report of the Trial of George Mackey" to be seized and destroyed as obscene books. *Held* that his decision was correct. *Steele v. Brannan*, L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 41 L. J. M. C. 85; 20 W. R. 607; 26 L. T. 509.

The report must be an impartial and accurate account of what really occurred at the trial; else no privilege will attach. It is the duty of the judge to exclude irrelevant evidence; if therefore such evidence be given in court and appear in the report, this is not the fault of the reporter.<sup>1</sup> The sworn evidence of the witnesses should be relied on, rather than the speeches of advocates. Counsel are frequently instructed to open to the jury facts which they fail to prove in evidence. If such an unsubstantiated statement be reported at all, the reporter should add, "but this the plaintiff failed to prove:" but it would be better to avoid all allusion to the matter. Especial care should be taken to report accurately the summing up of the learned judge,

<sup>1</sup> *Ryalls v. Leader*, L. R. 1 Ex. 300; 35 L. J. Ex. 185; 14 W. R. 838; 12 Jur. N. S. 503; 14 L. T. 563.

especially if the case be of more than transitory interest. In many cases a \* report has escaped the charge of partiality on the ground that it contained an accurate report of the judge's summing up of the case to the jury.<sup>1</sup> \* 251

Of course the report need not be *verbatim*; it may be abridged or condensed; but it must not be partial or garbled. It need not state all that occurred *in extenso*; but if it omit any fact which would have told in the plaintiff's favor, it will be a question for the jury whether the omission is material. Thus the entire suppression of the evidence of one witness may render the report unfair.<sup>2</sup> But a report will be privileged if it is "*substantially* a fair account of what took place" in court.<sup>3</sup> "It is sufficient to publish a fair abstract."<sup>4</sup>

The privilege is not confined to reports in a newspaper or law magazine. It attaches equally to fair and accurate reports issued for any lawful reason in pamphlet form or in any other fashion. Though of course if there be any other evidence of malice, the mode and extent of publication will be taken into consideration with such other evidence on that issue.<sup>5</sup>

Nor does it matter by whom the report is published; the privilege is the same, as a matter of law, for a private individual as for a newspaper.<sup>6</sup> "I do not think the public press has any peculiar privilege."<sup>7</sup>

If a publication purports to be a report of a trial, it will, it seems, be assumed in favor of the defendant that such a trial really took place: unless the plaintiff \* adduces \* 252 some evidence to the contrary. "We cannot suppose, without proof, that the occurrence of such a trial was mere invention, or that newspapers publish reports of merely imaginary trials."<sup>8</sup>

Where the report is clearly absolutely fair and there is no

<sup>1</sup> *Milissich v. Lloyds*, 46 L. J. C. P. 404; 36 L. T. 423; *Chalmers v. Payne*, 2 C. M. & R. 156; 5 Tyrw. 766; 1 Gale, 69.

<sup>2</sup> *Duncan v. Thwaites*, 3 B. & C. 580.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lord Campbell, C. J., in *Andrews v. Chapman*, 3 C. & K. 289.

<sup>4</sup> Per Mellish, L. J., in *Milissich v. Lloyds*, 46 L. J. C. P. 405; per Byles, J., in *Turner v. Sullivan and others*, 6 L. T. 130.

<sup>5</sup> *Milissich v. Lloyds*, 46 L. J. C. P. 404; *Salmon v. Isaac*, 20 L. T. 885.

<sup>6</sup> Per Brett, L. J., 46 L. J. C. P. 407.

<sup>7</sup> Per Bramwell, L. J., 5 Ex. D. 56.

<sup>8</sup> Per Alderson, B., in *Chalmers v. Payne*, 5 Tyrw. 769; 2 C. M. & R. 159; 1 Gale, 69.

suggestion of malice, the judge should stop the case and direct a verdict for the defendant: *e.g.* where the report is *verbatim* or nearly so; or corresponds in all material particulars with a report taken by an impartial shorthand writer.<sup>1</sup> But if anything be omitted in the report which could make any appreciable difference in the plaintiff's favor, or anything erroneously inserted which could conceivably tell against him, then it is a question for the jury whether such deviations from absolute accuracy make the report unfair; and the judge at *Nisi Prius* should not direct a verdict for either party.<sup>2</sup> The jury in considering the question should not dwell too much on isolated passages: they should consider the report as a whole. They should ask themselves what impression would be made on the mind of an unprejudiced reader who reads the report straight through, knowing nothing about the case beforehand. Slight errors may easily occur; and if such errors do not substantially alter the impression of the matter which the ordinary reader would receive, the jury should find for the defendant. If however there is a substantial misstatement of any material fact, and such misstatement is prejudicial to the reputation of the plaintiff, then the report is unfair and inaccurate, and the jury should find for the plaintiff.

## \* 253

\* *Illustrations.*

In a former action for libel brought by the plaintiff, the then defendant had justified. The report of this trial set out the libel in full, and gave the evidence for the defendant on the justification, concluding however by stating that the plaintiff had a verdict for £30. The jury, under the direction of Lord Abinger, took the "bane" and the "antidote" together and found a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the report when taken altogether was not injurious to the plaintiff. And the Court refused a rule for a new trial. *Chalmers v. Payne*, 5 Tyrw. 766; 1 Gale, 69; 2 C. M. & R. 156; *Dicas v. Lawson*, *ib.*

The plaintiff and M. were convicted of a conspiracy to extort money from B.; the report of the trial stated that the plaintiff had written a particular letter, which the plaintiff contended had not in fact been written by him, but by his fellow-conspirator, M. *Held*, that as the jury had convicted them of a common purpose, and the letter was written in furtherance of that common purpose and set out in the indictment as an overt act of the conspiracy, it made no difference which of the two wrote it: and that the error, if error it were, was immaterial. *Stockdale v. Tarte and others*, 4 A. & E. 1016; *Alexander v. N. E. R. Co.*, 6 B. & S. 340; 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 13 W. R. 651; 11 Jur. N. S. 619.

<sup>1</sup> Per Brett, L.J., in *Milissich v. Lloyds*, 46 L. J. C. P. 407.

<sup>2</sup> *Risk Allah Bey v. Whitehurst and others*, 18 L. T. 615; *Street v. Licensed Victuallers Society*, 22 W. R. 553.



A barrister, editing a book on the Law of Attorneys, referred to a case, *Re Blake*, reported in 30 L. J. Q. B. 32, and stated that Mr. Blake was struck off the rolls for misconduct. He was in fact only suspended for two years, as appeared from the *Law Journal* report. The publishers were held liable for this carelessness, although of course neither they nor the writer bore Mr. Blake any malice. Damages, £100. *Blake v. Stevens and others*, 4 F. & F. 232; 11 L. T. 543; *Gwynn v. S. E. R. Co.*, 18 L. T. 738; *Biggs v. G. E. R. Co.*, 16 W. R. 908; 18 L. T. 482; *R. v. Lofield*, 2 Barnard, 128.

Where the report of a trial gave none of the evidence, but only an abridgment of the speeches of counsel, and the defendant pleaded that it was still, *in substance*, a true report of the trial; such plea was held bad on demurrer. *Flint v. Pike*, 4 B. & Cr. 473; 6 D. & R. 528; *Kane v. Mulvany*, Ir. R. 2 C. L. 402.

A report is not privileged which does not give the evidence, but merely sets out the circumstances "as stated by the counsel" for one party. *Saunders v. Mills*, 6 Bing. 213; 3 M. & P. 520; *Woodgate v. Ridout*, 4 F. & F. 202.

Still less will it be privileged, if after so stating the case the only account given of the evidence, is that the witnesses "proved all that had been stated by the counsel for the prosecution." *Lewis v. Walter*, 4 B. & Ald. 605.

\* Where a report in the *Times* of a preliminary investigation before a mag- \* 254  
istrate set out at length the opening of the counsel for the prosecution, but entirely omitted the examination and cross-examination of the prosecutor, the only witness, merely saying that "his testimony supported the statement of his counsel," the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, £10. *Pinero v. Goodlake*, 15 L. T. 676.

[N.B.—The headnote to this case is strangely misleading; the proceedings were not *ex parte*; the defendant, himself a solicitor, was present and cross-examined the witnesses. The important monosyllable "no" appears to be omitted in the report of the argument of Coleridge, Q.C. p. 677.]

Where the report of a criminal trial gave the speech for the prosecution, a brief *résumé* of the speech of the prisoner's counsel, who called no witnesses, and the whole of the Lord Chief Baron's summing up *in extenso*; but it did not give the evidence except in so far as it was detailed in the judge's summing up; Lord Coleridge, C.J., held the report necessarily unfair because incomplete, and refused to leave the question of fairness to the jury. But the Court of Appeal held that he was wrong in so doing; that it is sufficient to publish a fair abstract of the trial, and that the judge's summing up was presumably such an abstract; that the question of fairness must be left to the jury, and that therefore there must be a new trial. *Milissich v. Lloyds (C. A.)*, 46 L. J. C. P. 404; 36 L. T. 423; 13 Cox, C. C. 575.

No privilege attaches to the report of unsworn statements made by a bystander at an inquest. *Lynam v. Gowing*, 6 L. R. Ir. 259.

The reporter must add nothing of his own. He must not state his opinion of the conduct of the parties, or impute motives therefor: above all he must not insinuate that a particular witness committed perjury. This is not a *report* of what occurred; it is the *comment* of the writer *on* what occurred, and to this no privilege attaches. (a) Often no doubt such comments may be

(a) *Commonwealth v. Blanding*, 3 Pick. 304; *Thomas v. Crosswell*, 7 Johns. 264.

justified on another ground, that they are fair and *bond fide* criticism on a matter of public interest and are therefore not libellous.<sup>1</sup> But such observations, to which quite different considerations apply, should not be mixed up with the history of the case. "If any comments are made, they should not be made as part of the report. The report should be confined to  
 \* 255 what takes place in court, and the two things, report and comment, should be kept separate."<sup>2</sup> And all sensational headings to reports should be avoided.

### *Illustrations.*

The captain of a vessel was charged before a magistrate with an indecent assault upon a lady on board his own ship. The defendant's newspaper published a report of the case, interspersed with comments which assumed the guilt of the captain, commended the conduct of the lady and generally tended to inflame the minds of the public violently against the accused. *Held* that no privilege attached to such comments and that the report was neither fair nor dispassionate. *R. v. Fisher and others*, 2 Camp. 563. And see *R. v. Lee*, 5 Esp. 123; *R. v. Fleet*, 1 B. & Ald. 379.

It is libellous to publish a highly-colored account of criminal proceedings, mixed with the reporter's own observations and conclusions upon what passed in court, headed "Judicial Delinquency," and containing an insinuation that the plaintiff ("our hero") had committed perjury: and it is no justification to pick out such parts of the libel as contain an account of the trial, and to plead that such parts are true and accurate, leaving the extraneous matter altogether unjustified. *Stiles v. Nokes*, 7 East, 493; same case *sub nomine Carr v. Jones*, 3 Smith, 491.

The report of a trial set out the speech of the counsel for the prosecution, and then added:—"The first witness was R. P., who proved all that had been stated by the counsel for the prosecution:" but owing to the absence of a piece of formal evidence in no way bearing on the merits of the case, "the jury, under the direction of the learned judge, were obliged to give a verdict of acquittal, to the great regret of a crowded court, on whom the statement and the evidence, so far as it went, made a strong impression of their guilt." *Held* that no privilege applied. *Lewis v. Walter*, 4 B. & Ald. 605; *Roberts v. Brown*, 10 Bing. 519; 4 Moo. & Sc. 407.

On an examination into the sufficiency of sureties on an election petition, under 9 Geo. IV. c. 22, s. 7, affidavits were put in to show that one of them (the plaintiff) was embarrassed in his affairs, and an insufficient surety. A newspaper report of the examination proceeded to ask why the plaintiff being wholly unconnected with the borough should take so much trouble about the matter. "There can be but one answer to these very natural and reasonable queries, *he is hired* for the occasion."

*Held* that this question and answer formed no part of the report; and therefore  
 \* 256 enjoyed no privilege; and that it was properly left to the jury to say whether they were a fair and *bond fide* comment on a matter of public interest in that borough. Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, £100. *Cooper v. Lawson*, 8 A. & E. 746; 1 W. W. & H. 601; 2 Jur. 919; 1 P. & D. 15.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, c. II. pp. 44-46.

<sup>2</sup> Per *Ld. Campbell*, C.J., in *Andrews v. Chapman*, 3 C. & K. 288.

The *Observer* gave a true and faithful account of some proceedings in the Insolvent Debtors Court, but headed it with the words "Shameful conduct of an attorney." Held that for those words, as they were not justified, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. *Clement v. Lewis* (Exch. Ch.), 3 Br. & B. 297; 3 B. & Ald. 702; 7 Moore, 200; *Bishop v. Latimer*, 4 L. T. 775.

A paragraph was headed "An honest lawyer," and stated that the plaintiff had been reprimanded by one of the Masters of the Queen's Bench, "for what is called sharp practice in his profession." Held libellous. *Boydell v. Jones*, 4 M. & W. 446; 1 H. & H. 408; 7 Dowl. 210; *Flint v. Pike*, 4 B. & C. 473; 6 D. & R. 528.

A report of the hearing of a charge of perjury before a magistrate, was headed "Wilful and Corrupt Perjury," and stated that the "evidence before the magistrate entirely negatived the story of the" plaintiff. The jury found a verdict for the defendant on the ground that it was a fair and correct report of what occurred at the hearing. But the Court set aside the verdict on this count, and entered a verdict for the plaintiff, with nominal damages. *Lewis v. Levy*, E. B. & E. 537; 27 L. J. Q. B. 282; 4 Jur. N. S. 970.

The privilege attaching to fair and accurate reports may of course be rebutted by proof of actual malice. Reports of judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged, by whomsoever published.<sup>1</sup> But it is of course very difficult to prove that an ordinary newspaper reporter has been actuated by express malice: whereas if one of the parties to a cause or his solicitor sent the report, this unusual conduct alone would be some evidence of malice, and the jury would start with a presumption that the report was biassed and unfair.<sup>2</sup>

In these cases there are in fact two distinct questions for the \* jury. (i.) Is the report fair and accurate? If so, it is *prima* \* 257 *facie* privileged; if not verdict for the plaintiff. (ii.) Was the report, though fair and accurate, published maliciously? Was it published solely to afford information to the public and for the benefit of society without any reference to the individuals concerned; or was it published with the malicious intention of injuring the reputation of the plaintiff? This second question of course only arises when the first has been already answered in the affirmative.

### *Illustrations.*

A churchwarden obtained a writ of prohibition against the Bishop of Chichester on an affidavit which falsely stated the facts. He immediately had the writ translated into English, and dispersed 2000 copies of such translation all over the kingdom with a title-page alleging that by such writ "the illegality of oaths is declared," which was not the case. Held, "a most seditious libel." *Waterfield v. Bishop of Chichester*, 2 Mod. 118.

<sup>1</sup> *Stevens v. Sampson*, 5 Exch. D. 53.

<sup>2</sup> See the remarks of Wood, V.-C., in *Coleman v. West Hartlepool Harbor & Railway Co.*, 2 L. T. 766; 8 W. R. 734.

In a County Court action, *Nettlefold v. Fulcher*, the defendant, a solicitor, appeared for Nettlefold, and commented severely on the conduct of the plaintiff, who was Fulcher's agent and debt collector. The defendant sent to the local newspapers a report of the case, which the jury found "was in substance a fair report;" but they also found that "it was sent with a certain amount of malice." Verdict for the plaintiff. Damages, 40s. On appeal, it was argued that the defendant was entitled to judgment on the first finding of the jury, and that the motive which the defendant had in sending the report was immaterial. But the Court of Appeal held that Cockburn, C.J., was right in directing judgment to be entered for the plaintiff. *Stevens v. Sampson*, 5 Ex. D. 53; 49 L. J. Q. B. 120; 28 W. R. 87; 41 L. T. 782.

Where the Court of Directors resolved to dismiss the plaintiff, one of their officers, for misconduct, and the defendant, the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, published this sentence of dismissal, it was held that no action lay, if it was part of the defendant's official duty so to publish it. *Oliver v. Lord Wm. Bentinck*, 3 Taunt. 456. See *Grant v. Secretary of State for India*, 2 C. P. D. 445; 25 W. R. 848; 37 L. T. 188, *ante*, p. 196.

### (ii.) *Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings.*

Every fair and accurate report of any proceeding in either House of Parliament or in any committee thereof, is privileged, even though it contain matter defamatory of an individual.

\* 258     \* The analogy between such reports and those of legal proceedings is complete. Whatever would deprive a report of a trial of immunity, will equally deprive a report of parliamentary proceedings of all privilege.

There was for a long time great doubt on this subject, but the law is now clearly and most satisfactorily settled by the decision in *Wason v. Walter*.<sup>1</sup> Such doubt was caused by the fact that there were standing orders of both Houses of Parliament prohibiting such publications; and it was argued with some force that no privilege could attach to any report which was published in contravention of such standing orders, and was therefore in itself a contempt of the House. We have seen<sup>2</sup> that when a learned judge expressly prohibits the publication of the proceedings before him, any report of them is a contempt and wholly unprivileged.<sup>3</sup> And the earliest reports of parliamentary proceedings were only published in fear and trembling as "*Debates in the Senate of Lilliput*," with the names of the speakers disguised. And even for such reports Cave, the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, was cited before the House of Lords for breach of privilege (April, 1747); and Johnson's pen ceased to indite ponderous speeches for "*Whig dogs*." But in 1749, Cave began again, and his reports now took the form of letters from an M. P. to a friend in the

<sup>1</sup> L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 409.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 249.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Clement*, 4 B. & Ald. 218.

country. After 1752 they were avowedly printed as reports; but still only the initials of the speakers were given. As late as 1801 the printer and publisher of the *Morning Herald* were committed to the custody of Black Rod, for publishing an account of a debate in the House of Lords; but then such account was expressly declared to be "a scandalous misrepresentation" of what had really occurred. And now such standing orders are quite obsolete. Within the last four or five years the House of Commons has modified its rules as to the presence of "strangers:" while the House of Lords has appointed a commission to increase the facilities given to reporters, and this commission has actually suggested the removal of the woosack to the other end of the House so as to enable their Lordships to be more distinctly heard.

\* A speech made by a member of Parliament in the \* 259 House is of course absolutely privileged. If he subsequently causes his speech to be printed, and circulates it privately among his constituents, *bonâ fide* for their information on any matter of general or local interest, a qualified privilege would attach to such report; [in spite of an obsolete order of the House of Commons forbidding such publication, passed in 1641, and still a standing order of the House; 2 Commons' Journal, 209].<sup>1</sup> But if a member of Parliament publishes his speech to all the world with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, he will be liable both civilly and criminally.<sup>2</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

The defendant published the report of a select committee of the House of Commons which contained a paragraph charging an individual with holding views hostile to the government. But the Court refused to grant a criminal information on the express ground that the publication was a true copy of a proceeding in parliament. *R. v. Wright* (1799), 8 T. R. 293.

The plaintiff induced Earl Russell to present a petition to the House of Lords charging a high judicial officer with having suppressed evidence before an election committee some thirty years previously. The charge was shown to be wholly unfounded, and the conduct of the plaintiff in presenting such a petition was severely commented on by the Earl of Derby and others in the debate which followed. The plaintiff sued the proprietor of the *Times* for reporting this debate. Cockburn, C.J., directed the jury that if they were satisfied that the report was faithful and correct, it was in point of law a privileged communication; and the Court of Queen's Bench subsequently discharged a rule *nisi* which had been obtained for a new trial on the ground of misdirec-

<sup>1</sup> Per *Ld. Campbell, C.J., and Crompton, J., in Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 233; 26 L. J. Q. B. 107; and *Cockburn, C.J., in Wason v. Walter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 95; 38 L. J. Q. B. 42; 19 L. T. 416.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Lord Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 226; *R. v. Creevey*, 1 M. & S. 273.

tion. *Wason v. Walter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; 8 B. & S. 671; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 409.

The proceedings of any Committee of the House of Lords may be reported and commented on. *Kane v. Mulvany*, Ir. L. R. 2 C. L. 402.

No other reports are privileged. If any one publishes an account of the proceedings of any meeting of a town-council, board of guardians, or vestry, of the shareholders in any company, of the subscribers to any charity, or of any public meeting, political or otherwise; and such account contains expressions defamatory of the plaintiff; the fact that it is a fair and accurate report of what actually occurred will not avail as a defence, though it may be urged in mitigation of damages. By printing and publishing the statements of the various speakers, he has made them his own; and must either justify and prove them strictly true, (c. VII.) or he may rely upon their being fair and *bonâ fide* comments on a matter of public interest.

### *Illustrations.*

The defendants, the printers and publishers of the *Manchester Courier*, published in their paper a report of the proceedings at a meeting of the Board of Guardians for the Altrincham Poor Law Union, at which *ex parte* charges were made against the medical officer of the union workhouse at Knutsford, of neglecting to attend the pauper patients when sent for. Held, that the matter was one of public interest; but that the report was not privileged by the occasion, although it was admitted to be a *bonâ fide* and a correct account of what passed at the meeting; and the plaintiff recovered 40s. damages and costs. *Purcell v. Sowler*, 1 C. P. D. 781; 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 W. R. 362; 36 L. T. 416.

A public meeting was called for the purpose of petitioning Parliament against the grant to the Roman Catholic College at Maynooth. The defendant made a telling speech at such meeting commenting severely on penances and other portions of the discipline of the Roman Catholic Church. Had the words been defamatory of the plaintiff, the Court held that they would not have been privileged, although the object of the meeting was legal, and the defendant's speech was pertinent to the occasion. *Hearne v. Stowell*, 12 A. & E. 719; 4 P. & D. 696; 6 Jur. 458; *ante*, p. 127. See *Pierce v. Ellis*, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 55.

At a meeting of the West Hartlepool Improvement Commissioners, one  
\* 261 \* of the Commissioners made some defamatory remarks as to the conduct of the former secretary of the Bishop of Durham in procuring from the Bishop a license for the chaplain of the West Hartlepool Cemetery. These remarks were reported in the local newspaper, and the secretary brought an action against the owner of the newspaper for libel. A plea of justification alleging that such remarks were in fact made at a public meeting of the commissioners, and that the alleged libel was an

impartial and accurate report of what took place at such meeting, was held bad on demurrer. *Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 229; 26 L. J. Q. B. 104; 3 Jur. N. S. 613; 5 W. R. 253; 28 L. T. (O. S.) 265.

So also a newspaper proprietor will be held liable for publishing a report made to the vestry by their medical officer of health, even although the vestry are required by Act of Parliament sooner or later to publish such report themselves. *Popham v. Pickburn*, 7 H. & N. 891; 31 L. J. Ex. 133; 8 Jur. N. S. 179; 10 W. R. 324; 5 L. T. 846. See also *Charlton v. Watton*, 6 C. & P. 385.

It is considered that this rule works a hardship upon newspaper proprietors, who in the ordinary course of their business have presented to the public a full, true and impartial account of what really took place at a public meeting, considering no doubt that thereby they were merely doing their duty. The Scotch Law on the subject is said to be less stringent than that of England or Ireland. The Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the Law of Libel "after careful consideration, have come to the conclusion that the balance of convenience requires that further protection should be given to such reports." They "accordingly recommend that any report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting should be privileged, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose, and was open to the public, and if such report was fair and accurate, and published without malice, and if the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit." But they "are of opinion that such protection should not be available as a defence in any proceeding if the plaintiff or prosecutor can show that the defendant has refused to insert a reasonable letter, or statement of explanation or contradiction by or on behalf of such plaintiff or prosecutor."

But it appears to me that no adequate reasons are assigned for such a change in the law. The consequences of publishing \* in \* 262 the papers calumnies uttered at a public meeting are most serious. The original slander may not be actionable *per se*, or the communication may be privileged; so that no action lies against the speaker. Moreover the meeting may have been thinly attended, and the audience may have known that the speaker was not worthy of credit. But it would be a terrible thing for the person defamed if such words could be printed and published to all the world, merely because they were uttered under such circumstances at such a meeting. Charges recklessly made in the excitement of the moment will thus be diffused throughout the country, and will remain recorded in a permanent form against a perfectly innocent person. We cannot tell into whose hands a copy of that newspaper may come. Moreover additional importance and weight is given to such a calumny by its republication in the columns of a respectable paper. Many people will believe it merely because it is in print. There is in fact an immense

difference between the injury done by such a slander and that caused by its extended circulation by the press.<sup>1</sup>

The Select Committee appear to me, if I may venture to say so, to have attached too much importance to the absence of malice, which generally characterizes such reports, and too little importance to the damage inflicted on the plaintiff by the publication. Their proviso as to the insertion of the plaintiff's contradiction is clearly intended to protect reports published *bonâ fide* or inadvertently, as distinct from those published maliciously. But malice is in no way essential to an action of libel, except in cases of qualified privilege. It is surely anomalous to determine the question: "Was the occasion such as to create a privilege for the libel?" by reference to the subsequent conduct of the defendant. And it is, I think, but a poor satisfaction to a plaintiff to allow him to write "a reasonable letter of contradiction." Many who read the report would not read the plaintiff's letter, and those who did would probably not believe it; they would say:

"Oh, of course he denies it." It would be difficult too to decide

\* 263 what \* is and what is not "a 'reasonable letter' under such circumstances. And then the speaker at the meeting, or some friend of his, would be sure to write a letter in reply to the plaintiff's, re-asserting the truth of the original charge, and probably adding a judicious selection of fresh accusations, and this letter also the editor would be bound in fairness to insert. And thus would arise a newspaper warfare which would only prolong and aggravate the mischief caused by the report.

The existing law appears to me to afford sufficient protection to newspaper proprietors. They ought surely to be liable to a civil action, whenever they publish a report defamatory of the plaintiff on a matter in which the public have no interest or concern. The Select Committee do not desire to encourage any mischievous prying into the private affairs of others, for they add the express proviso "if the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit." If, however, the matter is one of public interest, then all fair and *bonâ fide* comments thereon are held not to be libellous, and no action lies. And surely if unfair and *malâ fide* comments appear in a newspaper, the owner ought to be held liable for the injury thus done by his subordinates. In criminal proceedings, newspaper proprietors can avail themselves of the defences allowed them by Lord Campbell's act, which appear to me sufficient for the purpose.

<sup>1</sup> See the remarks of Lord Campbell in *Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 231; 26 L. J. Q. B. 106; 3 Jur. N. S. 613; 5 W. R. 253; 28 L. T. (Old S.) 265; and of Best, C.J., in *De Crespigny v. Wellesley*, 5 Bing. 402-406, cited *ante*, pp. 157, 8, c. VI.



## MALICE.

“IN an ordinary action for a libel or for words, though evidence of malice may be given to increase the damages, it never is considered as essential, nor is there any instance of a verdict for the defendant on the ground of a want of malice.”<sup>1</sup> (a) As we have seen, an accidental or inadvertent publication of defamatory words is ground for an action. Even a lunatic is liable for a libel.<sup>2</sup> The Courts for this purpose look at the tendency of the publication, not at the intention of the publisher.<sup>3</sup> The fact that the jury have expressly found in defendant's favor that he had no malicious intent, shall not avail him;<sup>4</sup> for if he has in fact spoken words which have injured the plaintiff's reputation he must be taken to have intended the consequences naturally resulting therefrom.

\* In former days this rule was not so strictly enforced in actions \* 265 of slander as of libel; the Courts in those days evincing a strong desire to discourage all actions of slander, except, perhaps, in cases where the words imputed a capital offence. Thus, where the defendant was sued for saying that he had heard that the plaintiff had been hanged for stealing a horse, and on the evidence it appeared that the defendant spoke the words in genuine grief and sorrow at the news, *Hobart, J.*, nonsuited the plaintiff on the express ground that the words were not spoken maliciously.<sup>5</sup> Now, however, the absence of malice could only be given in evidence in mitigation of damages; and the question whether the defendant acted

<sup>1</sup> Per Bayley, J., in *Bromage v. Prosser*, 1 C. & P. 475; 4 B. & C. 257; 6 Dowl. & R. 295; and per Mansfield, C.J., in *Hargrave v. Le Breton*, 4 Burr. 2425.

<sup>2</sup> Per Kelly, C.B., in *Mordaunt v. Mordaunt*, 39 L. J. Prob. & Matr. 59.

<sup>3</sup> *Haire v. Wilson*, 9 B. & C. 643; 4 Man. & Ry. 605; *Fisher v. Clement*, 10 B. & C. 472; 5 Man. & Ry. 730.

<sup>4</sup> Per Maule, J., in *Wenman v. Ash*, 13 C. B. 845; 22 L. J. C. P. 190; 17 Jur. 579; 1 C. L. R. 592; *Huntley v. Ward*, 6 C. B. N. S. 514; 6 Jur. N. S. 18; 1 F. & F. 552; *Blackburn v. Blackburn*, 4 Bing. 395; 1 M. & P. 33, 63; 3 C. & P. 146.

<sup>5</sup> *Crawford v. Middleton*, 1 Lev. 82. And see *Greenwood v. Prick*, cited *Cro. Jac.* 91, *ante*, p. 6.

(a) See in regard to implied malice note *ante*, p. 5.

maliciously or not, should never be left to the jury, unless the occasion be privileged.<sup>1</sup> (a) The defendant's intention or motive in using the words is, in fact, immaterial.

If I have in fact wrongfully injured another's reputation, I must compensate him, although I may have acted from the noblest motives. Just as if I break A.'s window accidentally in the attempt to save a child from falling down a grating, I am still bound in law to pay A. the value of the broken pane. If, then, I have defamed A. without lawful excuse, that is, on an occasion *not* privileged, malice forms no part of the issue.<sup>2</sup>

It is true that the word "malicious" is usually inserted in every definition of libel or slander, that the pleader invariably introduces it into every statement of claim, and that the older cases contain many *dicta* to the effect that "*malice*" is essential to an action for libel or slander. But in all these cases the word "*malice*" is used in a special and technical sense; it denotes "*the absence of lawful excuse*;" in fact, to say that defamatory words are malicious in that sense means simply that they are unprivileged, not employed under circumstances which excuse them. But I have dropped this technical and fictitious use of the word altogether—a use which

has been termed an "unfortunate" one by learned judges.<sup>3</sup> (b) I \* 266 \* use the word malice in the popular and ordinary sense of the word; *i.e.*, to denote some ill-feeling towards the plaintiff or the public; some mean or crooked motive of which an honorable man would be ashamed. This is called "*express malice*" or "*actual malice*" in our older books. Using the word in this sense, I say that till the defendant pleads privilege, malice is no part of the issue. As soon as that plea is placed on the record, the plaintiff has to prove malice, but not before.

But as soon as the Judge rules that the words are privileged by reason of the occasion on which they were uttered or published,

<sup>1</sup> *Haire v. Wilson*, 9 B. & C. 643; 4 Man. & Ry. 605. Per Lord Denman in *Baylis v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 924; 3 P. & D. 529; 4 Jur. 652. Per Parke, B., in *O'Brien v. Clement*, 15 M. & W. 437.

<sup>2</sup> *Hooper v. Truscott*, 2 Scott, 672; 2 Bing. N. C. 457; *Godson v. Home*, 1 Br. & B. 7; 3 Moore, 223.

<sup>3</sup> See 41 L. T. 590.

(a) This, as we have said in the note *ante*, p. 6, appears to proceed upon the simple and intelligible ground that it is not deemed advisable to permit a man to testify as to the state of his own mind except in so far as that is manifested by external facts (the "occasion" of the books); for evidence should relate to facts that may be testified and denied by all men. If however this is to be considered, what is much the same thing, a case of the exter-

nal standard by which men are to be judged (*Holmes, Common Law, Lect. 2-4*), it is still more clear that the malice in question is to be treated as actual (until disproved), for "the average man" of the law would in publishing defamation be actuated by malicious feeling. See the note above mentioned, p. 6.

(b) For the editor's view of this subject, see the note just cited, p. 6.

then (unless, indeed, the privilege be absolute), the question of malice becomes all-important. In the words of Lord Justice Brett in *Clark v. Molyneux*:<sup>1</sup> — “When there has been a writing or a speaking of defamatory matter, and the Judge has held — and it is for him to decide the question — that although the matter is defamatory the occasion on which it is either written or spoken is privileged, it is necessary to consider how, although the occasion is privileged, yet the defendant is not permitted to take advantage of the privilege. If the occasion is privileged it is so for some reason, and the defendant is only entitled to the protection of the privilege if he uses the occasion for that reason. He is not entitled to the protection if he uses the occasion for some indirect and wrong motive. If he uses the occasion to gratify his anger or his malice, he uses the occasion not for the reason which makes the occasion privileged, but for an indirect and wrong motive. If the indirect and wrong motive suggested to take the defamatory matter out of the privilege is malice, then there are certain tests of malice. Malice does not mean malice in law, a term in pleading, but actual malice, that which is popularly called malice. If a man is proved to have stated that which he knew to be false, \* no one need inquire further. Everybody assumes \* 267 thenceforth that he was malicious, that he did do a wrong thing for some wrong motive. So if it be proved that out of anger, or for some other wrong motive, the defendant has stated as true that which he does not know to be true, and he has stated it whether it is true or not, recklessly, by reason of his anger or other motive, the jury may infer that he used the occasion, not for the reason which justifies it, but for the gratification of his anger or other indirect motive. The judgment of Bayley, J., in *Bromage v. Prosser*,<sup>2</sup> treats of malice in law, and no doubt where the word ‘maliciously’ is used in a pleading, it means intentionally, wilfully. It has been decided that if the word ‘maliciously’ is omitted in a declaration for libel, and the words ‘wrongfully’ or ‘falsely’ substituted, it is sufficient, (a) the reason being that

<sup>1</sup> 3 Q. B. D. 246, 247; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 37 L. T. 694.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & C. at p. 255.

(a) *King v. Root*, 4 Wend. 113; *Weaver v. Hendrick*, 30 Mo. 502; *White v. Gratt*, 343; *Williams v. Gordon*, 11 Bush, 693. See *Keesling v. McCall*, 36 Ind. 321; *Nichols*, 3 How. 266. But see *Noonan v. Viele v. Gray*, 10 Abb. Pr. 1. *Orton*, 32 Wis. 106; *Dillard v. Collins*, 25

the word ‘maliciously,’ as used in a pleading, has only a technical meaning; but here we are dealing with malice in fact, and malice then means a wrong feeling in a man’s mind.”

Malice may be defined as any indirect and wicked motive which induces the defendant to defame the plaintiff. If malice be proved, the privilege attaching to the occasion is lost at once.

### *Illustrations.*

Plaintiff assaulted the defendant on the highway; the defendant met a constable and asked him to arrest the plaintiff. The constable refused to arrest the plaintiff unless he was charged with a felony. The defendant knowing full well that the plaintiff had committed a misdemeanor only, viz., the assault, charged him with felony, in order to get him locked up for the night. *Held* that the charge of felony was malicious, as being made from an indirect and improper motive. *Smith v. Hodgeskins*, Cro. Car. 276.

A near relative, or even an intimate friend, may warn a lady not to marry a particular suitor, and assign his reasons for thus cautioning her, provided \*this be done with a conscientious desire for her welfare, and in the *bona fide* belief that the charges made are true. *Todd v. Hawkins*, 2 M. & Rob. 20; 8 C. & P. 888.

But if a total stranger wrote an anonymous letter to the lady; or *a fortiori*, if a rival thus endeavored to oust the plaintiff from the lady’s affections, there would be evidence of malice to go to the jury.

The defendant on being applied to for the character of the plaintiff who had been his saleswoman, charged her with theft. He had never made such a charge against her till then; he told her that he would say nothing about it, if she resumed her employment at his house; subsequently, he said that if she would acknowledge the theft he would give her a character. *Held* that there was abundant evidence that the charge of theft was made *malâ fide*, with the intention of compelling plaintiff to return to defendant’s service. Damages, £60. *Jackson v. Hopperton*, 16 C. B. (N. S.) 829; 12 W. R. 913; 10 L. T. 529; *Rogers v. Clifton*, 3 B. & P. 587.

The defendant made a charge of felony against his former shopman to his relatives during his absence in London, with a view of inducing them to compound the alleged felony, and not for the purpose of prosecution or investigation. He actually received £50 from plaintiff’s brother as hush-money. *Held* that the charge of felony was altogether unprivileged. *Hooper v. Truscott*, 2 Bing. N. C. 457; 2 Scott, 672.

Letters from the commanding officer of a regiment to his immediate superior, containing charges against the colonel in command; and a conversation with a member of Parliament as to a question to be put in the House of Commons relative to the dismissal of the Colonel on those charges, were *held* to be *prima facie* privileged: but circumstances showing that the letters were written, not from a sense of duty, but from personal resentment on account of other matters, and that the object of the conversation was to prejudice the plaintiff by reason of such personal resentment—*held*, evidence of actual malice, taking away the privilege. *Dickson v. The Earl of Wilton*, 1 F. & F. 419.

A speech made by a member of Parliament in the House is absolutely privileged; but if he subsequently causes his speech to be printed, and published, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, he will be liable both civilly and criminally. *R. v. Lord Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 226; *R. v. Creevey*, 1 M. & S. 273.

The rector dismissed the parish schoolmaster for refusing to teach in the Sunday School. The schoolmaster opened another school on his own account in the parish. The rector published a pastoral letter warning all parishioners not to support "a schismatical school," and not to be partakers with the plaintiff "in his evil deeds," which tended "to produce disunion and schism," and "a spirit of opposition to authority." *Held* that there was some evidence to go to the jury that the rector cherished anger and malice against the schoolmaster. *Gilpin v. Fowler*, 9 Ex. 615; 23 L. J. Ex. 152; 18 Jur. 293.

\* The defendants presented a petition in the Croydon County Court to \* 269 adjudicate the plaintiff a bankrupt, and to set aside a bill of sale which they alleged to be fraudulent. The County Court judge heard the case in his own room, where no reporters were present, and decided that the bill of sale was fraudulent. After the case was over, the defendants sent for a reporter to the Greyhound Hotel, and gave him an account of the proceedings before the County Court judge, from which he drew up a report which appeared in several papers. The jury found that the report was "fair as far as it went;" but it did not state the fact that the plaintiff had announced his intention to appeal. *Held* that neither this omission, nor the fact that the report was furnished by one of the parties, instead of being taken by the reporter in the usual way, was, by itself, sufficient to destroy the privilege attaching to all fair reports of legal proceedings. Per Cockburn, C.J., at *Nisi Prius*, *Myers v. Defries*, *Times*, July 23rd, 1877. [But the jury being satisfied from the whole circumstances that the defendant furnished the report with the express intention of injuring the plaintiff, gave the plaintiff £250 damages on the first trial, and one farthing damages on the second. See *Myers v. Defries*, 4 Ex. D. 176; 5 Ex. D. 15, 180; 48 L. J. Ex. 446; 28 W. R. 406; 40 L. T. 795; 41 L. T. 695; from which it would seem the jury at all events considered that a man may not injure his enemy, even with a fair weapon.] And see *Stevens v. Sampson*, 5 Exch. Div. 53; 49 L. J. Q. B. 120; 28 W. R. 87; 41 L. T. 782. *Salmon v. Isaac*, 20 L. T. 885.

The *onus* of proving malice lies on the plaintiff; the defendant cannot be called on to prove he did *not* act maliciously, till some evidence of malice, more than a mere *scintilla*, has been adduced by the plaintiff.<sup>1</sup> And the plaintiff must prove express malice by some evidence besides that which merely proves the falsity of the statement.<sup>2</sup> That the defendant was mistaken in the words he spoke confidentially is, taken alone, no evidence of malice.<sup>3</sup>

\* Malice may be proved by some *extrinsic* evidence of \* 270 ill-feeling, or personal hostility between plaintiff and de-

<sup>1</sup> *Taylor v. Hawkins*, 16 Q. B. 321; 15 Jur. 746; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313; *Cook and another v. Wildes*, 5 E. & B. 340; 24 L. J. Q. B. 367; 1 Jur. N. S. 610; 3 C. L. R. 1090; *Clark v. Molyneux* (C. A.), 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 37 L. T. 694; 14 Cox, C. C. 10; *Chillingworth v. Grimble* (C. A.), *Times*, for Nov. 7th, 1877.

<sup>2</sup> *Caulfield v. Whitworth*, 16 W. R. 936; 18 L. T. 527.

<sup>3</sup> This is so also in America; see *Lewis and Herrick v. Chapman* (Selden, J.), 2 Smith (16 N. Y. R.), 369; *Vanderzee v. McGregor*, 12 Wend. 546; *Fowles v. Bowen*, 3 Tiffany (30 N. Y. R.) 20.

fendant; such as threats by defendant that he would rid the town of the plaintiff;<sup>1</sup> former libels or slanders on the plaintiff, &c. Such evidence must go to prove that the defendant himself was actuated by personal malice against the plaintiff. In an action against the *publisher* of a magazine, evidence that the *editor* or the author of any article, not being the publisher, had a spite against the plaintiff, is of course inadmissible.<sup>2</sup> But the plaintiff is not bound to prove malice by *extrinsic* evidence;<sup>3</sup> he may rely on the words of the libel itself and on the circumstances attending its publication, as affording evidence of malice; or in case of slander on the exaggerated language used, and on the fact that third persons were present.

But in either case, if the evidence adduced is equally consistent with either the existence or non-existence of malice, the Judge should stop the case; for there is nothing to rebut the presumption which has arisen in favor of the defendant from the privileged occasion.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if the only evidence of malice be the terms of the libel itself in reference to an act of the plaintiff's, and that act was in its nature equivocal, and would bear a construction compatible with *bona fides* in the defendant, then there is no evidence of malice to go to the jury.<sup>5</sup>

\* 271 \* A mere mistake innocently made through excusable inadvertence cannot in any case be evidence of malice.<sup>6</sup>

### I. *Extrinsic evidence of malice.*

Malice may be proved by extrinsic evidence (*a*) showing that the defendant bore a long-standing grudge against the plaintiff,

<sup>1</sup> *Blagg v. Sturt*, 10 Q. B. 904; 11 Jur. 101; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39.

<sup>2</sup> *Robertson v. Wylde*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 101; *Clark v. Newsam*, 1 Ex. 131, 139; *Carmichael v. Waterford and Limerick Ry. Co.*, 13 Ir. L. R. 313.

<sup>3</sup> *Wright v. Woodgate*, 2 C. M. & R. 573; 1 Tyr. & G. 12; 1 Gale, 329.

<sup>4</sup> *Somerville v. Hawkins*, 10 C. B. 590; 20 L. J. C. P. 131; 15 Jur. 450; *Harris v. Thompson*, 13 C. B. 333.

<sup>5</sup> *Spill v. Maule*, L. R. 4 Ex. 232; 38 L. J. Ex. 138; 17 W. R. 805; 20 L. T. 675.

<sup>6</sup> *Harrison v. Bush*, 5 E. & B. 350; 1 Jur. N. S. 846; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25; *Brett v. Watson*, 20 W. R. 723; *Kershaw v. Bailey*, 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129; *Scarll v. Dixon*, 4 F. & F. 250; *Pater v. Baker*, 3 C. B. 831; 16 L. J. C. P. 124; 11 Jur. 370.

(*a*) Express malice is shown either to aggravate damages (*Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292) or to rebut the inference arising from a qualified privilege. *Wilson v. Noo-*

*nan*, 35 Wis. 321; s. c. 27 Wis. 610. It cannot be shown for the purpose of proving publication by the defendant of the defamation. *State v. Riggs*, 39 Conn.

that there were former disputes between them, that defendant had formerly been in the plaintiff's employ, and that plaintiff had

498. But it was, it may be remarked, an odd slip in so accurate a lawyer as Mr. Justice Bronson to say that express malice is important only to overturn a supposed privilege, when in the same connection he proceeds to mention extrinsic facts which may be shown to enhance damages. *Root v. Lowndes*, 6 Hill, 518, 520. So much by way of introduction to the subject of the present note. We have elsewhere seen (*ante*, p. 6) that malice is shown in the first instance when the plaintiff proves that the defendant has published of him language of a certain well-ascertained character. Now express malice is malice to be specifically proved; that is, it is to be proved by evidence not contained in the language itself, though sometimes severity of defamation as seen only in the charge imputed is treated as express malice. See cases near end of this note. We have suggested in the note referred to that it would be well not to trouble the jury with the meaning of the term in such cases, simply instructing them (in accordance with all the authorities) that if they find the publication of the actionable words alleged they must give a verdict for the plaintiff, and that too with vindictive damages if they deem the charge outrageous. This supposes of course that no privilege or extenuating facts are in question. Express malice then becomes malice shown *aliunde*.

What external evidence shall be sufficient to establish this express malice? In the form of a general answer to the question it may be said (in language substantially of judicial authority directed to the specific purpose of defining malice) that evidence tending to show either a direct intention to injure the plaintiff or a reckless disregard of his rights and of the consequences that may result to him may be adduced to prove malice. *Gott v. Pulsifer*, 122 Mass. 235, Gray, C.J., citing *Commonwealth v. Bonner*, 9 Met. 410; *Moore v. Stevenson*, 27 Conn. 14; *Hibbs v. Wilkinson*, 1 Fost. & F. 608, 610; *Paris v. Levy*, 2 Fost. & F. 71, 74; s. c. 9 C. B. N. S. 342, 350. So *Burt v. McBain*, 29 Mich. 260. It will be observed that this propo-

sition is in the disjunctive; it is not necessary to prove any actual intention to injure the plaintiff. *Gott v. Pulsifer*, *supra*; *Barr v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 355; *Pennington v. Meeks*, 46 Mo. 217; *Buckley v. Knapp*, 48 Mo. 152; *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808; *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 10; s. c. 35 Mich. 372; *Burt v. McBain*, 29 Mich. 260; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 81, 87. So in an indictment for libel. *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199. This reckless disregard of the rights of the party defamed and of the consequences that may result to him may be shown in a variety of ways, the most common of which appear in actions for libel against newspapers. Now it may be stated in the outset that the publishers, editors, and writers of newspaper articles or paragraphs have no immunity (apart from statute) from prosecution or action not enjoyed by citizens generally. *Foster v. Scripps*, 39 Mich. 376; s. c. 41 Mich. 742; *Snyder v. Fulton*, 34 Md. 129; *Buckley v. Knapp*, 48 Mo. 152; *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51; *Sweeney v. Baker*, 13 W. Va. 158; *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, 107 Mass. 199; *Smart v. Blanchard*, 42 N. H. 137; *Huff v. Bennett*, 4 Sandf. 120; *Dunn v. Hall*, 1 Ind. 344; *Andres v. Wells*, 7 Johns. 260; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray, 261; *Sheckell v. Jackson*, 10 Cush. 25. The publisher of a newspaper is liable either civilly or criminally, or doubtless in both ways, for defamation published in his paper though he was ignorant of the fact. *Dunn v. Hall*, *supra*; *Huff v. Bennett*, *supra*; *Commonwealth v. Morgan*, *supra*; *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51.

With regard now to the matter of recklessness, or what is perhaps the same thing in this connection, carelessness, it is laid down that an allegation of carelessness in the publication of a newspaper libel is supported by evidence of particular instances of want of care in the publication of articles in the paper by the same party. *Scripps v. Reilly*, 35 Mich. 371. So also that the circumstances may be shown concerning the preparation and publication of the particular article, so far as that may

been compelled to dismiss him for misconduct, (a) &c. &c. Anything defendant has ever said or done with reference to the

have been done in undue haste; and even the general management of the newspaper. *Ib.*; s. c. 38 Mich. 10. But so far as evidence is to be drawn from the publication of other articles in a careless manner the evidence should relate to articles published near in time to the one in question. *Ib.* And it is further declared that the size and importance, character and circulation of the newspaper may be taken into the account in determining of the degree of care to be exercised in supervising the publication of its contents. The character again of the paper may be shown irrespective of the truth or falsity of the articles printed in it by producing the paper itself. If thus judged it appear to the jury to bear a low character the jury will be permitted to find that the publication in the particular case was reckless or careless. *Ib.* On the other hand to cut down the degree of malice which the jury might otherwise be permitted to find and thus to mitigate the damages, evidence is admissible on the part of the publisher of the newspaper that he had exercised caution as to the article, had made reasonable inquiry, and had become satisfied of its truth before he published it. Such evidence will disentitle the plaintiff to recover the amount of damages he might otherwise lawfully claim. *Ib.*

But while it is not necessary that evidence of actual intent to injure the plaintiff should be produced to constitute this malice *abunde*, it is necessary that the evidence should tend to show malice upon the particular occasion. General malevolence is not sufficient; the particular wrong should have been inspired of malice, and evidence that the defendant hates men generally is deemed incompetent to show that he was actuated by malice in the case in question. *Howard v. Sexton*, 4 Comst. 157; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 89. See *Pennington v. Meeks*, 46 Mo. 217; *Barr v. Hack*, 46 Iowa, 308. Hence in this view evidence of the publication by the defend-

ant of other slanders of different import from the one in suit or upon others than the plaintiff is not admissible. *Ib.* But perhaps such evidence in connection with facts leading to the particular case might be admissible, *e.g.* to rebut a supposed privilege, especially where the other publications were also made against the plaintiff. The general conduct of the defendant towards the plaintiff exhibited on numerous occasions though not on the particular occasion might in connection with such other slanders beget a just inference of express malice.

There is however a serious objection to the admission of evidence of other slanders upon the plaintiff or upon other persons when that evidence is offered for the purpose of furnishing the basis for enhanced damages; and that is, that the jury will be very apt consciously or unconsciously to give the plaintiff damages, if they see fit to award either punitive or large compensatory damages, for those other defamatory publications, which of course are not now the subject of suit. On this ground it has often been held that the publication of other libels or slanders, that is of libels or slanders of different import from the one in suit, cannot be shown in evidence. *Frazier v. McCloskey*, 60 N.Y. 337; *Root v. Lowndes*, 6 Hill, 518; *Howard v. Sexton*, 4 Comst. 157; *Taylor v. Kneeland*, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 67; *Bodwell v. Swan*, 3 Pick. 376; *Leonard v. Pope*, 27 Mich. 145. *Contra* in Connecticut. *State v. Riggs*, 39 Conn. 498; *Swift v. Dickerman*, 31 Conn. 285 (where the other defamation had already been recovered for). See *Williams v. Miner*, 18 Conn. 464; *Mix v. Woodward*, 12 Conn. 262; *Ward v. Dick*, 47 Conn. 300; *Stearns v. Cox*, 17 Ohio, 590; *Bartow v. Brands*, 3 Green (N. J.), 248; *Brittian v. Allen*, 2 Dev. 120; *Elliott v. Boyles*, 31 Penn. St. 65; *Miller v. Kerr*, 2 McCord, 285. The jury may indeed be instructed in such cases that they must not give damages for the other defamation, that

(a) But not by evidence of a difficulty between the defendant and the plaintiff's father. *Stowell v. Beagle*, 57 Ill. 97.



plaintiff may be urged as evidence of malice. Indeed, it is very difficult to say what possible evidence is inadmissible on this

is introduced in evidence merely to show the *quo animo* of the defamation sued for; but as has often been remarked such instruction will be wasted upon the average (perhaps even upon a highly intelligent) jury. *Root v. Lowndes*, 6 Hill, 518; *Thomas v. Crowell*, 7 Johns. 264. On the other hand it has generally been held that evidence of repeating the same publication or substantially the same publication is admissible to prove express malice and enhance damages. *Robbins v. Fletcher*, 101 Mass. 115; *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237; *Baldwin v. Soule*, 6 Gray, 321; *Whittemore v. Weiss*, 33 Mich. 348; *Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292; *Leonard v. Pope*, 27 Mich. 145; *Barr v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 385; *Root v. Lowndes*, 6 Hill, 518; *Campbell v. Butts*, 3 Comst. 173; *Howard v. Sexton*, 4 Comst. 157; *Rockwell v. Brown*, 36 N. Y. 207; *Thomas v. Fischer*, 71 Ill. 576; *Stowell v. Beagle*, 79 Ill. 525; *Hatch v. Potter*, 2 Gilm. 725; *Beasley v. Meigs*, 16 Ill. 139; *Spencer v. McMasters*, *ib.* 405; *Norris v. Elliot*, 39 Cal. 72; *Severance v. Hilton*, 32 N. H. 289; *Symonds v. Carter*, *ib.* 458; *Meyer v. Bohlring*, 44 Ind. 238; *McGlennery v. Keller*, 3 Blackf. 488; *Throgmorton v. Davis*, 4 Blackf. 174; *Swift v. Dickerman*, 31 Conn. 285; *State v. Riggs*, 39 Conn. 498; *Ward v. Dick*, 47 Conn. 300. Indeed it is held that malice may be shown by other slanders conveying the same imputation upon the plaintiff though in substantially different language. *Downs v. Hawley* and *Baldwin v. Soule*, *supra*. See *Brown v. Barnes*, 39 Mich. 211; *Leonard v. Pope*, 27 Mich. 145. Of course it matters not that the defamation was repeated in a foreign tongue, if to persons who understood it. *Schuisseur v. Kreilich*, 92 Ill. 347; *Townshend, Slander*, § 392.

The distinction between the admissibility of other defamation upon the plaintiff different in character from that in suit and of the repetition of the particular defamation sued for, is put (by some of the courts at least) upon the ground that the repetition of a slander or a libel and the original offence may be treated as but one wrong, and (the repeti-

tion being used in evidence) all barred by the one judgment (*Root v. Lowndes*, 6 Hill, 518; *Frazier v. McCloskey*, 60 N. Y. 337); which obviously could not be true of the publication of substantially different defamation. But mistake should not be made concerning the ground thus taken for the distinction. It is not meant that all or any subsequent repetition upon a distinct occasion is necessarily barred by the judgment rendered concerning the original defamation. Not only in principle but upon authority, and that too of the courts of the State in which the ground referred to is taken, every repetition made at a different time affords the same cause of action as the original publication. *Woods v. Pangburn*, 75 N. Y. 495; *Rockwell v. Brown*, 36 N. Y. 207; *Swift v. Dickerman*, 31 Conn. 285. See *Fox v. Wilson*, 3 Jones, 485; *Coleman v. Playsted*, 36 Barb. 26. Only such repetition is barred as is made use of in evidence upon the particular trial; and that is treated as barred because (as we have said) the jury are permitted to do what they probably would do anyhow, to wit, give damages for the repetition with the original publication. That repetition is not of itself barred in New York by judgment upon the original act is further seen in the fact that if it occur after suit it is always ground for an action; in that case the repetition not being admissible in evidence in the suit begun before it was published. *Frazier v. McCloskey*, 60 N. Y. 337; *Keenholts v. Becker*, 3 Denio, 346; *Daly v. Byrne*, 77 N. Y. 182, 188; *Distin v. Rose*, 69 N. Y. 122. Repetition after suit is however held or treated as admissible with reference solely to the defamation sued for, even to the giving vindictive damages, the jury being duly cautioned against awarding damages for anything else, in the following cases: *Stitzell v. Reynolds*, 67 Penn. St. 54; *Hinkle v. Davenport*, 38 Iowa, 355; *Taylor v. Moran*, 4 Met. (Ky.) 127; *Saunders v. Baxter*, 6 Heisk. 369; *Norris v. Elliot*, 39 Cal. 72; *Kean v. McLaughlin*, 2 Serg. & R. 469; *Hatch v. Potter*, 7 Ill. 725; *Sonneborn v. Bernstein*, 49 Ala. 168; *Chamberlain v. Vance*, 51 Cal. 79; *Farmer*

issue. The plaintiff has to show what was in the defendant's mind at the time of publication, and of that no doubt the de-

*v. Anderson*, 33 Ala. 78; *Bodwell v. Swan*, 3 Pick. 376; *Schoonover v. Rowe*, 7 Blackf. 202; *Throgmorton v. Davis*, 4 Blackf. 174; *McGlennery v. Keller*, 3 Blackf. 488; *Williams v. Harrison*, 3 Mo. 411. See *Meyer v. Bohlfling*, 44 Ind. 238. The same rule perhaps formerly obtained in New York. *Kennedy v. Gifford*, 19 Wend. 296; *Inman v. Foster*, 8 Wend. 602, 609. But that is not the case now, as *Frazier v. McCloskey* and the other cases cited *supra* have decided. The New York courts now hold all defamatory words or language admissible upon the question of express malice, to enhance damages, which cannot at the time be made the subject *per se* of an action for slander or libel. *Frazier v. McCloskey* and *Root v. Lowndes*, *supra*; *Keenholts v. Becker*, 3 Denio, 346. Within this rule is embraced not only repetition of the same defamation before the suit, but also other and different defamation barred by limitation (*Inman v. Foster*, 8 Wend. 602; *Titus v. Sumner*, 44 N. Y. 266; *Distin v. Rose*, 69 N. Y. 122). So in other States, *Flamingham v. Boucher*, Wright, 746; *Throgmorton v. Davis*, 4 Blackf. 174; *Randall v. Holsenbuke*, 3 Hill (S. Car.), 175; *Botelar v. Ball*, 1 Md. 173; and also other publications not actionable *per se* (*Root v. Lowndes*; *Thomas v. Crosswell*, 7 Johns. 264; *Inman v. Foster*), and doubtless defamatory publications already recovered for, as in *Swift v. Dickerman*, 31 Conn. 285. The admissibility however of words barred by limitation or by action, if not of other defamatory language not actionable *per se*, is within all the mischief of admitting any evidence of repetition. *Lincoln v. Chrisman*, 10 Leigh, 338. Indeed the mischief appears greater, for if it is improper to give the jury an opportunity not unlikely to be improved of giving damages for words not sued upon, it must *a fortiori* be improper to give them an opportunity (not less likely to be embraced) of giving damages which the plaintiff has no right in any event to demand. If the question were *res nova* it would appear better to reject all evidence to be drawn either from other defamatory publications or from repetition of the one in suit, whether such other publication or repeti-

tion preceded or followed the suit in which the evidence should be offered, provided the evidence were offered to enhance the plaintiff's damages. But if the evidence were offered, *e.g.* to rebut an inference of the want of malice drawn from proof of a qualified privilege, then there would be less danger in receiving it; or at all events there would be a stronger reason, a reason almost imperative in some cases, for receiving it. See *Root v. Lowndes*, 6 Hill, 518; *Letton v. Young*, 2 Met. (Ky.) 558; *Beardsley v. Bridgman*, 17 Iowa, 290; *Schrimper v. Heilman*, 24 Iowa, 505; *McAlmont v. McClelland*, 14 Serg. & R. 359; *Scott v. Mortsinger*, 2 Blackf. 454; *Burson v. Edwards*, 1 Ind. 164. *A fortiori* to rebut the inference of a privilege for words alleged in one count, words alleged in another may be proved to show express malice. *Clark v. Brown*, 116 Mass. 504; *Robbins v. Fletcher*, 101 Mass. 115; *Baldwin v. Soule*, 6 Gray, 321; *Markham v. Russell*, 12 Allen, 573. And with regard to the question of malice irrespective of privilege, if the existence of malice has been rendered doubtful by evidence of the circumstances under which the alleged defamation was published, it is considered proper to permit the introduction of evidence of the repetition of the language upon other occasions to make clear the *animus* of the publication in suit. *Hinkle v. Davenport*, 38 Iowa, 355. But such evidence must often be of doubtful relevancy, and its admission should be narrowly scanned. The repetition when sought to prop up the plaintiff's action in such a case should be near the time of the defamatory language in suit (comp. *Scripps v. Reilly*, 35 Mich. 371, *supra*, concerning evidence of careless publication), or it should in some way be connected with it, as for example by an admission of malice. Then again evidence of repetitions within similar limits may be proved, it seems, to rebut the effect of attempts to prove mitigating circumstances. *Thomas v. Fischer*, 71 Ill. 576. In many of the cases the reported facts do not show for what purpose the evidence was introduced: *Prime v. Eastwood*, 45 Iowa, 640; *Meyer v. Bohlfling*, 44 Ind. 238; but in

defendant's acts and words on that occasion are the best evidence. But if plaintiff can prove that at any other time, before or after, defendant had any ill-feeling against him, that is some evidence

those States it is clear from cases already cited that the evidence could not have been admitted to give damages springing from the repeated defamation.

The result appears to be (1) that evidence of defamation against others is never admissible unless perhaps clearly connected with the defamation in suit; (2) that by the better authorities evidence of the publication of defamation upon the plaintiff other in substance than that sued for is not admissible, on grounds of policy; (3) that evidence of the repetition of the defamation sued for is admissible in New York to enhance the plaintiff's damages if the same cannot be the subject of another action, with proper caution to the jury no doubt against giving damages for defamatory language already barred before the suit; (4) that in other States the same evidence as that just mentioned is admissible and also evidence of repetition after suit, with proper caution to the jury not to give damages for that; (5) that other defamatory publications upon the plaintiff and repetitions of the charges in suit may be shown to rebut the inference arising from proof of a qualified privilege; (6) that the same kind of evidence may be produced within suitable limits where it is rendered doubtful by the circumstances attending the publication whether the defendant was or was not actuated by malice; (7) and that the same kind of evidence may be introduced within limits where the defendant has brought forward evidence tending to show ground of mitigation. Concerning the effect of repeating the charge in a plea of the truth, see *post*, pp. 274, 485.

Two modes of showing malice *aliunde* have now been considered, to wit, by proof of reckless publication and by proof of repetition of the defamation sued for. The other modes may be shortly disposed of. The most obvious of these is that of admission. *Saunders v. Baxter*, 6 Heisk. 369, merely mentioning that mode of proof; *Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292, where it is said that malice is admitted by the defendant's saying that the charge in suit would not have been started had the

plaintiff dealt differently with him. Express malice is shown again by evidence that the defendant exhibited forwardness and zeal in making or in spreading the publication. This follows from what has already been said concerning careless publication. See *Burt v. McBain*, 29 Mich. 260. Malice *aliunde* is also shown by evidence that the defendant knew the charge made to be false. *Atwill v. Mackintosh*, 120 Mass. 177. Also by evidence that he had no ground in reason to believe the charge true, as where he could have relied only upon what all rational men would know was not trustworthy. *Atwill v. Mackintosh*, *supra*.

But a rumor may be sufficiently trustworthy to justify mitigation. *Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co.*, 40 Mich. 251. See also *Willover v. Hill*, 72 N. Y. 36; *Hayner v. Cowden*, 27 Ohio St. 292; *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116; and *ante*, p. 162, note; *post*, p. 299.

Again malice may be shown by evidence that a plea of the truth not sustained was pleaded without any ground for the same. *Distin v. Rose*, 69 N. Y. 122; *Chamberlain v. Vance*, 51 Cal. 79. (On this point see further, *post*, p. 485.) Express malice, as the term is commonly used, may also be found in excess of imputation. *Atwill v. Mackintosh*, 120 Mass. 177; *Gott v. Pulsifer*, 122 Mass. 235. But this, as we have elsewhere said, is not malice *aliunde*; unless indeed the excess is shown (not in the words but) in the manner of the defendant or in the mode in which he effected the publication or in other external facts indicating excess. See *Saunders v. Baxter*, 6 Heisk. 369. On the other hand malice is not shown by evidence of a difficulty between the defendant and the plaintiff's father. *Stowell v. Beagle*, 57 Ill. 97.

It matters not finally that the facts offered in evidence of malice transpired at a time which would bar an action for slander or libel, the subject-matter of the suit being within the period of limitation. *Harman v. Harmon*, 61 Maine, 233; *Titus v. Sumner*, 44 N. Y. 266; *supra*.

that the ill-feeling existed also at the date of publication ; therefore all defendant's acts and deeds that point to the existence of any such ill-feeling at any date, are evidence admissible for what they are worth. In fact, whenever the state of a person's mind on a particular occasion is in issue, everything that can throw

any light on the state of his mind then is admissible,  
\* 272 although it happened on some \* other occasion.<sup>1</sup>

Thus any other words written or spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, either before or after those sued on, or even after the commencement of the action, are admissible to show the *animus* of the defendant ; and for this purpose it makes no difference whether the words tendered in evidence be themselves actionable or not, or whether they be addressed to the same party as the words sued on or to some one else.<sup>2</sup> Such other words need not be connected with or refer to the libel or slander sued on ; provided they in any way tend to show malice in defendant's mind at the time of publication.<sup>3</sup>

And not only are such other words admissible in evidence, but also all circumstances attending their publication, the mode and extent of their repetition, &c.; the more the evidence approaches proof of a systematic practice of libelling the plaintiff, the more convincing it will be.<sup>4</sup> The jury no doubt should be told, whenever the other words so tendered in evidence are in themselves actionable, that they must not give damages in respect of such other words, because they might be the subject-matter of a separate action ;<sup>5</sup> but the omission by the Judge to give such a caution will not amount to a misdirection.<sup>6</sup> But the defendant is always at liberty to prove the truth of such other words so given in evidence ; for he could not *plead* a justification

\* 273 \* as to them, as they were not set out on the record.<sup>7</sup>

It must be remembered that this evidence of former or subsequent defamation is only admissible to determine *quo animo* the words sued on

<sup>1</sup> See *R. v. Francis*, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 128 ; and *Blake v. Albion Assurance Society*, 4 C. P. D. 94 ; 48 L. J. C. P. 169 ; 27 W. R. 321 ; 40 L. T. 211.

<sup>2</sup> *Pearson v. Lemaitre*, 5 M. & Gr. 700 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 253 ; 7 Jur. 748 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 607 ; *Mead v. Daubigny*, Peake, 168.

<sup>3</sup> *Barrett v. Long*, 3 H. L. C. 395 ; 7 Ir. L. R. 439 ; 8 Ir. L. R. 331.

<sup>4</sup> *Bond v. Douglas*, 7 C. & P. 626 ; *Barrett v. Long*, 3 H. L. C. p. 414.

<sup>5</sup> *Pearson v. Lemaitre*, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Darby v. Ouseley*, 1 H. & N. 1 ; 25 L. J. Ex. 227 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 497.

<sup>7</sup> *Stuart v. Lovell*, 2 Stark. 93 ; *Warne v. Chadwell*, 2 Stark. 457.

were published ; that is, they are only admissible when *malice in fact* is in issue. If there is no question of malice, no such other libels would be admissible, unless they had immediate reference to the libel sued on ; and even then it would be better that they should be set out in the statement of claim.<sup>1</sup> For such other libels are clearly independent substantive causes of action, and should not be used unfairly to enhance the damages in this action. It has sometimes been held that even when malice is in issue other words could not be given in evidence if they themselves were actionable ;<sup>2</sup> but these cases are expressly overruled, or explained away by Tindal, C.J., in 5 M. & Gr. 719, 720. And see the remarks of Lord Ellenborough in *Rustell v. Macquister* ;<sup>3</sup> and of Jervis, C.J., in *Camfield v. Bird*.<sup>4</sup> And it is now clear law that whenever the intention of the defendant is *equivocal*, that is, whenever the question of malice or *bona fides* is properly about to be left to the jury, evidence of any previous or subsequent libel is admissible, even though it be more than six years prior to the libel sued on ; and even though a former action has been brought for the libel now tendered in evidence and damages recovered therefor.<sup>5</sup> The law is the same in America.<sup>6</sup>

So if the defendant reasserts the libel in numbers of his periodical appearing after the commencement of the action ;<sup>7</sup> or in private letters written after action ;<sup>8</sup> \* or if the de- \* 274  
fendant continues to sell copies of the libel at his shop up to two days before the trial ;<sup>9</sup> these facts are admissible as evidence of deliberate malice, though no damages can be given in respect of them. A plea of justification may be such a reassertion of the libel or slander. No doubt where the words are privileged, the mere fact that a plea of justification was put on the record is not of itself evidence of malice sufficient to go to the jury.<sup>10</sup> But if there be other circumstances suggesting

<sup>1</sup> *Finnerty v. Tipper*, 2 Camp. 72 ; *Stuart v. Lovell*, 2 Stark. 93 ; *Defries v. Davis*, 7 C. & P. 112.

<sup>2</sup> *Pearce v. Ornsby*, 1 M. & Rob. 455 ; *Symmons v. Blake*, *ib.* 477.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Camp. 49, n.      <sup>4</sup> 3 C. & Kir. 56.

<sup>5</sup> *Symmons v. Blake*, 1 M. & Rob. 477 ; *Jackson v. Adams*, 2 Scott, 599. See also *Charlter v. Barret*, Peake, 32 ; *Lee v. Huson*, Peake, 223 ; *Jackson v. Adams*, 2 Scott, 599.

<sup>6</sup> *Fowles v. Bowen*, 3 Tiffany (30 N. Y. R.), 20.

<sup>7</sup> *Chubb v. Westley*, 6 C. & P. 436.

<sup>8</sup> *Pearson v. Lemaitre*, 5 M. & Gr. 700.

<sup>9</sup> *Plunkett v. Cobbett*, 5 Esp. 136 ; *Barwell v. Adkins*, 2 Scott, N. R. 11 ; 1 M. & Gr. 807.

<sup>10</sup> *Wilson v. Robinson*, 7 Q. B. 68 ; *Caulfield v. Whitworth*, 16 W. R. 936 ; 18 L. T. 527 ; *Brooke v. Avrillon*, 42 L. J. C. P. 126.

malice, the plaintiff's counsel may also comment on the justification pleaded: and indeed, in special circumstances, as where the defendant at the trial will neither abandon the plea, nor give any evidence in support of it, thus obstinately persisting in the charge to the very last without any sufficient reason, this alone may be sufficient evidence of malice.<sup>1</sup> (a)

The mere fact that the words are now proved or admitted to be false is no evidence of malice, unless evidence be also given by the plaintiff to show that the defendant knew they were false at the time of publication.<sup>2</sup> So if a false and groundless charge be made against the plaintiff, on a privileged occasion, but without reasonable or probable cause, this may be left to the jury, if there be any other circumstance suggesting malice;<sup>3</sup> but by itself, it is no evidence of malice.<sup>4</sup> As a general rule,  
 \* 275 therefore, the plaintiff cannot give any \* evidence of the falsity of the charge, unless a justification be pleaded; for such evidence is no proof of malice, and the truth of the charge is not in issue.<sup>5</sup>

But where the parties have been living in the same house for a long time, as master and servant, and the master must have known the true character of his servant, and yet has given a false one, there the plaintiff is allowed to give general evidence of his good character, and to call other servants of the defendant

<sup>1</sup> *Warwick v. Foulkes*, 12 M. & W. 508; *Simpson v. Robinson*, 12 Q. B. 513; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73.

<sup>2</sup> *Fountain v. Boodle*, 3 Q. B. 5; *Caulfield v. Whitworth*, 16 W. R. 936; 18 L. T. 527.

<sup>3</sup> *Padmore v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 380.

<sup>4</sup> *Clark v. Molyneux*, 3 Q. B. D. (C. A.) 237.

<sup>5</sup> *Brown v. Croome*, 2 Stark. 297; *Cornwall v. Richardson*, 1 R. & M. 305; *Brine v. Bazalgette*, 3 Exch. 692; 18 L. J. Ex. 348.

(a) An unproved plea of the truth is probably at the present day nowhere in this country evidence necessarily of malice; though formerly the rule of malice prevailed. The question now turns upon the circumstances of the plea. See *Distin v. Rose*, 69 N. Y. 122; *Klinck v. Colby*, 46 N. Y. 427; *Bush v. Prosser*, 11 N. Y. 347, 350; *Hix v. Drury*, 5 Pick. 296; *Shank v. Case*, 1 Ind. 170; *Swails v. Butcher*, 2 Ind. 84; *Shirley v. Keathy*, 4 Coldw. 29; *Proctor v. Houghtaling*, 37 Mich. 41; *Ransone v. Christian*, 49 Ga.

491; *Downing v. Brown*, 3 Col. 571; *Hawver v. Hawver*, 78 Ill. 412; *Corbley v. Wilson*, 71 Ill. 209; *Farnam v. Childs*, 66 Ill. 544; *Freeman v. Tinsley*, 50 Ill. 497; *Chamberlain v. Vance*, 51 Cal. 79; *Duval v. Davey*, 32 Ohio St. 604; *Rayner v. Kinney*, 14 Ohio St. 237; *McCue v. Ferguson*, 73 Penn. St. 333; *Gorman v. Sutton*, 32 Penn. St. 247. For the earlier rule see *Braden v. Walker*, 8 Humph. 34; *Wilson v. Nations*, 5 Yerg. 211; *Pool v. Devers*, 30 Ala. 672; *Doss v. Jones*, 6 Miss. 158; *Alderman v. French*, 1 Pick. 1.

to show that no complaints of misconduct were made against the plaintiff whilst he was in defendant's service; such evidence tending to show that defendant at the time he gave plaintiff a bad character, knew that what he was writing was untrue, and that is proof positive of malice.<sup>1</sup>

*Illustrations.*

Where a master has given a servant a bad character, the circumstances under which they parted, any expressions of illwill uttered by the master then or subsequently, the fact that the master never complained of the plaintiff's misconduct whilst she was in his service, or when dismissing her would not specify the reason for her dismissal, and give her an opportunity of defending herself, together with the circumstances under which the character was given, and its exaggerated language, are each and all evidence of malice. *Kelly v. Partington*, 4 B. & Adol. 700; 2 N. & M. 460; *Jackson v. Hoperton*, 16 C. B. N. S. 829; 12 W. R. 913; 10 L. T. 529; *ante*, p. 268; *Rogers v. Sir Gervas Clifton*, 3 B. & P. 387; *ante*, p. 202.

Defendant subsequently to the slander, admitted that there had been a dispute between himself and the plaintiff prior to the slander about a sum of £20 which the plaintiff claimed from the defendant. At the trial, also, the plaintiff offered to accept an apology and a verdict for nominal damages, if defendant would withdraw his plea of justification. The defendant refused to withdraw the plea, yet did not attempt to prove it. *Held* ample evidence of malice. Damages £40. *Simpson v. Robinson*, 12 Q. B. 511; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73; 13 Jur. 187.

\* If it be proved that any material part of a charge is false [and that the defendant knew it was false at the time he made the imputation], or if the charge be made to an official who has no jurisdiction over the matter, this is evidence of malice. *Blagg v. Sturt*, 10 Q. B. 899; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39; 11 Jur. 101; 8 L. T. (Old S.) 135; as explained by *Williams, J.*, 13 C. B. 352. \* 276

It is some evidence of malice that plaintiff and defendant are rivals in trade, or that they competed together for some post, and plaintiff succeeded, and that then defendant, being disappointed, wrote the libel. See *Warman v. Hine*, 1 Jur. 820; *Smith v. Mathews*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 151.

The defendant wrote a letter to be published in the newspaper. The careful editor struck out all the more outrageous passages, and published the remainder. The defendant's manuscript was admitted in evidence, and the obliterated passages read to the jury, to show the *animus* of the defendant. *Tarpley v. Blaby*, 2 Scott, 642; 2 Bing. N. C. 437; 1 Hodges, 414.

Even though a report of judicial proceedings be correct and accurate, still if it be published from a malicious motive, whether by a newspaper reporter or any one else, the privilege is lost. *Stevens v. Sampson*, 5 Exch. D. 53; 49 L. J. Q. B. 120; 28 W. R. 87; 41 L. T. 782.

A long practice by the defendant of libelling the plaintiff is cogent evidence of malice; therefore other libels of various dates, some more than six years old, some published shortly before that sued on, are all admissible to show that the publication

<sup>1</sup> *Fountain v. Boodle*, 3 Q. B. 5; 2 G. & D. 455; *Rogers v. Sir Gervas Clifton*, 3 B. & P. 587, *ante*, p. 202.

of the culminating libel sued on was malicious and not inadvertent. *Barrett v. Long*, 3 H. L. C. 395 ; 7 Ir. L. R. 439 ; 8 Ir. L. R. 331.

A libel having appeared in a newspaper, subsequent articles in later numbers of the same newspaper, alluding to the action and affirming the truth of the prior libel, are admissible as evidence of malice. *Chubb v. Westley*, 6 C. & P. 436 ; *Barwell v. Adkins*, 1 M. & Gr. 807 ; 2 Sc. N. R. 11 ; *Mead v. Daubigny*, Peake, 168.

So if there be subsequent insertions of substantially the same libel in other newspapers. *Delegal v. Highley*, 8 C. & P. 444 ; 5 Scott, 154 ; 3 Bing. N. C. 950 ; 3 Hodges, 158.

So if the defendant persists in repeating the slander or disseminating the libel pending action. In *Pearson v. Lemaitre*, 5 M. & Gr. 700 ; 6 Scott, N. R. 607 ; 12 L. J. Q. B. 253 ; 7 Jur. 748 ; a letter was admitted which had been written subsequently to the commencement of the action, and fourteen months after the libel complained of. In *McLeod v. Wakley*, 3 C. & P. 311, Lord Tenterden admitted a paragraph published only two days before the trial.

Where the defendant verbally accused plaintiff of perjury, evidence that \* 277 \* subsequently to the slander defendant preferred an indictment against the plaintiff for perjury, which was ignored by the grand jury, was received as evidence that the slander was deliberate and malicious, although it was a fit subject for an action for malicious prosecution. *Tate v. Humphrey*, 2 Camp. 73, n. And see *Finden v. Westlake*, Moo. & Malkin, 461.

In an action for libel and slander on privileged occasions, the only evidence of malice was some vague abuse of the plaintiff, uttered by the defendant on the Saturday before the trial in a public-house at Rye. Such abuse had no reference to the slander or the libel or to the action. *Held*, that this evidence was admissible ; but that the judge should have called the attention of the jury to the vagueness of the defendant's remarks in the public-house, to the fact that they were uttered many months after the alleged slander and libel, and that therefore they were but very faint evidence that the defendant bore the plaintiff malice at the time of the publication of the alleged slander and libel. A new trial was ordered. Costs to abide the event. *Hemmings v. Gasson*, E. B. & E. 346 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 252 ; 4 Jur. N. S. 834.

## II. *Evidence of malice derived from the mode and extent of publication, the terms employed, &c.*

The plaintiff is not restricted to extrinsic evidence of malice ; he may rely on the words of the libel itself and the circumstances attending its publication ; or in the case of slander upon the exaggerated language used, on the fact that third persons were present who were not concerned in the matter, &c. &c. The fact that the defendant was mistaken in the information he gave is, as we have seen, no evidence of malice. The jury must look at the circumstances as they presented themselves to the mind of the defendant at the time of the publication ; not at what are proved at the trial to have been the true facts of the case. It is a question of *bona fides* : Did the defendant honestly believe that



he had a duty to perform in the matter, and act under a sense of that duty? That other men would not have so acted is immaterial. That shrewder men would have seen through the tangled web of facts, and have discovered that things were not as \* they seemed, is absolutely immaterial. The question is, \* 278 Did the actual defendant honestly believe what he said? not whether a reasonable man so placed would have believed it.<sup>1</sup> The defendant will not lose the privilege afforded by the occasion merely because his reasoning powers were defective.<sup>2</sup> "People believe unreasonable things *bonâ fide*," says O'Hagan, J., in *Fitzgerald v. Campbell*.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the fact that he relied upon hearsay evidence without seeking primary evidence is immaterial.<sup>4</sup> Men of business habitually act upon hearsay evidence in matters of the greatest importance. But this is supposing of course that the defendant is guilty of no laches, and does not wilfully shut his eyes to any source of information. If, indeed, there were means at hand for ascertaining the truth of the matter, of which the defendant neglects to avail himself and chooses rather to remain in ignorance when he might have obtained full information, this will be evidence of such wilful blindness as may amount to malice.

But if defendant at the time of publication knew that what he said was false, this is clear evidence of malice. A man who knowingly makes a false charge against his neighbor cannot claim privilege. It can never be his duty to circulate lies. And if the statement was made wantonly, without the defendant's knowing or caring whether it was true or false, such recklessness is considered as malicious as deliberate falsehood.<sup>5</sup> And of course if in writing or speaking on a privileged occasion, the defendant breaks out into irrelevant charges against the plaintiff, wholly \* unconnected with the occasion whence the privi- \* 279 lege is derived, such excess will be evidence of malice; or, speaking more accurately, such irrelevant charges are wholly unprivileged, and no question of actual malice arises as to them; unless defendant proves them true the verdict must go against

<sup>1</sup> Per Brett, L.J. 3 Q. B. D. 248.

<sup>2</sup> Per Cotton, L.J., *ib.*, 249.

<sup>3</sup> 15 L. T. 75.

<sup>4</sup> Per Lord Westbury in *Lister v. Perryman*, L. R. 4 H. L. 521; overruling (*Exch. Ch.*) L. R. 3 Exch. 197.

<sup>5</sup> *Clark v. Molyneux*, 3 Q. B. D. 247; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 37 L. T. 694.

him.<sup>1</sup> One part of a letter may be privileged; other parts of the same letter unprivileged.<sup>2</sup> And where the occasion is privileged, and it is clear that the defendant believed in the truth of the communication he made, and was acting under a sense of duty, the plaintiff's counsel may still rely upon the words employed, and the manner and mode of publication, as evidence of malice. A man honestly indignant may often be led away into exaggerated or unwarrantable expressions; or he may forget where and in whose presence he is speaking, or how and to whom his writing may be published. Clearly this is but faint evidence of actual malice; the jury will generally pardon a slight excess of righteous zeal. But the prior question is always: "Is there any evidence of malice to go to the jury?" It is much better for the defendant, if the judge will stop the case, as he ought to do if there be no more than a *scintilla* of evidence for them. But it is very difficult to say beforehand what will be deemed a mere *scintilla*, what more than a *scintilla*, in any given case. The same piece of evidence may make different impressions on the minds of different judges.

\* 280 \* (i.) *Where the expressions employed are exaggerated and unwarrantable; but there is no other evidence of malice.*

"It is sometimes difficult to determine when defamatory words in a letter may be considered as *by themselves* affording evidence of malice."<sup>3</sup> But the test appears to be this. Take the facts as they appeared to the defendant's mind at the time of publication; are the terms used such as the defendant might have honestly and *bonâ fide* employed under the circumstances? If so the judge should stop the case. But if the expressions employed still appear uncalled for and in excess of the occasion, though taken in connection with what was in defendant's mind at the time, then it would seem that the defendant must have spoken recklessly or angrily, without weighing his words, and that is some evidence of malice to go to the jury.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if the plaintiff's

<sup>1</sup> *Huntley v. Ward*, 6 C. B. N. S. 514; 6 Jur. N. S. 18; *Senior v. Medland*, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1039; *Picton v. Jackman*, 4 C. & P. 257; *Simmonds v. Dunne*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 358.

<sup>2</sup> *Warren v. Warren*, 1 C. M. & R. 251; 4 Tyr. 850.

<sup>3</sup> Per *Bramwell, L.J.*, 3 Q. B. D. 245.

<sup>4</sup> *Clark v. Molyneux*, 3 Q. B. D. 247.

conduct was equivocal, and might honestly and *bond fide* be supposed by the defendant to be such as he described it, the mere fact that he used strong words in so describing it, is no evidence of malice to go to the jury.<sup>1</sup>

But where the language used in a libel is "much too violent for the occasion and circumstances to which it is applied;" or "utterly beyond and disproportionate to the facts;" or where improper motives are unnecessarily imputed, there is evidence of malice to go to the jury.<sup>2</sup>

And this is so especially in cases where a rumor prejudicial to the plaintiff has reached the defendant, \* which \* 281 he feels it his duty to report to those concerned, but in reporting it he does not state the rumor as it reached him, but gives an exaggerated or highly colored version of it. "*Inimici famam non ita, ut nata est, ferunt.*"<sup>3</sup> But in other cases, the tendency of the Courts is *not* to submit the language of privileged communications to too strict a scrutiny. "To hold all excess beyond the absolute exigency of the occasion to be evidence of malice would in effect greatly limit, if not altogether defeat that protection which the law throws over privileged communications."<sup>4</sup> "The particular expressions ought not to be too strictly scrutinized, provided the intention of the defendant was good."<sup>5</sup> "That the expressions are angry is not enough; the jury must go further and see that they are malicious."<sup>6</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

Defendant changed his printer, and on a privileged occasion stated in writing, as his reason for so doing, that to continue to pay the charges made by his former printer, the plaintiff, would be "to submit to what appears to have been an attempt to extort money by misrepresentation." *Held*, that these words imputing improper motives to the plaintiff were evidence of malice to go to the jury. Damages £50. *Cooke v. Wildes*, 5 E. & B. 328; 24 L. J. Q. B. 367; 1 Jur. N. S. 610; 3 C. L. R. 1090; *O'Donoghue v. Hussey*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 124.

Plaintiff sued defendant on a bond; defendant in public, but on a privileged occa-

<sup>1</sup> *Spill v. Maule*, Exch. Ch., L. R. 4 Exch. 232; 17 W. R. 805; 20 L. T. 675; 38 L. J. Ex. 138.

<sup>2</sup> *Fryer v. Kinnersley*, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 422; 33 L. J. (C. P.) 96; 12 W. R. 155; 9 L. T. 415; *Gilpin v. Fowler*, 9 Ex. 615; 23 L. J. Ex. 152; 18 Jur. 293.

<sup>3</sup> *Plaut. Persa* II. i. 23.

<sup>4</sup> Per Sir Robert Collier, L. R. 4 P. C. 508.

<sup>5</sup> Per Alderson, B., in *Woodward v. Lander*, 6 C. & P. 550. And see *Taylor v. Hawkins*, 16 Q. B. 308; *Ruckley v. Kiernan*, 7 Ir. C. L. R. 75.

<sup>6</sup> Per Tindal, C.J., in *Shipley v. Todhunter*, 7 C. & P. 680.

sion, denounced the plaintiff for attempting to extort money from him. *Held*, that the words were in excess of the occasion. *Robertson v. McDougall*, 4 Bing. 670; 1 M. & P. 692; 3 C. & P. 259. See *Tuson v. Evans*, 12 A. & E. 733, *ante*, p. 227.

While the defendant was engaged in winding up the affairs of the plaintiff's firm, of which defendant was also a creditor, the plaintiff took from the cash-box a parcel of bills to the amount of £1264. Thereupon the defendant wrote to another creditor of the firm that the conduct of the \* plaintiff "has been most disgraceful and dishonest, and the result has been to diminish materially the available assets of the estate." *Held*, that the occasion was privileged, and that, though the words were strong, they were, when taken in connection with the facts, such as might have been used honestly and *bona fide* by the defendant; for the plaintiff's conduct was equivocal, and might well be supposed by the defendant to be such as he described it: and that the judge was right in directing a verdict to be entered for the defendant, there being no other evidence of actual malice. *Spill v. Maule* (Exch. Ch.); L. R. 4 Ex. 232; 38 L. J. Ex. 138; 17 W. R. 805; 20 L. T. 675.

The defendant tendered to Brown at Crickhowell two £1 notes on the plaintiffs' bank; which Brown returned to him saying, there was a run upon that bank, and he would rather have gold. The defendant the very next day went into Brecon and told two or three people confidentially that the plaintiffs' bank had *stopped*, and that *nobody* would take their bills. *Held*, that this exaggeration of the report was *some* evidence of malice to go to the jury. *Bromage v. Prosser*, 4 B. & Cr. 247; 6 D. & R. 296; 1 C. & P. 475. And see *Senior v. Medland*, 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1039.

A gentleman told the second master of a school that he had seen one of the under-masters of the school on *one* occasion coming home at night "under the influence of drink," and desired him to acquaint the authorities with the fact. The second master subsequently stated to the governors that it was *notorious* that the under-master came home "almost *habitually* in a state of intoxication." There was no other evidence of malice. *Held*, that the Lord Chief Justice was right in not withdrawing the case from the jury. *Hume v. Marshall*, *Times* for November 26th, 1877.

## (ii.) *As to the method of communication employed.*

If the mode and extent of a privileged publication be more injurious to the plaintiff than necessary, this may be evidence of malice in the publisher. Though the words themselves would be privileged if addressed only to the few individuals concerned, yet the privilege may be lost if the defendant deliberately chooses to publish them to the general public, or to any one who has no corresponding interest in the communication. Letters as to plaintiff's private affairs should not be published in the newspapers, however meritorious the writer's motive may be. Confidential communications should not be shouted across the street for all the world to hear.<sup>1</sup> \* Defamatory remarks, if written at all, should be sent in a private letter properly sealed and fastened up; not written on a postcard, or sent by telegraph;

<sup>1</sup> *Wilson v. Collins*, 5 C. & P. 373.

for two strangers at least read every telegram; many more most postcards.<sup>1</sup> There is no privilege attaching even to correct and accurate reports of public meetings.<sup>2</sup> But where printing a report is the usual and necessary method of communication between the directors and shareholders, the privilege will not be lost merely because the compositors and journeymen printers employed were not shareholders.<sup>3</sup> So with an advertisement inserted in a newspaper defamatory of the plaintiff; if such advertisement be necessary to protect the defendant's interests, or if advertising was the only way of effecting the defendant's object, and such object is a legal one, then the circumstances excuse the extensive publication. But if it was not necessary to advertise at all, or if the defendant's object could have been equally well effected by an advertisement which did not contain the words defamatory of the plaintiff, then the extent given to the announcement is evidence of malice to go to the jury.<sup>4</sup> The law is the same as to posting libellous placards;<sup>5</sup> or having a libellous notice cried by the town crier.<sup>6</sup>

\* So with a privileged oral communication, it is impor- \* 284  
tant to observe who is present at the time it is made. A  
desire should be shown to avoid all unnecessary publicity. It is true that the accidental presence of an uninterested bystander will not alone take the case out of the privilege, and there are some communications which it is wise to make in the presence of witnesses; but if it can be proved that defendant purposely chose a time for making the communication when others were by, whom he knew would act upon it, this may be *some* evidence of malice. The question for the jury in such cases is: Was the charge against the plaintiff made *bond fide*, and, if so, was it made before more persons or in stronger language than necessary?<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Williamson v. Freer*, L. R. 9 C. P. 393; 43 L. J. C. P. 161; *Whitfield v. S. E. Ry. Co.*, E. B. & E. 115; *Robinson v. Jones*, 4 L. R. Ir. 391.

<sup>2</sup> *Davison v. Duncan*, 7 E. & B. 231; 26 L. J. Q. B. 104; *Popham v. Pickburn*, 7 H. & N. 897; 31 L. J. Ex. 133; *Purcell v. Sowler*, 2 C. P. D. 215; 46 L. J. C. P. 308; 25 W. R. 362; 36 L. T. 416.

<sup>3</sup> *Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262.

<sup>4</sup> *Brown v. Croome*, 2 Stark. 297; and *Lay v. Lawson*, 4 A. & E. 795; overruling, or at least explaining, *Delany v. Jones*, 4 Esp. 191.

<sup>5</sup> *Cheese v. Scales*, 10 M. & W. 488.

<sup>6</sup> *Woodard v. Dowsing*, 2 Man. & Ry. 74.

<sup>7</sup> *Padmore v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 380; *Fowler and wife v. Homer*, 3 Camp. 294.

*Illustrations.*

The defendant in a petition to the House of Commons charged the plaintiff with extortion and oppression in his office of vicar-general to the Bishop of Lincoln. Copies of the petition were printed and delivered to the members of the committee appointed by the House to hear and examine grievances, in accordance with the usual order of proceeding in the House. No copy was delivered to any one not a member of Parliament. *Held*, that the petition was privileged, although the matter contained in it was false and scandalous; and so were all the printed copies: for, though the printing was a publication to the printers and compositors, still it was the usual course of proceeding in Parliament; and it was not so great a publication as to have so many copies transcribed by several clerks. *Lake v. King*, 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 181; Sid. 414; 1 Mod. 58. See *Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., Limited*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498, *ante*, p. 242.

If libellous matter, which would have been privileged if sent in a sealed letter, be transmitted unnecessarily by telegraph, the privilege is thereby lost. *Williamson v. Freer*, L. R. 9 C. P. 393; 43 L. J. C. P. 161; 22 W. R. 878; 30 L. T. 332.

An Irish Court will take judicial notice of the nature of a postcard, and will presume that others besides the person to whom it is addressed will read what is written thereon. *Robinson v. Jones*, 4 L. R. Ir. 391.

\* 285      \* Defendant having lost certain bills of exchange, published a handbill, offering a reward for their recovery, and adding that he believed they had been embezzled by his clerk. His clerk at that time still attended regularly at his office. *Held*, that the concluding words of the handbill were quite unnecessary to defendant's object, and were a gratuitous libel on the plaintiff. Damages £200. *Finden v. Westlake, Moo. & Malk.* 461.

The justices were about to swear in the plaintiff as a paid constable, when defendant, a parishioner, came forward and stated that the plaintiff was an improper person to be a constable. *Held*, that the fact that several other persons besides the justices were present, as usual, did not destroy the privilege attaching to such *bond fide* remark. *Kershaw v. Bailey*, 1 Ex. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129.

Where a master about to dismiss his servant for dishonesty calls in a friend to hear what passes, the presence of such third party will not destroy the privilege. *Taylor v. Hawkins*, 16 Q. B. 308; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313; 15 Jur. 746.

Where a master discharged his footman and cook, and they asked him his reason for doing so, and he told the footman, in the absence of the cook, that "he and the cook had been robbing him," and told the cook in the absence of the footman that he had discharged her "because she and the footman had been robbing him." *Held*, that these were privileged communications as respected the absent parties, as well as those to whom they were respectively made. *Manby v. Witt*, 18 C. B. 544; 25 L. J. C. P. 294; 2 Jur. N. S. 1004; *Eastnead v. Witt, ib.*

That defendant caused the libel to be industriously circulated is evidence of malice. *Gathercole v. Miall*, 15 M. & W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337.

A shareholder in a railway company himself invited reporters for the press to attend a meeting of the shareholders which he had summoned, and at which he made an attack against one of the directors. *Held*, that the privilege was lost thereby. *Parsons v. Surgey*, 4 F. & F. 247. And see *Davis v. Cutbush and others*, 1 F. & F. 487.

Defendant accused the plaintiff, in the presence of a third person, of stealing his wife's brooch; plaintiff wished to be searched; defendant repeated the accusation to two women, who searched the plaintiff and found nothing. Subsequently it was dis-

covered that defendant's wife had left the brooch at a friend's house. *Held*, that the mere publication to the two women did not destroy the privilege attaching to charges, if made *bonâ fide*; but that all the circumstances should have been left to the jury. *Padmore v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 380; 4 Jur. 458; 3 P. & D. 209. And see *Amann v. Damm*, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 W. R. 470.

\* The defendant was a customer at the plaintiff's shop, and had occasion to \* 286 complain of what he considered fraud and dishonesty in the plaintiff's conduct of his business; but instead of remonstrating quietly with him, the defendant stood outside the shop-door and spoke so loud as to be heard by every one passing down the street. The language he employed also was stronger than the occasion warranted. *Held* that there was evidence of malice to go to the jury. Damages 40s. *Oddy v. Lord Geo. Paulet*, 4 F. & F. 1009. And see *Wilson v. Collins*, 5 C. & P. 373.

The mere fact that the defendant *volunteered* the information is, when it stands alone, no evidence of malice; but if there be any other circumstances raising a presumption of malice, then it may weigh with the jury. In fact, if the judge and jury agree in thinking the defendant's interference was officious and uncalled for, the privilege is lost, and no inquiry need be made as to the existence of express malice.

In *Brooks v. Blanshard*,<sup>1</sup> Lord Lyndhurst, C.B., says, "It is not merely because a communication is confidential that it is privileged, if it is volunteered by the party making it." But in every case, whether volunteered or not, the question is, Was the communication fairly warranted by the exigency of the occasion? If so, the jury should find for the defendant, unless there be some other evidence of malice. No doubt it will often require a greater exigency to warrant the defendant in volunteering the information than in merely answering a confidential inquiry. But still in all cases where the duty to speak is clear, it is defendant's duty to go and tell the person concerned, if he does not come to the defendant. For it may well be that he has no suspicions, and will never come and inquire. But in cases where there can be any doubt as to defendant's duty to speak, there the fact that the defendant took the initiative may tell against him. Thus it is usual for a former master to give the character of a \* servant *on application*, and not before. Hence if a mas- \* 287 ter hears a discharged servant is applying for a place at M.'s house, and writes at once to M. to give the servant a bad character, the fact that the communication was uncalled for will be apt to tell against the master. M. would almost certainly have applied to the defendant for the information sooner or later;

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cr. & M. 779, 3 Tyrw. 844.

and the eagerness displayed in thus imparting it unasked will be commented on as a proof of malice, and if there be any other evidence of malice, however slight, may materially influence the verdict. But if there be no other evidence of malice, the communication is still privileged.<sup>1</sup> The presumption in favor of the defendant arising from the privileged occasion remains, till it is rebutted by evidence of express malice; and evidence merely equivocal, that is, equally consistent with malice or *bona fides*, will do nothing towards rebutting the presumption. Also, when a communication is volunteered great care should be taken as to the person to whom it is addressed. No privilege attaches to a communication unnecessarily made to a person wholly unconcerned therewith. Thus in seeking redress for a grievance be sure to invoke the aid of some one who has some kind of jurisdiction in the matter. For though a *bonâ fide* mistake as to the respective functions of various state officials may easily be made by an uneducated or even an educated man, and will not therefore of itself be evidence of malice, still a statement volunteered to some one who has no possible duty or power to remedy the abuse complained of, will be clearly "in excess of the occasion."<sup>2</sup>

The defendant, the tenant of a farm, required some repairs to be done at his house; the landlord's agent sent up two workmen, the plaintiff and Taylor. They made a bad job of it; the plaintiff undoubtedly got drunk while on the premises; and the defendant was convinced from what he heard that the plaintiff had broken open his cellar-door, and drunk his cider. Two days afterwards the defendant met the plaintiff and Taylor together, and charged the plaintiff with breaking open the cellar-door, getting drunk, and spoiling the job. He repeated this charge later in the same day to Taylor alone in the absence of the plaintiff, and also to the landlord's agent. *Held*, that the communication to the landlord's agent was clearly privileged as he was the plaintiff's employer; that the statement made to the plaintiff in Taylor's presence was also privileged, if made honestly and *bonâ fide*; and that the circumstance of its being made in the presence of a third person did not of *itself* make it unauthorized, and that it was a question to be left to the jury to determine from the circumstances, including the style and character of the language used, whether the defendant acted *bonâ fide*, or was influenced by malicious motives. But, that the statement to Taylor, in the absence of the plaintiff, was unauthorized and officious, and therefore not protected, although

<sup>1</sup> Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Fowles v. Bowen, 3 Tiffany (30 N. Y. R.), 20; and see other cases cited, *ante*, pp. 202, 7, 9.

<sup>2</sup> See Scarll v. Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250; Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25; Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 642, *ante*, p. 224.



made in the belief of its truth, if it were in point of fact false. *Toogood v. Spyryng*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 181; 4 Tyr. 582.

A lieutenant in the navy was appointed by the Government agent or superintendent on board a transport ship, the *Jupiter*. He wrote a letter to the secretary at Lloyd's, imputing misconduct and incapacity to the plaintiff, the master of the *Jupiter*. This was held altogether unprivileged; the information should have been given to the Government alone, by whom the defendant was employed. *Harwood v. Green*, 3 C. & P. 141.

## DAMAGES.

DAMAGES are of two kinds :—

- (i.) General.
- (ii.) Special.

*General Damages* are such as the law will presume to be the natural or probable consequences of the defendant's conduct.

*Special Damages* are such as the law will not *presume* to have been suffered, from the nature of the words themselves; they must therefore be specially claimed on the pleadings, and evidence of them must be given at the trial. Such damages depend upon the special circumstances of the case, upon the defendant's position, upon the conduct of third persons, &c. &c. Very probably they would not have been incurred, had the same words been spoken on another occasion, or to different hearers.

But in some cases special damage is also a necessary element in the cause of action. When on the face of them the words used by the plaintiff clearly must have injured the plaintiff's reputation, they are said to be actionable *per se*; and the plaintiff may recover a verdict for a substantial amount, without giving any evidence of actual pecuniary loss. But where the words are

not on the face of them such as the courts will presume  
\* 290 to be necessarily prejudicial to the \* plaintiff's reputation,

there evidence must be given to show that in fact some appreciable injury has in this case followed from their use. In short, where the words are not actionable *per se*, special damage must be alleged and proved, or the plaintiff will be nonsuited. The injury to the plaintiff's reputation is the gist of the action: he has to show that his character has suffered through the defendant's false assertions: and where there is no presumption in plaintiff's favor, he can only show this by giving evidence of some special damage.

It will be convenient to divide this chapter into the following heads : —

I. — General Damages.

II. — Evidence for the plaintiff in aggravation of damages : —

- (i.) Malice.
- (ii.) Extent of publication.
- (iii.) Plaintiff's good character.

III. — Evidence for the defendant in mitigation of damages : —

- (i.) Apology and amends.
- (ii.) Absence of malice.
- (iii.) Plaintiff's bad character.
- (iv.) Provocation given by the plaintiff.
- (v.) Absence of special damage.

IV. — Special Damage, where the words are not actionable *per se*.

V. — Special Damage, where the words are actionable *per se*.

VI. — Remoteness of damages.

## \* I. — GENERAL DAMAGES.

\* 291

General damages are such as the law will presume to be the natural or probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. They arise by inference of law; and need not therefore be proved by evidence. Such damages may be recovered wherever the immediate tendency of the words is to impair the plaintiff's reputation, although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted.

Such general damages will only be presumed where the words are actionable *per se*. If any special damage has also been suffered, it should be set out on the pleadings; but, should plaintiff fail in proving it at the trial, he may still of course resort to and recover general damages.<sup>1</sup> If one single issue out of many be found in favor of the plaintiff the jury must proceed to assess damages.<sup>2</sup>

The amount at which general damages are to be assessed lies almost entirely in the discretion of the jury; the courts will

<sup>1</sup> Cook v. Field, 3 Esp. 133; Smith v. Thomas, 2 Bing. N. C. 372; 2 Scott, 546; 4 Dowl. 333; 1 Hodges, 353; Brown v. Smith, 13 C. B. 596; 22 L. J. C. P. 151; 17 Jur. 807; 1 C. L. R. 4; Evans v. Harries, 1 H. & N. 251; 26 L. J. Ex. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Clement v. Lewis, 3 Brod. & B. 297; 7 Moore, 200; 3 B. & Ald. 702.

never interfere with the verdict merely because the amount is excessive. (a) A new trial will only be granted where the verdict is so large as to satisfy the Court that it was perversely in excess or the result of some gross error on a matter of principle; it must be \* shown that the jury either misconceived the case or acted under the influence of undue motives. In fact, although in theory, it is the duty of the jury to give such sum only as will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the injury he has sustained, yet, in practice, juries frequently, especially where the defendant has acted with clear and express malice, give *vindictive* damages, which are clearly meant not so much as a compensation to the plaintiff for his loss, as a punishment to the defendant for his misconduct. And it is, I think, a benefit to the community that a penalty should thus be imposed on an exhibition of spite and ill-will.<sup>1</sup> (b) So, again, where the damages awarded appear strangely small, a new trial will not be granted, unless it is clearly shown that the jury wholly omitted to take into their consideration some element of damage;<sup>2</sup> or

<sup>1</sup> See *Emblen v. Myers*, 6 H. & N. 54; 30 L. J. Exch. 71; *Bell v. Midland Ry. Co.*, 10 C. B. N. S. 287; 30 L. J. C. P. 273; 9 W. R. 612; 4 L. T. 493.

<sup>2</sup> *Phillips v. London & S. W. Ry. Co.*, 4 Q. B. D. 406; 48 L. J. Q. B. 693; 27 W. R. 797; 40 L. T. 813; (*C. A.*) 5 Q. B. D. 78; 49 L. J. Q. B. 233; 28 W. R. 10; 41 L. T. 121.

(a) See *Douglass v. Tousey*, 2 Wend. 352; *Root v. King*, 7 Cowen, 613; s. c. 4 Wend. 113; *Gabe v. McGinnis*, 68 Ind. 538; *Indianapolis Sun Co. v. Horrell*, 53 Ind. 527; *Dean v. Miller*, 66 Ind. 440; *Clarkson v. McCarty*, 5 Blackf. 574; *Saunders v. Johnson*, 6 Blackf. 50; *Gerard v. Risk*, 11 Ind. 156; *McIntire v. Young*, 6 Blackf. 496; *Alexander v. Thomas*, 25 Ind. 268; *Iseley v. Lovejoy*, 8 Blackf. 442; *Dunn v. Hall*, 1 Ind. 344; *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51; *Freeman v. Tinsley*, 50 Ill. 497; *Clear v. Reasor*, 29 Iowa, 327; *Bowe v. Rogers*, 50 Wis. 598; *Rogers v. Henry*, 32 Wis. 327.

(b) That punitive damages may be given is well settled. *Harmon v. Harmon*, 61 Maine, 233; *Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co.*, 68 Maine, 279; *Nolan v. Traber*, 49 Md. 460; *Meyer v. Bohlfling*, 44 Ind. 238; *Taber v. Hutson*, 5 Ind. 322; *Gerard v. Risk*, 11 Ind. 156; *Schmisseur v. Kreilich*, 92 Ill. 347; *Flagg v. Roberts*, 67 Ill. 485;

*Snyder v. Fulton*, 34 Md. 129; *Evening News Assoc. v. Tryon*, 42 Mich. 549; *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 10; *Scripps v. Foster*, 41 Mich. 742; *Buckley v. Knapp*, 48 Mo. 152; *Clements v. Malory*, 55 Mo. 353; *Bump v. Betts*, 23 Wend. 85; *Hubbard v. Rutledge*, 52 Miss. 581; *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116, 127; *Fowles v. Chichester*, 26 Ohio St. 9; *Barr v. Moore*, 87 Penn. St. 385; *Rogers v. Henry*, 32 Wis. 327. Many of these cases show further that punitive damages may be given if thought proper by the jury without evidence of malice beyond the words; and in *Barr v. Moore*, *supra*, it is held that the fact that an indictment may be sustained for the same defamation is not material. That is no doubt the general law. *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 10. But the rule is stated rather more narrowly in *Ransone v. Christian*, 56 Ga. 351; s. c. 49 Ga. 491. See *post*, p. 490, note.

unless the smallness of the amount shows that the jury made a compromise, and did not really try the issues submitted to them.<sup>1</sup>

The jury must assess the damages once for all: no fresh action can be brought for any subsequent damage.<sup>2</sup> They should therefore take into their consideration every consequence which the words used would "have a natural tendency" \* to \* 293 produce; but not merely problematical or eventual damages that may possibly happen, or possibly may not.<sup>3</sup> The jury also may fairly take into their consideration the rank and position in society of the plaintiff, the mode of publication, the extent of the circulation of the words complained of, the fact that the attack was entirely unprovoked, that the defendant could have easily ascertained that the charge he made was false, &c.

Even if no evidence be offered by the plaintiff as to damages, the jury are in no way bound to give *nominal* damages only; they may read the libel and give such substantial damages as will compensate the plaintiff for such defamation.<sup>4</sup> And where the Statute of Limitations is relied on as a defence; but proof is given that one single copy has been sold by the defendant to an agent of the plaintiff within the last few months; the jury are not to limit the damages to the injury which the plaintiff may be supposed to have incurred from that single publication, but may give general damages for the original dissemination of the libel.<sup>5</sup>

A general loss of business by a trader in consequence of defamation is general damage which the law presumes; but no particular instances can be gone into, unless the customers' names be given in the statement of claim, or in the particulars; for this is special damage, and must therefore be laid specially.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Falvey v. Stanford*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 54; 44 L. J. Q. B. 7; 23 W. R. 162; 31 L. T. 677; *Kelly v. Sherlock*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686, 697; 35 L. J. Q. B. 209; 12 Jur. N. S. 937; *Forsdike and wife v. Stone*, L. R. 3 C. P. 607; 37 L. J. C. P. 301; 16 W. R. 976; 18 L. T. 722.

<sup>2</sup> *Fitter v. Veal*, 12 Mod. 542; B. N. P. 7; *Gregory and another v. Williams*, 1 C. & K. 568.

<sup>3</sup> *Per De Grey, C.J.*, in *Onslow v. Horne*, 3 Wils. 188; 2 W. Bl. 753; *Bayley, B.*, in *Lumby v. Allday*, 1 C. & J. 305; 1 Tyr. 217, and see *Doyley v. Roberts*, 3 Bing. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 154.

<sup>4</sup> *Tripp v. Thomas*, 3 B. & C. 427.

<sup>5</sup> *Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer*, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10.

<sup>6</sup> *Ashley v. Harrison, Peake*, 256; 1 Esp. 48; *Delegal v. Highley*, 5 Scott, 154; 8 C. & P. 444; 3 Bing. N. C. 950.

\* 294     \* In cases of libel, every one concerned either in writing or publishing the libel, or in causing or procuring the libel to be written or published, is equally liable for all the damage consequent on that publication. They are all deemed publishers. Thus, if the libel appear in a newspaper, the proprietor, the editor, the printer, and the author, are all liable to be sued, either separately or together. And that one has been already sued is no defence to an action brought against any of the others in respect of the same libel.<sup>1</sup> Nor should the fact that other actions are pending for the same libel be taken into consideration by the jury in assessing the damages arising from the publication by the present defendant.<sup>2</sup> And there is no contribution between tortfeasors. So that the proprietor of a paper sued jointly with his careless editor or with the actual composer of the libel, cannot compel either of his co-defendants to recoup him the damages, which he has been compelled to pay the plaintiff.<sup>3</sup>

But if there be two distinct and separate publications of the same libel, a defendant who was concerned in the first publication, but wholly unconnected with the second, would not be liable for any damages which he could prove to have been the consequence of the second publication and in no way due to the first.

In cases of slander, on the other hand, the defendant is only liable for such damages as result directly from his own utterance. If another chooses to repeat what defendant has said, that is his own conscious and voluntary act, for the results of which he alone is responsible.

In former days, it was the rule that if there were several counts \* 295 on different libels or slanders, and entire damages were \* given, judgment would be arrested, and a *venire de novo* awarded, if a single count proved for any reason defective. In criminal cases the rule has always been the reverse, and the judgment stands if a single count prove good. The judges often expressed a wish that the rule in civil cases was the same as in criminal; but the authorities to the contrary were too clear and decisive.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Frescoe v. May*, 2 F. & F. 123.

<sup>2</sup> *Harrison v. Pearce*, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

<sup>3</sup> *Colburn v. Patmore*, 1 C. M. & R. 73; 4 Tyr. 677.

<sup>4</sup> *Savile v. Jardine*, 2 Hen. Bl. 531; *Holt v. Scholefield*, 6 T. R. 694; *Angle v. Alexander*, 7 Bing. 119; 1 Tyr. 9; 1 C. & J. 143; *Day v. Robinson*, 1 A. & E. 554; 4 N. & M. 884; *Pemberton v. Colls*, 10 Q. B. 461; 16 L. J. Q. B. 403; 11 Jur. 1011.

It was therefore the duty of the plaintiff's counsel formerly to endeavor to have the damages assessed on each count separately, if he had any doubt as to sufficiency of any particular count. But now declarations and counts are abolished, and I apprehend this rule does not apply to the modern statement of claim; though as yet there has been no decision on the point.

The jury in assessing damages ought not to take into consideration the question of costs. They frequently ask a judge what amount will carry costs; but it seems it is the duty of a judge not to inform them.<sup>1</sup> Though Erle, C.J., gave the jury such information in *Atthill v. Soman*, on the Norfolk Circuit,<sup>2</sup> and in *Wakelin v. Morris*.<sup>3</sup> And indeed now as the costs are practically in the discretion of the judge, it would be difficult to answer the question.<sup>4</sup>

\* II. — EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN AGGRAVATION \* 296  
OF DAMAGES.

(i.) *Malice*.

The fact that the defamation was deliberate and malicious, will of course enhance the damages. All the circumstances attending the publication may therefore be given in evidence; and any previous transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant which have any direct bearing on the subject-matter of the action, or are a necessary part of the history of the case. But it does not follow that every piece of evidence which has been declared admissible to prove malice when malice is in issue,<sup>5</sup> is also admissible in aggravation of damages when there is no question as to the defendant's motive or intent. Thus evidence may be given of antecedent or subsequent libels or slanders to show that a communication *prima facie* privileged was made maliciously;<sup>6</sup> and also when evidence is necessary to explain the meaning of language which without it appears ambiguous.<sup>7</sup> But such evidence may *not* be given where the existence of malice is undis-

<sup>1</sup> *Kelly v. Sherlock*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 686, 691; 35 L. J. Q. B. 209; 12 Jur. N. S. 937; *Wilson v. Reed* and others, 2 F. & F. 152.

<sup>2</sup> 15 L. T. 36.

<sup>3</sup> 2 F. & F. 26. And see *Grater v. Collard*, 6 Dowl. 503.

<sup>4</sup> See the next chapter, pp. 334, 6.

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter IX.

<sup>7</sup> C. III., p. 113.

<sup>6</sup> C. IX., p. 272.

puted, and the words of the libel are clear.<sup>1</sup> And when such evidence is admissible, the jury should always be cautioned to give no damages in respect of it.<sup>2</sup> But if a subsequent libel has immediate reference to the one sued on, it may be admitted as a necessary part of the *res gestæ*, if the judge considers it as bearing directly on the matter in hand.<sup>3</sup>

\* 297 \* The defendant's conduct of his case, even the language used by his counsel at the trial, may aggravate the damages.<sup>4</sup> So a plea of justification, if not proved, will enhance the damages.<sup>5</sup>

If other words, not actionable *per se*, yet highly injurious, were uttered on the same occasion as the words complained of, these other words may clearly be given in evidence as an aggravation of the actionable words, and as showing the *animus* of the defendant. "Where a wrongful act is accompanied by words of contumely and abuse, the jury are warranted in taking that into consideration, and giving retributory damages."<sup>6</sup>

And where there has been no express malice, gross negligence on the part of the proprietor of a newspaper in allowing the libel to appear in its columns, may be proved to enhance the damages.<sup>7</sup>

But in all these cases the malice proved must be that of the defendant. If two be sued, the motive of one must not be allowed to aggravate the damages against the other.<sup>8</sup> Nor should the improper motive of an agent be matter of aggravation against his principal.<sup>9</sup>

\* 298

\* (ii.) *Extent of Publication.*

The attention of the jury should be especially directed to the mode and the extent of publication. If the libel was sold to the

<sup>1</sup> *Stuart v. Lovell*, 2 Stark. 93; *Pearce v. Ornsby*, 1 M. & Rob. 455; *Symmons v. Blake*, *ib.* 477; 2 C. M. & R. 416; 4 Dowl. 263; 1 Gale, 182.

<sup>2</sup> Per Tindal, C.J., in *Pearson v. Lemaitre*, 5 M. & Gr. 719; 12 L. J. Q. B. 253.

<sup>3</sup> *Finnerty v. Tipper*, 2 Camp. 72; *May v. Brown*, 3 B. & Cr. 113; 4 D. & R. 670.

<sup>4</sup> Per Pollock, C.B., *Darby v. Ouseley*, 25 L. J. Ex. 230, 233; *Blake v. Stevens* and others, 4 F. & F. 235; 11 L. T. 543; *Risk Allah Bey v. Whitehurst*, 18 L. T. 615.

<sup>5</sup> *Simpson v. Robinson*, 12 Q. B. 511; 18 L. J. Q. B. 73; 13 Jur. 187. See *ante*, p. 274.

<sup>6</sup> Per Byles, J., 10 C. B. N. S. 308.

<sup>7</sup> *Smith v. Harrison*, 1 F. & F. 565.

<sup>8</sup> *Clark v. Newsam*, 1 Ex. 131, 139.

<sup>9</sup> *Carmichael v. Waterford and Limerick Ry. Co.*, 13 Ir. L. R. 313; *Robertson v. Wylde*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 101.



public indiscriminately, heavy damages should be given, for the defendant has put it out of his power to recall or contradict his statements, should he desire to do so.<sup>1</sup>

If the libel has appeared in a newspaper, proof that the particular number containing the libel was gratuitously circulated in the plaintiff's neighborhood, or that its sale was in any way especially pushed, will enhance the damages.<sup>2</sup> Evidence of the mode and extent of publication is admissible with a view to damages, even where the publication has been admitted on the pleadings.<sup>3</sup> (a)

### (iii.) *Plaintiff's Good Character.*

The plaintiff cannot give evidence of general good character in aggravation of damages merely, unless such character is put in issue on the pleading; or has been attacked by the cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses; for till then the plaintiff's character is presumed good.<sup>4</sup> (b) As to when such evidence is

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Denman, 9 A. & E. 149.

<sup>2</sup> Gathercole v. Miall, 15 M. & W. 319; 15 L. J. Ex. 179; 10 Jur. 337.

<sup>3</sup> Vines v. Serell, 7 C. & P. 163.

<sup>4</sup> Cornwall v. Richardson, Ry. & M. 305; Guy v. Gregory, 9 C. & P. 584, 7; Brine v. Bazalgette, 3 Ex. 692; 18 L. J. Ex. 348.

(a) See Fry v. Bennett, 4 Duer, 247, 651.

(b) Klumph v. Dunn, 66 Penn. St. 141; Chubb v. Ysell, 34 Penn. St. 114; Harding v. Brooks, 5 Pick. 244, 247; Martin v. Hooker, 7 Cold. 130; Cooper v. Francis, 37 Texas, 445; Miles v. Vanhorn, 17 Ind. 245. See Downey v. Dillon, 52 Ill. 442; Haun v. Wilson, 28 Ind. 296; Wilson v. Barnett, 45 Ind. 163. The common allegation of good character is superfluous. Pink v. Catanich, 51 Cal. 420. Evidence of character not attacked is not admissible. Shroyer v. Miller, 3 W. Va. 158; Adams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250. But the plaintiff's position in life, his wealth and influence, may be shown as evidence of the extent of the injury which he has sustained. Clements v. Maloney, 55 Mo. 353; Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152; Polston v. See, 54 Mo. 291; Fowles v. Chichester, 26 Ohio St. 9; Harding v. Brooks, 5 Pick. 244, 247; Tolleson v. Posey, 32 Ga. 372; Klumph v. Dunn, *supra*; Bechler v. Steever, 2 Whart. 313; Ben-

nett v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 24; Case v. Marks, 20 Conn. 248; Adcock v. Marsh, 8 Ired. 360; Humphries v. Parker, 52 Maine, 502; Karney v. Paisley, 13 Iowa, 89; Hosley v. Brooks, 20 Ill. 1651. On the other hand it is held that the plaintiff's poverty cannot be shown. Pool v. Devers, 30 Ala. 672. The plaintiff cannot in Alabama show that he was a minister, without a suitable averment of the fact. Gandy v. Humphries, 35 Ala. 617. The defendant's wealth and position in life may be shown for the same purpose of showing the extent of the injury inflicted. Fowles v. Chichester; Buckley v. Knapp; Polston v. See, and other cases *supra*; Lewis v. Chapman, 19 Barb. 252; Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56; Barber v. Barber, 33 Conn. 335; Karney v. Paisley, 13 Iowa, 89; Justice v. Kirlin, 17 Ind. 588; Brown v. Barnes, 39 Mich. 211. Especially when exemplary damages are to be imposed, otherwise the defendant might not be made to smart. Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292. See Alpin v. Morton, 21 Ohio

admissible under special circumstances to show that the libel was false to the knowledge of the defendant, and must therefore have been written maliciously, see *ante*, p. 275, *Fountain v. Boodle*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 3 Q. B. 5; 2 G. & D. 455.

St. 536; *Fry v. Bennett*, 4 Duer, 247, 262. See however, as holding that mere wealth is not to be considered, *Palmer v. Hoskins*, 28 Barb. 90; *Ware v. Curtledge*, 24 Ala. 622; *Morris v. Barker*, 4 Harr. (Del.) 520. But *Palmer v. Hoskins* concedes that the defendant's standing in society may be taken into account. The defendant clearly cannot show his own poverty in mitigation. *Case v. Marks*, 20 Conn. 248. The sole question is, how much injury has the plaintiff sustained? and the word of a poor man may carry as much weight as that of a rich man. The plaintiff's standing need not be averred in the declaration. *Klumph v. Dunn*, *supra*. Nor probably need the defendant's.

Of course the plaintiff may defend his character when the other party whether on a plea of the truth or in mitigation of damages assails it. All the cases *supra* agree upon this point. So too it is agreed that the defendant under proper pleadings (see *ante*, p. 177, note) may give evidence to establish the truth or to mitigate the damages; but it is not agreed what evidence is proper on behalf of the plaintiff in rebuttal. The difficulty has been to determine whether evidence of general good character is admissible to rebut particular evidence of the truth (*proof* of the truth of the charge could not of course be rebutted) or of mitigating circumstances such as credible rumors. It probably would not be urged at the present day that evidence of general *bad* character would support a plea of the truth unless the charge in question were itself of general bad character, as in the case of sweeping written defamation. *Leader v. State*, 4 Texas App. 162. Nor would bad character in a particular direction not connected with the charge support such a plea. *Fountain v. West*, 23 Iowa, 9. So on the other hand when the defendant's evidence of bad character does not touch the plaintiff's general character evidence in rebuttal that the plaintiff's general character is good is not admissible upon such a plea (the truth).

*Miles v. Vanhorn*, 17 Ind. 245; *McBee v. Fulton*, 47 Md. 403; 1 Wharton, Crim. Law, § 636 (7th ed.). See *Downey v. Dillon*, 52 Ind. 442; *Haun v. Wilson*, 28 Ind. 296. But where the evidence of the defendant touches the plaintiff's general character he may according to some of the authorities bring similar evidence in reply. *Downey v. Dillon*, *supra*; *Byrket v. Monohon*, 7 Blackf. 83; *Harding v. Brooks*, 5 Pick. 244. See *Sheehey v. Cokley*, 43 Iowa, 183. But see *Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse*, *infra*. This appears to be deemed true according to the reasoning in *Harding v. Brooks* whenever the charge is of the commission of a crime and evidence of its truth is produced; but it may well be doubted if this at least is not too broad. There can be no good foundation for such evidence as rebuttal except where the charge sought to be proved true touches the general character of the plaintiff. The evidence should be of a nature to overcome the defendant's evidence. It need hardly be said that some of the criminal offences of the law do not affect general character; and this distinction is in effect recognized in *Downey v. Dillon*, and in *Haun v. Wilson*, *supra*. General good reputation or character would go a small way towards making it improbable that the plaintiff would *e.g.* publish a libel. In the cases above mentioned the evidence of general reputation was received against a charge of perjury. See also *Sheehey v. Cokley*, 43 Iowa, 183, where it was held that evidence of general reputation for chastity was admissible to rebut evidence tending to prove a charge of whoredom. But according to the New York authorities (which are distinguished in *Sheehey v. Cokley*) evidence of the plaintiff's general good character is inadmissible in reply to evidence offered to show the truth of the charge; though it is otherwise in criminal cases. *Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse*, 2 Barb. 149; s. c. 1 Comst. 530; *Pratt v. Andrews*, 4 Comst. 493; overruling *Ruan v. Perry*, 3 Caines, 120, and *Townsend v.*

\* III. — EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANT IN MITIGATION \* 299  
OF DAMAGES.

(i.) *Apology and Amends.*

By Lord Campbell's Act,<sup>1</sup> it is enacted "that in any action for defamation it shall be lawful for the defendant (after notice in writing of his intention so to do, duly given to the plaintiff at the time of filing or delivering the plea in such action), to give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, that he made or offered an apology to the plaintiff for such defamation before the commencement of the action, or as soon afterwards as he had an opportunity of doing so, in case the action shall have been commenced before there was an opportunity of making or offering such apology." (a) And by s. 2, "that in an action for a libel contained in any public newspaper or other periodical publication, it shall be competent to the defendant to plead that such libel was inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication without actual malice, and without gross negligence, and that, before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication a full apology for the said libel, or if the newspaper or periodical publication in

<sup>1</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 1.

Groves, 3 Paige, 435. And as we have already intimated *proof* of the truth of the charge cannot be affected by evidence of good reputation however general; for although the action is for damage done to reputation it is only the reputation to which the plaintiff is entitled that the law regards. The truth is a perfect defence.

It is equally clear upon a question of mitigation that to make the plaintiff's rebutting evidence of good reputation proper the mitigating facts must themselves have touched the plaintiff's character or reputation. If the mitigating facts do not affect the plaintiff's reputation or character, as for example where they merely tend to show provocation, then the plaintiff cannot introduce the evidence in question. See *post*, p. 305, note, for a consideration of the reverse case of evidence of bad character or reputation.

(a) Retraction made as near as may be before those who heard or read the defamatory language (*Kent v. Bonzey*, 38 Maine, 435), if full and complete, may be shown in mitigation. *Hotchkiss v. Oliphant*, 2 Hill, 510; *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51. *Secus* perhaps if made after suit. *Evening News Assoc. v. Tryon*, 42 Mich. 549. A retraction may be pleaded as an accord and satisfaction. *Storey v. Wallace*, 60 Ill. 51. The mere fact that a retraction is demanded however, and fully made, does not amount to a satisfaction of damages, apart from any stipulation to that effect, even though the retraction be read over in MS. to the plaintiff and approved, especially if not given the same publicity as the original defamation. *Ib.* If retraction be made at once in the same conversation and before the same persons it may be pleaded in bar. *Trabue v. Mays*, 3 Dana, 138.

which the said libel appeared should be ordinarily published at intervals exceeding one week, had offered to publish the said apology in any newspaper or periodical publication to be selected by the plaintiff in such action; and that every such defendant shall, upon filing such plea, be at liberty to pay into court a sum of money by way of amends for the injury sustained by the publication of such libel, . . . and that to such plea to such action

it shall be competent to the plaintiff to reply generally,  
 \* 300 denying the whole of \* such plea.”<sup>1</sup> Money must be paid into Court at the time such a pleading is delivered, or it will be treated as a nullity;<sup>2</sup> though now, no doubt, on good cause shown, a master at Chambers would give a defendant leave to pay money into Court at any later time under Judicature Act Rules, Order XXX. r. 1.

If the action be remitted to a county court under s. 10 of the County Courts Act, 1867, the defendant may still avail himself of these sections by giving to the registrar five clear days before the day fixed for the hearing, notice in writing of his intention so to do, signed by himself or his solicitor.<sup>3</sup>

The payment into Court under these sections will in no way operate as an admission of liability, not even to the amount paid in, and the jury should be directed to assess the damages irrespective of the sum so paid into Court.<sup>4</sup> The apology should be full, though it need not be abject; the defendant is not bound to insert an apology dictated by the plaintiff; but it must be such as an impartial person would consider reasonably satisfactory under all the circumstances of the case.<sup>5</sup> It should be printed in type of ordinary size, and in a part of the paper where it will be seen; not hidden away among the advertisements or notices to correspondents.<sup>6</sup> The sufficiency or insufficiency of an apology is peculiarly a question for the jury.<sup>7</sup>

But wholly apart from these sections, and with or without  
 \* 301 any apology, a defendant may now, under \* Order XXX. of the Judicature Act Rules, pay money into Court in any action by way of satisfaction or amends, at any time be-

<sup>1</sup> See *Chadwick v. Herapath*, 2 C. B. 885; 16 L. J. C. P. 104; 4 D. & L. 653.

<sup>2</sup> 8 & 9 Vict. c. 75, s. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See County Court Rules, 1875, Order XX. r. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Jones v. Mackie*, L. R. 3 Ex. 1; 37 L. J. Ex. 1; 16 W. R. 109; 17 L. T. 151.

<sup>5</sup> *Risk Allah Bey v. Johnstone*, 18 L. T. 620.

<sup>6</sup> *Lafone v. Smith*, 3 H. & N. 735; 28 L. J. Ex. 33; 4 Jur. N. S. 1064.

<sup>7</sup> *Risk Allah Bey v. Johnstone*, 18 L. T. 620.

tween service of the writ, the time of delivering his defence, or by leave of a master at Chambers at any later time. If such payment be made before delivering his statement of defence, he should at once give the plaintiff notice that he has paid in such money; and in any and every case he should plead the fact of payment into Court in his statement of defence. Such payment will in no way operate as an admission of liability;<sup>1</sup> and any other defence can be pleaded at the same time, even a justification.<sup>2</sup>

*Illustrations.*

To an action for libel in a newspaper, the defendant pleaded a defence under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 2, and paid £5 into Court. The jury found the apology insufficient, and awarded the plaintiff 20s. damages. *Held* that the plaintiff was only entitled to £1, as he had not accepted the £5, and taken it out of Court. *Jones v. Mackie*, L. R. 3 Ex. 1; 37 L. J. Ex. 1; 16 W. R. 109; 17 L. T. 151. See also *Lafone v. Smith* and others, 3 H. & N. 735; 28 L. J. Ex. 33; 4 Jur. N. S. 1064; 4 H. & N. 158; 5 Jur. N. S. 127.

(ii.) *Absence of Malice.*

As a rule, unless the occasion be privileged, the motive or intention of the speaker or writer is immaterial to the right of action: the Court looks only at the words employed and their effect on the plaintiff's reputation. But in all cases, in the absence of malice, though it may not be \* a bar to the action, it may \* 302 yet have a material effect in reducing the damages. The plaintiff is still entitled to reasonable compensation for the injury he has suffered; but if the injury was unintentional, or was committed under a sense of duty, or through some honest mistake, clearly no vindictive damages should be given. (a) In every

<sup>1</sup> *Berdan v. Greenwood*, 3 Ex. D. 251; 47 L. J. Ex. 628; 26 W. R. 902; 39 L. T. 223.

<sup>2</sup> *Hawkesley v. Bradshaw* (C.A.), 5 Q. B. D. 302; 49 L. J. Q. B. 333; 28 W. R. 557; 42 L. T. 285; overruling *O'Brien v. Clement*, 15 M. & W. 435; 15 L. J. Ex. 285; 3 D. & L. 676; 10 Jur. 395; and *Barry v. McGrath*, Ir. R. 3 C. L. 576.

(a) See *Finney v. Smith*, 31 Ohio St. 529; *Stevens v. Handley, Wright*, 121; *Rearick v. Wilcox*, 81 Ill. 77. The excitement of an election cannot be taken as mitigation. *Rearick v. Wilcox*. For the liability of newspapers in such cases, see *ante*, p. 157; *Hamilton v. Eno*, 81 N. Y. 116; *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 10; *Detroit Post Co. v. McArthur*, 16 Mich.

454. The hurry incident to the preparation and publication of a daily newspaper may be considered by the jury, not as excuse or justification, but as a circumstance characterizing the libel and in fixing the damages; as where an article is brought in and inserted at the last moment before printing, due care under the circumstances being exercised. *Scripps v.*

case therefore the defendant may, in mitigation of damages, give evidence to show that he acted in good faith and with honesty of purpose, and not maliciously. He may show that the remainder of the libel not set out on the record modifies the words sued on; or that other passages in the same publication qualify them. But he may not put in passages contained in a subsequent and distinct publication, unless the words sued on are equivocal or ambiguous.<sup>1</sup> The fact that the defendant did not originate the libel, but innocently repeated it, should tell in his favor. Thus, where it appears on the face of a libel that it is founded on a statement in a certain newspaper, the defendant is entitled to show that he did in fact read such statement in that newspaper, and wrote the libel believing such statement to be true.<sup>2</sup> So, if in the libel the defendant has named A. as his informant, he may prove in mitigation that he did in fact receive such information from A. (though of course this is no defence to the action; *ante*, p. 162).<sup>3</sup> But where the libel does not, *on the face of it*,

\* 303 \* purport to be derived from any one, but is stated as of the writer's own knowledge, there evidence is wholly inadmissible to show that it was copied from a newspaper or communicated by a correspondent.<sup>4</sup> Evidence that in another action the plaintiff had already sued A. the informant and recovered heavy damages, is altogether inadmissible.<sup>5</sup> But if the defendant can show that in copying the libel from another newspaper, he was careful to omit certain passages which reflected strongly on the plaintiff, his conduct in making such omissions is admissible as showing the absence of all *animus* against the plaintiff, and

<sup>1</sup> Cook v. Hughes, R. & M. 112; Darby v. Ouseley, 1 H. & N. 1; 25 L. J. Ex. 227; 2 Jur. N. S. 497.

<sup>2</sup> R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95; Mullett v. Hulton, 4 Esp. 248.

<sup>3</sup> *Seemle*, per Gibbs, C.J., in Mills and wife v. Spencer and wife (1817), Holt, N. P. 533; East v. Chapman, M. & M. 46; 2 C. & P. 570; Charlton v. Watton, 6 C. & P. 385; Bennett v. Bennett, 6 C. & P. 588; Duncombe v. Daniell, 2 Jur. 32; 8 C. & P. 222; 1 W. W. & H. 101; cited 7 Dowl. 472; Davis v. Cutbush and others, 1 F. & F. 487.

<sup>4</sup> Talbutt v. Clark and another, 2 Moo. & Rob. 312.

<sup>5</sup> Creevy v. Carr, 7 C. & P. 64.

Reilly, 38 Mich. 10. But express malice in an employee who has written a libel cannot be used against the employer for such purpose, if he was ignorant of the publication, and not negligent. *Ib.*; Detroit Post Co.

v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447. No mitigation is to be found in the importance of the publication alone. Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116.

this necessarily involves the admissibility of the original libel copied.<sup>1</sup>

I have thus attempted to reconcile cases which are generally considered in conflict. In *Talbutt v. Clark*,<sup>2</sup> Lord Denman says:—"I know that in a case in the Common Pleas it has been held that a previous statement in another newspaper is admissible; but even that decision had been very much questioned." His Lordship probably referred to *Saunders v. Mills*.<sup>3</sup> And thereupon Mr. Pitt-Taylor, in the last edition (1878) of his *Law of Evidence*, p. 316, remarks: "However, by the subsequent recognition of *Saunders v. Mills*, in *Pearson v. Lemaitre*,<sup>4</sup> the case of *Talbutt v. Clark* would seem to be indirectly overruled." But with all deference to that learned writer, the *decision* in *Saunders v. Mills* was that evidence that many other papers besides the defendant's had also copied the statement from the *Observer* was inadmissible; evidence that defendant had copied it from the *Observer* into his own paper had been admitted apparently without question at the trial; and in allowing that evidence, Tindal, C.J., says:<sup>5</sup> "It appeared to me I had gone the full length." There is no real conflict between the *decisions* in *Saunders v. Mills* or *Pearson v. Lemaitre* and that in *Talbutt v. Clark*. I think, therefore, \* 304 that the last case must still be regarded as good law.

### *Illustrations.*

The defendant published an inaccurate report of proceedings in a court of justice, reflecting on the character of the plaintiff; any evidence to show that the defendant honestly intended to present a fair account of what took place, and had blundered through inadvertence solely, was held admissible by Coleridge, J. *Smith v. Scott*, 2 Car. & Kir. 580.

And, therefore, evidence of what really did take place at the trial is admissible; though no evidence can be given of the truth or falsehood of the statements there made. *East v. Chapman*, M. & M. 46; 2 C. & P. 570; *Vessey v. Pike*, 3 C. & P. 512.

Where a newspaper published the report of a company containing reflections on the plaintiff, their manager, Wightman, J., directed the jury that if they were satisfied such publication was made innocently, and with no desire to injure the plaintiff, they might give nominal damages only. *Davis v. Cutbush and others*, 1 F. & F. 487.

On the day of the nomination of candidates for the representation of the borough of Finsbury, the defendant published in the *Morning Post* certain facts discreditable to one of the candidates, the plaintiff, which he alleged he had heard from one Wilkinson at a meeting of the electors. *Held*, that Wilkinson was an admissible witness to prove, in mitigation of damages, that he did in fact make the statement which the defendant had published at the time and place alleged. *Duncombe v. Daniell*, 2 Jur. 32; 8 C. & P. 222; 1 W. W. & H. 101.

<sup>1</sup> *Creedy v. Carr*, 7 C. & P. 64; *Creighton v. Finlay*, Arm. Mac. & Ogle (Ir.) 385.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Moo. & Rob. 312.

<sup>3</sup> 6 Bing. 213; 3 M. & P. 520.

<sup>4</sup> 5 M. & Gr. 719.

<sup>5</sup> 6 Bing. 220.

(iii.) *Evidence of the plaintiff's bad character.*

There has been a great conflict of opinion as to the admissibility of evidence of the plaintiff's general bad character, and of rumors prejudicial to his reputation. There is no doubt as to the general rule that circumstances, which, if pleaded, would have been a bar to the action, cannot be given in evidence in mitigation of damages.<sup>1</sup> Evidence of the truth of the slander or

libel is therefore inadmissible, unless a justification is \* 305 pleaded.<sup>2</sup> \* Evidence of a rumor that the plaintiff had in fact committed the offence charged against him clearly falls short of a justification, and is moreover objectionable also as hearsay. On the other hand, the gist of the action is the injury done to the plaintiff's reputation; and if the plaintiff had no reputation to be injured, surely he cannot be entitled to substantial damages. It seems therefore that evidence of the plaintiff's *general* bad character may be given in mitigation of damages, but the defendant may not go into particulars.<sup>3</sup> (a) If, however,

<sup>1</sup> *Speck v. Phillips*, 7 Dowl. 470.

<sup>2</sup> *Underwood v. Parks*, 2 Str. 1200.

<sup>3</sup> *Williams v. Callender* (1810), Holt, N. P. 307, n.; *Mills and wife v. Spencer and wife* (1817), Holt, N. P. 533; ——— *v. Moor*, 1 M. & S. 284; *Waithman v. Weaver*, D. & R. N. P. C. 10; 11 Price, 257, n.; *Rodriguez v. Tadmire*, 2 Esp. 721; *contra*, *Jones v. Stevens*, 11 Price, 235; wherein the case of *Earl of Leicester v. Walter*, 2 Camp. 251, is denied to be law; *Snowdon v. Smith*, 1 M. & S. 286, n.; *Woolmer v. Latimer*, 1 Jur. 119; *Bracegirdle v. Bailey*, 1 F. & F. 536.

(a) The English rule does not obtain in some of the States. In Pennsylvania it is laid down that neither particular nor general reports of the truth of the charge or of other particular offences are admissible in evidence on behalf of the defendant for any purpose. *Pease v. Shippen*, 80 Penn. St. 513; *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, 53 Penn. St. 343; *Lukehart v. Byerly*, ib. 418; *Long v. Brougher*, 5 Watts, 439; *Conroe v. Conroe*, 47 Penn. St. 198, 201. See also *Hackett v. Brown*, 2 Heisk. 264; *Wilson v. Fitch*, 41 Cal. 363, 384 (where this is incorrectly said to be the general view). The plaintiff's general reputation may however under proper pleadings (the general issue alone) be assailed in Pennsylvania where the charge is against general character though in a particular direction, as where the charge is of general unchastity in distinction from a particular act of

lewdness. *Pease v. Shippen*, *Conroe v. Conroe*, and *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, *supra*; *Drown v. Allen*, 91 Penn. St. 393. In such a case the plaintiff puts his general character in the matter of the charge in issue; and his character and reputation thus far and no further may in this view be shown. *Conroe v. Conroe*. In New York while the plaintiff's character may in mitigation be shown to be bad, this can only be done by (1) such reports in the neighborhood as amount to reputation for general bad character, or (2) such facts within the defendant's own knowledge as may afford a reasonable ground of belief, actually entertained, that the plaintiff was guilty of the offence charged. *Bush v. Prosser*, 11 N. Y. 347; *Mapes v. Weeks*, 4 Wend. 659; *Root v. King*, 7 Cowen, 629; *Gilman v. Lowell*, 8 Wend. 579; *Hatfield v. Lasher*, 81 N. Y. 246. In



the plaintiff goes into the box, he can of course be cross-examined "to credit" on all the details of his previous life; but unless such details are material to the issue the defendant must take the plaintiff's answer and cannot call evidence to contradict it.

Rumors as to plaintiff's general bad character will not however

other words (1) the mere fact that reports of the bad character of the plaintiff are in circulation is not enough; the reports must amount to reputation of bad character and thus show actual loss of good repute; they must, it seems, be wide-spread and definite; (2) reports however general or facts naturally suggestive of the plaintiff's guiltiness of any particular offence charged are not admissible for any purpose unless known at the time to the defendant and reasonably believed to be true. See also in addition to the New York cases above cited *Proctor v. Houghtaling*, 37 Mich. 41; *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, 53 Penn. St. 343; *Quinn v. Scott*, 22 Minn. 456. In Illinois and in Alabama the position is broadly taken that reports of guiltiness, though general, are inadmissible in bar or in mitigation. *Strader v. Snyder*, 67 Ill. 404; *Sheehan v. Collins*, 20 Ill. 325; *Scott v. McKinnish*, 15 Ala. 662. See *Bradley v. Gibson*, 9 Ala. 406.

The English rule however very widely prevails. *Dillard v. Collins*, 25 Gratt. 343, 350; *McCurry v. McCurry*, 82 N. Car. 296; *Harding v. Brooks*, 5 Pick. 244; *Stone v. Varney*, 7 Met. 86; *Watson v. Moore*, 2 Cush. 133, 141; *Leonard v. Allen*, 11 Cush. 241; *Parkhurst v. Ketchum*, 6 Allen, 406; *Clark v. Brown*, 116 Mass. 504; *Peterson v. Morgan*, ib. 350; *Bridgman v. Hopkins*, 34 Vt. 532; *McNutt v. Young*, 8 Leigh, 542; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 81; *Bullard v. Lambert*, 40 Ala. 204; *Hadjo v. Gooden*, 13 Ala. 718; *Martin v. Martin*, 25 Ala. 201; *Ward v. State*, 28 Ala. 53; *Bailey v. Kalamazoo Pub. Co.*, 40 Mich. 251; *Brown v. Barnes*, 39 Mich. 211; *Huson v. Dale*, 19 Mich. 17; *Fowler v. Gilbert*, 38 Mich. 292; *Barr v. Hack*, 46 Iowa, 308; *Storey v. Early*, 86 Ill. 461; *Adams v. Smith*, 58 Ill. 417; *Powers v. Cary*, 64 Maine, 9; *Langton v. Hagerty*, 35 Wis. 150; *Wilson v. Noonan*, ib. 321; *Kimball v. Fernandez*, 41 Wis.

329; *Talmadge v. Baker*, 22 Wis. 625; *Henry v. Norwood*, 4 Watts, 347; *Sawyer v. Erfert*, 2 Nott & M. 511; *Buford v. McLuny*, 1 Nott & M. 268; *Lamos v. Snell*, 6 N. H. 413; *Wier v. Allen*, 51 N. H. 177; *Duval v. Davey*, 32 Ohio St. 604, overruling *Dewitt v. Greenfield*, 5 Ohio, 225. According to these authorities (1) actual bad character in the direction of the charge, such for example as would be shown by proof of the commission of other crimes of the same nature as that charged (*Kimball v. Fernandez*, *supra*), or (2) general (*i.e.*, wide-spread) reputation of bad character, such for example as the general low repute of the plaintiff for moral worth throughout the neighborhood (*Stone v. Varney*, 7 Met. 86) or general reports throughout the neighborhood that he had committed the offence charged, may be shown in mitigation of damages. And this too though there be a plea of the truth of the charge, provided such evidence is not offered in support of that plea. *Clark v. Brown*, 116 Mass. 504, 509. See *Stone v. Varney*, 7 Met. 86, 89. But evidence of particular as opposed to general or wide-spread reports is not admissible; for such would not show that the plaintiff had already lost that good reputation among his neighbors (which of course means a general good reputation) for damage done to which he sues. See especially the Massachusetts cases above cited; and see *Lamos v. Snell*, 6 N. H. 413; *Powers v. Cary*, 64 Maine, 9; *Mapes v. Weeks*, 4 Wend. 659; *Adams v. Hannon*, 3 Mo. 222; *Luther v. Skeen*, 8 Jones, 356; *Stowell v. Beagle*, 79 Ill. 525; *Storey v. Early*, 86 Ill. 461; *Sawyer v. Eifert*, 2 Nott & M. 511; *Bradley v. Gibson*, 9 Ala. 406. *Comp. Sunman v. Brewin*, 52 Ind. 140; *Leader v. State*, 4 Texas, App. 162. And the evidence, it seems, should relate to the general subject of the offence charged. See *Clark v. Brown*, 116 Mass. 504; *Wil-*

be admissible in evidence unless they be shown to have existed previously to the alleged slander or libel; for otherwise they may have been occasioned by the defendant's own publication, in which case they should rather aggravate than diminish the damages.<sup>1</sup> (a) The law on this point was much discussed in *Bell v.*

*Parke*; <sup>2</sup> and it was decided that evidence of antecedent \* 306 general reputation of plaintiff's \* bad character is admissible, and so is evidence that the plaintiff had certain vicious habits which would lead him to commit such acts as that ascribed to him in the slander. But that evidence of a general report that plaintiff had actually committed the particular offence

<sup>1</sup> *Thompson v. Nye*, 16 Q. B. 175; 20 L. J. Q. B. 85; 15 Jur. 285.

<sup>2</sup> 11 Ir. C. L. R. 413.

*son v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321; *Lambert v. Pharis*, 3 Head, 622. The question to be asked therefore is what reputation the plaintiff generally bore in the direction of the charge, or in regard to the charge itself, among those who know him at the time of the publication (see *Dufresne v. Weise*, 46 Wis. 290; *Senter v. Carr*, 15 N. H. 351; *Powers v. Presgroves*, 38 Miss. 227); and though it is often said, as we have seen, that facts cannot be treated as mitigation if they were not known to and believed by the defendant at the time of the publication (*Hatfield v. Lasher*, 81 N. Y. 246; *Bush v. Prosser*, 11 N. Y. 347; *Cooper v. Barber*, 24 Wend. 105; *Willover v. Hill*, 72 N. Y. 36; *Fitzgerald v. Stewart*, 53 Penn. St. 343; *Quinn v. Scott*, 22 Minn. 456; *Gorton v. Keeler*, 51 Barb. 475; *Proctor v. Houghtaling*, 37 Mich. 41), it is apprehended that this should be true only of facts relating to the plaintiff's guilt (though insufficient as evidence thereof in bar of the action) and not of matters affecting the plaintiff's general reputation or character. If the plaintiff's character was in fact in low repute among his acquaintances at large, he suffers less from the publication than he would if this were not the case; and the defendant's knowledge of his reputation can make no difference even if his belief in the truth of the language be necessary. If it be said that unless the defendant can show that he knew of the existence of the reports and believed them (*Bush v. Prosser*

and *Fitzpatrick v. Stewart*, *supra*) he does not cut down the malice of the words, the answer is that a man with a tarnished reputation ought not to recover punitive damages, and that the evidence in question is offered to prevent him from recovering them. A man who has utterly lost his reputation, though unjustly, has no right to substantial damages, if to any, against one who has not caused or contributed to that loss; and if he is not entitled to substantial damages it is difficult to see how he can be entitled to punitive damages. It is hardly to be supposed that the distinction between civil and criminal process and between slander and libel can now be narrowed everywhere to such an extent as would follow from the doctrine in question.

It may be added in conclusion that by statute in some of the States matters in mitigation must be pleaded. *Willover v. Hill*, 72 N. Y. 36; *Spooner v. Keeler*, 51 N. Y. 527; *Langton v. Hagerty*, 35 Wis. 150. In the absence of statute however, as we have seen, such may be shown under the general issue. In Indiana it is not necessary but it is allowable to plead matter of mitigation. *O'Conner v. O'Conner*, 27 Ind. 69. And mitigating facts may there be given under a plea in justification. *Id.*

(a) *Rodgers v. Kline*, 56 Miss. 808; *Stone v. Varney*, 7 Met. 86, 89. All the cases proceed upon such an assumption.

charged by the slander was not admissible. The following Nisi Prius decisions must therefore be considered bad law.<sup>1</sup>

As to justifying part of the words complained of in mitigation of damages, see *ante*, p. 176.

### *Illustrations.*

One officer charged another with stealing a watch; a third officer in the same regiment was called to state that he had previously heard rumors that the plaintiff had stolen that watch, but his evidence was rejected: and the Court held that such rejection was right (Pigot, C.B., dissenting). *Bell v. Parke* (1860), 11 Ir. C. L. R. 413.

The Lord Chief Baron is reported to have given a similar ruling in *Dobede v. Fisher*, *Times* for July 29th, 1880.

#### (iv.) *Plaintiff's previous conduct in provoking the publication.*

In some cases, so we have seen, the plaintiff's conduct towards the defendant may be a bar to the action. If the plaintiff has attacked the defendant in the newspaper, and the defendant replies without undue personality, and without wandering into extraneous matters, then such reply, if made honestly in self-defence, is privileged.<sup>2</sup> But where the facts do not amount to such a defence, they may still tend to mitigate the damages. (a) "There can be no set-off of one libel or misconduct against another; but in estimating \* the compensation for the plaintiff's in- \* 307 jured feelings, the jury might fairly consider the plaintiff's

<sup>1</sup> *Earl of Leicester v. Walter*, 2 Camp. 251; *Richards v. Richards*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 557; *Chalmers v. Shackell and others*, 6 C. & P. 475; and *Knobell v. Fuller*, Peake's Add. Cas. 139.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 228.

(a) That provocation by the *plaintiff* may be shown in mitigation is well settled. *Miller v. Johnson*, 79 Ill. 58; *Thomas v. Fischer*, 71 Ill. 576; *Freeman v. Tinsley*, 50 Ill. 497; *Hasley v. Brooks*, 20 Ill. 116; *Flagg v. Roberts*, 67 Ill. 485; *Miles v. Harrington*, 8 Kans. 425; *Bourland v. Eidson*, 8 Gratt. 27; *Duncan v. Brown*, 15 B. Mon. 186; *Underhill v. Taylor*, 2 Barb. 348; *Beardsley v. Maynard*, 4 Wend. 336; s. c. 7 Wend. 560; *Child v. Homer*, 13 Pick. 503; *Ranger v. Goodrich*, 17 Wis. 78; *Powers v. Presgroves*, 38 Miss. 227; *Jauch v. Jauch*, 50 Ind. 135; *McClintock v. Crick*, 4 Iowa, 453; *Pugh v. McCarty*, 40 Ga. 444; *Hackett v. Brown*, 2 Heisk. 264; *Whittemore v. Weiss*, 33

Mich. 348. But the cases show that it is essential that the defendant should have been provoked by the plaintiff. And the provocation should be direct and immediate. *Sheffill v. Van Deusen*, 15 Gray, 485. Thus it is not enough that the plaintiff had published an independent libel of the defendant. *Child v. Homer*, 13 Pick. 503. Nor that there existed an inveterate hostility between the parties. *Porter v. Henderson*, 11 Mich. 20; *Craig v. Catlet*, 5 Dana, 323; *Goodbread v. Leadbetter*, 1 Dev. & B. 12. Though as evidence of bad character it may be shown in an action for libel that the plaintiff is a common libeller. *Maynard v. Beardsley*, 7 Wend. 560.

conduct, and the degree of respect he has shown for the feelings of others.”<sup>1</sup> Thus evidence is admissible in mitigation of damages to show that plaintiff had previously himself published a libel, provided it be also shown that this libel had come to the defendant’s knowledge and occasioned the publication of the libel now sued on.<sup>2</sup> And under the new system of pleading inaugurated by the Judicature Act such previous libels may be made the matter of a counter-claim, even though not immediately connected with the words on which plaintiff is suing; and the defendant may thus not only reduce the amount of damages due to the plaintiff, but even overtop the plaintiff’s claim and recover judgment for the balance.<sup>3</sup> And where there is no counter-claim, the previous conduct of the plaintiff may be ground for applying to the Judge to deprive him of costs. In *Harnett v. Vise and wife*,<sup>4</sup> Huddleston, B., deprived a plaintiff of his costs on this ground; although the jury found that the plea of justification was not proved, and had given him damages £10. And this decision of the learned Baron was upheld both in the Exchequer Division and in the Court of Appeal.

\* 308

\* (v.) *Absence of Special Damage.*

When any special damage is alleged, (a) the *onus* of proving it lies of course on the plaintiff. The defendant may call evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s proof. He may either dispute that the special damage has occurred at all, or he may argue as a point of law that it is too remote;<sup>5</sup> or he may call evidence to show that it was not the consequence of the defendant’s words, but of some other cause. Thus if two newspapers have made each a distinct charge against the plaintiff, and subsequently the plain-

<sup>1</sup> Per Blackburn, J., in *Kelly v. Sherlock*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 698; 35 L. J. Q. B. 213; 12 Jur. N. S. 937.

<sup>2</sup> *Finnerty v. Tipper*, 2 Camp. 76; *Antony Pasquin’s Case*, cited 1 Camp. 351; *Tarpley v. Blabey*, 2 Bing. N. C. 437; 2 Scott, 642; *May v. Brown*, 3 B. & C. 113; 4 D. & R. 670; *Watts v. Fraser*, 7 A. & E. 223; 7 C. & P. 369; 1 M. & Rob. 449; 2 N. & P. 157; *Wakley v. Johnson*, Ry. & M. 422.

<sup>3</sup> *Quin v. Hession*, 40 L. T. 70; 4 L. R. Ir. 35.

<sup>4</sup> 5 Ex. D. 307; 29 W. R. 7.

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, p. 321.

(a) It must be alleged, to be proved. 374; *Cook v. Cook*, 100 Mass. 194; *Bas-sell v. Elmore*, 48 N. Y. 561; *Geisler v. Carpenter v. Bailey*, 56 N. H. 283; s. c. 53 N. H. 590; *Hilton v. Muzzy*, 30 Vt. Brown, 6 Neb. 254.

tiff finds his business falling off, whichever paper he sues may endeavor to show that the loss of trade is due to the charge made against the plaintiff by the other paper. But, generally speaking, a defendant does not call evidence to rebut the special damage, but relies upon the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses.

#### IV. SPECIAL DAMAGE WHERE THE WORDS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE *per se*.

*Special Damage* is such a loss as the law will not *presume* to have followed from the defendant's words ; but which depends, in part at least, on the special circumstances of the case. It must therefore be proved by evidence at the trial ; and should always be explicitly claimed on the pleadings. In the vast majority of cases proof of special damage is not essential to the right of action. Thus it is not necessary to prove special damage —

(i.) In any action of libel.

(ii.) Wherever the words spoken impute to the plaintiff the commission of any indictable offence.

\* (iii.) Or a contagious disease.

\* 309

(iv.) Or are spoken of him in the way of his profession or trade ; or disparage him in an office of public trust.

Such words from their natural and immediate tendency to produce injury, the law adjudges to be defamatory, although no special loss or damage is, or can be, proved. Though even in these cases, if any special damage has in fact accrued, the plaintiff may of course prove it to aggravate the damages.

But in all cases not included in any of the above four classes, proof of special damage is essential to the cause of action ; for the words are not actionable *per se*. The words do not, apparently and upon the face of them, import such defamation as will of course be injurious ; it is necessary, therefore, that the plaintiff should aver some particular damage to have happened. And to maintain the action the damage thus averred must be the natural, immediate, and legal consequence of the words which the defendant uttered. It is not enough that his words have in fact produced such and such damage, unless it can reasonably be presumed that the defendant, when he uttered the words, either knew, or ought to have known, that such damage would

result. Such damage being essential to the action, must have accrued before action brought.

The special damage necessary to support an action for defamation where the words are not actionable in themselves, must be the loss of some material temporal advantage. (a) The loss of a marriage, of employment, of custom, of profits, and even of gratuitous entertainment and hospitality, will constitute special damage; but not mere annoyance or loss of peace of mind, nor even physical illness occasioned by the slanderous report. (b)

Such loss may be either the loss of some right or position already acquired, or the loss of some future benefit or advantage the acquisition of which is prevented. Thus if the defendant causes a servant to lose his situation, or prevents his getting one, by maliciously giving a false character; in either case an action will lie, though the words be not actionable *per se*. So if he prevent either a new comer from going to the plaintiff's shop, or an old customer from continuing to deal there. But in either case, and in every other, it must be clearly proved that the loss is the direct result of defendant's words.

### *Illustrations.*

Anthony Elcock, citizen and mercer of London, of the substance and value of £3000, sought Anne Davis in marriage; but the defendant *premissorum haud ignarus*, accused her of incontinency, wherefore the said Anthony wholly refused to marry the said Anne. *Held*, sufficient special damage. Verdict for the plaintiff for 200 marks. *Davis v. Gardiner*, 4 Rep. 16; 2 Salk. 294; 1 Roll. Abr. 38.

So if a man lose a marriage. *Matthew v. Crass*, Cro. Jac. 323.

In consequence of defendant's slandering the plaintiff, a dissenting minister, his congregation diminished: but this was held insufficient, as it did not appear that the plaintiff lost any emolument thereby. *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 8 C. B. 293; 14 Jur. 87. But see *Hartley v. Herring*, 8 T. R. 130.

"If a divine is to be presented to a benefice, and one to defeat him of it, says to the patron 'that he is a heretic, or a bastard, or that he is excommunicated,' by which the patron refuses to present him (as he well might if the imputations were true), and he loses his preferment, he shall have his action on the case for those slanders tending to such end." *Davis v. Gardiner*, 4 Rep. 17.

Loss of a situation will constitute special damage. *Martin v. Strong*, 5 A. & E. 535; 1 N. & P. 29; 2 H. & W. 336.

Or of a chaplaincy. *Payne v. Beauwmorris*, 1 Liv. 248.

(a) It is not enough to allege that the plaintiff has been put to great cost and expense and that *e.g.* he "has had to pay \$100 costs." *Cook v. Cook*, 100 Mass. 194. Or that he has lost the society of his relatives and friends. *Bassell v. Elmore*, 48 N. Y. 561; *Geisler v. Brown*, 6 Neb. 254.

(b) See *post*, p. 313.

If, however, the dismissal from service be colorable only, the master intending to take the plaintiff back again, as soon as the action is over: this is no evidence that the plaintiff's reputation has been impaired, but rather the contrary. If, therefore, no other special damage can be proved, the plaintiff should be nonsuited. *Coward v. Wellington*, 7 C. & P. 531.

If a man be refused employment through defendant's slander, this is sufficient special damage. *Sterry v. Foreman*, 2 Car. & P. 592.

\* So, if the agent of a certain firm going to deal with the plaintiff be \* 311 stopped and dissuaded by the defendant, and this, although such firm subsequently became bankrupt, and paid but 12s. 6d. in the £, so that had plaintiff obtained the order he would have lost money by it. *Storey v. Challands*, 8 C. & P. 234.

The loss of the hospitality of friends gratuitously afforded is sufficient special damage. *Moore v. Meagher*, 1 Taunt. 39; 3 Smith, 135; *Davies and wife v. Solomon*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; 20 W. R. 167; 25 L. T. 799.

So is the loss of any gratuity or present, if it be clear that the slander alone prevented its receipt. *Bracebridge v. Watson*, Lilly, Entr. 61; *Hartley v. Herring*, 8 T. R. 130.

In consequence of defendant's words, a friend who had previously voluntarily promised to give the plaintiff, a married woman, money to enable her to join her husband in Australia, whither he had emigrated three years before, refused to do so. *Held*, sufficient special damage. *Corcoran and wife v. Corcoran*, 7 Ir. C. L. R. 272.

Where a vicar in open church falsely declared that the plaintiff, one of his parishioners, was excommunicated, and refused to celebrate divine service till the plaintiff departed out of the church, whereby the plaintiff was compelled to quit the church, and was scandalized, and was hindered of hearing divine service for a long time; it was *held* that an action lay. *Barnabas v. Traunter* (1641), 1 Vin. Abr. 396.

But a mere apprehension of future loss cannot constitute special damage. "I know of no case where ever an action for words was grounded upon *eventual* damages which may possibly happen to a man in a future situation," says De Grey, C.J., in *Ouslow v. Horne*, 3 Wils. 188; 2 W. Bl. 753. And see *Doyley v. Roberts*, 3 Bing. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 154.

The defendant said of a married man that he had had two bastards: "by reason of which words discord arose between him and his wife, and they were likely to have been divorced." *Held*, that this constituted no special damage. *Barmund's Case*, Cro. Jac. 473.

But where the defendant advertised in *Hue and Cry* that the plaintiff had been guilty of fraud, and offered a reward for his apprehension, and the plaintiff immediately sued on the libel, and after action brought was twice arrested in consequence of it; he was allowed to give evidence of these two arrests at the trial, not indeed as special damage, for they happened after action brought, but in order to show the injurious nature of the libel, and that the plaintiff was at time of action brought in serious danger of being arrested. *Goslin v. Corry*, 7 M. & Gr. 342; 8 Scott, N. R. 21. And see *Ingram v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 9 C. & P. 326; 4 Jur. 151.

\* So where the words are not actionable *per se*, and no pecuniary damage \* 312 has followed, no compensation can be given for outraged feelings, nor for sickness induced by such mental distress, even though followed by a doctor's bill. *Allsop v. Allsop*, 5 H. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; 6 Jur. N. S. 433; 8 W. R. 449; 36 L. T. (Old S.) 290; *Lynch v. Knight and wife*, 9 H. L. C. 577; 8 Jur. N. S. 724; 5 L. T. 291.

Nor will the fact that plaintiff has been expelled from a religious society of which she was a member, constitute special damage. *Roberts et ux. v. Roberts*, 5 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Jur. N. S. 1027; 12 W. R. 909; 10 L. T. 602.

Loss of the *consortium* of a husband is special damage. Per Lords Campbell and Cranworth in *Lynch v. Knight* and wife, 9 H. L. C. at p. 589; but not merely of the society of friends and neighbors. *Medhurst v. Balam*, cited in 1 Siderfin 397. *Barnes v. Prudlin or Bruddel*, 1 Lev. 261; 1 Sid. 396; 1 Vent. 4; 2 Keb. 451.

### The law is the same in America.

The refusal of civil entertainment at a public-house was held sufficient special damage. *Olmsted v. Miller*, 1 Wend. 506.

So was the fact that the plaintiff was turned away from the house of her uncle, where she had previously been a welcome visitor, and charged not to return till she had cleared up her character. *Williams v. Hill*, 19 Wend. 305.

So was the circumstance that persons who had been in the habit of so doing refused any longer to provide food and clothing for the plaintiff. *Beach v. Ranney*, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 309.

The defendant told Neiper that the plaintiff committed adultery with Mrs. Fuller. Neiper had married Mrs. Fuller's sister and was an intimate friend of the plaintiff's. Neiper thought it his duty to tell the plaintiff what people were saying of him. Plaintiff, who was hoeing at the time, turned pale, felt bad, flung down his hoe, and left the field: lost his appetite, turned melancholy, could not work as he used to do, and had to hire more help. *Held*, that such mental distress and physical illness were not sufficient to constitute special damage; for they did not result from any injury to the plaintiff's reputation, which had affected the conduct of others towards him. The Court said, in giving judgment, "It would be highly impolitic to hold all language, wounding the feelings and affecting unfavorably the health and ability to labor, of another, a ground of action: for that would be to make the right of action depend often upon whether the sensibilities of a person spoken of are easily excited or otherwise;

\* 313 his strength of mind \* to disregard abusive insulting remarks concerning him, and his physical strength and ability to bear them. Words which would make hardly an impression on most persons, and would be thought by them, and should be by all, undeserving of notice, might be exceedingly painful to some, occasioning sickness and an interruption of ability to attend to their ordinary avocations." *Terwilliger v. Wands*, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.), 54, overruling *Bradt v. Towsley*, 13 Wend. 253, and *Fuller v. Fenner*, 16 Barb. 333. (a)

So, too, a husband cannot maintain an action for the loss of his wife's services caused by illness or mental depression resulting from defamatory words not actionable *per se* being spoken of her by the defendant, for the wife, if *sole*, could have maintained no action. "The facility with which a right to damages could be established by pretended illness where none exists, constitutes a serious objection to such an action as this." Per Denio, J., in *Wilson v. Goit*, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.), 445.

(a) *Adams v. Smith*, 58 Ill. 417. But it is said to be otherwise when the words are actionable *per se* and have been legally published. *Ib.*; *Swift v. Dickerman*, 31 Conn. 294; *Dufort v. Abodie*, 23 La. An. 280; *Carpenter v. Bailey*, 56 N. H. 283; s. c. 53 N. H. 590; *Scripps v. Reilly*, 38 Mich. 10, 20, in which the right to damages for mental distress is still further re-

stricted; *Wilson v. Noonan*, 35 Wis. 321; *Rogers v. Henry*, 32 Wis. 327, 334. See also *Burt v. McBain*, 29 Mich. 260; *Phillips v. Hoyle*, 4 Gray, 568; *Abrahams v. Kidney*, 104 Mass. 222. The distinction just mentioned however has little to commend it. *Shafer v. Abalt*, 48 Md. 171; *Prime v. Eastwood*, 45 Iowa, 640; *Hoar v. Ward*, 47 Vt. 657.



Special damage must always be explicitly claimed on the pleadings and strictly proved at the trial. And where the words are not actionable *per se*, the plaintiff will be confined to the special damage laid; he must either prove that, or be nonsuited; he cannot fall back on general damages, as he can where the words are actionable *per se*. For there are no general damages to fall back on; *ex hypothesi* the words are such as the law will not presume injurious. And so, too, where the special damage is proved, the jury should strictly find a verdict for the amount of such special damage merely, for the sum that the plaintiff has proved he has lost and no more. The jury ought not to compensate the plaintiff for pain, mental anxiety, or a general loss of reputation; but should confine their assessment to the actual pecuniary loss that has been alleged and proved.<sup>1</sup> This rule, however, is frequently neglected in practice; and as soon as *any* special damage is proved, the words are treated as though they were actionable *per se*.

To allege generally that in consequence of the defendant's \* words the plaintiff has lost a large sum of money, or \* 314 that his practice or business has declined, is not a sufficiently precise allegation of special damage. The names of the persons who have ceased to employ the plaintiff, or would have commenced to deal with him, had not the defendant dissuaded them, must be set out in the statement of claim, or in the particulars; and they must themselves be called as witnesses at the trial to state their reason for not dealing with the plaintiff. Else it will not be clear that their withholding their custom was in consequence of defendant's words; it might well be due to some other cause.<sup>2</sup> Loss of custom or diminution of profits, when not specifically alleged, and the customers' names assigned, is general, not special, damage, and can only therefore be proved where the words are actionable *per se*.<sup>3</sup> If the plaintiff cannot give the names of those who have ceased to deal with him, or cannot prove that their so ceasing is due to the defendant's words, he must be nonsuited; although there has in fact been a falling off in his business.

<sup>1</sup> Dixon v. Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Kenyon, C.J., in Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48; Peake, 256; per Best, C.J., in Tilk v. Parsons, 2 C. & P. 201.

<sup>3</sup> Harrison v. Pearce, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

The loss to the plaintiff must be directly connected with the defendant's utterance of the words. If others repeat his words, with or without additions of their own, the defendant is not liable for the consequences of what they say. And it is only by such repetitions that a general loss of business can be brought about. It is true that many traders, such as innkeepers, tobacconists, and others, seldom know the names of their customers, who are often chance passers-by. It might therefore be urged that such traders should never be required to state the names of particular customers, whether

the words be actionable *per se* or not. This is the law in Victoria \* 315 apparently.<sup>1</sup> And in *Riding v. Smith*,<sup>2</sup> \* Kelly, C.B., after stating with great clearness that "the words would not be actionable as slander without proof of special damage, which must be established not merely by general evidence that the business has fallen off, but by showing that particular persons have ceased to deal with the plaintiff,"—yet held that such evidence was properly received in the case before him, which he deemed an action on the case, and not an action of defamation. It is clear, therefore, that the late Lord Chief Baron did not mean to lay down any general rule, and that *Riding v. Smith* is not to be regarded as an authority in actions of defamation, but merely as an exceptional case depending upon its own peculiar facts. In a very similar case,<sup>3</sup> Lord Coleridge, C.J., refused to follow *Riding v. Smith* on this point; as being contrary to all previous decisions. In *Clarke v. Morgan*,<sup>4</sup> Grove, J., points out the anomaly which would follow if the rule in *Riding v. Smith* were universally carried out. The defendant has spoken to A. words which are not actionable *per se*; *i.e.*, words of such a character that the law will not presume that they can injure the plaintiff. A. repeats them to B., B. to C., C. to D., and so on, till at last the plaintiff's business declines. If B., C., and D. were called, they would state that they never heard a word from the defendant on the matter; and then it is clear law that the jury could only award the plaintiff damages for the loss of A.'s custom, A. being the one man to whom defendant spoke.<sup>5</sup> And yet, by merely keeping them out of the box, the plaintiff would (if *Riding v. Smith* be adopted as a general authority in cases of slander) illegally recover damages for the loss of the custom of B., C., D., E., and F. Lindley, J., in the same case<sup>6</sup> expresses his opinion that the decisions in *Ward v. Weeks* and *Parkins v. Scott* have in no way been overruled by *Riding v. Smith* and *Evans v. Harries*. As a rule, words

<sup>1</sup> See *Brady v. Youlden*, *post*, p. 317.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500.

<sup>3</sup> *Kent v. Stone*, Bristol Summer Assizes, 1880.

<sup>4</sup> 38 L. T. 354.

<sup>5</sup> *Dixon v. Smith*, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125; *Bateman and wife v. Lyall and wife*, 7 C. B. N. S. 638; *Hirst v. Goodwin*, 3 F. & F. 257.

<sup>6</sup> 38 L. T. 355.

which cause loss of custom to a trader are spoken of him in the way of his trade, and are therefore actionable *per se*. And in other cases of special damage there is no possible hardship in the old rule; for the plaintiff must be aware of the names of \* the master who has dismissed \* 316 him, and of the friends who formerly showed him hospitality.

### *Illustrations.*

The plaintiff alleged that in consequence of the defendant's slander, she had "lost several suitors." This was held too general an allegation: for the names of the suitors could hardly have escaped the plaintiff's memory. *Barnes v. Prudlin, vel Bruddel*, 1 Sid. 396; 1 Ventr. 4; 1 Lev. 261; 2 Keb. 451. See also *Hunt v. Jones*, Cro. Jac. 499; *Davies and wife v. Solomon*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; 20 W. R. 167; 25 L. T. 799.

The defendant slandered a dissenting minister, who averred that his congregation diminished in consequence. *Held*, too general an averment to constitute special damage, the names of the absentees not being given. *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87.

Such an averment would have been sufficient, had the words been spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, and so actionable *per se*. *Hartley v. Herring*, 8 T. R. 130; *Evans v. Harries*, 1 H. & N. 254; 26 L. J. Ex. 31.

Dawes intended to employ the plaintiff, a surgeon and accoucheur, at his wife's approaching confinement; but the defendant told Dawes that the plaintiff's female servant had had a child by the plaintiff: Dawes consequently decided not to employ the plaintiff: Dawes told his mother and his wife's sister what defendant had said; and consequently the plaintiff's practice fell off considerably among Dawes' friends and acquaintance and others. The fee for one confinement was a guinea. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to more than the one guinea; the jury should give him such a sum as they considered Dawes' custom was worth to him; but that the plaintiff clearly could not recover anything for the general decline of his business, which was caused by the gossip of Dawes' mother and sister-in-law. *Dixon v. Smith*, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125.

The law is the same in America:—

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's words had "injured her in her good name, and caused her relatives and friends to slight and shun her." This was held to disclose no special damage. *Bassell v. Elmore*, 48 N. Y. R. 563; 65 Barbour, 627.

So where the allegation was merely that by reason of defendant's words "the plaintiff had been slighted, neglected, and misused by the neighbors and her former associates, and turned out of doors." *Pettibone v. Simpson*, 66 Barb. 492.

A general allegation that by reason of defendant's acts, plaintiff had been \*compelled to pay a large sum of money, without showing how, was held in- \* 317 sufficient. *Cook v. Cook*, 100 Mass. 194; *Pollard v. Lyon*, 1 Otto (91 U. S.), 225.

But in Australia a different rule apparently prevails:—

To say to the keeper of a restaurant, "You are an infernal rogue and swindler," was held, in the Supreme Court of Victoria, not actionable without proof of special damage, as not affecting plaintiff in his trade. But the plaintiff having alleged that, by reason

of the words, people who used to frequent his restaurant, ceased to deal with him, it was held the special damage made the words actionable, and that the special damage was sufficiently alleged; that the cases of frequenters of theatres, members of congregations, and travellers using an inn, were exceptions to the rule requiring the names of the customers lost to be set forth. *Brady v. Youlden, Kerferd & Box's Digest of Victoria Cases*, 709; *Melbourne Argus Reports*, 6 Sept. 1867, *sed quære*.

Where the words are not actionable without special damage, the jury, as we have seen, must confine their consideration to such special damage as is specially alleged and proved. It might, therefore, very well be argued, on the principle of *Bonomi v. Backhouse*,<sup>1</sup> that if any fresh damage followed in the future, that would constitute a fresh ground of action. And of this opinion were North, C.J., in *Lord Townshend v. Hughes*,<sup>2</sup> and Tindal, C.J., in *Goslin v. Corry*.<sup>3</sup> But Buller, in his "*Nisi Prius*," p. 7, lays it down most distinctly, that where a plaintiff "has once recovered damages, he cannot after bring an action for any other special damage, whether the words be in themselves actionable or not."<sup>4</sup> And this rule is obviously more practically convenient: it is also in accordance with recent cases, such as *Stone v. Mayor of Yeovil*,<sup>5</sup> and must therefore, I think, be considered good law.

\* 318 \*V. SPECIAL DAMAGE WHERE THE WORDS ARE  
ACTIONABLE, *per se*.

Where special damage is not essential to the action, it may still of course be proved at the trial to aggravate the damages. But to entitle such evidence to be given, the special damage relied on must be stated on the record with the same particularity as is required where the words are actionable only by reason of such special damage. The defendant is entitled to know beforehand what case he has to meet. Thus, in an action by a trader for words spoken of him in the way of his trade, evidence of a general loss of business is always admissible; for this is not special damage. (a) But the plaintiff cannot be asked whether particular persons have not ceased to deal with him, unless the loss of

<sup>1</sup> 9 H. L. C. 503; E. B. & E. 662; 34 L. J. Q. B. 181.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Mod. 150.

<sup>3</sup> 7 M. & Gr. 345; 8 Scott N. R. 21.

<sup>4</sup> *Fitter v. Veal*, 12 Mod. 542.

<sup>5</sup> 1 C. P. D. 691; 45 L. J. C. P. 657; 24 W. R. 1073; 34 L. T. 874; (C. A.) 2 C. P. D. 99; 46 L. J. C. P. 137; 25 W. R. 240; 36 L. T. 279, and *Lamb v. Walker*, 3 Q. B. D. 389; 45 L. J. Q. B. 451; 26 W. R. 775; 38 L. T. 643.

(a) So of exclusion from society. *Burt v. McBain*, 29 Mich. 260; *Phillips v. Hoyle*, 4 Gray, 568.

their special custom is set out in the pleadings as special damage. It is clearly right that the defendant should be furnished with their names before the trial.

But though the special damage must be laid as explicitly whether the words be actionable or not, it seems that in other respects the law is not quite so strict as to what constitutes special damage in the first case as in the second. Thus, where the words are *not* actionable *per se*, we have seen that mental distress, illness, expulsion from a religious society, &c., do not constitute special damage. But where the words are actionable *per se*, the jury may take such matters into their consideration in according damages. "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes *that alone*; though where a material damage occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimating it, should altogether overlook the feelings of the \* party \* 319 interested."<sup>1</sup> And had the charge against Mrs. Roberts been one of felony I do not think any Judge would have excluded the evidence as to her expulsion from her religious sect.

Again, where words are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade, so as to be actionable *per se*, the plaintiff may allege and prove a general diminution of profits or decline of trade, without naming particular customers or proving they have ceased to deal with him.<sup>2</sup> [In *Delegal v. Highley*,<sup>3</sup> Tindal, C.J., refused to allow any evidence to be given of general loss of business, on the ground that the law already presumed such loss in the plaintiff's favor; but this decision must now be considered overruled.] If, however, the plaintiff desires to go into such details at the trial, he must plead them specially and call the customers named as witnesses. Still, if the customers are not called at the trial, or if for any other reason the proof of the special damage fails, the plaintiff may still fall back on the general damage and prove a loss of income induced by the slander.<sup>4</sup> This he could not do, had the words not been actionable *per se*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Wensleydale, in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*, 9 H. L. C. 598. See also *Haythorn v. Lawson*, 3 C. & P. 196; *Le Fanu v. Malcolmson*, 8 Ir. L. R. 418.

<sup>2</sup> *Ashley v. Harrison*, 1 Esp. 48; *Peake*, 256; *Ingram v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326; *Harrison v. Pearce*, 1 F. & F. 569; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

<sup>3</sup> 8 C. & P. 448.

<sup>4</sup> *Cook v. Field*, 3 Esp. 133; *Evans v. Harries*, 1 H. & N. 251; 26 L. J. Ex. 31.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, pp. 313-317.

But where it is clear that the action lies, and that the jury must find damages to *some* amount for the plaintiff, evidence as to the nature and extent of plaintiff's business before and after publication is necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount of damages.

Where the defendant published in a newspaper that a certain ship of the plaintiff's was unseaworthy, and had been purchased by the Jews to carry convicts, evidence as to the average profits of a voyage was admitted, and also evidence that upon the first voyage after the libel appeared the profits were nearly £1500 below the average, and this although the action was brought immediately after the libel appeared and before the last-mentioned voyage was commenced. The jury, however, awarded the plaintiff only £900 damages. *Ingram v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; *Goslin v. Corry*, 7 M. & Gr. 342; 8 Scott, N. R. 21.

Where a declaration alleged that the defendant spoke words of the plaintiff, a dissenting minister, in the way of his office and profession, and his congregation rapidly diminished, and he was compelled for a time to give up preaching altogether, and lost profits thereby; it was held that this was a sufficient allegation of special damage, although the members of his congregation were not named. *Hartley v. Herring*, 8 T. R. 130; *Hopwood v. Thorn*, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87.

Where words actionable *per se* are spoken of an innkeeper in the way of his trade, evidence may be given of a general loss of custom and decline in his business. *Evans v. Harries*, 1 H. & N. 251; 26 L. J. Ex. 31.

"Suppose a biscuit baker in Regent Street is slandered by a man saying his biscuits are poisoned, and in consequence no one enters his shop. He cannot complain of the loss of any particular customers, for he does not know them, and how hard and unjust it would be if he could not prove the fact of the loss under a general allegation of loss of custom." Per Martin, B., in *Evans v. Harries*, 26 L. J. Ex. 32. And see *Weiss v. Whittemore*, 38 Michigan, 366.

Where the words are actionable without special damage, the jury must assess the damages once for all: for no fresh action can be brought should fresh damage follow. They should therefore take into consideration not only the damage that has accrued, but also such damage, if any, as will arise from the defendant's defamatory words in the future.<sup>1</sup>

The special damage alleged must be the natural and probable result of the defendant's wrongful conduct. In some cases it can be shown that the defendant contemplated and desired such re-

<sup>1</sup> *Fitter v. Veal*, 12 Mod. 542; B. N. P. 7; *Lord Townshend v. Hughes*, 2 Mod. 150; *Ingram v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 4 Jur. 151; 9 C. & P. 326; *Gregory and another v. Williams*, 1 C. & K. 568.

sult at the time of publication: in other cases the result is so clearly the natural and necessary consequence of the libel or slander that the defendant must fairly be taken to have contemplated it, whether in fact he did so or not. But where the damage sustained by the plaintiff is neither the necessary and reasonable result of the defendant's conduct, nor such as can be shown to have been in the defendant's contemplation at the time, there the damage will be held too remote. (a) Evidence cannot be given at the trial of any special damage unless it either flows from defendant's words in the ordinary course of things, or through special circumstances known to the defendant may be supposed to have been in his contemplation at the date of publication.

The special damage must be the direct result of the defendant's words. The jury may not take into their consideration any damage which is produced partly by the defendant's words and partly by some other fact or circumstance unconnected with the defendant. The defendant's words must at all events be the *pre-dominating* cause of the damage assigned.

*Illustrations.*

The defendant slandered the plaintiff to his master B. Subsequently B. discovered from another source that the plaintiff's former master had \* dismissed \* 322 him for misconduct. Thereupon B. discharged the plaintiff in the middle of the term for which he had engaged his services. *Held* that no action lay against the defendant; for his words alone had not caused B. to dismiss the plaintiff. *Vicars v. Wilcox*, 8 East, 1; 2 Sm. L. C. 553 (8th ed.). As explained in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*, 9 H. L. C. 590, 600.

The plaintiff alleged that certain persons would have recommended him to X., Y., & Z., had not the defendant spoken certain defamatory words of him on the Royal Exchange, and that X., Y., & Z. would, on the recommendation of those persons, have taken the plaintiff into their employment. The plaintiff claimed damages for the loss of the employment. Such damage was held too remote, for it was caused by the non-recommendation, not by the defendant's words. *Serry v. Foreman*, 2 C. & P. 592. And see *Hoey v. Felton*, 11 C. B. N. S. 142; 31 L. J. C. P. 105.

In an action of slander of title to a patent, the plaintiff alleged as special damage that in consequence of defendant's opposition, the Solicitor-General refused to allow the letters-patent to be granted with an amended title, as the plaintiff desired. *Held* that this damage was too remote, being the act of the Solicitor-General and not of the plaintiff. *Haddon v. Lott*, 15 C. B. 411; 24 L. J. C. P. 49; *Kerr v. Shedden*, 4 C. & P. 528.

(a) *Secus* of course if the result was actually intended or authorized. *Georgia v. N. Y.* 561; *Terwilliger v. Wands*, 17 N. Y. 54; *Fowles v. Bowen*, 30 N. Y. 20; *Keppord*, 45 Iowa, 48; *Bassell v. Elmore*, Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing. 211.

The plaintiff engaged Mdlle. Mara to sing at his concerts; the defendant libelled Mdlle. Mara, who consequently refused to sing lest she should be hissed and ill-treated; the result was that the concerts were more thinly attended than they otherwise would have been, whereby the plaintiff lost money. *Held* that the damage to the plaintiff was too remote a consequence of defendant's words to sustain an action by the plaintiff. It was, in short, not so much the result of defendant's words as of Mdlle. Mara's timidity or caprice. *Ashley v. Harrison*, 1 Esp. 48; *Peake*, 256. And see *Tarleton v. McGawley*, *Peake*, 270; *Taylor v. Neri*, 1 Esp. 386; *Lumley v. Gye*, 2 E. & B. 216.

The defendant, having had a quarrel in the street with a negro boy, took up a pickaxe and pursued him into the plaintiff's store, where the boy was employed. The negro being alarmed, and not able to escape rapidly by the back door, which was shut, ran behind the counter to save himself from being struck, and in so doing knocked out the faucet from a cask of wine standing there, a quantity of which ran out and was wasted. The Supreme Court of the State of New York held that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff for this loss; the damage in question being, in their opinion, the direct and natural, though not the necessary result of the wrongful act of the defendant. *Vandenburg v. Truax*, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 464; *Clark v. Chambers*, 3 Q. B. D. 327; 47 L. J. Q. B. 427; 26 W. R. 613; 38 L. T. 454.

The defendant insinuated that the plaintiff had been guilty of the murder  
 \* 323 \* of one Daniel Dolly; the plaintiff thereupon demanded that an inquest should be taken on Dolly's body, and incurred expense thereby. *Held* that such expense was recoverable as special damage; though it was not *compulsory* on the plaintiff to have an inquest held. *Peake v. Oldham*, *Cowp.* 275; 2 W. Bl. 960.

The defendant said to Mr. Knight of his wife Mrs. Knight, "Jane is a notorious liar . . . she was all but seduced by Dr. C., of Roscommon, and I advise you, if C. comes to Dublin, not to permit him to enter your place . . . She is an infamous wretch, and I am sorry that you had the misfortune to marry her, and if you had asked my advice on the subject, I would have advised you not to marry her." Knight thereupon turned his wife out of the house and sent her home to her father, and refused to live with her any longer. *Held* that loss of *consortium* of the husband can constitute special damage; but that in this case the husband's conduct was not the natural or reasonable consequence of defendant's slander. *Secus*, had the words imputed actual adultery since the marriage. *Allsop v. Allsop*, 5 H. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; 6 Jur. N. S. 433; 8 W. R. 449; 36 L. T. (Old S.) 290. Affirmed in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*, 9 H. L. C. 577; *Parkins et ux. v. Scott et ux.*, 1 H. & C. 153; 31 L. J. Ex. 331; 8 Jur. N. S. 593; 10 W. R. 562; 6 L. T. 394, *post*, p. 330. (a)

A declaration alleged that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke of the plaintiff, a working stonemason, "He was the ringleader of the nine hours' system," and "He has ruined the town by bringing about the nine hours' system," and "He has stopped several good jobs from being carried out, by being the ringleader of the system at Llanelly," whereby the plaintiff was prevented from obtaining employment in his trade at Llanelly. *Held*, on demurrer, that the alleged damage was not the natural or reasonable consequence of the speaking of such words, and that the action could not be sustained. *Miller v. David*, L. R. 9 C. P. 118; 43 L. J. C. P. 84; 22 W. R. 332; 30 L. T. 58.

Damage which has resulted to A. in consequence of the defendant's having defamed B., is too remote to constitute special

(a) *Georgia v. Kepford*, 45 Iowa, 48. *Secus*, if the charge was made for the purpose of effecting the result. *Ib.*; note (a), p. 321.



damage in any action brought by B. Whether A., who has himself suffered the damage, can sue, depends upon the closeness of the relationship between A. and B. If A. is B.'s master, A. may have an action on the case *per quod servitium amisit*. If A. is B.'s husband, then it is clear law, that the husband may sue for any special damage which has accrued to him through the def-  
amation of his wife. But a wife cannot \* recover for any \* 324  
special damage which words spoken of her have inflicted on her husband.<sup>1</sup>

This rule presses very harshly upon married women; for before the Married Women's Property Act there was hardly any special damage which they could suffer. Their earnings were their husband's; so was their time. Lord Wensleydale, in *Lynch v. Knight & wife*,<sup>2</sup> even doubted if loss of *consortium* of her husband was such special damage as would sustain an action of slander by a wife. Loss of the society of her friends and neighbors clearly is not. The only special damage in fact which a married woman could set up was loss of hospitality. And even in conceding her this, the judges seemed to be straining the law, for her husband was bound to maintain her: so that such gratuitous entertainment was really a saving to the husband's pocket. But in *Davies v. Solomon*,<sup>3</sup> the judges declined to scrutinize too nicely into such matters: and no doubt the loss is really the wife's. Her friends would supply her with better and other food than that which the law compels her husband to afford her. The operation of the Married Women's Property Acts, 1870 and 1874, may lessen the hardship. In some cases the difficulty might perhaps have been obviated, had the husband sued alone.

### *Illustrations.*

If one partner be libelled he cannot recover for any special damage which has occurred to the firm. *Solomons & others v. Medex*, 1 Stark. 191; *Robinson v. Marchant*, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 156.

Similarly, if the firm be libelled as a body, they cannot jointly recover for any private injury to a single partner: though that partner may now recover his individual damages in the same action. *Haythorn v. Lawson*, 3 C. & P. 196; *Le Fanu v. Malcolmson*, 1 H. L. C. 637; 8 Ir. L. R. 418; 13 L. T. 61.

Where the libel imputed that the plaintiff, a married man, kept a gaming-house, and that his wife was a woman of notoriously bad character, and his wife suffered greatly in her mind in consequence and became ill and died, \* evidence \* 325  
of such damage was excluded in an action brought by the surviving husband. *Guy v. Gregory*, 9 C. & P. 584. And see *Wilson v. Goit*, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.), 445, *ante*, p. 313.

<sup>1</sup> *Harwood et ux. v. Hardwick et ux.* (1668), 2 Keble, 387.      <sup>2</sup> 9 H. L. C. 597.

<sup>3</sup> L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; 20 W. R. 167; 25 L. T. 799.

Where words actionable *per se* were spoken of a married woman, she was allowed to recover only 20s. damages; all the special damage which she proved at the trial was held to have accrued to her husband, and not to her: he ought, therefore, to have sued for it in a separate action (or count since the C. L. P. Act, 1852; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 40; Jud. Act, 1875, Order XVII. r. 4). *Dengate v. Gardiner*, 4 M. & W. 5; 2 Jur. 470.

A declaration by husband and wife alleged that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke certain words of the wife imputing incontinence to her, whereby she lost the society of her neighbors, and became ill and unable to attend to her necessary affairs and business, and her husband incurred expense in curing her, and lost the society and assistance of his wife and his domestic affairs. *Held* that the declaration disclosed no cause of action. *Allsop and wife v. Allsop*, 5 H. & N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; 6 Jur. N. S. 433; 8 W. R. 449; 36 L. T. (Old S.) 290. Approved in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*, 9 H. L. C. 577.

[N. B. — The excommunication case *Barnabas v. Traunter*, 1 Vin. Abr. 396; *ante*, p. 59, was not cited to the court in this case.]

Where words were spoken imputing unchastity to a woman, and by reason thereof she was excluded from a private society and congregation of a sect of Calvinistic Methodists, of which she had been a member, and was prevented from obtaining a certificate without which she could not become a member of any other society of the same nature, — *Held* that such a result was not such special damage as would render the words actionable. *Roberts and wife v. Roberts*, 5 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; 12 W. R. 909; 10 L. T. 602; 10 Jur. N. S. 1027.

The act of a third party, if caused by the defendant's language, is *not* too remote; and this, whether such act be in itself a ground of action by the plaintiff against such third party or not. But of course the act of the third party must be the result of the defendant's words and such a result as the defendant either did contemplate or ought to have contemplated. The defendant cannot be held liable for any eccentric or foolish conduct on the part of the person he addressed; but only for the ordinary and reasonable consequences of his words.

\* 326      \* Formerly this was much doubted; it was held, in *Vicars v. Wilcox*,<sup>1</sup> that where the plaintiff's master was induced by the slander to dismiss the plaintiff from his employ, before the end of the term for which they had contracted, such dismissal was too remote to be special damage; because it was a mere wrongful act of the master, for which the plaintiff could sue him. The same doctrine was laid down in *Morris v. Langdale*,<sup>2</sup> and *Kelly v. Partington*.<sup>3</sup> But this case is clearly contrary to *Davis v. Gardiner*,<sup>4</sup> and the numerous other cases in which loss of a marriage was held to constitute special damage, although the plaintiff there had an

<sup>1</sup> 8 East 1; 2 Sm. L. C. 553 (8th edition).

<sup>2</sup> 2 B. & P. 284.

<sup>3</sup> 5 B. & Ad. 645; 3 N. & M. 116.

<sup>4</sup> 4 Rep. 16, *ante*, p. 310.

action for breach of promise of marriage. Doubts were thrown on *Vicars v. Wilcox*, in *Knight v. Gibbs*,<sup>1</sup> and in *Green v. Button*,<sup>2</sup> and it must now be taken to have been overruled by the *dicta* of the Law Lords in *Lynch v. Knight* and wife,<sup>3</sup> and by the decision in *Lumley v. Gye*.<sup>4</sup> And it is now, I think, clear law that the defendant is liable for any illegal act which it was his obvious intention, or the natural result of his words, to induce another to commit. "To make the words actionable, by reason of special damage, the consequence must be such as, taking human nature as it is with its infirmities, and having regard to the relationship of the parties concerned, might fairly and reasonably have been anticipated and feared would follow from the speaking of the words."<sup>5</sup> "If the experience of mankind must lead any one to expect the result, the defendant will be answerable for it."<sup>6</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

If I tell a master falsely that his servant has robbed him and thereupon he instantly dismisses him, I must be taken to have contemplated this as a natural and probable consequence of my act. But if the master horsewhips his servant instead of dismissing him, this is not the natural result of my accusation; I could not be held liable for the assault as special damage. See per Williams, J., in *Haddon v. Lott*, 15 C. B. 411; 24 L. J. C. P. 50.

\* "Suppose that during the war of 1870, an Englishman had been pointed out to a Parisian mob as a German spy, and thrown by them into the Seine, it could not be contended that one act was *not* the natural and necessary consequence of the other." Mayne on Damages, 3rd ed., by Lumley Smith, p. 426. And see such cases as *Lee v. Riley*, 18 C. B. N. S. 722; *Sneesby v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co.*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 263; 43 L. J. Q. B. 69; 30 L. T. 492; (and in C. A.) 1 Q. B. D. 42; 45 L. J. Q. B. 41; 24 W. R. 99; 33 L. T. 372.

A man may not recover the same damages for the same injury twice from two different defendants; but he may recover from two different defendants damages proportioned to the injury each has occasioned, and clearly where words are spoken by a defendant *with the intent* to make a third person break his contract with the plaintiff, the fact that such person did break his contract with the plaintiff in consequence of what the defendant said, may be proved as special damage against that defendant. *Carrol v. Falkiner*, Kerferd & Box's Digest of Victoria Cases, 216.

It is not essential that the third person, whose act constitutes the special damage, should believe the words spoken by the defendant, if it is shown that the words spoken did directly induce the act. The law is otherwise in America.

<sup>1</sup> 1 A. & E. 43; 3 N. & M. 467.

<sup>2</sup> 2 C. M. & R. 707.

<sup>3</sup> 9 H. L. C. 577.

<sup>4</sup> 2 E. & B. 216.

<sup>5</sup> Per Lord Wensleydale in *Lynch v. Knight* and wife, 9 H. L. C. p. 600.

<sup>6</sup> Per Littledale, J., in *R. v. Moore*, 3 B. & Ad. 188.

*Illustrations.*

The plaintiff and another young woman worked for Mrs. Enoch, a strawbonnet-maker, and lived in her house. Mrs. Enoch's landlord, who lived two doors off, came to Mrs. Enoch and complained that the plaintiff and her fellow-lodger had made a great noise and been guilty of openly outrageous conduct. Mrs. Enoch thereupon dismissed them from her employ, not because she believed the charge made, but because she was afraid it would offend her landlord if they remained. *Held* that the special damage was the direct consequence of the defendant's word. *Knight v. Gibbs*, 1 A. & E. 43; 3 N. & M. 467. And see *Gillett v. Bullivant*, 7 L. T. (Old S.) 490, *post* p. 332.

But where the plaintiff was under twenty-one and lived at home with her father, and the defendant foully slandered her to her father, in consequence of which he refused to give her a silk dress and a course of music lessons on the piano which he had promised her, although he entirely disbelieved the defendant's story, this was *held* in America *not* to be such special damage as will sustain the action, on the ground that such treatment by a parent of his child is not the natural result of a falsehood told him against her. Per Grover, J.: "I do not think special damage can be predicated upon the act of any one who wholly disbelieves the truth of the story. It is inducing acts

injurious to the plaintiff, caused by a belief of the truth of the charge  
 \* 328 \* made by the defendant, that constitutes the damage which the law redresses." *Anon.*, 60 N. Y. 262. And see *Wilson v. Goit*, 17 N. Y. 445.

But where the wrongful act of the third person is voluntary and spontaneous, there, as a rule, he alone is liable for it. This is especially the case where A. tells a falsehood against the plaintiff to B., which B. repeats, and from B.'s repetition special damage flows; here the plaintiff cannot recover for such special damage from A.; and indeed if the words be not actionable *per se*, he cannot sue A. at all: his only action is against B. For B. acted consciously and voluntarily; the repetition is his own unlawful act; for the consequences of which he alone is answerable. By repeating A.'s words, B. became an independent slanderer. (a)

The law is not quite so restricted in cases of libel; every one in any way concerned in the publication of a libel is equally responsible for all the damages which flow from that publication. Thus, if I write you a private letter containing a libel on A., and you show the letter to various persons, one of whom acts on it to A.'s prejudice, we both are liable to an action; for I set the libel in circulation. But if, instead of merely showing my letter, you make a copy of it and send it to a newspaper to be published to all the world, without my leave, and in a way which I could not

(a) *Terwilliger v. Wands*, 17 N. Y. 54; *wood*, 45 Iowa, 640. See *Gough v. Gold-*  
*Stevens v. Hartwell*, 11 Met. 542; *Hastings smith*, 44 Wis. 262.  
*v. Stetson*, 126 Mass. 329; *Prime v. East-*

have anticipated, then this republication is your own unlawful act, for the consequences of which you alone are liable. *Secus* if I either requested or expected and intended you to publish it.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, it may happen that a person who invents a lie and maliciously sets it in circulation, may sometimes escape punishment altogether, while a person who is merely injudicious may \* be liable to an \* 329 action through incautiously repeating a story which he believed to be the truth, as he heard it told frequently in good society. For if I originate a slander against you of such a nature that the words are not actionable *per se*, the utterance of them is no ground of action, unless special damage follows. If I myself tell the story to your employer, who thereupon dismisses you, you have an action against me; but if I only tell it to your friends and relations, and no pecuniary damage ensues from my own communication of it to any one, then no action lies against me, although the story is sure to get round to your master sooner or later.

The unfortunate man whose lips actually utter the slander to your master is the only person that can be made defendant; for it is his publication alone which is actionable as causing special damage.

As to this state of the law, see the remarks of Kelly, C.B., in *Riding v. Smith*,<sup>2</sup> who differed from Pollock and Huddleston, B.B., in denouncing the decision in *Ward v. Weeks*,<sup>3</sup> which they maintained.

It might, perhaps, have been argued formerly, in analogy to the principle of *Scott v. Shepherd*,<sup>4</sup> that he who invented the slander and first set it in circulation, is as liable as he who "gave the mischievous faculty to the squib" and first started it on its wild career across the market-house at Milborne Port. But it will be remembered that the decision in that famous case turns expressly on the assumption that Willis and Ryal were *not* to be considered free agents, that what they did was "by necessity," was "the inevitable consequence of the defendant's unlawful act." Had they been considered as free agents voluntarily intervening, the other judges would have agreed with Blackstone, J. On principle, therefore, it is clearly good law to hold that when the repetition of the slander is spontaneous and unauthorized, when it is the voluntary act of a free agent, the originator of the slander is not answerable for any mischief caused by such repetition: and this principle is also far too strongly established by authority to be easily, if ever, shaken.<sup>5</sup> \* It is only in cases where \* 330 the words are not actionable *per se*, that the rule as to the remote-

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, pp. 360-365.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ex. D. 94; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500.

<sup>3</sup> 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Sm. L. Cases (8th ed.), 466; 2 Wm. Bl. 892; 3 Wils. 403.

<sup>5</sup> See *Ward v. Weeks*, 7 Bing. 211; *Rutherford v. Evans*, 4 C. & P. 79; *Tunni-*

ness of damages inflicts this apparent hardship upon the plaintiff; for where the words are actionable *per se*, and in all cases of libel, the jury find the damages *generally*, and will be careful to punish the author of a pernicious falsehood with all due severity; although, of course, the judge will still direct them not to take into their consideration any damage which ensued from a repetition by a stranger.<sup>1</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

Weeks was speaking to Bryce of the plaintiff, and said, "He is a rogue and a swindler; I know enough about him to hang him." Bryce repeated this to Bryer as Weeks' statement. Bryer consequently refused to trust the plaintiff. *Held* that the judge was right in nonsuiting the plaintiff: for the words were not actionable *per se*, and the damage was too remote. *Ward v. Weeks*, 7 Bing. 211; 4 M. & P. 796; *Hirst v. Goodwin*, 3 F. & F. 257.

A groom in a passion called a lady's-maid "a whore." A lady, hearing the groom had said so, refused to afford the lady's-maid her customary hospitality. *Held* that no action lay, for the groom had never spoken to the lady. *Clarke v. Morgan*, 38 L. T. 354; *Dixon v. Smith*, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125, *ante*, p. 316.

The defendant's wife charged Mrs. Parkins with adultery. She indignantly told her husband, and he was unreasonable enough to insist upon a separation in consequence. *Held* that the defendant was not liable. *Parkins et ux. v. Scott et ux.*, 1 H. & C. 153; 31 L. J. Ex. 331; 8 Jur. N. S. 593; 10 W. R. 562; 6 L. T. 394.

Bingham caused a libel on plaintiff, the proprietor of a newspaper, to be printed by Hinchcliffe as a placard, and distributed 5000 such placards. He also put the same libel into a rival newspaper, the defendant's, as an advertisement. Plaintiff sued both Bingham and Hinchcliffe as well as the defendant, alleging that the circulation of his paper had greatly declined. The action against the defendant came on first, and his

counsel, having failed to prove the justification pleaded, contended that the  
 \* 331 decline of \*circulation must principally be ascribed to the 5000 placards, not to the advertisement. Martin, B., while admitting that defendant was not liable for damage caused by the placards, ruled that it lay on defendant to prove that the damage sustained by the plaintiff was in fact due to the placard, and not to the advertisement. Verdict for the plaintiff, 500*l.* In the action against Bingham and Hinchcliffe plaintiff recovered only 40*s.* The 500*l.* was probably due to the justification pleaded and not proved. *Harrison v. Pearce*, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

But this rule, that the originator of a slander, not actionable *per se*, is not liable for damage caused by its repetition, cannot of course override the general principle that every man will be

cliffé v. Moss, 3 C. & K. 83; *Parkins et ux. v. Scott et ux.*, 1 H. & C. 153; 31 L. J. Ex. 331; 8 Jur. N. S. 593; *Dixon v. Smith*, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125; *Bateman v. Lyall*, 7 C. B. N. S. 638; *Clarke v. Morgan*, 38 L. T. 354, in which last case Lindley, J., expressly states his opinion that the decisions in *Ward v. Weeks* and *Parkins v. Scott* have been in no way overruled by *Riding v. Smith* and *Evans v. Harries*, 26 L. J. Ex. 31; 1 H. & N. 254.

<sup>1</sup> *Rutherford v. Evans* (1829), 4 C. & P. 79; *Tunnicliffe v. Moss*, 3 C. & K. 83.

liable for the natural and necessary consequences of his act. And it may well be that the repetition of a slander may be the natural and necessary consequence of defendant's original publication. It clearly is so whenever the original communication made to A., places A. under a moral obligation to repeat the slander to B. And, indeed, if defendant knew the relation in which A. stood to B., he will be taken to have maliciously contemplated and desired this result when he spoke to A. So, again, whenever the first publisher either expressly or implicitly requested or procured the repetition; then he will of course be liable for all the mischief caused by the act of his agent, and the agent would be liable also.

In America the judges in one or two cases appear to carry this doctrine further, and seem to lay down the rule that wherever the repetition is *innocent* (that is, I presume, not malicious, and on a privileged occasion), the originator must be liable for all consequential damage caused by the repetition; for else, it is said, the person injured would be without a remedy. He cannot sue the person repeating the slander, as the repetition is privileged; therefore he *must* be able to sue the first publisher for the damage caused by his own publication, and by the innocent repetition as well. (a) "Where slanderous words are repeated *innocently* and without an intent to defame, as under some circumstances they may be, I do not see why the \* author of the slander should not be held \* 332 liable for injuries resulting from it as thus repeated, as he would be if these injuries had arisen directly from the words as spoken by himself."<sup>1</sup> But this is not the law of England, at all events; it by no means follows that because the repetition is privileged or innocent, that it is therefore the natural and necessary consequence of the prior publication. In *Parkins v. Scott* the repetition was clearly innocent; yet no action lay against the original defamer. Mrs. Parkins was in fact held to have no remedy. So also in *Holwood v. Hopkins*,<sup>2</sup> the communication would probably in the present day be deemed privileged.

<sup>1</sup> Per Beardsley, J., in *Keenholts v. Becker*, 3 Denio N.Y. 352, and see *Terwilliger v. Wands*, 17 N. Y. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Cro. Eliz. 787.

(a) It is impossible to sustain this view on principle. A man is liable only for the damage which he has caused, except in certain cases of agency (when the principal may have been entirely innocent) and in certain extraordinary situations. In contemplation of law a man does not cause damage unless he actually intended it or unless his act had an obvious tendency to produce the result. When the repetition

therefore was authorized by the defendant or when he presumably intended it he will be liable for it; otherwise not. Whether the plaintiff must trace the defamation to the hearing of the person who acted upon it to his (the plaintiff's) damage, see *Keenholts v. Becker*, 3 Denio, 346. But see *Bassell v. Elmore*, 48 N. Y. 561, 567; *Titus v. Sumner*, 44 N. Y. 266.

*Illustrations.*

The plaintiff was governess to Mr. L.'s children; the defendant told her father that she had had a child by Mr. L.: the father went straight to Mr. L. and told him what defendant had said. Mr. L. thereupon said that the plaintiff had better not return to her duties, for although he knew that the charge was perfectly false, still for her to continue to attend to his children, would be injurious to her character and unpleasant to them both. *Held* that the repetition by the father to Mr. L., and his dismissal of the plaintiff, were both the natural consequences of the defendant's publication to the father. *Gillett v. Bullivant*, 7 L. T. (Old S.) 490; *Fowles v. Bowen*, 3 Tiff. (30 N. Y.) 20.

A police magistrate dismissed a trumped-up charge brought by the plaintiff, a policeman, and added: "I am bound to say, in reference to this charge and a similar one brought from the same spot a few days ago, that I cannot believe William Kendillon on his oath." This observation was duly reported to the Commissioners of Police, who in consequence dismissed the plaintiff from the force. Lord Denman held that the dismissal was special damage for which the defendant would have been liable, if the action had lain at all: for he must have known that such a remark would certainly be reported to the commissioners, and would most probably cause them to dismiss the plaintiff. Nonsuit on the ground of privilege. *Kendillon v. Maltby*, 1 Car. & Marsh, 402.

[N. B. The report of this case in 2 Moo. & Rob. 438, refers only to the point of privilege.]

H. told Mr. Watkins that the plaintiff, his wife's dressmaker, was a woman of immoral character. Mr. Watkins naturally informed his wife of this charge, \* 333 and she ceased to employ the plaintiff. *Held* that the plaintiff's loss of Mrs. Watkins' custom was the natural and necessary consequence of the defendant's communication to Mr. Watkins. *Derry v. Handley*, 16 L. T. 263.

If the defendant makes an oral statement to the reporter of a newspaper, intending and desiring him to insert the substance of it in the paper, he is liable for all the consequences of its appearing in print, although he may not have expressly requested the reporter to publish it. *Bond v. Douglas*, 7 C. & P. 626; *R. v. Lovett*, 9 C. & P. 462; *Adams v. Kelly*, Ry. & Moo. 157; *R. v. Cooper*, 8 Q. B. 533; 15 L. J. Q. B. 206.



## COSTS.

IF an action of slander or libel be tried by a jury, the costs always follow the event unless, upon application made at the trial for good cause shown, the Judge before whom such action is tried, or the Court, shall otherwise order.<sup>1</sup> If by any chance such an action be tried by a Judge alone (which it very seldom is, except in the case of trade libels),<sup>2</sup> the costs are absolutely in his discretion. The provisions of the County Courts Act, 1867,<sup>3</sup> no longer apply to actions of libel or slander, since s. 67 of the Judicature Act, 1873, came into operation : for no action of either slander or libel can be brought in the County Court, except by consent.

Formerly the provisions of the County Courts Act applied to all actions, whether they could be brought in the County Court or not; the words of the Act being wider than the Legislature intended.<sup>4</sup> Formerly also the provisions of Lord Denman's Act<sup>5</sup> applied to actions of slander and libel, and therefore a plaintiff who \* recovered less than 40s. dam- \* 335  
ages could not recover any costs whatever from the defendant unless the judge immediately certified on the record that the slander or libel was wilful and malicious. But even if the judge certified both that the action was one fit to be tried in the Superior Court, and also that the slander was wilful and malicious, so as to take the case out of both the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, s. 5, and the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, s. 2, still no certificate could enable a plaintiff to get more costs than damages if he sued for a slander actionable *per se*, and recovered less than 40s.<sup>6</sup> For the relentless words of the

<sup>1</sup> Order LV. r. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Thomas v. Williams*, 14 Ch. D. 864 ; 49 L. J. Ch. 605 ; 28 W. R. 983 ; 43 L. T. 91.

<sup>3</sup> 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, s. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Sampson v. Mackay*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 643 ; 10 B. & S. 694 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 245 ; 17 W. R. 883 ; 20 L. T. 807 ; *Gray v. West et ux.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 175 ; 9 B. & S. 196 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 78 ; 17 W. R. 497 ; 20 L. T. 221 ; *Craven v. Smith*, L. R. 4 Ex. 146 ; 38 L. J. Ex. 90 ; 17 W. R. 710 ; 20 L. T. 400 ; *Kent v. Lewis*, 21 W. R. 413.

<sup>5</sup> 3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, s. 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Evans v. Rees*, 9 C. B. N. S. 391 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 16 ; *Marshall v. Martin*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 239 ; 39 L. J. Q. B. 85 ; 18 W. R. 378 ; 21 L. T. 788.

21 Jac. I. c. 16, contain no proviso enabling a judge to make any exemption from the imperative rule that a plaintiff, suing on the case for slanderous words, and recovering less than 40s. shall have "only so much costs as the damages so given or assessed amount unto." This statute, 21 Jac. I. c. 16, was held to apply only to words actionable *per se*, and not to actions of libel, of slander of title, of *scandalum magnatum*, or where the words are actionable only by reason of special damage alleged.

But both the 21 Jac. I. c. 16 and the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, s. 2, and all special Acts relating to costs, are now repealed by s. 33 of the Judicature Act, 1875,<sup>1</sup> while the County Courts Act, 1867, is, by the express words of s. 67 of the Judicature Act of 1873, restricted to actions in which relief can be given in a County Court; and slander and libel are not among such actions.<sup>2</sup>

Hence now, if a plaintiff recovers nominal damages merely, he will get his costs, unless the Judge or a Divisional Court otherwise orders. It is therefore the duty of defendant's counsel at once to apply for such an order, or at least at the same sitting of the Court.<sup>3</sup> He cannot apply to that Judge subsequently, nor to a Judge at chambers.<sup>4</sup> If no application be made at the trial, the only chance is to apply to a Divisional Court, which has under Order LV. an original jurisdiction to make an order to deprive a successful plaintiff of the costs of an action tried before a jury.<sup>5</sup>

But such an application must be made within a reasonable time.<sup>6</sup> In the three other cases reported with *Bowey v. Bell*, in the first, *Brooks v. Israel*, the plaintiff was eventually allowed his costs on the merits; and so in the second, *North v. Bilton*; while in *Siddons v. Lawrence* the plaintiff was eventually deprived of his costs, good cause being shown.

<sup>1</sup> *Parsons v. Tinling*, 2 C. P. D. 119; 46 L. J. C. P. 230; 25 W. R. 255; 35 L. T. 851; *Garnett v. Bradley* (C. A.), 2 Ex. D. 349; 46 L. J. Ex. 545; 25 W. R. 653; 36 L. T. 725; (H. of Lds.), 3 App. Cas. 944; 48 L. J. Ex. 186; 26 W. R. 698; 39 L. T. 261; *Ex parte Mercers' Company*, 10 Ch. D. 481; 48 L. J. Ch. 384; 27 W. R. 424.

<sup>2</sup> County Courts Act, 1846 (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95), s. 58.

<sup>3</sup> *Kynaston v. Mackinder*, 47 L. J. Q. B. 76; 37 L. T. 390.

<sup>4</sup> *Baker v. Oakes* (C. A.), 2 Q. B. D. 171; 46 L. J. 246; 25 W. R. 220; 35 L. T. 832; *Tyne Alkali Co. v. Lawson*, 36 L. T. 100; W. N. 1877, p. 18; *Forsdike and wife v. Stone*, L. R. 3 C. P. 607; 37 L. J. C. P. 301; 16 W. R. 976; 18 L. T. 722.

<sup>5</sup> *Myers v. Defries*; *Siddons v. Lawrence*, 4 Ex. D. 176; 48 L. J. Ex. 446; 27 W. R. 791; 40 L. T. 795.

<sup>6</sup> *Kynaston v. Mackinder*, 47 L. J. Q. B. 76; 37 L. T. 390; *Bowey v. Bell*, 4 Q. B. D. 95; 48 L. J. Q. B. 161; 27 W. R. 247; 39 L. T. 608.

The Judge or Divisional Court will, as a rule, only deprive a plaintiff of his costs where "contemptuous" damages, such as a farthing or a shilling, are given. If forty shillings or more be given, the law is generally allowed to take its course. Though in a recent case *Huddleston, B.*, deprived a plaintiff of his costs, where the verdict was for £10 damages, and his discretion was approved both in the Exchequer Division and in the Court of Appeal.<sup>1</sup> But there of course the circumstances were exceptional.

\* And although the rule expressly requires that the \* 337 Judge should only interfere as to costs, "upon application made at the trial for good cause shown," it has now been decided that the Judge need not wait for any express application to be made to him, but may make such an order *mero motu*, if he think proper;<sup>2</sup> provided both parties are still present and have an opportunity of arguing the question at the time.<sup>3</sup> It must be assumed that "the counsel in whose favor the order was made was ready to apply for it."<sup>4</sup>

Application for any special costs, such as those of shorthand writer's notes, or of a commission abroad, or of a special jury, or of photographic copies of the libel, should be made when judgment is delivered. No order will be made as to such costs after the judgment has been drawn up; they must be borne by the party ordering them.<sup>5</sup> To entertain such an application would substantially be to rehear the cause.<sup>6</sup>

I presume that the word "judge," in Order LV., r. 1, includes the judge of a County Court to which the case is sent for trial; and an under-sheriff executing a writ of inquiry, for they were both included in the word "judge" in the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, s. 5.<sup>7</sup> A master, to whom an action is referred with the powers of a judge at Nisi Prius, may, in his award, make any order as to costs, not inconsistent with the terms of the submission.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Harnett v. Vise and wife* (C. A.), 5 Ex. D. 307; 29 W. R. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Turner v. Heyland*, 4 C. P. D. 432; 48 L. J. C. P. 535; 41 L. T. 556.

<sup>3</sup> *Collins v. Welch*, 5 C. P. D. 27; 49 L. J. 260; 28 W. R. 208; 41 L. T. 785.

<sup>4</sup> But see *Marsden and wife v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co.*, 42 L. T. 631.

<sup>5</sup> *Ashworth v. Outram*, 9 Ch. D. 483; 27 W. R. 98; 39 L. T. 441; *Executors of Sir Rowland Hill v. Metropolitan District Asylum*, 49 L. J. Q. B. 668; 43 L. T. 462; W. N. 1880, p. 98; *Davey v. Pemberton*, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 629.

<sup>6</sup> *In re St. Nazaire Co.*, 12 Ch. D. 88; 27 W. R. 854; 41 L. T. 110.

<sup>7</sup> *Taylor v. Cass*, L. R. 4 C. P. 614; 17 W. R. 860; 20 L. T. 667; *Craven v. Smith*, L. R. 4 Ex. 146; 38 L. J. Ex. 90; 17 W. R. 710; 20 L. T. 400.

<sup>8</sup> *Bedwell v. Wood*, 2 Q. B. D. 626; 36 L. T. 213.

\* 338 It is, however, usual in references to give the \* arbitrator power over the costs of the reference and award only, leaving the costs of the action to follow the event.<sup>1</sup>

These rules as to nominal damages carrying costs apply to all courts whatsoever in England and to all actions of slander and libel, wherever tried, so long as they come before a jury. Thus, in the Salford Hundred Court of Record,<sup>2</sup> or in the Liverpool Court of Passage,<sup>3</sup> the rule is the same as in the Superior Courts.

And if at the first trial there was a nonsuit and a new trial be granted, which results in plaintiff's favor, Order LV. gives him his costs of both trials, if no order be made to the contrary.<sup>4</sup>

But if the Judge chooses to make an order, that order is not necessarily that each party should pay his own costs. He may on *very* good cause shown, order that the successful plaintiff should pay defendant's costs; and where there has been a nonsuit, and a new trial, the Judge who tries the case the second time may order that the successful plaintiff shall pay the whole costs of both trials.<sup>5</sup> But of course such an order would only be made in an extreme case.<sup>6</sup>

In *Harris v. Petherick*,<sup>7</sup> Bramwell, L.J., says: "If it were possible to apportion the costs of the issues \* between the parties, perhaps it would in some cases, especially in actions for slander where the damages are assessed at a farthing, be the most satisfactory manner of concluding a litigation in which, at least technically, both the plaintiff and the defendant are to blame." And accordingly it has now been decided that where the plaintiff joins four distinct causes of action in one suit (*e.g.*, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, and trespass), and the jury find for the plaintiff damages one farthing for the libel, and for the de-

<sup>1</sup> And see *Frean v. Sargent*, 2 H. & C. 293; 32 L. J. Ex. 281; 11 W. R. 808; 8 L. T. 467.

<sup>2</sup> *Turner v. Heyland*, 4 C. P. D. 432; 48 L. J. C. P. 535; 41 L. T. 556.

<sup>3</sup> *King v. Hawkesworth*, 4 Q. B. D. 371; 48 L. J. Q. B. 484; 27 W. R. 660; 41 L. T. 411.

<sup>4</sup> *Green v. Wright*, 2 C. P. D. 354; 46 L. J. C. P. 427; 25 W. R. 502; 36 L. T. 355; *Field v. Great Northern Ry. Co.*, 3 Ex. D. 261; 26 W. R. 817; 39 L. T. 80.

<sup>5</sup> *Harris v. Petherick* (C. A.), 4 Q. B. D. 611; 48 L. J. 521; 28 W. R. 11; 41 L. T. 146.

<sup>6</sup> See *Norman v. Johnson*, 29 Beav. 77; *Wootton v. Wootton*, Weekly Notes, 1869, p. 175.

<sup>7</sup> 4 Q. B. D. 612.

fendant as to the other causes of action, the word "event" must be read distributively, and the defendant is entitled to tax his costs of the issues found for him, unless the Court or a judge otherwise orders.<sup>1</sup> And by analogy to these cases, it would appear the right course in some cases to apportion the costs of the various issues arising out of the same cause of action where it is possible so to do.<sup>2</sup> Thus, if a defendant in an action of defamation both justified and pleaded privilege, and called at the trial ten witnesses in support of his plea of justification, all of whom broke down under cross-examination, or were confuted by the evidence of plaintiff's witnesses, and the jury found that the words were false, and yet at the same time it appeared that the occasion of publication was clearly a privileged one, and there was no evidence of malice, here it would clearly be right that the plaintiff should pay the general costs of the action, for he ought never to have brought it; but that all extra costs occasioned by the plea of justification being placed on the record should be paid by the defendant.<sup>3</sup> As the law now stands, the plaintiff would have to pay all the costs of the action, unless a special order be made to the above effect. But supposing that the judge at the trial makes such an order, there are immense practical difficulties in the way of taxation. It would be difficult for the master, who was not at the trial, to determine whether it was, or was not, solely in consequence of the plea of justification that a particular \* witness was subpoenaed, or a particular page of the \* 340 brief prepared. The only plan would be to tax the costs of the action generally, and then deduct such sum as the plaintiff could prove to have been occasioned by the justification. This is the plan adopted in Chancery, where a claim and a counter-claim are both dismissed with costs.<sup>4</sup>

But even this involves great additional trouble, and the masters generally adopt a rough and ready method of apportionment. Thus in *Knight v. Pursell*,<sup>5</sup> where the plaintiff applied for an injunction in respect of three separate subjects of complaint, and was successful as to one, unsuccessful as to the other two, and a special order was made, the taxing-master taxed the costs of the action as a whole, and then divided them into thirds, allowing plaintiff one third, and defendant two thirds of both plaintiff's and

<sup>1</sup> *Myers v. Defries*, 5 Ex. D. 15, 180; 48 L. J. 446; 49 L. J. Ex. 266; 28 W. R. 253, 406; 41 L. T. 137, 659; *Davidson v. Gray*, 5 Ex. D. 189, n.; 40 L. T. 192; (C. A.) 42 L. T. 834.

<sup>2</sup> See *James v. Brook*, 16 L. J. Q. B. 168; *Prudhomme v. Fraser*, 2 A. & E. 645.

<sup>3</sup> See *Skinner v. Shoppee et ux.*, 6 Bing. N. C. 131; 8 Scott, 275; *Empson v. Fairfax*, 8 A. & E. 296; 3 N. & P. 385; *Harrison v. Bush*, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 99; 2 Jur. N. S. 90.

<sup>4</sup> See *post*, p. 341; *Bailiff of Burford v. Lenthall and others*, 2 Atk. 551, and *Cracknall v. Janson* (C. A.), 11 Ch. D. 1, 23; 27 W. R. 851; 40 L. T. 640.

<sup>5</sup> 49 L. J. Ch. 120; 28 W. R. 90; 41 L. T. 581.

defendant's costs. And the Court held that this was all that could be expected of him.<sup>1</sup>

### *Payment into Court.*

It has now been finally decided by the Court of Appeal that money may be paid into Court in any action of libel or slander without admitting the plaintiff's cause of action, and that any other defence may be pleaded at the same time, even a justification.<sup>2</sup> If the plaintiff accepts the sum paid into Court in satisfaction of his claim, he must give the defendant a notice in Form No. 6, Jud. Act, 1875, App. B.; and may then proceed to tax his costs, and in case of non-payment within forty-eight \* 341 hours, \* may sign judgment for his costs. But even in this case the plaintiff is subject to the general jurisdiction of the Court over all costs; and may be deprived of his costs, if the whole action was useless or malicious.<sup>3</sup> If the plaintiff does not accept the sum paid into Court, but continues his action for the balance, he may have to pay the whole costs of the action, should the jury deem the sum paid insufficient.<sup>4</sup> But the practice in this respect has lately changed; and the rule now is, that in the absence of special circumstances, the plaintiff shall have his costs of the action up to the time when the money was paid into Court, and the defendant shall have his costs after that time.<sup>5</sup>

### *Counterclaim.*

It is very seldom that there is a counterclaim in an action of libel or slander; but wherever there is, its presence always complicates the question of costs. The law on this point can hardly be considered as settled at present. But it is clear that the County Courts Act, 1867, does not apply to actions of libel or slander, nor to counterclaims of any kind.<sup>6</sup> It follows therefore,

<sup>1</sup> As to dividing the costs of a divisible plea of justification, see, under the old practice, *Biddulph v. Chamberlayne*, 17 Q. B. 351; *Reynolds v. Harris*, 3 C. B. N. S. 267; 28 L. J. C. P. 26. As to costs of immaterial issues, see *Goodburne v. Bowman*, 9 Bing. 667.

<sup>2</sup> *Hawkesley v. Bradshaw* (C. A.), 5 Q. B. D. 302; 49 L. J. Q. B. 333; 28 W. R. 557; 42 L. T. 285.

<sup>3</sup> *Broadhurst v. Willey*, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> *Langridge v. Campbell*, 2 Ex. D. 281; 46 L. J. Ex. 277; 36 L. T. 64; 25 W. R. 351.

<sup>5</sup> *Buckton v. Higgs*, 4 Ex. D. 174; 27 W. R. 803; 40 L. T. 755.

<sup>6</sup> *Blake v. Appleyard*, 3 Ex. D. 195; 47 L. J. Ex. 407; 26 W. R. 592.

where the original action is either for libel or slander and the defendant sets up any counterclaim, that if the plaintiff recover any sum at all, even a farthing, and the defendant nothing on his counterclaim; then the plaintiff, in the absence of any special order to the contrary, is entitled to the whole costs of the action.<sup>1</sup> If both recover something, \* the plaintiff on his \* 342 claim and the defendant on his counterclaim, then the one who recovers the larger sum is entitled to the general costs of the cause; the other to the costs only of the particular issues which have been found in his favor.<sup>2</sup> If neither plaintiff nor defendant recover anything, and both claim and counterclaim be dismissed with costs, the plaintiff pays the general costs of the action, including those common to both claim and counterclaim, for he commenced the litigation; and the defendant pays only such costs as the plaintiff can prove to have been occasioned by the counterclaim.<sup>3</sup> If, however, the action be not of libel or slander, but be such that it could have been brought in the County Court, then the plaintiff cannot recover any costs at all from the defendant, unless the damages exceed £20, in an action of contract, or £10 in an action of tort; while the defendant is entitled to recover on his counterclaim in libel or in slander all the costs of his counterclaim, if he recover a farthing only thereunder.<sup>4</sup>

\* When an action of libel or slander is remitted to the \* 343 County Court, under s. 10 of the County Courts Act, 1867,<sup>5</sup> the costs will follow the event, unless the Judge at the trial make any order to the contrary;<sup>6</sup> the costs of the proceedings in the Superior Court will be allowed according to the scale in

<sup>1</sup> *Potter v. Chambers*, 4 C. P. D. 457; 48 L. J. C. P. 274; 27 W. R. 414.

<sup>2</sup> *Blake v. Appleyard*, 3 Ex. D. 195; 47 L. J. Ex. 407; 26 W. R. 592; *Hallinan v. Price*, 27 W. R. 490; 41 L. T. 627; *Neale and others v. Clark and others*, 4 Ex. D. 286; 41 L. T. 438; *Davidson v. Gray*, 5 Ex. D. 189 n.; 40 L. T. 192; (C. A.) 42 L. T. 834; *Cole v. Firth*, 4 Ex. D. 301; 40 L. T. 857; *Stooke v. Taylor*, 5 Q. B. D. 569; 49 L. J. Q. B. 857; 29 W. R. 49; 43 L. T. 208.

<sup>3</sup> *Saner v. Bilton*, 11 Ch. D. 416; 48 L. J. Ch. 545; 27 W. R. 472; 40 L. T. 134, followed in the Court of Appeal in *Mason v. Brentini*, 15 Ch. D. 287; 29 W. R. 126; 42 L. T. 726; 43 L. T. 557.

<sup>4</sup> *Staples v. Young*, 2 Ex. D. 324; 25 W. R. 304; *Chatfield v. Sedgwick*, 4 C. P. D. 459; 27 W. R. 790; 41 L. T. 438; *Rutherford v. Wilkie*, 41 L. T. 435. As to when costs will be given on the "higher scale," see *Horner v. Oyler*, 49 L. J. C. P. 655, and *Chapman v. Midland Ry. Co.*, 5 Q. B. D. 167; 28 W. R. 413; (C. A.) 5 Q. B. D. 431; 49 L. J. Q. B. 449; 28 W. R. 592; 42 L. T. 612.

<sup>5</sup> 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142.

<sup>6</sup> County Courts Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 88.

use in the Superior Court ; the costs incurred subsequent to the order of reference according to the County Court scale.

Any costs occasioned by undue prolixity in the indorsement on the writ,<sup>1</sup> or in the pleadings,<sup>2</sup> or by delivering interrogatories unnecessarily, vexatiously, or at improper length,<sup>3</sup> shall be borne by the party in fault.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Order II., r. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Order XIX., r. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Order XXXI., r. 2.

<sup>4</sup> As to costs in criminal proceedings, see, as to indictments, *post*, p. 590 ; as to criminal informations, *post*, p. 595.



THE LAW OF PERSONS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.

WE have hitherto dealt with the plaintiff and defendant as individuals, under no disability, who sue and are sued singly and in their own right. I propose in this chapter to examine the rights and liabilities of joint plaintiffs and defendants, and also to deal with cases of personal disability or disqualification, both in civil and criminal cases.

Formerly the law and practice as to "parties" was of the utmost importance, misjoinder of a plaintiff being ground of nonsuit, while a non-joinder of a necessary plaintiff was the subject of a plea in abatement. But now, by Judicature Act, 1875, Order XIX., r. 3, "no plea or defence shall be pleaded in abatement," and in Order XVI., r. 13, the general principle is laid down, that "No action shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder of parties, and the Court may in every action deal with the matter in controversy, so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. The Court or a Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court or a Judge to be just, order that the name or names of any party or parties, whether as plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the \* Court may \* 345 be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the action, be added." But such order will not as a rule be made where the party applying for it is clearly to blame, or where a hardship would thus be inflicted on his opponent. And even when such an order is made, it will generally be only upon payment of all costs thereby occasioned. The importance of this branch of the law is therefore scarcely diminished.

It will be convenient to divide this chapter into the following heads:—

1. Husband and Wife.
2. Infants.
3. Lunatics.
4. Bankrupts.
5. Receivers.
6. Executors and Administrators.
7. Aliens.
8. Master and Servant; Principal and Agent.
9. Partners.
10. Corporation and Companies.
11. Other Joint Plaintiffs.
12. Joint Defendants.

### 1. *Husband and Wife.*

Whenever words actionable *per se* are spoken of a married woman she may sue, but she must join her husband's name as co-plaintiff. (a) When the words are not actionable *per se*, she may sue, provided she can show that some special damage has followed from the words *to her*. That special damage has \* 346 accrued to her \* husband, in consequence of such words, will not avail her; for such damage he alone can sue, although it is *her* reputation that has been assailed.

If the wife has been divorced or judicially separated from her husband, or has obtained a protection order under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 21, she may sue as a *feme sole* without joining her husband.<sup>1</sup> If, however, she be living separate from her husband voluntarily, or under a deed of separation, she must join her husband as a co-plaintiff, even though the special damage alleged be the loss of her own personal earnings, which are now by the Married Women's Property Act, 1870,<sup>2</sup> s. 1, her separate estate. Though where the action is brought solely "for the protection and security" of such separate estate (*e.g.* an action for a libel upon her in the way of her separate trade); there by s. 11 she

<sup>1</sup> *Ramsden v. Brearley*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 147; 44 L. J. Q. B. 46; 23 W. R. 294; 32 L. T. 24.

<sup>2</sup> 33 & 34 Vict. c. 93.

(a) This is permitted in Michigan, but *Mich.* 260. For the common law rule see *is not necessary. Burt v. McBain*, 29 *Beach v. Ranney*, 2 Hill, 309.

may sue alone. In the Chancery Division the practice is for a married woman in all actions relating to her separate estate to sue by her next friend, who will be personally liable for the costs of the action, and to make her husband a defendant.<sup>1</sup> But in the Common Law Divisions it is still practically impossible for a wife to sue her husband. Under special circumstances, however, a married woman may by leave of a Master at Chambers sue without her husband and without her next friend, on giving due security for costs.<sup>2</sup>

If the words be spoken of the woman before marriage, the husband's name must still be joined on the writ; if she marry pending action, the husband should be made a party under Order L., r. 2.

\* If a married woman having general separate estate \* 347 fail in an action of libel, she may be condemned in costs, although her husband was joined as a co-plaintiff.<sup>3</sup>

Whenever the wife is the meritorious cause of action, the right survives to her on her husband's death; the widow continues sole plaintiff and the action does not abate. If, however, the wife dies before final judgment, the action must cease; it cannot be continued by her husband either *jure mariti*, or as her administrator.

In Scotland a married woman can sue for libel or slander without joining her husband, a *curator ad litem* being appointed; and so she can by special statute in New York and Pennsylvania. But even in those States she cannot sue her husband for slandering her.<sup>4</sup>

If defamatory words be spoken of a married woman and damage thereby follow to her husband, the husband can sue for the damage that has ensued to himself: and this whether the wife has suffered any special damage also or not. Formerly he would have been compelled to bring a separate action; by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 40, the husband was allowed to add claims in his own right whenever he was necessarily made a

<sup>1</sup> *Roberts v. Evans*, 7 Ch. D. 830; 47 L. J. Ch. 469; 26 W. R. 280; 38 L. T. 99.

<sup>2</sup> Order XVI., r. 8; *Martano v. Mann* (C. A.), 14 Ch. D. 419; 49 L. J. Ch. 510; 42 L. T. 890.

<sup>3</sup> *Newton and wife v. Boodle and others*, 4 C. B. 359; 18 L. J. C. P. 73; *Morris v. Freeman and wife*, 3 P. D. 65; 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 79; 27 W. R. 62; 39 L. T. 125.

<sup>4</sup> *Freethy v. Freethy*, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 641; *Tibbs v. Brown*, 2 Grant's Cas. (Penns.) 39.

co-plaintiff in any action brought for an injury done to his wife ; and it was provided that on the death of either party the action should not abate so far as the causes of action belonging to the survivor were concerned. And now, by Order XVII., r. 4, "Claims by or against husband and wife may be joined with claims by or against either of them separately."

\* 348      \* This right of the husband to sue for words defamatory of his wife is somewhat anomalous, for *his* reputation is in no way assailed ; and though he has sustained damage, is it not *damnum sine injuriâ* ? Generally speaking, if words defamatory of A., but not actionable in themselves, produce damage only to B., neither A. nor B. can sue. But the reputation of a husband is so intimately connected with that of his wife, that he has always been allowed to sue whenever he has received damage, just as though the words had been spoken of him.

And it would seem that this right attaches even where the words are not actionable *per se* ; so that if such words be spoken of a married woman and damage ensue to the husband, and none to her, she cannot sue, but he can. The damage to him is in fact the sole cause of action. That this is law, is clearly laid down in *Siderfin*, 346, under the year 1667 :— "Nota, si parols queux de eux m̃ ne sont Actionable mes solement in respect del collateral dāms. sont p̃le. (parlés) del feme covert, Le Baron sole port L'action, et si le feme soit joyn ove luy le Judgment serra pur ceo arrest, coment soit apres verdict." Other cases of that date turn almost entirely on points of pleading (*e.g.*, whether the declaration should end "*ad damnum ipsius*" or "*ad damnum ipsorum*").<sup>1</sup> But so far as they decide any matter of principle, these cases are not inconsistent with the above citation from *Siderfin* ; neither is *Russell et ux. v. Corne* (1704),<sup>2</sup> which was at that date the leading case on the subject of battery of a wife. And this view is certainly confirmed by the recent case of *Riding v. Smith*,<sup>3</sup> where the wife's name was struck off the record by the judge at the trial, and the husband recovered for the damage to his business caused by words not actionable *per se*, spoken of his wife ; though there it is true the judges of the Exchequer Division base their judgment on the fact that Mrs. Riding helped her husband in the shop, and was therefore his servant or assistant as well as his wife. It will clearly, therefore, be prudent for the

\* 349      pleader to make a separate claim for damages for the husband \* in all cases of the class of *Allsop v. Allsop*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Harwood et ux. v. Hardwick et ux.* (1668), 2 Keble, 387 ; *Coleman et ux. v. Harcourt* (1664), 1 Levinz, 140 ; *Grove et ux. v. Hart* (1752), B. N. P. 7.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Salk. 119 ; 6 Mod. 127 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 1031.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Ex. D. 91 ; 45 L. J. Ex. D. 281 ; 24 W. R. 487 ; 34 L. T. 500.

<sup>4</sup> 5 H. & N. 534 ; 29 L. J. Ex. 315.

*Illustrations.*

Where words actionable *per se* were spoken of a married woman, she was allowed to recover only 20s. damages ; all the special damage which she proved at the trial was held to have accrued to her husband, and not to her : he ought therefore to have sued for it in a separate action. He could now claim such damage in the statement of claim in his wife's action. *Dengate and wife v. Gardiner*, 4 M. & W. 5 ; 2 Jur. 470.

Where a married woman lived in service apart from her husband, maintaining herself, and was dismissed in consequence of a libellous letter sent to her master, it was held that the husband could sue : for his was the special damage (before the Married Women's Property Act, 1870). *Coward v. Wellington*, 7 C. & P. 531.

In such a case, had the cause of her dismissal been slanderous words not actionable *per se*, the wife could not (before the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, at all events) have joined in the action at all. She would have been held to have suffered no damage at all, her personal property belonging entirely to her husband. Per Lord Campbell in *Lynch v. Knight and wife*, 9 H. L. C. 589 ; 8 Jur. N. S. 724 ; 5 L. T. 291.

The female plaintiff lived separate from her husband and kept a boarding house. The defendant spoke words imputing to her insolvency, adultery, and prostitution ; some of her boarders left her in consequence, and certain tradesmen refused her credit. After verdict for the plaintiff, judgment was arrested, on the ground that the husband should have sued alone, for the words were actionable only by reason of the damage to the business and such damage was solely his. *Saville et ux. v. Sweeny*, 4 B. & Adol. 514 ; 1 N. & M. 254.

And so in America where a married woman was living apart from her husband under articles of separation, wherein the husband had covenanted that she might use his name in suing for any injury to her person or character, and the wife brought an action for slander in the joint names of her husband and herself ; the defendant induced the husband to execute a deed releasing the cause of action, and pleaded the release in bar of the wife's action, and the Court was compelled to hold this deed a good answer to the action. *Beach et ux. v. Beach*, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 260.

A married woman trading under her own name according to the custom of London, may sue as a trader without joining her husband, for a libel on her in the way of her trade. Per Brett, J., L. R. 9 C. P. 583.

A married woman carrying on a separate trade within the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, sect. 1, may by sect. 11 sue without joining her husband for any tort affecting such separate trade or her credit therein. *Summers v. City Bank*, L. R. 9 C. P. 580 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 261.

\* Where the libel imputed that the plaintiff, a married man, kept a gaming- \* 350 house, and that his wife was a woman of notoriously bad character, and the wife fell ill and died in consequence, evidence of such damage was excluded in an action brought by the surviving husband alone. *Guy v. Gregory*, 9 C. & P. 584. And see *Wilson v. Goit*, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.), 445, *ante*, p. 313.

Words directly defamatory of the wife may also be defamatory of the husband, who may therefore sue alone. Thus where defendant said to plaintiff's wife : " You are a nuisance to live beside of. You are a bawd ; and your house is no better than a bawdy-house," it was held unnecessary to make the wife a party to the action, although the husband proved no special damage. For had the charge been true, the plaintiff might have been indicted as well as his wife. *Huckle v. Reynolds*, 7 C. B. N. S. 114 ; Cole-

man *et ux. v. Harcourt* (1664), 1 Lev. 140. And see *Bash v. Sommer*, 20 Pennsylvania St. R. 159.

Where the defendant said to the plaintiff, an innkeeper, "Thy house is infected with the pox, and thy wife was laid of the pox," it was held that the husband could sue; for even if smallpox only was meant, the words were still actionable, "for it is a discredit to the plaintiff, and guests would not resort hither." Damages £50. *Levet's Case*, Cro. Eliz. 289.

"If an innkeeper's wife be called '*a cheat*,' and the house lose the trade, the husband has an injury by the words spoken of his wife." Per Wythens, J., in *Baldwin v. Flower* (1688), 3 Mod. 120; *Grove et ux. v. Hart* (1752), B. N. P. 7.

For all libels published, or slanders uttered, by the wife during coverture, her husband is liable, and must always be joined with her as a defendant. (a) This is so, even where the plaintiff wishes to charge the wages and earnings of the wife, which are now her separate property; for the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, makes no alteration in the position of a married woman as defendant.<sup>1</sup>

For all libels published, or slanders uttered by the wife before coverture, her husband was at common law liable to the full extent. But on this point the law has recently been altered

\* 351 by the Married Women's Property \* Act Amendment Act, 1874,<sup>2</sup> ss. 2, 5, which limit the liability of the husband for torts committed by his wife *dum sola* to the extent merely of the property which has vested in him by reason of the marriage. Still the husband must be made a joint defendant in every case, and must plead specially that no property came to him with his wife, if such be the fact.

If the husband dies, the action continues against the widow; if however the wife dies in the lifetime of her husband, the action immediately abates. If they be divorced, the wife must be sued

<sup>1</sup> *Hancocks & Co. v. Madame Demeric-Lablache*; 3 C. P. D. 197; 47 L. J. C. P. 514; 26 W. R. 402; 38 L. T. 753.

<sup>2</sup> 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50.

(a) At common law words which charged the wife with crimes uttered in presence of the husband, or jointly with him, imputed no act for which she would be criminally liable; and hence no action could be maintained by her for slander, either with or without her husband. *Nolan v. Traber*, 49 Md. 460. This proceeded upon a presumption of coercion. But this presumption may now be rebutted even in England. *Id.*; Taylor, Ev. 191 (6th ed.);

*Rex v. Hughes*, 2 Lewin, C. C. 229; *Rex v. Pollard*, 8 Car. & P. 553; *Rex v. Stapleton*, 1 Jebb, C. C. 93; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 28, n. 5. Hence an action for slander can now be maintained in such a case. *Nolan v. Traber*, *supra*. But see *Bash v. Sommer*, 20 Penn. St. 159. Concerning husband or wife as witness in the action see *Hawver v. Hawver*, 78 Ill. 412; *Duval v. Davey*, 32 Ohio St. 604; *Bennifield v. Hypres*, 38 Ind. 498.

alone, even though the words complained of were published before the divorce.<sup>1</sup> So in the case of a judicial separation.<sup>2</sup> But if the husband and wife voluntarily live apart under a separation deed, the common law rule prevails, and the husband must be joined as a defendant.<sup>3</sup>

A married woman will be held criminally liable for a libel she has published.<sup>4</sup> Her coverture will, it seems, be no defence to an indictment for a misdemeanor.<sup>5</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

Plaintiff sued Orchard and his wife for slanderous words, the jury found that Orchard had spoken the words, but not Mrs. Orchard. Judgment against the husband. It was moved in arrest of judgment that the speaking of the words could not be a joint act, and that if the husband alone uttered them, the wife ought never to have been made a party to the action. But it was held that this defect was cured by the verdict, and that the plaintiff was entitled to retain his judgment. *Burcher v. Orchard et ux.*, (1652) Style, 349. But see *Swithin et ux. v. Vincent et ux.*, (1764) 2 Wils. 227.

Mrs. Harwood slandered Mrs. White; wherefore White and wife sued \* 352  
\* Harwood and wife. Pending action, Harwood died, and his widow remarried. The Court was very much puzzled, and gave no judgment, apparently, though inclining to think that the writ abated. I think it would now depend on whether the widow had any property at the date of her second marriage; if so, the second husband could be added under Order L., r. 2; if not, the action would probably be held to abate: but it would certainly be but little use continuing it. See the Married Women's Property Act Amendment Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 50), s. 2. *White et ux. v. Harwood et ux.*, (1648) Style, 138; Vin. Abr. "Baron and Feme," A. a.

### *2. Infants.*

An infant may sue by his next friend, as before the Judicature Act. The next friend of an infant is personally liable for the costs of the suit;<sup>6</sup> but security for costs will not as a rule be required from him, lest the infant should lose his rights altogether. That an infant has been defamed gives his parents no right of action, unless in some very exceptional case it deprives the parent of services which the infant formerly rendered, in which case an

<sup>1</sup> *Capel v. Powell and another*, 17 C. B. N. S. 743; 34 L. J. C. P. 168; 10 Jur. N. S. 1255; 13 W. R. 159; 11 L. T. 421.

<sup>2</sup> 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 25, 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Head v. Briscoe et ux.*, 5 C. & P. 485; 2 L. J. C. P. 101.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Mary Carlile*, 3 B. & Ald. 167.

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Ingram*, 1 Salk. 384; *R. v. Cruse and Mary his wife*, 2 Moo. C. C. 53; 8 C. & P. 541.

<sup>6</sup> *Caley v. Caley*, 25 W. R. 528.

action on the case may lie for the special damage thus wrongfully inflicted, provided it be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's words.<sup>1</sup> A child will be held to be the servant of its parents, provided it is old enough to be capable of rendering them any act of service.<sup>2</sup> An infant defends by a guardian *ad litem* appointed *ex parte* by the Master or District Registrar upon the infant's petition, supported by affidavit. Any fit and proper person *sui juris* and within the jurisdiction may be appointed, if he has no adverse interest. A co-defendant in the same interest may be appointed. If an infant defendant

\* 353 do not appear to a writ duly served, \* the plaintiff may by virtue of Order XIII., r. 1, apply *ex parte* to a Master or District Registrar, on an affidavit of due service both of the writ and of notice of this application, for an order appointing some proper person guardian *ad litem*. A guardian *ad litem* is not liable for costs, unless he has been guilty of gross misconduct.

The infancy of the defendant is of course no defence to any action of tort not founded on contract. In *Defries v. Davies*,<sup>3</sup> the defendant, a lad of fifteen, was imprisoned for default in payment of damages and costs for a slander.

An infant will also be criminally liable for any libel, if he be above the age of fourteen. If he be under fourteen but above seven, he might possibly be found guilty of a libel, if evidence were given of a disposition prematurely wicked. *Malitia supplet ætatem*. But much more than the proof of express malice ordinarily given in cases of privilege would probably be required. A child under seven cannot possibly commit any crime.

### 3. Lunatics.

It is almost inconceivable that an admitted lunatic should bring an action of libel or slander. But, should such an event happen, he ought to sue by his next friend, if he has not yet been found of unsound mind by inquisition; if he has been, then by his committee, who before commencing the action must obtain the sanc-

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, Master and Servant, p. 358.

<sup>2</sup> *Dixon v. Bell*, 5 Maule & S. 198; *Hall v. Hollander*, 4 B. & C. 660; 7 D. & R. 133; *Evans v. Walton*, L. R. 2 C. P. 615; 15 W. R. 1062.

<sup>3</sup> 7 C. & P. 112; 3 Dowl. 629.



tion of the Lords Justices and of the Master in Lunacy in the proper way.

Lunatics defend an action by their committee, if one be appointed, and if he has no adverse interest; in other cases by a guardian *ad litem* appointed in the same way as in the case of an infant.<sup>1</sup> \* Lunacy is in England no defence to an \* 354 action for slander or libel.<sup>2</sup> In America, however, insanity at the time of speaking the words is considered a defence, "where the derangement is great and notorious, so that the speaking the words could produce no effect on the hearers," because then "it is manifest no damage would be incurred." But where the degree of insanity is slight, or not uniform, there evidence of it is only admissible in mitigation of damages.<sup>3</sup>

A lunatic cannot be held criminally liable for a libel, published under the influence of mental derangement; but the onus of proving this defence lies on the accused.

#### 4. *Bankrupts.*

An undischarged bankrupt may sue for and recover damages for a personal wrong such as libel or slander, nor will such damages pass to his trustee under s. 15 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869.<sup>4</sup> The right of action is not assignable.<sup>5</sup> A defendant if sued by a bankrupt or one whose affairs are actually in liquidation is entitled to have security given for the costs of the action.<sup>6</sup>

#### \* 5. *Receivers.*

\* 355

If receivers appointed by the Court of Chancery in an administration suit to carry on a gazette, publish a libel therein, they are of course personally liable to the defendant for damages and costs. The damages, it would seem, may be paid out of the

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 352, and Order XIII., r. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Per Kelly, C.B., in *Mordaunt v. Mordaunt*, 39 L. J. Prob. & Matr. 59.

<sup>3</sup> *Dickinson v. Barber*, 9 Tyng (Mass.), 218; *Yeates et ux. v. Reed et ux.*, 4 Blackford (Indiana), 463; *Horne v. Marshall's Administratrix*, 5 Munford (Virginia), 466.

<sup>4</sup> *Dowling v. Browne* (1854), 4 Ir. C. L. R. 265; *Ex parte Vine, In re Wilson*, 8 Ch. D. 364; 26 W. R. 582; 38 L. T. 730.

<sup>5</sup> *Benson v. Flower*, Sir Wm. Jones, 215.

<sup>6</sup> Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 142. *Brocklebank & Co. v. King's Lynn Steamship Co.*, 3 C. P. D. 365; 47 L. J. C. P. 321; 38 L. T. 489.

estate, but not the costs ; those the receivers must pay out of their own pocket.<sup>1</sup> So in America.<sup>2</sup>

### 6. *Executors and Administrators.*

The maxim *actio personalis cum personâ moritur* applies to all actions of libel and slander. If, however, a verdict be obtained, and then plaintiff die, his executor may enter up judgment.<sup>3</sup> But if interlocutory judgment be signed and a writ of inquiry issue, and then plaintiff die, final judgment cannot be entered.<sup>4</sup> And the law on this point is in no way altered by Order L., r. 1. But if final judgment has once been entered in the plaintiff's favor, and then defendant appeals, the action will not abate ; but the executors or administrators of the late plaintiff may appear as respondents to the appeal.<sup>5</sup> So in America.<sup>6</sup>

An alien friend residing abroad may sue in England for a libel or slander published of him in England.<sup>7</sup> The place where the words were spoken or published is the test of jurisdiction ; not the domicile of the plaintiff or the defendant.<sup>8</sup> But a foreign plaintiff, if domiciled abroad, will be ordered to give security for costs, unless he either has *real* property within jurisdiction available in execution, or is co-plaintiff with others resident in England. Plaintiffs resident in Scotland and Ireland are not, however, considered foreigners for this purpose.<sup>9</sup>

If, however, an English plaintiff goes to reside out of jurisdiction during the action, he may be ordered to give security for costs, and that for costs already incurred as well as past costs.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, if an alien plaintiff happen to be within jurisdiction at the date of the application, no order for security for

<sup>1</sup> *Stubbs v. Marsh*, 15 L. T. 312.      <sup>2</sup> *Marten v. Van Schaick*, 4 Paige, 479.

<sup>3</sup> 17 Car. II. c. 8 ; *Palmer v. Cohen*, 2 B. & Adol. 966 ; cf. *Kramer v. Waymark*, L. R. 1 Ex. 241 ; 35 L. J. Ex. 148 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 395 ; 14 W. R. 659 ; 14 L. T. 368.

<sup>4</sup> 8 & 9 Will. III. c. 11, s. 6 ; *Ireland v. Champneys*, 4 Taunt. 884.

<sup>5</sup> *Twyeross v. Grant and others* (C. A.), 4 C. P. D. 40 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 676 ; 27 W. R. 87 ; 39 L. T. 618.

<sup>6</sup> *Sandford v. Bennett*, 24 N. Y. 20.

<sup>7</sup> *Pisani v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 90 ; 5 Scott, 418.

<sup>8</sup> Order XI., r. 2.

<sup>9</sup> 31 & 32 Vict. c. 54, s. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Massey v. Allen*, 12 Ch. D. 807 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 692 ; 28 W. R. 243.

costs can be made against him, even though it is admitted that he intends to return to the continent as soon as the case is at an end.<sup>1</sup>

That the plaintiff is an outlaw is ground for staying proceedings.<sup>2</sup> But such stay will be removed on the reversal of the outlawry.<sup>3</sup> But now no person can be outlawed in any civil proceeding.<sup>4</sup>

Every foreigner within jurisdiction for however short \* a time owes the Queen allegiance during his stay, and is \* 357 subject to our laws. He will be liable therefore, both civilly and criminally, for every libel published within the jurisdiction of the English courts; he will also be civilly liable for every slander uttered within jurisdiction. If he has left England before the writ is issued, plaintiff must apply, under Order XI., for leave to issue a writ and give the defendant notice thereof in lieu of service out of the jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup>

But if the words be spoken out of jurisdiction, the fact that they incidentally affect property within jurisdiction is not sufficient to bring the case within Order XI.

### *Illustrations.*

The defendant out of jurisdiction made a statement in the nature of slander of title to the plaintiff's ship. The Court refused to allow the writ to be served, although the ship was at the time within jurisdiction. *Casey v. Arnott*, 2 C. P. D. 24; 46 L. J. C. P. 3; 25 W. R. 46; 35 L. T. 424.

A French refugee in England wrote a stilted poem about the apotheosis of Napoleon Buonaparte, then first consul of the French Republic, suggesting that it would be an heroic deed to assassinate him. He was held amenable to the English criminal law, although the libel was purely political, affecting no one in the British Isles, and attacked the man who was England's greatest enemy at the time. The jury found him guilty; but war broke out again between England and France soon afterwards, and no sentence was ever passed. *R. v. Jean Peltier*, 28 Howell's St. Tr. 617.

<sup>1</sup> *Redondo v. Chaytor* (C. A.), 4 Q. B. D. 453; 48 L. J. Q. B. 697; 27 W. R. 701; 40 L. T. 797.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Lowe and Clements*, 8 Ex. 697; 22 L. J. Ex. 262.

<sup>3</sup> *Somers v. Holt*, 3 Dowl. 506.

<sup>4</sup> 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, s. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Westman v. Aktiebolaget &c.*, 1 Ex. D. 237; 45 L. J. Ex. 327; 24 W. R. 405; *Beddington v. Beddington*, 1 P. D. 426; 45 L. J. P. D. 44; 24 W. R. 348; 34 L. T. 366; *Bustros v. Bustros*, 49 L. J. Ch. 396; 28 W. R. 595. (For the form of such notice see Judicature Act, 1875, Appendix A., form No. 3.)

\* 358 \* 8. *Master and Servant — Principal and Agent.*

If a servant or apprentice be libelled or slandered he can of course sue in his own right. In some cases his master also can sue in an action on the case, if the words have directly caused him pecuniary loss; *e.g.* if the servant has been arrested, and the master deprived of his services in consequence of the defendant's words; or if in any other way the natural consequence of the words spoken has been to injure the master in the way of his trade. And this appears to be the law whether the words be actionable *per se* or not.

*Illustrations.*

If defendant threaten plaintiff's workmen, so that they dare not go on with their work, and the plaintiff in consequence loses the profit he would have made on the sale of his goods, an action lies. *Garret v. Taylor* (1621), Cro. Jac. 567; 1 Roll. Abr. 108; *Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley*, L. R. 6 Eq. 551; 37 L. J. Ch. 889; 16 W. R. 1138; 19 L. T. 64.

"Supposing the statement made not to be slander, but something else calculated to injure the shopkeeper in the way of his trade, as for instance a statement that one of his shopmen was suffering from an infectious disease, such as scarlet-fever, this would operate to prevent people coming to the shop; and whether it be slander or some other statement which has the effect I have mentioned, an action can, in my opinion, be maintained on the ground that it is a statement made to the public which would have the effect of preventing their resorting to the shop and buying goods of the owner." Per Kelly, C.B., in *Riding v. Smith*, 1 Ex. D. 94.

Mrs. Riding assisted her husband in his shop; words not actionable *per se* were spoken of her which by natural consequence injured the trade of the shop. Mrs. Riding sued the speaker, joining her husband for conformity. At the trial it became clear that the only special damage was to the husband. Thereupon the plaintiff's counsel applied to have the wife's name struck off the record. The learned judge made the required amendment, and the action then became an action by a master for injury to his business caused by slander of his assistant in that business. *Held*, that the action lay. *Riding v. Smith*, 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500.

\* 359 \* If any agent or servant be in any way concerned in writing, printing, publishing, or selling a libel, he will be both civilly and criminally liable. If a clerk or servant copy a libel, and deliver the copy he has made to a third person, he will be liable as a publisher. That his master or employer ordered him to do so, will be no defence.<sup>1</sup> "For the warrant of no man, not even of the king himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act; for although the commanders are trespassers, so are also the

<sup>1</sup> Per Wood, B., in *Maloney v. Bartley*, 3 Camp. 210.

persons who did the fact.”<sup>1</sup> The agent or servant cannot recover any contribution from his employer;<sup>2</sup> and any promise to indemnify him against the consequences of the publication, or against the costs of an action brought for the libel, will be void.<sup>3</sup>

But it will be a defence if the agent or servant can satisfy the jury that he never read the paper he delivered and was wholly ignorant that it was a libel; *e.g.* where a postman or messenger carries a sealed letter of the contents of which he is not conscious.

So, too, a servant or agent will be liable for any slander uttered on his master's behalf and by his master's orders: but here he cannot set up as a defence that he did not know his master's orders were illegal; for he must be conscious of what he himself is saying.

### *Illustrations.*

A compositor will be criminally liable for setting up the type of a libel; so will the man whose business it is merely to clap down the press. *R. v. Knell* (1728), 1 Barnard. 305; *R. v. Clerk*, 1 Barnard. 304.

A porter who, in the course of business, delivers parcels containing \*libellous handbills, is not liable in an action for libel, if shown to be ignorant of the contents of the parcel; for he is but doing his duty in the ordinary way. *Day v. Bream*, 2 M. & Rob. 54. \* 360

A master or principal will be liable to an action, if false defamatory words be spoken or published by his servant or agent with his authority and consent. The mere fact that the actual publisher was the servant or agent of the defendant is not alone sufficient; for authority to commit an unlawful act will not in general be presumed. It must be further proved that the servant or agent in speaking or publishing the defamatory words was acting in accordance with the express or implied instructions of the defendant: the wrongful act then becomes the master's by construction, being the servant's in fact.

Where the instructions are express, there can be no difficulty. But the inclination of our Courts has of late years been not to press the doctrine of implied authority so far as was done in older cases. However, it is clear law that the proprietor of a newspaper is both civilly and criminally responsible for whatever appears in its columns, although the publication may have been made without his knowledge, and in his absence. For he must

<sup>1</sup> *Per cur.* in *Sanda, qui tam, &c., v. Child and others* (1693), 3 Lev. 352.

<sup>2</sup> *Merryweather v. Nixan*, 2 Sm. Lg. Cases (8th Edn.), 546; 8 T. R. 186.

<sup>3</sup> *Shackell v. Rosier*, 2 Bing. N. C. 634; 3 Sc. 59.

be taken to have ordered his servants to print and sell whatever manuscript the editor might send them for that purpose. The proprietor trusts to the discretion of the editor to exclude all that is libellous; if the editor fails in this duty, still the paper will be printed and published by the proprietor's servants, by virtue of his general orders. So if a master-printer has contracted to print a monthly magazine, he will be liable for any libel that may appear in any number printed at his office. So every bookseller must be taken to have told his shopmen to sell whatever books or pamphlets are in his shop for sale; if any one contain libellous matter, the bookseller is (*prima facie* at all events) liable for its publication by his servant by reason of such general instructions. But where a master's orders are such

\* 361 that they can be obeyed without any \* illegality, he is not liable because his servant chooses to carry them out illegally and tortiously, even although the servant honestly believes that he is best serving his master's interests by thus executing his business.

But although the master has not authorized the act of the servant, still if it was done for his benefit and on his behalf, he may subsequently *ratify* it. *Omnis ratihabitio priori mandato æquiparatur*. But "in order that there may be a valid ratification, there must be both a knowledge of the fact to be ratified, and an intention to ratify it."<sup>1</sup> The master must do something more than merely stand by, and let the servant act. Non-intervention is not ratification.<sup>2</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

At a meeting of a board of guardians, at which reporters were present, the chairman made a statement reflecting on the plaintiff, and added "I am glad gentlemen of the press are in the room, and I hope they will take notice of it: publicity should be given to the matter." A report accordingly appeared in two local papers. *Held* by the majority of the Exchequer Chamber (three judges against two) that there was some evidence to go to the jury that the defendant had expressly authorized the publication of the alleged libel in the newspapers. *Parkes v. Prescott & another*, L. R. 4 Ex. 169; 38 L. J. Ex. 105; 17 W. R. 773; 20 L. T. 537. See also *R. v. Cooper*, 8 Q. B. 533; 15 L. J. Q. B. 206; *Tarpley v. Blabey*, 2 Bing. N. C. 437; 2 Scott, 642; 1 Hodges, 414.

The defendant's daughter, a minor, was authorized to make out his bills and write his general business letters: she chose to insert libellous matter in one letter. The father was held not liable for the wrongful act of his daughter, in the absence of any direct instructions. *Harding v. Greening*, 8 Taunt. 42; 1 Moore, 477; 1 Holt, N. P. 531. See *Moon v. Towers*, 8 C. B. N. S. 611.

<sup>1</sup> Per Keating, J., in *Edwards v. London & N. W. Ry. Co.*, L. R. 5 C. P. 449.

<sup>2</sup> *Moon v. Towers*, 8 C. B. N. S. 611; *Weston v. Beeman and another*, 27 L. J. Ex. 57.

The defendant Moyes regularly printed *Fraser's Magazine*; but had nothing to do with preparing the illustrations. One number contained a libellous \* lith- \* 362 ographic print. The defendant, the printer, was held liable for this print, though he had never seen it; because it was referred to in a part of the accompanying letterpress, which had been printed by his servants. A rule on this point was refused. The editor was of course liable also. *Watts v. Fraser & Moyes*, 7 C. & P. 369; 7 A. & E. 223; 1 Jur. 671; 1 M. & Rob. 449; 2 N. & P. 157; W. W. & D. 451.

The proprietor of a newspaper will be held liable for an accidental slip made by his printer's man in setting up the type. *Shepherd v. Whitaker*, L. R. 10 C. P. 502; 32 L. T. 402. And for a libellous advertisement inserted by the editor without his knowledge. *Harrison v. Pearce*, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

The proprietor of a newspaper in America on going away for a holiday expressly instructed his acting editor to publish nothing exceptionable, personal or abusive, and warned him especially to scan very particularly any article brought in by B., who was known to be a "smart" writer. The editor permitted an article of B.'s to appear which contained libellous matter. The proprietor was held liable though the publication was made in his absence and without his knowledge. *Dunn v. Hall*, 1 Carter (Indiana), 345; 1 Smith, 288; *Huff v. Bennett*, 4 Sand. (New York) 120; *Curtis v. Mussey*, 6 Gray (Mass.), 261; *Andres v. Wells*, 7 Johns. (New York) 260.

A master or principal is criminally liable for any libel published by his servant or agent with his authority or consent. At common law he is even criminally liable for such libel, although he had no knowledge of what his servant was doing, if his servant was acting in pursuance of general orders. Thus, whenever an employer is civilly liable for a libel published by his servants, he is, apart from Lord Campbell's Act, criminally liable also. Indeed, in *Parkes v. Prescott* and another,<sup>1</sup> Byles, J., asserts that the criminal liability of the master may be more extensive than his civil liability:—"There is a great distinction between the authority which will make a man liable criminally and the authority which will make him liable civilly. A principal is not civilly liable for the acts of his agent, unless the agent's authority be by the agent duly pursued; \* but the princi- \* 363 pal may be criminally liable though the agent have deviated very widely from his authority." And the learned Judge, while approving of *R. v. Cooper*,<sup>2</sup> as a decision in criminal law, refused to follow it as any authority in a civil case. But this view was not adopted by the rest of the Court.

The criminal liability of a master or principal for a libel published by his servant or agent without his knowledge or consent is now defined by s. 7 of Lord Campbell's Act,<sup>3</sup> by which it is

<sup>1</sup> Exch. Ch. L. R. 4 Ex. 169; 38 L. J. Ex. 105; 17 W. R. 773; 20 L. T. 537.

<sup>2</sup> 8 Q. B. 533; 15 L. J. Q. B. 206.

<sup>3</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96.

enacted "that whensoever, upon the trial of any indictment or information for the publication of a libel, under the plea of 'Not Guilty,' evidence shall have been given which shall establish a presumptive case of publication against the defendant by the act of any other person by his authority, it shall be competent to such defendant to prove that such publication was made without his authority, consent, or knowledge, and that the said publication did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part." This enactment applies only to criminal cases, and it may be questioned whether it altered or only declared, the existing criminal law.<sup>1</sup> The only reported case on this section is *R. v. Holbrook and others*.<sup>2</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

The defendant kept a pamphlet-shop : she was sick and upstairs in bed : a libel was brought into the shop without her knowledge, and subsequently sold by her servant on her account. She was held criminally liable for the act of her servant, on the ground that "the law presumes that the master is acquainted with what his servant does in the course of his business." *R. v. Dodd*, 2 Sess. Cas. 33 ; *Nutt's Case*, Fitzg. 47 ; *Barnard*, K. B. 306.

\* 364 \* But I doubt if later judges would have been quite so strict : the sickness upstairs would surely have been held an excuse, even before the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, became law. See *R. v. Almon*, 5 Burr. 2686.

A libel was published in a London newspaper, *The Morning Journal*. At the time of publication, Mr. Gutch, one of the proprietors, was away ill in Worcestershire, in no way interfering with the conduct of the paper, which was managed entirely by Alexander. Lord Tenterden directed the jury to find Gutch guilty, on the ground that it was on his capital that the paper was carried on, that he derived profit from its sale, and he had selected the editor who had actually inserted the libel. Lord Tenterden the next day admitted (p. 438) that some possible case might occur in which the proprietor of a newspaper might be held not criminally answerable for a libel which had appeared in it. Gutch was convicted, but subsequently discharged on his own recognizances. *R. v. Gutch*, Fisher & Alexander, Moo. & Mal. 433 ; *R. v. Walter*, 3 Esp. 21. And see *Attorney-General v. Siddon*, 1 Cr. & J. 220.

The defendants were the proprietors of the *Portsmouth Times and Naval Gazette* ; each of them managed a different department of the newspaper, but the duty of editing what was called the literary department was left by them entirely to an editor whom they had appointed, named Green. The libel in question was inserted in the paper by Green without the express authority, consent, or knowledge of the defendants. At the trial of a criminal information the judge directed a verdict of guilty against the defendants. *Held*, by Cockburn, C.J., and Lush, J., that there must be a new trial, for upon the true construction of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, the libel was published without the defendants' authority, consent, or knowledge, and it was a question for the

<sup>1</sup> See *R. v. Almon*, 5 Burr. 2686.

<sup>2</sup> 3 Q. B. D. 60 ; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35 ; 26 W. R. 144 ; 37 L. T. 530 ; 13 Cox, C. C. 650 ; 4 Q. B. D. 42 ; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113 ; 27 W. R. 313 ; 39 L. T. 536 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 185.



jury whether the publication arose from any want of due care and caution on their part. By Mellor, J., dissenting, that the defendants, having for their own benefit employed an editor to manage a particular department of the newspaper, and given him full discretion as to the articles to be inserted in it, must be taken to have consented to the publication of the libel by him: that 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, had no application to the facts proved, and that the case was properly withdrawn from the jury. *R. v. Holbrook & others*, 3 Q. B. D. 60; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 26 W. R. 144; 37 L. T. 530; 13 Cox, C. C. 650.

On the new trial Green was called as a witness, and stated that he had general authority to conduct the paper, that the defendants left it entirely to his discretion to insert what he pleased, and that he had allowed the letter complained of to appear in the paper without the knowledge or express authority of the defendants, one of whom was absent from Portsmouth at the time. The jury found all the defendants guilty. On a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against evidence, and of misdirection, *Held* by Cockburn, C.J., and Lush, J. (Mellor, J., still dissenting), that the general authority given to the editor was not *per se* evidence that the defendants had authorized or consented to the publication \* of the libel, \* 365 within the meaning of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, and that, as the learned judge at the trial had summed up in terms which might have led the jury to suppose that it was, and the jury had apparently given their verdict on that footing, there must be another new trial. *R. v. Holbrook and others*, 4 Q. B. D. 42; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113; 27 W. R. 313; 39 L. T. 536; 14 Cox, C. C. 185.

The prosecutor, Mr. John Howard, Clerk of the Peace for the borough of Portsmouth, died shortly afterwards, so the proceedings dropped, and no third trial ever took place.

### 9. Partners.

Partners could always jointly sue for a libel defamatory of the firm.<sup>1</sup> But in such an action no damages could formerly have been given for any private injury thereby caused to any individual partner; nor for the injury to the feelings of each member of the firm. Only joint damages could be recovered in the joint action; for the basis of such action was the injury to their joint trade.<sup>2</sup> But now, by virtue of Order XVII., r. 6, "claims by plaintiffs jointly may be joined with claims by them or any of them separately against the same defendant." And see Order XVI., r. 1. Hence it is no longer necessary to bring two actions for the same words; each individual partner may, in any action brought by the firm, recover separate damages for any special injury done to himself, if properly claimed in the statement of claim, the firm at the same time recovering their joint damages.<sup>3</sup> If, however, one

<sup>1</sup> *Ward and another v. Smith*, 6 Bing. 749; 4 C. & P. 302; *Le Fanu v. Malcolmson*, 1 H. L. C. 637.

<sup>2</sup> *Haythorn v. Lawson*, 3 C. & P. 196; *Robinson v. Marchant*, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134.

<sup>3</sup> See *Booth and others v. Briscoe*, 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. R. 838, *post*, p. 370.

partner be defamed as to his private life, the conduct of the firm not being attacked directly or indirectly, nor any special damage resulting to them from defendant's words; then the individual partner should, of course, sue alone.

\* 366 \* Partners may sue or be sued in the name of their firm ;

but any other party to the action may, in such a case, apply by summons to a Master at Chambers or a District Registrar for a statement of the names of the partners in such firm.<sup>1</sup> And where partners are suing in the name of the firm, they must, on demand in writing by or on behalf of the defendant, disclose the names and places of residence of all the persons constituting the firm; the proceedings nevertheless continuing in the name of the firm. If the plaintiffs or their solicitor fail to comply with such demand, a Master at Chambers or District Registrar will stay all proceedings.<sup>2</sup> If both joint and several damages be claimed, the partners should sue in their own names, either with or without the name of the firm.

If a partner conducting the business of a firm causes a libel to be published on a rival firm, the firm will be liable as well as the individual partner. So, if any agent or servant of the firm defames any one by the express direction of the firm, or in accordance with the general orders given by the firm for the conduct of their business.<sup>3</sup> But if there be any doubt as to the liability of the firm, it is always safer to join the individual partner or agent or servant as a co-defendant with the firm.<sup>4</sup> "Any person carrying on business in the name of a firm apparently consisting of more than one person may be sued in the name of such firm."<sup>5</sup> Where partners are sued in the name of their firm they must appear individually in their own names. But all subsequent proceedings continue in the name of the firm.<sup>6</sup> Where judgment

has been obtained against a firm, it may be enforced against  
\* 367 the property either of the\* firm or of any one proved or admitted to be a partner.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Order XVI., r. 10.

<sup>3</sup> See *Master and Servant*, *ante*, p. 360.

<sup>5</sup> Order XVI., r. 10 a.

<sup>7</sup> Order XLII., r. 8.

<sup>2</sup> Order XVII., r. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See Order XVI., r. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Order XII., rr. 12, 12 a.

*Illustrations.*

If one partner be libelled in his private capacity he cannot recover for any special damage which has occurred to the business of the firm. All the partners should sue for that jointly. They may now do so in the same action. *Solomons and others v. Medex*, 1 Stark. 191; *Robinson v. Marchant*, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 156; *Cook and another v. Batchellor*, 3 Bos. & Pul. 150; *Maitland and others v. Goldney and another*, 2 East, 426.

Similarly, if the firm be libelled as a body, they cannot jointly recover for any private injury to a single partner: though that partner may now recover his individual damages in the same action. *Haythorn v. Lawson*, 3 C. & P. 196; *Le Fanu v. Malcolmson*, 1 H. L. C. 637; 13 L. T. 61; 8 Ir. L. R. 418.

But if insolvency be imputed to one member of a firm, this is a reflection on the credit of the firm as well: therefore either he, or the firm, or both may sue, each for their own damages. *Harrison v. Bevington*, 8 C. & P. 708; *Foster and others v. Lawson*, 3 Bing. 452; 11 Moore, 360.

*10. Corporations and Companies.*

A corporation may sue for any libel upon it, as distinct from a libel upon its individual members. (a) It may also sue for a slander upon it in the way of its business or trade. If, however, the corporation be not engaged in any business, it would probably be necessary to prove special damage in any case of slander.

A corporation "could not sue in respect of an imputation of murder, or incest or adultery, because it could not commit those crimes. Nor could it sue in respect of a charge of corruption; for a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption, although the individuals composing it may be."<sup>1</sup>

The law is the same with regard to unincorporated trading companies, which may sue for libel in the manner \* di- \* 368 rected by the special Act creating them, or any statute applicable to them.<sup>2</sup>

Corporations and companies may maintain actions for slander of their title; whether the slander be uttered by one of their own members or by a stranger.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Per Pollock, C.B., 4 H. & N. 90.

<sup>2</sup> *Williams v. Beaumont*, 10 Bing. 260; 3 M. & Scott, 705.

<sup>3</sup> *Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins*, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281; *Trenton Insurance Co. v. Perrine*, 3 Zab. (New Jersey), 402.

(a) *Hahnemannian Life Ins. Co. v. Beebe*, 48 Ill. 87; *Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Ecclesine*, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 9; *Brennan v. Tracy*, 1 Mo. App. 540. So too a criminal prosecution may be instituted for libel upon a corporation, and this without alleging injury to it. *State v. Boogher*, 3 Mo. App. 442; *State v. Atchison*, 3 Lea, 729; *Pharmaceutical Soc. v. London Supply Assoc.*, 5 App. Cas. 869, 870; note 3, next p.

A corporation will not, it is submitted, be liable for any slander uttered by an officer, even though he be acting honestly for the benefit of the company and within the scope of his duties, unless it can be proved that the corporation expressly ordered and directed that officer to say those very words: for a slander is the voluntary and tortious act of the speaker.

A corporation will be liable to an action for a libel published by its servants or agents, whenever such publication comes within the scope of the general duties of such servants or agents, or whenever the corporation has expressly authorized or directed such publication.<sup>1</sup> (a)

Whether a corporation can be guilty of express malice, so as to destroy a *prima facie* privilege arising from the occasion of publication has not yet been decided; but *semble*,<sup>2</sup> it can.

\* 369 \* A corporation can be indicted for libel and fined.<sup>3</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

A joint-stock company incorporated under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, may sue in its own corporate name for words imputing to it insolvency, dishonesty, and mismanagement of its affairs, and this although the defendant be one of its own shareholders. *Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins*, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281.

Where, before the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, a joint-stock insurance company though not incorporated, was authorized by statute to sue in the name of its chairman, it was held that the chairman might bring an action for a libel which attacked the mode in which the company carried on its business. *Williams v. Beaumont*, 10 Bing. 260; 3 M. & Scott, 705.

A railway company was held liable for transmitting a telegram to the effect that the plaintiff's bank had stopped payment. *Whitfield & others v. South Eastern Railway Co.*, E. B. & E. 115; 27 L. J. Q. B. 229; 4 Jur. N. S. 688.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, Master and Servant, p. 360; *Yarborough v. Bank of England*, 16 East, 6; *Latimer v. Western Morning News Co.*, 25 L. T. 44; *Alexander v. N. E. Ry. Co.*, 6 B. & S. 340; 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 11 Jur. N. S. 619; *Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498. And in America, *Aldrich v. Press Printing Co.*, 9 Min. 133.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Campbell, C.J., E. B. & E. 121; 27 L. J. Q. B. 231.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lord Blackburn in *Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association*, 5 App. Cas. 869, 870; 49 L. J. Q. B. 742; 28 W. R. 960; 43 L. T. 389; dissenting from the remarks of Bramwell, L.J., in the Court below, 5 Q. B. D. 313; 49 L. J. Q. B. 338; 28 W. R. 608; 42 L. T. 569.

(a) *Maynard v. Fireman's Ins. Co.*, 47 Cal. 207; *Johnson v. St. Louis Despatch Co.*, 1 Mo. App. 565; s. c. 65 Mo. 539; *Carter v. Howe Machine Co.*, 51 Md. 290; *Howe Machine Co. v. Souder*, 58 Ga. 64.

11. *Other Joint Plaintiffs.*

"All persons may be joined as plaintiffs in whom the right to any relief claimed is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. And judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to, without any amendment. But the defendant, though unsuccessful, shall be entitled to his costs occasioned by so joining any person or persons who shall not be found entitled to relief, unless the Court in disposing of the costs of the action shall \* other- \* 370 wise direct."<sup>1</sup>

By virtue of this rule, an action of libel or slander may now be brought by two or more persons jointly, although they are not in partnership or otherwise jointly interested. (*a*) *Barratt v. Collins*<sup>2</sup> must be considered overruled. The damages in such an action ought to be claimed and assessed separately; but if they be assessed jointly, and the plaintiffs be content with such a verdict, the defendant cannot avail himself of the defect.<sup>3</sup>

The defendant may counter-claim separately against such joint plaintiffs, if the counter-claims can be conveniently disposed of in the same action with the plaintiff's claim.<sup>4</sup>

*Illustrations.*

A charity near Wisbeach was managed by a body of trustees, eight in number. A libellous letter was published in the *Wisbeach Chronicle*, imputing to the trustees misconduct in the management of the funds of the charity. The eight trustees sued the proprietor of the paper in one joint action for the libel. *Held*, that they were empowered so to do by Order XVI., r. 1; although before the Judicature Act, it would never have been allowed. The jury having returned a single verdict for the plaintiffs, damages 40s., the Court of Appeal refused, on the motion of the defendant, to disturb the verdict. *Booth & others v. Briscoe*, 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. R. 838.

Two co-proprietors of a newspaper may sue jointly for a libel on their paper without proving special damage; and the jury may find the damages generally. *Russell and another v. Webster*, 23 W. R. 59.

<sup>1</sup> Order XVI., r. 1. Cf. C. L. P. Act, 1860, s. 19.

<sup>2</sup> 10 Moo. 451.

<sup>3</sup> *Booth and others v. Briscoe*, 2 Q. B. D. 496; 25 W. R. 838.

<sup>4</sup> *Manchester, &c., Ry. Co. and L. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Brooks*, 2 Ex. D. 243; 46 L. J. Ex. 244; 25 W. R. 413; 36 L. T. 103.

(*a*) Probably not in this country. *Hinkle v. Davenport*, 38 Iowa, 355.

12. *Joint Defendants.*

"All persons may be joined as defendants against whom \* 371 the right to any relief is alleged to exist, \* whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. And judgment may be given against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities, without any amendment." <sup>1</sup>

"Where in any action, whether founded upon contract or otherwise, the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants, to the intent that in such action the question as to which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties to the action." <sup>2</sup> Though here, of course, the plaintiff will have to pay the costs of the defendant who proves not liable, unless such defendant has colluded with the other defendant found to be liable, or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct.

"It shall not be necessary that every defendant to any action shall be interested as to all the relief thereby prayed for, or as to every cause of action included therein; but the Court or a Judge may make such order as may appear just to prevent any defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense by being required to attend any proceedings in such action in which he may have no interest." <sup>3</sup>

Under these rules a joint action can now be maintained against two or more persons for slander. Formerly this was impossible.<sup>4</sup> (a) Even if husband and wife uttered similar words simultaneously, there were two separate publications, and an action had to be brought against the husband alone for what he said, against both husband and wife for her words.<sup>5</sup> (b)

<sup>1</sup> Order XVI., r. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Order XVI., r. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Order XVI., r. 4.

<sup>4</sup> *Chamberlain v. White*, Cro. Jac. 647; s. c. *sub nomine* *Chamberlaine v. Willmore*, Palm. 313.

<sup>5</sup> *Burcher v. Orchard et ux.* (1652), Style, 349, *ante*, p. 351; *Swithin et ux. v. Vincent et ux.* (1764), 2 Wils. 227; and in America, *Tait v. Culbertson*, 57 Barb. 9.

(a) See *Woods v. Pangburn*, 75 N. Y. cil, 9 B. Mon. 198. A joint action for 495; *Thomas v. Rumsey*, 6 Johns. 31; libel may be maintained against several. *Giraud v. Beach*, 3 E. D. Smith, 337; *Webb v. Cecil*. *Cooper v. Weed*, 2 How. Pr. 40; *Glass v.* (b) See *Penters v. England*, 1 McCord, Stewart, 10 Serg. & R. 222; *Webb v. Ce-* 14.

\* But with libel it was different; the publication of a \* 372 libel might well be the joint act of two or more persons, who might in such a case be sued either jointly or separately at the election of the plaintiff. Thus, if a husband and wife jointly publish a libel, they might always have been jointly sued.<sup>1</sup> If, however, plaintiff prefers to sue only one defendant when he might have sued others also, the one defendant sued cannot recover any share of damages or costs from the others, who might have been, but are not, sued.<sup>2</sup>

Joint defendants may counter-claim jointly or separately, or one may do so alone, against the plaintiffs jointly, or against one plaintiff separately, or against one plaintiff and a third party.<sup>3</sup>

### *Illustration.*

The members of the committee of the Reform Union were held jointly liable for publishing a report charging the plaintiff and others by name with bribery at the Berwick election. *Wilson v. Reed and others*, 2 F. & F. 149.

<sup>1</sup> *Catterall v. Kenyon*, 3 Q. B. 310; *Keyworth v. Hill*, 3 B. & Ald. 685.

<sup>2</sup> *Colburn v. Patmore*, 1 C. M. & R. 73; 4 Tyr. 677; *Merryweather v. Nixan*, 8 T. R. 186; 2 Sm. L. C. 546; *Moscatti v. Lawson*, 7 C. & P. 32.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix C. to Judicature Act, 1875, Forms of Pleadings, No. 14, Statement of Defence and Counter-claim in an action of Foreclosure. Such a counter-claim will however be, of course, subject to the provisions of Order XIX., r. 3, and Order XXII., r. 9, if it cannot be conveniently disposed of in the pending action.

## CRIMINAL LAW.

OUR attention hitherto has been chiefly directed to the civil action for libel or slander, whereby the person defamed seeks such compensation as damages can afford for the injury done him by the defendant's words. But in all libels, and in some cases of spoken words, the State is also concerned, and interferes to punish the defendant as an offender against the criminal law. (*a*) The evil done by some libels is so extensive, the example set so pernicious, that it is desirable that they should be repressed for the public good. Slanders do less mischief as a rule, are not permanent, and are more easily forgotten; their evil influence is not so widely diffused. As a rule, therefore, no spoken words are treated as a crime. Another reason often assigned for the interference of the State is, that libels conduce to a breach of the peace; but that reason would, I think, apply with equal, if not greater force, to slanders.

Criminal proceedings for libel may be taken either at common law, or under certain statutes; the remedy may be either by indictment or information; though informations are only granted in urgent cases, where the publication of the libel is likely to produce great public mischief and must therefore be promptly suppressed.

The fact that libel is a crime as well as a tort, produces other  
 \* 374 \* consequences in law which it may be well to briefly notice here, though they are not strictly within the scope of the present treatise.

No action can be maintained for the price of libellous pictures,<sup>1</sup> or for their value, if destroyed by the person ridiculed.<sup>2</sup> A printer cannot recover

<sup>1</sup> *Fores v. Johnes*, 4 Esp. 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Du Bost v. Beresford*, 2 Camp. 511.

(*a*) See *e.g.* *State v. Avery*, 7 Conn. 266; *Commonwealth v. Chapman*, 13 Met. 68; *State v. Burnham*, 9 N. H. 34; *Hodges v. State*, 5 Humph. 112; *State v. White*, 6 Ired. 418; *State v. Henderson*, 1 Rich. 179; *Gilbert v. People*, 1 Denio, 41; *Commonwealth v. Sweney*, 10 Serg. & R. 173.



for printing a libel.<sup>1</sup> If a printer undertakes to print a book for a certain price, and discovers as the work proceeds that the matter is defamatory, he may decline to continue the work, and can recover for the part of the work which is not defamatory in an action for work and labor done and materials provided, the special contract notwithstanding.<sup>2</sup> Nor can an action be maintained for breach of a contract to furnish manuscript of defamatory matter,<sup>3</sup> or of a contract to let rooms to be used for the delivery of blasphemous lectures,<sup>4</sup> or for pirating a libellous book.<sup>5</sup> There is no copyright in any libellous or immoral book, or picture. A Court of Equity will not interfere in one way or another. It will not grant an injunction to restrain a piracy of an illegal book or picture, nor decree an account of the profits made thereby.<sup>6</sup>

No contract will be *implied* to indemnify a party against the consequences of an illegal act, such as the publication of a libel.<sup>7</sup> And *semble* the proprietor of a newspaper convicted and fined for the publication of a libel which was inserted in his paper without his knowledge or consent by the editor, has no right of action against the editor for the damages sustained through such conviction.<sup>8</sup> Even an express promise to indemnify another if he will publish a libel is void;<sup>9</sup> for it is a promise on an illegal executory consideration, an incitement to do an illegal act. But it has been decided in America that \*an express promise to indemnify \* 375 another against the consequences of an illegal act already done is binding.<sup>10</sup>

### I. *Criminal Remedy by Indictment.*

It is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable on indictment with fine and imprisonment, to speak any blasphemous, obscene, or seditious words in the hearing of others. *A fortiori*, it is such misdemeanor to write and publish blasphemous, obscene, or seditious words.

It is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable on indictment

<sup>1</sup> Poplett v. Stockdale, Ry. & M. 337; Bull v. Chapman, 8 Ex. 104.

<sup>2</sup> Clay v. Yates, 1 H. & N. 73; 25 L. J. Ex. 237; 4 W. R. 557; 27 L. T. (Old S.) 126. <sup>3</sup> Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark. 107.

<sup>4</sup> Cowan v. Milbourn, L. R. 2 Ex. 230; 36 L. J. Ex. 124; 15 W. R. 750; 16 L. T. 290.

<sup>5</sup> Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 5 B. & C. 173; 7 D. & R. 625; 2 C. & P. 163.

<sup>6</sup> Per Lord Eldon, in Walcot v. Walker, 7 Ves. 1; in Southey v. Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435, and in Lawrence v. Smith, Jacob, 471.

<sup>7</sup> Shackell v. Rosier, 3 Sc. 59; 2 Bing. N. C. 634.

<sup>8</sup> Colburn v. Patmore, 1 C. M. & R. 73; 4 Tyr. 677.

<sup>9</sup> Arnold v. Clifford, 2 Sumner, 238.

<sup>10</sup> Griffiths v. Hardenburgh, 41 N. Y. 469; Howe v. Buffalo & Erie Rail. Co., 38 Barbour (N. Y.), 124.

with fine and imprisonment, to write and publish defamatory words of any living person; or exhibit any picture or effigy defamatory of him.

It is not a crime merely to speak such words, however maliciously.

Whatever words would be deemed defamatory of a living person in any civil action will be held a libel on the trial of an indictment. All the rules laid down in Chapters II., III., VIII., IX., as to *Bona Fide* Comment, Construction and Certainty, Privilege, and Malice, apply equally to civil and criminal proceedings.

But a libel on a *thing* is no crime; and wherever no action would lie without proof of special damage, clearly no indictment can be preferred.

It will be an aggravation of the offence, if the person libelled be a foreign prince, statesman or ambassador; for such a libel would embarrass the government, and might disturb the friendly relations between England and that foreign country.<sup>1</sup>

It is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable on indictment with fine and imprisonment, to write and publish defamatory words of any person deceased; (a) \* provided it be alleged and proved that this was done with intent to bring contempt and scandal on his family and relations and provoke them to a breach of the peace.<sup>2</sup>

It will also be such misdemeanor to libel any sect, company or class of men, without mentioning any person in particular; provided it be alleged and proved that such libel tends to excite the hatred of the people against all belonging to such sect or class, and conduces to a breach of the peace.<sup>3</sup>

Such intention may sufficiently appear from the words of the libel itself, or it may be proved by the consequences that have followed from its publication.

The criminal remedy for libel, as it is the earlier, so it is the more extensive remedy; a libel may be indictable, though it be not actionable. Thus in neither of the above cases would an action lie, for want of a proper plaintiff.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, p. 383.

<sup>2</sup> Hawkins, P.C., i. 58; 5 Rep. 125 a; R. v. Topham, 4 T. R. 129.

<sup>3</sup> R. v. Gathercole, 2 Lewin, C. C. 254.      <sup>4</sup> And see R. v. Darby, 3 Mod. 139.

(a) More v. Bennett, 48 N. Y. 472; Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 168.

*Illustrations.*

Libel complained of: "On Saturday evening died of the small-pox at his house in Grosvenor Square, Sir Charles Gaunter Nicoll, Knight of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, and representative in Parliament for the town of Peterborough. . . . He could not be called a friend to his country, for he changed his opinions for a red ribbon, and voted for that pernicious object, the excise." It was alleged that this passage was published with intent to vilify, blacken and defame the memory of the said Sir Charles, and to stir up the hatred and evil will of the people against the family and posterity of the said Sir Charles. An information was granted. *R. v. Critchley* (1734), 4 T. R. 129, n.

But an indictment which alleged that a libel on the late Earl Cowper had been published with intent to disgrace and vilify his memory, reputation, and character, but did not go on to aver any intent to create ill blood or throw scandal on the children and family of Earl Cowper, or to provoke them to a breach of the peace, was held bad, after a verdict of guilty, and judgment arrested. *R. v. Topham*, 4 T. R. 126.

\* And, *à fortiori*, to discuss the characters of deceased statesmen and noble- \* 377 men, as a matter of history, is no crime. Per Lord Kenyon, C.J., *ib.* 129.

But if in discussing the character and policy of William III. and George I., discredit is thrown on the character and administration of the present king (George II.), with intent to spread dissatisfaction among his subjects, the publication is a seditious libel. *R. v. Dr. Shebbeare* (1758), cited in Lord Mansfield's judgment in *R. v. Dean of St. Asaph*, 3 T. R. 430, n.

The defendant published a sensational account of a cruel murder committed by certain Jews said to have lately arrived from Portugal, and then living near Broad Street. They were said to have burnt a woman and a new-born baby, because its father was a Christian. Certain Jews who had arrived from Portugal, and who then lived in Broad Street, were attacked by the mob, barbarously treated, and their lives endangered. A criminal information was granted, although it was objected that it did not appear precisely who were the persons accused of the murder. *R. v. Osborne*, Kel. 230; 2 Barnard, 138, 166.

It is a crime to write of a Roman Catholic nunnery that it is a "brothel of prostitution;" for this is an aspersion on the characters of the nuns in general, though none are singled out by name. *R. v. Gathercole*, 2 Lew. C. C. 254.

A pamphlet reflecting on the government and asserting that its officers are corrupt, ignorant, and incapable, will be a libel, and punishable as a crime; although no particular member of the government, and no individual officer, is mentioned or referred to. *R. v. Tutchin*, 14 Howell's St. Tr. 1095; 5 St. Tr. 527; Holt, 56; 2 Lord Raym. 1061; Salk. 50; 6 Mod. 268.

A notice was posted in church calling attention to certain abuses permitted by "the trustees" of Lambeth workhouse; an information was granted on behalf of the whole body of trustees [although the trustees could not before the Judicature Act have jointly sued for the libel, *ante*, p. 370]. *R. v. Griffin*, 1 Sess. Cas. 257.

An information was granted for a libel commencing:—"Whereas an East India director has raised the price of green tea to an extravagant rate," although there was nothing to show which particular director was intended. *R. v. Jenour*, 7 Mod. 400.

But an indictment for a libel on "persons to the jurors unknown" is bad, even after verdict. *R. v. Orme (vel Alme) & Nutt*, 1 Ld. Raym. 486; 3 Salk. 224.

It is a misdemeanor at common law to utter words which amount to a direct challenge to fight a duel, or to utter insulting

words with the intention of provoking another to send a  
 \* 378 challenge.<sup>1</sup> \* *A fortiori*, it is a misdemeanor to write a  
 challenge or to consciously deliver a written challenge.  
 And indeed all words which amount to a solicitation to commit  
 a crime, whether spoken or written, are indictable, whether the  
 person solicited commit the crime or not.<sup>2</sup>

It is also said to be a misdemeanor to fabricate and publish false news  
 in writing,<sup>3</sup> or to endeavor, by spreading false rumors, to raise or lower the  
 price of food or merchandise.<sup>4</sup> According to Scroggs, J., it is a misde-  
 meanor to publish any news at all, though true and harmless.<sup>5</sup> Where  
 eight persons combined to raise the price of Government stocks on Feby.  
 21st, 1814, by spreading a false rumor of the death of Napoleon Buona-  
 parte, they were indicted and convicted of a conspiracy, for their common  
 purpose was illegal.<sup>6</sup> But this is scarcely an authority for holding that the  
 merely spreading a false rumor is in itself indictable.

In all the above cases of misdemeanor at common law, the de-  
 fendant may be fined or imprisoned, or both; but he cannot be  
 sentenced to hard labor. He may also be required to find sure-  
 ties to keep the peace and to be of good behavior for any length of  
 time. A married woman could not, before the Married Women's  
 Property Act, be fined; but she could be required to find sure-  
 ties, though she could not enter into recognizances herself.

None of the above offences can be tried at Quarter Sessions.

Certain statutes have been passed in aid of the common law:—

By the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 3, it is a misdemeanor to publish,  
 or threaten to publish, any libel upon any other person,  
 \* 379 or to threaten to publish, or propose to \* abstain from pub-  
 lishing, or to offer to prevent the publishing of, any matter  
 or thing touching another, with intent to extort money, or gain,  
 or to procure for any one any appointment or office of profit.  
 The offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any term  
 not exceeding three years, either with or without hard labor.  
 Except under the first clause of the section the matter or thing  
 threatened to be published need not be libellous; the intent to  
 extort money is the gist of the offence.<sup>7</sup> But the commencement

<sup>1</sup> R. v. Philipps, 6 East, 464, and note on p. 476.

<sup>2</sup> R. v. Higgins, 2 East, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Dig. L. L. 23.

<sup>4</sup> See R. v. Waddington (1800), 1 East, 143.

<sup>5</sup> See 11 Hargrave's St. Tr. 322.

<sup>6</sup> R. v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67.

<sup>7</sup> R. v. Coghlan, 4 F. & F. 316.

of legal proceedings is not "a publishing of any matter or thing" within the meaning of the section.<sup>1</sup>

By the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 4, it is a misdemeanor to maliciously publish any defamatory libel knowing the same to be false; the punishment may be fine or imprisonment, or both, such imprisonment not to exceed two years.

By the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 5, it is a misdemeanor to maliciously publish any defamatory libel; the punishment may be fine or imprisonment, or both, such imprisonment not to exceed one year.<sup>2</sup>

By the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, ss. 46, 47, it is a felony to accuse or threaten to accuse another of any infamous crime, whether by letter or otherwise, with intent to extort money or gain. The offender may for each letter he has sent be sentenced to penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than three years,<sup>3</sup> or to imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for any term not exceeding two years.<sup>4</sup>

## \* II. *Criminal Remedy by Information.*

\* 380

In some cases of indictable words, the prosecutor may also, if he prefer, proceed by way of Criminal Information.

Criminal Informations are of two kinds: —

- (i) Those filed by the Attorney-General himself, usually called *ex officio* informations.
- (ii) Those filed by the Master of the Crown Office by the direction of the Queen's Bench Division at the instance of some private individual.

(i) The first class is, as a rule, confined to libels of so dangerous a nature as to call for immediate suppression by the officers of the State; especially blasphemous, obscene, or seditious libels, or such as are likely to cause immediate outrage and public riot and disturbance. In these cases, therefore, the Attorney-General himself takes the initiative. There has been no *ex officio* information filed since 1830.

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Yates* and another, 12 Cox, C. C. 441.

<sup>2</sup> See the whole Statute in Appendix C., *post*, p. 674.

<sup>3</sup> Now *five* years, 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, s. 2.

<sup>4</sup> See *R. v. Redman*, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 12; 39 L. J. M. C. 89; *R. v. Ward*, 10 Cox, C. C. 42; and before this Act, *R. v. Southerton*, 6 East, 126.

(ii) In the second class of informations the relator is generally some private individual who has been defamed. But still the words complained of must be such as call for the prompt and immediate interference of the Court. There must be some evidence that the ordinary remedies by action or indictment are insufficient in the particular case. The Court, moreover, always looks at all the circumstances which occasioned or provoked the libel. Thus, if the prosecutor or relator has himself libelled the defendant,<sup>1</sup> or in any way invited the publication of the libel of which he now complains,<sup>2</sup> or had an opportunity of expressing his \* 381 disapproval of its terms, of which \* he did not avail himself,<sup>3</sup> no information will be granted.

It is not necessary that the libel should charge a criminal offence, to induce the Court to grant a criminal information. It is enough that the libel, though on a private individual, is one requiring prompt suppression. The rank and dignity of the person libelled was formerly taken into consideration; and informations have been granted for imputing that the children of a marquis were bastards;<sup>4</sup> that a peer had married an actress;<sup>5</sup> that a naval captain was a coward, a bishop a bankrupt, a peer a perjurer, &c., &c. So, too, where foreign potentates or their ambassadors are libelled, an information will be readily granted, lest ill-feeling should spring up between England and that foreign country.

Again, for any libels tending to obstruct the course of justice, for invectives against a judge or magistrate, or imputations on a jury, an information will be readily granted; and so for all reflections on the administration of justice, and for all publications tending to prejudice the fair trial of any accused person.<sup>6</sup>

So if there be general reflections on a body or class, no particular individual being specially attacked, still if the words are likely to cause outrage and violence, the Court will grant an information: as where the libel was on the Jews, and certain Jews in consequence had been ill-used by the mob;<sup>7</sup> so where the

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Nottingham Journal*, 9 Dowl. 1042.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Larrieu*, 7 A. & E. 277.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Lawson*, 1 Q. B. 486.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Gregory*, 8 A. & E. 907.

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Kinnersley*, 1 Wm. Bl. 294.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Watson and others*, 2 T. R. 199, *post*, p. 428; *R. v. Jolliffe*, 4 T. R. 285; *R. v. White*, 1 Camp. 359; *Ex parte Duke of Marlborough*, 5 Q. B. 955; 13 L. J. M. C. 105; 1 Dav. & Mer. 720; *R. v. Gray*, 10 Cox, C. C. 184.

<sup>7</sup> *Anon.*, 2 Barnard. 138; *R. v. Osborn*, *ib.* 166, *ante*, p. 377.

general \* body of clergymen in a particular diocese were \* 382 libelled.<sup>1</sup>

But no information will be granted for a libel contained in a private letter never made public;<sup>2</sup> nor for any matter of mere trade dispute, even though fraud be imputed; nor in any case where no malicious intention appears;<sup>3</sup> nor where the matter is trivial and the civil remedy sufficient.

*A fortiori*, no information will be granted where the words are privileged by reason of the occasion on which they were employed.<sup>4</sup>

In every case the application for a criminal information must be made promptly; any delay in making the application after knowledge of the libel has reached the prosecutor will be ground for refusing an information, unless such delay can be satisfactorily accounted for. The prosecutor, too, must come to the court in the first instance, and must not have attempted to obtain redress in other ways before applying for a criminal information.

### *Illustrations.*

A county court judge illegally refused to hear a barrister who appeared before him. The barrister memorialized the Lord Chancellor. Obtaining no redress, he applied to the Court of Queen's Bench for a criminal information. This would have been granted him, had he not previously applied to the Lord Chancellor. *R. v. Marshall*, 4 E. & B. 475.

An information was refused where the alleged libel was proved to be a true copy of a report of a committee of the House of Commons, though it did reflect on the individual prosecutor, and though its publication was not authorized by the House. *R. v. Wright* (1799), 8 T. R. 293.

A French gentleman D'Eon de Beaumont published a libel on the Count de Guerchy, then French Ambassador in England. The libel chiefly referred to private disputes between D'Eon and the Count, alleging that the Count had supplanted D'Eon at the Court of Versailles by trickery; but it also reflected on the public conduct of the ambassador, and insinuated \* that he was not fit for his post. An \* 383 information was filed and D'Eon convicted. (Lord Mansfield.) *R. v. D'Eon* (1764), 3 Burr. 1514; 1 W. Bl. 501; Dig. L. L. 88. And see *R. v. Peltier* (1803), 28 Howell's St. Tr. 617; *ante*, p. 357.

Lord George Gordon was tried in 1787 and convicted upon an information charging him with libelling Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, and "her tool" the French Ambassador in London. He was fined £500 and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, and at the expiration of that time to find sureties for his good behavior. This he could not do: so he turned Jew and died in prison on November 1st, 1793. (Ashurst, J.) *R. v. Lord George Gordon*, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 177.

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Williams*, 5 B. & Ald. 595.

<sup>2</sup> *Ex parte Dale*, 2 C. L. R. 870

<sup>3</sup> *Ex parte Doveton*, 26 L. T. 73.

<sup>4</sup> *Ex parte Hoare*, 23 L. T. 83.

The *Courier* published the following passage: — “The Emperor of Russia is rendering himself obnoxious to his subjects by various acts of tyranny, and ridiculous in the eyes of Europe by his inconsistency. He has now passed an edict prohibiting the exportation of timber, deals and other naval stores. In consequence of this ill-timed law, upwards of 100 sail of vessels are likely to return to this country without freights.” This was deemed a libel upon the Emperor Paul I.; an information was granted, and the proprietor of the *Courier* was fined £100, sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, and to find sureties for good behavior for five years from the expiration of that term. The printer and publisher were also sentenced to one month’s imprisonment. (Lord Kenyon, C.J.) *R. v. Vint* (1799), 27 Howell’s St. Tr. 627.

### III. *Law Common to all Criminal Cases.*

It must be proved that the defendant published the defamatory words. In civil cases it is necessary to show a publication to some third person other than the person defamed. In criminal cases this is not absolutely necessary; (a) it is sufficient to prove a publication to the prosecutor himself, provided it be alleged and proved, that the defendant did so with intent “to provoke the prosecutor, and excite him to break the peace.”<sup>1</sup>

In all other respects the law as to publication is practically identical in civil and criminal cases.<sup>2</sup>

\* 384 \* Thus both author, printer and publisher are each and all liable to be prosecuted for a libel contained in any book or newspaper. In the latter case the proprietor of the newspaper will also be liable. Every fresh publication of a libel is a fresh crime. The sale of every separate copy of a libel is a distinct offence.<sup>3</sup> “Not only the party who originally prints, but every party who utters, who sells, who gives, or who lends a copy of an offensive publication will be liable to be prosecuted as a publisher.”<sup>4</sup> “The mere delivery of a libel to a third person by one conscious of its contents amounts to a publication, and is an indictable offence.”<sup>5</sup>

In the last extract, the learned Baron is careful to insert the words “by one conscious of its contents.” For although any

<sup>1</sup> Per Abbott, J., in *R. v. Wegener*, 2 Stark. 245. And see *Hicks’ case*, Hob. 215; Poph. 139; cited 6 East, 476; *Clutterbuck v. Chaffers*, 1 Stark. 471.

<sup>2</sup> See c. VI., *ante*, pp. 150–168.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Carlile*, 1 Chitty, 453.

<sup>4</sup> Per Bayley, J., in *R. v. Carlile*, 3 B. & Ald. 169.

<sup>5</sup> Per Wood, B., in *Maloney v. Bartley*, 3 Camp. 213.

(a) Upon this subject see *State v. Avery*, 112; *Swindle v. State*, 2 Verg. 581; *Hazleton Coal Co. v. Megargel*, 4 Barr. 324. 7 Conn. 268; *Hodges v. State*, 5 Humph.



delivery to a third person will amount to a *prima facie* publication, it is open to the defendant to prove, both in civil and criminal cases, that he delivered the libel without any knowledge of the libellous nature of its contents: *e.g.*, where a postman or messenger carries a sealed letter<sup>1</sup> or a parcel in which libellous handbills were wrapped up,<sup>2</sup> or where the defendant cannot read.<sup>3</sup> And even if the defendant read the libel, still if the words were on the face of them innocent, and only became defamatory when their meaning was pointed by certain extrinsic facts and circumstances wholly unknown to the defendant, then he would still be unconscious that what he published was a libel, and such a publication would be deemed innocent; as where the libel was contained in an allegory or a riddle, to which the defendant had \* no clue. Again, where the defendant copied \* 385 a libel knowing it to be a libel, and afterwards inadvertently delivered such copy to a third person in mistake for some other paper, it is submitted that he would not be held criminally liable for such an accident, though he would be held liable in a civil case.<sup>4</sup>

A master will be liable criminally for the acts of his servant done in the ordinary course of his employment in pursuance of his master's orders, general or express. The liability of a defendant for such constructive publication is now defined by the 7th section of Lord Campbell's Act,<sup>5</sup> which, however, rather declared than altered the existing law: — "Whensoever, upon the trial of any indictment or information for the publication of a libel, under the plea of not guilty, evidence shall have been given which shall establish a presumptive case of publication against the defendant by the act of any other person by his authority, it shall be competent to such defendant to prove that such publication was made without his authority, consent or knowledge, and that the said publication did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part."

The section only says that evidence may be given of such facts ;

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Kenyon in *R. v. Topham*, 4 T. R. 129.

<sup>2</sup> *Day v. Bream*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lord Kenyon, C.J., in *R. v. Holt*, 5 T. R. 444.

<sup>4</sup> See the dicta of Lord Kenyon in *R. v. Topham*, 4 T. R. 129; and in *R. v. Lord Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 228; and the ruling of Abbott, C.J., in *R. v. Harvey*, 2 B. & C. 257.

<sup>5</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96.

but it has always been construed to mean that such facts, if proved, shall be an answer to the indictment; for such evidence was always admissible at common law in mitigation of punishment (if not in defence). I can only find one case reported in which a defendant has availed himself of this statutory defence, and that is *R. v. Holbrook and others*.<sup>1</sup>

Merely to be in possession of a copy of a libel is no crime, unless some publication thereof ensue. *R. v. Beere*, Carth. 409; 12 Mod. 219; Holt, 422; Salk. 417; 1 Lord Raym. 414; John Lamb's Case, 9 Rep. 60; *ante*, p. 156. Overruling *R. v. Algernon Sidney*, 9 Howell's St. Tr. 817, 867; 3 Hargrave's St. Tr. 807; 4 St. Tr. 197.

As soon as the manuscript of a libel has passed out of the defendant's possession and control, it is deemed to be published, so far as the defendant is concerned. Per Holroyd, J., in *R. v. Burdett*, 4 B. & Ald. 143.

A libel was printed and published; the printer produced the manuscript from which he had printed it, and this manuscript was proved to be in the handwriting of the prisoner; there was no evidence to show that he authorized or directed the printing or publishing. This is evidence of publication sufficient to go to the jury, though the prisoner may give evidence to rebut it. *R. v. Lovett*, 9 C. & P. 462.

Cooper told the editor several good stories against the Rev. J. K., and asked the editor to "show Mr. K. up;" subsequently the editor published the substance of them in the newspaper; this was held a publication by Cooper, although the editor knew of the facts from other quarters as well. *R. v. Cooper*, 15 L. J. Q. B. 206; 8 Q. B. 533.

The defendant was the proprietor of *The Times*, but resided in the country, leaving the management of the paper entirely to his son, with whom he never interfered. A libel on the late Lord Cowper having appeared therein, the defendant was held criminally liable, and convicted. *R. v. Walter*, 3 Esp. 21. And see *R. v. Gutch, Fisher & Alexander*, Mo. & Mal. 433.

A rule was granted, calling on Wiatt to show cause why he should not be attached for selling a book containing a libel on the Court of King's Bench. The book was in Latin. On filing an affidavit that he did not understand Latin, and on giving up the name of the printer from whom he obtained it, and the name of the author, the rule was discharged. *R. v. Wiatt* (1722), 8 Mod. 123.

The defendant was a bookseller, who published a seditious libel written by the Rev. Gilbert Wakefield; he was convicted, but filed an affidavit in mitigation of punishment that he had no knowledge whatever of the nature of the book or its contents; he was accordingly discharged on payment of a fine of thirty marks. The Rev. Gilbert Wakefield was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. *R. v. Cuthell* (1799), 27 Howell's St. Tr. 642.

\* There appeared in *Mist's Weekly Journal*, an account professedly of certain intrigues, &c., at the Persian Court; but any reader of ordinary intelligence could see that it was the English Court that the author really meant, that the Sultan "Esreff" was intended for George II., his father the late Sultan "Merewits" for

<sup>1</sup> 3 Q. B. D. 60; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 26 W. R. 144; 37 L. T. 530; 4 Q. B. D. 42; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113; 27 W. R. 313; 39 L. T. 536, *ante*, pp. 364, 5.

George I., "Sophi" for the Pretender, &c., &c. The two compositors who set it up divided the work between them, one taking one column, the other the next. It was almost impossible that thus they could gain any notion of the general sense of what they were printing. Yet one of them was convicted of publishing a seditious libel; and so was the servant whose business "was only to clap down the press." *R. v. Knell* (1728), 1 Barnard. 305; *R. v. Clerk*, *ib.* 304.

In Massachusetts it has been held that the publisher of a newspaper is not liable for publishing an article which he reasonably and *bona fide* believes to be a fancy sketch or a fictitious narrative, in no way applicable to any living person; although the writer intended it to be libellous of the plaintiff. Probably this would be a defence in England in a criminal case; not I apprehend in any civil proceeding. *Smith v. Ashley* (1846), 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 367; *Dexter v. Spear*, 4 Mason, 115. See *Chubb v. Flanagan*, 6 C. & P. 431.

Rev. Samuel Paine sent his servant to his study for a certain paper which he wished to show Brereton; the servant by mistake brought a libellous epitaph on Queen Mary which Paine inadvertently handed to Brereton. This would probably be deemed a sufficient publication in a civil case (note to *Mayne v. Fletcher*, 4 Man. & Ry. 312), but was held insufficient in a criminal case. *R. v. Paine* (1695), 5 Mod. 163. See the remarks of Lord Kenyon in *R. v. Lord Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 228.

A libel appeared in the *Man of the World* of May 11th. On May 25th the defendant was appointed publisher of the paper and the back-stock was sent to his office. On December 13th the relator's agent applied at the defendant's office for a copy of the number for March 11th and the defendant told his assistant to look it up and deliver it, which was done. The defendant swore that he had not examined the back numbers at all and knew nothing of the libel. The Lord Chief Justice intimated that in those circumstances no jury would ever find the defendant guilty of criminally publishing the libel. *R. v. Barnard*, *Ex parte* Lord Ronald Gower, *Times* for Jan. 13th, 1879.

A defendant on the trial of any information or indictment may give evidence to show that the alleged libel was privileged by reason of the occasion; and, unless such privilege be absolute, the prosecutor may rebut \* this defence by evidence \* 388 of express malice; precisely as in civil cases; *ante*, cc. VIII. and IX.

Except in such cases of privilege it is quite unnecessary to prove malice in any criminal proceeding for a defamatory libel; it is enough that the defendant published that which the jury have found to be a libel. After conviction, however, the defendant is allowed to file affidavits in mitigation of punishment, showing that he honestly believed in the truth of what he wrote, and published it without malice.<sup>1</sup>

The law is otherwise in Scotland; there malice must be proved in all criminal proceedings, though it need never be in civil.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Sir F. Burdett*, 3 B. & Ald. 95.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Hume, 342; Borthwick, 190, 195.

But it is in the matter of justification that the main difference lies between civil and criminal proceedings. In a civil trial, as we have seen, *ante*, c. VII., the truth of the matters charged in a libel was always a perfect answer to the action ; the plaintiff was never allowed to recover damages for an injury done to a reputation to which he had no right. But in all criminal proceedings, by the common law, the truth of the libel constitutes no defence. The maxim used to be "the greater the truth, the greater the libel ;" meaning that the injudicious publication of the truth about A. would be more likely to sting him to a breach of the peace than if some falsehood were invented about him, which he could easily and completely refute. Accordingly, on a criminal trial, whether of an indictment or an information, no evidence could be received of the truth of the matters charged, not even in mitigation of punishment. But now, by the 6th section of Lord Campbell's Act,<sup>1</sup> "On the trial of any indictment or information for a defamatory libel, the defendant having pleaded

\* 389 \* such plea as hereinafter mentioned, the truth of the matters charged may be inquired into, but shall not amount to a defence, unless it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published. To entitle the defendant to give evidence of the truth of such matters charged as a defence to such indictment or information, it shall be necessary for the defendant, in pleading to the said indictment or information, to allege the truth of the said matters charged in the manner now required in pleading a justification to an action for defamation, and further to allege that it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published, and the particular fact or facts by reason whereof it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published ; to which plea the prosecutor shall be at liberty to reply generally, denying the whole thereof. If after such plea the defendant shall be convicted on such indictment or information, it shall be competent to the Court, in pronouncing sentence, to consider whether the guilt of the defendant is aggravated or mitigated by the said plea and by the evidence given to prove or disprove the same : Provided always that the truth of the matters charged in the alleged libel complained of by such indictment or information, shall in no case be inquired into without such plea of justification : Provided also, that, in

<sup>1</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96.

addition to such plea, it shall be competent to the defendant to plead a plea of not guilty: Provided also, that nothing in this Act contained shall take away or prejudice any defence under the plea of not guilty, which it is now competent to the defendant to make under such plea to any action or indictment, or information for defamatory words or libel." (a)

And here note that there is still a most important distinction between civil and criminal cases on this point. The mere truth is an answer to a civil action, however \* maliciously \* 390 and unnecessarily the words were published. But in a criminal case, the defendant has to prove, not only that his assertions are true, but also that it was for the public benefit that they should be published. Moreover, the statute does not apply in cases of blasphemous, obscene, or seditious words.<sup>1</sup> It does not apply, by its express terms, unless there be a special plea of justification. In short, the truth of the matter complained of "can only become a defence under the statute, and then only when the statutory conditions are complied with." Wherever the Act does not apply, the law remains still as it was settled prior to that Act. Hence a magistrate at the preliminary investigation of a charge of libel, whether under s. 5 of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, or at common law, has no power to receive and perpetuate any evidence of the truth of the matters charged.<sup>2</sup>

Thus we see that there are two criminal remedies for libel — by criminal information and by indictment, — in addition to the civil remedy of action for damages. That there should be a criminal remedy as well as a civil one is clearly necessary, for most libellers are penniless, and a civil action has no terrors for them. The plaintiff will never get his damages. In fact — as it appears from a recent case — the proprietor of many a low newspaper rather rejoices at the prospect of a civil action for libel being brought against him. He regards it as a gratuitous advertisement for his

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Duffy*, 2 Cox, C. C. 45.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Townsend*, 4 F. & F. 1089; 10 Cox, C. C. 356; *R. v. Sir Robert Carden*, 5 Q. B. D. 1; 49 L. J. M. C. 1; 28 W. R. 133; 41 L. T. 504; 14 Cox, C. C. 359.

(a) Upon this subject of the truth of the charge see 2 Wharton, *Crim. Law*, §§ 1643-1647; *State v. Burnham*, 9 N. H. 34; *Commonwealth v. Blanding*, 3 Pick. 304; *Commonwealth v. Snelling*, 15 Pick. 337; *State v. Allen*, 1 McCord, 525; *Gage v. Robinson*, 12 Ohio, 250; *Castle v. Houston*, 19 Kans. 417. The exception in the Massachusetts statute of libel that the truth shall be deemed a justification "unless malicious intention shall be proved" applies to civil as well as to criminal cases. *Perry v. Porter*, 124 Mass. 338.

paper, calculated to increase its circulation in these degenerate days. It is clear, therefore, that there must be a criminal as well as a civil remedy for libel.

But is it essential that there should be *two* criminal remedies? Having regard to the number of criminal prosecutions for libel in the present day, and to the recent decision in Labouchere's case,<sup>1</sup> it deserves con-  
 \* 391 sideration whether \* the remedy by indictment — involving as it does, a triple investigation of the charge, before the magistrate, the grand jury, and the petty jury — might not be abolished. The remedy by way of criminal information would insure the punishment of all offenders in whose conviction the public were interested, while the numerous petty indictments for libel which are obviously vexatious, and tendered solely through personal malice and ill will, would be discouraged and gradually disappear. Moreover, on the argument of the rule, the defendant himself may make an affidavit, whereas in proceeding by indictment, the defendant's mouth is more or less closed. If one or two of the rules relating to criminal information were altered, especially that compelling the relator to forego his civil action, I think it would be found that the lesser criminal remedy might safely be dispensed with, and that no offender, whose publications were a serious outrage on society, would escape the punishment he so justly merited, although the number of prosecutions would thereby be greatly diminished.

Since the above remarks were written, the Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the Law of Newspaper Libel, have published a Report in which they recommend "that no criminal prosecution shall be commenced against the proprietor, publisher, editor, or any one responsible for the publication of a newspaper, for any libel published therein, without the *fiat* of the Attorney-General being first obtained." No doubt in this way a certain number of frivolous prosecutions might be prevented. But I doubt if the Attorney-General would approve of so serious an addition to his already arduous duties. For I conceive it would be the duty of the Attorney-General, under the new system, to go into the facts of each case, and to carefully consider whether or no it would be for the public benefit that this particular defendant should be prosecuted. Unless he did so, the new rule would soon become nugatory, and the *fiat* would be granted whenever the words amounted to a libel in law. The recommendation of the Committee is confined, it will be observed, to the proprietors and editors of newspapers. Why should it not be extended to all cases of constructive publication? Surely a master-printer, or a bookseller, should be included; and why not the publisher of a book as well as of a newspaper? But supposing the

<sup>1</sup> R. v. Carden, *supra*.

Committee \* to have considered themselves restricted to the Law \* 392 of Newspaper Libel, they have included one person who it seems to me deserves no protection, and that is the acting editor, the person actually in charge of the paper at the time of publication. It is his fault that the libel appeared; he professes to understand his business; he is paid by his employers to supervise the paper and exclude all libels; and if through carelessness or ignorance he omits to do his duty, he deserves punishment, at least as much as a medical man who, through culpable negligence, kills, when he might have cured, a patient. The Committee very properly grant no immunity to the actual composer and author of the libel.

There will be some difficulty in working out the recommendation of the Committee. Is the Attorney-General to hear only the prosecutor's story? If so, in most cases nothing will be easier than for an angry and vindictive prosecutor to obtain the *fiat* on an *ex parte* statement. In cases of libel, malignant feelings are perhaps more thoroughly aroused than in any other criminal proceedings. And even where the prosecutor would scruple to mislead the law officer of the Crown, he may *bonâ fide* and on good grounds believe an innocent man to be the author of the libel of which he complains, as in the recent case of Sir Francis Truscott; or he might honestly assert that the defendant was the acting editor of a newspaper at the time of publication, whereas he was then away ill in the country, as was Mr. Gutch.<sup>1</sup> Without calling on the defendant for his version of the case, the Attorney-General could not refuse his *fiat* in such cases as *R. v. Ledger*,<sup>2</sup> or as Lambri's case, or as *R. v. Truscott*. Yet if the Attorney-General is to hear both sides and thoroughly investigate the matter, he is doing informally precisely what the Court of Queen's Bench would do before allowing a criminal information to be filed. And surely if the Attorney-General granted a *fiat*, it would be quite unnecessary that the matter should be again investigated before a police magistrate. It cannot be necessary that the case should be gone into *four* times: once before the Attorney-General, next before a magistrate, then before the grand jury, and lastly in open court before the petty jury. Omit, therefore, the hearings before the magistrate and the grand jury, and let the case proceed direct to the trial in open court, as soon as the *fiat* has \* been obtained: \* 393 and what is the procedure so devised, but an exact reproduction of the *ex officio* information? It is no uncommon experience to those who study the suggestions of would-be law-reformers to discover that the schemes which they advocate as novel expedients certain to cure some crying evil, are but resuscitations of ancient methods of procedure, which doubtless for some good reason have long ago fallen into disuse. I venture

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 364.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 50.

therefore to retain my former opinion, expressed above, that the best method of avoiding the difficulty would be by abolishing altogether indictments for defamatory libels, and by allowing criminal informations to be filed in all cases wherein the Court shall be of opinion that the civil remedy by action is an insufficient protection to the public.



## BLASPHEMOUS WORDS.

It is a misdemeanor, punishable by indictment and by criminal information, to speak, or write and publish, any profane words vilifying or ridiculing God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, the Old or New Testament, or Christianity in general, (a) with intent to corrupt the public morals, to shock and insult believers, or to bring the established religion into hatred and contempt. This is the crime of blasphemy, and on conviction thereof the blasphemer may be sentenced to fine and imprisonment to any extent, in the discretion of the Court. Formerly he was frequently also sentenced to the pillory or to banishment.<sup>1</sup> He may also be required to give security for his good behavior for any reasonable time after he comes out of prison; and can be detained in prison till such sureties be found.<sup>2</sup> Also under the 60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 8, s. 1, the Court may after conviction make an order \* for the seizure of copies of the blasphemous \* 395 libel in the possession of the prisoner or in the possession of any person to his use.<sup>3</sup>

The intent to corrupt the public morals, to shock and insult believers, or to bring the established religion into hatred and con-

<sup>1</sup> In Scotland up till the year 1813 blasphemy was in certain circumstances a capital offence. The last person executed for blasphemy appears to have been Thomas Aikenhead, a young student just twenty years of age, and the son of a surgeon in Edinburgh; he seems to have been very harshly, if not illegally, treated; no counsel appeared for him: his crime consisted in loose talk about Ezra and in crude anticipations of Materialism. He was hanged on January 8th, 1697, buried beneath the gallows, and all his movables forfeited to the Crown.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Emlyn, in 1703, and Richard Carlile, in 1820, were condemned to find sureties for their good behavior throughout the remainder of their lives.

<sup>3</sup> See the Statute in Appendix C. *post*, p. 669.

(a) 2 Wharton, Crim. Law, § 1605 (8th ed.); citing *Commonwealth v. Kneeland*, 20 Pick. 206; *Chapman v. Gillett*, 2 Conn. 41; *People v. Ruggles*, 8 Johns. 290; *Updegraff v. Commonwealth*, 11 Serg. & R. 394; *State v. Chandler*, 2 Harr. (Del.) 553. See *Vidal v. Girard*, 2 How. 198.

tempt, is an essential element in the crime. *Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea*. The existence of such an intent is a question of fact for the jury, and the *onus* of proving it lies on the prosecution. The best evidence of such an intention is usually to be found in the work itself. If it is full of scurrilous and opprobrious language, if sacred subjects are treated with offensive levity, if indiscriminate abuse is employed instead of argument, then a malicious design to wound the religious sensibilities of others may be readily inferred. If, however, the author abstains from ribaldry and licentious reproach, a similar design may still be inferred if it be found that he has deliberately had resort to sophistical arguments, that he has wilfully misrepresented facts within his knowledge, or has indulged in sneers and sarcasms against all that is good and noble; for then it is clear that he does not write from conscientious conviction, but desires to pervert and mislead the ignorant; or at all events that he is criminally indifferent to the distinctions between right and wrong. But even though the work is free from all offensive levity, sarcasm, and sophistry, and is in fact the honest and temperate expression of the religious opinions conscientiously held and avowed by the writer, still it does not follow, as our law at present stands, that the author should be acquitted. It will still be the duty of the Judge to consider what would be the effect of a general dissemination of those opinions. If the doctrines maintained are

\* 396 so monstrous that their direct tendency \* is to subvert religion, to destroy morality, and “to dissolve all the bonds and obligations of civil society,” then the maxim applies that “Every man must be taken to have intended the natural and necessary consequences of his act,” and the Judge will direct a conviction.

It is very difficult, however, to say in what cases a judge in the present day would feel it his duty so to direct the jury. Every one would naturally be reluctant to construe into a crime the fair and temperate expression of opinions sincerely entertained, merely in obedience to a legal presumption. And it may well be doubted whether the free discussion of any doctrines, however heretical, can in any case tend to subvert the Truth. “For, if we be sure we are in the right,” says Milton in his *Areopagitica*,<sup>1</sup> “and do not hold the truth guiltily, which becomes not, . . . what can be more fair than when a man judicious, learned, and of a conscience for aught we

<sup>1</sup> P. 65, Arber's Reprint.

know as good as theirs that taught us what we know, shall . . . openly by writing publish to the world what his opinion is, what his reasons, and wherefore that which is now taught cannot be sound?" *Magna est veritas et prævalebit.* And it may also be doubted how far the reported decisions would bind a judge in the present day. For the heretical writings of the last century were written as a rule by uneducated and immoral men, and were filled with foul and offensive passages, and were therefore deservedly punished: whereas in the present day heretical opinions are often held and advocated by men of culture and refinement, who instinctively avoid giving wanton offence to their more orthodox fellow-citizens. Again, there is one argument frequently adduced in the earlier cases in favor of prosecutions for blasphemy — that all attacks upon the established religion tend to destroy the solemnity of an oath "on which the due administration of justice depends," and thus "the law will be stripped of one of its principal sanctions — the dread of future punishment." The strength of this argument is now seriously impaired by the Acts recently passed, permitting even atheists and persons who do not believe in a future life to give evidence in our law courts.<sup>1</sup> \* But from the decided cases, it would \* 397 seem that "Christianity is part and parcel of the law of England."<sup>2</sup>

At all events, it is the established religion of the land. Hence to attack Christianity *in general* by striking at its very roots cannot fail, it is considered, to wound the religious feelings of others and to excite hatred and contempt against the Church.<sup>3</sup> Again, to deny the existence or goodness of God must tend to subvert all law and all morality, and to destroy the peace and good order of society. In these two cases, therefore, even in the absence of any indecent or offensive expressions, the jury would still probably be directed that a criminal intent must be presumed, although it is clear that the author's purpose was the *bonâ fide* dissemination of his peculiar views.

But in all other cases I think that the jury would be told that the intent to subvert religion, and to deprave the public morals, must be proved as a fact to their satisfaction before they can convict; and that if they are of opinion that the author's attack on some particular doctrine, however generally accepted and received, was made honestly with the conscientious desire of arriving at the truth, then the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.

<sup>1</sup> See the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 105, s. 1; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 4; 33 & 34 Vict. c. 49, s. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Per Kelly, C.B., L. R. 2 Ex. 234. Lord Hale first uttered this dictum in *R. v. Taylor*, 1 Vent. 293; 3 Keb. 607. It was repeated by Ashurst, J., in *R. v. Williams*, and by many other judges. But Archbishop Whately said he never could understand its precise meaning, and the Commissioners on Criminal Law (6th Report, p. 83) have done their best to explain it away. See also Jefferson's Letter to Major Cartwright, published in Cartwright's "Life and Correspondence."

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Woolston*, Str. 834; *Fitzgib.* 66; 1 Barnard. 162.

In all cases in which a criminal intent is not presumed under the maxim mentioned above, it is not blasphemy to seriously and reverently propound any opinions conscientiously entertained by the accused. Honest error is no crime in this country so long as its advocacy be rational and dispassionate and do not degenerate into fanatical abuse of Christianity in general, or into scurrilous attacks upon individuals. "Every man may fearlessly  
 \* 398 \* advance any new doctrines, provided he does so with proper respect to the religion and government of the country."<sup>1</sup> "I would have it taken notice of that we do not meddle with any differences of opinion, and that we interpose only where the very root of Christianity is struck at."<sup>2</sup>

The defendant cannot plead a justification: nor can he be permitted at the trial to argue that his blasphemous libel is true.<sup>3</sup>

The last trial for blasphemy took place at the Bodmin Summer Assizes, July, 1857, before Coleridge, J., his son, the present Lord Coleridge, C.J., being counsel for the prosecution. The prisoner had scribbled some disgusting language concerning Jesus Christ on a gate, and was convicted of a blasphemous libel, but was subsequently discovered to be insane.<sup>4</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

It is blasphemy to write and publish that Jesus Christ is an impostor, the Christian religion a mere fable, and those who believe in it infidels to God. *R. v. Eaton*, 31 Howell's St. Tr. 927.

It is blasphemy to write and publish that Jesus Christ was an impostor, a murderer in principle, and a fanatic. Such words would be libellous of whomsoever written, and the jury also had found as a fact that the intention of the prisoner was malicious; and the court on motion refused to arrest the judgment. *R. v. Waddington*, 1 B. & C. 26.

In the last case Abbott, C.J., parried a question asked him by one of the jurymen at the trial whether every publication which denied the divinity of Jesus Christ was an unlawful libel, and the Court of King's Bench gave no opinion on the point: it was unnecessary so to do. I apprehend, however, that a controversial work in which a Unitarian divine while expressing his reverence for Christ as a Great Teacher yet denied His Deity, would never in the present day be deemed blasphemous, if written in a reverent and temperate tone and expressing the conscientious convictions of  
 \* 399 the author (in spite of such cases as *R. v. Clendon* (1712), cited \* 2 Str. 789; *R. v. Hall* (1721), 1 Str. 416, and *R. v. Ilive* (1756), Dig. L. L. 83).

Reflections on the old Testament are as bad as on the New. *R. v. Hetherington*, 5 Jur. 529.

<sup>1</sup> Per Best, J., in *R. v. Burdett* (1820), 4 B. & Ald. 132.

<sup>2</sup> Per Raymond, C.J., in *R. v. Woolston* (1729), Str. 834; Fitzgib. 66; 1 Barnard. 162.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lord Abbott, C.J., in *Cooke v. Hughes*, R. & M. 115.      <sup>4</sup> *R. v. Pooley*.

*Queen Mab* was found by a jury in 1841 to be a blasphemous libel. *R. v. Moxon*, 2 Mod. St. Tr. 356.

But this prosecution was a purely vindictive one by Hetherington, and no sentence was ever passed. Blackburn, J., expresses his disapproval of their finding in *R. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 374; 37 L. J. M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 803; 11 Cox, C. C. 19; 18 L. T. 395.

To deliver a lecture publicly maintaining that the character of Christ is defective, and his teaching misleading, and that the Bible is no more inspired than any other book, was held blasphemy by the Court of Exchequer without any regard to the style of the lecture, or the religious convictions of the lecturer. [But that was a civil case in which the criminal intention might not be considered so essential.] *Cowan v. Milbourn*, L. R. 2 Ex. 230; 36 L. J. Ex. 124; 15 W. R. 750; 16 L. T. 290.

To write and publish that the Christian miracles were not to be taken in a literal but in an allegorical sense was held blasphemous in 1729; but there the Court clearly considered that to attack the miracles was to attack Christianity in general, and could not be included amongst "disputes between learned men upon particular controverted points." *R. v. Woolston*, 2 Str. 834; Fitz. 66; 1 Barnard. 162.

It was held blasphemy to publish or sell Paine's "Age of Reason." *R. v. Williams* (1797), 26 Howell's St. Tr. 656; *R. v. Richard Carlile* (1819), 3 B. & Ald. 161; 1 Chit. 451.

Richard Carlile on his trial read over to the jury the whole of Paine's "Age of Reason," for selling which he was indicted. After his conviction, his wife published a full, true, and accurate account of his trial, entitled "The Mock Trial of Mr. Carlile," and in so doing republished the whole of the "Age of Reason" as a part of the proceedings at the trial. *Held*, that the privilege usually attaching to fair reports of judicial proceedings did not extend to such a colorable reproduction of a blasphemous book; and that it is unlawful to publish even a correct account of the proceedings in a court of justice, if such an account contain matter of a scandalous, blasphemous, or indecent nature. *R. v. Mary Carlile* (1819), 3 B. & Ald. 167. See also *Steele v. Brannan*, L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 41 L. J. M. C. 85; 20 W. R. 607; 26 L. T. 509; *post*, p. 407.

For other cases of blasphemy at common law, see *R. v. Atwood* (1618), Cro. Jac. 421; *R. v. Taylor, Ventris*, 293; 3 Keble, 607; *R. v. Annet* (1763), 3 Burn, Eccl. Law, 386, 9th ed.; *R. v. Wilkes* (1763), 4 Burr. 2527; 2 Wils. 151; *Paterson's Case* (1843), 1 Brown (Scotch), 629; *Robinson's Case* (1843), *ib.* 643.

\* In aid of the common law, many statutes have at different times been passed to punish particular species of blasphemy. Of these the following appear to be still unrepealed:—

"Whatsoever person or persons shall deprave, despise, or condemn the most blessed Sacrament in contempt thereof by any contemptuous words or by any words of depraving, despising, or reviling, or what person or persons shall advisedly in any otherwise condemn, despise, or revile the said most blessed Sacrament, shall suffer imprisonment of his or their bodies and make fine and ransom at the king's will and pleasure."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 1 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 1.

“Any vicar or other minister whatsoever that shall preach, declare, or speak anything in the derogation or depraving of the Book of Common Prayer, or anything therein contained, or of any part thereof,” shall on conviction for the first offence suffer forfeiture of one year’s profit of benefices and six months’ imprisonment, and for the second offence, one year’s imprisonment and deprivation, and for the third offence, deprivation and imprisonment for life: or, if not beneficed, for the first offence imprisonment for one year, and for the second offence imprisonment for life.<sup>1</sup>

Any person whatsoever, lay or clerical, who “shall in any interludes, plays, songs, rhymes, or by other open words, declare or speak anything in the derogation, depraving, or despising of the same book, or of anything therein contained, or any part thereof,” shall for the first offence forfeit one hundred marks, for the second offence four hundred marks, and for the third offence shall forfeit all his goods and chattels to the Queen and be imprisoned for life.<sup>2</sup>

\* 401 \* These provisions are applied to our present Book of Common Prayer by the 14 Car. II. c. 4, s. 1.

Every person ecclesiastical, who shall persist in maintaining or affirming any doctrine directly contrary or repugnant to any of the Articles agreed on in the Convocation holden at London in 1562, shall be deprived of his living.<sup>3</sup>

The statute 3 Jac. I. c. 21, as to players, was repealed in 1843 by the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 1.

“If any person, having been educated in, or at any time having made profession of, the Christian religion within this realm, shall by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking, assert or maintain that there are more Gods than one, or shall deny the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of divine authority,” he shall, on conviction by the oath of two or more credible witnesses, be deprived of all offices, civil, ecclesiastical, and military, unless he renounce his errors within four months from the date of his conviction; and for a second offence he shall be declared unable to sue in any court of law or equity, to be a guardian, an executor or administrator, to take any legacy, or to hold any office, and shall also

<sup>1</sup> 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 2; 1 Eliz. c. 2, s. 2.

<sup>2</sup> 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 1, s. 3; & 1 Eliz. c. 2, s. 3.

<sup>3</sup> 13 Eliz. c. 12, s. 2.

suffer imprisonment for three years. But information must be given on oath to a magistrate within four days after such words were spoken, and the prosecution must be within three months after such information.<sup>1</sup>

But these statutes do not affect or alter the common law;<sup>2</sup> nor will their repeal.<sup>3</sup>

By the Burial Laws Amendment Act, 1880,<sup>4</sup> any person who shall at any burial \* under the Act, “under color of \* 402 any religious service or otherwise, in any churchyard or graveyard, wilfully endeavor to bring into contempt or obloquy the Christian religion, or the belief or worship of any church or denomination of Christians, or the members or any minister of any such church or denomination, or any other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

In former days the ecclesiastical courts were empowered by the canon law and various statutes to punish with penance and excommunication, and even with imprisonment and death, any person guilty of blasphemy, heresy, and schism. But by the 1 Eliz. c. 1, s. 6, all statutes relating to heresy were repealed; and by the 29 Car. II. c. 9, s. 1, the writ *de hæretico comburendo* was abolished; but s. 2 of the same Act expressly provides “that nothing in this Act shall extend, or be construed to take away or abridge the jurisdiction of Protestant archbishops or bishops, or any other judges of any ecclesiastical courts, in cases of atheism, blasphemy, heresy, or schism, and other damnable doctrines and opinions, but that they may proceed to punish the same according to His Majesty’s ecclesiastical laws, by excommunication, deprivation, degradation, and other ecclesiastical censures, not extending to death, in such sort and no other as they might have done before the making of this Act, anything in this law contained to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding.” By the 53 Geo. III. c. 127, s. 3, it is enacted that “no person who shall be pronounced or declared excommunicate shall incur any Civil Penalty or Incapacity whatever, in consequence of such Excommunication, save such Imprisonment, not exceeding Six Months, as the Court pronouncing or declaring such Person Excommunicate shall direct.”

But no blasphemous publication, which is punishable in the secular courts, can be taken cognizance of in the ecclesiastical. For “where the common or statute law giveth remedy *in foro seculari* (whether the matter

<sup>1</sup> 9 Wm. III. c. 35 [c. 32 in the Statutes at Large], as amended by 53 Geo. III. c. 160.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Carlile*, 3 B. & Ald. 161; *R. v. Williams*, 26 Howell’s St. Tr. 656.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Waddington*, 1 B. & C. 26.

<sup>4</sup> 43 & 44 Vict. c. 41, s. 7.

be temporal or spiritual) the consuance of that cause belongeth to the King's temporal Courts only."<sup>1</sup> It is then only over blasphemous libels,

\* 403 *not* punishable by the common law or under any statute, \* that the ecclesiastical courts have jurisdiction. And here it must be remarked that the canon law, speaking generally, is not binding at all events on laymen. "The canon law forms no part of the law of England, unless it has been brought into use and acted upon in this country : the burden of proving which rests on those who affirm the adoption of any portion of it in England."<sup>2</sup> And indeed there seems strong authority for holding that at the present day the Ecclesiastical Courts no longer possess any criminal jurisdiction over *laymen*. In *Burder v. —*,<sup>3</sup> Sir H. Jenner Fust says : "As against laymen, whatever may be the nature of the charge, undoubtedly the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a criminal suit." And though four years earlier a criminal suit was commenced against a layman for an incestuous marriage, Dr. Lushington contented himself with pronouncing the marriage null and void, which was clearly within his power, and did not impose any punishment or penance on the defendant.<sup>4</sup> And in *Phillimore v. Machon*,<sup>5</sup> Lord Penzance says : "Speaking generally, and setting aside for the moment all questions as to the clergy, it cannot, I think, be doubted that a recurrence to the punishment of the laity for the good of their souls by ecclesiastical courts, would not be in harmony with modern ideas, or the position which ecclesiastical authority now occupies in the country. Nor do I think that the enforcement of such powers, where they still exist, *if they do exist*, is likely to benefit the community." We may consider, therefore, that the criminal jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over libels published by laymen is obsolete : their jurisdiction over civil proceedings for defamation is expressly taken away by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41, s. 1.

<sup>1</sup> Coke upon Littleton, 96 b., and see *Phillimore v. Machon*, 1 P. D. 481.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Denman, C.J., in *The Queen v. The Archbishop of Canterbury*, 11 Q. B. 649. See Year Book, 34 H. VI., fo. 38 (1453) ; *Prisot c. 5* ; *Fitzh. Abr. quare imp.* 89 ; *Bro. Abr. qu. imp.* 12.

<sup>3</sup> 3 Curteis, 827, May 31st, 1844.

<sup>4</sup> *Woods v. Woods*, 2 Curt. 516, July 18th, 1840.

<sup>5</sup> 1 P. D. 481.



## OBSCENE WORDS.

It is a misdemeanor punishable by indictment and by information to publish obscene and immoral books and pictures: (a) for such an act is destructive of morality in general, and may affect all the subjects of the realm.

The test of obscenity is this:—"Whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."<sup>1</sup>

Similarly it is a crime to speak vicious and immoral words, provided they be uttered before a large assembly, so as to affect the mass of society: for else there is no detriment to the public.

Obscene words and libels are apparently within the jurisdiction of Courts of Quarter Sessions; not being excepted by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38.

The punishment may be either fine or imprisonment for a term of any length, and either with or without hard labor.<sup>2</sup>

*Illustrations.*

Wilkes was fined £500 and imprisoned for a year for printing and publishing "An Essay on Woman." *R. v. John Wilkes*, 4 Burr. 2527; 2 Wils. 151; Dig. L. L. 69.

\* Actors have been prosecuted for performing obscene plays. Tremayne's \* 405 Entries, 209, 213, 214, 215; Str. 790.

The obscene words must be set out in the indictment *verbatim*. *Bradlaugh & Besant v. The Queen* (C. A.), 3 Q. B. D. 607; 48 L. J. (M. C.) 5; 26 W. R. 410; 38 L. T. 118; 14 Cox, C. C. 68.

"Obtaining and procuring" obscene works for the purpose of uttering and selling them is a misdemeanor indictable at common

<sup>1</sup> Per Cockburn, C.J., in *R. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 371; 37 L. J. M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 801; 18 L. T. 395; 11 Cox, C. C. 19.

<sup>2</sup> 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 29.

(a) 2 Wharton, Crim. Law, § 1606 (8th ed.), citing *State v. Brown*, 1 Williams (Vt.); *Commonwealth v. Holmes*, 17 Mass. 336; *Knowles v. State*, 3 Day, 103; *Commonwealth v. Sharpless*, 2 Serg. & R. 91;

*Barker v. Commonwealth*, 19 Penn. 412; *McNair v. People*, 89 Ill. 441; *Bell v. State*, 1 Swan, 42. See also *People v. Girardin*, 1 Mich. 90.

law; for it is an overt act taken in pursuance of an unlawful intention: but merely “preserving and keeping them in one’s possession” for the same purpose is not indictable; for “there is no act shown to be done which can be considered as the first step in the prosecution of a misdemeanor.”<sup>1</sup>

By the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, if any one reasonably believes that any obscene books, or pictures, are kept in any place for the purpose of being sold or exhibited for gain, he may make a complaint on oath before the police magistrate, stipendiary magistrate, or any two justices, having jurisdiction over such place. The magistrate or justices must be satisfied:—

(i.) That such belief is well founded: and for that purpose the complainant must also state on oath that at least one such book or picture has in fact been sold or exhibited for gain in such place.

(ii.) That such book or picture is so obscene that its publication would be a misdemeanor.

(iii.) That such publication would be a misdemeanor proper to be prosecuted as such.

Thereupon the magistrate or justices issue a special warrant authorizing their officer to search for and seize all such books and pictures, and bring them into Court; and then a summons is

issued calling upon the occupier of the place to appear  
\* 406 and show cause why such books \* and pictures should not be destroyed. Either the owner, or any other person

claiming to be the owner, of such books and pictures may appear: but if no one appears, or if in spite of appearance the justices are still satisfied that the books and pictures, or any of them, are of such a character that their publication would be a misdemeanor proper to be prosecuted, they must order them to be destroyed; if not so satisfied, they must order them to be restored to the occupier of the place in which they were seized. The order for the destruction of such books must state, not only that the magistrate is satisfied that the books are obscene, but also that he is satisfied that the publication of them would be a misdemeanor, and proper to be prosecuted as such: else such order will be bad on the face of it, as not showing that the magistrate

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in *Dugdale v. Reg.*, Dears. C. C. 64; 1 E. & B. 425; 22 L. J. M. C. 50; 17 Jur. 546.

had jurisdiction to make it, and a *certiorari* will be granted, in spite of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, s. 49, to bring it up and quash it.<sup>1</sup>

Any person aggrieved by the determination of the justices may appeal to Quarter Sessions by giving notice in writing of such appeal, and of the grounds thereof, and entering into a recognizance, within seven days after such determination. Hence the books and pictures ordered to be destroyed will only be impounded during such seven days; on the eighth day, if no notice of appeal be given, they will be destroyed. If the appeal be dismissed, or not prosecuted, the Court of Quarter Sessions may order the books and pictures to be destroyed.<sup>2</sup> The death of the complainant after the issuing of the summons will not cause the proceedings to lapse.<sup>3</sup>

\* If the work be in itself obscene, its publication is an \* 407 indictable misdemeanor, and the work may be seized under this Act, however innocent may be the motive of its publisher.<sup>4</sup>

If any point of law arises under this Act, the magistrates or justices may state a case for the opinion of a Superior Court, under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, irrespective of the power of appeal given by s. 4. That the libel is an accurate report of a judicial proceeding is no defence, if it contain matter of an obscene and demoralizing character.<sup>5</sup>

Any one who openly exposes or exhibits any indecent exhibition or obscene prints or pictures in any street, road, public place or highway, or in any window or other part of any house situate in any street, road, public place or highway, shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond, and punished on summary conviction.<sup>6</sup> The 3 Geo. IV. c. 40, s. 3, is repealed.

By the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 79, s. 20, the postmaster-general may prevent the delivery by post of any obscene or indecent prints, photographs, or books.

<sup>1</sup> *Ex parte* Bradlaugh, 3 Q. B. D. 509; 47 L. J. M. C. 105; 26 W. R. 758; 38 L. T. 680.

<sup>2</sup> See the Act *in extenso* in Appendix C., *post*, p. 680.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Truelove*, 5 Q. B. D. 336; 49 L. J. M. C. 57; 28 W. R. 413; 42 L. T. 250; 14 Cox, C. C. 408.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 371; 37 L. J. M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 801; 18 L. T. 398; 11 Cox, C. C. 19.

<sup>5</sup> *Steele v. Brannan*, L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 41 L. J. M. C. 85; 20 W. R. 607; 26 L. T. 509.

<sup>6</sup> 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 4, as explained by the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 38, s. 2.

*Illustrations.*

The Protestant Electoral Union published a book, called "The Confessional Unmasked," intended to expose the abuses of the Roman Catholic discipline, and to promote the spread of the Protestant religion. But however praiseworthy their motive may appear, many passages in the book were necessarily obscene, and it was seized and condemned as an obscene libel. *R. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 37 L. J. M. C. 89; 16 W. R. 801; 18 L. T. 395; 11 Cox, C. C. 19.

The Protestant Electoral Union thereupon issued an expurgated edition of "The Confessional Unmasked," with some new matter. For selling this George  
 \* 408 Mackey was tried at the Winchester Quarter Sessions on October 19th, \*1870, when the jury, being unable to agree as to the obscenity of the book, were discharged without giving any verdict. The Union thereupon published "A Report of the Trial of George Mackey," in which they set out the full text of the second edition of the "Confessional Unmasked;" although it had not been read in open court, but only taken as read, and certain passages in it referred to. A police magistrate thereupon ordered all copies of this "Report of the Trial of George Mackey" to be seized and destroyed as obscene books. *Held*, that this decision was correct. *Steele v. Brannan*, L. R. 7 C. P. 261; 47 L. J. M. C. 85; 20 W. R. 607; 26 L. T. 509.

SEDITIONOUS WORDS.

SEDITIONOUS words may be defined generally in the words of 60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 8, s. 1, as any words which tend "to bring into hatred or contempt the person of his Majesty, his heirs or successors, or the Regent, or the government and constitution of the United Kingdom as by law established, or either House of Parliament, or to excite his Majesty's subjects to attempt the alteration of any matter in Church or State as by law established, otherwise than by lawful means."

Seditious words may in some special cases amount to Treason or to Treason-felony. This chapter will, therefore, be divided into

I. *Treasonable Words.*

- (i.) Words merely spoken.
- (ii.) Words written or printed, but not published.
- (iii.) Words written or printed, and published.

II. *Seditious Words.*

- (i.) Words defamatory of the Sovereign himself.
- (ii.) Words defamatory of the King's Ministers and Government.
- \* (iii.) Words defamatory of the Constitution and of \* 410 our Laws generally.
- (iv.) Words defamatory of either House of Parliament, or of the members thereof.
- (v.) Words defamatory of Courts of Justice, and of the Judges thereof.
  - (a.) Superior Courts.
  - (b.) Inferior Courts. \*

I. *Treason and Treason-Felony.*

(i.) Words *merely spoken* against the king or his ministers cannot amount to treason. It was resolved in Hugh Pine's case<sup>1</sup> (overruling several arbitrary decisions of earlier date), "that, unless it were by some particular statute, no words will be treason."<sup>2</sup> There is no such statute; but by s. 3 of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, to express, utter, and declare, *by open and advised speaking*, certain traitorous compassings, inaginations, inventions, devices, or intentions, is made treason-felony.<sup>3</sup>

But words *accompanying any act* may be given in evidence to explain the intention with which such act is done.

\* 411 \* (ii.) Words written or printed, but *not published*, cannot be treason at common law: and they do not constitute an overt act of treason within the meaning of the 25 Edw. III. c. 2. The decisions to the contrary in *R. v. Peacham* (1615),<sup>4</sup> and *R. v. Algernon Sidney* (1683),<sup>5</sup> were reversed by a private Act of Parliament in 1689.<sup>6</sup> But by the 6 Anne, c. 7 (Al. 41), s. 1; <sup>7</sup> "maliciously advisedly and directly, by writing or printing, to maintain and affirm," that Queen Anne was not the rightful queen, that the Pretender or any else, except the descendants of the Electress Sophia, had any right or title to the Crown, or that an Act of Parliament could not bind the Crown, and limit the descent thereof, was made high treason; and it does not appear that any publication was requisite to complete the offence created by this statute.

(iii.) But a writing which imports a compassing the king's death within the meaning of 25 Edw. III. c. 2, will amount to an overt act of treason, if it be *published*.

<sup>1</sup> Cro. Car. 117.

<sup>2</sup> The story so frequently repeated that in the reign of Edward IV., Thomas Burdett was convicted of high treason for saying that he wished the horns of his stag in the belly of him who had advised the king to shoot it (though it is still to be found in Blackstone, vol. iv. c. 6, and Folkard, p. 619), has been proved by Hallam to be mythical. The charge against Burdett was of a much more serious nature; and these idle words of his are not anywhere alluded to in the indictment against him. "Middle Ages," c. viii. *ad fin.*

<sup>3</sup> See the section in Appendix. The words in italics were not in the earlier statutes to the same effect.

<sup>4</sup> Cro. Car. 125; 2 Cobbett's St. Tr. 870.

<sup>5</sup> 9 St. Tr. 889, 893.

<sup>6</sup> See Hallam's Const. Hist. I. 467.

<sup>7</sup> Passed in 1707, probably in consequence of a libel called "Mercurius Politicus:" see *R. v. Brown*, Holt, 425; 1 Mod. 86, *post*, p. 421.

*Illustration.*

Williams, a barrister of the Middle Temple, wrote two books, "Balaam's Ass" and the "Speculum Regale," in which he predicted that King James I. would die in the year 1621. He was indicted for high treason, convicted, and executed. R. v. Williams, 2 Rolle R. 88.

By the 36 Geo. III. c. 7, made perpetual by the 57 Geo. III. c. 6,<sup>1</sup> to compass, devise, or intend death or wounding, imprisonment, or bodily harm to the person of the \*Sover- \* 412 eign, and such compassing, device, or intention to express, utter, or declare, *by publishing any printing or writing*, or by any overt act or deed, is made high treason, punishable with death.

And by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, s. 3, to compass, devise, and intend to depose the Queen, or to levy war against her in order by force or constraint to compel her to change her counsels, or to intimidate either House of Parliament, or to stir up any foreigner or stranger with force to invade any of her dominions; and such compassings, devices, or intentions, or any of them, to express, utter, or declare, *by publishing any printing or writing or by open and advised speaking*, or by any overt act or deed, is made treason-felony, punishable with transportation (now penal servitude) for life.<sup>2</sup>

## II. SEDITION.

It is a misdemeanor, punishable by indictment or by information, to libel or to slander the Sovereign, or his administration, or the Constitution of the realm, or either House of Parliament, or its members, or any judge or magistrate. It is also a high misprision or contempt; and therefore the defendant may be fined to any amount, or sentenced to a term of imprisonment of any length, or both, at the discretion of the Judge, as in *præmunire*. (a) Formerly banishment and the pillory could also be inflicted; but these punishments are now abolished.<sup>3</sup>

The offence cannot be tried at Quarter Sessions.

<sup>1</sup> As amended by 11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, s. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See the section in Appendix.

<sup>3</sup> 60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 8, ss. 1, 2, 3, 4; 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. c. 73, s. 1; 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 23.

(a) See 2 Wharton, Crim. Law, § 1611 (8th ed.), citing Thomas v. Crosswell, 7 Johns. 264; King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113; Cramer v. Riggs, 17 Wend. 209; Respub-  
lica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates, 270; Commonwealth v. Meeser, 1 Brewst. 492; Robbins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540.

\* 413 \* (i.) *Words defamatory of the Sovereign himself.*

It is sedition to speak or publish of the King any words which would be libellous and actionable *per se*, if printed and published of any other public character.

Thus, any words will be deemed seditious, which strike at the King's private life and conduct, which impute to him any corrupt or partial views or other bad motives for his policy, which insinuate that he is a tyrant, and does not take a lively interest in the welfare of his subjects, or which charge him with deliberately favoring or oppressing any individual or class of men in distinction to the rest of his subjects.<sup>1</sup> *A fortiori*, any words are seditious which strike at his title to the Crown, call his legitimacy in question, or are otherwise treasonable.<sup>2</sup>

But to assert that the King is misled by his ministers, or that he takes an erroneous view of some great question of policy is not seditious, if it be done respectfully, with decency and moderation.

*Illustrations.*

The following words appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* for October 2nd, 1809:—  
“What a crowd of blessings rush upon one's mind that might be bestowed upon the country in the event of a total change of system! Of all monarchs, indeed, since the Revolution, the successor of George the Third will have the finest opportunity of becoming nobly popular.” On the trial of a criminal information against the proprietor and printer of the paper for libel, Lord Ellenborough told the jury that if they considered that the words meant that the king's death would be a blessing to the nation, and that the sooner it happened the better, then they should find the prisoners guilty;

\* 414 but that if they thought the passage could fairly be construed as an \* expression of regret that an erroneous view had been taken of public affairs, and of a wish for some change in the policy and system of administration under His Majesty, they might acquit them. The jury found the prisoners, Not Guilty. *R. v. Lambert & Perry*, 2 Camp. 398; 3 How. St. Tr. 340.

To publish falsely of George IV. that he is insane is a criminal libel, as it would be of any other person. *R. v. Harvey and Chapman*, 2 B. & C. 257.

So is charging the King with a breach of his coronation oath. *Oliver St. John's Case* (1615), Noy, 105.

To insinuate that the King is a liar and a deceiver, and to assert that he has treacherously betrayed the interests of his subjects and allies, and prostituted the honor of his crown (*The North Briton*, No. 45) is a seditious libel. *R. v. John Wilkes* (1763), 4 Burr. 2527; 19 How. St. Tr. 1075; *R. v. Kearsley*, Dig. L. L. 69; *R. v. John Williams*, *ib.*

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Dr. Shebbeare* (1758), 3 T. R. 430, note.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Clerk* (1729), 1 Barnardiston, 304; *R. v. Knell*, 1 Barnard. 305; *R. v. Nutt*, *ib.* 306.



As to certain of the letters of Junius, see *R. v. Woodfall*, 5 Burr. 2661; *R. v. Almon*, *ib.* 2686.

Many *dicta* in the old text-books represent the law as stricter on this point than is stated above. According to Hawkins' "Pleas of the Crown," i. c. 6,<sup>1</sup> and 4 Blackstone, 123, c. ix. ii. 3, it is a high misprision and contempt merely to speak contemptuously of the King, to curse him or wish him ill, to assert that he lacks wisdom, valor, or steadiness, or, in short, to say anything "which may lessen him in the esteem of his subjects, weaken his government, or raise jealousies between him and his people." But I can find no decision reported which supports so wide a proposition: and I venture to doubt if in the present day it would be deemed a crime to call the king a coward or a fool. Mere words of vulgar abuse can hardly amount to sedition. In fact, the only distinctions that the law makes between words defamatory of the king, and of any other leading public character appear to be:—

(i.) That the former may be criminal when only *spoken*; whereas the latter must be written or printed and published;

(ii.) That in the case of the former it cannot be pleaded as a defence that the words are true.<sup>2</sup>

\* (ii.) *Words Defamatory of the King's Ministers and* \* 415  
*Government.*

It is sedition to speak or publish of individual members of the Government words which would be libellous and actionable *per se*, if written and published of any other public character.

It is also sedition to speak or publish words defamatory of the Government collectively, or of their general administration, with intent to subvert the law, to produce public disorder, or to foment or promote rebellion.

"There is no sedition in censuring the servants of the Crown, or in just criticism on the administration of the law, or in seeking redress of grievances, or in the fair discussion of all party questions."<sup>3</sup>

Where corrupt or malignant motives are attributed to an individual minister, the words are clearly seditious.

Where, however, no particular person is libelled, the jury must be satisfied that the author or publisher maliciously and design-

<sup>1</sup> 8th ed. by Curwood, p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Francklin* (1731), 9 St. Tr.; 17 Howell's St. Tr. 626.

<sup>3</sup> Per Fitzgerald, J., in *R. v. Sullivan*, 11 Cox, C. C. 50.

edly intended to subvert our laws and constitution, and to excite dissatisfaction and discontent. There must be a criminal intent. But such an intent will, of course, be presumed, if the jury find that the natural and necessary consequence of the words employed was "to excite a contempt of Her Majesty's Government, to bring the administration of its laws into disrepute, and thus impair their operation, to create disaffection, or to disturb the public peace and tranquillity of the realm."<sup>1</sup>

In determining whether such is a natural and necessary \* 416 consequence of the words employed, the jury should consider the state of the country and of the public mind at the date of the publication: passages which in tranquil times might be comparatively innocent might be most pernicious in a time of insurrection.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, the circumstances which provoked the attack may tell in the prisoner's favor. If a man be smarting under a grievance, or honestly indignant at some act of a government official, he cannot be expected to speak or write as calmly and deliberately as if he were discussing matters in which he felt no special interest.<sup>3</sup> The jury should, in every case, consider the book or newspaper article *as a whole*, and in a fair, free, and liberal spirit: not dwelling too much upon isolated passages, or upon a strong word here or there, which may be qualified by the context, but endeavoring to gather the general effect of the whole composition on the minds of the public. Considerable latitude must be given to political writers.<sup>4</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

To attribute "the sad state of the country to the influence of French gold on those who have the conduct of affairs," is a seditious libel, though no particular minister is singled out; but to complain of "the mismanagement of the navy through the ignorance and incapacity of those who have the management of it," would (it is submitted) not be held a libel in the present day. *R. v. Tutchin* (1704), 5 St. Tr. 527; 14 Howell's St. Tr. 1095; Holt, 424; 2 Lord Raym. 1061; 1 Salk. 50; 6 Mod. 268.

An announcement that a collection had been made for "the relief of the widows, orphans, and aged parents of our beloved American fellow-subjects, who, faithful to the character of Englishmen, preferring death to slavery, were for that reason only inhumanly murdered by the King's troops at or near Lexington and Concord in the province

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Collins* (1839), 9 C. & P. 456; *R. v. Lovett*, *ib.* 462.

<sup>2</sup> Per Fitzgerald, J., 11 Cox, C. C. 50, 59.

<sup>3</sup> Per Littledale, J., in *R. v. Collins*, 9 Car. & P. 460.

<sup>4</sup> Per Lord Kenyon, C.J., in *R. v. Reeves*, Peake, Add. Ca. 84; 26 How. St. Tr.

of Massachusetts on the 19th of April last," was held a seditious libel on his Majesty's Government and \* their employment of his troops, tending to foment \* 417 discord and to promote rebellion. *R. v. John Horne* (afterwards *John Horne Tooke*) (1777), 11 St. Tr. 264; 20 Howell's St. Tr. 651; Cowp. 672.

Articles in the *Examiner* declaring that an improper and cruel method of punishment was practised in the King's army, and that his soldiers were punished with excessive severity thereby, was declared by the jury, in spite of the summing up of Lord Ellenborough, *not* to be a seditious libel on the government and the military service of the king tending to excite disaffection in the army and to deter others from becoming recruits. *R. v. John Hunt & John Leigh Hunt* (1811), 31 Howell's St. Tr. 408. See also *R. v. Beere* (1698), 12 Mod. 219; Holt, 422; Carth. 409; 2 Salk. 417; 1 Ld. Raym. 414; *R. v. Laurence* (1699), 12 Mod. 311; *R. v. Bedford* (1714), cited in 2 Str. 789; Dig. L. L. 19, 121; *R. v. Bliss* (1719), Sid. 219; Rol. 773; *R. v. Owen* (1752), 18 Howell's St. Tr. 1203; Dig. L. L. 67; *R. v. Francklin* (1731), 9 St. Tr. 255; 17 Howell's St. Tr. 626; *R. v. Cobbett* (1804), 29 Howell's St. Tr. 1; *R. v. Johnson* (1805), 29 Howell's St. Tr. 103; 7 East, 65; 3 Smith, 94; *R. v. Burdett* (1820), 4 B. & Ald. 95, 115, 314; *R. v. Collins* (1839), 9 C. & P. 456; *R. v. Lovett* (1839), 9 C. & P. 462.

By the statutes of *Scandalum magnatum*,<sup>1</sup> it is a crime to tell or publish false news or tales of the great officers of the realm, &c.

So also in America by Act of Congress, July 14, 1798, it is an indictable offence to libel the Government, Congress, or President of the United States.

There are old cases which appear to go further, and to decide that any publication tending to beget an ill opinion of the Government is a criminal libel. "If persons should not be called to account for possessing the people with an ill opinion of the Government, no Government can subsist; for it is very necessary for all Governments that the people should have a good opinion of it" (*sic*).<sup>2</sup> And Lord Ellenborough, C.J., expressly following this decision, \* told the jury in *R. v. Cobbett* \* 418 (1804): \* — "It is no new doctrine that if a publication be calculated to alienate the affections of the people, by bringing the Government into disesteem, whether the expedient be by ridicule or obloquy, . . . it is a crime." If this is to be taken literally, all Opposition newspapers commit such crime every day. Such a doctrine, if strictly enforced, would destroy all liberty of the press, and is, moreover, in conflict with more recent *dicta*: — "The people have a right to discuss any grievances that they may have to complain of," per Littledale, J., in *R. v. Collins*.<sup>4</sup> "A journalist may canvass and censure the acts of the Government and their public

<sup>1</sup> 3 Edw. I., c. 34; 2 Rich. II., c. 5; 12 Rich. II., c. 11, *ante*, c. IV., pp. 133-135.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Holt, C.J., in *R. v. Tutchin* (1704), 5 St. Tr. 532; 14 Howell's St. Tr. 1127.

<sup>3</sup> 29 Howell's St. Tr. 49.

<sup>4</sup> 9 Car. & P. 461.

policy—and indeed, it is his duty. . . . It might be the province of the press to call attention to the weakness or imbecility of a Government when it was done for the public good,” per Fitzgerald, J.<sup>1</sup> It is clearly legitimate and constitutional to endeavor, by means of arguments addressed to the people, to replace one set of ministers by another. And the precise object of such arguments is to bring the ministers then in office into disesteem, and to alienate from them the affections of the people. Sir Francis Burdett could not possibly be convicted in the present day for such an electoral address as he issued on August 22nd, 1819.<sup>2</sup>

But I think Lord Holt’s words must not be taken strictly in their modern signification: we must construe them with reference to the times in which he spoke. He clearly was not referring to a quiet change of ministry which in no way shakes the throne, or loosens the reins of order and government. In 1704 the present system of party-government was not in vogue: it was barely conceived by William III., and was certainly not generally understood under Queen Anne. And even in Lord Ellenborough’s time the ministry were still appointed by the King and not by the people. By “the Government” both judges meant, not so much a particular set of ministers, as the political system settled by the Constitution, the general order and discipline of the realm. “To subvert the Government” is the phrase employed in the earlier case of *R. v. Beere*;<sup>3</sup> and to Lord Holt’s mind “subverting the Government” meant bringing in the Pre-  
 \* 419 tender; to Lord Ellenborough’s, \* the introduction of Jacobinism and Red Republicanism from France: not the substitution of one statesman for another at the Council Board.

(iii.) *Words Defamatory of the Constitution and of our Laws generally.*

All malicious endeavors by word, deed or writing, to promote public disorder or to induce riot, rebellion or civil war, are clearly seditious, and may be overt acts of treason. But where no such conscious endeavor is proved; still, if the natural and necessary consequence of any word, deed, or writing, be to subvert our laws and constitution and to excite or promote dissatisfaction and discontent amongst the people, a criminal intent will be presumed; and the author is guilty of sedition.<sup>4</sup> Thus all publications, the tendency of which is to bring the constitution of the realm into hatred and contempt, and to induce the people to dis-

<sup>1</sup> 11 Cox, C. C. 54, 57.

<sup>2</sup> See 4 B. & Ald. 116, 7n.

<sup>3</sup> 12 Mod. 221; Holt, 422.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Burdett* (1820), 4 B. & Ald. 95; *R. v. Collins* (1839), 9 C. & P. 456.

obey the laws and to defy legally constituted authority, are seditious libels, for which the author is criminally liable.

But mere theoretical discussions of abstract questions of political science, comparisons of various forms and systems of government, and controversies as to details of our own constitutional law are clearly permissible. And so is any *bonâ fide* effort for the repeal by constitutional methods of any law deemed obnoxious. The prosecution must satisfy the jury that the publication is calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State and to lead ignorant persons to endeavor to subvert the government and the laws of the realm. Without satisfactory proof of such tendency, there is no evidence \* of that criminal intention which is \* 420 essential to constitute the offence.

The old cases *R. v. Brewster* (1663) ;<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Harrison* (1677), and *R. v. Bedford* (1714),<sup>2</sup> so far as they run counter to this proposition, must be considered as overruled. It seems that Harrison would not have been convicted but for the Stat. 13 Car. II. c. 1, which, to my surprise, remains still in part unrepealed.<sup>4</sup>

The jury must find, first, that the defendant in fact spoke or published the words complained of ; secondly, that the words are seditious and were spoken or published with the intent alleged in the indictment. The latter as well as the former is entirely a question for the jury. The fact that the House of Commons has resolved that the same publication is "a malicious, scandalous and seditious libel, tending to create jealousies and divisions amongst the liege subjects of Her Majesty and to alienate the affections of the people of this country from the Constitution," ought not to weigh with the jury in the least. The defendant is not to "be crushed by the name of his prosecutor."<sup>5</sup>

"In a free country like ours," says Lord Kenyon, C.J., in *R. v. Reeves*,<sup>6</sup> "the productions of a political author should not be too hardly dealt with." The jury should "recollect that they are dealing with a class of articles, which, if written in a fair spirit and *bonâ fide*, might be productive of great public good, and were often necessary for public protection ;" and they should therefore "deal with them in a broad spirit, allowing a

<sup>1</sup> Dig. L. L. 76.

<sup>2</sup> 3 Keb. 841 ; Ventr. 324.

<sup>3</sup> Cited in 2 Str. 789.

<sup>4</sup> See *post*, p. 421, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Per Lord Kenyon, C.J., in *R. v. Reeves*, Peake, Add. Ca. 84.

<sup>6</sup> Peake, Add. Ca. 86.

fair and wide margin, looking upon the whole, not on isolated words." And they should also take into their consideration the state of the country and of the public mind at the date of the publication.<sup>1</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

To assert that a parliament would be justified in making war against any king who broke the Social Compact, was naturally deemed seditious in the days of Charles II., as tending to a renewal of the Civil War. *R. v. Brewster* (1663), Dig. L. L. 76; *R. v. Harrison* (1677), 3 Keble, 841; Ventr. 324; Dig. L. L. 66.

To assert that "the late revolution was the destruction of the laws of England," or an unjustifiable and unconstitutional proceeding, and that the Act of Settlement was "illegal and unwarrantable," and "had been attended with fatal and pernicious consequences to the subjects of this realm," was deemed seditious in the days of Queen Anne and of George II., as tending to favor the cause of the Pretender. *R. v. Dr. Brown* (1707), 11 Mod. 86; Holt, 425; *R. v. Richard Nutt* (1754), Dig. L. L. 68. And see *R. v. Thomas Paine* (1792), 22 Howell's St. Tr. 358.

The Reverend William Winterbotham was convicted for preaching a sermon on November 18th, 1792, containing the following words, which were deemed seditious:—"Darkness has long cast her veil over the land. Persecution and tyranny have carried universal sway. Magisterial powers have long been a scourge to the liberties and rights of the people." He was fined £100 and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. *R. v. Winterbotham*, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 823, 875.

To habitually republish in Ireland during a time of political excitement and threatened insurrection extracts from American papers expressing sympathy with the Fenians, and inciting all Irishmen to rebel, without one word of editorial comment or disapproval, is an act of sedition. *R. v. Pigott* (1868), 11 Cox, C. C. 47. See Irish St. Tr. 1848, 1865, 1867, 1868.

In Ireland, newspapers containing treasonable and seditious matter could, till 1875, be seized under the provisions of the Peace Preservation Act (Ireland), 1870,<sup>2</sup> ss. 30-34; but these sections were repealed by the Act of 1875,<sup>3</sup> s. 2.

By an entirely obsolete, but still unrepealed, section, any person who shall maliciously and advisedly declare and publish by writing, printing, preaching or other speaking, that the parliament begun at Westminster on November 3rd, 1640 (the Long Parliament) is not yet dissolved, or that it ought still to be in being, or hath yet any continuance or existence, or that both Houses of Parliament or either House of Parliament have  
\* 422 \* or hath a legislative power without the King, or any other words to the same effect, incurs the penalties of a *præmunire*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Per Fitzgerald, J., in *R. v. Sullivan*, 11 Cox, C. C. 50, 59.

<sup>2</sup> 33 & 34 Vict. c. 9.

<sup>3</sup> 38 Vict. c. 14.

<sup>4</sup> 13 Car. II. stat. I. c. 1, s. 3. See also 6 Anne, c. 7 (al. 41), s. 2.

(iv.) *Words Defamatory of either House of Parliament, or of the Members thereof.*

It is a misdemeanor to speak or publish of individual members of either House of Parliament, in their capacity as such, words which would be libellous and actionable *per se*, if written and published of any other public character.

It is also a misdemeanor to speak or publish words defamatory of either House collectively with intent to obstruct or invalidate their proceedings, to violate their rights and privileges, to diminish their authority and dignity, or to bring them into public odium or contempt.

In both cases, all such words are also a contempt and breach of privilege, punishable summarily by the House itself, with fine and imprisonment.

Also by the statutes of *Scandalum magnatum*,<sup>1</sup> it is a crime to "devise, tell or publish any false news, lyes, or such other false things," of any member of the House of Lords, or of any great officer of the realm.

*Illustration.*

Rainer printed a scandalous libel, reflecting both on the House of Lords and on the House of Commons, called "Robin's Game, or Seven's the Main;" he was tried in the Court of King's Bench, fined £50, and sentenced to be imprisoned for two years and until he should pay such fine. *R. v. Rainer*, 2 Barnard. 293; Dig. L. L. 125.

On three occasions the House of Commons has voted a particular \* publication a scandalous and seditious libel, and a breach of privi- \* 423 lege, &c., and petitioned the Crown to direct the Attorney-General to prosecute the author, printers and publishers thereof. But strange to say, on each occasion such prosecution has been unsuccessful: the jury in each of the three cases having acquitted the prisoner.<sup>2</sup> Hence the House of Commons now invariably deals with offenders itself.

The House of Lords can inflict fine and imprisonment for any length of time. In former days the pillory was sometimes added: *e.g.*, in the case of Thomas Morley in 1623, and of William Carr in 1667, who was sentenced to stand in the pillory for libelling individual peers.

<sup>1</sup> 3 Edw. I., c. 34; 2 Rich. II., c. 5; 12 Rich. II., c. 11, *ante*, c. IV., pp. 133-5.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Owen* (1752), 18 Howell's St. Tr. 1203, 1228; *R. v. Stockdale* (1789), 22 Howell's St. Tr. 238; *R. v. Reeves* (1796), Peake, Add. Ca. 84; 26 Howell's St. Tr. 530.

The House of Commons can inflict fine and imprisonment, and in the case of a member, expulsion. One unfortunate member, Arthur Hall, suffered all three penalties in 1581 for publishing a book disparaging the authority of the House of Commons, and reflecting upon certain individual members—see Hallam. Const. Hist. Vol. I., c. v. — the first instance of a libel being punished by the House. But in the case of a commitment by the House of Commons, the imprisonment can only last till the close of the existing session. The prisoner must be liberated on prorogation.<sup>1</sup> It is otherwise with the House of Lords.

The Speaker's warrant is a perfect answer to any writ of *habeas corpus*, and fully justifies the Serjeant-at-arms and his officers in arresting the offender, and protects them from any action of assault or false imprisonment.<sup>2</sup> It will not be scanned too strictly

by the courts of law, nor set aside for any defect of form.<sup>3</sup>  
 \* 424 \* Thus, the libel for which the prisoner was committed need not be set out in such warrant;<sup>4</sup> though the libel must always be set out at full length in either an indictment<sup>5</sup> or a statement of claim.<sup>6</sup> Still less will any court of common law inquire into the propriety of the commitment or hear it argued that the act complained of did not amount to a contempt, or that the privilege of the House alleged to have been broken does not exist.<sup>7</sup>

The House is the best judge of its own privileges, and of what is a contempt of them. But if on the face of the warrant it *plainly and expressly* appears that the House is exceeding its jurisdiction, the courts of common law would feel bound to order the release of the prisoner.<sup>8</sup>

The House may commit for any contempt of one of its committees, or of the members of any such committee; instances of such committals occurred in 1832, 1858, and 1879.

<sup>1</sup> Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 114; Grissell's Case, Aug. 1879.

<sup>2</sup> Howard v. Gosset, 10 Q. B. 359; Burdett v. Colman, 14 East, 163.

<sup>3</sup> R. v. Paty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1108; R. v. Hobhouse (1819), 2 Chit. 210.

<sup>4</sup> Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1; see 1 Moore, P. C. C. 80.

<sup>5</sup> Bradlaugh and Besant v. The Queen (C.A.), 3 Q. B. D. 607; 48 L. J. M. C. 5; 26 W. R. 410; 38 L. T. 118.

<sup>6</sup> Harris v. Warre, 4 C. P. D. 125; 48 L. J. C. P. 310; 27 W. R. 461; 40 L. T. 429.

<sup>7</sup> Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 165, 195.

<sup>8</sup> See *ib.* 169; Hawkins, 3 Pl. Cr. II., 15, 73, p. 219; R. v. Evans and another, 8 Dowl. 451.



So in America the House of Representatives has a general power of committing for contempt, whether the offender be a member or a stranger.<sup>1</sup> But as with the English House of Commons, the imprisonment terminates at the adjournment or dissolution of Congress.

But with subordinate legislative bodies it is different. No power of committing for contempt is inherent in them ;<sup>2</sup>

\* although they have, of course, power to preserve order \* 425 during their deliberations, which involves a power to remove from the Chamber any person obstructing their proceedings, or otherwise guilty of disorderly conduct *in the presence of the House itself*, and if the offender be a member, to exclude him for a time, or even to expel him altogether. Such latter power is necessary for self-preservation ; and is quite distinct from the judicial power of sentencing the obstructive to a term of imprisonment as a punishment for his misconduct.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the House of Assembly of Newfoundland ;<sup>4</sup> the Legislative Council of Van Diemen's Land ;<sup>5</sup> the House of Keys in the Isle of Man ;<sup>6</sup> and the Legislative Assembly of the Island of Dominica,<sup>7</sup> possess no inherent powers to commit for contempt.<sup>8</sup>

But though such a power is not inherent in any inferior legislature, it may be expressly granted by statute ; thus the Legislative Assembly of Victoria possesses this privilege by virtue of the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 55, s. 35 and the Colonial Act, 20 Vict. No. 1.<sup>9</sup>

\* Also it is said that such a power may be acquired by \* 426 prescription, acquiescence and usage.<sup>10</sup> And it is by virtue

<sup>1</sup> *Anderson v. Dunn*, 6 Wheat. 204.

<sup>2</sup> *Kielley v. Carson*, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 63 ; *Fenton v. Hampton*, 11 Moore, P. C. C. 347, overruling *dicta* of Lord Denman, C.J., in *Stockdale v. Hansard*, 9 A. & E. 114 ; of Parke, B., in *Beaumont v. Barrett*, 1 Moore, P. C. C. 76.

<sup>3</sup> *Doyle v. Falconer*, L. R. 1 P. C. 328 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 37 ; 15 W. R. 366 ; *Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Macpherson*, L. R. 3 P. C. 268 ; 7 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 49 ; 39 L. J. P. C. 59. <sup>4</sup> *Kielley v. Carson*, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 63.

<sup>5</sup> *Fenton v. Hampton*, 11 Moore, P. C. C. 347.

<sup>6</sup> *Ex parte Brown*, 5 B. & S. 280 ; 33 L. J. Q. B. 193 ; 12 W. R. 821 ; 10 L. T. 453.

<sup>7</sup> *Doyle v. Falconer*, L. R. 1 P. C. 328 ; 36 L. J. P. C. 33 ; 15 W. R. 366.

<sup>8</sup> See also *Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Macpherson*, L. R. 3 P. C. 268 ; 7 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 49 ; 39 L. J. P. C. 59.

<sup>9</sup> *Dill v. Murphy*, 1 Moore, P. C. C. (N. S.) 487 ; *Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Victoria v. Glass*, L. R. 3 P. C. 560 ; 40 L. J. P. C. 17 ; 24 L. T. 317.

<sup>10</sup> Per Lord Ellenborough, C.J., in *Burdett v. Abbott*, 14 East, 137, and Cockburn, C.J., in *Ex parte Brown*, 5 B. & S. 293.

of such acquiescence and usage that the Jamaica House of Assembly has the power of committing a libeller, if indeed it has such power at all.<sup>1</sup>

(v.) *Words Defamatory of Courts of Justice and of Individual Judges.*

(a) Superior Courts.

It is a misdemeanor to speak or publish of any Judge of a superior court words which would be libellous and actionable *per se*, if written and published of any other public officer. (a)

It is also a misdemeanor to speak or publish words defamatory of any court of justice or of the administration of the law therein, with intent to obstruct or invalidate its proceedings, to annoy its officers, to diminish its authority and dignity, and to lower it in public esteem.

Such words, whether spoken or written, are punishable on indictment or information, with fine or imprisonment or both. They are also in every such case a contempt of Court punishable summarily by the Court itself with fine or commitment.

Such words are also indictable under the statutes of *Scan-*  
\* 427 *dalum Magnatum*,<sup>2</sup> \* as well as at common law.

It is immaterial whether the words be uttered in the presence of the Court or at a time when the Court is not sitting, and at a distance from it ;<sup>3</sup> nor need they necessarily refer to the judges in their official capacity.

But "there is no sedition in just criticism on the administration of the law. . . . A writer may freely criticise the proceedings of courts of justice and of individual judges — nay, he is invited to do so, and to do so in a free, and fair, and liberal spirit. But it must be without malignity, and not imputing cor-

<sup>1</sup> Beaumont v. Barrett, 1 Moore, P. C. C. 80, as explained by Parke, B., in 4 Moore, P. C. C. 89.

<sup>2</sup> 3 Edw. I., c. 34 ; 2 Rich. II., c. 5 ; 12 Rich. II., c. 11, *ante*, c. IV., pp. 133–135.

<sup>3</sup> Crawford's case, 13 Q. B. 630 ; 18 L. J. Q. B. 225 ; 13 Jur. 955.

(a) A libellous publication upon members of the court, or the grand jury, cannot in Illinois be treated as a contempt if it has no tendency to hinder or obstruct the court or jury in the performance of duty. Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45. *Secus*

of charges of corruption on the court. *Ib.* ; People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195 ; Robbins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540. Or of incapacity. Robbins v. Treadway. See further as to libels on judges, *In re Moore*, 63 N. Car. 397.

rupt or malicious motives.”<sup>1</sup> “It certainly was lawful, with decency and candor, to discuss the propriety of the verdict of a jury, or the decisions of a judge, . . . but if the extracts set out in the information contained no reasoning or discussion, but only declamation and invective, and were written, not with a view to elucidate the truth but to injure the characters of individuals, and to bring into hatred and contempt the administration of justice in the country,” then the defendants had transgressed the law, and ought to be convicted.<sup>2</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

To say that a judge had been bribed, or that in any particular case he had endeavored to serve his own interests or those of his friends or of his party, or wished to curry favor at Court, or was influenced by fear of the Government or of any great man, or by any other side-motive other than a simple desire to arrive at the truth and to mete out justice impartially, is a seditious libel. See *R. v. Lord George Gordon*, 22 Howell’s St. Tr. 177.

To call the Lord Chief Justice “a traitor and a perjured judge,” and to \* allege that a recent judgment delivered by him was treason, is a misdemeanor. \* 428 *R. v. Jeffe* (1632), 15 Vin. Abr. 89; *Hutton, J. v. Harrison, Hutton*, 131.

To say that the Lord Chief Justice disgraces his high station and prevents justice being done, is a misdemeanor. *R. v. Hart and White* (1808), 30 How. St. Tr. 1168, 1345; 10 East, 94; *R. v. Wrennum* (1619), Popham, 135; *Butt v. Conant*, 1 Brod. & Bing. 548; 4 Moore, 195; Gow, 84.

Hurry sued Watson for a malicious prosecution, and recovered damages £3000: the corporation of which Watson was a member thereupon resolved “that Mr. Watson had been actuated by motives of public justice in prosecuting Hurry,” and voted him £2300 towards payment of his damages. The court of King’s Bench granted an information against the members of the corporation. *R. v. Watson & others*, 2 T. R. 199.

[That the vote of money was an improper employment of the corporate funds is very probable; but so far as the mere words of the resolution are concerned, I see no misdemeanor. They appear to me to be but a temperately worded statement that the corporation differed from the jury in their opinion of Mr. Watson’s conduct.]

Besides such indictable offences, many other acts and words are contempts of Court. Thus it is contempt of Court to insult the Judge, jury or witnesses, to obstruct any officer of the Court in the execution of his duty, to express contempt for the process of the Court, to calumniate the parties concerned in any cause, to prejudice the minds of the public against the suitors or others before the cause is finally heard, or in any other way to taint the source of justice or to divert or interrupt its ordinary course.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Per Fitzgerald, J., in *R. v. Sullivan*, 11 Cox, C. C. 50.

<sup>2</sup> Per Grose, J., in *R. v. White and others*, 1 Camp. 359.

<sup>3</sup> See the judgment of Blackburn, J., in *Skipworth’s Case*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 232, 241.

In all such cases a Superior Court may interfere summarily to protect itself and fine the offender or commit him to prison *proprio motu*; and this, although no indictable offence has been committed.<sup>1</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

Even the prisoner in the dock, who is always allowed great latitude, if he  
\* 429 be defending himself, may be fined for contempt of court, if he persist \* in using blasphemous language and in applying offensive epithets to the presiding judge in the course of his speech to the jury. *R. v. Davison*, 4 B. & Ald. 329.

So, too, a barrister may be guilty of contempt of Court, if he unnecessarily insults one of the jury in the course of his address to them. *In re Pater*, 5 B. & S. 299; 33 L. J. M. C. 142; 12 W. R. 823; 10 L. T. 376.

The most innocent words, if uttered in a peculiar manner and tone, may be a contempt of Court. For an insult may be conveyed either by language or by manner. *Carus Wilson's Case*, 7 Q. B. 1015.

It is a contempt of court and a libel, punishable by attachment, to publish a pamphlet asserting, that judges have no power to issue an attachment for libels upon themselves, and denying that reflections upon individual judges are contempts of Court at all. *R. v. Almon*, *Wilmot's Notes of Opinions and Judgments*, p. 253.

Any attempt to bribe a judge, or to influence his probable decision on a matter before him by any private communication, is a contempt of Court. *Martin's Case*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 674; *Macgill's Case*, 2 Fow. Ex. Pr. 404.

But not every silly or impudent letter addressed to a judge about a matter which he *has* decided will be treated as a contempt. *R. v. Faulkner*, 2 Mont. & Ayr. 321, 322.

It is a contempt for a party to a suit to publish before the case has come on for hearing a copy of his brief, or even an abstract of his petition or statement of claim, or of the affidavits filed on either side, or any other *ex parte* statement tending to prepossess the minds of the public in his favor or to calumniate his adversary. *Captain Perry's Case*, cited 2 Atk. 469; 2 Dick. 794; *Mrs. Farley's Case*, 2 Vesey, senr., 520; *Coleman v. West Hartlepool Harbor & Railway Co.*, 8 W. R. 734; 2 L. T. 766; *In re The Cheltenham & Swansea Waggon Co.*, L. R. 8 Eq. 580; 38 L. J. Ch. 330; 17 W. R. 463; 20 L. T. 169; *Tichborne v. Mostyn*, L. R. 7 Eq. 55, n.; 15 W. R. 1072; 17 L. T. 5.

An article in a newspaper, commenting on a case still before the Court, is a contempt, though written temperately and respectfully, and in all other respects such an article as might properly and legitimately be written and published *after* the trial is ended. *R. v. Clement*, 4 B. & Ald. 218; *Little v. Thompson*, 2 Beav. 129; *Roach v. Garvan*, Read & Huggonson, 2 Atk. 469; 2 Dick. 794; *Tichborne v. Mostyn*, per Wood, V.C., L. R. 7 Eq. 57, n.; 15 W. R. 1074; 17 L. T. 7; *Tichborne v. Tichborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 398; 18 W. R. 621; 22 L. T. 55; *Vernon v. Vernon*, 40 L. J. Ch. 118; 19 W. R. 404; 23 L. T. 697; *Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde*, 29 W. R. 43; 42 L. T. 657.

\* 430 \* An advertisement in a newspaper offering £100 reward for legal proof of a certain marriage, such evidence being required in a pending suit, was considered by Parker, L.C., a contempt of Court, as tending to procure false evidence. (But I doubt if such a construction would be put on such an advertisement in the present day.) *Pool v. Sacheverel*, 1 P. Wms. 675.

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Holt, C.J., in *R. v. Rogers*, 7 Mod. 29.

Threats and insults addressed either to a party or a witness pending a suit, whether by word or letter, are a contempt of Court. *Smith v. Lakeman*, 26 L. J. Ch. 305 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1202 ; 28 L. T. (Old S.) 98 ; *Shaw v. Shaw*, 31 L. J. Pr. & Matr. 35 ; 6 L. T. 477 ; 2 Sw. & Tr. 515 ; *Re Mulock*, 33 L. J. Pr. & Matr. 205 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 1188 ; 13 W. R. 278.

*A fortiori*, if addressed to the judge or a master. *Lechmere Charlton's Case*, 2 Myl. & Cr. 316.

So it is a contempt for the solicitor to a defendant to publish in a newspaper anonymous letters full of arguments in the defendant's favor, and denying the facts on which the plaintiff would rely at the trial. *Daw v. Eley*, L. R. 7 Eq. 49 ; 38 L. J. Ch. 113 ; 17 W. R. 245.

The publisher of a newspaper was committed for printing an article which attacked the persons who had made affidavits in a suit in Chancery not yet concluded, imputing to them ignorance of facts and interested motives. *Felkin v. Herbert*, 33 L. J. Ch. 294 ; 12 W. R. 241, 332 ; 9 L. T. 635 ; 10 Jur. N. S. 62. See also *Littler v. Thompson*, 2 Beav. 129. *In re William Watson, Shaw's Cases* (Scotch), No. 6.

Still more is it a contempt of court for one committed for trial for perjury or for any of his partisans to address public meetings, alleging that there is a conspiracy against him, and that he will not have a fair trial. *Castro, Onslow's & Whalley's Case*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 219 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 358 ; *Skipworth's Case*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 230 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 371.

And even when the case is over, the solicitor for the defeated party will be guilty of a contempt, if he publishes a pamphlet describing the judgment pronounced as "an elaborate production, wholly beside the merits of the case," with other flippant and contumacious observations. *Ex parte Turner*, 3 Mont. D. & De G. 523, 551, 558.

The committee of a lunatic published a pamphlet reflecting upon persons who were managing the lunatic's estate under the orders of the Court of Chancery. Lord Erskine, C., committed him to prison for contempt, and the printer as well. *Ex parte Jones*, 13 Ves. 237.

Where the Court of Bankruptcy has appointed a receiver to take and \* hold possession of a bankrupt's property, it is a contempt of Court for the \* 431 holder of even a valid bill of sale to forcibly oust the receiver. *Ex parte Cochrane, In re Mead*, L. R. 20 Eq. 282 ; 44 L. J. Bkcy. 87 ; 23 W. R. 726 ; 32 L. T. 508. And see *In re Fells, Ex parte Andrews*, 4 Ch. D. 509 ; 46 L. J. Bkcy. 23 ; 25 W. R. 382 ; 36 L. T. 38. And *Ex parte Drake, In re Ware*, 5 Ch. D. 866 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 105 ; 25 W. R. 641 ; 36 L. T. 677.

To beat and kick the officer of the Court who serves a *subpœna* and to compel him to eat the wax and parchment thereof is a contempt, punishable by committal. *Williams v. Johns* (1773), cited in the note to *Elliot v. Halmarack*, 1 Mer. 303.

So is merely using abusive and violent language towards any person serving the process of any Court. *Price v. Hutchinson*, L. R. 9 Eq. 534 ; 18 W. R. 204 ; *R. v. Jones* (1719), 1 Stra. 185.

If a high sheriff proceeds to address the grand jury in open Court at the close of the judge's charge and persists in so doing though ordered by the judge to sit down and be quiet, he may be fined £500 for contempt. *In re the High Sheriff of Surrey*, 2 F. & F. 234, 237.

So for a civilian high sheriff to meet a judge of assize in ordinary civilian dress has been deemed a contempt of Court.

Wilful disobedience to any lawful order of a Court or a judge is a contempt, especially if on being served with a copy of the

order the party expresses in defiant and contemptuous language his intention to disregard such order.<sup>1</sup> And if a plaintiff be guilty of such contempt, he is liable, in addition to fine or imprisonment, to have all proceedings stayed, or even the whole action dismissed and money paid into Court returned to the defendant.<sup>2</sup> A true copy of the order of the Court must as a

\* 432 rule be served.<sup>3</sup> If, however, at the \* time of disobedience the offender has from any reasonable source knowledge that the order has been made, it is immaterial that the order has not yet been duly served. Notice by telegram may be sufficient.<sup>4</sup>

But where the defendant *bonâ fide* desires, but is in fact unable, to obey the order of the Court, such disobedience is not wilful, and is not a contempt.<sup>5</sup> Where, however, a person ordered to perform a particular act, purposely puts it out of his power to obey with a view of evading the order of the Court, such conduct is an aggravation of his original offence in disobeying, and is in itself a contempt of Court.

### *Illustrations.*

A trustee was ordered to pay £94 14s. into court: on the same day he was adjudicated a bankrupt: the Court refused to attach him for disobedience to the order. *Cobham v. Dalton*, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 655; 44 L. J. Ch. 702; 23 W. R. 865. See also *Earl of Lewes v. Barnett*, 6 Ch. D. 252; 47 L. J. Ch. 144; 26 W. R. 101; *Pashler v. Vincent*, 8 Ch. D. 825; 27 W. R. 2.

The defendant had illegally removed a quantity of human bones and earth from the parish burial ground of Chew Magna to his own field. The Court of Arches issued a monition to him to replace them. In the meantime, the defendant on the marriage of his daughter to a Mr. Bromfield conveyed this field and other land to the trustees of the marriage settlement, and it was argued that the defendant was unable to obey the order of the Court as he no longer either owned or occupied the field, and it was

further pretended that Mr. Bromfield refused to allow his father-in-law to enter \* 433 on the field and remove the bones. The Court of Arches pronounced the \* defendant guilty of contumacy and contempt. The bones were replaced within six days. *Adlam v. Colthurst*, L. R. 2 Adm. & Eccl. 30; 36 L. J. Ec. Ca. 14.

<sup>1</sup> *Anon.* (1711) 1 Salk. 94; *R. v. Clement*, 4 B. & Ald. 218; *Mr. Long Wellesley's Case*, 2 Russ. & Mylne, 639; *Hudson v. Tooth*, 2 P. D. 125; 35 L. T. 820; *Martin v. Mackonochie*, 3 Q. B. D. 730; *Combe v. Edwards*, 3 P. D. 103.

<sup>2</sup> *Republic of Liberia v. Roye*, 1 App. Cas. 139; 45 L. J. Ch. 297; 24 W. R. 967; 34 L. T. 145.

<sup>3</sup> *In re Holt*, 11 Ch. D. 168; 27 W. R. 485; 40 L. T. 207.

<sup>4</sup> *In re Bryant*, 4 Ch. D. 98; 25 W. R. 230; 35 L. T. 489; *Ex parte Langley, Ex parte Smith, In re Bishop*, 13 Ch. D. 110; 49 L. J. Bkey. 1; 28 W. R. 174; 41 L. T. 388. See further on this point *Jud. Act, Order XLII.*, rr. 2, 4, 5, 20; *Order XLIV.*; *Order XXXI.*, rr. 20, 22, and *Hutchinson v. Hartmont*, W. N. 1877, p. 29 (M. R.); *Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Hartmont*, 25 W. R. 743.

<sup>5</sup> *Clare v. Blakesley and others*, 8 Dowl. 835.

An advocate at Aberdeen snatched a petition from the Clerk of the Court; the Sheriff-substitute remonstrated and warned him he was committing a contempt of Court; but the advocate put the petition in his pocket and immediately left the Court. The Sheriff-substitute thereupon issued a warrant ordering him to deliver up the document on pain of imprisonment. As soon as the sheriff's officers entered the advocate's office, and demanded the petition, the advocate threw it into the fire. The officer thereupon immediately seized and imprisoned him. In an action brought by the advocate for false imprisonment, *held* by the House of Lords, that the arrest was perfectly lawful under the circumstances. *Watt v. Ligertwood & another*, L. R. 2 Sc. App. 361.

If the contempt is committed in open Court and in presence of the Judge, he may commit the offender *instantly*, and without any prior notice.<sup>1</sup> And I presume this power is not taken away by Jud. Act, Order XLIV., r. 2. A written warrant is not essential to such a committal, though it is usual.<sup>2</sup>

But when the offender is not present, and the contempt is committed by words spoken or published out of Court, it is usual to grant first a rule *nisi* calling on the offender to show cause why an attachment should not be granted against him; although the Court still may, and in flagrant cases will, on clear and satisfactory evidence, grant an attachment in the first instance, and issue its warrant, so that the offender shall answer for his contempt in custody.<sup>3</sup> The rule *nisi* is generally granted on affidavit of the fact, though the Court may proceed on its own knowledge, without any suggestion.<sup>4</sup> \* If the \* 434 offender fails to appear and show cause, a warrant may issue for his apprehension;<sup>5</sup> or he may be fined in his absence.<sup>6</sup>

When the offender was brought before the Court, it was formerly the custom to adjourn the matter for four days, in order that interrogatories might be exhibited against him, which he was compelled to answer on oath. But now it is usual to dispense with all interrogatories; the offender at once shows what cause he can, and endeavors to purge his contempt with the aid of ordinary affidavits. If the Court is not satisfied, it may commit him to prison for a time certain, or may impose a fine, or may do both; and in every case the Court may further order the

<sup>1</sup> Gascoyne, C.J., thus committed the Prince of Wales in 1406. See L. R. 2 Sc. App. 367, *n*.

<sup>2</sup> Per Wightman, J., in *Carus Wilson's Case*, 7 Q. B. 1017.

<sup>3</sup> *Anon.* (1711), 1 Salk. 94; *R. v. Jones* (1719), 1 Stra. 185.

<sup>4</sup> *In re the High Sheriff of Surrey*, 2 F. & F. 236; *Skipworth's and Castro's Cases*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 230; 12 Cox, C. C. 358.

<sup>5</sup> *Lechmere Charlton's Case*, 2 Myl. & Cr. 316.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Clement*, 4 B. & Ald. 218.

offender to pay the costs of the proceedings.<sup>1</sup> But in this case, as in every other, the costs are in the discretion of the Court, and will not be granted where the proceedings are clearly vexatious, and the party instituting them is himself to blame.<sup>2</sup> The costs should be asked for when the rule is argued ;<sup>3</sup> and in cases where the contempt is slight or unintentional, and the offender submits himself to the Court, and has done all in his power to clear his contempt, the Court often makes no other order, except that defendant pay the costs of the motion.<sup>4</sup>

The commitment must be for a time certain.<sup>5</sup> But in all other respects the warrant may be in general terms : no special grounds need be stated ; nor need the facts which are the cause of \* 435 the arrest be \* specified : it is sufficient to state that the offender is committed for contempt of Court.<sup>6</sup> Two lines are sufficient,<sup>7</sup> and will justify the officer of the Court in arresting the offender, and protect him from any action of false imprisonment. It is presumed that the Court was acting regularly and rightly, unless, indeed, the contrary appears expressly on the face of the writ.<sup>8</sup> And the decision of the Judge committing cannot be reviewed by any other Court.<sup>9</sup> If a fine is inflicted it is usual to add a sentence of imprisonment till the fine be paid, in addition to any other term of imprisonment that may have been inflicted.<sup>10</sup> Where the period for which the offender is to be detained is expressed in the margin of the writ, or may be gathered from it by necessary inference, the gaoler should discharge the prisoner at the end of that period.<sup>11</sup> But if the warrant does not state the period for which he is to be kept in custody, nor refer to the nature of the contempt committed, the gaoler should not release him without an order of the Court.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Martin's Case, 2 Russ. & Myl. 674.

<sup>2</sup> Vernon v. Vernon, 40 L. J. Ch. 118 ; 19 W. R. 404 ; 23 L. T. 697.

<sup>3</sup> Abud v. Riches, 2 Ch. D. 528 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 649 ; 24 W. R. 637 ; 34 L. T. 713.

<sup>4</sup> See L. R. 7 Eq. 58, n.

<sup>5</sup> R. v. James, 5 B. & Ald. 894 ; Green v. Elgie and another, 5 Q. B. 99.

<sup>6</sup> Howard v. Gosset, 10 Q. B. 411 ; *Ex parte* Fernandez, 6 H. & N. 717 ; 10 C. B. (N. S.) 3.

<sup>7</sup> R. v. Paty, 2 Lord Raym. 1108.

<sup>8</sup> R. v. Evans and another, 8 Dowl. 451.

<sup>9</sup> Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East, 1 ; Stockdale v. Hansard, per Littledale, J., 9 A. & E. 169 ; Carus Wilson's Case, per Lord Denman, C.J., 7 Q. B. 1008.

<sup>10</sup> L. R. 9 Q. B. 228, 229, 240.

<sup>11</sup> Moore v. Rose, L. R. 4 Q. B. 486 ; 38 L. J. Q. B. 236.

<sup>12</sup> Greaves v. Keene, 4 Ex. D. 73 ; 27 W. R. 416 ; 40 L. T. 216 ; McCombe v. Gray, 4 L. R. (1r.) 432.



When the period assigned comes to an end, the offender may not be detained in custody merely for the costs of the application to the Court to commit.<sup>1</sup> *A fortiori* where condemnation in costs is the only punishment inflicted, the \* Court has no \* 436 power subsequently to commit to prison for default in payment.<sup>2</sup>

In Scotland the Court of Session has sometimes *by interdict* prevented the intended publication of any statements having a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Thus, where one of two prisoners charged with murder confessed before his trial and by his confession seriously implicated the other, the Court of Session prohibited the *Edinburgh Evening Courant* from publishing the confession, lest it should prejudice the fair trial of the other prisoner.<sup>3</sup> But in *Fleming v. Newton*,<sup>4</sup> Lord Cottenham expresses a strong opinion that such interdicts are an excess of the powers of the Court of Session; as by such intervention "jurisdiction over libels is taken from the jury, and the right of unrestricted publication is destroyed."

In England such a prohibition would be clearly an illegal restriction of the liberty of the press. But the Court of Chancery has sometimes asserted that an exception to this rule exists in its own favor: and it has granted injunctions to restrain, not indeed all publications which it deems contempts, but one special class, viz., premature publications of its own proceedings, whether in court or before an examiner.<sup>5</sup> And there is one instance in which a court of gaol delivery exercised a similar power,<sup>6</sup> on the trial of Thistlewood and others for treason in 1820.

It is said that such injunction will not generally be granted unless applied for promptly, nor if the party complaining has himself invited, or commenced, public discussion of the matter in a newspaper.<sup>7</sup> But having regard to the recent decision in the *Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott*,<sup>8</sup> it may well be doubted whether \* any such exception to the \* 437 general rule exists either in Scotland or in England. No doubt it is a *contempt* for any one to prematurely publish garbled *ex parte* accounts of

<sup>1</sup> *Jackson v. Mawby*, 1 Ch. D. 86; 45 L. J. Ch. 53; 24 W. R. 92; *Hudson v. Tooth*, 2 P. D. 125; 35 L. T. 820.

<sup>2</sup> *Mickelthwaite v. Fletcher*, 27 W. R. 793.

<sup>3</sup> Bell's Notes, 165. See also *Emond's Case*, Dec. 7th, 1829, Shaw, 229.

<sup>4</sup> 1 H. L. C. 376.

<sup>5</sup> *Ex parte Jones*, 13 Vesey, 237; *Brook v. Evans*, 29 L. J. Ch. 616; 6 Jur. N. S. 1025; 8 W. R. 688; *Coleman v. West Hartlepool Rail. Co.*, 8 W. R. 734; 2 L. T. 766.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Clement*, 4 B. & Ald. 218.

<sup>7</sup> *Daw v. Eley*, L. R. 7 Eq. 49; 38 L. J. Ch. 113; *Buenos Ayres Gas Co. v. Wilde*, 29 W. R. 43; 42 L. T. 657.

<sup>8</sup> L. R. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192; 23 W. R. 249; 31 L. T. 866.

interlocutory proceedings : but surely subsequent punishment by fine and imprisonment is a sufficient deterrent. There seems no need of such an unusual remedy in this particular case, especially as the Courts of Equity have no jury, whose minds might be influenced thereby.

The words "Superior Court" include the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal, the High Court of Justice, and any Divisional Court thereof, and any Judge of any division sitting in Court alone<sup>1</sup> and the London Court of Bankruptcy.<sup>2</sup> Also any commissioner of oyer and terminer, assize, gaol delivery, and Nisi Prius.<sup>3</sup> And the Superior Courts of Law and Equity in Dublin, and the Court of Session in Scotland.

But whether a judge sitting at chambers is "a superior court," and has such power to commit for contempt, may well be doubted. Wilmot, C.J., was clearly of opinion that a judge at chambers had such a power, as appears by the very learned judgment which he intended to deliver in *R. v. Almon*,<sup>4</sup> but it was not delivered in fact, the case having dropped on the resignation of the then Attorney-General, Sir Fletcher Norton. But there is no instance of a judge at chambers himself inflicting fine or imprisonment. He invariably reports any insult offered to him at chambers to the full court, and leaves it to the Court to punish the offender. And in *R. v. Faulkner*,<sup>5</sup> Lord Abinger, C.B., states most distinctly that a judge at chambers has *no* power to commit for contempt. Section 39 of the Jud. Act, 1873, seems in no way to enlarge the powers of a judge at chambers ; and \* 438 its concluding sentence certainly implies that a judge at chambers is not "a court," and in so far confirms Lord Abinger's opinion. In the analogous case of the Court of Review, it has been decided that a single judge has no power to commit for contempt, except when sitting as the Court.<sup>6</sup> Hence, in spite of the *dictum* of Folkard & Starkie,<sup>7</sup> the better opinion appears to be that a judge at chambers cannot safely commit summarily for a contempt of himself ; although, of course, he constantly issues at chambers writs of attachment *after notice* to the party in default under Jud. Act, Order XLIV.

<sup>1</sup> Jud. Act, 1873, s. 39.

<sup>2</sup> 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, ss. 19, 77 ; G. R. 178, 179 ; c. 62, s. 9 ; c. 83, ss. 4, 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Ex parte Fernandez*, 6 H. & N. 717 ; 10 C. B. (N. S.) 3 ; 30 L. J. C. P. 321 ; 7 Jur. N. S. 529, 571 ; 9 W. R. 832 ; 4 L. T. 296, 324 ; *In re McAleece*, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 146.

<sup>4</sup> Wilmot's Opin. & Judgments, 253.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Mont. & Ayr. 338.

<sup>6</sup> *Ex parte Van Sandau*, 1 Phillips, 445 ; *Van Sandau v. Turner*, 6 Q. B. 773 ; compare also, *In re Ramsay*, L. R. 3 P. C. 427 ; 7 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 263 ; *Rainey v. Justices of Sierra Leone*, 8 Moo. P. C. C. 47.

<sup>7</sup> 4 ed., 631.

And *a fortiori* no official or special referee,<sup>1</sup> and no arbitrator,<sup>2</sup> can commit for contempt.

The Colonial courts of record are also superior courts, and possess the power of instantly committing for contempt in all the above cases: and no appeal lies from such a commitment to the Privy Council.<sup>3</sup> But if it appear on the face of the writ that the Court had exceeded its jurisdiction;<sup>4</sup> or if the offender had no opportunity given him of defending or explaining his conduct;<sup>5</sup> or if the punishment awarded for the contempt was not appropriate to the offence;<sup>6</sup> the order of commitment will \* be set aside, and the fine ordered to be remitted, by \* 439 the judicial committee of the Privy Council on appeal.

But if it sufficiently appears that the prisoner was committed for contempt, and that the Court had power to commit for such contempt, the offender cannot be heard to say that such contempt was not in fact committed. "Every Court in such a case has to form its own judgment."<sup>7</sup> When a competent court, acting clearly within its jurisdiction, states certain matters of *fact*, affidavits are not admissible to contradict such findings. So if the colonial court administers a different system of law from ours, affidavits cannot be received in England to show that the colonial court was acting contrary to its own law. The English Courts must "give full credit to that Court for knowing and administering their own law."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jud. Act, Order XXXVI. r. 33.

<sup>2</sup> 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Crawford's Case*, 13 Q. B. 613; 18 L. J. Q. B. 225; 13 Jur. 955; *In re McDermott*, L. R. 1 P. C. 260; 2 P. C. 341; 38 L. J. P. C. 1; 20 L. T. 47; *Hughes v. Porral and others*, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 41.

<sup>4</sup> *In re Ramsay*, L. R. 3 P. C. 427; 7 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 263; *Rainey v. The Justices of Sierra Leone*, 8 Moore, P. C. C. 47.

<sup>5</sup> *In re Pollard*, L. R. 2 P. C. 106; 5 Moore, P. C. C. N. S. 111.

<sup>6</sup> *Re Wallace*, L. R. 1 P. C. 283; 36 L. J. P. C. 9; 15 W. R. 533; 14 L. T. 286; *Re Downie & Arrindell*, 3 Moore, P. C. C. 414.

<sup>7</sup> Per Ld. Denman, C.J., in *Carus Wilson's Case*, 7 Q. B. 1015.

<sup>8</sup> Per Ld. Denman, C.J., in *Carus Wilson's Case*, 7 Q. B. 1014. See also *The Bank of Australasia v. Harding*, 9 C. B. 661; 19 L. J. C. P. 345; *Bank of Australasia v. Nias*, 16 Q. B. 717; 20 L. J. Q. B. 284; *De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone*, 6 H. & N. 301; 30 L. J. Ex. 238; *Munroe v. Pilkington*, 31 L. J. Q. B. 89; 8 Jur. N. S. 557; 6 L. T. 21; *Simpson v. Fogo*, 32 L. J. Ch. 249; 1 H. & M. 195; 1 J. & H. 18; 9 Jur. N. S. 403; 1 N. R. 422; 11 W. R. 418; 8 L. T. 61; *Godard v. Gray*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 139; 40 L. J. Q. B. 62; 19 W. R. 348; 24 L. T. 89.

The Judge of an inferior court is in no better position than any other public character, so far as words written and published are concerned. It is a misdemeanor to write and publish concerning him in the execution of his office any words which would be libellous and actionable *per se* if written and published of any other public officer.

It is not indictable to *speak* disrespectful and abusive words of the judge of an inferior court behind his back, or even to his face, provided he be out of court.

But it is indictable to *speak* aloud in open court when the judge is present in the discharge of his duty, words reflecting upon him in his official capacity.

### Illustrations.

It is indictable —

to give the lie to the steward of a manor holding a court leet, *Earl of Lincoln v. Fisher*, Cro. Eliz. 581; *Ow*, 113; *Moore*, 470;

to put on your hat in the presence of the lord of a court leet and refuse to take it off, saying, "I care not what you can do," *Bathurst v. Coxe*, 1 Keb. 451, 465; *Sir T. Raym.* 68;

to rise up in court and say to the justices in session, "Though I cannot have justice here, I will have it elsewhere," *R. v. Mayo*, 1 Keb. 508; 1 Sid. 144 (although *Twisden, J.*, mercifully endeavored to construe the words to mean merely, "I propose to appeal from your decision");

to say to a justice of the peace in the execution of his office, "You are a rogue and a liar," *R. v. Revel*, 1 Str. 420;

to call the mayor of Yarmouth in his court in the hearing of the suitors, a puppy and a fool, *Ex parte The Mayor of Yarmouth*, 1 Cox, C. C. 122.

But it is not indictable —

to call a justice of the peace, "a logger-headed, a slouch-headed, bursen-bellied hound," *R. v. Farr*, 1 Keb. 629;

\* 441     \* Nor to say that a justice is a fool, or an ass, or a coxcomb, or a block-head, or a bafflehead. Per *Holt, C.J.*, in *R. v. Wrightson*, 2 Salk. 698; 11 Mod. 166; 2 Roll. Rep. 78; 4 Inst. 181;

Nor to say of a burgess of Hull, that "Whenever he comes to put on his gown, Satan enters into him," *R. v. Baker*, 1 Mod. 35;

Nor to say of a justice of the peace in his absence that he is a scoundrel and a liar. Per *Lord Ellenborough*, *R. v. Weltje*, 2 Camp. 142;

Nor to accuse a justice of partiality or corruption, unless the words were uttered at a time when the magistrate was in the actual execution of his office, *Ex parte The Duke of Marlborough*, 5 Q. B. 955; 1 Dav. & Mer. 720;

Nor to tell a borough magistrate, out of court but to his face, that he is a liar, and unfit to be a magistrate, and that he will hear the same every time he came into town; unless indeed the words can be construed as tending to provoke a breach of the peace.

*Ex parte* Chapman, 4 A. & E. 773. See also *Anon.* (1650), *Style*, 251; *Simmons v. Sweete*, Cro. Eliz. 78; *Bagg's Case*, 11 Rep. 93, 95; 1 Roll. Rep. 79, 173, 224; *R. v. Burford*, 1 Ventris, 16; *R. v. Leafe, Andrews*, 226; *R. v. Penny*, 1 Ld. Raymond, 153; *R. v. Langley*, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1029; 2 Salk. 697; 6 Mod. 125; *Holt*, 654; *R. v. Rogers*, 2 Ld. Raymond, 777; 7 Mod. 28; *R. v. Nun*, 10 Mod. 186; *R. v. Granfield*, 12 Mod. 98; *R. v. Pocock*, 2 Str. 1157; *R. v. Burn*, 7 A. & E. 190. These cases overrule *R. v. Darby*, 3 Mod. 139; Comb. 65; Carth. 14.

Thus the same act which would be indictable if committed with respect to a superior court may not be indictable if only an inferior court is concerned. And the power of an inferior court to deal itself with such contempts is again still further restricted.

For as we have seen the superior courts could commit to prison in many cases where the offence is not indictable. An inferior court on the other hand cannot commit \*in every \*442 case which is indictable, and certainly in none which is not.<sup>1</sup>

An inferior court of record can only commit for contempts committed in open court, *in facie curiæ*.<sup>2</sup> The judge or coroner must at the moment be actually discharging his duty; and the words employed or act done must either be pointedly and personally disrespectful to the judge or coroner himself; or else amount to a serious obstruction of the course of justice.

### *Illustrations.*

If a coroner for any reason (and the sufficiency of such reason is a matter entirely for the coroner in the exercise of his discretion) order a particular person to quit the room where he is about to hold an inquest, and such person wholly refuse to go, and defiantly continues in the room to the hindrance of the inquest, the coroner may lawfully order him to be expelled. *Garnett v. Ferrand*, 6 B. & C. 611.

The solicitor for a plaintiff in a county court wrote a letter to the local newspaper, accusing the judge of the county court of "arbitrary and tyrannical abuse of power," and calling one statement he had made "a monstrosity" and "an untruth." Held that the judge had no power to proceed against the solicitor for contempt of court; although the matter was still pending. *R. v. Lefroy, Ex parte Jolliffe*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 134; 42 L. J. Q. B. 121; 21 W. R. 332; 28 L. T. 132.

Before actually committing, the judge or coroner should always give the offender an opportunity of explaining his conduct and showing cause why he should not be committed.

If the judge or coroner does commit, he must issue a warrant in writing, and duly signed; he may not commit by word of

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Revel*, 1 Str. 420.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Lefroy*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 134; 42 L. J. Q. B. 121; 21 W. R. 332; 28 L. T. 132.

mouth, as a judge of a superior court may sometimes do.<sup>1</sup> Such warrant should state clearly the cause for which the prisoner was committed and all facts necessary to give jurisdiction to commit. Affidavits are inadmissible to contradict any statement of *fact* contained in the warrant;<sup>2</sup> though they are admissible to show want of jurisdiction.<sup>3</sup> But where it sufficiently appears that the prisoner was committed for contempt, and the court had power on the facts as stated by them to commit for such contempt, their decision cannot be reviewed by any court.<sup>4</sup> They alone can judge of the insult offered to them. Such a warrant will justify any officer of the inferior court in arresting the offender, and protect him from any action of assault or false imprisonment.<sup>5</sup>

### *Illustrations.*

Charles Carus Wilson, an English attorney, went to reside in Jersey, and there brought an action against Peter Le Sieur in the Royal Court of Jersey, which was composed of a Bailiff and two Jurats, or Lieutenant-bailiffs. On September 23rd, 1844, the court was about to deliver an interlocutory judgment in the cause against Wilson, when he interposed and in an unbecoming manner protested against the competency of the court, his own counsel being present and silent. Wilson had previously been repeatedly warned that his conduct was disrespectful. The Court thereupon, after giving Wilson full opportunity to explain or apologize for his conduct, sentenced him to pay a fine of £10 and apologize to the Court, and in default to be imprisoned till obedience. This sentence was duly recorded in the Judgment Book, and read aloud to Wilson and his counsel then and there; but Wilson wholly refused either to pay or to apologize, and was accordingly at once arrested by the Viscount of the island, whose duty it was to carry into effect the sentences of the Royal Court, and lodged in Her Majesty's gaol. A writ of *habeas corpus* was obtained on the ground that there was no written warrant for his arrest or detainer. The return to the writ set out all the facts and also stated that by the law and practice of the Island of Jersey no written warrant was necessary or usual, but the sentence duly recorded was of itself a sufficient authority justifying and compelling the Viscount to arrest, and the gaoler to detain, the offender. *Held* by Lord Denman, C.J., Patteson, Williams and Wightman, JJ., that affidavits on behalf of Wilson to show that such was *not* the law or practice of Jersey, and that in other respects the Royal Court had acted inconsistently with its own law, could not be received: that no written warrant was necessary; that the contempt was a matter which the Royal Court had to decide for itself; that its decision, being the decision of a competent court, could not be reviewed by the Queen's Bench; and Wilson was accordingly, on April 22nd, 1845, remanded to Her Majesty's Prison in Jersey. *Carus Wilson's Case*, 7 Q. B. 984.

<sup>1</sup> *Mayhew v. Locke*, 7 Taunt. 63.

<sup>2</sup> *In re John Rea* (2), 4 L. R. Ir. 345; 14 Cox, C. C. 256.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Bolton*, 1 Q. B. 73.

<sup>4</sup> *Carus Wilson's case*, 7 Q. B. 984, 1014; *Garnett v. Ferrand*, 6 B. & Cr. 625; *R. v. Bolton*, 1 Q. B. 73.

<sup>5</sup> *Levy v. Moylan*, 19 L. J. C. P. 308; 1 L. M. & P. 307.

Inferior Courts not of record have no power to fine or commit for contempt. But they have another remedy which is now peculiar to inferior courts, although it was formerly employed also by the superior courts in cases not calling for severer punishment. The offender may be required to find *sureties for his good behavior* : —

- (i.) If he use any disrespectful or unmannerly expressions in the face of the court.<sup>1</sup>
- (ii.) If, out of court, he uses words disparaging the judge or magistrate in relation to his office.
- (iii.) If, out of court, he obstruct or insult an officer of the court in the execution of his duty.<sup>2</sup>
- (iv.) And generally, if he use any words which directly tend to a breach of the peace.

But *not* for contemptuous and uncivil words spoken of the judge in his private capacity.

Such binding over should be done as soon as possible after the contempt is committed ; and in the case of petty sessions, it should be done, *not* by the justice specially attacked, but one of his brethren.<sup>3</sup> And in default of sureties being provided, the justices may commit either to the common gaol or to the House of Correction ;<sup>4</sup> but it should appear clearly upon the face of their warrant that the committal is for want of sureties, and not merely for contempt.<sup>5</sup> And the committal should be for a time \* certain, not “until he shall find such sureties,” else \* 445 a poor and friendless man might be imprisoned for life.<sup>6</sup>

#### *Illustrations.*

Langley said to the Mayor of Salisbury whilst in the execution of his office, “Mr. Mayor, I do not care for you ; you are a rogue and a rascal.” *Held* that the words were not indictable ; but that the Mayor might have bound him over then and there to be of good behavior, and ought to have done so instantly. *R. v. Langley*, 2 *Ld. Raym.* 1029 ; 6 *Mod.* 125 ; 2 *Salk.* 697 ; *Holt*, 654.

Rogers spoke unmannerly words to Sir Robert Jeffryes, an Alderman of the City of London, while he was holding a wardmote in a church. *Holt*, C.J., said, “No information or indictment will lie for these words. For the common law has provided a proper method for punishment of scandalous words, viz., binding to the good behavior ; such words being a breach of the peace.” *R. v. Rogers*, 2 *Ld. Raym.* 777 ; 7 *Mod.* 28.

<sup>1</sup> 1 *Lev.* 107 ; 1 *Keb.* 558.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Lee*, 12 *Mod.* 514.

<sup>3</sup> *Dean's case*, *Cro. Eliz.* 689.

<sup>4</sup> *Hawk. P. C. c.* 61, ss. 2, 3.

<sup>5</sup> 6 *Geo. I.*, c. 19, s. 2.

<sup>6</sup> *Prickett v. Gratrex*, 8 *Q. B.* 1020.

As to some inferior courts special statutes have been passed. Thus, as to County Courts, by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 113,<sup>1</sup> it is enacted, that, "if any person shall wilfully insult the judge or any juror, or any bailiff, clerk or officer of the said court for the time being, during his sitting or attendance in court, or in going to or returning from the court, or shall wilfully interrupt the proceedings of the court, or otherwise misbehave in court, it shall be lawful for any bailiff or officer of the court, with or without the assistance of any other person, by the order of the judge, to take such offender into custody, and detain him until the rising of the court; and the judge shall be empowered, if he shall think fit, by a warrant under his hand, and sealed with the seal of the court, to commit any such offender to any prison to which he has power to commit offenders under this Act,<sup>2</sup> for any time \* 446 not exceeding seven days, or to impose upon any such \* offender a fine not exceeding £5 for every such offence; and, in default of payment thereof, to commit the offender to any such prison as aforesaid for any time not exceeding seven days, unless the said fine be sooner paid."<sup>3</sup>

And it has been held that a County Court judge has no power to commit in any case not within this section.<sup>4</sup> Except, of course, for breach of injunction and in other cases coming within rules 30 & 31 of County Court Rules, 1875, Order XIX.<sup>5</sup>

By the County Voters Registration Act, 1865,<sup>6</sup> s. 16, it is declared to be lawful for any Revising Barrister, whether revising the Lists of a County, City, or Borough, to order any person to be removed from his Court who shall interrupt the business of the Court, or refuse to obey his lawful orders in respect of the same; and it shall be the duty of the Chief Constable, Commissioner, or Chief Officer of Police of the County, City, Borough, or Place in which the Court is held, to take care that an officer of police do attend that Court, during its sitting, for the purpose of keeping order therein, and to carry into effect any order of the Revising Barrister as aforesaid.

By the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851,<sup>7</sup> s. 9, it is enacted . . .

<sup>1</sup> County Courts Act, 1846.

<sup>2</sup> See 12 & 13 Vict. c. 101, s. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See *Levy v. Moylan*, 19 L. J. C. P. 308; 1 L. M. & P. 307.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Lefroy, Ex parte Jolliffe*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 134; 42 L. J. Q. B. 121; 21 W. R. 332; 28 L. T. 132.

<sup>5</sup> *Martin v. Bannister*, 4 Q. B. D. 212, 491; 48 L. J. Ex. 300; 27 W. R. 431.

<sup>6</sup> 28 Vict. c. 36.

<sup>7</sup> 14 & 15 Vict. c. 93.



that if any person shall wilfully insult any Justice or Justices . . . . sitting in any . . . . Court or place, or shall commit any contempt of any such Court, it shall be lawful for such Justice or Justices by any verbal order, either to direct such person to be removed from such Court or place, or to be taken into custody, and at any time before the \* rising of such Court, by \* 447 warrant, to commit such person to jail for any period not exceeding seven days, or to fine such person in any sum not exceeding 40s.

*Illustrations.*

In 1874 Thomas Willis claimed to vote as a freeholder ; but the revising barrister on the meagre evidence before him held that the property in respect of which he claimed was copyhold, and disallowed the vote. His cousin William Willis who was present in court as agent for the opposite political party knew perfectly well that it was really freehold, but held his tongue. In 1875 Thomas Willis accordingly claimed as a copyholder. Then William came forward and produced the family title-deeds and proved clearly that the land was freehold. The revising barrister was compelled again to disallow Thomas's vote ; but ordered William to be turned out of the room for not having produced this evidence in 1874. *Held* that such expulsion was wrongful, as William's conduct in 1874, though possibly deserving of moral reprobation, was certainly no "interruption" of the proceedings of the court then being held in 1875. *Willis v. Maclachlan*, 1 Ex. D. 376 ; 45 L. J. Ex. 689 ; 35 L. T. 218.

To insist, in spite of repeated remonstrance, upon interrupting and insulting a court of petty sessions, by shouting at the bench in the most violent and unseemly manner, so that not even one of the justices was able to speak a word, is a contempt for which the court may commit to prison even a solicitor practising before them. *In re John Rea* (1878), 2 L. R. Ir. 429 ; 14 Cox, C. C. 139.

A material witness against a prisoner committed for trial on a charge of felony refused to be bound over to appear at the Quarter Sessions to give evidence against him, saying that she would not go to Maidstone, and nobody should make her. After fully explaining the matter and expending nearly an hour in the attempt to persuade her to go, the committing magistrate issued a warrant by virtue of which she was taken to Maidstone, and gave her evidence, and the prisoner was convicted ; without her evidence he could not have been convicted. *Held* that the arrest was lawful, by necessary implication from 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 13. *Bennett and wife v. Watson and another*, 3 M. & S. 1.

The term "Inferior Court" includes the Mayor's Court, London, the Sheriff's Court, the City of London Court of Record, the Secondary's Court, the Tolzey Court of Bristol, the Salford Court of Record, the Court of Passage, Liverpool, all Sheriff's Courts, all County Courts, all Courts of Quarter and Petty Sessions, all Coroner's, all \* Revising Barrister's, and, in short, \* 448 all *temporal* Courts not enumerated as Superior Courts, *ante*, p. 437.

The ecclesiastical Courts have no power to commit for contempt at all. All that such Court can do is to signify such contempt to the Lord Chancellor, who thereupon, under 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 93, issues a writ *de contumace capiendo* for taking the offender into custody.<sup>1</sup> But such writ will not issue if the alleged offender be a peer, a lord of Parliament, or a member of the House of Commons (s. 2). Note that both Mr. Long Wellesley and Mr. Lechmere Charlton,<sup>2</sup> were members of Parliament, and yet both were committed to the Fleet for contempt of the Court of Chancery.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Adlam v. Colthurst*, L. R. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 30 ; 36 L. J. Ec. Ca. 14 ; *Ex parte Dale*, 43 L. T. 534.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 430, 431.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Russ. & Mylne, 639 ; 2 Mylne & Cr. 316. And see the remarks of Cockburn, C.J., in *Onslow's* and *Whalley's* cases, L. R. 9 Q. B. 228, 9 ; 12 Cox, C. C. 369.

# PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND EVIDENCE.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES.

AN action of libel or slander should not be lightly undertaken ; it is a dangerous experiment ; many a plaintiff, even though nominally successful, has bitterly regretted that he ever issued his writ. Every one who proposes to bring an action of defamation should remember that he is about to stake his reputation on the event of a lawsuit, and to invite the public to be spectators of the issue. No step, therefore, should be taken in hot haste. There are many matters which require careful consideration before an action be commenced. (a)

#### *Considerations before Writ.*

First, is it clear that the plaintiff is the person defamed ? Libels are often couched in guarded language, so that none but the initiated can tell to whom they refer. Thus, if the libel be on "a certain vicar," no individual vicar should sue, unless by other passages in the libel he is unmistakably identified ; otherwise he will be "putting the cap on his own head." It is not enough that one or two of the plaintiff's dearest friends feel convinced that he is the person aimed at ; he should not sue unless his relations and acquaintances generally have arrived at the same conclusion.

Next, is the charge, or any part of it, true ? If so, the plaintiff, by bringing an action takes the surest method of advertising \* his \* 450 own disgrace. When once the action is brought and a justification pleaded, no honorable compromise can be effected ; the matter must be fought out to the bitter end ; and every detail will become matter of

(a) The action does not survive in Massachusetts though attended with special damage. *Cummings v. Bird*, 115 Mass. 346. An action for libel survives against the defendant's estate in Iowa. *Carson v. McFadden*, 10 Iowa, 91.

“town talk.” It would be better, therefore, for such a plaintiff to affect an indifference which he does not feel, and treat the libel as “beneath contempt.”

And even if the charge itself be false, still if the plaintiff has been at all to blame in the matter, if his conduct, though not morally reprehensible, has yet been indiscreet or unbecoming, it will be better for him not to sue. He will have to be cross-examined in open court, and every admission wrung from him will be published in all the county papers; the blackest motives will be imputed to him, and the worst possible construction be put upon his conduct. And although the verdict be ultimately in the plaintiff's favor, many of his acquaintances will remember with pleasure to their dying day what a sorry figure he cut in the box.

The plaintiff should also consider whether he has not brought the libel or slander on himself, whether his own conduct was not such as naturally to lead people to make unkind remarks.<sup>1</sup> Sometimes it is a defence to an action that the plaintiff challenged or invited the defendant's attack;<sup>2</sup> and in every case the defendant may show in mitigation of damages the provocation given by the plaintiff.<sup>3</sup> A man who has commenced a newspaper controversy comes with a very bad grace to the law courts for assistance against too powerful an adversary. If both parties are to blame, the result of the trial is generally:—Damages, one farthing; each party to pay his own costs.

And wholly apart from the above considerations, is it worth while to bring an action? Is the matter sufficiently serious? A man does not advance either his dignity or his reputation by showing himself too sensitive to calumny. His friends will think that he is eager for litigation, because he knows that his character cannot stand the least wear and tear. This remark applies chiefly to actions of slander. It is not wise to inquire too curiously what others say of us behind our backs. The slander \* 451 is only heard by few; it will soon be forgotten: if you \* bring an action, it will be disseminated throughout the country, and recorded in a permanent shape. If then you are in doubt whether to bring an action of slander or not, my advice would be in the negative, unless the charge made be really serious. A libel in a newspaper is very different.

And even in cases of libel, it is better to exhaust every other method first. If the libel has appeared in a newspaper, write to the editor a calm and dignified letter in answer, avoiding all “smart writing,” and indulging in no *tu quoque*. This will probably bring an apology from the writer of the original letter. And a prompt apology and retractation of the charge

<sup>1</sup> See *Davis v. Duncan*, L. R. 9 C. P. 396; 43 L. J. C. P. 185; 22 W. R. 575; 30 L. T. 464; *ante*, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 228.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 306, 307.

is always worth more to the plaintiff than any amount of damages. If, however, no apology comes, but another letter worse than the first, the plaintiff should lie by awhile till his adversary has thoroughly committed himself by some third letter palpably outrageous. Now the plaintiff can show a systematic course of persistent libelling, which is cogent evidence of malice, entitling him to heavy damages.

Next, before issuing a writ, the plaintiff should make sure what were the defendant's exact words. Of a libel, a copy can as a rule be easily obtained; but with slanders it is different. What has reached the plaintiff's ears is probably a much exaggerated version of what defendant actually said. The plaintiff is usually the last person who hears the charge against him; and words not actionable *per se* are frequently converted into actionable words in the intermediate process; for we know that:—

“Fama, malum quo non aliud velocius ullum,  
Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo,  
\* \* \* \* \*  
Tam ficti praviq[ue] tenax, quam nuntia veri.”

VIRG. *ÆN.* IV. 174, 188.

The person slandered should, therefore, take a friend with him (who will make a good witness) and go and ask the alleged slanderer:—“Is it true that you have been saying this of me?” If he denies that he ever said so, as is very possible, appear at all events to believe him, and bring no action; if he confesses that he did say so, but has since discovered he was mistaken, get him to write you a letter acknowledging his error, to show \* any one if necessary, and then forgive him. If, however, \* 452 he admits that he said so and reiterates the charge, then you are provided by anticipation with the best possible evidence of publication—an admission by the defendant. Lord Denman says, in *Griffiths v. Lewis*,<sup>1</sup> “it is never wise to bring an action for slander unless some such course has been taken.”<sup>2</sup>

As soon as it is clear what is the precise charge made by the defendant, the next question will be:—Are the words actionable? On this point the plaintiff should consult his solicitor, who should consult c. II. *ante*, pp. 17–92. If the words are not actionable without special damage, the plaintiff must wait for some damage to accrue before commencing his action.

### *Parties.*

Next, it must be determined who is the right plaintiff, and who the proper defendant; as to which see c. XII. *ante*, pp. 344–372. In cases

<sup>1</sup> 7 Q. B. 61; 14 L. J. Q. B. 199; 9 Jur. 370.

<sup>2</sup> See his remarks, *ante*, p. 231.

of slander where special damage is essential to the action, be careful to sue only that person whose actual utterance of the slander caused the special damage. Do not sue the originator of the falsehood, if his utterance of it has produced no direct injury to the plaintiff. In cases of written libels, it is often wise to sue the person who actually wrote the libel as well as his master or employer who directed or sanctioned what he wrote. For thus, should the plaintiff fail to prove agency at the trial, he will yet be entitled to judgment against the clerk or servant. In a recent case<sup>1</sup> the libel was contained in a business letter written by the wife of a tradesman: the plaintiff sued the husband alone, and failed to prove that the libellous portion of the letter was written with the husband's knowledge or consent. The plaintiff's counsel thereupon applied to have the wife added as co-defendant; but Grove, J., ruled that it was too late to do so. Had the wife's name been added in the first instance, the plaintiff must have succeeded, whether the husband knew what his wife was writing or not.

Where a libel has appeared in a newspaper, the person defamed \* 453 can sue the editor, printer, publisher, or author, or \* some, or all of them. He would naturally prefer to sue the author, and should write to the editor demanding the writer's name and address. This information the editor will, as a rule, refuse to give. It is generally regarded as a point of honor with an editor not to disclose the name of any of his regular contributors. In *Harle v. Catherall* and others,<sup>2</sup> Martin, B., says, "When a man went to an editor to ask for the name of an anonymous correspondent, no blame attached to the editor for refusing to give the name. Indeed, an editor would almost be mad to do so. He should blame no editor for so refusing." The plaintiff must in such a case be content to sue the proprietor of the paper.

### *Letter before Action.*

In all cases, before actually issuing a writ, the plaintiff's solicitor should write to the defendant, demanding an apology and threatening proceedings. If the charge was made publicly, a public apology should be demanded. If only a few heard it, the plaintiff should be content with a letter of apology, fully retracting the charge; this could be shown to every one who heard what the defendant said.

### *Notice of Action.*

Sometimes besides the letter before action it is necessary to give a formal notice of action a month and a day before the writ is issued — *e.g.*, where a libel is written by any one acting *bonâ fide* in the execution of any statu-

<sup>1</sup> Pollard v. Green, Bristol Summer Assizes, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> 14 L. T. 802.

tory duty.<sup>1</sup> In such cases, a letter asking for the name of the writer's informant, and threatening proceedings if the name be not disclosed, will not be a sufficient notice within the statute.<sup>2</sup>

### *Choice of Court.*

Next, in what Court shall the action be brought? The County Court has no jurisdiction,<sup>3</sup> unless by consent of both parties;<sup>4</sup> (although the action may subsequently be remitted to the County Court.<sup>5</sup>)

\* Where the particulars before a County Court judge disclose a \* 454 cause of action for libel or slander, he has no power to amend them so as to give himself jurisdiction, *e.g.*, by turning the case into an action for false imprisonment.<sup>6</sup> The Courts of Equity before the Judicature Act had no cognizance over libels or slander, whether public or private, except as contempt of their own Courts.<sup>7</sup> The Chancery Division now undoubtedly has jurisdiction to try a case of libel.<sup>8</sup> But it is obviously inexpedient to commence such an action there; for libel or no libel is peculiarly a question for a jury, and the judges of the Chancery Division never have a jury.<sup>9</sup> In *Thomas v. Williams*, the defendant never expressed a wish for a jury till the whole of the evidence on both sides had been taken; had he applied sooner, Fry, J., would have changed the mode of trial.<sup>10</sup> The only object in going to the Chancery Division would be to obtain an injunction; and it is clear now that an interim injunction cannot be obtained on an interlocutory application.<sup>11</sup> And at the full hearing of the case, after the trial, an injunction can be obtained as readily in the Common Law Divisions as in the Chancery Division.<sup>12</sup> For every reason, therefore, it is best to issue the writ in one of the Common Law Divisions of the High Court of Justice.

### *District Registry.*

The plaintiff, wherever resident, may, if he pleases, issue a writ out of the registry of any district;<sup>13</sup> but it is absolutely useless to do so, unless

<sup>1</sup> 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Norris v. Smith*, 10 A. & E. 188.

<sup>3</sup> 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 58.

<sup>4</sup> 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 23.

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, pp. 468, 565.

<sup>6</sup> *Hopper v. Warburton*, 7 L. T. 722.

<sup>7</sup> *Roach v. Read and another*, 2 Atk. 469; 2 Dick. 794.

<sup>8</sup> *Thomas v. Williams*, 14 Ch. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 23 W. R. 983; 43 L. T. 91.

<sup>9</sup> *Clark v. Cookson*, 2 Ch. D. 746; 45 L. J. Ch. 752; 24 W. R. 535; 34 L. T. 646; *Murdock v. Warner*, 4 Ch. D. 750; 46 L. J. Ch. 121; 25 W. R. 207; 35 L. T. 748.

<sup>10</sup> See 14 Ch. D. 871.

<sup>11</sup> *Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott*, L. R. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192; 23 W. R. 249; 31 L. T. 866.

<sup>12</sup> *Saxby v. Easterbrook*, 3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. R. 188.

<sup>13</sup> Order V. r. 1.

the plaintiff's solicitor has his office within the district.<sup>1</sup> The districts of the district registries are defined by an Order in Council issued under s. 60 of the Judicature Act, 1873, on August 12th, 1875: they are \* 455 as a rule co-extensive \* with the County Court district of the same place. Again, there is very little advantage in issuing a writ out of a District Registry, unless all the defendants reside or carry on business within the district; as if one of them neither resides nor carries on business within the district, he is almost sure to appear in London. If, however, all parties and their respective solicitors reside or carry on business within the district, then, if the action be simple and straightforward, it may be as well to issue the writ out of the District Registry. Instructions to draw pleadings may in that case be sent direct to counsel in town by post; and thus some few agency expenses will be saved. But if there are likely to be many applications at chambers, *e.g.*, over the Interrogatories and their Answers, or as to a plea of Justification, then it would be much better to issue the writ in London in the usual way. Even where the defendant resides and carries on business within the district, he may after appearance there remove the action to London as of right at any time before delivering his statement of defence, by merely giving a notice under Order XXXV. r. 12. After the expiration of the time for delivering defence an order is requisite.<sup>2</sup> Of course issuing the writ out of the Central Office in London in no way prevents the trial taking place at the assizes.

### *Statute of Limitations.*

It is seldom that a plaintiff in an action of defamation allows his remedy to be barred by lapse of time. He is generally too eager to commence proceedings, and will not wait till his special damage has fully accrued.<sup>3</sup> Still the Duke of Brunswick waited nearly eighteen years; it may be as well therefore to state that an action of slander for words actionable *per se* must be brought "within *two* years next after the words spoken, and not after,"<sup>4</sup> and that an action for libel or of *scandalum magnatum* must be brought within six years from the date of publication.<sup>5</sup> In cases of slander \* 456 of title, and indeed whenever the words are actionable \* only by reason of special damage, the plaintiff has six years within which to sue; and the time does not begin to run till the damage has actually been sustained.<sup>6</sup> This is in accordance with the principle of *Bonomi v. Back-*

<sup>1</sup> See Order IV. r. 3a; R. S. C. Feb. 1876, r. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Order XXXV. r. 13.

<sup>3</sup> See *Ingram v. Lawson*, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 9 C. & P. 326; 4 Jur. 151; *Goslin v. Corry*, 7 M. & Gr. 342; 8 Scott, N. R. 21.

<sup>4</sup> 21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Lord Saye & Seal v. Stephens*, cited Cro. Car. 535; Litt. 342.

<sup>6</sup> *Saunders v. Edwards*, 1 Sid. 95.



house.<sup>1</sup> Lord Campbell was evidently under a misapprehension as to the effect of stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 16, in his remarks in 9 H. L. C. p. 513. In all other cases the time runs from the date of publication, (a) unless indeed the party then entitled to bring the action be under any disability, or be beyond the seas.<sup>2</sup> But if once such disability be removed and the time begin to run, nothing afterwards can stop it.

But the publication relied on to oust the statute need not be the original or substantial publication. Thus if any agent of the plaintiff can induce the defendant to sell him an old copy of the libel, published many years ago, such second publication, although contrived by the plaintiff for the very purpose, will be sufficient to disprove the plea of the Statute of Limitations. And that plea being once ousted the jury will not be confined to that single publication within the six years, but may give damages generally for the original dissemination of the libel.<sup>3</sup>

### *Former Proceedings.*

That a previous action has already been brought and damages recovered against the same defendant for the same words is a bar to any subsequent action, even though fresh damage has since arisen therefrom. For the jury in the former action must be taken to have assessed the damages once for all; and the probability or possibility that this subsequent damage would follow should have been submitted to their consideration then. And this is so whether the words are in themselves actionable or not.<sup>4</sup> So if the prior action was unsuccessful, this will also be a bar to the action; unless indeed the plaintiff was only nonsuited on some technical ground and the judge in giving \* judgment of nonsuit expressly declared that it \* 457 was a common law nonsuit, and that the plaintiff might bring a second action.

But it must be clear that the cause of action is the same in both cases. Thus where the declaration in an action of slander alleged that the defendant spoke of the plaintiff, *in the way of his trade*, the words, "He cheated me;" "He is a thief and robbed me of £100;" and contained an averment of special damage, the defendant pleaded a former judgment recovered for the same grievances; but the record of the previous action showed the slanderous words to have been, "That thief is a villain, a scoundrel and a

<sup>1</sup> 9 H. L. C. 503; E. B. & E. 662; 34 L. J. Q. B. 181.

<sup>2</sup> 21 Jac. I. c. 19, s. 7; 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 (al. c. 16), s. 19; 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 7; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 12.

<sup>3</sup> Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 317.

(a) Barnard v. Boulware, 5 Mo. 454.

rascal, and I can prove him a thief at any moment ;” and it neither alleged that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his trade, nor contained an averment of special damage. This was held to be no bar to the action. “I cannot think,” said Crompton, J., “that the cause of action in that record which contains words charging the plaintiff with felony, is the same cause of action as that in the present declaration, which imputes a charge against the plaintiff as a trader.”<sup>1</sup>

So, too, a previous recovery against another person may be a bar to the present action, if the former defendant was jointly concerned with the present defendant in the very publication now sued on. Thus if A. & B. be in partnership either as printers or publishers of a newspaper, a previous judgment recovered against A. would be a bar to any action against B. for the same libel, even though the judgment obtained in the prior action be not satisfied.<sup>2</sup> But this is only because they ought to have been sued jointly, and could have been so sued before the Judicature Act. Where two are severally liable, judgment against one is no bar to an action against the other. Thus, a previous judgment against the proprietor of a newspaper, even though satisfied, is no bar to an action for the same libel against the author.<sup>3</sup> *A fortiori* that heavy damages had been recovered against

\* 458 one newspaper is no bar to an action against \* another newspaper which has published the same libel. Such previous recovery should not even be mentioned to the jury in mitigation of damages;<sup>4</sup> nor should it be stated that such other actions are pending.<sup>5</sup> In America it seems no judgment against another, whether jointly or severally liable, will be a bar, unless it be satisfied.<sup>6</sup>

### *Joinder of Causes of Action.*

The Judicature Act gives a plaintiff very wide powers of joining several causes of action in one writ; but as a rule in cases of libel and slander the plaintiff should not avail himself of these provisions. Defamation is a matter *sui generis*, and it would be imprudent to complicate the issue by joining irrelevant claims. Of course any number of libels or slanders published by the same defendant may well be sued on in the same action,

<sup>1</sup> Wadsworth v. Bentley, 23 L. J. Q. B. 3; 17 Jur. 1077; 2 C. L. R. 127; 1 B. C. Cases (L. & M.), 203.

<sup>2</sup> Brown v. Wootton, Cro. Jac. 73; Yelv. 67; Moo. 762; King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, 504; Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 547; 41 L. J. C. P. 190; 20 W. R. 784; 27 L. T. 99, followed in *Ex parte Drake*, *In re Ware*, 5 Ch. D. 866; 25 W. R. 641; 36 L. T. 677.

<sup>3</sup> Frescoe v. May, 2 F. & F. 123.

<sup>4</sup> Creevy v. Carr, 7 C. & P. 64.

<sup>5</sup> Harrison v. Pearce, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

<sup>6</sup> Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wallace (Supr. Ct.), 1; Thomas v. Rumsay, 6 Johns. (N.Y.) 26; Brown v. Hirley, 5 Upper Canada, Q. B. Rep. (Old S.) 734.

unless they be wholly disconnected. (a) So, too, a claim for malicious prosecution, or wrongful dismissal, or even assault may be joined, if it arises out of the same circumstances, and will be substantiated by the same witnesses, as the claim for libel or slander. In a recent case, where the plaintiff alleged that a foreign merchant and his Manchester agent had conspired to libel the plaintiff in the way of his trade, the Court allowed this joint cause of action to be joined with claims against each defendant severally for the same libels or others of the same class.<sup>1</sup>

Claims by plaintiffs jointly may be joined with claims by them or any of them separately against the same defendant.<sup>2</sup> Claims by or against husband and wife may be joined with claims by or against either of them separately.<sup>3</sup> But these rules are expressly declared (r. 7) to be subject to rr. 1, 8, 9 of Order XVII., which enact that if a plaintiff unites in the same action several causes of action which cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, a Master or District Registrar shall on the application \* of the defendant strike out some of such causes of action, \* 459 or order separate trials to be had.

#### *Indorsement on Writ.*

The writ must be indorsed with a plain statement of the nature of the action:—*e.g.*, “The plaintiff’s claim is for damages for libel” or “for slander” or “for libel and slander.” The words “and for an injunction” may be added.<sup>4</sup> But in cases of newspaper libel, it is as well to give more particulars:—“The plaintiff’s claim is for a libel on him published by the defendant in the ——— *Gazette* for Friday, November 5th, 1880.” This fuller form is useful as identifying the libel in case judgment should be allowed to go by default.

It is not necessary to state what sum is asked as damages; for they must always be unliquidated in these actions. But if the plaintiff does so, he should be sure to ask *enough*, for although he may recover *less*, he cannot recover *more*, than the sum claimed on the writ; unless the judge at the

<sup>1</sup> *Desilla v. Schunck & Co. & Fels & Co.*, Weekly Notes, 1880, p. 96.

<sup>2</sup> Order XVII. r. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Order XVII. r. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 454.

(a) Different sets of words may in Missouri be embraced within the same count spoken on different occasions, if they import the same offence. *Pennington v. Meeks*, 46 Mo. 217. *A fortiori* if said at the same time. *Rathburn v. Emigh*, 6 Wend. 407; *Churchill v. Kimball*, 3 Ohio, 409. Non-actionable words may in New York be joined with actionable words in

the same count. *Dioyt v. Tanner*, 20 Wend. 190. See *Bloom v. Bloom*, 5 Serg. & R. 391. Words of different import may be set out in the same *declaration*. *Hall v. Nees*, 27 Ill. 411. And counts in slander in libel may be joined. *Noonan v. Orton*, 32 Wis. 106. See *Hoyt v. Smith*, 32 Vt. 304.

trial will consent, after verdict, to amend the writ under Order XXVII. r. 11; R. S. C. Feb. 1876, r. 6.

At the same time it is foolish to claim an extravagant amount as it may prevent an advantageous settlement. The defendant should always be described on the writ with reasonable certainty; his Christian and surname should both be stated, if possible, so as to facilitate service. Corporations should be described by the corporate name. But inaccuracies, or mere misnomers, are immaterial, if not misleading; and if they are in any way misleading, the indorsement may be amended by a judge at chambers, under Order III. r. 2, who will also dispense with any re-service. The writ must also be indorsed with the address of the plaintiff, and the name and place of business of his solicitor.<sup>1</sup> The writ remains in force twelve months from date instead of six months, as formerly;<sup>2</sup> and, if any defendant has not been served with it, the plaintiff, by leave of a master or district registrar, on proof that reasonable efforts have been made to serve the writ, or for other good reason, may renew it for another six months.<sup>3</sup> The original writ must be produced on the application for renewal.<sup>4</sup>

\* 460 \* But a writ will not be renewed so as to bar the Statute of Limitations after the period has expired.<sup>5</sup> Concurrent writs may be issued at any time within the twelve months for which the original writ is issued, and continue in force as long only as the original.<sup>6</sup>

### *Service of the Writ.*

No service of the writ is required where the defendant, by his solicitor, agrees to accept service and enter an appearance;<sup>7</sup> in other cases the service of the writ must, wherever practicable, be personal.<sup>8</sup> If, however, from any cause the plaintiff is unable to effect prompt personal service, he should apply to a judge at chambers for an order for substituted or other service, or for the substitution of notice for service. Such an application must be supported by affidavit setting forth the grounds upon which the application is made,<sup>9</sup> *e.g.*, that the defendant had absconded, and that his address could not be ascertained;<sup>10</sup> that two or more calls had been made at his residence, and a copy of the writ left there for him;<sup>11</sup> or that his

<sup>1</sup> See Order IV. rr. 1, 2, 2a, and 3a; R. S. C. Feb. 1876, rr. 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Order VIII. r. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Davies v. Garland*, 1 Q. B. D. 250; 45 L. J. Q. B. 137; 24 W. R. 252; 33 L. T. 727.

<sup>5</sup> *Doyle v. Kaufman*, 3 Q. B. D. 7; 47 L. J. Q. B. 2; 26 W. R. 98.

<sup>6</sup> Order VI. r. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Order IX. r. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Order IX. r. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Order X.

<sup>10</sup> *Waters v. Waters*, 24 W. R. 190; *Hartley v. Dilke*, 35 L. T. 706.

<sup>11</sup> *Capes v. Brewer*, 24 W. R. 40.

only known address is a club.<sup>1</sup> It should also show a probability of the substituted service coming to the defendant's knowledge.<sup>2</sup>

The person serving a writ must be able both to read and to write; it may be necessary for him to swear that the copy served was a true copy, therefore he should be able to read; and he is, by Order IX. r. 13, required to indorse on the writ the date of service, therefore he must be able to write. Service may not be effected on Sunday.<sup>3</sup> Service may be made in any county; but not out of jurisdiction without special leave.<sup>4</sup> A true copy of the writ should be served, but the person serving it should always have the original with him to show to the defendant, should he require to see it.

\* Where the action is against husband and wife, service on the husband will be sufficient; but a judge at chambers may order service on the wife when necessary,<sup>5</sup> as, *e.g.*, where the husband happens to be abroad. When an infant is defendant, service on his or her father or guardian, or, if none, then upon the person with whom he or she resides, will be good, unless otherwise ordered.<sup>6</sup>

When the defendant is a lunatic or person of unsound mind, service on the committee of the lunatic or on the person with whom the person of unsound mind resides, or under whose care he or she is, will be deemed good service, unless a master at chambers otherwise orders.<sup>7</sup>

Service may be effected upon a firm by serving any one of the partners, or, at the firm's principal place of business, upon any person having the control or management of the partnership business there.<sup>8</sup> So where the firm really consists of only one person.<sup>9</sup> Whenever by any statute provision is made for service of any writ of summons, or other process, upon any corporation, or other body, or number of persons, the writ must be served in manner so provided.<sup>10</sup> There are such provisions in the Companies Clauses Act, 1845,<sup>11</sup> s. 135; in the Lands Clauses Act, 1845,<sup>12</sup> s. 134; and the Railways Clauses Act, 1845,<sup>13</sup> s. 138. So, too, writs issued against a corporation aggregate may be served on the mayor, head officer, town clerk, clerk, treasurer, or secretary of such corporation, by the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 16. And writs issued against a company registered under the Companies Act, 1862,<sup>14</sup> may, by s. 62 of the Act, be served by leaving them at the registered office of the company, or sending it by post in a reg-

<sup>1</sup> *Rafael v. Ongley*, 24 W. R. 857; 34 L. T. 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Cook v. Day*, 2 Ch. D. 218; 45 L. J. Ch. 611; 24 W. R. 362; *Sloman v. The Governor of New Zealand (C. A.)*, 1 C. P. D. 563; 46 L. J. C. P. 185; 25 W. R. 86; 35 L. T. 454; Bitt. 15.

<sup>3</sup> 29 Car. II. c. 7, s. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Order IX. r. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Order IX. r. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Order IX. r. 7.

<sup>13</sup> 8 Vict. c. 20.

<sup>4</sup> Order XI. r. 1, *ante*, p. 357.

<sup>6</sup> Order IX. r. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Order IX. r. 6a; R. S. C. June, 1876, r. 4.

<sup>11</sup> 8 Vict. c. 16.

<sup>14</sup> 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89.

<sup>7</sup> Order IX. r. 5.

<sup>12</sup> 8 Vict. c. 18.

istered letter addressed to the company at such office. But it is quite useless to serve a director, even where the company has no office.<sup>1</sup>

\* 462 \* The person serving the writ must (except where substituted service has been ordered),<sup>2</sup> within three days at most after such service, indorse on the writ the day of the month and week of the service, otherwise the plaintiff cannot proceed by default for non-appearance.<sup>3</sup>

### *Appearance.*

The writ, as we have seen, may be issued, in the discretion of the plaintiff, either in London or in any district registry.<sup>4</sup>

If issued in London, a defendant must enter his appearance in London.<sup>5</sup> If issued in a district registry, any defendant residing or carrying on business within the district must appear there;<sup>6</sup> but any defendant neither residing nor carrying on business in the district may appear either in the district registry or in London.<sup>7</sup> In the latter case the action will proceed in London.<sup>8</sup> As a rule I should always advise such a defendant to appear in London. But if he does so, he must be sure on the same day to give notice of his appearance to the plaintiff's country solicitor in the district registry, or to the plaintiff himself, if he sues in person.<sup>9</sup> As if he omit to do so, judgment will be entered against him in the district registry for want of appearance, and such judgment being regularly entered will not be set aside; at all events not without a strong affidavit of merits.<sup>10</sup> Notice to the London agent of the plaintiff's country solicitor is insufficient.<sup>11</sup>

The defendant must enter an appearance to the writ within eight days after service of the writ, inclusive of the day of service. If the defendant be out of the jurisdiction, a time will be named in the order giving

<sup>1</sup> *Lawrenson v. The Dublin Metropolitan Junction Ry. Co.*, 37 L. T. 32. And as to the service of writs on foreign corporations, see *Scott v. Royal Wax Candle Co.*, 1 Q. B. D. 404; 45 L. J. Q. B. 586; 24 W. R. 668; 34 L. T. 683; *Newby v. Van Oppen*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 293; 41 L. J. Q. B. 148; 20 W. R. 383; 26 L. T. 164; *Mackereth v. Glasgow and South Western Ry. Co.*, L. R. 8 Ex. 149; 42 L. J. Ex. 82; 21 W. R. 339; 23 L. T. 167. And, generally, as to service of a writ out of jurisdiction, see *Tottenham v. Barry*, 12 Ch. D. 797; 48 L. J. Ch. 641; 28 W. R. 180; *Harris v. Fleming*, 13 Ch. D. 208; 49 L. J. Ch. 32; 28 W. R. 389; *McStevens v. Carnegie*, 28 W. R. 385; 42 L. T. 309.

<sup>2</sup> *Dymond v. Croft (C. A.)*, 3 Ch. D. 512; 45 L. J. Ch. 604; 24 W. R. 700; 35 L. T. 27.

<sup>3</sup> Order IX. r. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Order V. r. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Order XII. r. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Order XII. r. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Order XII. r. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Order XII. r. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Order XII. r. 6a; R. S. C. February, 1876, r. 5.

<sup>10</sup> Order XIII. r. 5a; R. S. C. Dec. 1875, r. 7; *Smith v. Dobbin (C. A.)*, 3 Ex. D. 338; 47 L. J. Ex. 65; 26 W. R. 122; 37 L. T. 777.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.*

leave to effect service, within which \* he must appear.<sup>1</sup> If the de- \* 463  
fendant be described in the writ by initials, or by a wrong name,  
the appearance should be entered in his true name, as "John William Smith,  
sued as J. W. Smith," and all subsequent pleadings and affidavits should be  
so entitled. An infant must appear by his guardian in the guardian's own  
name.<sup>2</sup> Partners sued in the name of their firm must appear individually  
in their own names;<sup>3</sup> so must a person carrying on business in the name  
of a firm.<sup>4</sup> In either case all subsequent proceedings nevertheless continue  
in the name of the firm. An appearance may be entered by a third person,  
though he be not a solicitor.<sup>5</sup>

A defendant may appear at any time before judgment; but if he appear  
*after* the time (eight days) limited for appearance, he must on the same  
day give notice thereof to the plaintiff's solicitor, or to the plaintiff him-  
self if he sues in person.<sup>6</sup> By giving this notice, he will be in the same  
position as if he had appeared in time; but judgment signed *after* appear-  
ance, though plaintiff have no notice, is irregular.<sup>7</sup>

I should never, I think, advise a defendant not to appear to an action of  
libel or slander, unless he is utterly and hopelessly in the wrong, and at  
the same time there is no hope of compromise. If he regrets his conduct,  
he should come forward and say so, and pay money into Court as amends.  
And after appearance, a defendant can always apply at chambers for leave  
to withdraw his defence and to let judgment go by default.

### *Judgment by Default.*

Where any defendant fails to appear to a writ of summons, the plaintiff  
must before taking any proceeding upon default file an affidavit of service,  
or of notice in lieu of service as the case may be.<sup>8</sup> He can then enter  
interlocutory \* judgment, and a writ of inquiry will issue to assess \* 464  
the damages.<sup>9</sup> But if the affidavit of service be afterwards proved  
to have been insufficient, the judgment and execution may be set aside.

The affidavit of service should be made by the process-server himself, if  
possible; but an affidavit by any one who saw service effected will be re-  
ceived, if need be.<sup>10</sup> It should be properly intitled in the proper Division

<sup>1</sup> Order XI. r. 4. As to the method of entering an appearance, see Order XII. rr. 6b, 7, 8, and 9; R. S. C. April, 1880, r. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Fitzgerald v. Villiers, 3 Mod. 236; Jarman v. Lucas, 33 L. J. C. P. 108.

<sup>3</sup> Order XII. r. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Order XII. r. 12a; R. S. C. June, 1876, r. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Oake and another v. Moorecroft, L. R. 5 Q. B. 76; 39 L. J. Q. B. 15; 18 W. R. 115.

<sup>6</sup> C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 29; Order XII. r. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Rhodes v. Bryant, 2 F. & F. 265; Oake and another v. Moorecroft, *supra*.

<sup>8</sup> Order XIII. r. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Order XIII. r. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Goodtitle v. Badtittle, 2 Bos. & P. 120.

of the Court, and with the names of all the parties in full. If any defendant be in any way misnamed in the writ, the affidavit should in its title follow the writ.<sup>1</sup> Where a constructive service is relied on, the affidavit must show fully why such service should be deemed good service on the defendant. Thus, if a servant or agent of the defendant was served, facts must be stated from which the judge can infer that the copy has actually reached the defendant's hands.<sup>2</sup> The affidavit must also state the day on which the indorsement of date of service was made on the writ.<sup>3</sup>

A sufficient affidavit of service being filed, interlocutory judgment may immediately be entered, and a writ of inquiry issues to the sheriff bidding him summon a jury to assess the damages the plaintiff has sustained. As a rule the plaintiff does not recover such heavy damages from a sheriff's jury, as after a full trial at *Nisi Prius*. There is a provision in Order XIII. r. 6, that a judge at chambers may order the damages to be ascertained like any other issue by a judge and jury or by a referee. But it would be very difficult to obtain such an order in a case of libel or slander. As there is no statement of claim, the plaintiff should give the defendant formal notice a reasonable time before the hearing that he intends to offer before the under-sheriff evidence of such and such special damage. The inquiry is conducted precisely in the same way as a trial at *Nisi Prius*, except that counsel do not wear wig and gown, and that the plaintiff *must* recover some damages. The plaintiff need not adduce any evidence at all before the under-sheriff, but merely put in the libel. And the jury will not in such a case be bound to give him nominal damages only.<sup>4</sup> The under-sheriff before the Judicature Act had jurisdiction to certify for costs.<sup>5</sup>

\* 465 \* I presume therefore that he may now under the new system, on good cause shown, deprive a plaintiff of costs. But he would never do so except in very exceptional circumstances.

Judgment by default may be set aside if irregular on application to a master at chambers or to a district registrar; but such application must be made within a reasonable time after defendant has notice of the judgment.<sup>6</sup> And even if the judgment be regular, the master or district registrar will set it aside upon terms, if defendant in his affidavit accounts for his non-appearance, and sets out facts which show that he has a good defence on the merits. Such an application should be made promptly, as soon as the defendant is aware that judgment has been signed.

<sup>1</sup> *Sims v. Prosser*, 15 M. & W. 151.

<sup>2</sup> *Sprightly v. Dunch*, 2 Burr. 1116.

<sup>3</sup> Order IX. r. 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Tripp v. Thomas*, 3 B. & C. 427.

<sup>5</sup> *Craven v. Smith*, L. R. 4 Ex. 146; 38 L. J. Ex. 90; 17 W. R. 710; 20 L. T. 400.

<sup>6</sup> R. G. Hil. T. 1853, r. 135; Order XXIX. r. 14.



*Matters to be considered by the Defendant.*

The defendant should at the earliest moment after being served with the writ, consider the advisability of apologizing. He may pay money into Court at any moment after service of the writ;<sup>1</sup> and offer an apology in mitigation of damages under Lord Campbell's Act, ss. 1, 2.<sup>2</sup> It is particularly desirable in the case of a newspaper that this question should be dealt with at once, in order that the apology may be published in the next issue of the paper. Counsel will, if necessary, send advice on this point by telegram.

If, however, the defendant means to contest the action, he should consider whether the plaintiff has shaped his claim in the proper way, and also whether security cannot be obtained for costs. Thus, if an infant or person of unsound mind has commenced an action without a next friend, the defendant should take out a summons to dismiss the action; and the master or district registrar, if satisfied that there ought to have been a next friend will dismiss the action with costs against the solicitor. So if a married woman sue without joining her husband. If in the same action claims by the plaintiffs jointly be combined with claims by them or any of them separately under Order XVI. r. 1, or Order XVII. rr. 4, 5, 6, the defendant may apply to have such claims severed on the ground that they cannot be conveniently disposed of in the same action, if such

\* indeed be the fact.<sup>3</sup> But such an application would probably be \* 466 unsuccessful if the words sued on be the same in each case, or were published simultaneously. If on the other hand two or more actions be unnecessarily brought against the same defendant either alone or with others for the same words, or for separate publications of similar words; or for two distinct libels or slanders, or for a libel and a slander, all arising out of the same transaction and intimately connected with each other; a master at chambers will consolidate the actions.<sup>4</sup> An application for consolidation may be made at any time after service of the writs, and without any consent on the plaintiff's part.<sup>5</sup>

If the writ has been issued in a district registry, the defendant may remove the action as of right to London at any time after appearance and before delivering a statement of defence.<sup>6</sup> This can be done by merely giving a notice under r. 12. If the defendant neglects to remove it before the expiration of the time for delivering his statement of defence, he must

<sup>1</sup> Order XXX. r. 1.<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 299.<sup>3</sup> Order XVII. rr. 1, 7, 8, 9.<sup>4</sup> Order LI. r. 4; *Whitely v. Adams*, 15 C. B. N. S. 392; *Jones v. Pritchard*, 18 L. J. Q. B. 104; 6 D. & L. 529.<sup>5</sup> *Hollingsworth v. Brodrick*, 4 A. & E. 646; 6 N. & M. 240; 1 H. & W. 691.<sup>6</sup> Order XXXV. r. 13.

apply to the district registrar for an order for removal, and file an affidavit showing good cause for the application.

If the alleged libel was published by order of either House of Parliament, all proceedings will be stayed at once on production of a certificate to that effect by the clerk of the House, with an affidavit verifying such certificate.<sup>1</sup>

### *Security for Costs.*

An order will generally be made requiring the plaintiff to give security for costs, if he be a foreigner, out of jurisdiction at the moment and holding no land in England, or a felon undergoing imprisonment or penal servitude, or a bankrupt or a liquidating debtor. If there be more than one plaintiff the defendant will not be entitled to security for costs unless they all come within one or other of the preceding classes. Security is generally confined to the future costs of the action; but it may include costs already incurred, if they are of any considerable amount, and \* 467 the defendant has not been guilty of \* laches in not applying sooner.<sup>2</sup>

Any application for security for costs must be made promptly; that is within a reasonable time after appearance; or if the defendant was not then aware of the facts entitling him to apply, then within a reasonable time after such facts come to his knowledge, and before taking any further step in the action. If the order be made, it will be a stay of proceedings till security be given; and if such security be not given within a reasonable time, the defendant may take out a further summons calling on the plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed with costs unless security be given by a fixed day.<sup>3</sup> Where the plaintiff, a foreigner, had in an action of libel been ordered to find security for costs to the amount of £400, and had given security to that amount, the Court refused to increase it in spite of an affidavit to the effect that certain necessary witnesses resided abroad and that the expense of obtaining their evidence would greatly exceed £400.<sup>4</sup> What is a reasonable time for finding security must depend on the special circumstances of each particular case; and in determining it, the Court will have regard to the amount ordered to be paid.<sup>5</sup> Where a bond is to be given as security for costs, it shall, unless a

<sup>1</sup> 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9, Appendix C, *post*, p. 672.

<sup>2</sup> *Brocklebank & Co. v. King's Lynn Steamship Co.*, 3 C. P. D. 365; 47 L. J. C. P. 321; 31 L. T. 489; *Massey v. Allen*, 12 Ch. D. 807; 48 L. J. Ch. 692; 28 W. R. 243.

<sup>3</sup> *De la Grange v. McAndrew*, 4 Q. B. D. 210; 48 L. J. Q. B. 317; 27 W. R. 413; *Ex parte Isaacs*, 10 Ch. D. 1; 27 W. R. 297; 39 L. T. 520.

<sup>4</sup> *Pisani v. Lawson*, 5 Scott, 418; 6 Bing. N. C. 90.

<sup>5</sup> *Sturla v. Freccia*, *Polini v. Gray*, 11 Ch. D. 741; 28 W. R. 81; 40 L. T. 861.

master at chambers otherwise directs, be given to the party or person requiring the security, and not to an officer of the Court.<sup>1</sup>

If a married woman sue by her next friend instead of her husband, and such next friend is a person of no means, or is insolvent, a master at chambers will stay proceedings till security for costs is given. But in the case of an infant it seems that security for costs will never be required, even though the next friend be a pauper. Nor in the case of a married woman who has a separate income of £1500 a year.<sup>2</sup>

*\* Remitting the Action to the County Court.*

By virtue of s. 10 of the County Courts Act, 1867 :<sup>3</sup>—“It shall be lawful for any person against whom an action for . . . libel, slander . . . or other action of tort may be brought in a Superior Court, to make an affidavit that the plaintiff has no visible means of paying the costs of the defendant should a verdict be not found for the plaintiff; and thereupon a judge of the Court in which the action is brought shall have power to make an order that unless the plaintiff shall, within a time to be therein mentioned, give full security for the defendant's costs to the satisfaction of one of the masters of the said Court, or satisfy the judge that he has a cause of action fit to be prosecuted in the Superior Court, all proceedings in the action shall be stayed, or in the event of the plaintiff being unable or unwilling to give such security, or failing to satisfy the judge as aforesaid, that the cause be remitted for trial before a County Court to be therein named; and thereupon the plaintiff shall lodge the original writ and the order with the registrar of such County Court, who shall appoint a day for the hearing of the cause, notice whereof shall be sent by post or otherwise by the registrar to both parties or their attorneys; and the County Court so named shall have all the same powers and jurisdiction with respect to the cause as if both parties had agreed, by a memorandum signed by them, that the said County Court should have power to try the said action, and the same had been commenced by plaint in the said County Court; and the costs of the parties in respect of the proceedings subsequent to the order of the judge of the Superior Court shall be allowed according to the scale of costs in use in the County Courts, and the costs of the proceedings in the Superior Court shall be allowed according to the scale in use in such latter Court.”

It is expressly enacted by the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 67, that the provisions of this section shall apply “to all actions commenced in the High Court of Justice *in which any relief is sought which can be given in a County Court.*” The words in italics have been much discussed in Garnett

<sup>1</sup> Order LV. r. 3; R. S. C. April, 1880, r. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Noel v. Noel, 13 Ch. D. 510; 28 W. R. 720; 42 L. T. 352.      <sup>3</sup> 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142.

\* 469 *v. Bradley*;<sup>1</sup> \* and the other decisions as to costs; and were held when taken with Order LV. r. 1, to limit the various sections of the County Courts Act, 1867, to actions which could be commenced in the County Court. But it could hardly, I think, be contended that these words have the same effect on s. 10, and limit its operation to actions of tort which could be commenced in the County Court; though that is perhaps the strictly logical result of the decisions mentioned above. For Order LV. r. 1, has of course nothing to do with the matter, and "libel" and "slander" are expressly mentioned in s. 10. Any how, the practice at chambers under the section continues the same, and s. 10 is always considered to apply to all actions of tort, whether they can or cannot be commenced in the County Court.

The application can be made at any stage of the action; but only by the defendant. If an order be made, its effect is practically to transform the action into a County Court cause.<sup>2</sup>

### *Statement of Claim.*

The defendant, on his memorandum of appearance, must state whether he does or does not require a statement of claim to be delivered. I should advise the defendant in every action of libel or slander always to require a statement of claim; as it is clearly to his interest to have the exact words alleged to be defamatory set out on the record. And even if the defendant expressly says that he does *not* require a statement of claim, I should advise plaintiff still to deliver one, in spite of the risk of costs which he may incur under Order XXI. r. 1c. I do not think any taxing-master would ever consider the delivery of a statement of claim in an action of libel or slander to be "unnecessary or improper."

The plaintiff may, if he chooses, deliver his statement of claim with the writ; but this is not often done. He must deliver it within six weeks after the defendant's appearance, unless the time be extended by  
\* 470 leave;<sup>3</sup> otherwise \* the defendant will apply to the master at chambers to dismiss the action with costs for want of prosecution.

The Judicature Act has made but little difference in the plaintiff's pleadings in an action of libel or slander. An old declaration, if cut up into paragraphs in obedience to Order XIX. r. 4, would pass muster as a statement of claim; and would, indeed, be a more satisfactory document than many modern pleadings. All decisions since 1852 seem still to apply, except those relating to variances, which are rendered somewhat obsolete

<sup>1</sup> (C. A.) 2 Ex. D. 349; 46 L. J. Ex. 545; 25 W. R. 653; 36 L. T. 725; (H. L.) 3 App. Cas. 944; 48 L. J. Ex. 186; 26 W. R. 698; 39 L. T. 261; *Parsons v. Tinling*, 2 C. P. D. 119; 46 L. J. C. P. 230; 25 W. R. 255; 35 L. T. 851.

<sup>2</sup> As to the further conduct of the action, see *post*, p. 565.

<sup>3</sup> Order XXI. r. 1.

by the largely increased powers of amendment given to our judges, and the greater readiness with which such powers are exercised.

The very words complained of must be set out by the plaintiff in his statement of claim, "in order that the Court may judge whether they constitute a ground of action,"<sup>1</sup> and also because "the defendant is entitled to know the precise charge against him, and cannot shape his case until he knows."<sup>2</sup> It is not sufficient to give the substance or purport of the libel or slander with innuendoes.<sup>3</sup> So too in cases of slander of title the words must be set out *verbatim*.<sup>4</sup> Order XIX. r. 24, does not apply; for the words of the libel are most material.<sup>5</sup> The defendant may be interrogated as to the exact words he uttered if the plaintiff cannot otherwise discover them.<sup>6</sup> If the words are in a foreign language, they should be set out *verbatim* in such language.<sup>7</sup> And an exact translation should be added. Take care not to translate actionable words into non-actionable, as was done in *Ross v. Lawrence* (1651).<sup>8</sup> It was formerly necessary to \* aver expressly in the case of foreign words that those present \* 471 understood them.<sup>9</sup> And in *Amann v. Damm*,<sup>10</sup> where the words were spoken in German, Williams, J., appeared to think that such an averment was still necessary, but the rest of the Court thought otherwise, it would seem; although section 61 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, was not cited to the Court. It may be safer, however, to insert a short allegation to that effect in the statement of claim, although I do not think it is now essential.<sup>11</sup> The fact must of course still be proved at the trial.<sup>12</sup>

If the slander was contained in a question, it must be set out as a question, and not as a fact affirmed. So, if the slander consists in the answer to a question, and the answer alone is unintelligible, both question and answer should be set out exactly as they were spoken.<sup>13</sup> So if the words were "Woor says M'Pherson is bankrupt," they must be so set out; if the

<sup>1</sup> Per Lord Tenterden, 3 B. & Ald. 506.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Coleridge, in *Harris v. Warre*, 4 C. P. D. 128; 48 L. J. C. P. 310; 27 W. R. 461; 40 L. T. 429.

<sup>3</sup> *Newton v. Stubbs*, 3 Mod. 71; *Cooke v. Cox*, 3 M. & S. 110; *Wood v. Brown*, 6 Taunt. 169; *Wood v. Adam*, 6 Bing. 481; *Wright v. Clements*, 3 B. & Ald. 503; *Saunders v. Bate*, 1 H. & N. 402; *Solomon v. Lawson*, 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796.

<sup>4</sup> *Gutsole v. Mathers*, 1 M. & W. 495; 1 Tyrw. & Gr. 694; 5 Dowl. 69; 2 Gale, 64.

<sup>5</sup> *Harris v. Warre*, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Atkinson v. Fosbrooke*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 628; 35 L. J. Q. B. 182; 14 W. R. 832; 14 L. T. 553.

<sup>7</sup> *Zenobio v. Axtell*, 6 T. R. 162; 3 M. & S. 116. And see *R. v. Manasseh Goldstein*, 3 Brod. & B. 201; 7 Moore, 1; 10 Price, 88; R. & R. C. C. 473.

<sup>8</sup> Sty. 263. <sup>9</sup> *Jones v. Davers*, Cro. Eliz. 496; *Price v. Jenkins*, Cro. Eliz. 865.

<sup>10</sup> 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 W. R. 470.

<sup>11</sup> See Precedent, No. 30.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 110.

<sup>13</sup> See *Bromage v. Prosser*, 4 B. & C. 247.

declaration alleged that the defendant had said "M'Pherson is bankrupt" merely, the variance would formerly have been fatal;<sup>1</sup> but now such a variance would be amended, on payment of the costs, if any, thereby occasioned.<sup>2</sup> If the libel consist of two letters written to the *Times*, neither of which is a complete libel without the other, both must be set out *verbatim*.<sup>3</sup> But in other cases it is not necessary to set out the whole of an article or review, containing libellous passages; it is sufficient to set out the libellous passages only, provided that nothing be omitted which qualifies or alters their sense. If, however, the meaning of the libellous passages taken singly is not clear, or if the rest of the article would in any substantial degree vary the meaning of the words complained of, the whole must be set out.<sup>4</sup>

Where detached portions of a book or article are thus given, it \* 472 should appear on the statement of \* claim that they *are* detached portions; they should not be printed as though they ran on continuously.<sup>5</sup>

It must be alleged that the defendant "spoke and published" or "wrote and published" these words, and it should be stated when and to whom. It is essential in cases of libel to add the words "and published," as writing a libel which is never published is no tort. Still it is not absolutely necessary to use the very word "published;" in *Baldwin v. Elphinston*,<sup>6</sup> the phrase "printed and caused to be printed" was held sufficient. Further, it must always be alleged that the words were spoken or written "of and concerning the plaintiff." Then it should be averred that the defendant spoke or wrote and published the words "falsely and maliciously." This is a time-honored phrase which should always appear in every statement of claim; it would be foolish to idly raise a point of law by omitting it. But in my opinion its omission would not render the statement of claim demurrable. For, by r. 28 of Order XIX., "neither party need in any pleading allege any matter of fact which the law presumes in his favor, or as to which the burden of proof lies upon the other side, unless the same has first been specifically denied." As long ago as 1652, Rolle, C.J., held these words unnecessary in a declaration.<sup>7</sup> In 1813, Lord Ellenborough held the absence of the word "falsely" immaterial, "unlawfully and maliciously" being present.<sup>8</sup> So, too, under the old practice it

<sup>1</sup> *M'Pherson v. Daniels*, 10 B. & C., at p. 274; *Bell v. Byrne*, 13 East, 554; *Pearce v. Rogers*, 2 F. & F. 137.

<sup>2</sup> *Smith v. Knowelden*, 2 M. & Gr. 561.

<sup>3</sup> *Solomon v. Lawson*, 8 Q. B. 823; 15 L. J. Q. B. 253; 10 Jur. 796.

<sup>4</sup> *Cartwright v. Wright*, 5 B. & Ald. 615; *Buckingham v. Murray*, 2 C. & P. 47; *Rutherford v. Evans*, 6 Bing. 451; 4 C. & P. 74; *Rainy v. Bravo*, L. R. 4 P. C. 287; 20 W. R. 873.

<sup>5</sup> Per Lord Ellenborough, in *Tabart v. Tipper*, 1 Camp. 353.

<sup>6</sup> 2 W. Bl. 1037.

<sup>7</sup> *Anon.*, Style, 392.

<sup>8</sup> *Rowe v. Roach*, 1 M. & S. 309.

was decided that if "falsely" was inserted, "maliciously" might be omitted.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, a practical convenience in alleging malice in the statement of claim, viz., if the defendant pleads privilege, no special reply is then necessary, the formal averment in the statement of claim takes a new meaning, and becomes an allegation of express malice.

But the part of the statement of claim which requires most care in drafting is the innuendo.<sup>2</sup> Where the words are clearly actionable on the face of them, no innuendo is necessary, though even here one is frequently inserted. But whenever the words are actionable \* only \* 473 in some secondary sense, an innuendo is essential to the plaintiff's success. So, too, if it is not clear that the words refer to the plaintiff, an innuendo must be inserted, "meaning thereby the plaintiff," &c.; and it will be well, though not essential, to state facts which make it clear that the plaintiff is the person referred to.<sup>3</sup>

Besides the innuendo, it was formerly expected that the pleader should insert in the plaintiff's declaration a variety of minute averments, tending to increase the "certainty" of the pleading, as it was then imagined. Thus it was necessary that there should be a *colloquium*, an averment that the defendant was speaking of the plaintiff, as well as constant innuendoes, and other allegations properly connecting these innuendoes with the introductory averments which described the locality, the relationship between the various persons mentioned, and all the surrounding circumstances necessary to fully understand the defendant's words. These matters could not be proved at the trial, unless they were set out on the record.<sup>4</sup> And if some of them were proved at the trial and not others, many legal refinements arose as to how far such allegations were or were not divisible, with which I need not trouble my readers. For now, by s. 61 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, the *colloquium* and all other such frivolous averments are rendered unnecessary; and r. 4 of Order XIX. requires that only material facts should be stated in the pleadings, and these "as concisely as may be." The only case in which an introductory averment is now essential to the plaintiff's success is where words are actionable only by reason of being spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or trade. Here there must always be an averment that the plaintiff actually held the office or carried on the profession or trade at the time when the words were spoken.<sup>5</sup> And there should also be an averment that the words were spoken of the plaintiff with reference to such office, profession, or trade. But if the former allegation appear, the omission of the latter is not fatal,

<sup>1</sup> *Mercer v. Sparks* (1586), *Owen*, 51; *Noy*, 35; *Anon.* (1596), *Moo.* 459. See per *Brett, L. J.*, in *Clark v. Molyneux*, 3 Q. B. D. 247, *ante*, p. 267.

<sup>2</sup> As to its office, see *ante*, pp. 100-117.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 128.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 118-120, 128.

<sup>5</sup> *Gallwey v. Marshall*, 9 Ex. 300; 23 L. J. Ex. 78; 2 C. L. R. 399.

as the judge will in a proper case amend the statement of claim by inserting an allegation to that effect.<sup>1</sup> But it is often desirable in other cases to plead some introductory averment which, though not strictly neces-

\* 474 sary, \* will help to make the case clear, by explaining what is to follow.<sup>2</sup>

Also where the words were spoken ironically, it must be averred that they were so spoken, or the statement of claim would be demurrable.<sup>3</sup>

Always aver, wherever it is not palpably absurd so to do, that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his trade. This allegation won the demurrer for the plaintiff in *Foulger v. Newcomb*; <sup>4</sup> and had it been present it would probably have saved *Miller v. David*.<sup>5</sup> Yet it does not always avail.<sup>6</sup>

Lastly, insert a claim for damages. Where the words are clearly actionable *per se*, it is of course unnecessary to claim *general* damages, though it is sometimes done; but any special damage that may have accrued must in every case be specifically stated and with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant to know precisely what case he has to meet. If the special damage alleged be loss of custom, the customers' names must be given; so if loss of marriage be alleged, the gentleman or lady must be named.<sup>7</sup>

If a plaintiff does not deliver a statement of claim within the time limited for so doing, he will be liable to have the action dismissed with costs, under Order XXIX. r. 1. But the defendant will not be allowed to take advantage of a mere slip.<sup>8</sup>

Every pleading which contains ten or more folios of seventy-two words must be printed.<sup>9</sup>

### Venue.

The plaintiff must now select the place of trial, and name it at the foot of his Statement of Claim. If he name no place, it will be tried in Middlesex, unless an order be made to the contrary.<sup>10</sup> The plaintiff's choice will be determined as a rule by questions of economy and convenience; he will fix the trial in the place that best suits himself and

<sup>1</sup> *Ramsdale v. Greenacre*, 1 F. & F. 61.

<sup>2</sup> See *Precedents of Pleading*, Nos. 3, 7, and 32, App. A.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 113, 116.

<sup>4</sup> L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 15 W. R. 1181; 16 L. T. 595.

<sup>5</sup> L. R. 9 C. P. 118; 43 L. J. C. P. 84; 22 W. R. 332; 30 L. T. 53.

<sup>6</sup> See *Sheahan v. Ahearne*, Ir. R. 9 C. L. 412.

<sup>7</sup> See *Precedents*, Nos. 27, 28, 36, App. A. As to what constitutes special damage, see *ante*, pp. 309-313.

<sup>8</sup> *Michel v. Wilson*, 25 W. R. 380; *Canadian Oilworks Corporation v. Hay*, 38 L. T. 549; *Weekly Notes*, 1878, p. 107.

<sup>9</sup> Order XIX. r. 5; R. S. C. June, 1876, r. 9.

<sup>10</sup> See *post*, p. 528.



his witnesses. But if the action be against a newspaper of wide circulation in \* the district, or if the defendant in any other way \* 475 is popular or powerful in his own neighborhood, the plaintiff should decide on Middlesex, where he is sure of an educated and impartial jury.

*Instructions for Statement of Defence.*

On receiving the statement of claim, the defendant should carefully consider his position, and decide on his course of action. Often it would be well for him to apologize at once, and pay money into Court. In some few cases he should declare war to the knife, and justify. But it is no use for him to send his counsel merely a copy of the statement of claim with instructions consisting solely of the words "Counsel will please prepare the necessary pleas." The statement of defence in an action of libel or slander is a most important document;<sup>1</sup> and before settling it, counsel should be put in possession of all the facts. He should be asked to advise whether the occasion was privileged; and if there is any thought of a justification, the evidence by which it is proposed to support that plea should be submitted to counsel in full detail, and his opinion taken as to its sufficiency. If no definite instructions be given to counsel, he will content himself with merely denying every material allegation in the plaintiff's statement of claim.

*Demurrer.*

The defendant's counsel, on receiving the statement of claim should first consider if it is demurrable. But if it is, it by no means follows that in every such case he should demur. If the words are not actionable *per se*, and no special damage is alleged, a demurrer is obviously the shortest way to put an end to the action, and should of course be resorted to. So, if the words set out are not defamatory in their ordinary signification, and there is no innuendo, or if the innuendo alleges a meaning which it is clear that the words will not bear. But even in the last case the defendant generally should not demur, unless the law is clearly in his favor, and the facts are not. Counsel should always bear in mind the good advice which my Lord Coke deduces as a moral from "the first cause that he ever moved in the King's Bench:"—

"When the matter in fact will clearly serve for your client, \* although your opinion is that the plaintiff has no cause of action, \* 476 yet take heed that you do not hazard the matter upon a demurrer; in which, upon the pleading, and otherwise, more perhaps will arise than you thought of; but first take advantage of the matters of fact, and leave matters in law, which always arise upon the matters in fact, ad ultimum,

<sup>1</sup> See Precedents, Nos. 25, 26.

and never at first demur in law; when after trial of the matters in fact, the matters in law (as in this case it was) will be saved to you.”<sup>1</sup>

This advice, though nearly three hundred years old, is as sound now as it was in the days of Queen Elizabeth. In fact, owing to the liberal powers of amendment given by the C. L. P. Acts, and by the Judicature Acts, its efficacy has increased rather than diminished. The result of most demurrers is that the plaintiff obtains leave, on paying the costs of the demurrer, to amend his statement of claim. And it is generally better for the defendant that the plaintiff should be driven to such amendment at the trial in the presence of the jury. If, therefore, the facts are likely to prove in the defendant's favor, he should not as a rule demur, unless it is clear that the statement of claim is insufficient, and that no amendment which the plaintiff can truthfully make will cure the defect. But if, at the trial you will be compelled to admit that your client *did* speak the words complained of, that they are false, and that the occasion was not privileged, then by all means demur, and take advantage of any point of law you can.

What I have said above applies to all ordinary cases of defamation, where the law is clear, and the only difficulty is to apply the rule of law to the particular subject in question. But where the matter is one of first impression, or where in any other way the law on the point is not clear, as in the *Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co.*,<sup>2</sup> there it is clearly desirable to demur and settle the point of law, before incurring the expense of a trial at Nisi Prius. A summons should be taken out for leave to plead over should the demurrer be overruled, and that in the meantime all proceedings be stayed.

Clients are sometimes afraid that, by not demurring, counsel throw away for ever one chance of success, that the objection, if not taken by \* 477 demurrer, cannot be taken afterwards. But \*this is not so. No doubt, slight defects, such as slips of the pen, careless omissions through inartificial pleading, &c., may sometimes be aided by pleading over; and may still more often be cured by verdict. But it is never worth while in these days to demur on the ground of some merely formal defect. But all matters of substance, as my Lord Coke says, “will be saved to you.” “If the defendant wants to avail himself of ‘his points of law’ in a summary way, he must demur; but if he does not demur, he does not waive the objection, and may say at the trial that the claim is bad on the face of it.”<sup>3</sup> [But note, that there would be a difficulty in relying upon this rather startling decision in one of the Courts of Common Law; be-

<sup>1</sup> The Lord Cromwell's Case (1581), 4 Rep. 14.

<sup>2</sup> L. R. 9 Ex. 218; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 23 W. R. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lindley, J., in *Stokes v. Grant*, 4 C. P. D. 28; 27 W. R. 397; 40 L. T. 36. And, further, as to the effect of a demurrer, see *Johnasson v. Bonhote*, 2 Ch. D. 298; 45 L. J. Ch. 651; 24 W. R. 619; 34 L. T. 745.

cause the notion of setting up the Statute of Frauds by way of demurrer is abhorrent to every principle of Common Law pleading, whether before or since the Judicature Act.<sup>1</sup>] In Equity it was formerly the practice to allow a successful defendant only the costs of a demurrer, if he went to trial when he might clearly have demurred, on the ground that it is the duty of a defendant to win his case in the manner least expensive to his opponent.<sup>2</sup> But this practice now is in disuse.<sup>3</sup>

If there has to be a demurrer, it is often good policy not to demur yourself, but to plead in such a way as to compel your opponent to demur. Then, on the argument of his demurrer to your plea, it is open to you to object to his statement of claim. The Court will sometimes of their own motion call on the demurring party to defend his own previous pleading.<sup>4</sup>

Part of a statement of claim may be demurred to, and the rest pleaded to, without leave, provided such part be distinct and severable from the rest, and amounts to a separate cause of action ;<sup>5</sup> \* but a defend- \* 478 ant cannot, without leave, plead and demur to the same part of the same statement of claim. He should always apply for leave both to plead and demur whenever the statement of claim appears to be untrue in point of fact as well as bad in law.<sup>6</sup> If he does not apply for such leave, and his demurrer is overruled, he will have to apply to the Court for leave to plead under Order XXVIII. r. 12, which will, however, be granted to him almost as a matter of course if he can show any merits.<sup>7</sup> The defendant must state some ground in law for his demurrer ; but he will not on the argument be limited to the ground or grounds so stated.<sup>8</sup> It is sufficient apparently to allege that the statement of claim discloses no cause of action.<sup>9</sup> It is as well, after enumerating the chief grounds, to add a general clause, "and on other grounds sufficient in law to sustain this demurrer," as was done in *Dawkins v. Lord Penrhyn*.<sup>10</sup> The plaintiff cannot amend pending the demurrer, without leave ;<sup>11</sup> and, if convinced that his statement of claim cannot be supported as it stands, he should apply for such leave as soon as the demurrer is called on, if not previously. For if he takes his chance

<sup>1</sup> See *Catling v. King*, 5 Ch. D. 660 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 384 ; 25 W. R. 550 ; 36 L. T. 526 ; *Dawkins v. Lord Penrhyn*, 4 App. Cas. 51.

<sup>2</sup> *Godfrey v. Tucker*, 3 N. R. 20 ; *Webb v. England*, 29 Beav. 44.

<sup>3</sup> *Bush v. Trowbridge Waterworks Co.*, L. R. 10 Ch. 459 ; 23 W. R. 641 ; 33 L. T. 137 ; *Pearce v. Watts*, L. R. 20 Eq. 492 ; 44 L. J. Ch. 492 ; 23 W. R. 771.

<sup>4</sup> *Clay v. Roberts*, 11 W. R. 649 ; 9 Jur. N. S. 580 ; 8 L. T. 397.

<sup>5</sup> Order XXVIII. r. 1 ; *Eaton v. Johns*, 1 Dowl. N. S. 602, 608.

<sup>6</sup> See Order XXVIII. r. 5.

<sup>7</sup> *Bell v. Wilkinson and another* (C. A.), 26 W. R. 275 ; Weekly Notes, 1878, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Order XXVIII. r. 2.

<sup>9</sup> Per Lindley, J., Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 37.

<sup>10</sup> C. A., 6 Ch. D. 318 ; 26 W. R. 6 ; 37 L. T. 80 ; (H. L.) 4 App. Cas. 51 ; 48 L. J. Ch. 304 ; 27 W. R. 173 ; 39 L. T. 583.

<sup>11</sup> Order XXVIII. r. 7.

of succeeding on the argument, the Court will then be indisposed to allow him to amend. On the other hand, if no ground of demurrer be stated by the defendant, or only a frivolous one, the plaintiff may apply to a master at chambers to set aside such demurrer with costs.<sup>1</sup>

Each party must draw up his points for argument, and deliver four copies thereof at the proper office for the use of the judges. They are also by courtesy usually exchanged between the parties. The demurring party must also make up the demurrer book on plain paper, and deliver four copies at the proper office for the use of the judges, four clear days before the day appointed for argument. The demurring party ought also to enter the demurrer for argument; but, if he does not do so, the party demurred to *must*; as if the demurrer be not entered by somebody within ten \* 479 days after delivery, it will be \* deemed to have been allowed with costs.<sup>2</sup> Either party on entering it must give notice thereof to the other.<sup>3</sup>

Often, instead of demurring, the defendant prefers to take out a summons at chambers to strike out or amend certain portions of the statement of claim.<sup>4</sup> But the more usual application at this stage is for particulars.

### *Particulars.*

The defendant's counsel should next consider whether the statement of claim is sufficiently definite. Before the Judicature Act particulars were constantly ordered of the places where, the times when, and the persons to whom the alleged slanders were uttered. (a) The legislature probably intended that there should be no particulars under the Judicature Act; and an attempt was at first made to carry out this presumed intention.<sup>5</sup> But it was soon found necessary to revive the former practice, and an order for such particulars as above is frequently made, where the details are not set out in the statement of claim. But particulars of the names of the persons passing in the street at the time the alleged slander was uttered will not be ordered.<sup>6</sup> So, too, whenever any special damage is claimed, but not with sufficient explicitness, particulars will be ordered of the alleged damage, setting out the names of the customers who had ceased to deal with the plaintiff in consequence of defendant's words. This is a

<sup>1</sup> Order XXVIII. r. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Order XXVIII. rr. 6, 13.

<sup>3</sup> See *Restell and wife v. Steward*, Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 231; 1 Charley, 87; Bitt. 46; 20 Sol. J. 99; 60 L. T. Notes, 87.

<sup>4</sup> See further as to the event of the demurrer, Order XXVIII. rr. 8-12.

<sup>5</sup> Order XXVII. r. 1, *post*, p. 499.

<sup>6</sup> Per Denman, J., in *Wingard v. Cox*, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 106; Bitt. 144; 20 Sol. J. 341; 60 L. T. Notes, 304.

(a) *Clark v. Munsell*, 6 Met. 373; Commonwealth *v. Snelling*, 15 Pick. 321. See Wharton, *Crim. Pl. & Ev.* §§ 157, 702 (8th ed.).

very useful order ; as, if plaintiff cannot give the names, he will be compelled to strike out the allegation of special damage from his statement of claim.<sup>1</sup> Particulars of general damage will, of course, never be ordered ; as such damage exists rather in contemplation of law than in reality.

The summons for particulars should always ask for a stay.<sup>2</sup> It will then be a stay from the time it is attendable till the particulars are delivered, unless the master otherwise order.

\* *Statement of Defence.*

\* 480

Formerly, by one short and convenient plea, "Not Guilty," the defendant denied the publication of the defamatory matter, denied its publication in the defamatory sense imputed, or in any defamatory actionable sense which the words themselves imported, asserted that the occasion was privileged, and also denied that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his profession or trade, whenever they were alleged to have been so spoken. But now this compendious mode of pleading is abolished. "Not Guilty" can no longer be pleaded ; though "Not Guilty by statute" may.<sup>3</sup> It is necessary now to deal specifically with every fact of which the defendant does not admit the truth. It will be necessary, therefore, to consider the following several pleas :—

1. Denial of the publication.
2. Traverse of the innuendo.
3. Traverse of the plaintiff's special character.
4. Denial that the words were spoken with reference thereto.
5. Denial that the words were spoken of the plaintiff.
6. Traverse of the damage.
7. No libel.
8. Privilege.
9. Justification.
10. Apology.
11. Accord and satisfaction.
12. Statute of Limitations.
13. Previous action.
14. Other defences.
15. Payment into Court.
16. The defendant may also set up a counterclaim.

All these defences, or any number of them, may be pleaded together in the same action without leave ; although they are obviously inconsistent. (*a*)

<sup>1</sup> See Precedents of Pleading, App. A., Nos. 27, 28.

<sup>2</sup> See form, p. 608.

<sup>3</sup> Order XIX. rr. 20, 16.

(*a*) Inconsistent pleas may be pleaded anywhere in this country, such as the general issue and a justification. *Horton v. Banner*, 6 Bush, 596 ; *Farnan v. Childs*,

A defendant may "raise by his statement of defence without leave, as many distinct and separate, and therefore inconsistent, defences as he may think proper, subject only to the provision contained in rule 1, Order XXVII.," as to striking out embarrassing matter.<sup>1</sup>

\* 481 \* Thus, in *Restell and wife v. Steward*,<sup>2</sup> Quain, J., held that a denial of the publication and a justification could be pleaded together. In *Stainbank v. Beckett, Bart.*,<sup>3</sup> the defendant pleaded that the alleged libel did not relate to the plaintiff, that it was a fair comment upon a matter of public interest, and also that it was true in fact. This was obviously most inconsistent, but the Court of Appeal held that it was not embarrassing, and merely ordered particulars of the justification.<sup>4</sup>

If there is some defect or absurdity in your adversary's pleading, and yet you decide neither to demur nor to apply for an amendment under Order XXVII. r. 1, then be careful in pleading over not to aid the defect in any way. The less said about that part of the pleading the better; do not admit it; if need be, traverse it in so many words; but after such denial, avoid the whole topic, if possible; leaving plaintiff's counsel to explain it to the judge at the trial, if he can.

The defendant cannot bring in a third party under Order XVI. rr. 17-21; because there is no contribution between tort-feasors.<sup>5</sup>

The defendant may deliver interrogatories with his Statement of Defence.<sup>6</sup>

### *Traverses.*

It was intended by the framers of the Judicature Act, that each party in his pleading should frankly admit every statement of fact which he does not intend to seriously dispute at the trial. But this intention has not been carried out. Counsel do not make admissions unless they are expressly instructed to do so, which they very seldom are. No doubt some-

<sup>1</sup> Per Thesiger, L.J., in *Berdan v. Greenwood*, 3 Ex. D. 255; 47 L. J. Ex. 628; 26 W. R. 902; 39 L. T. 223.

<sup>2</sup> Weekly Notes, 1875, pp. 231, 232; 1 Charley, 87; Bitt. 46; 20 Sol. J. 99; 60 L. T. Notes, 87.

<sup>3</sup> Weekly Notes, 1879, p. 203.

<sup>4</sup> See also *Hawkesley v. Bradshaw* (C. A.), 5 Q. B. D. 302; 49 L. J. Q. B. 333; 28 W. R. 557; 42 L. T. 285; *post*, p. 492.

<sup>5</sup> *Horwell v. London General Omnibus Co.*, 2 Ex. D. 365; 46 L. J. Ex. 700; 25 W. R. 610; 36 L. T. 637. As to pleading a defence which has arisen since action brought, see Order XX.

<sup>6</sup> See *post*, p. 500.

66 Ill. 544; *Summer v. Chipman*, 65 N. Y. 67; *Miller v. Graham*, 1 Brev. 283. But Car. 623; *Spooner v. Keeler*, 51 N. Y. 527; *Peters v. Ulmer*, 74 Penn. St. 402; inconsistent facts should not be pleaded in the same plea. *Sayles v. Wooden*, 6 How. Barr v. Hack, 46 Iowa, 308; *Kelly v. Craig*, Pr. 84. See *Payson v. Macomber*, 3 Allen, 69.

times in cases of slander it may be desirable to deny uttering the words, so as to compel the plaintiff to call as his witness the person to whom the defendant spoke, whom then the defendant cross-examines to show privilege. But as a rule in cases of libel the \* defendant should ad- \* 482 mit the publication whenever it can be proved against him without trouble. All the rest of the statement of claim, even immaterial averments, should be traversed; as if not denied they will be taken as admitted.<sup>1</sup> The most convenient form of denial is this:—

“The defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, and each and every of them.”

This is the form proper to a denial of matters within the defendant’s knowledge; as to matters not within his knowledge, it will be more correct to say:—

“The defendant does not admit any of the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim.”

But it is contrary to the spirit of Order XIX. rr. 20 & 22 to deal too largely in these general traverses. It also looks weak, as though the defendant had no real defence. It will be well therefore to insert some more special denials:—

1. “The defendant denies that he spoke or published of the plaintiff the words set out in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim.” The words “either falsely or maliciously” must not be added. For the plea, as it stands without them, is a denial of the publication in fact: if the plaintiff prove publication, the law will presume it to have been false and malicious, until the defendant proves either privilege or a justification; and both privilege and justification must be specially pleaded, not merely suggested by the addition of four words to a plea which really raises quite a different defence.

2. “The defendant denies that he spoke or published of the plaintiff the words set out in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim with the meaning as therein alleged.” This is a traverse of the innuendo. The innuendo, if there be one, should always be traversed.

3. “The plaintiff did not, at the date of the publication, if any, of the said words, carry on the business of a butcher as alleged in paragraph 1 of the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim;” or “The plaintiff was not at the date, &c., such vicar as alleged,” or “was not at such date a partner in the firm of Mears and Stainbank as alleged.” This is a traverse of the special character in which the plaintiff sues; and must always be specially pleaded.<sup>2</sup>

\* 4. “The defendant denies that he spoke or published the said \* 483 words, if at all, with reference to the plaintiff in the way of his said

<sup>1</sup> Order XIX. r. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Rules of Trinity Term, 1853, r. 16; Jud. Act. Order XIX. r. 11.

business or trade of a butcher [office or profession of —].” This plea did not require to be pleaded specially under the old system ; and it would, therefore, I presume be now deemed to be included in a general denial of the allegations in the paragraph. But it is better to set it out plainly.

5. “The defendant denies that the said words in any way referred to the plaintiff. They were not so understood by those who heard them uttered.”<sup>1</sup>

6. Deny all the allegations as to damage. It was formerly the rule that the defendant could not plead to damage. But he is now bound at all events to deny the allegations contained in that paragraph ;<sup>2</sup> he often goes further, and states that the damage alleged to have been suffered was not caused by defendant’s words, but by a repetition of them, or is otherwise too remote.<sup>3</sup>

#### 7. *Bona fide Comment. No Libel.*

For a plea of *bona fide* comment on a matter of public interest.<sup>4</sup>

It was decided in Ireland before the Judicature Act that a plea “that the matter contained in the said paragraph is not a libel” was a good plea ; for it raised a question which was now for the jury, not the judge.<sup>5</sup> And since then such a plea has been freely used in Ireland.<sup>6</sup> But such pleading is not in accordance with our practice. Perhaps in England the following plea would be allowed : — “The defendant denies that he wrote or published the said words of the plaintiff with the meaning alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, or in any other defamatory sense. The said words without the alleged meaning are no libel.” But a simple plea that “the said words are not defamatory,” would certainly be regarded as an informal demurrer.

\* 484

#### \* 8. *Privilege.*

It was decided in the Exchequer Division in a case not reported,<sup>7</sup> that since the Judicature Act privilege must be specially pleaded, and also that the facts and circumstances must be stated showing why and how the occasion is privileged. This is clearly in accordance with Order XIX. r. 18. There is a similar decision in Ireland.<sup>8</sup> Many such pleas may be suggested : —

<sup>1</sup> See Precedent of Pleading, No. 5, para. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Order XIX. r. 17.

<sup>3</sup> See Precedent, No. 34, para. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See Precedents, Nos. 5, 19, 20 ; *Earl Lucan v. Smith*, 1 H. & N. 481 ; 26 L. J. Ex. 94 ; 2 Jur. N. S. 1170 ; *Clinton v. Henderson*, 13 Ir. C. L. R. App. 43 ; *Hort v. Reade*, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 551.

<sup>5</sup> *Nixon v. Harvey*, 8 Ir. C. L. Rep. 446.

<sup>6</sup> See *Maguire v. Knox*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 408 ; *Stannus v. Finlay*, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 264 ; *Cosgrave v. Trade Auxiliary Co.*, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 349 ; *M’Loughlin v. Dwyer* (1), Ir. R. 9 C. L. 170.

<sup>7</sup> *Spackman v. Gibney*.

<sup>8</sup> *Simmonds v. Dunne*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 358.



"The said words were spoken by the defendant whilst in the witness box during his examination on oath as a witness, in the course of a judicial proceeding before an alderman at Guildhall." <sup>1</sup>

"The said words are part of an official report written by the defendant in accordance with his military duty for the information of his military superiors, and published by him in the discharge of his said duty to such military superiors and not otherwise." <sup>2</sup>

"Before and at the time of the alleged grievances the defendant was the son-in-law of the Mrs. Hawkins mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim. The defendant was informed, as the fact was, that she was about to marry the plaintiff. Thereupon the defendant spoke the said words confidentially to the said Mrs. Hawkins, without malice, and in the honest desire to protect her private interests, and those of the defendant. The defendant at the time *bonâ fide* believed in the truth of what he said." <sup>3</sup>

It is necessary where the occasion is not absolutely privileged to aver that the defendant acted *bonâ fide* and without malice.<sup>4</sup> Such an allegation is immaterial in cases of absolute privilege. If defendant avers that he had just and reasonable grounds for believing the charges against the plaintiff to be true, he must set forth what were the grounds of such belief.<sup>5</sup> It is better however to avoid such an averment altogether and to state that he repeated the charge \* *bonâ fide* and in the honest belief in \* 485 its truth. An averment of just and reasonable grounds runs dangerously near to a justification, and the averment of *bona fides* covers and includes it.

### 9. Justification.

This is a most dangerous plea, and should never be placed on the record without careful consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence by which it is to be supported. (a) For the strictest proof is required;<sup>6</sup> and, if not

<sup>1</sup> See *Seaman v. Netherclift*, 1 C. P. D. 540; 46 L. J. C. P. 128; 25 W. R. 159; 35 L. T. 784.

<sup>2</sup> *Dawkins v. Lord Paulet*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53; 18 W. R. 336; 21 L. T. 584.

<sup>3</sup> *Todd v. Hawkins*, 8 C. & P. 88; 2 Moo. & Rob. 20. See also *Precedents*, Nos. 2, 11, 15, 17, 20, 39.

<sup>4</sup> *Smith v. Thomas*, 2 Bing. N. C. 372.

<sup>5</sup> *Fitzgerald v. Campbell*, 18 Ir. Jur. 153; 15 L. T. 74.

<sup>6</sup> See *Leyman v. Latimer*, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 25 W. R. 751; 26 W. R. 305; 37 L. T. 360, 819.

(a) See *ante*, p. 274. But a plea in justification does not, with or without the general issue, exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of proving the words. *Farnan v. Childs*, 66 Ill. 544; *Summer v. Chipman*, 65 N. Car. 623 (*with* general issue);

*Whittaker v. Freeman*, 1 Dev. 271; *Cilley v. Jenness*, 2 N. H. 87. The contrary rule prevailed in Massachusetts until changed by statute. *Alderman v. French*, 1 Pick. 1; *Hix v. Drury*, 5 Pick. 296.

proved, the defendant's persistence in the charge is some evidence of malice, and will always tend to aggravate the damages given against him. The defence cannot be raised without a special plea; but counsel should never draw such a plea without express instructions, and even then should always caution the defendant as to the risk he runs.

When the libel consists of one specific charge, *e.g.*, "He forged my name to a bill for £500," it is sufficient to plead generally:—"The said words are true in substance and in fact." So if the charge made by the defendant were:—"He stole his master's sheep," it would be sufficient to allege that "the plaintiff did steal four sheep the property of his master, John Jones." But whenever a general charge is made, the very words alleged to have been uttered should be expressly justified;<sup>1</sup> and also specific instances must be given, either in the plea or in the particulars.<sup>2</sup> And it is not sufficient to allege and prove one solitary instance, where the words impute constant and habitual misconduct.<sup>3</sup> (a) It is enough to cite three instances.<sup>4</sup>

These instances should be set out fully in the plea; they should be stated to have happened "before the publication, if any, of the said words,"

and then the plea may conclude, "Wherefore the defendant says  
\* 486 that the said words are true in \* substance and in fact." Such instances must be stated with sufficient particularity to inform the plaintiff precisely what are the facts to be tried. As a rule these instances should be given in the plea.<sup>5</sup> But if they are numerous or complicated, they may be stated in the particulars instead.<sup>6</sup>

If it appears from the words set out in the statement of claim that the defendant did not make a direct charge himself, but only repeated what A. said, then a general plea that the words are true will be insufficient;<sup>7</sup> for it will only amount to an assertion that A. said so; whereas the defendant must go further and prove in addition that what A. said was true.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Per Quain, J., in *Restell & another v. Steward*, Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 249; 1 Charley, 89; Bitt. 65; 20 Sol. J. 140; 60 L. T. Notes, 123.

<sup>2</sup> *Newman v. Bailey*, 2 Chit. 665; *I'Anson v. Stuart*, 1 T. R. 748; 2 Sm. Lg. Cas. 6th ed. 57; *Holmes v. Catesby*, 1 Taunt. 543; *Hickinbotham v. Leach*, 10 M. & W. 361.

<sup>3</sup> *Wakley v. Cooke & Healey*, 4 Ex. 511; 19 L. J. Ex. 91.

<sup>4</sup> *Moore v. Terrell and others*, 4 B. & Ad. 870; 1 N. & M. 559.

<sup>5</sup> *Honess & others v. Stubbs*, 7 C. B. N. S. 555; 29 L. J. C. P. 220; 6 Jur. N. S. 682.

<sup>6</sup> *Behrens v. Allen*, 8 Jur. N. S. 118; 3 F. & F. 135; *Jones v. Bewicke*, L. R. 5 C. P. 32; *Gourley v. Plimsoll*, L. R. 8 C. P. 362; 42 L. J. C. P. 121; 21 W. R. 683; 28 L. T. 598.

<sup>7</sup> *Duncan v. Thwaites*, 3 B. & C. 556.

<sup>8</sup> See *ante*, pp. 173-6.

(a) *Stowell v. Beagle*, 79 Ill. 525; s. c. 57 Ill. 97.

The precise charge must be justified; and the whole of the precise charge.<sup>1</sup> Every fact stated must be proved true,<sup>2</sup> unless it be absolutely immaterial and trivial, and in no way alters the complexion of the affair. But not every comment on such facts need be justified. Thus, if the defendant states certain facts, and then calls the plaintiff a "scamp" and a "rascal," and such epithets would be deserved if the facts as stated are true, then it is sufficient to plead the truth of the facts; the epithets need not be expressly justified.<sup>3</sup> But if the comment introduces an independent fact, or substantially aggravates the main imputation, it must be expressly justified. Thus a libellous heading to a newspaper article must be justified as well as the facts stated in the article.<sup>4</sup>

But the defendant may in mitigation of damages justify a part of the libel, provided such part is distinct and severable from the rest.<sup>5</sup> (a) Also the defendant may deny that the plaintiff's innuendo puts the true construction on \*the words and assert that in their natural and \*487 ordinary signification they are true. Such a plea might be in the following form:—"The defendant denies that he spoke or published the said words of the plaintiff with the meaning alleged in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim. The said words, without the said meaning, and according to their natural and ordinary signification are true in substance and in fact."<sup>6</sup> But if the defendant adopts the meaning put upon the words by the innuendo, then he must justify them in that sense, and not in any other.<sup>7</sup> Where a plaintiff claims damages for a libel contained in a letter set out with innuendoes, a justification in the form—"The statements in the said letter are true," is a justification of the libel itself, but not of it as read with the innuendo.<sup>8</sup> For a plea of justification under the new system will "not be taken to intend a justification of anything more than it actually professes to justify." But any plea which wears a doubtful aspect, which may be either a justification, or a mere traverse, or a plea of privilege, will be struck out at chambers as embarrassing.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Goodburne v. Bowman & others*, 9 Bing. 532.

<sup>2</sup> *Weaver v. Lloyd*, 2 B. & C. 678; *Helsham v. Blackwood*, 11 C. B. 111; 20 L. J. C. P. 187; 15 Jur. 861.

<sup>3</sup> *Morrison v. Harmer*, 3 Bing. N. C. 767; 4 Scott, 533; 3 Hodges, 108; *Tighe v. Cooper*, 7 E. & B. 639; 26 L. J. Q. B. 215; 3 Jur. N. S. 716.

<sup>4</sup> *Bishop v. Latimer*, 4 L. T. 775; *Clement v. Lewis & others*, 3 Br. & Bing. 297; 3 B. & Ald. 702; 7 Moore, 200. See *ante*, pp. 170-3.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 176.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 177.

<sup>7</sup> *White v. Tyrrell* (2), 5 Ir. C. L. R. 498.

<sup>8</sup> Per Archibald, J., at *Nisi Prius*, in *Payne v. Courthope*, 20 Sol. Journ. 724.

<sup>9</sup> *Carr v. Duckett*, 5 H. & N. 783; 29 L. J. Ex. 468; *Bremridge v. Latimer*, 12 W. R. 878; 10 L. T. 816; *O'Keefe v. Cardinal Cullen*, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 319.

A defendant will not be allowed to amend his defence and plead a justification at the last moment, *e.g.*, on the day before the trial.<sup>1</sup>

### 10. *Apology.*

By Lord Campbell's Libel Act,<sup>2</sup> in an action for a libel contained in any public newspaper or periodical publication, the defendant may plead that the libel was inserted without actual malice and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, an apology was published or offered, and may pay money into Court by way of amends. Money must be paid into Court when the pleading is delivered if not before.<sup>3</sup> But such payment will not operate as an admission of liability, even to the amount paid in.<sup>4</sup> Any  
\* 488 other pleas may be pleaded \* at the same time.<sup>5</sup>

The following is the form of a plea under Lord Campbell's Act :  
— "The alleged libel was contained in a public daily newspaper called the  
——— *Daily Press*, and was inserted in such newspaper without actual malice and without gross negligence. Before the commencement of this action [*or at the earliest opportunity after*] the defendant inserted in several issues of the said newspaper a full apology for the said libel according to the statute in such case made and provided ; and the defendant immediately after the commencement of this action paid the sum of forty shillings into Court in the said action by way of amends for the injury sustained by the plaintiff for the publication of the said libel, and gave notice of such payment into Court to the plaintiff. And the defendant says that the said sum is enough to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the said libel."

The above section of Lord Campbell's Act applies only to public periodical publications ; but s. 1 of the same Act empowers *any* defendant to give in evidence in mitigation of damages in any action, whether of slander or libel, that he made or offered an apology to the plaintiff before action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, if he had no opportunity before action. This section distinctly does not empower a defendant to plead an apology ; for it requires him *with his plea* to give notice in writing to the plaintiff of his intention to give such apology in evidence. But there can be no objection now to the plaintiff making such written notice part of his statement of defence ; indeed that he made such an apology is a material fact on which he relies, within the meaning of Order XIX. r. 4. I incline

<sup>1</sup> Kirby *v.* Simpson, 3 Dowl. 791.

<sup>2</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 2.

<sup>3</sup> 8 & 9 Vict. c. 75, s. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Jones *v.* Mackie, L. R. 3 Ex. 1 ; 37 L. J. Ex. 1 ; 16 W. R. 109 ; 17 L. T. 151.

<sup>5</sup> Hawkesley *v.* Bradshaw (C. A.), 5 Q. B. D. 302 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 333 ; 28 W. R. 557 ; 42 L. T. 285 ; *post*, p. 492.

to think that it is now no longer objectionable for a defendant to state in his pleading facts which are no defence, but which tend to mitigate the damages. At least, I do not see how such a method of pleading could embarrass a plaintiff: it gives him notice what will be the defendant's case at the trial.

But it is quite another matter for the defendant in his Statement of Defence to apologize for the first time, when he had previous opportunities, of which he did not avail himself. Still this is frequently done when money is paid into Court: it \*shows that the defend- \* 489 ant has taken his counsel's opinion, and acted on it. It certainly cannot embarrass a plaintiff to have placed upon the record a full retraction of the charge accompanied by an expression of regret; and it should conduce to an amicable settlement.<sup>1</sup> But it is certainly strange pleading; and if the plaintiff wishes to have it struck out, his application will probably be successful; though he can hardly afterwards demand an apology at the trial.

### 11. *Accord and Satisfaction.*

"The plaintiff was the proprietor and publisher of a certain weekly journal called the *Musical Review*; and the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of another weekly journal called the *Orchestra*. And, after the publication, if any, of the said words, the plaintiff and defendant agreed together to accept certain mutual apologies, to be published by the plaintiff and defendant respectively in their said weekly journals, in full satisfaction and discharge of all the causes and rights of action in the declaration mentioned, and all damages and costs sustained by the plaintiff in respect thereof. And thereupon, in pursuance of the said agreement, the defendant did, on the 14th of May, 1864, print and publish his part of the said mutual apologies in the form agreed on in his weekly journal the *Orchestra*, of which the plaintiff had notice. And the plaintiff did also after the making of the said agreement and in pursuance thereof, to wit, on the 14th of May, 1864, print and publish his part of the said apologies in the form agreed on in his said weekly journal, the *Musical Review*. And such apologies so published as aforesaid the plaintiff accepted and received in full satisfaction and discharge of the causes of action set out in the statement of claim."

A similar plea under the old practice was held a bar to the action in *Boosey v. Wood*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Precedent, No. 34.

<sup>2</sup> 3 H. & C. 484; 34 L. J. Ex. 65. See also *Lane v. Applegate*, 1 Stark. 97. As to accord and satisfaction made by one jointly liable with the defendant, see *Bainbridge v. Lax*, 9 Q. B. 819; *Thurman v. Wild*, 11 A. & E. 453; *Hey v. Moorhouse*, 6 Bing. N. C. 52.

An accord or satisfaction made by a third party on the defendant's behalf, and accepted by the plaintiff in discharge will be a bar to the action.<sup>1</sup>

"The alleged cause of action did not accrue within six years before this suit;" or in the case of slander actionable *per se*, "The words complained of were not spoken within two years before this suit."<sup>2</sup>

### 13. *Previous Action.*

"The plaintiff heretofore, to wit, on the — day of —, 1878 (date of writ), sued the defendant in the — Division of this Honorable Court, for the same cause of action as is alleged in the Statement of Claim herein; and such proceedings were thereupon had in that action that the plaintiff afterwards by the judgment of the said Court recovered against the defendant £—— for the said cause of action, and his costs of suit in that behalf; and the said judgment still remains in force." (a) State in the margin of the plea the date when such judgment was signed, and the number of the roll in which such proceedings are entered.<sup>3</sup>

A plea that judgment was recovered against a joint publisher will also be a bar to an action against the others for the same publication.<sup>4</sup> (b)

A plea that in a former action judgment was given against the plaintiff, is really a plea in estoppel. (c) Commence as above. "And such proceedings were thereupon had in that action that afterwards and before this suit it was considered by the judgment of the said Court in the said action that the plaintiff should take nothing by his writ for or in respect of the said cause of action. The said judgment was signed on the — day of —, A.D. 1878, and still remains in force. [The proceedings are entered on roll No. —.] Wherefore the defendant says that the plaintiff is estopped, and ought not to be admitted to bring the present action against the defendant."

<sup>1</sup> Jones v. Broadhurst, 9 C. B. 173.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 455.

<sup>3</sup> Reg. Gen. Hilary Term, 1853, r. 10.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 457.

(a) What is included in the judgment, see Campbell v. Butts, 3 Comst. 173; also note on repetitions, *ante*, p. 271, n.

(b) But a former judgment in a suit by a firm for slander is held to be no bar to a suit by one of the partners for the same words. Duffy v. Gray, 52 Mo. 528. The slander in this case mentioned the partners each by name. See also Noonan v. Orton, 32 Wis. 106, that the partners may sue separately for words of the firm.

(c) Not so of judgment in a criminal action; that would be no bar to a civil suit. Nor would any special or general verdict therein be conclusive in a civil proceeding. The parties are different, and a criminal judgment is not a judgment *in rem*. Corbley v. Wilson, 71 Ill. 209; McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403. See also *ante*, p. 292, note.

14. *Other Defences.*

In an American case,<sup>1</sup> the defendant pleaded a release.<sup>2</sup>

\* By virtue of the Married Women's Property Act Amendment \* 491 Act, 1874,<sup>3</sup> s. 2, a husband, if sued for a libel or slander published or uttered by his wife before her marriage, may, in addition to any other pleas, plead that no property vested in him by reason of the marriage within the meaning of s. 5, or if a certain amount of property did so vest in him, then that he is liable to that extent, and no further.

By Order XIX. r. 3, it is provided that "no plea or defence shall be pleaded in abatement:" but we are not told what course to adopt in cases where such a plea would formerly have been good. Where a man and woman sue as husband and wife for slander of the woman, the defendant is surely still entitled to plead that they are not husband and wife; for, if so, the male plaintiff has no right of action.<sup>4</sup> (a)

15. *Payment into Court.*

Payment into Court is not strictly a *defence*: it is rather a payment in mitigation of damages, allowed as a favor to defendants by statute, in the hope that thereby many actions may be settled out of Court. Such a plea was not formerly allowed in all actions of tort: but, where allowed, its effect always was to admit that the plaintiff had a cause of action against the defendant; and if the declaration was specific to admit the cause of action therein specified; so that the only question left for the jury was that of damages *ultra*, that is, Is the sum so paid into Court sufficient to compensate the plaintiff, or is he entitled to more?<sup>5</sup>

By s. 70 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, payment into Court was allowed in all actions except actions for assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, or malicious arrest or prosecution, or debauching the plaintiff's daughter or servant. But s. 2 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96,<sup>6</sup> was left unaffected.

But now by the Judicature Act:<sup>7</sup>—"Where any action is brought to recover a debt or damages, any defendant may at any time after service of the writ, and before or at the time of delivering his defence,

<sup>1</sup> *Beach et ux v. Beach*, 2 Hill, 260.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 349.

<sup>3</sup> 37 & 38 Vict. c. 50.

<sup>4</sup> See *Chantler and wife v. Lindsey*, 16 M. & W. 82; 4 Dowl. & Lowndes, 339.

<sup>5</sup> *Perren v. Monmouthshire Railway Co.*, 11 C. B. 855.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 487.

<sup>7</sup> Order XXX. r. 1.

(a) At common law it is enough in an action for slander of the wife that the plaintiff was married at the time of suing. *Spencer v. McMasters*, 16 Ill. 405.

or by leave of the Court or a judge at any later time, pay into

\* 492 Court a sum of money by way \* of satisfaction or amends." These words are so wide that they must be taken to overrule s. 70 of the C. L. P. Act, 1852, and money therefore can now be paid into Court in actions of slander as well as libel. And, moreover, such payment into Court, if properly pleaded, will not operate as an admission of the cause of action. This was decided by the Court of Appeal in *Potter v. Home and Colonial Assurance Co.* (not reported). But shortly afterwards the Queen's Bench Division decided that although such a payment need not necessarily be an admission that the plaintiff had a cause of action, still to plead payment into Court and to deny the plaintiff's right of action in respect of the same part of the statement of claim might in special circumstances be embarrassing to the plaintiff, and therefore such a pleading would be amended under Order XXVII. r. 1.<sup>1</sup> This decision, however, must be considered to be strictly confined to actions of its own peculiar character, and not to lay down any general rule. For the general rule is the reverse, that a defendant may by his statement of defence deny the plaintiff's causes of action, and at the same time plead payment into Court in respect of the whole or any part of them.<sup>2</sup> In that case, Brett and Thesiger, L.JJ., after laying down this general rule, add:—"It may, however, possibly be that in some actions brought to try a right of or in respect of property which is denied, or to establish character which has been assailed, and in actions where the plaintiff is by the statement of defence charged with fraud, and perhaps in some other cases, it would be, as a matter of practice, improper to allow the defence of payment into Court concurrently with other defences." And Cotton, L.J., also says:—"I am of opinion that the paragraph in question cannot be considered as in any way tending 'to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action;' but there may be special cases in which this would be the effect, as in actions for libel, which the defendant by his statement of defence justifies."

This very point was raised before the Queen's Bench Division in

\* 493 *Hawkesley v. Bradshaw*.<sup>3</sup> There the defendant admitted the \* publication but traversed the innuendo; then said that the words without the alleged meaning were true in substance and in fact; then that the words were *bonâ fide* comment on a matter of public interest, and therefore not libellous; and then pleaded under Lord Campbell's Act that they were published inadvertently, and apologized, and paid forty shillings into Court. This mode of pleading the Court held to be embarrassing under Order

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 499. *Spurr v. Hall*, 2 Q. B. D. 615; 46 L. J. Q. B. 693; 26 W. R. 678; 37 L. T. 313.

<sup>2</sup> *Berdan v. Greenwood and another* (C. A.), 3 Ex. D. 251; 47 L. J. Ex. 628; 26 W. R. 902; 39 L. T. 223.

<sup>3</sup> 5 Q. B. D. 22; 49 L. J. Q. B. 207; 28 W. R. 167; 41 L. T. 653.



XXVII. r. 1; and both Cockburn, C.J., and Manisty, went further and held that Order XXX. r. 1 did not apply to actions for libel, and that payment into Court in actions of libel could still only be pleaded under Lord Campbell's Act, and therefore still operated as an admission of the cause of action. But the Court of Appeal<sup>1</sup> held that the rule in *Berdan v. Greenwood* applied to actions of libel and to everything else; that a plea under Lord Campbell's Act can be pleaded with any other defences; that such a method of pleading was not embarrassing; and that the plaintiff's course, if the imputation was a serious one, was to go down to trial trusting to the judge and juries to protect him, either in the way of damages or of costs, in the event of the justification failing. It will in future be almost impossible for any collocation of pleas in an action of defamation to be held embarrassing within Order XXX. r. 1.<sup>2</sup>

However, no doubt when it comes to trial, a payment into Court will generally be considered by the jury as a practical admission that defendant is somehow in the wrong, and this as a matter of common sense and not of law. I should not, therefore, advise any defendant who had a fair defence on the merits to pay money into Court. Nor again is it generally worth while to pay a farthing or a shilling into Court; for it is very improbable that plaintiff will accept that sum, and if the jury do not award more than such contemptuous damages, the judge would probably order plaintiff to pay his own costs. If defendant is going to pay anything into Court, he should pay a good round sum; generally *twice* as much as the defendant himself thinks the plaintiff is entitled to, will be about the right amount for him to pay into Court.

\* If it be desired to pay money into Court and at the same time \* 494 to guard against any admission, the plea should commence with a saving clause as in *Berdan v. Greenwood*:—"Lest contrary to what the defendant believes and contends he is under any liability to the plaintiff," or thus, "The defendant, while not admitting that he is under any liability to the plaintiff, yet brings into Court the sum of £——, &c." At whatever stage of the action the money be paid into Court, the payment must be specially pleaded in the statement of defence.

### *Counterclaims.*

It is not often that there is a counterclaim in an action for libel or slander, and it would clearly be prejudicial to the fair trial of the action to permit a defendant to raise incongruous issues. Still there is no reason why other libels or slanders published by the plaintiff of the defendant

<sup>1</sup> 5 Q. B. D. 302; 49 L. J. Q. B. 333; 28 W. R. 557; 42 L. T. 285.

<sup>2</sup> *O'Brien v. Clement*, 15 M. & W. 435; 15 L. J. Ex. 285; 3 D. & L. 676; 10 Jur. 395; and *Barry v. M'Grath, Ir. R.* 3 C. L. 576, are now clearly overruled.

should not be made matter of counterclaim, and the fact that they arise out of a different transaction will be no ground for excluding them.<sup>1</sup> Though of course a master at chambers may on the application of the plaintiff before trial, strike out a counterclaim, if in his opinion it "cannot be conveniently disposed of in the pending action, or ought not to be allowed." In *Nicholson v. Jackson*,<sup>2</sup> where an action had been brought by a director of a company for libel, a counterclaim set up by the defendant for damages for loss sustained in respect of shares bought on false representations, was struck out, Lindley, J., remarking, "This is one of those cases where it would be very difficult to keep the jury from mixing up the two claims." So in *Lee v. Colyer*,<sup>3</sup> Quain, J., struck out a counterclaim for not repairing a house, the action being for assault and slander. But in *Dobede v. Fisher*, at the Cambridge Summer Assizes, 1880; the Lord Chief Baron had to try an action of slander, in which there was a counterclaim about a right of shooting over the land occupied by the defendant.<sup>4</sup> Where however the action was for two quarters' rent and the writ was specially indorsed for

30*l.*, the defendant was not allowed to set up a counterclaim for  
\* 495 libel and slander not connected \* with the claim for rent.<sup>5</sup>

Facts relied on in support of a counterclaim must be specifically stated as such; they must be distinguished from the facts relied on as defence proper.<sup>6</sup> But of course they need not be repeated at full length, if they have been previously set out in the statement of defence. It is sufficient to say:— "And by way of set-off [or counterclaim, or both] the defendant repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 8 and 10 above, and says further, &c."<sup>7</sup>

A counterclaim is in the nature of a cross-action commenced at date of writ. Hence no counterclaim arising after action brought can strictly be pleaded without leave, although a defence proper can.<sup>8</sup> In *Ellis v. Munson*,<sup>9</sup> leave had been obtained. Such a counterclaim must, of course, be expressly pleaded *puis darrein continuance*.

Where the defendant is a foreigner residing out of jurisdiction, and sets up a counterclaim arising out of the same facts as the plaintiff's claim, the

<sup>1</sup> *Quin v. Hession*, 40 L. T. 70; 4 L. R. (Ir.) 35.

<sup>2</sup> W. N. 1876, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> W. N. 1876, p. 8; Bitt. '80; 1 Charley, 86; 20 Sol. J. 177; 60 L. T. Notes, 157.

<sup>4</sup> *Times* for July 29th, 1880.

<sup>5</sup> *Rotheram v. Priest*, 49 L. J. C. P. 104; 28 W. R. 277; 41 L. T. 558.

<sup>6</sup> *Crowe v. Barnicot*, 37 L. T. 68.

<sup>7</sup> *Birmingham Estates Co. v. Smith*, 13 Ch. D. 506; 49 L. J. Ch. 251; 28 W. R. 666; 42 L. T. 111.

<sup>8</sup> Order XX. Per Jessel, M.R., in *Original Hartlepool Colliery Co. v. Gibb*, 5 Ch. D. 713; 46 L. J. Ch. 311; 36 L. T. 433.

<sup>9</sup> C. A., 35 L. T. 585; Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 253.

plaintiff will not be entitled to security for the costs of such counterclaim even though its amount exceeds that of his claim.<sup>1</sup>

### *Judgment in Default of Pleading.*

The defendant is bound (unless the time is enlarged by a master at chambers, or by consent under Order LVII. r. 6a, R. S. C. April, 1880, r. 42) to deliver his defence within eight days from the delivery of the claim or from the time limited for appearance, whichever is last.<sup>2</sup> Failing his doing so, the plaintiff may enter an interlocutory judgment against the defendant, in default of pleading. A writ of inquiry will then issue to assess the damages, unless the judge at chambers order them to be ascertained in another way. But if there be several defendants and one or more make default, \* the damages against him or those in \* 496 default must be assessed at the trial of the action against the other defendants, unless a master at chambers shall otherwise direct.<sup>3</sup>

But a solicitor should never "snap a judgment," if he has any reason for supposing that the delay in pleading is accidental or unavoidable.<sup>4</sup> And even where there has been no unseemly haste in signing judgment, still the judgment will generally be set aside on an affidavit of merits, on the terms that the defendant pay costs occasioned by his default, plead the same day, and, if need be, take short notice of trial.

### *Reply.*

The plaintiff on receiving the statement of defence should first see whether any part of it is so objectionable as to entitle him to apply at chambers for an order to amend it, under Order XXVII. rr. 1, 6. Paragraphs in the nature of an informal demurrer may be struck out as embarrassing under this rule.<sup>5</sup> Then, it may be that his own statement of claim may require amendment; such amendment now takes the place of a "new assignment."<sup>6</sup> Next, if the pleading is not so bad as to require amendment, particulars may still be demanded. Thus, where the libel imputed that the plaintiff had infringed defendant's patents, the defendant was ordered to deliver particulars to the plaintiffs, showing in what respects he alleged that the plaintiffs had infringed his patents, and giving references to line and page of his own specifications.<sup>7</sup> But of course particulars will only

<sup>1</sup> *Mapleson v. Masini*, 5 Q. B. D. 144; 49 L. J. Q. B. 423; 28 W. R. 488; 42 L. T. 531.

<sup>2</sup> Ord. XIX. r. 2; Ord. XXII. r. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Ord. XXIX. rr. 4, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Canada Oil Works v. Hay*, W. N. 1878, p. 107.

<sup>5</sup> *Stokes v. Grant and others*, 4 C. P. D. 25; 27 W. R. 397; 40 L. T. 36.

<sup>6</sup> Order XIX. r. 14. <sup>7</sup> *Wren and another v. Weild*, 38 L. J. Q. B. 88.

be ordered of such of defendant's words as are material in the present action.<sup>1</sup>

If no facts be stated in a plea of justification the plaintiff should apply for particulars, unless the charge itself be specific and precise.<sup>2</sup> If the facts stated are insufficient in law to justify the imputation, the defendant should demur, or apply to have the plea struck out or amended.

\* 497 So, \* too, a plea of privilege is often demurred to. But the plaintiff should never demur unless he is sure that his own previous pleading is perfectly good in law. For by demurring he submits the whole record to the judgment of the Court, and his counsel, who came to attack the defence, may suddenly be called on to defend his own statement of claim, as in *Clay v. Roberts*.<sup>3</sup>

A reply as a rule is a mere joinder of issue in actions of defamation, unless there be a counterclaim. Joinder of issue will operate as a denial of every material allegation of fact in the pleading of the other side, except facts admitted.<sup>4</sup> To a plea of absolute privilege no other reply can be framed which is not demurrable.<sup>5</sup> To a plea of qualified privilege a special reply is unnecessary, if malice be alleged in the statement of claim. On a plea under s. 2 of Lord Campbell's Act, the plaintiff usually merely joins issue, but he may if he likes admit that the libel appeared in a newspaper, and that money had been paid into Court; but deny that the libel was inserted without actual malice and without gross negligence, and that the sum of money paid into Court is sufficient.<sup>6</sup> To a general plea of payment into Court some pleaders reply specially that the sum paid in is insufficient; but a mere joinder of issue will raise the question with equal effect. To a justification setting out a conviction, or to a plea of a previous action, the plaintiff may reply specially *Nul tiel record*; or if the conviction be erroneously stated in the defence<sup>7</sup> the plaintiff may set it out correctly in his reply. Or to such a conviction the plaintiff may reply on a pardon,<sup>8</sup> or that he had undergone and completed his sentence, which will have the same effect,<sup>9</sup> though I apprehend neither reply would be an answer

<sup>1</sup> Colonial Assurance Corporation, Limited *v.* Prosser, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 55; Bitt. 122; 20 Sol. J. 281; 60 L. T. Notes, 250.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 485, 6.

<sup>3</sup> 11 W. R. 649; 9 Jur. N. S. 580; 8 L. T. 397.

<sup>4</sup> Ord. XIX. r. 21.

<sup>5</sup> See *Scott v. Stansfeld*, L. R. 3 Ex. 220; 37 L. J. Ex. 155; 16 W. R. 911; 18 L. T. 572; *Dawkins v. Lord Paulet*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53; 18 W. R. 336; 21 L. T. 584.

<sup>6</sup> *Chadwick v. Herapath*, 3 C. B. 885; 16 L. J. C. P. 104; 4 D. & L. 653; *Smith v. Harrison*, 1 F. & F. 565.

<sup>7</sup> As in *Alexander v. N. E. Ry. Co.* 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 11 Jur. N. S. 619; 13 W. R. 651; 6 B. & S. 340.

<sup>8</sup> *Cuddington v. Wilkins*, Hob. 67, 81; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 37, s. 48.

<sup>9</sup> *Leyman v. Latimer and others*, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; 46 L. J. Ex. 765; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 25 W. R. 751; 26 W. R. 305; 37 L. T. 360, 819; 14 Cox, C. C. 51.

if the words complained of were that the \* plaintiff "was convicted \* 498 of such and such a crime." To a plea of the Statute of Limitations, a plaintiff may specially reply absence beyond seas under the statute of Anne.<sup>1</sup>

To a counterclaim the plaintiff must of course plead as specially as a defendant is compelled to do to a statement of claim.<sup>2</sup>

The plaintiff may deliver interrogatories with his reply.<sup>3</sup> The reply must be delivered within three weeks after the defence has been received,<sup>4</sup> unless the time be extended.

### *Rejoinder.*

A rejoinder is almost always a mere joinder of issue. If it is not, leave must be obtained to plead it.<sup>5</sup> There is an instance of a special rejoinder, which was held good on demurrer, in *Alexander v. North-Eastern Railway Co.*, *supra*.

A rejoinder must be delivered within four days after the receipt of the reply, unless the time be extended by order of a master at chambers, or by consent.<sup>6</sup>

### *Amendment of Pleadings.*

The plaintiff may without leave amend his claim once within the time limited for reply and before reply, or, if no defence has been delivered, then within four weeks from the appearance of the defendant who has last appeared; and so, also, a defendant who has pleaded a set-off or counterclaim may amend the same within the time limited for and before pleading to the reply; or, if there be no reply, then within twenty-eight days from the filing of his defence.<sup>7</sup> (a) But there is no provision enabling a defendant to amend his *defence* without leave. Either party may with leave amend his claim, defence, or reply, at any stage of the proceedings.<sup>8</sup> In such case the order to amend, if not acted upon within the time limited therein, or fourteen days from the date thereof, becomes void *ipso facto*.<sup>9</sup> Generally, such leave will be readily granted on payment of costs,<sup>10</sup> unless the party applying has been guilty of *mala fides*, or desires the amendment merely in order to raise a technical defence.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 456.

<sup>2</sup> *Benbow v. Low*, 13 Ch. D. 553; 49 L. J. Ch. 259; 28 W. R. 384; 42 L. T. 14; *Green v. Sevin*, 13 Ch. D. 589; 41 L. T. 724.

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 500.

<sup>4</sup> Order XXIV. r. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Order XXIV. r. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Order XXIV. r. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Order XXVII. rr. 2, 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.* r. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Order XXVII. r. 7.

<sup>10</sup> *Marriott v. Marriott*, 26 W. R. 416; *Weekly Notes*, 1878, p. 57.

<sup>11</sup> *Tildesley v. Harper* (C. A.), 10 Ch. D. 393; 48 L. J. Ch. 495; 27 W. R. 249; 39 L. T. 552; *Collette v. Goode*, 7 Ch. D. 842; 47 L. J. Ch. 370; 38 L. T. 504.

(a) Amendment is allowed in Maine tiff in his office or occupation. *Powers v. Cary*, 64 Maine, 9. after testimony taken, so as to charge, *e.g.* that the words were published of the plain-

\* 499 \* But it is a very different matter where one party applies to amend, not his own pleading, but that of the opposite party. No party may dictate to the other how he shall plead; he must satisfy the master at chambers or district registrar that the passage to which he objects is either scandalous (that is, both offensive and at the same time irrelevant), or that it tends to prejudice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action. Some pleaders appear to be easily embarrassed; but it is no part of their duty to reform their opponent's pleadings. It is also much better policy to leave a flagrantly bad specimen of pleading unamended, and not to kindly strengthen your adversary's position. Still, if an allegation be really unintelligible or frivolously irrelevant, it should be struck out.<sup>1</sup>

Either party dissatisfied with the order made by the master or district registrar may appeal to a judge by summons returnable within four days.<sup>2</sup> Appeals from any decision of the judge at chambers to the Divisional Court must be made by motion within eight days after the decision appealed against;<sup>3</sup> or if no Court sits within the eight days, then on the first day on which any Court sits, to which such application can be made.<sup>4</sup> If the last of the eight days be Sunday, the appellant may make his appeal on the following Monday.<sup>5</sup> ~~Two clear days'~~ notice of motion must be given.<sup>6</sup> But unless a matter of principle is involved, it is not as a rule desirable to carry an appeal thus far; for the Court generally refuses to interfere with the discretion of the judge below on any point of pleading.<sup>7</sup>

\* 500 \* Where any party has amended without leave, the other may within eight days after the receipt of the amended pleading apply to the judge at chambers to disallow the same,<sup>8</sup> or for leave to plead further or amend his former pleading.<sup>9</sup> All amended pleadings must be marked with the date of the amending order (if any), and the day on which such amendment is made,<sup>10</sup> and delivered to the other side within the time allowed for amending.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cashin v. Cradock*, 3 Ch. D. 376; 25 W. R. 4; 35 L. T. 452; *Smith and others v. Richardson*, 4 C. P. D. 112; 48 L. J. C. P. 140; 27 W. R. 230; 40 L. T. 256.

<sup>2</sup> Order LIV. r. 4; *Gibbons v. London Financial Association*, 4 C. P. D. 263; 48 L. J. C. P. 514; 27 W. R. 619.

<sup>3</sup> Order LIV. r. 6a.

<sup>4</sup> *R. S. C.*, March, 1879, r. 8; *Runtz v. Sheffield (C. A.)*, 4 Ex. D. 150; 48 L. J. Ex. 385; 40 L. T. 539; *Stirling v. Du Barry (C. A.)*, 5 Q. B. D. 65; 28 W. R. 404.

<sup>5</sup> *Taylor v. Jones*, 1 C. P. D. 87; 45 L. J. C. P. 110; 34 L. T. 131; and see Order LVII. r. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Order LIII. r. 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Golding v. Wharton Saltworks Co.*, 1 Q. B. D. 374; 24 W. R. 423; 34 L. T. 474; *Byrd v. Nunn*, 7 Ch. D. 284; 47 L. J. Ch. 1; 26 W. R. 101; 37 L. T. 585; *Huggons v. Tweed*, 10 Ch. D. 359; 27 W. R. 495; 40 L. T. 284.

<sup>8</sup> Order XXVII. r. 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* r. 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* r. 9.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* r. 10.

### *Default in Pleading.*

The plaintiff must deliver his reply within three weeks after defence delivered.<sup>1</sup> All pleadings subsequent to reply, must be delivered within four days after delivery of the previous pleading.<sup>2</sup> If the plaintiff does not deliver his reply, or either party fails to deliver any subsequent pleading, within the period allowed, the pleadings will at its expiration be deemed closed, and the statements of fact in the pleading last delivered admitted.<sup>3</sup>

And, therefore, if it be the defendant that is in default, the plaintiff may at once give notice of trial under Order XXXVI. r. 3. If, however, it is the plaintiff that is in default, the defendant must wait for six weeks after expiration of the period allowed for pleading, and then either himself give notice of trial under Order XXXVI. r. 4, or apply to a master at chambers to dismiss the action for want of prosecution, under r. 4a, R. S. C. June, 1876, r. 13.<sup>4</sup>

### *Interrogatories.*

Interrogatories are now delivered almost as a matter of course in every action of libel or slander where there is any dispute as to the facts. Formerly leave was required to exhibit interrogatories, but now they are delivered as of right. They are generally administered by the party on whom will lie the main burden of proof at the trial, but often there are cross interrogatories.

The plaintiff cannot administer interrogatories without leave, before the statement of defence is delivered, in spite of the \* express \* 501 words of Order XXX. r. 1; for the defendant may admit in his pleading the very matters on which it is proposed to interrogate him.<sup>5</sup> So, too, the defendant as a rule cannot interrogate the plaintiff before delivering his statement of defence.<sup>6</sup> But between the date of delivery of the statement of defence and the close of the pleadings either party may deliver interrogatories without leave.

After the close of the pleadings, or before the delivery of the statement of defence, leave must be obtained to administer interrogatories, and good cause must be shown on affidavit for the application.<sup>7</sup> A plaintiff has been allowed to administer interrogatories before statement of claim in order to

<sup>1</sup> Order XXIV. r. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* r. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Order XXIX. r. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Litton v. Litton*, 3 Ch. D. 798; 24 W. R. 962.

<sup>5</sup> *Mercier v. Cotton*, 1 Q. B. D. 442; 46 L. J. Q. B. 184; 24 W. R. 566; 35 L. T. 79.

<sup>6</sup> *Disney v. Longbourne*, 2 Ch. D. 704; 45 L. J. Ch. 532; 24 W. R. 663; 35 L. T. 301.

<sup>7</sup> *Anon.*, 1 Charley, 100; Bitt. 4; 20 Sol. J. 32; 60 L. T. Notes, 32; *Hawley v. Reade*, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 64; Bitt. 130; 20 Sol. J. 298; 60 L. T. Notes, 268; *Ellis v. Ambler*, 25 W. R. 557; 36 L. T. 410.

ascertain the exact words of a libel or slander. So, too, leave has in a special case been obtained for the delivery of a second set of interrogatories, where the pleadings have been amended since the first set was delivered, and such amendments involved fresh facts. Leave is also necessary to administer interrogatories to a corporation when a party to an action; but it is almost always granted as a matter of course. The party interrogating is entitled to select any officer of the corporation or company to answer. Such officer need not and should not be made a party to the suit.<sup>1</sup> If there be no officer of the company capable of giving them the information required, then, but not else, the party interrogating is entitled to name some ordinary member of the company, who is acquainted with the facts, who shall answer the interrogatories; nor can such member refuse to file

his affidavit in answer until he has been paid his taxed costs of

\* 502 answering it.<sup>2</sup> \* Very often, however, the party interrogating leaves it to the company to select the person who shall answer the interrogatories, in which case the company must select some one conversant with the facts and capable of answering fully and freely.<sup>3</sup> If a corporation elects to answer by an officer who is also their solicitor in the action, they lose the privilege attaching to information acquired by the solicitor for the purposes of the action.<sup>4</sup> The propriety of the interrogatories proposed to be administered cannot be discussed at this stage.<sup>5</sup>

There is some art required in drawing interrogatories. It consists chiefly in looking rather at the answer you may reasonably expect to obtain than at the answer which you are instructed ought to be given to the question you are putting. The defendant's version of the matter must differ from the plaintiff's version, and the object of interrogatories is to discover precisely where and to what extent they differ. The question then should be framed so as, in the first place, to elicit if possible the answer you desire; and at the same time, failing that answer, to get, at all events, some definite statement sworn to, from which the party interrogated cannot afterwards

<sup>1</sup> C. L. P. Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), s. 51; *Cooke v. Oceanic Steam Co.*, Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 220; Bitt. 33; 20 Sol. J. 80; 60 L. T. Notes, 68; *Wilson v. Church*, 9 Ch. D. 552; 26 W. R. 735; 39 L. T. 413.

<sup>2</sup> *Berkeley v. Standard Discount Co. (C. A.)*, 13 Ch. D. 97; 49 L. J. Ch. 1; 28 W. R. 125; 41 L. T. 374, reversing the decision of Fry, J., below; 12 Ch. D. 295; 48 L. J. Ch. 797; 27 W. R. 852; 41 L. T. 29.

<sup>3</sup> *Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger*, 1 Ch. D. 171; 45 L. J. Ch. 145; 24 W. R. 151; 1 Charley, 111.

<sup>4</sup> *Mayor, &c., of Swansea v. Quirk*, 5 C. P. D. 106; 49 L. J. C. P. 157; 28 W. R. 371; 41 L. T. 758.

<sup>5</sup> *Berkeley v. Standard Discount Co. (Malins, V.C.)*, 9 Ch. D. 643; 26 W. R. 852; overruling the decision of Lush, J., at chambers in *Hewetson v. Whittington Life Insurance Soc.*, Weekly Notes for 1875, p. 219; 1 Charley, 101; Bitt. 27; 20 Sol. J. 79; 60 L. T. Notes, 67.



diverge. Care should be taken to leave him no loophole of escape. If he will not answer the question your way, still at least find out how far he is prepared to go in the opposite direction.

To secure this it is well to ask a long series of short questions, not one long question. Each additional detail should be put in a question by itself. Thus if you are instructed that the plaintiff gave evidence in the Bankruptcy Court, in the presence of a Mr. Henderson, that a certain cheque was in the handwriting of the defendant, it will be of little use to ask merely: "Did you not state on oath, in the Bankruptcy Court, in the presence of J. Henderson, that the said cheque was in the defendant's handwriting?" as the plaintiff will simply answer "No." \* Nor \* 503 will it avail to add to the above question the Chancery phrase, "Or, how otherwise?" The only way to discover precisely what it is the plaintiff denies is to split the question up into several — "Were you not examined as a witness in the Bankruptcy Court on the 15th of May, 1880, or some other and what day? Was not a cheque then and there produced to you? Did you not state that such cheque was in the handwriting of the defendant? If nay, in whose handwriting did you state the said cheque to be? Was not the said cheque the one mentioned in Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim, or some other, and what cheque? Did you not state so on oath? Did you not state so in the presence of one John Henderson?"

Interrogatories should be put so that the party interrogated can answer "Yes" and "No" to them.<sup>1</sup>

Great care is necessary in applying former decisions as to interrogatories to the present practice. Before the Judicature Act special leave was required to administer interrogatories, and the judge might in every case exercise his discretion as to allowing them. Now either party has a right to administer them, subject only to this — that if he exhibits interrogatories unreasonably, vexatiously, or at improper length, he may have to pay the costs of them.<sup>2</sup> Then between November 1st, 1875, and November 18th, 1878, the party interrogated was always allowed to apply at chambers to have objectionable interrogatories struck out; this now, as a rule, he may not do; he merely refuses to answer them in his affidavit in answer.<sup>3</sup>

In actions of slander the Courts formerly felt a great reluctance in allowing any interrogatories at all to be administered.<sup>4</sup> In fact, there is only one instance reported of such interrogatories being allowed before the Judicature Act, and in that case<sup>5</sup> the plaintiff had exhausted every other

<sup>1</sup> Per Archibald, J., in *Armitage v. Fitzwilliam* and others, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 56; Bitt. 126; 20 Sol. J. 281; 60 L. T. Notes, 251.

<sup>2</sup> Order XXXI. r. 2.

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 509.

<sup>4</sup> *Stern v. Sevastopulo*, 14 C. B. N. S. 737; 32 L. J. C. P. 268.

<sup>5</sup> *Atkinson v. Fosbrooke*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 628; 35 L. J. Q. B. 182; 12 Jur. N. S. 810; 14 W. R. 832; 14 L. T. 553.

channel of inquiry, and was unable to discover what were the exact words the defendant had uttered. \* But now no leave is required, and the plaintiff administers interrogatories as of right in slander as in any other action; and the defendant answers them without demur.

But with libel it is different; for libel is a crime. To ask, therefore, whether the defendant had any share in writing, printing, or composing the alleged libel, or was the editor of the newspaper at the date of publication, has a direct tendency to criminate the defendant, who may, therefore, refuse to answer such questions. But this alone does not satisfy him. To refuse to answer on the express ground that to answer might criminate him is tantamount to a confession of criminality; and the defendant's endeavor, therefore, has always been to prevent such a question being put to him. In oral examination it is well known that the witness cannot object to such questions being asked; he can only decline to answer; and to do that he must take his objection on oath, stating in open Court that in his opinion the answer would tend to criminate him.<sup>1</sup> But in the days when interrogatories were still a novelty, when leave to exhibit them was only granted as a favor, it was thought unfair to the defendant to permit a string of questions to be asked him which it was clear he was not bound to answer;<sup>2</sup> and it came to be the rule that, in the absence of very special circumstances,<sup>3</sup> questions which on the face of them tended to criminate could not be asked;<sup>4</sup> that questions not clearly criminatory might be asked, but the defendant might refuse to answer them, if he stated his objection on oath at the time of answering.<sup>5</sup>

\* 505 \* But, though this was the rule at Common Law, in Equity the practice was different. There the distinction between an obvious and a latent tendency to criminate was unknown, though there was a rule against allowing discovery in aid of an action for a mere personal tort.<sup>6</sup> All questions material to the issue might be asked, and the defendant was always

<sup>1</sup> *Boyle v. Wiseman*, 10 Ex. 647; 24 L. J. Ex. 160; 24 L. T. (Old S.) 274; 25 L. T. (Old S.) 203.

<sup>2</sup> *Tupling v. Ward*, 6 H. & N. 749; 30 L. J. Ex. 222; 7 Jur. N. S. 314; 9 W. R. 482; 4 L. T. 20; *Baker v. Lane*, 3 H. & C. 544; 34 L. J. Ex. 57; *Edmunds v. Greenwood*, L. R. 4 C. P. 70; 38 L. J. C. P. 115; 17 W. R. 142; 19 L. T. 423.

<sup>3</sup> *Inman v. Jenkins*, L. R. 5 C. P. 738; 39 L. J. C. P. 258; 18 W. R. 897; 22 L. T. 659; *Greenfield v. Reay*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 217; 44 L. J. Q. B. 81; 23 W. R. 732; 31 L. T. 756.

<sup>4</sup> *Villeboisnet v. Tobin and others*, L. R. 4 C. P. 184; 38 L. J. C. P. 146; 17 W. R. 322; 19 L. T. 693.

<sup>5</sup> *Osborne v. London Dock Co.*, 10 Exch. 698; 24 L. J. Ex. 140; *Chester v. Wortley*, 17 C. B. 410; 25 L. J. C. P. 117; *Bartlett v. Lewis*, 12 C. B. N. S. 249; 31 L. J. C. P. 230; *Bickford v. Darcy and Beachey*, L. R. 1 Ex. 354; 14 W. R. 900; 14 L. T. 629; *McFadzen v. Mayor and Corporation of Liverpool*, L. R. 3 Ex. 279; 16 W. R. 48.

<sup>6</sup> *Glynn v. Houston*, 1 Keen, 329.

compelled to answer them unless he took the objection on oath in his answer. And this is now the practice in all the divisions; for by sub-s. 11 of s. 25 of the Judicature Act, 1873, whenever there is a variance between the practice at Common Law and at Equity, the rules of Equity shall prevail.<sup>1</sup> In an earlier case,<sup>2</sup> the Queen's Bench Division, it is clear, desired and intended to follow the Chancery rule, but were misled as to what precisely was the practice in Equity.<sup>3</sup> It is now, therefore, clear that relevant interrogatories cannot be set aside merely because they tend to criminate; the party interrogated must take the objection on oath in his affidavit in answer.<sup>4</sup>

The fusion of Law and Equity appears also to have done away with another distinction as to what questions could be asked and what not. It was formerly a rule, well recognized at Common Law, that interrogatories must be confined to matters which relate to the case of the party administering them, and must not extend to matters which relate exclusively to the case of the opposite party; though questions might be asked as to any matter common to the case of both parties.<sup>5</sup> The rule was formerly precise: — "Put your own case to your opponent by means of interrogatories; but apply for particulars of his case." But in Chancery there \* was nothing corresponding to particulars.<sup>6</sup> There the only way \* 506 in which a party could ascertain what was the case he had to meet, was by means of interrogatories. And such information may still be so obtained.<sup>7</sup> And in *Gay v. Labouchere*,<sup>8</sup> Cockburn, C.J., asks, "Why should not the plaintiff have this information by means of interrogatories as well as by particulars?" and overrules the distinction that the answer to interrogatories is on oath, while particulars are not sworn to, and can be at any time amended. It seems, then, that the Common Law rule is now obsolete, and that instead of it must stand the Equity rule: that either party is entitled, by means of interrogatories, to ascertain the facts on which his opponent relies, but not the evidence by which he proposes to prove those facts.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Fisher v. Owen* (C. A.), 8 Ch. D. 645; 47 L. J. Ch. 477, 681; 26 W. R. 417, 581; 38 L. T. 252, 577; *Allhusen v. Labouchere* (C. A.), 3 Q. B. D. 654; 47 L. J. Ch. 819; 27 W. R. 12; 39 L. T. 207.

<sup>2</sup> *Atherley v. Harvey*, 2 Q. B. D. 524; 46 L. J. Q. B. 518; 25 W. R. 727; 36 L. T. 551.

<sup>3</sup> See the remarks of Cotton, L.J., in *Fisher v. Owen*, 8 Ch. D. 654.

<sup>4</sup> See also *Webb v. East* (C. A.), 5 Ex. D. 23, 108; 49 L. J. Ex. 250; 28 W. R. 229, 336; 41 L. T. 715.

<sup>5</sup> Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in *Carew v. Davies*, 5 E. & B. 709; 25 L. J. Q. B. 165; and per Cockburn, C.J., in *Moor v. Roberts*, 3 C. B. N. S. 671; 26 L. J. C. P. 246.

<sup>6</sup> *Augustinus v. Nerinckx* (C. A.), 16 Ch. D. 13; 43 L. T. 458.

<sup>7</sup> *Saunders v. Jones* (C. A.), 7 Ch. D. 435; 47 L. J. Ch. 440; 26 W. R. 226; 37 L. T. 395, 769. <sup>8</sup> 4 Q. B. D. 206; 48 L. J. Q. B. 279; 27 W. R. 412.

<sup>9</sup> *Ashley v. Taylor*, 37 L. T. 522; (C. A.) 38 L. T. 44; *Commissioners of Sewers v. Glasse*, L. R. 15 Eq. 302; 42 L. J. Ch. 345; 21 W. R. 520; 28 L. T. 433, as explained in *Saunders v. Jones*, *supra*.

Thus you are not entitled to see your adversary's brief, or to ask him to name the witnesses he means to call at the trial. You may not ask in whose presence such and such events occurred; but you are entitled to know precisely what is the charge made against you, and what are the facts upon which your opponent intends to rely.<sup>1</sup>

One instance which came within the above-mentioned Common Law rule deserves special notice. The defendant could formerly, as now, apply for particulars of the special damage alleged in the declaration; therefore, it was held he might not interrogate as to it. It was entirely the plaintiff's

case.<sup>2</sup> But even before the Judicature Act this strictness was \* 507 abated, and a defendant was allowed to interrogate as to \* special damage, when his object was to ascertain how much would be a reasonable sum to pay into Court.<sup>3</sup> And now there would appear to be no objection to a defendant's applying first for particulars and then interrogating the plaintiff as to those particulars.

In an action for libel, *Davis v. Gray*,<sup>4</sup> interrogatories were disallowed, the object of which was to establish special malice so as to meet the defence of privilege, should it be set up. But the reason for this decision is not clearly stated in the report. Even then there was no objection to a plaintiff interrogating as to matter of reply: certainly there is none now.

The following, therefore, are, with some diffidence, suggested as the rules which now in a Common Law action determine what interrogatories may be administered and what not.

1. Interrogatories must be relevant to the matter in issue. Not every question which could be asked a witness in the box may be put as an interrogatory.<sup>5</sup> Thus, questions to credit only will not be allowed, although, of course, they may be asked the party in cross-examination.<sup>6</sup> Again, no question need be answered which is not put *bond fide* for the purposes of the present action. Thus, the publisher of a newspaper must answer the interrogatory: "Was not the passage set out in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim intended to apply to the plaintiff?" but he need not answer the further question, "If not, say to whom?" as, if the passage did

<sup>1</sup> *Eade and another v. Jacobs* (C. A.), 3 Ex. D. 335; 47 L. J. Ex. 74; 26 W. R. 159; 37 L. T. 621; *Johns v. James*, 13 Ch. D. 370; *Lyon v. Tweddell*, *ib.* 375.

<sup>2</sup> *Peppiatt and wife v. Smith*, 33 L. J. Ex. 239; *Jourdain v. Palmer*, L. R. 1 Ex. 102; 35 L. J. Ex. 69; 12 Jur. N. S. 214; 14 W. R. 283; 13 L. T. 600; overruling *Wood v. Jones*, 1 F. & F. 301, where *Williams, J.*, refused particulars, but allowed interrogatories as to the names of the persons to whom a slander was uttered.

<sup>3</sup> *Horne v. Hough and others*, L. R. 9 C. P. 135; 43 L. J. C. P. 70; 22 W. R. 412; *Wright v. Goodlake*, 34 L. J. Ex. 82. 4 30 L. T. 418.

<sup>5</sup> Per *Martin, B.*, in *Peppiatt and wife v. Smith*, 33 L. J. Ex. 240.

<sup>6</sup> *Baker v. Newton*, *Weekly Notes*, 1876, p. 8; 1 *Charley*, 107; *Bitt.* 80; 20 *Sol. J.* 177; 60 *L. T. Notes*, 157; *Allhusen v. Labouchere* (C. A.), 3 *Q. B. D.* 654; 47 *L. J. Ch.* 819; 27 *W. R.* 12; 39 *L. T.* 207.

not apply to the plaintiff, it is immaterial to whom it referred, so far as the plaintiff's action is concerned.<sup>1</sup>

\* 2. Next, as we have seen above, the party interrogating may \* 508 deal with his own case, or with matters common to the case of both parties, in full detail. But he is entitled to obtain an outline only of matters exclusively relating to the case of the party interrogated, and not the evidence which the party interrogated means to give at the trial in support of his allegations.

3. The questions asked must not be "fishing;" that is, they must refer to some definite and existing state of circumstances, not be put merely in the hopes of discovering something which may help the party interrogating to make out *some* case. They must be confined to matters which there is good ground for believing to have occurred. "Fishing" interrogatories are especially objectionable when their object is to get at something which may support a plea of justification.<sup>2</sup>

4. In the Common Law divisions, at all events, interrogatories are not allowed as to the contents of written documents, unless it is admitted that such documents have been lost or destroyed.<sup>3</sup> Nor will interrogatories be allowed, the object of which is to contradict a written document.<sup>4</sup> The old question as to documents which formerly concluded every set of interrogatories is no longer allowed.<sup>5</sup> Its place is taken by a summons for discovery of documents.<sup>6</sup>

If, however, the party from whom discovery is sought does not in his affidavit of documents disclose a document which there is good reason for believing was once, at all events, in his possession, then interrogatories may be administered asking him whether he did not receive a particular document from a certain person on a given day; whether it is not now in his possession or control; if nay, when did he part with it, and to

<sup>1</sup> *Wilton v. Brignell*, Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 239; 1 Charley, 105; Bitt. 56; 20 Sol. J. 121; 60 L. T. Notes, 104. For further instances of interrogatories held irrelevant, see *Sivier v. Harris*, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 22; Bitt. 98; 20 Sol. J. 240; 60 L. T. Notes, 213; Phillips and another v. Barron and another, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 54; Bitt. 119; 20 Sol. J. 280; 60 L. T. Notes, 249; Mansfield v. Childerhouse, 4 Ch. D. 82; 46 L. J. Ch. 30; 25 W. R. 68; 35 L. T. 590; Sheward v. Earl of Lonsdale, 5 C. P. D. 47; 28 W. R. 324; 42 L. T. 54; Bolekow v. Young, 42 L. T. 690.

<sup>2</sup> *Gourley v. Plimsoll*, L. R. 8 C. P. 362; 42 L. J. C. P. 121; 21 W. R. 683; 28 L. T. 598; Buchanan v. Taylor, Weekly Notes for 1876, p. 73; Bitt. 131; 20 Sol. J. 298; 60 L. T. Notes, 268.

<sup>3</sup> *Fitzgibbon v. Greer*, Ir. R. 9 C. L. 294.

<sup>4</sup> *Moor v. Roberts*, 3 C. B. N. S. 671; 26 L. J. C. P. 246.

<sup>5</sup> *Pitten v. Chatterburg*, Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 248; 1 Charley, 106; Bitt. 62; 20 Sol. J. 139; 60 L. T. Notes, 122.

<sup>6</sup> See *post*, p. 515.

\* 509 whom? Was it ever in his possession or control?<sup>1</sup> \* And the interrogatory might continue: "If you state that such document is lost or destroyed, set out the contents of the same to the best of your recollection and belief."<sup>2</sup>

5. Questions which tend to criminate may certainly be asked, unless they are either irrelevant or "fishing" though the party interrogated is not bound to answer them.<sup>3</sup> That the interrogatories will tend to criminate others is no objection, if they be put *bonâ fide* for the purposes of the present action.<sup>4</sup> That to answer them would expose the party interrogated, or third persons, to civil actions was never an objection.<sup>5</sup>

### *Striking-out Interrogatories.*

By the Rules of November, 1878, the original Rules 5 and 8 of Ord. XXXI. are repealed, and the following rule substituted:—

5. "Any objection to answering any one or more of several interrogatories on the ground that it or they is or are scandalous or irrelevant, or not *bonâ fide* for the purpose of the action, or that the matters inquired into are not sufficiently material at that stage of the action, or on any other ground, may be taken in the affidavit in answer.

"An application to set aside the interrogatories on the ground that they have been exhibited unreasonably or vexatiously, or to strike out any interrogatory or interrogatories on the ground that it or they is or are scandalous, may be made at chambers within four days after service of the interrogatories."

This rule came into operation on November 18th, 1878.

It will be observed that the words of the first clause are "*may be*" only, but the judicial interpretation of the rule, founded no doubt on practical convenience, is that such objections *must* be taken in the affidavit in answer and not otherwise; and that it is only in cases within the second clause of

the rule, that an application may be made to strike out the inter-  
\* 510 rogatories.<sup>6</sup> \* The present practice, therefore, is to dismiss every summons to strike out interrogatories, unless they are, as a whole, "unreasonably or vexatiously exhibited," or unless any one or more of them is or are "scandalous." All objections to particular interrog-

<sup>1</sup> Lethbridge v. Cronk, 44 L. J. C. P. 381; Jones v. Monte Video Gas Co. (C. A.), 5 Q. B. D. 556; 49 L. J. Q. B. 627; 28 W. R. 758; 42 L. T. 639.

<sup>2</sup> And see Stein v. Tabor, 31 L. T. 444.

<sup>3</sup> Per Thesiger, L.J., in Fisher v. Owen, 8 Ch. D. 655.

<sup>4</sup> M'Corquodale v. Bell and another, W. N. 1876, p. 39; Bitt. 111; 20 Sol. J. 260; 60 L. T. Notes, 232.

<sup>5</sup> Tetley v. Easton, 25 L. J. C. P. 293.

<sup>6</sup> Gay v. Labouchere, 4 Q. B. D. 206; 48 L. J. Q. B. 279; 27 W. R. 413.

atories, or portions of interrogatories, on the ground that they are irrelevant, or "fishing," &c., must be taken in the affidavit in answer, and is no ground for any application to set the interrogatories aside. And both the phrases "unreasonable or vexatious" and "scandalous" have special meanings. Masters at chambers, following the *dictum* of Pollock, B., in *Gay v. Labouchere*,<sup>1</sup> construe "unreasonable or vexatious" as referring to the time or stage in the cause at which they are exhibited; in short, that they are "premature,"<sup>2</sup> or that leave has not been obtained to administer them when leave is requisite.<sup>3</sup> The mere fact that it would involve great expense and trouble to answer the interrogatories, was never considered in itself a sufficient reason for disallowing them.<sup>4</sup>

A "scandalous" interrogatory may be defined as an insulting or degrading question, which is irrelevant or impertinent to the matters in issue. It was a well-known term in Chancery, and is adopted by the framers of the Rules. "It is the doctrine in Chancery that nothing is scandalous that is strictly relevant to the merits."<sup>5</sup> "Certainly nothing can be scandalous which is relevant."<sup>6</sup> Questions which tend to criminate are not scandalous, unless they are either irrelevant or "fishing,"<sup>7</sup> and will not, therefore, be struck out; the party interrogated must take the objection on oath in his answer.

And even where the party might have applied to have the \* in- \* 511 terrogatory struck out, he may still take the same objection in his answer.<sup>8</sup> Applications to strike out particular interrogatories will, therefore, in future be rare. But whenever there is a good objection to the whole set of interrogatories, the proper course is to take out a summons to strike them out: *e.g.*, on the ground that they have been administered to a corporation without leave.<sup>9</sup> The party applying to strike out interrogatories

<sup>1</sup> 4 Q. B. D. 207.

<sup>2</sup> See *Mercier v. Cotton*, 1 Q. B. D. 442; 46 L. J. Q. B. 184; 24 W. R. 566; 35 L. T. 79.

<sup>3</sup> For instances in which searching interrogatories were considered in Chancery *not* to be "unreasonable or vexatious" prior to the publication of this order, see *Reade v. Woodroffe*, 24 Beav. 421; *Elmer v. Creasy*, L. R. 9 Ch. 69; *Saull v. Browne*, *ib.* 364; *West of England and South Wales Bank v. Nicholls*, 6 Ch. D. 613.

<sup>4</sup> *Macintosh v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, 22 L. J. Ch. 72; *Hall v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.*, 35 L. T. 848.

<sup>5</sup> *Sidney Smith's Chancery Practice*, 878; 25 L. J. C. P. 197.

<sup>6</sup> Per Cotton, L.J., in *Fisher v. Owen*, 8 Ch. D. 653.

<sup>7</sup> *Allhusen v. Labouchere*, 3 Q. B. D. 654; 47 L. J. Ch. 819; 27 W. R. 12; 39 L. T. 207.

<sup>8</sup> *Fisher v. Owen*, 8 Ch. D. 645; 47 L. J. Ch. 477; 26 W. R. 417, 581; 38 L. T. 252, 577.

<sup>9</sup> *Carter v. Leeds Daily News Co.*, *Weekly Notes* 1876, p. 11; 1 *Charley*, 101; *Bitt.* 91; 20 *Sol. J.*, 218; 60 *L. T. Notes*, 196.

must, unless they are altogether an abuse of the practice of the Court, specify those to which he objects.<sup>1</sup>

*Answers to Interrogatories.*

An affidavit in answer to interrogatories must be filed within ten days after their delivery, unless a master or district registrar allow further time. The answer is now very frequently drawn by counsel. It must be written or printed bookwise, and filed at the Central Office, with a note appended, showing on whose behalf it is filed.<sup>2</sup>

Any party may use, in evidence at the trial, any one or more of the answers of the opposite party without putting in the whole, but the judge may direct any others to be put in.<sup>3</sup>

The affidavit in answer to interrogatories, like all other affidavits, should be made in the first person, and should state the description and true place of abode of the deponent. It should be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively. One paragraph should be devoted to each interrogatory, dealing with it specifically. It is quite admissible to answer "Yes" or "No" simply, only the deponent should carefully define how much he is thus admitting or denying. So, too, it is quite admissible to say "I do not know," where the matter is clearly not within the deponent's own knowledge. The deponent is not bound to procure information for the purpose of answering.<sup>4</sup> But if the deponent has received any information on the point from others, he should state it with the prefix "I am informed and believe," and not aver it as a fact.<sup>5</sup> If the affidavit exceed ten folios, it must be printed.<sup>6</sup>

Any objection to answering any interrogatory on the ground that it is scandalous or irrelevant, or not *bonâ fide* for the purpose of the action, or that the matters inquired into are not sufficiently material at that stage of the action, or on any other ground *ejusdem generis*, must be taken in the affidavit in answer.<sup>7</sup>

Any other objection which might be ground for striking out the interrogatory may also be taken in the affidavit in answer. The party, by not applying at chambers, in no way waives the objection. The doubt raised

<sup>1</sup> *Allhusen v. Labouchere* (C. A.), *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> See Order XXXVII. rr. 3 a, b, c, d, e, f, g; R. S. C., April, 1880, rr. 12-18.

<sup>3</sup> Order XXXI. r. 23.

<sup>4</sup> *Per Brett, J.*, in *Phillips v. Routh*, L. R. 7 C. P. 287.

<sup>5</sup> *The Minnehaha*, L. R. 3 A. & E. 148; 19 W. R. 304; 23 L. T. 747. As to a corporation, see *ante*, p. 501.

<sup>6</sup> Order XXXI. r. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Order XXXI. r. 5, R. S. C. Nov. 1878; *Gay v. Labouchere*, 4 Q. B. D. 206; 48 L. J. Q. B. 279; 27 W. R. 413.



as to this point by Baggallay, L.J., in *Saunders v. Jones*,<sup>1</sup> is now definitely overruled by *Fisher v. Owen*.<sup>2</sup>

Such objections are usually taken in the following form :—

1. "I object to answer the 9th and 10th interrogatories on the ground that they are irrelevant and are not put *bonâ fide* for the purposes of this action."

Or the party interrogated may pass over the question altogether, where it is clearly irrelevant.<sup>3</sup> It is not wise, however, to treat the whole of an interrogatory thus with silent contempt; but there are often little side questions not going to the main purpose of the interrogatory which may be thus passed over if irrelevant.

2. "I object to name my witnesses." "I object to state the evidence by which I intend to establish the facts set out in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 of my Statement of Defence."

3. "I object to answer the 5th interrogatory on the ground that it is a *fishy* interrogatory, put for the purpose of making out some case under the defendant's plea of justification."

4. "I object to state the contents of a written document;" or, "The said document when produced will be the best evidence of its own contents."

\* This being an objection of law, it is not essential to expressly state it.<sup>4</sup> \* 513

5. "In answer to the 5th interrogatory, I say that the said interrogatory, if answered, would tend to criminate me, wherefore I respectfully decline to answer the same;" or, "wherefore I humbly submit that I am not bound to make any further or other answer to the same."

This answer (except in one case) is conclusive; and it is idle for the party interrogating to argue that he does not see how the question can possibly criminate the deponent, if the deponent swears positively it will. But by statute an exception has been created. Section 19 of the 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, was re-enacted by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, sched. 2, while other sections were repealed by sched. 1. It therefore remains in force, although subsequently the whole original Act was repealed by the 33 & 34 Vict. c. 99. It runs as follows: "If any person shall file any bill in any Court for the discovery of the name of any person concerned as printer, publisher, or proprietor of any newspaper, or of any matters relative to the printing or publishing of any newspaper, in order the more effectually to bring or carry on any suit or action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of any slanderous or libellous matter contained in any such

<sup>1</sup> 7 Ch. D. 435; 47 L. J. Ch. 440; 26 W. R. 226; 37 L. T. 395, 769.

<sup>2</sup> 8 Ch. D. 645; 47 L. J. Ch. 477, 681; 26 W. R. 417, 581; 38 L. T. 252, 577.

<sup>3</sup> *Church v. Perry*, 36 L. T. 513.

<sup>4</sup> *Smith v. Berg*, 25 W. R. 606; 36 L. T. 471.

newspaper respecting such person, it shall not be lawful for the defendant to plead or demur to such bill, but such defendant shall be compellable to make the discovery required; provided always, that such discovery shall not be made use of as evidence or otherwise in any proceeding against the defendant, save only in that proceeding for which the discovery is made." But before the Judicature Act it was held that this section was confined to a bill for discovery in equity, and was not incorporated by the C. L. P. Act, 1854, so as to apply to interrogatories at Common Law. It followed that if the defendant answered such interrogatories, his answers could have been used against him in a criminal proceeding. The Court therefore refused to order the defendant to give the required information, he having objected on oath to answer the interrogatories, and this, although by going into Equity the plaintiff could have compelled the defendant to answer.<sup>1</sup>

\* 514 \* Hence a plaintiff was compelled to file a bill for discovery in

Equity to obtain this information, a cumbrous and expensive proceeding. There is only one instance reported in which a plaintiff availed himself of the privilege.<sup>2</sup> But directly the Judicature Act came into operation, every division of the High Court of Justice was empowered to grant all equitable remedies, and to exercise all powers formerly possessed by the Court of Chancery.<sup>3</sup> The principal object of the fusion of law and equity was to avoid all circuitry and multiplicity of legal proceedings. Hence as early as November 7th, 1875, Lush, J., in *Ramsden v. Brearley*,<sup>4</sup> decided that the following interrogatory was allowable, and could not be struck out:—"Were you, on the 22nd of November, 1874, the printer or publisher, or both, of the *Standard* newspaper?" And his lordship decided that the protection accorded by the concluding proviso of the s. 19 of 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 76, would attach to the defendant's answers, which therefore cannot be used against the defendant in any other proceeding. To answer such an interrogatory cannot therefore tend to criminate the defendant. This decision was followed by Archibald, J., in *Carter v. Leeds Daily News Co.*, and Jackson.<sup>5</sup>

So, too, in *Lefroy v. Burnside*,<sup>6</sup> the defendant in an action for libel, the alleged proprietor of a newspaper, was served with interrogatories by the plaintiff inquiring, *inter alia*, whether he was not such proprietor. This interrogatory the defendant in his answer declined to answer, on the ground

<sup>1</sup> *Bowden v. Allen*, 39 L. J. C. P. 217; 18 W. R. 695; 22 L. T. 342.

<sup>2</sup> *Dixon v. Enoch*, L. R. 13 Eq. 394; 41 L. J. Ch. 231; 20 W. R. 359; 26 L. T. 127.

<sup>3</sup> Ss. 16, 24.

<sup>4</sup> 33 L. T. 322; Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 199; 1 Charley, 96; Bitt. Addenda; 20 Sol. J. 30.

<sup>5</sup> Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 11; 1 Charley, 101; Bitt. 91; 20 Sol. J. 218; 60 L. T. Notes, 196, *post*, p. 620.

<sup>6</sup> 4 L. R. (Ir.) 340; 41 L. T. 199; 14 Cox, C. C. 260.

that it might tend to criminate him in certain criminal proceedings which had been commenced against him by the same plaintiff, and were then actually pending. On summons by the plaintiff to compel further answer to this interrogatory, the Exchequer Division in Ireland held that it must be answered; inasmuch as s. 19 of the 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, was still in force, and was by sect. 24, subs. 7, of the Judicature Act, 1873, made enforceable by interrogatories in an action in a Common Law Division.<sup>1</sup>

\* But it must be remembered that s. 19 of 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, \* 515 applies only to the "printer, publisher, or proprietor" of a newspaper. A defendant may therefore object on the ground of criminality to answer any interrogatory asking whether he is the editor of the paper,<sup>2</sup> or whether he is the author of the alleged libel.<sup>3</sup>

### *Further and Better Answers.*

If the answers are insufficient or evasive, a summons should be taken out calling on the deponent to show cause why he should not within two days make and file a further and better affidavit in answer. The summons should specify the interrogatories or parts of interrogatories to which a better answer is required.<sup>4</sup> And it should be taken out promptly, within a reasonable time after the answers are delivered.<sup>5</sup> The summons may ask in the alternative that the deponent be examined *vivâ voce* before a Master.<sup>6</sup> Should the deponent have taken the objection that he is asked as to the contents of a written document, the party interrogating may set out on affidavit facts showing a strong probability that the document has been lost or destroyed; and then on the hearing of a summons for better answers, the judge may order the deponent to state his recollection of its contents, on his opponent undertaking not to use such answer at the trial until the judge shall be satisfied that it was in fact lost or destroyed.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, p. 619.

<sup>2</sup> *Carter v. Leeds Daily News & Jackson*, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> *Wilton v. Brignell*, Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 239; 1 Charley, 105; Bitt. 56; 20 Sol. J. 121; 60 L. T. Notes, 104. And see *M'Loughlin v. Dwyer* (1), Ir. R. 9 C. L. 170.

<sup>4</sup> *Church v. Perry*, 36 L. T. 513; *Chesterfield Colliery Co. v. Black*, 24 W. R. 783; Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 204; *Anstey v. N. & S. Woolwich Subway Co.*, 11 Ch. D. 439; 48 L. J. Ch. 776; 27 W. R. 575; 40 L. T. 393.

<sup>5</sup> *Lloyd v. Morley*, 5 L. R. (Ir.) 74.

<sup>6</sup> Order XXXI. r. 10.

<sup>7</sup> *Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawksford*, 5 C. B. N. S. 703; 23 L. J. C. P. 198.

*Discovery of Documents.*

Either party may, under Order XXXI. r. 12, without filing any  
 \* 516 affidavit, or naming any particular document,<sup>1</sup> \* apply by summons to a Master at Chambers for an order directing any other party to the action to make discovery on oath of the documents which are or have been in his possession or power, relating to any matter in question in the action, or stating what he knows as to the custody they or any of them are in.

A Master at Chambers may at any time during the pendency of any action or proceeding, order the production by any party thereto on oath of such of the documents in his possession or power relating to any matter in question in such action or proceeding, as the master shall think right; and may deal with such documents when produced in such manner as shall appear just.<sup>2</sup> Except under special circumstances, which must be set out on affidavit if they exist,<sup>3</sup> the plaintiff cannot have discovery until he has delivered his claim.<sup>4</sup> Nor can the defendant until he has delivered his statement of defence.<sup>5</sup>

The Courts of Common Law used formerly, when discovery was only granted as a favor, to refuse to assist a defendant to obtain evidence in support of a plea of justification, on the ground that he should not have published the charge till he was in a position to prove its truth. Thus where a shareholder in a joint-stock company published and justified a libel imputing insolvency to the company, he was held to be not entitled to inspect the books of the company.<sup>6</sup> But in equity it appears that a defendant, in an action of libel was allowed precisely the same discovery as a defendant in any other suit, and that although he had pleaded a justification.<sup>7</sup> And now the Chancery rules govern discovery in all Divi-  
 \* 517 sions.<sup>8</sup> \* But it may still be questioned whether such discovery should be allowed till after full particulars of such justification have

<sup>1</sup> Bitt. 44.<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* r. 11.<sup>3</sup> *Union Bank of London v. Manby*, 13 Ch. D. 239; 49 L. J. Ch. 106; 28 W. R. 23; 41 L. T. 393.<sup>4</sup> *Cashin v. Cradock*, 2 Ch. D. 140; 25 W. R. 4; 34 L. T. 52; *Davis v. Williams*, 13 Ch. D. 550; 28 W. R. 223.<sup>5</sup> *Hancock v. Guerin*, 4 Ex. D. 3; 27 W. R. 112; *Egremont Burial Board v. Egremont Iron Ore Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 158; 49 L. J. Ch. 623; 28 W. R. 594; 42 L. T. 179; *Webster v. Whewall*, 15 Ch. D. 120; 49 L. J. Ch. 704; 28 W. R. 951; 42 L. T. 868.<sup>6</sup> *Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins*, 4 H. & N. 87, 146; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281.<sup>7</sup> Per Sir John Leach, V.C., in *Thorp v. Macaulay*, 5 Madd. 230; and see *Hare on Discovery*, p. 116.<sup>8</sup> *Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia (C. A.)*, 2 Ch. D. 644; 45 L. J. Ch. 449; 24 W. R. 724; 35 L. T. 76.

been delivered. A plaintiff was always allowed discovery and inspection of all documents in the possession of the defendant which would help him to rebut the justification.<sup>1</sup>

The party against whom the order for discovery is made must make an affidavit, describing all the documents material to the matters in dispute, which are, *or have been*, in his possession, with sufficient particularity to identify them.<sup>2</sup> He must also specify which, if any, he objects to produce,<sup>3</sup> and on what grounds he so objects.<sup>4</sup> "Everything which will throw light on the case is *primâ facie* subject to inspection."<sup>5</sup> Every material document must be produced, unless the party objecting to produce it can show it to be privileged: the party seeking discovery has a right to its production; the matter is not in the discretion of the Master or Judge.<sup>6</sup> What documents are privileged from production will be decided by the rules formerly prevailing in the Court of Chancery.<sup>7</sup> There are four possible grounds on which production may be refused:

(1.) That the documents required to be produced relate solely to the party's own title to real property.<sup>8</sup>

(2.) That the documents were prepared with a view to the present action, and were called into existence solely for the purposes of the party's own case. Thus counsel's opinion, all \* briefs, draft plead- \* 518 ings, &c., are privileged, but not counsel's indorsement on the outside of his brief.<sup>9</sup> So are all papers prepared by any agent of the party for the use of his solicitor for the purposes of the action, provided such action be then commenced, or at least imminent.<sup>10</sup> But discovery

<sup>1</sup> Collins v. Yates and another, 27 L. J. Ex. 150.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Charley, 109.

<sup>3</sup> Order XXXI. r. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Gardner v. Irwin, 4 Ex. D. 49; 48 L. J. Ex. 223; 27 W. R. 442; 40 L. T. 357.

<sup>5</sup> Per Blackburn, J., in Hutchinson v. Glover, 1 Q. B. D. 141; 45 L. J. Q. B. 120; 24 W. R. 185; 33 L. T. 605, 834.

<sup>6</sup> Bustros v. White (C.A.), 1 Q. B. D. 423; 45 L. J. Q. B. 642; 24 W. R. 721; 34 L. T. 835.

<sup>7</sup> Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, subs. 11; Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, (C. A.) 2 Ch. D. 644; 45 L. J. Ch. 449; 24 W. R. 624; 35 L. T. 76.

<sup>8</sup> As to this, see Lake and another v. Pooley, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 54; Bitt. 121; 20 Sol. J. 280; 60 L. T. Notes, 250; New British Co. v. Peed, Weekly Notes, 1878, p. 52; 26 W. R. 354; Fortescue v. Fortescue, 24 W. R. 945; 34 L. T. 847; Egremont Burial Board v. Egremont Iron Ore Co., 14 Ch. D. 158; 49 L. J. Ch. 623; 28 W. R. 594; 42 L. T. 179.

<sup>9</sup> Walsham v. Stainton, 2 H. & M. 1; 12 W. R. 199; Nicholl v. Jones, 2 H. & M. 588; 13 W. R. 451.

<sup>10</sup> M'Corquodale and another v. Bell and another, 1 C. P. D. 471; 45 L. J. C. P. 329; 24 W. R. 399; 35 L. T. 261; English v. Tottie, 1 Q. B. D. 141; 45 L. J. Q. B. 138; 24 W. R. 393; 33 L. T. 724; Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co. v. Quick, 3 Q. B. D. 315; 47 L. J. Q. B. 258; 26 W. R. 328, 341; 38 L. T. 28; The Theodor Körner, 3 P. D. 162; 47 L. J. P. & M. 85; 38 L. T. 818; Martin v. Butchard, 36 L.

may be had of proceedings in a former suit relating to the same subject-matter.<sup>1</sup> No privilege can be claimed for private letters written to the party by a stranger to the suit, even though they are expressed to be written in confidence, and the writer forbids their production.<sup>2</sup> That letters are privileged in the special sense in which that term is used in actions of defamation (*i.e.*, that the occasion on which they were written renders them not actionable unless the plaintiff can prove express malice) is no ground for refusing to produce them: they are not privileged from inspection.<sup>3</sup>

(3.) The third ground of privilege is that the documents, if produced, would tend to criminate the party producing them. But this objection (as in the case of interrogatories) can only be taken by the party himself and on oath. Thus, in an action to recover damages for a libel, alleged by the plaintiff to be contained in two letters written by the defendant to Lord Rosslyn, the plaintiff administered interrogatories to the defendant, who in his answer admitted that he had written two letters

\* 519 to Lord \* Rosslyn on specified dates, and that copies of such letters were in his possession. On a summons before the Master for inspection of these copies, an objection was raised by the defendant that such inspection might expose him to criminal proceedings for libel. The Master thereupon refused to order inspection, but Kelly, C. B., and Stephen, J., subsequently reversed the decision of the Master, and granted an order to inspect. The decision of the Exchequer Division was affirmed in the Court of Appeal, where it was held that if the defendant could protect himself from production at all, it could only be by his oath that the production would expose him to criminal proceedings.<sup>4</sup>

This decision overrules *Hill v. Campbell*;<sup>5</sup> a case which was indeed already practically overruled by *Fisher v. Owen*.<sup>6</sup>

(4.) The fourth excuse is on the ground of public policy and convenience. This can only arise where one party to the suit is officially in possession of State documents of importance. If the defendant be a subordinate officer of a public department sued in his official capacity, he cannot claim privilege on the ground of public policy; production can only be refused on

T. 732; *Friend v. London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Co.*, (C. A.) 2 Ex. D. 437; 46 L. J. Ex. 696; 25 W. R. 735; 36 L. T. 739.

<sup>1</sup> *Richards v. Morgan*, 4 B. & S. 641; 33 L. J. Q. B. 114; 12 W. R. 162; 9 L. T. 662; *Hutchinson v. Glover*, 1 Q. B. D. 138; 45 L. J. Q. B. 120; 24 W. R. 185; 33 L. T. 605.

<sup>2</sup> *Hopkinson v. Lord Burghley*, L. R. 2 Ch. 447; 36 L. J. Ch. 504; 15 W. R. 543; *Slade v. Tucker*, 14 Ch. D. 824; 49 L. J. Ch. 644; 28 W. R. 807; 43 L. T. 49.

<sup>3</sup> *Webb v. East*, (C. A.) 5 Ex. D. 23, 108; 49 L. J. Ex. 250; 28 W. R. 229, 336; 41 L. T. 715.

<sup>4</sup> *Webb v. East*, *supra*.

<sup>5</sup> L. R. 10 C. P. 222; 44 L. J. C. P. 97; 23 W. R. 336; 32 L. T. 59.

<sup>6</sup> (C. A.) 8 Ch. D. 645; 47 L. J. Ch. 681; 26 W. R. 581; 38 L. T. 252, 577.

that ground by the head of a department.<sup>1</sup> But if it be shown to the Court that the mind of some responsible person has been brought to bear upon the question, the objection will be upheld.<sup>2</sup>

*Further and Better Affidavit.*

An affidavit of documents which omitted the words "and never have had" would be deemed an insufficient compliance with the order, and a further and better affidavit will be ordered.<sup>3</sup> So if the affidavit does not state what the defendant had done with the documents which he admits were formerly in his possession.<sup>4</sup> But if an affidavit of documents be drawn up in proper form, it is as a rule conclusive.

\* No affidavit in reply thereto will be permitted. Applications \* 520 for a further and better affidavit are discouraged. Still, if it appears from the affidavit of documents itself, or from any admission on the pleadings of the party making it, or from the documents mentioned therein, that it is insufficient, a further affidavit will be ordered.<sup>5</sup> Otherwise if discovery be wrongfully withheld, the party seeking discovery must administer interrogatories.<sup>6</sup>

*Inspection of Documents.*

Every party to an action or other proceeding may, at or before the hearing, give notice in writing to any other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any document, to produce such document for inspection. Such notice should be in Form No. 10, Jud. Act, 1875, App. B. Any party not complying with such notice shall not afterwards put such document in evidence on his behalf in such action, unless he satisfy the Court that it relates only to his own title, he being a defendant, or that he had some sufficient cause for not complying with such notice.<sup>7</sup>

The party to whom such notice is given must, within two days from the receipt thereof, if all the documents therein referred to have been set forth by him in his affidavit of documents, or within four days, if any of the documents referred to in such notice have not been set forth by him in

<sup>1</sup> *Beatson v. Skene*, 5 H. & N. 838; 29 L. J. Ex. 430; 6 Jur. N. S. 780; 2 L. T. 378, *post*, p. 535.

<sup>2</sup> *Kain v. Farrer*, 37 L. T. 469; W. N. 1877, p. 266.

<sup>3</sup> *Wagstaffe v. Anderson and others*, 39 L. T. 332.

<sup>4</sup> *Per Lush, J.*, 1 Charley, 109; Bitt. 24; 60 L. T. Notes, 66.

<sup>5</sup> *Welsh Steam Colliery Co. v. Gaskell*, 36 L. T. 352; *Johnson v. Smith*, 25 W. R. 539; 36 L. T. 741; *Appleby v. Waring*, 15 L. J. Notes of Cases (1880), p. 125.

<sup>6</sup> *Jones v. Monte Video Gas Co., (C. A.)* 5 Q. B. D. 556; 49 L. J. Q. B. 627; 28 W. R. 758; 42 L. T. 639.

<sup>7</sup> Order XXXI. r. 14. As to which, see *Webster v. Whewall*, 15 Ch. D. 120; 49 L. J. Ch. 704; 28 W. R. 951; 42 L. T. 868.

such affidavit, give notice to the party desiring inspection, stating a time within three days from delivery thereof at which the documents, or such of them as he does not object to produce, may be inspected at the office of his solicitor, and stating which (if any) of the documents he objects to produce, and on what ground.<sup>1</sup> Such counter-notice should be in Form 11, Jud. Act, 1875, App. B. If he omit to give notice of time for inspection, or object to give inspection, the party desiring it may apply to

\* 521 a Master for an order to inspect documents which it \* will be sufficient for him to serve on the solicitor of the objecting party.<sup>2</sup> If, however, the documents desired to be inspected have not been disclosed or referred to in the affidavits or pleadings of the party against whom the application is made, such application must be founded upon an affidavit showing of what documents inspection is sought, that the party applying is entitled to inspect them, and his belief that they are in the possession or power of the other party.<sup>3</sup>

But the application generally made at this stage is for inspection of those documents which the party holding them refuses to produce. It is thus that the claim of privilege set up is tested. Very often, on such a summons, the documents are shown to the Judge by consent in order to take his decision after he has read them. Where this is done, no appeal lies from his order.<sup>4</sup> If this is not done, then the only question is, whether the defendant has in his affidavit said enough about the documents in dispute to entitle him to refuse production.<sup>5</sup>

Any description is sufficient which identifies the documents sufficiently to enable the Court to enforce production, if it should see fit to order it.<sup>6</sup>

When inspection is obtained, the party seeking discovery, or his solicitor, attends at the time named and examines the documents. He may take copies of them himself, but the usual course is to bespeak copies of the more important ones. Such copies are of course paid for by the party bespeaking them. In a proper case, (as when the chief question in dispute is, In whose handwriting is the libel?) the Master will order the party in possession of the libel to permit his opponent to take photographic or facsimile copies thereof, of course at his own expense.<sup>7</sup>

Formerly all applications relating to interrogatories or to discovery and inspection of documents were made to a Judge at chambers, unless both

<sup>1</sup> Order XXXI. r. 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* rr. 17, 21, 22.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* r. 18.

<sup>4</sup> *Bustros v. White*, (C. A.) 1 Q. B. D. 423; 45 L. J. Q. B. 642; 24 W. R. 721; 34 L. T. 835.

<sup>5</sup> Per Lindley, J., in *Kain v. Farrer*, 37 L. T. 471; W. N. 1877, p. 266.

<sup>6</sup> *Taylor v. Batten*, (C. A.) 4 Q. B. D. 85; 48 L. J. Q. B. 72; 27 W. R. 106; 39 L. T. 408.

<sup>7</sup> *Davey v. Pemberton*, 11 C. B. N. S. 628.



parties agreed to their being decided by a Master.<sup>1</sup> But now by the Rules of November, 1878, all such applications must be made in the first instance to a Master.

*\* Default in making Discovery.*

Any party failing to answer interrogatories or to discover or allow inspection of documents as ordered, is liable to attachment; and, if a plaintiff, to have his action dismissed for want of prosecution; and, if a defendant, to have his defence, if any, struck out, and to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended.<sup>2</sup> This highly penal provision will only be exercised in the last resort, and, it seems, will not be enforced when the parties really intend to answer.<sup>3</sup> And before any application of this kind, the other party must have obtained a peremptory order for such discovery within a time fixed. If the Master makes an order dismissing an action for want of prosecution unless an affidavit in answer to interrogatories be filed by a certain date; then if no such affidavit be filed, the action is at an end.<sup>4</sup> But it seems that a Master or Judge still has power to enlarge the time for appealing against the Master's order dismissing the action;<sup>5</sup> and then an order may be made enlarging the time for delivering the interrogatories.<sup>6</sup> Though such power will only be exercised in very special circumstances.

*Notice of Trial; Entry for Trial.*

Directly either party has joined issue, simply, without adding any further or other pleading, the pleadings will be deemed closed;<sup>7</sup> though if it appear to a Judge that the issues of fact in dispute are not sufficiently defined, he may direct the parties to prepare issues; in case of difference to be settled by himself.<sup>8</sup>

The parties being thus fairly at issue, the plaintiff should \* give \* 523 notice of trial. If he neglects to give such notice within six weeks after close of pleadings, the defendant may either himself give notice of trial,<sup>9</sup> or may apply to a Master at Chambers to dismiss the action for want of prosecution under Order XXXVI. r. 4.<sup>10</sup> Whichever party gives

<sup>1</sup> Order XXXI. r. 18, Order LIV. r. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Order XXXI. r. 20.

<sup>3</sup> Per Lush, J., in *Twycross v. Grant*, Weekly Notes, 1875, pp. 201, 229; 1 Charley, 114, 115; Bitt. 10, 38; 20 Sol. J. 54, 97; 60 L. T. Notes, 49, 84; *Fisher v. Hughes*, 25 W. R. 528.

<sup>4</sup> *Whistler v. Hancock*, 3 Q. B. D. 83; 45 L. J. Q. B. 460; 24 W. R. 640; 34 L. T. 682; *Wallis v. Hepburn*, 3 Q. B. D. 84 n.; *King v. Davenport*, 4 Q. B. D. 402; 48 L. J. Q. B. 606; 27 W. R. 798.

<sup>5</sup> *Burke v. Rooney*, 4 C. P. D. 226; 48 L. J. C. P. 601; 27 W. R. 915; *Wallingford v. Mutual Society*, (H. L.) 5 App. Cas. 685; 50 L. J. C. P. 49; 43 L. T. 258.

<sup>6</sup> *Carter v. Stubbs*, (C. A.) 50 L. J. C. P. 4; 29 W. R. 132; W. N. 1880, p. 183.

<sup>7</sup> Order XXV.

<sup>8</sup> Order XXVI.

<sup>9</sup> Order XXXVI. r. 4.

<sup>10</sup> R. S. C. June, 1876, r. 13.

notice of trial has the choice of the mode of trial : but this should always be by judge and jury in cases of defamation. Either party therefore receiving notice of trial by any other mode than before a jury should within four days give notice that he requires a jury, and will thereupon without any summons or order at Chambers, be entitled to have the cause tried before a jury. Nor can any Judge or Master deprive either party of his right to a trial by jury, if it has been claimed in due time.<sup>1</sup>

Ten days' notice of trial must be given, unless the other party has consented to take short (*i.e.*, four days') notice.<sup>2</sup> The notice must be given before entering the action for trial,<sup>3</sup> and cannot be countermanded except by consent or leave.<sup>4</sup> It must state whether it is for the trial of the action or of issues therein ; and in actions in the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer Divisions, the place and day for which it is to be entered for trial.<sup>5</sup> Notice of trial for London or Middlesex will not be deemed to be for any particular sittings, but for any day after expiration of the notice on which the trial can come on in its order.<sup>6</sup> If the party giving notice of trial for London or Middlesex omit on the same day, or the day after, to enter the action for trial, the other party may do so within four days.<sup>7</sup> But notice of trial elsewhere than London or Middlesex will be deemed to be for the first day of the next assizes at the place mentioned,<sup>8</sup> and there either party may enter the action for trial.<sup>9</sup>

By the express words of Order XXXVI. r. 3, a plaintiff may give notice of trial with his reply, although the pleadings be not yet completed. But he cannot *enter* the cause for trial until the record is complete ; because by rule 17*a* of the same Order the party entering the action for trial must deliver to the officer two copies of the *whole* of the pleadings in the action.<sup>10</sup> \* In this case Stephen, J., construed r. 3 to mean that a plaintiff could only give notice of trial with his reply, where such reply completed the pleadings. That was very probably the intention of those who framed the rule ; but the words they have used are undoubtedly to the contrary effect. And there is a practical advantage in enabling a plaintiff thus to hurry on a dilatory defendant. Kelly, C.B., considered that a plaintiff could always deliver notice of trial with his reply, and such has been and still is the practice at chambers, both before and since this case was reported. The remarks of Stephen, J., were cited to the Divisional Court (Cockburn, C. J., and Hawkins, J.), on August 2nd, 1880, in

<sup>1</sup> *Sugg v. Silber*, 1 Q. B. D. 362 ; 45 L. J. Q. B. 460 ; 24 W. R. 640 ; 34 L. T. 682.

<sup>2</sup> Order XXXVI. r. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* r. 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* r. 13.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* r. 8 ; R. S. C. Dec. 1875, r. 12.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.* r. 11.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.* r. 14.

<sup>8</sup> *Ib.* r. 12.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.* r. 15.

<sup>10</sup> See *Metropolitan Inner Circle Railway Co. v. Metropolitan Railway Co.*, 5 Ex. D. 196 ; 49 L. J. Ex. 505 ; 28 W. R. 510 ; 42 L. T. 591.

a case of *Asquith v. Molineux*; <sup>1</sup> but it was held that the words of Order XXXVI. r. 3, were precise, and fully justified the practice at chambers. So that now it is settled that a plaintiff may always, if he pleases, deliver notice of trial with reply.<sup>2</sup>

*Advice on Evidence.*

As soon as notice of trial is given, or in urgent cases even sooner, the papers should be laid before counsel for his advice on evidence. This should always be done by both sides, even in cases apparently simple; else the action may be lost for want of some certificate or other formal piece of proof, as in *Collins v. Carnegie*.<sup>3</sup> Every document in the case should be sent in to counsel, especially the affidavits of documents, the answers to interrogatories, and the draft notices to produce and to inspect and admit. Also some statement as to the oral evidence proposed to be given, if not the full proofs which will afterwards form part of the brief.

Counsel in advising on evidence must consider first what are the issues in the case and which lie on the plaintiff, which on the defendant; and then state *seriatim* how each is to be proved or rebutted.

The *onus* lies on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant published or uttered the defamatory words, that they were understood in the sense alleged in the innuendo, that they \*referred to the plaintiff, \* 525 and, if the occasion be one of qualified privilege, that they were published or uttered maliciously. In some cases, also, it is essential, in every case desirable, to prove special damage resulting from the words. It may further be necessary to prove that the plaintiff at the date of publication held some office or exercised some profession or trade, and that the words were spoken of him in the way of such office, profession, or trade. If money has been paid into Court, the *onus* lies on the plaintiff of proving that the amount is insufficient. If the Statute of Limitations has been pleaded, the *onus* lies on the plaintiff <sup>4</sup> of proving a publication of the libel within six years, or the utterance by the defendant of words actionable *per se* within two years, or that damage has within six years resulted from the utterance by the defendant of a slander not actionable *per se*.

On the defendant, on the other hand, lies the *onus* of proving privilege, justification, or an accord and satisfaction. If he has pleaded a plea under Lord Campbell's Act, the *onus* lies on the defendant to prove that the libel was inserted without gross negligence, and that a full apology was inserted in proper type before action brought, or as soon as possible afterwards.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 49 L. J. Q. B. 800; Weekly Notes, 1880, p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> As to either party discontinuing the action, see Order XXIII.

<sup>3</sup> 1 A. & E. 695.

<sup>4</sup> *Wilby v. Henman*, 2 Cr. & M. 658.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 455.

The plaintiff may also offer evidence in aggravation, the defendant in mitigation, of damages.<sup>1</sup>

Each party should be prepared with evidence not only to prove the issues which lie upon him, but also to rebut his adversary's case. Counsel should name the witnesses who will be required. If a material witness is unavoidably absent, it may be necessary to apply for leave to countermand notice of trial, under Order XXXVI. r. 13, or to postpone the trial. The trial will, even after notice of trial, be postponed, upon terms, in order to procure the attendance of witnesses from abroad.<sup>2</sup> In other cases it may be necessary to apply for a commission abroad, or for leave to examine, before trial, a witness who is dangerously ill or about to leave the country.<sup>3</sup> If it be necessary to bring up a prisoner to give evidence, an application may be made to the judge *ex parte* for an order, under 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, s. 9,

on an affidavit stating where the prisoner is confined, and for what  
\* 526 crime, and when \* and where his attendance will be required. In the case, now rare, of a person being confined upon civil process, the above statute does not apply, and a writ of *habeas corpus ad testificandum* must be obtained upon application on affidavit to a judge at chambers. This application apparently cannot be made *ex parte*. A lunatic may be brought up from his asylum under such a writ if he is fit for examination.<sup>4</sup> A witness residing in Ireland or Scotland can be compelled to attend by a *subpoena ad testificandum* issued by the special leave of a judge under the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 34, s. 1.

Counsel should next consider what documents will be required, and how, if the originals cannot be produced, they may be proved by secondary evidence.<sup>5</sup> For this purpose he must carefully go through the notice to inspect and admit, and the notice to produce and advise on their sufficiency. He is sometimes also consulted as to the advisability of securing a special jury or of applying to change the venue.<sup>6</sup>

It is often convenient to copy the advice on evidence into the leader's brief, especially if any points of law are discussed in it, and cases cited.

### *Examination of Witnesses before Trial.*

If a witness is obliged to go abroad on a voyage of necessity, or is so ill and infirm that in all probability he will not be able to attend at the trial, an application should be made, after issue joined, for an order, under Order XXXVII. rr. 1, 4, that he be examined upon oath before a Master or a special examiner, and that his deposition may be read at the trial.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 296, 299.

<sup>2</sup> *Brown v. Murray*, 4 D. & R. 830; *M'Cauley v. Thorpe*, 1 Chit. 685.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 526.

<sup>4</sup> *Fennell v. Tait*, 1 C. M. & R. 584.

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, p. 536.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 528.

It is a misfortune to both sides when such a necessity arises. The jury pay little attention to a deposition read out by an officer of the Court; and the other side loses the precious opportunity of cross-examining the witness in the presence of the jury. The party applying should show on affidavit that the witness is so necessary and material that he cannot safely proceed to trial without him. The reasons for his absence must be stated and verified: in the case of illness the affidavit of the medical man in attendance must be obtained. The other side will object on the ground that the evidence of the witness is \* immaterial, that there is no suffi- \* 527  
cient reason for his not being produced in Court, that the same evidence could be given by others who can attend, &c. If the order be made, and the deposition taken, still it cannot be read in Court without proof of continued absence or illness. But for this purpose the affidavit of the solicitor is generally sufficient.

The above practice applies to witnesses either within or without the jurisdiction of the Court; but it is practically confined to witnesses of the former class. Where it is desired to take evidence out of the jurisdiction, the rule is to apply for a commission abroad. This application must be made on affidavit, stating as far as practicable the names and addresses of the foreign witnesses; and showing the necessity for the application, and that the party applying cannot safely proceed to trial without their evidence. Where the defendant in an action of slander applied for a commission to examine witnesses in Australia, he was ordered to state in an affidavit the general nature of the evidence which he expected such witnesses to give.<sup>1</sup> Such affidavit may be made by the managing clerk having the conduct of the action. The application is not usually made till after issue joined: if it is made earlier, reasons for such urgency must be assigned in the affidavit. It will be an answer to the application, if it can be shown that the witnesses could be brought to England without much greater expense;<sup>2</sup> or that witnesses now in England could give the same evidence.<sup>3</sup> Sometimes the mere delay, which will thus necessarily be caused, is a sufficient reason for refusing the application.<sup>4</sup>

The costs of the commission must be borne by the party who applied for it, unless the judge at the trial makes any order in respect of them.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Barry v. Barclay*, 15 C. B. N. S. 849. And see *Macaulay v. Shakell* and others, 1 Bligh, N. S. 96; *Thorpe v. Macauley*, 5 Madd. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink Co.*, Weekly Notes, 1880, p. 228.

<sup>3</sup> *The M. Moxham*, (C. A.) 1 P. D. 107, 115; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 17; 24 W. R. 597, 650; 34 L. T. 559.

<sup>4</sup> *Steuart v. Gladstone*, 7 Ch. D. 394; 47 L. J. Ch. 154; 26 W. R. 277; 37 L. T. 575. But see *Milissich v. Lloyd's*, Weekly Notes, 1875, p. 200; 1 Charley, 119; Bitt. 5; 20 Sol. J. 31; 60 L. T. Notes, 33.

<sup>5</sup> *Re Imperial Land Co. of Marseilles*, 37 L. T. 588; Weekly Notes, 1877, p. 244.

Either party will be entitled to have the cause tried by a special jury upon giving notice in writing to his opponent of such intention. The plaintiff must give such notice ten days at least before trial, unless the defendant is under terms to take short notice of trial: the defendant must give his notice more than six days before commission day.<sup>1</sup> The ss. 109, 112 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, originally did not apply to actions in London or Westminster, but were extended to such actions by the Jury Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 77, s. 18. If the time has gone by, either party may take out a summons for a special jury, and must then be prepared to show some reason for the application, *e.g.*, that difficult questions of fact will arise, &c. That there were special pleas in a case of libel has been held a sufficient reason for allowing a special jury.<sup>2</sup>

The party who has obtained a special jury must give notice thereof to the sheriff six days before the first day of the sittings or the commission day of the assizes.<sup>3</sup> Such party will also have to pay the costs of the special jury, if sworn, unless the judge certifies to the contrary.

#### *Change of Venue.*

The plaintiff having selected a place of trial when he drew up his statement of claim, cannot change it without an order; and for that he must apply to a master or district registrar, showing reasonable ground for the change. If, however, a defendant desires to have the venue changed, he must show more than reasonable ground for the change. For the plaintiff has the right to fix the place of trial; and the defendant must show a distinct preponderance of convenience to oust plaintiff of his right.<sup>4</sup> Where the defendant resides is quite immaterial.<sup>5</sup> Where the cause of

\* 529 action arose has now but little to do with the question. \* The defendant must show that a trial in the county to which he desires to change the venue, will be clearly less expensive and more convenient for the majority of witnesses on both sides. That it will be more convenient for defendant's witnesses is alone no ground for the application.<sup>6</sup> But the defendant will, as a rule, be entitled to have the venue changed, if he can show that there is no probability of a fair trial in the place the plaintiff has selected, *e.g.*, if a local newspaper of extensive circulation has published

<sup>1</sup> Reg. Gen. Hilary Term 1853, r. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *Roberts v. Brown*, 6 C. & P. 757.

<sup>3</sup> Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 112.

<sup>4</sup> *Church v. Barnett*, L. R. 6 C. P. 116; 40 L. J. C. P. 138; *Plum v. Normanton Iron Co.*, Weekly Notes, 1876, p. 105; Bitt. 140; 20 Sol. J. 340; 60 L. T. Notes, 303.

<sup>5</sup> *Per Quain, J.*, 1 Charley, 119; Bitt. 53; 60 L. T. Notes, 103.

<sup>6</sup> *Wheatcroft v. Mousley*, 11 C. B. 677.

unfair attacks on the defendant with reference to the subject-matter of the action.<sup>1</sup>

This application is not generally made by defendant till after notice of trial.

### *Trial.*

When the action is called on, if the defendant does not appear, the plaintiff may prove his claim so far as the burden of proof lies upon him.<sup>2</sup> It is not necessary to produce an affidavit of service of notice of trial.<sup>3</sup> If the plaintiff does not appear, the defendant is entitled to judgment with costs. Verdict or judgment obtained in default of such appearance may be set aside upon application to a judge at chambers within six days after trial, upon terms.<sup>4</sup> Or the judge, when the case is called on, may postpone or adjourn the trial, upon terms, if he think it expedient for the interests of justice.<sup>5</sup> But the fact that either party is not ready, that his witnesses have missed the train, or that his counsel has been but that moment briefed, is not generally considered by judges as *any* ground for a postponement. But it is otherwise where there has been no negligence or default, *e.g.*, where it is stated on affidavit that a witness is unavoidably absent through illness.<sup>6</sup> A judgment obtained by default of appearance will be set aside if no notice of trial was given, or if for any other reason the defendant was not aware that his case was in the paper for trial, unless his ignorance of the fact was caused by gross negligence in his \* solicitor.<sup>7</sup> \* 530

If, however, both parties appear at the trial, the plaintiff is always entitled to begin, even where the *onus* of proof lies on the defendant.<sup>8</sup>

### *Proof of the Plaintiff's Special Character.*

Where the words are actionable only by reason of the plaintiff's holding an office or exercising a profession or trade, the plaintiff must prove that he held such office or exercised such profession or trade at the date of publication, and that the words complained of were spoken of him in the way

<sup>1</sup> Pybus *v.* Scudamore, Arn. 464; Walker *v.* Brogden, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 571; 11 Jur. N. S. 671; 13 W. R. 809; 12 L. T. 495.

<sup>2</sup> Order XXXVI. r. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Chorlton *v.* Dickie, 13 Ch. D. 160; 49 L. J. Ch. 40; 28 W. R. 228; 41 L. T. 469.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.* r. 20.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* i. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Turner *v.* Meryweather, 7 C. B. 251; 18 L. J. C. P. 155.

<sup>7</sup> Burgoine *v.* Taylor, (C. A.) 9 Ch. D. 1; 47 L. J. Ch. 542; 26 W. R. 568; 38 L. T. 438.

<sup>8</sup> Carter *v.* Jones, 6 C. & P. 64; 1 M. & R. 281; Mercer *v.* Whall, 5 Q. B. 447, 462, 463; 14 L. J. Q. B. 267, 272.

thereof. Sometimes the words themselves admit the plaintiff's special character, or it may be admitted on the pleadings: if so, it is of course unnecessary to give any evidence on the point.<sup>1</sup>

Strict proof of the plaintiff's special character is not, as a rule, required. Thus, to prove that a person holds a public office, it is not necessary to produce his written or sealed appointment thereto; <sup>2</sup> not even in a case of murder.<sup>3</sup> It is sufficient to show that he acted in that office, and it will be presumed that he acted legally. So where the libel imputes to the plaintiff misconduct in his practice of a physician or surgeon, or as a solicitor, and does not call in question or deny his qualification to practise, it will not be necessary for him to do more than prove that he was acting in the particular professional capacity imputed to him at the time of the publication of the libel.<sup>4</sup> It is, as a rule, sufficient to call the plaintiff to say "I am an M.R.C.S." or "I am a barrister." But, when the libel or slander imputes to a medical or legal practitioner that he is not properly qualified, and the professional qualification is again denied on the pleadings, the plaintiff should always be prepared to prove it, by producing his

\* 531 diploma or certificate, duly sealed or signed, and stamped, \* where a stamp is requisite. At Common Law there was no other way.<sup>5</sup> But now the "Law List" is by the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 22, made *prima facie* evidence that any one whose name appears therein as a solicitor is a solicitor duly certificated for the current year; and similarly by the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, s. 27, the "Medical Register" is *prima facie* evidence that the persons specified therein are duly registered medical practitioners. But if it is known the plaintiff's qualification will be seriously challenged at the trial, it is safer not to rely solely on such *prima facie* proof, but to produce all diplomas and certificates. If the plaintiff sues as a solicitor, and his name does not appear in the "Law List," that may be only because he has not taken out his certificate for the present year; if so, he may still sue for a libel on him as solicitor.<sup>6</sup>

So too a medical man can sue for a libel on him professionally, although his name does not appear in the "Medical Register," if he can show by a certificate under the hand of the registrar, or in any other way, that he is duly qualified and entitled to be registered.

<sup>1</sup> Yrisarri v. Clement, 3 Bing. 432; 4 L. J. (Old S.) C. P. 128; 11 Moore, 308; 2 C. & P. 223.

<sup>2</sup> Berryman v. Wise, 4 T. R. 366; Cannell v. Curtis, 2 Bing. N. C. 228; 2 Scott, 379.

<sup>3</sup> R. v. Gordon, 2 Leach, 581.

<sup>4</sup> Smith v. Taylor, 1 B. & P. N. R. 196, 204; Rutherford v. Evans, 6 Bing. 451; 8 L. J. (Old. S.) C. P. 86.

<sup>5</sup> Moises v. Thornton, 8 T. R. 303; Collins v. Carnegie, 1 A. & E. 695; 3 N. & M. 703; Sparling v. Haddon, 9 Bing. 11; 2 Moo. & Scott, 14.

<sup>6</sup> Jones v. Stevens, (1822) 11 Price, 235.



No other introductory averment is now material or necessary ; hence, if inserted, it may be treated as a surplusage ; it need not be proved.

*Proof of Publication.*

The plaintiff must next prove that the defendant published the libel or spoke the slanderous words to some third person. The statute 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 76, ss. 6, 8, 13, formerly facilitated proof of publication of a libel contained in a newspaper<sup>1</sup>(a) ; but these sections are now repealed by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, s. 1, sched. 1. Nor is the 29th section of the 39 Geo. III. c. 79, as qualified by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 33, s. 1, of any practical assistance.

The Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to inquire into the law of Newspaper Libel recommend "that the name of every proprietor of a newspaper, or, in the case of several \*persons \* 532 engaged as partners in such proprietorship, the names of all such persons, should be registered at the office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, with full particulars of the addresses and occupations of all such persons, or of any change therein."<sup>2</sup> This would be a beneficial provision, if it were also enacted that a certificate purporting to issue from the office of the said Registrar should be receivable in all Law Courts, and in all proceedings whether civil or criminal, as sufficient evidence that the defendant was proprietor or part-proprietor of the paper throughout the period during which his name was on the register.

Till some such measure becomes law, discovery can only be obtained under the 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 76, s. 19, which is still law ;<sup>3</sup> or interrogatories may now be administered on this point.<sup>4</sup> But if no satisfactory admission be thus obtained, the plaintiff must prove that the newspaper "was purchased of the defendant, or at any house, shop, or office belonging to or occupied by the defendant, or by his servants or workmen, or where he may usually carry on the business of printing or publishing such newspaper, or where the same may be usually sold."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Mayne v. Fletcher*, 9 B. & C. 382 ; *R. v. Franceys*, 2 Ad. & E. 49 ; *R. v. Amphlit*, 4 B. & C. 35.

<sup>2</sup> See App. B.

<sup>3</sup> *Dixon v. Enoch*, L. R. 13 Eq. 394 ; 41 L. J. Ch. 231 ; 20 W. R. 359 ; 26 L. T. 127.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 514.

<sup>5</sup> 6 & 7 Wm. IV. c. 76, s. 8. As to what is a sufficient publication in law see *ante*, c. VI. pp. 150-168. As to constructive publication by a servant or agent, see *ante*, c. XII. pp. 360-365, Principal and Agent. As to publication by telegram, see *Williamson v. Freer*, L. R. 9 C. P. 393 ; 43 L. J. C. P. 161 ; 22 W. R. 878 ; 30 L. T. 332 ; by postcard, *Robinson v. Jones*, 4 L. R. Ir. 391.

(a) See *State v. Jeandell*, 5 Harr. (Del.) 475 ; *Commonwealth v. Blanding*, 3 Pick. 304 ; *Southwick v. Stevens*, 10 Johns. 443 ; *Woodburn v. Miller*, Cheves, 194 ; *Respublica v. Davis*, 3 Yeates, 128. Upon the general subject of proving publication see *Simpson v. Wiley*, 4 Porter (Ala.), 215 ; *Callan v. Gaylord*, 3 Watts, 321 ; *Rice v. Withers*, 9 Wend. 138 ; *Lawson v. Hicks*, 38 Ala. 279 ; *Lewis v. Few*, 5 Johns. 1.

The sale of each copy is a distinct publication.<sup>1</sup> Causing a libel to be printed may be a *prima facie* publication.<sup>2</sup> But if the libel never reaches the hands of any one except the printers and compositors, this alone would in the present day be deemed insufficient.<sup>3</sup>

A letter is published as soon as it is posted, provided it ever  
 \* 533 \*reaches the party to whom it is addressed, which will be presumed if there be no evidence to the contrary. Thus if a letter in the handwriting of the defendant be produced in Court with the seal broken, and the proper postmarks outside, that is sufficient evidence of publication.<sup>4</sup> So where a libel had appeared in print, and the manuscript from which it was printed is proved to be in the defendant's handwriting, this is *prima facie* a publication by the defendant. It is not necessary to prove expressly that he directed or authorized the printing.<sup>5</sup> So if the defendant write a libel, which is in some way subsequently published, this is, *prima facie*, at all events, a publication by the defendant.<sup>6</sup>

Any one who has ever seen the defendant write (even though once only),<sup>7</sup> can be called to prove his handwriting. So can any one who has corresponded with the defendant, or seen letters which have arrived in answer to letters addressed to the defendant. Thus a clerk in a merchant's office who has corresponded with the defendant on his master's behalf, may be called to prove the handwriting.<sup>8</sup> The usual course is for the plaintiff's counsel merely to ask the witness, "Are you acquainted with the defendant's handwriting?" leaving it to defendant's counsel to cross-examine as to the extent of his acquaintance. Such cross-examination will only weaken the force of his evidence, not destroy its admissibility.<sup>9</sup> By s. 27 of the C. L. P. Act, 1854, "comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by the witnesses; and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the Court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute."<sup>10</sup> But the evidence of experts must always be received with

<sup>1</sup> R. v. Richard Carlile, 1 Chitty, 451; Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; R. v. Stanger, L. R. 6 Q. B. 352; 40 L. J. Q. B. 96; 16 W. R. 640.

<sup>2</sup> Baldwin v. Elphinstone, 2 W. Bl. 1037.

<sup>3</sup> Watts v. Fraser, 7 A. & E. 223; ante, p. 152; Lawless v. Anglo-Egyptian Cotton and Oil Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 262; 10 B. & S. 226; 38 L. J. Q. B. 129; 17 W. R. 498.

<sup>4</sup> Warren v. Warren, 1 C. M. & R. 250; 4 Tyr. 850; Ward v. Smith, 6 Bing. 749; 4 M. & P. 595; 4 C. & P. 402; Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 C. & P. 680.

<sup>5</sup> Bond v. Douglas, 7 C. & P. 626; Tarpley v. Blabey, 2 Bing. N. C. 437; R. v. Lovett, 9 C. & P. 462; Adams v. Kelly, Ry. & M. 157.

<sup>6</sup> Per Holt, C.J., in R. v. Beere, 12 Mod. 221; 1 Ld. Raym. 414.

<sup>7</sup> Garrels v. Alexander, 4 Esp. 37.

<sup>8</sup> R. v. Slaney, 5 C. & P. 213.

<sup>9</sup> Eagleton v. Kingston, 8 Ves. 473; Doe d. Mudd v. Suckermore, 5 A. & E. 730.

<sup>10</sup> See Brookes v. Tichborne, 5 Ex. 929; 20 L. J. Ex. 69; 14 Jur. 1122.

caution. In a recent case, an expert in handwriting \*swore posi- \* 534  
tively that the libel was in the handwriting of the Lord Mayor  
elect; but subsequently a young man came forward and acknowledged that  
he wrote it, and that Sir F. Truscott never had anything to do with the  
matter.<sup>1</sup> If the defendant be present in Court, he may, it seems, be then  
and there required to write something which the Court and jury may com-  
pare with the document in dispute.<sup>2</sup>

Publication may also be proved by the evidence of an accomplice,<sup>3</sup> or  
by the defendant's own admission.<sup>4</sup> But such admission will not be ex-  
tended beyond its exact terms. Thus an admission that the defendant  
wrote the libel is no admission that he also published it.<sup>5</sup> An admission  
that defendant was the editor of a periodical at a certain date is no evidence  
to connect him with a libel published in the same periodical at a later  
date.<sup>6</sup> A witness may be asked if he knows who wrote the libel, but if  
he answers "yes," he is not bound to name the person, because it may be  
himself.<sup>7</sup> The plaintiff may even call the defendant himself as a witness,  
nor can his counsel object that no relevant question can be asked him that  
will not tend to criminate him. The defendant must go into the box, and  
take the objection himself, when the question is asked. No one can take  
it for him.<sup>8</sup> But no witness can be compelled to answer any question, if  
he states on oath that he objects on the ground that to answer it might  
tend to show that he was concerned in the publication of libel.

Where the facts are in dispute, it will be for the jury to decide whether  
the defendant wrote the libel, whether it was ever published to a third  
person other than the plaintiff, whether the office where the libel was pur-  
chased was the defendant's or not, &c., &c. When the facts are found, it  
is for the judge to decide whether there has been a publication in law by  
the defendant.

*\* Proof of the Libel.*

\* 535

The libel itself must be produced at the trial; the jury are entitled in  
all cases to see it.<sup>9</sup> The defendant is entitled to have the whole of it read.<sup>10</sup>  
The original must be carefully traced, where it has passed through many

<sup>1</sup> See also *Seaman v. Netherclift*, 1 C. P. D. 540; 45 L. J. C. P. 798; 24 W. R. 884; 34 L. T. 878; (C. A.) 2 C. P. D. 53; 46 L. J. C. P. 128; 25 W. R. 159; 35 L. T. 784.

<sup>2</sup> *Doe d. Devine v. Wilson*, 10 Moo. P. C. 502, 530.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Haswell and Bate*, 1 Dougl. 387; *R. v. Steward*, 2 B. & Ad. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Hall*, 1 Str. 416.

<sup>5</sup> *The Seven Bishops' case*, 4 St. Tr. 300.

<sup>6</sup> *Macleod v. Wakley*, 3 C. & P. 311.

<sup>7</sup> *R. v. Slaney*, 5 C. & P. 213.

<sup>8</sup> *Boyle v. Wiseman*, 10 Ex. 647; 24 L. J. Ex. 160; 24 L. T. (Old S.) 274; 25 L. T. (Old S.) 203.

<sup>9</sup> *Wright v. Woodgate*, 2 C. M. & R. 573; *Gilpin v. Fowler*, 23 L. J. Ex. 156.

<sup>10</sup> *Cook v. Hughes*, R. & M. 112.

hands.<sup>1</sup> Where a large number of copies are printed from the same type, or lithographed at the same time by the same process, none of them are copies in the legal sense of the word. They are all counterpart originals, and each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest.<sup>2</sup>

Where the libel is contained in a letter or memorial sent to a Secretary of State, or to some Government department, an objection is often raised to its production on grounds of public policy. If this objection appears to the judge to be well founded, no evidence can be given of the contents of such letter or memorial. In *Beatson v. Skene*,<sup>3</sup> it was decided that the objection must be taken by the head of the public department of State, who is alone able to judge. That course was followed in the recent case of *Swann v. Vines*, tried before Lord Coleridge and a special jury at Westminster in November, 1877.<sup>4</sup> The rule on the point is that "the Court is entitled to have the pledge and security of the head officer of State to give the reason for the non-production of those documents which it is objected to produce, and to demand that he shall come into the witness-box, and there say that he is the head of the department, and objects to such and such documents being produced, specifying them, on the ground of public policy."<sup>5</sup> But in the case of *Spackman v. Gibney*, tried before the same learned judge at the Bristol Spring Assizes, 1878, the Government clerk, who had brought down the document in obedience to his subpoena, refused

to produce it, stating that the Home Secretary had ordered him to  
 \* 536 object on grounds of public policy; and the learned judge \* refused to trouble Mr. Cross to come down to Bristol to repeat what his clerk had said. But a letter written by a private individual to the Chief Secretary of the Postmaster General complaining of the conduct of the guard of the Exeter mail, though it may be a privileged communication in the sense that the plaintiff must prove actual malice, is not a document privileged from production on the ground of public policy.<sup>6</sup>

If the original libel has been lost or destroyed, secondary evidence may of course be given of it,<sup>7</sup> except where the libel is contained in an official document, which is privileged from production on the ground of public policy, in which case the same public policy requires that no secondary evidence of its contents shall be given.<sup>8</sup> The plaintiff is also entitled to

<sup>1</sup> *Fryer v. Gathercole*, 4 Ex. 262; 18 L. J. Ex. 389; *Adams v. Kelly*, Ry. & Moo. 157.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Watson*, 2 Stark. 129; *Johnson v. Hudson and Morgan*, 7 A. & E. 233, n.

<sup>3</sup> 5 H. & N. 838; 29 L. J. Ex. 430; 6 Jur. N. S. 780; 2 L. T. 378.

<sup>4</sup> See also *M'Elveney v. Connellan*, 17 Ir. C. L. R. 55.

<sup>5</sup> *Per Grove, J.*, in *Kain v. Farrer*, 37 L. T. 470.

<sup>6</sup> *Blake v. Pilfold*, 1 Moo. & Rob. 198.

<sup>7</sup> *Rainy v. Bravo*, L. R. 4 P. C. 287; 20 W. R. 873; *Gathercole v. Miall*, 15 M. & W. 319.

<sup>8</sup> *Home v. Bentinck*, 2 Brod. & B. 130; *Anderson v. Hamilton*, *ib.* 156, n.; *Stace*

give secondary evidence of the contents of the libel, if it be in the defendant's possession and is not produced, after notice to produce it given a reasonable time before the trial. So also where the libel is in the possession of some one beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, who refuses to produce it, on request, although informed of the purpose for which it is required.<sup>1</sup> Where the libel is written or placarded on a wall, so that it cannot conveniently be brought into Court, secondary evidence may be given of its contents.<sup>2</sup>

All questions as to the admissibility of secondary evidence are for the judge, and should be decided by him then and there.<sup>3</sup>

If the words proved materially differ from those set out in the statement of claim, this is a variance which would formerly have been fatal.<sup>4</sup>(a)

*v. Griffith*, L. R. 2 P. C. 428; 6 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 18; 20 L. T. 197; *Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby* (Ex. Ch.), L. R. 8 Q. B. 255.

<sup>1</sup> *Boyle v. Wiseman*, 10 Ex. 647; 24 L. J. Ex. 160; *Newton v. Chaplin*, 10 C. B. 56; *R. v. Llanfaethly*, 2 E. & B. 940; 23 L. J. M. C. 33; *R. v. Aickles*, 1 Leach, 330.

<sup>2</sup> Per Lord Abinger in *Mortimer v. McCallan*, 6 M. & W. at p. 68; *Bruce v. Nicopolulo*, 11 Ex. at p. 133; 24 L. J. Ex. at p. 324.

<sup>3</sup> *Boyle v. Wiseman*, 11 Ex. 360; 24 L. J. Ex. 284.

<sup>4</sup> *Bell v. Byrne*, 13 East, 554; *Tabart v. Tipper*, 1 Camp. 350.

(a) The more general rule at common law in this country is that while all the words need not be proved provided enough are proved to establish the making of the alleged charge against the plaintiff, other words of similar import or equivalent words cannot be received in evidence. *Durrah v. Stilwell*, 59 Ind. 139; *Wheeler v. Robb*, 1 Blackf. 330; *Tucker v. Call*, 45 Ind. 31; *Moore v. Bond*, 4 Blackf. 458; *Olmsted v. Miller*, 1 Wend. 506; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 89; *Commonwealth v. Walters*, 1 Port. (Ala.) 377; *Williams v. Bryant*, 4 Ala. 44; *Teague v. Williams*, 7 Ala. 844; *Easley v. Moss*, 9 Ala. 266; *Scott v. Mackintosh*, 15 Ala. 662; *Merrill v. Peaslie*, 17 N. H. 546; *Taylor v. Moran*, 4 Met. (Ky.) 127; *Wallace v. Dixon*, 82 Ill. 202; *Slocomb v. Kuykendall*, 1 Scam. 187; *Sanford v. Gaddis*, 15 Ill. 228; *Baker v. Young*, 44 Ill. 42; *Clements v. Maloney*, 55 Mo. 353; *Street v. Bushnell*, 24 Mo. 328; *Birch v. Benton*, 26 Mo. 153; *Pennington v. Meeks*, 46 Mo. 217; *Bundy v. Hart*, *ib.* 460. So far indeed has this rule gone that in *Williams v. Bryant*, *supra*, it was held that evidence that the defendant called the plaintiff a strumpet would

not satisfy an allegation that he had charged her with being a whore. *Comp. Doherty v. Brown*, 10 Gray, 250. In *Long v. Fleming*, 2 Miles, the words alleged were "L. is pregnant and gone with child seven months," and evidence was excluded that the defendant had said "Have you heard anything about L.'s being pregnant by Dr. P.?" See *King v. Whitley*, 7 Jones, 529. In *Foster v. Small*, 3 Whart. 138, the words alleged were, "Dr. F. is not a physician but a two-penny bleeder," and evidence was excluded that the defendant had said, "If Dr. F. is a two-penny physician, I am none; I am a regular graduate and no quack." In *Stees v. Kemble*, 27 Penn. St. 112, the words alleged were, "You would steal, and you will steal," and it was held that the following words could not be shown, "A man that would do that would steal." And in *Dickey v. Andros*, 32 Vt. 55, it was held that evidence that the defendant said he *supposed* the plaintiff to have committed a certain crime would not support an allegation that the defendant directly charged the crime upon the plaintiff. But see *Treat v. Browning*, 4 Conn. 408. The declaration in *John-*

\* 537 But now the judge has ample power to amend \* the record, if in his discretion he considers such amendment can be made without prejudice to the defendant.<sup>1</sup> But no amendment will be made, the result of which will be to render the statement of claim demurrable.<sup>2</sup> The de-

<sup>1</sup> Order XXVII., rr. 1, 6; Order LIX., r. 2, R. S. C. April, 1880, r. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *Martyn v. Williams*, 1 H. & N. 817; 26 L. J. Ex. 117; *Caulfield v. Whitworth*, 16 W. R. 936; 18 L. T. 527.

ston *v. Tait*, 6 Binn. 121, alleged collusion between three persons to have been charged, and it was held that it could not be shown that the charge was of collusion between two of the three, including the plaintiff. But comp. *Nichols v. Hayes*, 13 Conn. 155; *Dowd v. Winters*, 20 Mo. 361. All this, it must be said, looks not a little like solemn trifling with serious things. There may be reason for a strict rule as to proof of an alleged libel; but some allowance should be made in slander cases for the weakness of memory.

In some States it is held that synonymous words may be proved, though not words that merely convey a similar idea. *Jones v. Edwards*, 57 Miss. 28. And in other States (perhaps with the same meaning) it is held with much good sense that other words than those alleged may be proved if they are of the same effect. *Brown v. Barnes*, 39 Mich. 211; *Distin v. Rose*, 69 N. Y. 122; *Chace v. Sherman*, 119 Mass. 287; *Baldwin v. Soule*, 6 Gray, 321; *Robbins v. Fletcher*, 101 Mass. 115 (statute); *Pegram v. Stoltz*, 67 N. Car. 144 (statute); for the earlier rule see *King v. Whitby*, 7 Jones, 529; *Dufresne v. Weise*, 46 Wis. 290. But it is probably different in Massachusetts, where the plaintiff professes to set out the precise language of the defendant. *Downs v. Hawley*, 112 Mass. 237. See *Payson v. Macomber*, 3 Allen, 69; *Taylor v. Kneeland*, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 67. At common law to allege words to have been spoken in English and to attempt to prove them spoken in a foreign tongue would be a variance. *Bower v. Deideker*, 38 Iowa, 355; *Zenobia v. Axtell*, 6 T. R. 162; *Rehauser v. Schwarger*, 3 Watts, 28; *Hickley v. Grosjean*, 6 Blackf. 351; *Keenholts v. Becker*, 3 Denio, 346; *Warmouth v. Cramer*, 3 Wend. 395; *Kuschbaughn v. Slusser*, 12 Ind. 453; *Townshend, Slander*, § 330. So too after alleging the words to have been spoken in the third person to

offer evidence of words in the second person, according to *Miller v. Miller*, 8 Johns. 74. And *vice versa*. *Culbertson v. Stanley*, 6 Blackf. 67; *Williams v. Harrison*, 3 Mo. 411; *Wolf v. Rodifer*, 1 Har. & J. 409. But this too is a hard rule, and the contrary is held in *Daily v. Gaines*, 1 Dana, 529; *Huffman v. Shumate*, 4 Bibb, 515. Variance in time and place is not material in ordinary cases. *Potter v. Thompson*, 22 Barb. 89; *Pegram v. Stoltz*, 67 N. Car. 144.

By all of the authorities it is enough to prove the substance of the alleged words, that is, to prove enough or indeed more than enough of those words to make out the offence declared upon. *Clark v. Brown*, 116 Mass. 504; *Doherty v. Brown*, 10 Gray, 250; *Payson v. Macomber*, 3 Allen, 69, 72; *Edgerly v. Swain*, 32 N. H. 478; *Pennington v. Meeks*, 46 Mo. 217; *Cooper v. Marlow*, 3 Mo. 188; *Pasley v. Kemp*, 22 Mo. 409; *Durrah v. Stilwell*, 59 Ind. 139; *Desmond v. Brown*, 29 Iowa, 53; *Bower v. Deideker*, 38 Iowa, 355; *Thomas v. Fischer*, 71 Ill. 576; *Baker v. Young*, 44 Ill. 42; *Crotty v. Morrissey*, 40 Ill. 477; *Wallace v. Dixon*, 82 Ill. 202; *Haley v. State*, 63 Ala. 89. See *Wilson v. Nations*, 5 Yerg. 211, laying down a similar rule concerning pleas in justification; and see *ante*, p. 170. It is not necessary to prove the allegation of words which in no way affect the main charge when that is actionable alone and is proved. *Schmisser v. Kreilich*, 92 Ill. 347; *Sanford v. Gaddis*, 15 Ill. 228; *Wilborn v. Odell*, 29 Ill. 456; *Thomas v. Fischer*, 71 Ill. 576; *Baker v. Young*, 44 Ill. 42. When however all the words alleged are necessary to constitute one charge all must be proved. *Schmisser v. Kreilich*, *supra*. And in Massachusetts immaterial words may be made material by specially setting them out. *Payson v. Macomber*, 3 Allen, 69.

fendant is entitled to an adjournment if he really desires to justify the words newly inserted in the statement of claim by such amendment.<sup>1</sup>

*Proof of the Speaking of the Slander.*

In cases of slander, the only way to prove publication is by calling those who heard the defendant speak the words. It is not, in strictness, sufficient to prove that the defendant spoke words *equivalent* to those set out in the statement of claim.<sup>2</sup> Thus where the declaration alleged that the defendant stated as a fact that "A. could not pay his laborers," and the evidence was that he had asked a question, "Have you heard A. cannot pay his laborers?" the plaintiff was nonsuited.<sup>3</sup> But now if the words proved convey practically the same meaning as the words laid, the variance will be held immaterial, or else the judge will amend.<sup>4</sup>

It was never necessary, however, to prove all the words laid in the declaration; if the words that are proved are intelligible and actionable by themselves.<sup>5</sup>

If the witness committed the words to writing shortly after the defendant uttered them, he may refer to such writing to refresh his memory; but it must be the original memorandum that is referred to, not a fair copy.<sup>6</sup> And so where the action is for procuring a libel to \* be \* 538 published by making a verbal statement to the reporter of a newspaper, who took it down in writing, the original writing taken down by the reporter and handed by him to the editor must be produced in Court; otherwise it will not appear that it was the same or substantially the same as the libel which appeared in the newspaper.<sup>7</sup>

Where the Governor of a British colony made communications to the Attorney-General in his official capacity defamatory of the plaintiff, and the Attorney-General was called as a witness in an action against the Governor, it was held that he was not bound to disclose what the Governor had said to him.<sup>8</sup>

If the words be spoken in a foreign language, the interpreter must be called to prove their meaning; and it must be further proved that those who heard them understood that language; else there is no publication.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Saunders v. Bate*, 1 H. & N. 402. And see *Foster v. Pointer*, 9 C. & P. 718; *May v. Brown*, 3 B. & C. 113; *Lord Churchill v. Hunt*, 2 B. & Ald. 685.

<sup>2</sup> *Armitage v. Dunster* (1785), 4 Dougl. 291; *Maitland and others v. Goldney and another* (1802), 2 East, 426.

<sup>3</sup> *Barnes v. Holloway* (1799), 8 T. R. 150.

<sup>4</sup> *Danaster v. Hewson*, 2 Man. & Ry. 176; *Sydenham v. Man* (1617), Cro. Jac. 407; *Orpwood v. Barks, vel Parkes*, 4 Bing. 261; 12 Moore, 492; *Smith v. Knowelden*, 2 M. & Gr. 561.

<sup>5</sup> Per Lawrence, J., 2 East, 434.

<sup>6</sup> *Burton v. Plummer*, 2 A. & E. 343.

<sup>7</sup> *Adams v. Kelly*, Ry. & Moo. 157.

<sup>8</sup> *Wyatt v. Gore*, 1 Holt, N. P. 299.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 110, 471.

*Evidence as to the Innuendo.*

Whenever the words used are not well-known and perfectly intelligible English, but are foreign, local, technical, provincial, or obsolete expressions, parol evidence is admissible to explain their meaning, provided such meaning has been properly alleged in the statement of claim by an innuendo. The rule is the same where words which have a meaning in ordinary English are yet, in the particular instance before the Court, clearly used not in that ordinary meaning, but in some peculiar sense; as are slang and cant expressions. But where the words are well-known and perfectly intelligible English, evidence cannot be given to explain that meaning away, unless it is first in some way shown that that meaning is for once inapplicable. This may appear from the words themselves: to give them their ordinary English meaning may make nonsense of them. But if with their ordinary meaning the words are perfectly good sense as they stand, facts must be given in evidence to show that they may have borne a special meaning on that particular occasion. After that has been done, a bystander may be asked, "What did you understand by the expression used?" But without such a foundation being laid, the question is not allowable.<sup>1</sup>

\* 539 \* And this is so, whether the word can be found in the last edition of the English dictionary or not.<sup>2</sup> Figurative or allegorical terms of a defamatory character, if of well-known import, such as imputing to a person the qualities of the "frozen snake" in the fable, need no evidence to explain their meaning.<sup>3</sup> Nor do historical allusions or comparisons to odious, notorious, disreputable persons; as where the conduct of the plaintiff in a case which he conducted as attorney for one of the parties was compared to that of "Messrs. Quirk, Gammon, and Snap;" the novel "Ten Thousand a Year" was put in and taken as read.<sup>4</sup>

Wherever the words sued on are susceptible, both of a harmless and an injurious meaning, it will be a question for the jury to decide which meaning was in fact conveyed to the hearers or readers at the time of publication. It will be of no avail for the defendant to urge (except, perhaps, in mitigation of damages) that he intended the words to convey the innocent meaning, if the jury are satisfied that ordinary bystanders or readers would have certainly understood them in the other sense.<sup>5</sup> Every man must be taken to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his act. The

<sup>1</sup> Daines v. Hartley, 3 Exch. 200; 18 L. J. Ex. 81; 12 Jur. 1093; Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 376; 27 L. J. Ex. 415; Humphreys v. Miller, 4 C. & P. 7; Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 3 C. & K. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Homer v. Taunton, 5 H. & N. 661.

<sup>3</sup> Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 Q. B. 624; 17 L. J. Q. B. 306.

<sup>4</sup> Woodgate v. Ridout, 4 F. & F. 202.

<sup>5</sup> Fisher v. Clement, 10 B. & C. 472.



plaintiff may give evidence of surrounding circumstances from which a defamatory meaning can be inferred ; he may call witnesses to state how they understood the libel ; though the jury are not bound to adopt the opinions of such witnesses.<sup>1</sup> Also in this case evidence of subsequent words of the same import may be given, so as to explain and point the libel charged.<sup>2</sup>

The plaintiff may also show that the words, though apparently commendatory, may have been spoken ironically.

If, however, the words are in their primary sense not actionable, and there is no evidence of any facts known both to the writer and the person to whom he wrote, which could reasonably induce the latter to put upon them any actionable secondary \* meaning, the judge should \* 540 stop the case.<sup>3</sup> So, too, if the words are not reasonably susceptible of the defamatory meaning put upon them by the innuendo, the judge should nonsuit the plaintiff.<sup>4</sup> If, however, in his opinion the words are capable of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo, and there is any evidence to go to the jury that they were used with that meaning, then it will be for the jury to decide whether in fact the words were understood in that sense by those who heard or read them.

*Proof that the words refer to the Plaintiff.*

If the libel does not name the plaintiff, there may be need of some evidence to show who was meant. (a) The plaintiff may give evidence of all "surrounding circumstances ;" *i.e.*, the cause and occasion of publication, later statements made by the defendant, and other extraneous facts which will explain and point the allusion. The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others acquainted with the circumstances, to state that on reading the libel they at once concluded that it was aimed at the plaintiff.<sup>5</sup> (b) It is not necessary that all the world should understand the

<sup>1</sup> Broome *v.* Gosden, 1 C. B. 732.

<sup>2</sup> Pearce *v.* Ornsby, 1 M. & Rob. 455.

<sup>3</sup> Capital and Counties Bank *v.* Henty and Sons, (C. A.) 5 C. P. D. 514 ; 49 L. J. C. P. 830 ; 28 W. R. 851 ; Ruel *v.* Tatnell, 29 W. R. 172 ; 43 L. T. 507.

<sup>4</sup> Mulligan *v.* Cole and others, L. R. 10 Q. B. 549 ; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153 ; 33 L. T. 12 ; *ante*, pp. 112 - 117.

<sup>5</sup> Broome *v.* Gosden, 1 C. B. 728 ; R. *v.* Barnard, *Times* for December 17th, 1878, *post*, p. 593.

(a) If the words do not plainly indicate the fact it should be alleged that they were spoken of the plaintiff. Geisler *v.* Brown, 6 Neb. 254 ; Milligan *v.* Thorn, 6 Wend. 412 ; Sayre *v.* Jewett, 12 Wend. 135 ; Baldwin *v.* Hildreth, 14 Gray, 221 ; Lewis *v.* Black, 27 Miss. 425.

(b) See *ante*, p. 94, note ; Smart *v.* Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137 ; Mix *v.* Wood-

ward, 12 Conn. 262 ; Goodrich *v.* Davis, 11 Met. 473 ; Miller *v.* Butler, 6 Cush. 71 ; Leonard *v.* Allen, 11 Cush. 241 ; McLaughlin *v.* Russell, 17 Ohio, 475 ; Smagley *v.* Stark, 9 Ind. 386 ; Tompkins *v.* Wisener, 1 Sneed, 558 ; Morgan *v.* Livingston, 2 Rich. 573 ; Russell *v.* Kelly, 44 Cal. 641 ; Howe Machine Co. *v.* Souder, 58 Ga. 64. But see Snell *v.* Snow, 13

libel; it is sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff, can make out that he is the person meant.<sup>1</sup> [In *Eastwood v. Holmes*,<sup>2</sup> Willes, J., would not allow a witness to be asked, "To whom did you understand the words to apply?" on the ground that that was *the* question for the jury. But the circumstances of that case were peculiar.] Evidence that the plaintiff was jeered at at a public meeting is admissible to show that his neighbors understood the libel as referring to him.<sup>3</sup> So, in *Du Bost v. Beresford*,<sup>4</sup> Lord Ellenborough held that the declarations made by spectators, while they were looking at a libellous caricature, were admissible in evidence to show whom the figures were intended to represent.

\* 541 \* *Proof that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or trade.*

It is not enough for the plaintiff to prove his special character, and that the words refer to himself; he must further prove that the words refer to himself in that special character, if they be not otherwise actionable. It is a question for the jury whether the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or trade. It is by no means necessary that the defendant should expressly name the plaintiff's office or trade at the time he spoke, if his words must necessarily affect the plaintiff's credit and reputation therein.<sup>5</sup> But often words may be spoken of a professional man which, though defamatory, in no way affect him in his profession, *e.g.*, an imputation that an attorney had been horsewhipped off the course at Doncaster,<sup>6</sup> or that a physician had committed adultery.<sup>7</sup> But any imputation on the solvency of a trader, any suggestion that he had been bankrupt years ago, is clearly a reflection on him in the way of his trade.<sup>8</sup>

*Evidence of Malice.*

The judge must decide whether the occasion is or is not privileged, and also whether such privilege is absolute or qualified. (a) If he decide that

<sup>1</sup> *Bourke v. Warren*, 2 C. & P. 310.

<sup>2</sup> 1 F. & F. 349.

<sup>3</sup> *Cook v. Ward*, 4 M. & P. 99; 6 Bing. 412.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Camp. 511.

<sup>5</sup> *Jones v. Littler*, 7 M. & W. 423; 10 L. J. Ex. 171. See *ante*, p. 124.

<sup>6</sup> *Doyley v. Roberts*, 3 Bing. N. C. 835; 5 Scott, 40; 3 Hodges, 154; *ante*, p. 75.

<sup>7</sup> *Ayre v. Craven*, 2 A. & E. 2; 4 N. & M. 220; *ante*, p. 76. See further, *ante*, pp. 65-69.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 78, 79.

*Met.* 278; *Rangler v. Hummel*, 37 Penn. St. 130; *Briggs v. Byrd*, 11 Ind. 353; *White v. Sayward*, 33 Maine, 322; *Gibson v. Williams*, 4 Wend. 320; *Van Vechten v. Hopkins*, 5 Johns. 211.

(a) Malice may be proved before any attempt is made to rebut it. *Langton v. Hagerty*, 35 Wis. 150.

the occasion was one of absolute privilege, the defendant is entitled to judgment, however maliciously and treacherously he may have acted. If, however, the privilege was only qualified, the *onus* lies on the plaintiff of proving actual malice.<sup>1</sup> This he may do either by *extrinsic* evidence of personal ill-feeling,<sup>2</sup> or by *intrinsic* evidence, such as the exaggerated language of the libel, the mode and extent of publication, and other matters in excess of the privilege.<sup>3</sup> Any other words written or spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, and indeed all previous transactions or communications \* between the parties, are evidence on this issue. The \* 542 defendant often makes the mistake of cross-examining the plaintiff severely on such previous matters, with the view no doubt of showing that in all these transactions the plaintiff was solely to blame. The jury, as a rule, will hold both parties to a silly quarrel equally blameworthy. But even if they adopt the defendant's view that all the provocation was given by the plaintiff, that will only tell against the defendant. For such provocation must produce a feeling of resentment, or at least of injured innocence, in the defendant's mind; and if, under the influence of such feeling, he writes or speaks a falsehood of his late antagonist, such falsehood will probably be deemed spiteful and malicious.

A plea of justification, if neither abandoned nor proved, will be evidence of malice, if there be any other circumstance in the case suggesting malice, but not otherwise. Care must be taken in citing *Simpson v. Robinson*,<sup>4</sup> to refer to the judgments of the Court; as the headnote is declared misleading by Willes, J., in *Caulfield v. Whitworth*.<sup>5</sup> Proof that the plaintiff at the time of publication knew that what he was saying or writing was false, is proof positive of malice. Proof that in fact the words were false is no evidence of malice; the falsity of the words is indeed always presumed in the plaintiff's favor. The plaintiff's counsel may, if he chooses, in the first instance rebut the justification; but it is generally safer to leave such proof till the reply, as he will then know the strength of defendant's case. But he cannot, in the absence of special circumstances, call some evidence to rebut the justification in the first instance, and more afterwards, thus dividing his proof.<sup>6</sup>

If no justification be pleaded, and yet the plaintiff's counsel gives evidence of the falsity of the libel, this will let in evidence on the other side of the truth of the statement.<sup>7</sup>

The plaintiff cannot, as a rule, give any evidence of his own good character.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Clark v. Molyneux*, (C. A.) 3 Q. B. D. 237; 47 L. J. Q. B. 230; 26 W. R. 104; 37 L. T. 694.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 271-277.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 277-288.

<sup>4</sup> 12 Q. B. 511.

<sup>6</sup> 16 W. R. 936; 18 L. T. 526.

<sup>6</sup> *Brown v. Murray*, R. & M. 254.

<sup>7</sup> Per Lord Ellenborough in *Brown v. Croome*, 2 Stark. 298, 299.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, p. 298.

*Evidence of Damage.*

The plaintiff need give no evidence of any actual damage where \* 543 the words are actionable *per se*; he will nevertheless be \* entitled to substantial damages.<sup>1</sup> But if the plaintiff has suffered any special damage, this should be pleaded and proved. It cannot be proved unless it has been pleaded.<sup>2</sup>

Where words are not actionable *per se*, the plaintiff cannot prove a general loss of custom; he must call individual customers and friends to state why they have ceased to deal at his shop, or to entertain him. Such witnesses cannot, however, be called unless their names have been set out in the statement of claim or the particulars. It must also be proved that they heard of the charge against the plaintiff from the defendant, and from no one else. It will not be sufficient to prove that they heard a rumor, and that the defendant set such a rumor afloat.<sup>3</sup>

The plaintiff may also call evidence in aggravation of damages.<sup>4</sup>

*Nonsuit.*

At the close of plaintiff's case, the defendant's counsel sometimes submits to the judge that there is no case for him to answer.

The judge should nonsuit the plaintiff, or direct a verdict for the defendant:—

(1.) If there is no evidence that the defendant published the words. If the Statute of Limitations be pleaded, the plaintiff must prove a publication within the period prescribed.

(2.) If there is no evidence that the words refer to the plaintiff.

(3.) If the words proved are not actionable *per se*, and there is no evidence of any special damage.

(4.) If the words are actionable by reason only of their being spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or trade, and there is no evidence that the words were so spoken, or that the plaintiff held such office or exercised such profession or trade at the time of publication.

\* 544 (5.) If the words are not actionable in their natural and \* primary signification, and there is no innuendo; or if the only innuendo puts upon the words a meaning that they cannot possibly bear. If, however, it is reasonably conceivable by reason of any facts known to those

<sup>1</sup> Tripp v. Thomas, 3 B. & C. 427; Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212.

<sup>2</sup> As to what constitutes special damage, see *ante*, pp. 308–320. As to what damage is too remote, see *ante*, pp. 321–333.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, pp. 314, 328; Dixon v. Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125; Bateman v. Lyall, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 638.

<sup>4</sup> As to which see *ante*, pp. 296–298.

addressed that they might have put upon the words the secondary meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo, then it would be a question for the jury in which meaning the words were in fact understood. Whenever the words, though primarily not actionable, are yet reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, the judge should not stop the case; if he does so, the Divisional Court will order a new trial.<sup>1</sup> "It is only when the judge is satisfied that the publication *cannot* be a libel, and that, if it is found by the jury to be such, their verdict will be set aside, that he is justified in withdrawing the question from their cognizance."<sup>2</sup> Where the words of the libel are ambiguous, allegorical, or in any way equivocal, and the jury have found that they were meant and used in a defamatory sense, the Court will not set aside their verdict, unless it can be clearly shown that on reading the whole passage, there is no possible ground for the construction put upon it by the jury.<sup>3</sup> But where the words are not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning, there the judge will be right in directing a nonsuit.<sup>4</sup>

(6.) If the occasion of publication was one of absolute privilege.

(7.) If the occasion is clearly or admittedly one of qualified privilege, and there is no evidence, or not more than a *scintilla* of evidence, to go to the jury of express malice. If the evidence adduced to prove malice is equally consistent with either the existence or the non-existence of malice, the judge should stop the case; for there is nothing to rebut the presumption which the privileged occasion has raised in the defendant's favor.<sup>5</sup>

(8.) Where, however, the question of privilege involves \* matters \* 545 of fact which are disputed, it will be for the jury to find the facts, and for the judge subsequently to decide whether on the facts so found the occasion is privileged.<sup>6</sup>

Under the former practice a nonsuit did not estop the plaintiff from bringing a second action, though such second action might, on application, be stayed till he had paid the costs of the first.<sup>7</sup> But now, by Order XLI. r. 6, judgment of nonsuit is equivalent to a judgment on the merits for the defendant, unless the Court or a judge otherwise directs. Whenever the

<sup>1</sup> Hart and another v. Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373.

<sup>2</sup> Per Kelly, C.B., L. R. 4 Exch. at p. 288.

<sup>3</sup> Hoare v. Silverlock, 12 Q. B. 624; 17 L. J. Q. B. 306; Fray v. Fray, 17 C. B. N. S. 603; 34 L. J. C. P. 45; 10 Jur. N. S. 1153.

<sup>4</sup> Hunt v. Goodlake, 43 L. J. C. P. 54; 29 L. T. 472; Mulligan v. Cole and others, L. R. 10 Q. B. 549; 44 L. J. Q. B. 153; 33 L. T. 12; *ante*, p. 117.

<sup>5</sup> Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 583; 20 L. J. C. P. 131; 15 Jur. 450; Harris v. Thompson, 13 C. B. 333.

<sup>6</sup> Beatson v. Skene, 5 H. & N. 838; 29 L. J. Ex. 430; 6 Jur. N. S. 780; 2 L. T. 378.

<sup>7</sup> Hoare v. Dickson, 7 C. B. 164; 18 L. J. C. P. 158; Prowse v. Loxdale, 3 B. & S. 896; 32 L. J. Q. B. 227.

nonsuit is caused merely by some failure in the formal proof of plaintiff's case, the plaintiff's counsel should apply to the judge to direct a common law nonsuit, not on the merits. The defendant is entitled to his costs on a nonsuit, unless the judge expressly orders otherwise.

The judge at the trial has full power to amend any defect or error in any pleading or proceeding on such terms as may seem just.<sup>1</sup>

### *Evidence for the Defendant.*

The defendant, as we have seen, is entitled to have the whole libel read or the whole of the conversation, in which the slander was uttered, detailed in evidence. If the alleged libel refers to any other document, the defendant is also entitled to have that document read, as part of the plaintiff's case.<sup>2</sup> So where the action is brought for a criticism on the plaintiff's book, no imputation being cast on him personally, it was held that the plaintiff ought to put in the book criticised as part of his own case.<sup>3</sup> This will save the defendant from the necessity of giving any evidence. But where a paragraph in a subsequent number of a newspaper is given in evidence by the plaintiff to show malice, the rest of the newspaper is no part of plaintiff's case, unless it refers to the special paragraph put

\* 546 in. The defendant is therefore not \*entitled to have other passages in that newspaper read.<sup>4</sup>

The defendant's counsel often prefers not to call any witnesses, so as to have the last word with the jury. He must rely, instead, on the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses. These should often be cross-examined not only as to the facts of the case, but also "to credit;" that is, they should be cross-examined as to matters not material to the issue, with a view of shaking their whole testimony. But in order to prevent the case from thus branching out into all manner of irrelevant issues, it is wisely provided that on such matters the defendant must take the witness's answer: he cannot call any evidence to contradict it. There is one exception. By section 24 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, if a witness in any cause be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, and if he either denies the fact, or refuses to answer, the opposite party may prove such conviction, however irrelevant the fact of such conviction may be to the matter in issue in the cause.<sup>5</sup> The right method of proving a conviction at the Assizes or Quarter Ses-

<sup>1</sup> Order XXVII. r. 6; Order LIX. r. 2, R. S. C., April, 1880, r. 44.

<sup>2</sup> *Weaver v. Lloyd*, 2 C. & P. 296; *Thornton v. Stephen*, 2 M. & Rob. 45; *Hedley v. Barlow and another*, 4 F. & F. 227.

<sup>3</sup> *Strauss v. Francis*, 4 F. & F. 939, 1107.

<sup>4</sup> *Darby v. Ouseley*, 11 H. & N. 1; 25 L. J. Ex. 227.

<sup>5</sup> *Ward v. Sinfield*, 43 L. T. 253.

sions, either for this purpose, or as evidence under a plea of justification, is by a certificate under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 25, containing the substance and effect of the indictment and conviction, but omitting the formal parts. If, however, the conviction was at petty sessions only, then it was decided, in *Hartley v. Hindmarsh*,<sup>1</sup> that either the record itself must be produced, or an examined copy of it. This involves the trouble and expense of having the record duly made up for the purpose.<sup>2</sup> But since that decision, the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871,<sup>3</sup> has become law : and though the Act applies entirely to criminal proceedings, yet s. 18 contains the words "in any legal proceeding whatever." As a rule, therefore, no objection is made to the admissibility in civil proceedings of a certificate under that section ; although the point has never yet been decided, and is certainly open to argument.

The defendant must be careful, however, not to increase, by such cross-examination, the amount of damages that may be \*given \* 547 against him. Thus where the libel consisted of comments in a newspaper on a criminal trial, in which the plaintiff was acquitted, and the defendant's counsel put to the plaintiff a series of questions tending to show that he really had been guilty of the crime with which he was charged, such a course of cross-examination was held a serious aggravation of the libel.<sup>4</sup>

Either party may use in evidence at the trial any one or more of the answers of the opposite party to interrogatories, without putting in the others : but the judge may direct any others to be put in.<sup>5</sup>

Where the words are actionable only because they were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his trade, the defendant may show that such trade is illegal ;<sup>6</sup> and it is no objection to such evidence that it also indirectly proves the truth of the defendant's words.<sup>7</sup>

Where it is not alleged that the defendant is the author of the libel, he may give evidence to show that he published it innocently without any knowledge of its contents, as where a porter delivered a sealed packet.<sup>8</sup> But in most cases such evidence will only tend to mitigate the damages ; it will not be a defence to the action.<sup>9</sup>

The defendant's counsel may also urge that the occasion of publication was privileged.<sup>10</sup> If the facts necessary to raise this defence are not already in evidence, he must call witnesses to prove them. Thus it is often neces-

<sup>1</sup> L. R. 1 C. P. 553 ; 35 L. J. M. C. 255 ; 12 Jur. N. S. 502 ; 14 W. R. 862 ; 13 L. T. 795.

<sup>2</sup> Per Byles, J., L. R. 1 C. P., at p. 556.

<sup>3</sup> 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112.

<sup>4</sup> *Risk Allah Bey v. Whitehurst*, 18 L. T. 615.

<sup>5</sup> Order XXXI. r. 23.

<sup>6</sup> *Hurst v. Bell*, 1 Bing. 1.

<sup>7</sup> *Manning v. Clement*, 7 Bing. 362, 368 ; 5 M. & P. 211.

<sup>8</sup> *Day v. Bream*, 2 M. & Rob. 54.

<sup>9</sup> See *ante*, pp. 160, 384.

<sup>10</sup> See *ante*, c. VIII., pp. 182-263.

sary to put the defendant himself in the box to state the facts as they were presented to him at the date of publication, the information which he received and on which he acted, and all surrounding circumstances. He will also state that he acted *bond fide*, and under a sense of duty. But there is danger in calling the defendant in such a case: he will be severely cross-examined, and may let slip some observation which will be seized upon as evidence of malice. It is better, if possible, by denying the fact of publication, to compel the plaintiff to call those to whom the defendant wrote or spoke, and to elicit from them, in cross-examination, circumstances which show that the occasion was privileged. Statements

\* 548 made \* to the defendant behind the plaintiff's back, and acts to which he was no party, are admissible in evidence on this issue to show the state of the defendant's mind at the moment when he spoke or wrote the words.

The defendant may also give evidence of antecedent conversations and transactions, or other circumstances well known to the bystanders, which show that the words were not used in their ordinary signification. Thus they may have been uttered in joke; or the preceding part of the conversation may limit or qualify the words sued on. But the defendant cannot give in evidence some particular transaction which he had in his mind at the time he spoke, but to which he did not expressly refer, and which was unknown to the person addressed.<sup>1</sup> For the question which the jury have to determine is not "What did the defendant intend?" but "What would a reasonable person have understood from the language used?" So, too, where a libel is unambiguous in itself, and does not refer to any other writing, the defendant cannot use any other writing for the purpose of explaining away its meaning.

The defendant may also prove a justification. The attempt, if unsuccessful, will aggravate the damages. Strict proof must be given of the whole charge made and of the precise charge made. Sometimes a libel contains two or more distinct and severable charges against the plaintiff: if so, it will tend in mitigation if the defendant can prove any one of such charges true.<sup>2</sup> If the charge made against the plaintiff is that he was *convicted* of an offence, then such conviction may be proved in the manner stated.<sup>3</sup> So, too, where the libel consists of an incorrect statement of a conviction of the plaintiff by a magistrate, the plaintiff may, with a view of the assessment of damages, enter into all the circumstances which led to the conviction, although such evidence tends to show that the conviction

<sup>1</sup> *Hankinson v. Bilby*, 16 M. & W. 442; 2 C. & K. 440; *Martin v. Loei*, 2 F. & F. 654; *ante*, pp. 107-9.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 176.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 546. See *Alexander v. North-Eastern Railway Co.*, 6 B. & S. 340; 34 L. J. Q. B. 152; 13 W. R. 651.



was erroneous.<sup>1</sup> If, however, the imputation is that the plaintiff has committed a crime, then the charge must be proved as strictly as on an indictment for the same offence. And here, \* the fact that the \* 549 plaintiff had been previously tried and acquitted, or convicted, is irrelevant; and the record of the criminal trial is not admissible in evidence either way, for the parties are not the same.<sup>2</sup>

Where no justification is pleaded, the defendant can give no evidence of the truth of his words, not even in mitigation of damages.<sup>3</sup> But evidence admissible and pertinent under another issue cannot be excluded merely because it happens incidentally to prove the truth of the libel.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if the defendant has pleaded privilege, he may show that he reasonably and *bonâ fide* believed in the truth of the charge he made, and it is no objection that the grounds of his belief were so forcible as to convince every reasonable man of the plaintiff's guilt.

If the present defendant is liable, the fact that some one else is also liable is of course no defence. The plaintiff may at his option sue one or all in the same or in different actions. And the fact that such other actions are pending should not be mentioned to the jury. Thus, if an author be sued for a libel he has composed, it is no defence that the publisher has been already sued and heavy damages recovered against him in another action.<sup>5</sup> So too, that others have previously published the same charges against the plaintiff and have *not* been sued, is no justification for the defendant's republication. Still less is it any evidence of the truth of such charges.<sup>6</sup> If, however, the libel purports on the face of it to be derived from a certain newspaper, the defendant may prove in mitigation of damages that a paragraph to the same effect had appeared in that newspaper.<sup>7</sup> The defendant may not give evidence that there was a rumor current to the same effect as the words he spoke.<sup>8</sup>

\* *Withdrawing a Juror.*

\* 550

Actions of defamation are often compromised before the judge comes to sum up the evidence. A juror is often withdrawn, sometimes at the

<sup>1</sup> *Gwynn v. South-Eastern Railway Co.*, 18 L. T. 738.

<sup>2</sup> *Justice v. Gosling and others*, 12 C. B. 39; 21 L. J. C. P. 94; *England v. Bourke*, 3 Esp. 80.

<sup>3</sup> *Smith v. Richardson*, Willes, 20.

<sup>4</sup> *Manning v. Clement*, 7 Bing. 362, 368; 5 M. & P. 211.

<sup>5</sup> *Frescoe v. May*, 2 F. & F. 123; *Harrison v. Pearce*, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Newman*, 1 E. & B. 268; 21 L. J. Q. B. 156; 3 C. & K. 252; *Dears. C. C.* 85; 17 Jur. 617.

<sup>7</sup> *Wyatt v. Gore*, 1 Holt, N. P. 303; see also *ante*, p. 302, 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ante*, pp. 304-6. As to the proof of a plea under Lord Campbell's Act see *ante*, p. 300; — as to other evidence in mitigation of damages, see *ante*, pp. 301-8.

suggestion of the judge. This means that neither party cares for the case to proceed. If no special terms are agreed on, the effect of withdrawing a juror is that the action is at an end, that no fresh action can be brought on the same libel or slander, and that each party pays his own costs.<sup>1</sup> If any other terms be agreed on, they should be indorsed on counsels' briefs, and each indorsement signed by the leading counsel on both sides. The terms of such a compromise will be strictly enforced, if necessary by an order of the Court.<sup>2</sup> Counsel have full authority to make such a compromise, unless expressly forbidden to do so by the client at the time.<sup>3</sup>

### *Summing-up.*

The judge now sums up the facts of the case to the jury, and directs them as to the law. He is not bound to state to the jury, as matter of law, whether the publication complained of be a libel or not.<sup>4</sup> The proper course is for him to define what is a libel in point of law, and to leave it to the jury to say whether the publication in question falls within that definition.<sup>5</sup> The jury are bound to take the judge's definition of a libel, and decide in accordance therewith.<sup>6</sup> Though the question for the jury "Libel or no libel" is not precisely the same as "What is the legal definition of an actionable libel?"<sup>7</sup> The question for the jury is *not* "Did the defendant intend to injure the plaintiff?" but, "Has he in fact injured the plaintiff's reputation?"

\* 551 \* Where other libels, &c., have been given in evidence to prove express malice, the judge should caution the jury not to give any damages in respect of them.<sup>8</sup> But the omission of the judge to give such caution is not a misdirection.<sup>9</sup>

Either party had formerly the power of excepting to the direction of the judge at the trial on a point of law. This was done by tendering to the judge a bill of exceptions before verdict, which was then annexed to the record, so that the point could be raised at once in a Court of Error. But now, by Order LVIII. r. 1, bills of exceptions and proceedings in error are abolished. But by s. 22 of the Judicature Act, 1875, a very similar method

<sup>1</sup> See *Strauss v. Francis*, 4 F. & F. 939, 1107; 15 L. T. 674.

<sup>2</sup> *Riley v. Byrne*, 2 B. & Ad. 779; *Tardrew v. Brook*, 5 B. & Ad. 880.

<sup>3</sup> *Strauss v. Francis*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 379; 35 L. J. Q. B. 133; 12 Jur. N. S. 486; 14 W. R. 634; 14 L. T. 326; *Davis v. Davis*, 13 Ch. D. 861; 28 W. R. 345.

<sup>4</sup> *Baylis v. Lawrence*, 11 A. & E. 920; *Hearne v. Stowell*, 12 A. & E. 719; 11 L. J. Q. B. 25; 4 P. & D. 696.

<sup>5</sup> *Parmiter v. Coupland and another*, 6 M. & W. 105.

<sup>6</sup> *Levi v. Milne*, 4 Bing. 195; 12 Moore, 418.

<sup>7</sup> Per Barry, J., in *Stannus v. Finlay*, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 264.

<sup>8</sup> *Pearson v. Lemaitre*, 5 M. & Gr. 700.

<sup>9</sup> *Darby v. Ouseley*, 1 H. & N. 1; 25 L. J. Ex. 229.

is provided. That section enacts that nothing in either Judicature Act "shall take away or prejudice the right of any party to any action to have the issues for trial by jury submitted and left by the judge to the jury before whom the same shall come for trial, with a proper and complete direction to the jury upon the law, and as to the evidence applicable to such issues. Provided also that the said right may be enforced by motion in the Court of Appeal founded upon an exception entered upon or annexed to the record."

Thus, whenever the judge, on a point of law, directs a verdict to be entered for either party, the other party may still tender exceptions to such ruling, and the judge should then be asked to order such exceptions to be annexed to the record. The proper mode of bringing before the Court of Appeal exceptions to the ruling of a judge in directing a jury, is to give an ordinary notice of motion of appeal against the judge's ruling, stating the point intended to be raised.<sup>1</sup> Such exceptions must be tendered before verdict, so as to give the judge an opportunity of reforming his direction, if he thinks fit.<sup>2</sup>

### *Verdict.*

The jury now consider their verdict. They should look to the whole of the publication to see whether it is calculated to \* injure \* 552 the plaintiff's character, not study detached and isolated sentences. The conclusion may modify the commencement, and if so, "the bane and antidote must be taken together."<sup>3</sup>

Where the words are actionable *per se*, the amount of damages is entirely a matter for the jury. They may consider the libel itself, the mode and extent of publication, and the express malice evinced by the defendant. Also in an action against a newspaper, they may have regard to the gross negligence shown by the editor in allowing the libel to appear in print.<sup>4</sup> The jury must assess the damages once for all, as no fresh action can be brought for any subsequent damage.<sup>5</sup> And in assessing the damages, the jury should not regard at all the question of costs.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cheese v. Lovejoy*, (C.A.) 2 P. D. 161; 46 L. J. P. D. & A. 67; 25 W. R. 453; 37 L. T. 294.

<sup>2</sup> *Rutter v. Chapman*, 8 M. & W. 38; *Armstrong v. Lewis*, 2 Cr. & M. 274.

<sup>3</sup> Per Alderson, B., in *Chalmers v. Payne*, 2 C. M. & R. 159; see also *Hunt v. Algar* and others, 6 C. & P. 245; *R. v. Lambert and Perry*, 2 Camp. 398.

<sup>4</sup> *Smith v. Harrison*, 1 F. & F. 565.

<sup>5</sup> *Fitter v. Veal*, 12 Mod. 542; B. N. P. 7; *Gregory and another v. Williams*, 1 C. & K. 568.

<sup>6</sup> *Poole v. Whitcomb*, 12 C. B. N. S. 770; *Levi v. Milne*, 4 Bing. 195; 12 Moore, 418.

*Judgment.*

The judge at the trial may

- (1.) direct that judgment be entered for any or either party,
- or (2.) adjourn the case for further consideration,
- or (3.) leave any party to move for judgment.

No judgment shall be entered after a trial without the order of a Court or judge.<sup>1</sup> From the repeal of the former rule 22, it may be inferred that the judge should no longer enter judgment, subject to leave to move. At all events it is not the practice now to give either party leave to move.

If the judge direct judgment to be entered for either party absolutely, then if the officer present at the trial be not the proper officer to enter judgment, the associate's certificate will be authority to the proper officer,<sup>2</sup> a full copy of the pleadings being delivered to him, to enter judgment in a book kept for the purpose.<sup>3</sup> And thereupon execution will issue forthwith, unless it be stayed.<sup>4</sup> There is no need to ask for speedy execution.

\* 553 \* Where the judge leaves either party to move for judgment, the plaintiff should set the case down and give notice of motion within ten days after the trial; if he omit to do so the defendant may do so himself.<sup>5</sup> At least two clear days' notice of motion must be given.<sup>6</sup>

If the plaintiff move for judgment, the judge has full power on that motion to direct judgment to be entered for the defendant.

Further considerations and motions for judgment must now take place before the judge who tried the case.<sup>7</sup> They are in fact but a prolongation of the *Nisi Prius* trial. The judge has no longer any power, apparently, to reserve any point for the consideration of a Divisional Court, or to direct any point to be argued before a Divisional Court.<sup>8</sup> He must decide the point himself one way or the other, and leave the parties to appeal if they wish to do so.

*Costs.*

There is no longer any need to ask for a certificate for the general costs of the suit. The successful party now gets his costs as of right, unless the judge deprives him of them for good cause shown.<sup>9</sup> Thus if there be a verdict for the plaintiff for nominal damages only, his counsel should say

<sup>1</sup> Order XXXVI. r. 22a, R. S. C. December, 1876, r. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Order XXXVI. r. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Order XII. r. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Order XLII. r. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Order XL. r. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Order LIII. r. 4; *Roupell v. Parsons*, 24 W. R. 269; 34 L. T. 56.

<sup>7</sup> Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 59, s. 17; Order LVIIA., R. S. C., December, 1876, rr. 8, 9.

<sup>8</sup> Judicature Act, 1873, s. 46; 1875, s. 22.

<sup>9</sup> Order LV. r. 1, *ante*, c. XI. p. 334.

nothing about costs; it is the duty of the defendant's counsel to ask the judge to interfere. But it is otherwise with special costs, such as costs of a special jury, of a commission to take evidence abroad, or of photographic copies of the libel: the party who has required these will have to pay for them unless he obtain an order for their allowance on taxation before judgment is entered.<sup>1</sup> If a married woman having general separate estate fail in an action of libel, she may be condemned in costs, although her husband was joined with her as a co-plaintiff or a co-defendant.<sup>2</sup>

*\* Proceedings after Judgment.*

\* 554

After a judgment has been entered by order of the judge, there seem now to be only three possible courses open to the unsuccessful party. He may

(1.) Move in the Divisional Court for a new trial under Order XXXIX.

(2.) Move in the Court of Appeal to set aside the judgment on the ground that on the verdict, as entered, the judgment directed was wrong,<sup>3</sup> or upon exceptions annexed to the record.<sup>4</sup>

(3.) Apply to a Master at Chambers under Order XLII. r. 22, for a stay of execution or for other relief against such judgment, upon the ground of facts which have arisen too late to be pleaded. This is in lieu of the antiquated proceeding by *audita querelâ*: but it can very seldom be necessary to make such an application, regard being had to the extensive powers given by Order XX. of pleading matters which have arisen since action brought.

There seems to be now no case in which, after judgment entered, a party can move the Divisional Court for judgment. Order XL. r. 2 is practically abolished by Order XXXVI. r. 22a, R. S. C., Dec. 1876, r. 3, which seems to take away from the judge the power of ordering judgment to be entered subject to leave to move. Motions for judgment must in fact be made either to the judge who tried the case, sitting alone, or to the Court of Appeal.<sup>5</sup> Motions for judgment *non obstante veredicto* and motions in arrest of judgment are now obsolete, if not abolished. Nor is any repleader any longer necessary, as by Order XL. r. 10 the Court has power,

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 337.

<sup>2</sup> *Newton and wife v. Boodle and others*, 4 C. B. 359; 18 L. J. C. P. 73; *Morris v. Freeman*, 3 P. D. 65; 47 L. J. P. D. & A. 79; 27 W. R. 62; 39 L. T. 125; and see the remarks of Jessel, M.R., in *Besant v. Wood*, 12 Ch. D. 630; 40 L. T. 453.

<sup>3</sup> Order XL. r. 4a, R. S. C., Dec. 1876, r. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Judicature Act, 1875, s. 22, *ante*, p. 551.

<sup>5</sup> See Order LVIIA, R. S. C., Dec. 1876, rr. 8, 9, which altered the previous practice in order to give effect to the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 59, s. 17.

upon a motion for judgment or for a new trial, to direct issues or questions to be tried or determined.

There has sometimes been a difficulty in deciding whether application should be made to the Divisional Court or to the Court of Appeal. The most obvious test appears to be this :—Does the party applying complain of the verdict, or of the judgment entered on that verdict? If his \* 555 contention is that \* accepting the findings of the jury as correct, still the judgment as entered is wrong, then he must move the Court of Appeal. If on the other hand he complains of the verdict as recorded, then, although the judge directed such verdict, he must apply to the Divisional Court within the time allowed for a new trial.<sup>1</sup>

Whenever the judgment is right, if the verdict is right, the application must be to the Divisional Court; for the Court of Appeal has no power in the first instance to review the finding of a jury.<sup>2</sup> Thus if on the trial of an action for libel, the counsel for the defendant asks the judge to nonsuit the plaintiff or to direct a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there is no evidence to go to the jury in support of the plaintiff's case, then, whether the judge grants or refuses this application, the only course by which his decision can be reviewed is by motion for a new trial in the Divisional Court.<sup>3</sup> A nonsuit is for this purpose considered as of the same effect as a judgment directed by the judge in the defendant's favor: although in the former case there is no finding by the jury.<sup>4</sup> But Thesiger, L.J., guarded himself from giving any opinion as to the case where a nonsuit is directed on admitted facts entered on the judge's notes. Here, as the jury decide nothing, it is substantially a trial by the judge alone, and if so, the application should perhaps be made to the Court of Appeal.

These distinctions are important, because the parties, as a rule, do not make up their mind to move for a new trial till after it is too late to make the application, and then endeavor to appeal instead. But apart from the rules as to time, the matter is one rather of name than of substance. For when, in an action tried by a jury, the judge has given judgment for one party on the findings of the jury, and the other party has, without appealing from such judgment, moved the Divisional Court for a new \* 556 trial either on the ground of misdirection by \* the judge, or on the ground that the findings are against the weight of evidence; the Divisional Court has power under Order XL. r. 10, on the argument, to set

<sup>1</sup> *Yetts and another v. Foster* (C. A.), 3 C. P. D. 437; 26 W. R. 745; 38 L. T. 742.

<sup>2</sup> *Davies and others v. Felix and others* (C. A.), 4 Ex. D. 32; 48 L. J. Ex. 3; 27 W. R. 108; 39 L. T. 322.

<sup>3</sup> *Davies and others v. Felix and others*, *supra*; *Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty and Sons*, 28 W. R. 490; 42 L. T. 314; (C. A.) 5 C. P. D. 514; 49 L. J. C. P. 830; 28 W. R. 851; *Etty v. Wilson* (C. A.), 3 Ex. D. 359; 47 L. J. Ex. 664; 39 L. T. 83.

<sup>4</sup> *Etty v. Wilson*, *supra*.

aside the judgment entered and enter final judgment for the party unsuccessful at the trial, if they are of opinion that the findings and the judgment at the trial cannot stand, and if they have before them all the materials necessary for finally determining the questions in dispute.<sup>1</sup> So, too, if the unsuccessful party moves for judgment in the Court of Appeal, and that Court is dissatisfied with the findings as to any matter of fact, it may, in a proper case, set aside the verdict and the judgment entered thereon, and direct that a new trial shall be had.<sup>2</sup>

*Application for a New Trial.*

Applications for new trials shall be by motion [for an order] calling on the opposite party to show cause at the expiration of eight days from the date of the order, or so soon after as the case can be heard, why a new trial should not be directed. Such motion shall be made within the times following, unless the Court, or a judge, shall enlarge the time :—

An application to a Divisional Court for a new trial, if the trial has taken place in London or Westminster, shall be made within four days after the trial, or on the first subsequent day on which a Divisional Court, to which the application may be made, shall have actually sat to hear motions. If the trial has taken place elsewhere than in London or Middlesex, the motion shall be made within seven days after the last day of sitting on the circuits for England and Wales during which the action shall have been tried, or within the first four days of the next following sittings, if such day occurs during or within a week immediately before vacation.<sup>3</sup>

Where an action is commenced in one of the Common Law Divisions, and the trial takes place before a judge of another Division, the cause shall from that time be transferred to the Division of which such judge is a member.<sup>4</sup> \* Any application for a new trial must be \* 557 made to a Divisional Court of that division, if the trial was by a jury. If, however, the trial was by the judge without a jury, the application for a new trial must be made direct to the Court of Appeal.<sup>5</sup>

If a *prima facie* case be made out, an order *nisi* will be granted, a copy of which must be served on the opposite side within four days.<sup>6</sup> Such order *nisi* will be a stay of proceedings unless a special order be made to the contrary.<sup>7</sup> The grounds on which such order is granted should be

<sup>1</sup> Hamilton & Co. v. Johnson & Co. (C. A.), 5 Q. B. D. 263 ; 49 L. J. Q. B. 155 ; 28 W. R. 879 ; 41 L. T. 461.

<sup>2</sup> Order LVIII. r. 5a, R. S. C., April, 1879, r. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Order XXXIX. r. 1b, R. S. C., March, 1879, r. 6 ; Grant v. Holland, 49 L. J. Q. B. 800 ; 29 W. R. 32.

<sup>4</sup> Order V. r. 4a, R. S. C., March, 1879, r. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Order XXXIX. r. 1a, R. S. C., Dec. 1876, r. 5.

<sup>6</sup> Order XXXIX. i. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.* r. 5.

stated in it. After full argument the order will be either discharged or made absolute.

An application for a new trial may be made on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence, that the damages are excessive or inadequate, or on the ground of misdirection or surprise. That no notice of trial was given, or that the jury misbehaved, may also be ground for a new trial.

But a new trial will not be granted on the ground of misdirection or improper admission or rejection of evidence, if the party showing cause can satisfy the Court that no substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned.<sup>1</sup> And then the Court may grant a new trial as to so much of the matter only as the miscarriage affects, without interfering with the decision upon any other question.<sup>2</sup> So too the Court may grant a new trial as against one defendant without granting it as to all; though notice of the order *nisi* must be served on all.<sup>3</sup>

The question of libel or no libel is pre-eminently one for a jury; the Court will rarely interfere to set aside a verdict or grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence; especially where the question left to the jury was whether the matter complained of was or was not fair comment on the acts of a public man.<sup>4</sup> And whenever

the words are fairly susceptible both of an innocent and of an acc-  
\* 558 tionable meaning, the finding \* of the jury is final; whichever construction they may have placed upon the words will be upheld.<sup>5</sup>

"The Court never, or very rarely, grants new trials in actions for words."<sup>6</sup>

A new trial will, however, be granted when the matter complained of is clearly libellous, and there is no question as to the fact of publication, or as to its application to the plaintiff, and yet the jury have perversely found a verdict for the defendant, in spite of the summing-up of the learned judge.<sup>7</sup> But unless the jury are manifestly wrong, unless the Court can say with certainty that there has been a miscarriage of justice, no new trial will be granted.<sup>8</sup> If the judge directs the jury that the publication is in law a

<sup>1</sup> Order XXXIX. r. 3; *Anthony v. Halstead*, 37 L. T. 433; *Faund v. Wallace*, 35 L. T. 361.

<sup>2</sup> *Marsh v. Isaacs*, 45 L. J. C. P. 505.

<sup>3</sup> *Price v. Harris*, 10 Bing. 331; *Purnell v. G. W. Ry. Co. and Harris (C. A.)*, 1 Q. B. D. 636; 45 L. J. Q. B. 687; 24 W. R. 720, 909; 35 L. T. 605.

<sup>4</sup> *Odger v. Mortimer*, 28 L. T. 472.

<sup>5</sup> *Per Cur.* in *Burgess v. Bracher* (1724), 8 Mod. 240; 2 Ld. Raym. 1366; 1 Stra. 594; *Walter v. Beaver*, and *Naden v. Micocke* (1684), 3 Lev. 166; *Sir T. Jones*, 235; 2 Ventr. 172; 3 Salk. 325.

<sup>6</sup> *Per Holt, C.J.*, *Anon.* (1696), 2 Salk. 644.

<sup>7</sup> *Levi v. Milne*, 4 Bing. 195, *ante*, p. 130; *Hakewell v. Ingram*, 2 C. L. R. 1397.

<sup>8</sup> *Per Tindal, C.J.*, in *Broome v. Gosden*, 1 C. B. 731.



libel, and the Court above hold that it is not, a new trial will be granted on the ground of misdirection.<sup>1</sup>

A new trial will not be granted on the ground that the jury expressed an opinion during the judge's summing-up inconsistent with their subsequent verdict.<sup>2</sup>

In actions of defamation the Court very rarely grants a new trial on the ground that the damages are either too small or too great. Still there is no inflexible rule on the subject. Scroggs, J., indeed, contended in *Lord Townshend v. Dr. Hughes*,<sup>3</sup> that the Court had no power to order a new trial on the ground that the damages (4000*l.*) were excessive; but Atkins, J., was of the contrary opinion, and gave an instance in which the Court of Queen's Bench had done so. The Court however declined to exercise their power both in that case and in *Highmore v. Earl and Countess of Harrington*,<sup>4</sup> where 750*l.* damages were awarded. A new trial will only be granted where the amount of damages is so large as to satisfy the Court that the jury acted perversely and with partiality, or grossly misconceived the case on a matter of principle. Whenever there is any evidence

\* of express malice, the jury are entitled to give vindictive dam- \* 559  
ages.

So, too, there is no inexorable rule of practice which precludes the Court from granting a new trial on account of the smallness of damages. In *Kelly v. Sherlock*,<sup>5</sup> a rule *nisi* was granted on that ground, though it was discharged on the argument. There seems to be no case reported in which a rule for a new trial has been made absolute on this ground in an action of libel; but in an action of slander a rule for a new trial was made absolute, where the smallness of the amount recovered ( $\frac{1}{4}$ *l.*) showed that the jury had made a compromise, instead of deciding the issues submitted to them.<sup>6</sup> See, however, *Forsdike and wife v. Stone*,<sup>7</sup> and *Rendall v. Hayward*,<sup>8</sup> which lay down the rule that where there has been no misconduct on the part of the jury, no error in the calculation of figures, no mistake in law on the part of the judge, a new trial will not be granted. That the jury intended their verdict to carry costs, but have returned an amount insufficient in law to do so, never was a ground for granting a new trial.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hearne v. Stowell*, 12 A. & E. 719; 11 L. J. Q. B. 25; 4 P. & D. 696.

<sup>2</sup> *Napier v. Daniel and another*, 3 Bing. N. C. 77; 3 Scott, 417.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Mod. 150.

<sup>4</sup> 3 C. B. (N. S.) 142.

<sup>5</sup> L. R. 1 Q. B. 686, 697; 35 L. J. Q. B. 209; 12 Jur. N. S. 937.

<sup>6</sup> *Falvey v. Stanford*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 54; 44 L. J. Q. B. 7; 23 W. R. 162; 31 L. T. 677.

<sup>7</sup> L. R. 3 C. P. 607; 37 L. J. C. P. 301; 16 W. R. 976; 18 L. T. 722.

<sup>8</sup> 5 Bing. N. C. 424.

<sup>9</sup> *Mears v. Griffin*, 1 M. & Gr. 796; 2 Scott N. R. 15; *Kilmore v. Abdoolah*, 27 L. J. Ex. 307; *Forsdike and wife v. Stone*, *supra*.

The whole law on this subject has recently been discussed in *Phillips v. London and S. W. Ry. Co.*<sup>1</sup>

That either judge or jury prematurely expressed a strong opinion as to the case is no ground for a new trial.<sup>2</sup> It would be otherwise if a juror before being sworn had expressed a determination to give a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.<sup>3</sup>

If a new trial be moved for on the ground of surprise, the absence of a material witness at the trial, &c., there must be an affidavit setting out the facts. "Surprise is a matter extrinsic to the record and the judge's notes, and consequently can only be made to appear by affidavit; and here  
\* 560 we have \* no affidavit of surprise, in the sense required by the practice of the Court."<sup>4</sup>

The question whether an apology was or was not sufficient is peculiarly a question for the jury, and their decision cannot be reviewed or set aside by the Court.<sup>5</sup> So, too, a verdict cures a misjoinder of parties, *e.g.*, where husband and wife are jointly sued in a case where the husband should be sued alone.<sup>6</sup>

If a new trial be ordered, the costs of the first trial are in the discretion of the judge who tries the case the second time; if he makes no order, they follow the event.<sup>7</sup>

If an order *nisi* be refused, the applicant must apply within four days, if at all, to the Court of Appeal.<sup>8</sup> An order *nisi* granted in the Court of Appeal on such an application will in itself be no stay of proceedings.<sup>9</sup> If the Divisional Court makes absolute an order for a new trial, an appeal from this decision must be brought, if at all, within twenty-one days from the time when the order absolute is entered and recorded.<sup>10</sup>

Where the trial has been before a judge without a jury, an application for a new trial, if made at all, must in all cases be made direct to the Court of Appeal.<sup>11</sup> As a rule, however, the application should be by way of ap-

<sup>1</sup> 4 Q. B. D. 406; 48 L. J. Q. B. 693; 27 W. R. 797; 40 L. T. 813; (C. A.) 5 Q. B. D. 78; 49 L. J. Q. B. 223; 28 W. R. 10; 41 L. T. 121.

<sup>2</sup> *Lloyd v. Jones*, 7 B. & S. 475.

<sup>3</sup> *Ramadge v. Ryan*, 9 Bing. 333; 2 Moo. & Sc. 421.

<sup>4</sup> Per Maule, J., in *Hoare v. Silverlock* (No. 2) (1850), 9 C. B. 22.

<sup>5</sup> *Risk Allah Bey v. Johnstone*, 18 L. T. 620.

<sup>6</sup> *Burcher v. Orchard* (1852), Sty. 349; 1 Roll. Abr. 781.

<sup>7</sup> *Green v. Wright*, 2 C. P. D. 354; 46 L. J. C. P. 427; 25 W. R. 502; 36 L. T. 355; *Field v. G. N. Ry. Co.*, 3 Ex. D. 261; 26 W. R. 817; 39 L. T. 80; *Harris v. Petherick* (C. A.), 4 Q. B. D. 611; 48 L. J. Q. B. 521; 28 W. R. 11; 41 L. T. 146.

<sup>8</sup> Order LVIII. r. 10.

<sup>9</sup> *Goddard v. Thompson* (C. A.), 47 L. J. Q. B. 382; 26 W. R. 362; 38 L. T. 166.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*, r. 15. *Highton v. Treherne*, 48 L. J. Ex. 167; 27 W. R. 245; 39 L. T. 411.

<sup>11</sup> Order XXXIX. r. 1*a*, R. S. C., Dec. 1876, r. 5; *Oastler v. Henderson* (C. A.), 2 Q. B. D. 575; 46 L. J. Q. B. 607; 37 L. T. 22.

peal, and not by motion for a new trial,<sup>1</sup> for the Court of Appeal has power upon an appeal to review the judge's findings as to the facts, without a rule for a new trial having been expressly asked for \* or obtained. \* 561 The only exception to this rule is in the case of surprise: then a new trial should be asked for.<sup>2</sup> If, however, the issues were settled before the case was heard by the judge, or if the judge first tried the issues of fact, and subsequently there was a separate determination of the law applied to those facts, then perhaps there should be a motion for a new trial.<sup>3</sup>

If an action commenced in the Chancery Division be tried by a judge and jury in one of the Common Law Divisions, it is *ipso facto* transferred to the Division to which that judge belongs, and the application for a new trial must be made to a Divisional Court of that Division; for such a case is within Order XXXIX,<sup>4</sup> though not within the words of Order V.<sup>5</sup> But this does not apply to an action in which an issue has been directed by a judge of the Chancery Division. The action in that case still remains attached to the Chancery Division.<sup>6</sup>

*Proceedings in the Court of Appeal.*

If no exception be taken at the trial, and annexed to the record,<sup>7</sup> the only rule which authorizes a party to come direct from *Nisi Prius* to the Court of Appeal appears to be the following:—

Where, at or after the trial of an action by a jury, the judge has directed that any judgment be entered, any party may, without any leave reserved, apply to set aside such judgment and enter any other judgment, on the ground that the judgment directed to be entered is wrong, by reason of the judge having caused the finding to be wrongly entered with \* reference to the finding of the jury upon the question or questions \* 562 submitted to them.

Where, at or after the trial of an action before a judge, the judge has directed that any judgment be entered, any party may, without any leave reserved, apply to set aside such judgment and to enter any other judgment, upon the ground that, upon the finding as entered, the judgment so directed is wrong.

<sup>1</sup> Pannell v. Nunn (C. A.), 28 W. R. 940; Potter v. Cotton (C. A.), 5 Ex. D. 137; 49 L. J. Ex. 158; 28 W. R. 160; 41 L. T. 460.

<sup>2</sup> Jones v. Hough (C. A.), 5 Ex. D. 115; 42 L. T. 108.

<sup>3</sup> Krehl v. Burrell (C. A.), 10 Ch. D. 420; 48 L. J. Ch. 252; 27 W. R. 234; 39 L. T. 461; as explained by Lowe v. Lowe (C. A.), 10 Ch. D. 432; 48 L. J. Ch. 383; 27 W. R. 309; 40 L. T. 236; and Dollman v. Jones, 12 Ch. D. 553; 27 W. R. 877; 41 L. T. 258.

<sup>4</sup> R. 1a, R. S. C., Dec. 1876, r. 5.

<sup>5</sup> R. 4a, R. S. C., March, 1879. Hunt v. City of London Real Property Co., 3 Q. B. D. 19; 47 L. J. Q. B. 42, 51; 26 W. R. 37; 37 L. T. 344; Jones v. Baxter (C. A.), 5 Ex. D. 275; 28 W. R. 817.

<sup>6</sup> Jenkins v. Morris (C. A.), 14 Ch. D. 674; 49 L. J. Ch. 392. <sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 551.

An application under this rule shall be to the Court of Appeal.<sup>1</sup>

An application under this rule must be made by motion upon notice, not as in the case of a motion for a new trial by an *ex parte* application for an order *nisi*.<sup>2</sup> It may be made at any time within a year after the party seeking to make the motion first became entitled so to do.<sup>3</sup> He apparently becomes so entitled the moment the jury are discharged.<sup>4</sup> Fourteen days' notice of motion must be given under Order LVIII. r. 4.<sup>5</sup>

Either party may also, of course, appeal from any decision of the Divisional Court, not being an order made by consent or as to costs merely.<sup>6</sup> Such appeal shall be by way of rehearing, and shall be brought, by notice of motion, within twenty-one days from the date of an interlocutory order, or within a year from a final judgment.<sup>7</sup> An order overruling or allowing a demurrer, is a final judgment, as it is a conclusive determination of one part of the case, if not the whole.<sup>8</sup> An order making absolute an order *nisi* for a new trial is an interlocutory order, the rights of the parties not being finally determined thereby.<sup>9</sup> It might be contended that an order discharging such an order *nisi* was a final judgment, so as to enable the party desiring a new trial to appeal at any time within a year. But in *Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange*,<sup>10</sup> Brett, L.J., lays down a rule that no order can be final, unless the application on which it was granted, would have determined the action, *whichever way it was decided*.

\* 563 \* If this be so, then an order discharging an order *nisi* for a new trial will be interlocutory, because an order making it absolute would have been interlocutory. But the point has not yet been decided, and it would be safer not to raise it, if it can be avoided. Sundays are included within the twenty-one days.<sup>11</sup> An extension of the time will only be granted under very special circumstances.<sup>12</sup> That the appellant's legal

<sup>1</sup> Order XL. r. 4a; R. S. C., Dec. 1876, r. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Order LIII. rr. 2, 3; Order LVIII. r. 2; *Jones v. Davis* (C. A.), 36 L. T. 415; W. N. 1877, p. 86.

<sup>3</sup> Order XL. r. 9.

<sup>4</sup> *Shaw v. Hope*, 25 W. R. 729.

<sup>5</sup> R. 4; *Foster v. Roberts*, W. N. 1877, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> Jud. Act, 1873, s. 49.

<sup>7</sup> Order LVIII. rr. 2, 15.

<sup>8</sup> *Trowell v. Shenton* (C. A.), 8 Ch. D. 318, 321; 47 L. J. Ch. 738; 26 W. R. 837; 38 L. T. 369.

<sup>9</sup> *Highton v. Treherne*, 48 L. J. Ex. 167; 27 W. R. 245; 39 L. T. 411.

<sup>10</sup> C. A., 3 C. P. D. 71; 47 L. J. C. P. 3; 26 W. R. 25; 37 L. T. 372.

<sup>11</sup> *Ex parte Viney* (C. A.), 4 Ch. D. 794; 46 L. J. Bank. 80; 25 W. R. 364; 36 L. T. 43.

<sup>12</sup> *Craig v. Phillips* (C. A.), 3 Ch. D. 249; 47 L. J. Ch. 239; 26 W. R. 293; 37 L. T. 772; *McAndrew v. Barker* (C. A.), 7 Ch. D. 701; 47 L. J. Ch. 340; 26 W. R. 317; 37 L. T. 810; *In re Mansel*, *Rhodes v. Jenkins* (C. A.), 7 Ch. D. 711; 47 L. J. Ch. 870; 26 W. R. 361; 38 L. T. 403; *Taylor's case* (C. A.), 8 Ch. D. 643; 47 L. J. Ch. 701; 26 W. R. 601; 38 L. T. 587; *Collins v. Vestry of Paddington* (C. A.), 5 Q. B. D. 368; 49 L. J. Q. B. 264; 28 W. R. 588; 42 L. T. 573.

adviser misconstrued the rules of the Supreme Court, is no ground for an extension of the time for appealing.<sup>1</sup>

If the appellant be a foreigner residing abroad, or if the appeal be unreasonable or vexatious, the appellant may be ordered to give security for costs on an application made by the respondent within a reasonable time on notice of motion.<sup>2</sup> But such an application must always be made promptly.<sup>3</sup> The insolvency of the appellant is not alone a sufficient ground, if the question \* raised by the appeal be a doubtful one, \* 564 well worthy argument in the Court of Appeal.<sup>4</sup>

An appeal is no stay of execution or of proceedings, unless the Court below, or failing that, the Court of Appeal, otherwise orders.<sup>5</sup>

The respondent may give notice that he intends to apply upon the hearing of the appeal that the order appealed against be varied. He need not give any notice of motion by way of cross-appeal.<sup>6</sup>

If the appellant does not appear at the hearing, the respondent is entitled to have the appeal dismissed with costs, without giving any proof of the service of notice of appeal.<sup>7</sup>

At the hearing, the Court of Appeal has all the powers of a Court of first instance as to amendment or otherwise. The Court may, in its discretion, receive further evidence as to any matter of fact; but special grounds must be shown and special leave obtained for the production of such further evidence after there has been a full hearing on the merits at *Nisi Prius*.<sup>8</sup> Due notice must be given to the respondent that appellant intends to apply at the hearing to adduce fresh evidence.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *International Financial Soc. v. City of Moscow Gas Co.* (C. A.), 7 Ch. D. 241; 47 L. J. Ch. 258; 26 W. R. 272; 37 L. T. 736; *Highton v. Treherne*, *supra*. As to the notice of motion and the amendment thereof, see Order LVIII. rr. 3, 4; and *In re Stockton Iron Furnace Co.* (C. A.), 10 Ch. D. 335, 348; 48 L. J. Ch. 417; 27 W. R. 433; 40 L. T. 19. As to setting down the appeal for hearing, see Order LVIII. r. 8; *In re National Funds Insurance Co.* (C. A.), 4 Ch. D. 305; 46 L. J. Ch. 183; 25 W. R. 151; 35 L. T. 689; *Webb v. Mansel* (C. A.), 2 Q. B. D. 117; 25 W. R. 389; *In re Harker, Goodbarne v. Fothergill* (C. A.), 10 Ch. D. 613; 27 W. R. 587; 40 L. T. 408.

<sup>2</sup> *Grant v. Banque Franco-Egyptienne* (C. A.), 2 C. P. D. 430; 47 L. J. C. P. 41; 26 W. R. 68.

<sup>3</sup> *Corporation of Saltash v. Goodman and another*, 43 L. T. 464; W. N. 1880, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup> *Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co.* (C. A.), 1 C. P. D. 556, 562.

<sup>5</sup> Order LVIII. rr. 16, 17; *Goddard v. Thompson* (C. A.), 47 L. J. Q. B. 382; 26 W. R. 362; 38 L. T. 166; *Wilson v. Church* (C. A.), 11 Ch. D. 576; 48 L. J. Ch. 690; 27 W. R. 843; 12 Ch. D. 454; 28 W. R. 284; 41 L. T. 50; *Grant v. Banque Franco-Egyptienne* (C. A.), 3 C. P. D. 202; 47 L. J. C. P. 455; 26 W. R. 669; 38 L. T. 622.

<sup>6</sup> Order LVIII. rr. 6, 7; *Ex parte Payne, in re Cross*, 11 Ch. D. 539, 550; 27 W. R. 808; 40 L. T. 563; *Ralph v. Carrick*, 11 Ch. D. 873; 28 W. R. 67; 40 L. T. 505.

<sup>7</sup> *Ex parte Lows, in re Lows* (C. A.), 7 Ch. D. 160; 47 L. J. Bank. 24; 26 W. R. 229; 37 L. T. 583.

<sup>8</sup> Order LVIII. r. 5.

<sup>9</sup> *Hastie v. Hastie* (C. A.), 1 Ch. D. 562; 45 L. J. Ch. 288; 24 W. R. 564; 34

The judge's note is decisive as to the evidence taken in the Court below ; but either party may read a shorthand-writer's note, to supplement,

\* 565 though not to overrule, the judge's note.<sup>1</sup> \* The cost of printing the evidence below will be allowed if it is very voluminous.<sup>2</sup>

If, upon the hearing of an appeal from a judgment pronounced by a judge or Court on the verdict or finding of a jury, or of a judge without a jury, it shall appear to the Court of Appeal that a new trial ought to be had, it shall be lawful for the said Court of Appeal, if it shall think fit, to order that the verdict and judgment shall be set aside, and that a new trial shall be had.<sup>3</sup>

The successful party will, as a rule, obtain costs.<sup>4</sup> When the respondent gives notice of his intention to contend that the order appealed from be varied, and the appeal is dismissed, the appellant will have to pay all costs which he cannot show to have been occasioned solely by the respondent's notice.<sup>5</sup> A special order must be obtained before the judgment of the Court of Appeal is entered, allowing the costs of shorthand-writers' notes or of printing the evidence.<sup>6</sup>

### *County Court Proceedings.*

No action of libel or slander can be commenced in the County Court,<sup>7</sup> except by consent.<sup>8</sup> I presume that the word "slander" includes

\* 566 "slander of title." In cases of a trifling nature, it may be \* desirable that both parties should consent to such a course, especially if all the witnesses reside in a town where a County Court is held. The parties or their respective solicitors must in that case sign a memorandum of consent (in the form given as No. 45), which must be filed ; and thereupon a plaint will be entered and a summons issued, and all further proceedings will be taken as in an ordinary County Court case.<sup>9</sup>

L. T. 13 ; Dicks v. Brooks, 13 Ch. D. 652 ; 28 W. R. 525 ; 43 L. T. 71. As to what are sufficient special grounds, see *In re Chennell* (C. A.), 8 Ch. D. 504-507 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 583 ; 26 W. R. 595 ; 38 L. T. 494 ; *Bigsby v. Dickinson* (C. A.), 4 Ch. D. 24 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 280 ; 25 W. R. 89 ; 35 L. T. 679.

<sup>1</sup> Order LVIII. r. 13 ; *Laming v. Gee* (C. A.), 28 W. R. 217.

<sup>2</sup> Order LVIII. r. 12 ; *Bigsby v. Dickinson*, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Order LVIII. r. 5a, R. S. C., March, 1879.

<sup>4</sup> Per James, L.J., 1 Ch. D. 41, 113 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *The Lauretta*, 4 P. D. 25 ; 48 L. J. Prob. 55 ; 27 W. R. 902 ; 40 L. T. 444.

<sup>6</sup> *Ashworth v. Outram*, 9 Ch. D. 483 ; 27 W. R. 98 ; 39 L. T. 441 ; *In re Silver Lead Ore Co.*, 10 Ch. D. 307, 312 ; *Executors of Sir Rowland Hill v. Metropolitan District Asylum*, 49 L. J. Q. B. 668 ; 43 L. T. 462 ; *Weekly Notes*, 1880, p. 98 ; *Bigsby v. Dickinson* (C. A.), 4 Ch. D. 24 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 280 ; 25 W. R. 89, 122 ; 35 L. T. 679. As to a further appeal to the House of Lords, see the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59), and the Standing Orders of August, 1876, *Weekly Notes*, 1876, Part II., p. 475-7 ; as amended, *Weekly Notes*, 1877, Part II., p. 57.

<sup>7</sup> 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 58.

<sup>8</sup> 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 23.

<sup>9</sup> County Court Order XXXVII. r. 46.

But an action of libel or slander, whatever the amount of damages claimed, may be transferred to the County Court, under s. 10 of the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, *ante*, p. 468. The defendant may apply to a master at chambers under this section, at any stage of the proceedings, on an affidavit, showing a good defence on the merits, that the plaintiff has no visible means, and that there will be a saving of costs, and greater convenience in trying in the County Court. But no order will be made (1) if the action is one fit to be prosecuted in the Superior Court, because involving important points of law, or because it is a test action, &c.; or (2) if the plaintiff can prove that he has visible means of paying costs. "Visible" means tangible, such property as the defendant could reach in the event of his obtaining judgment for his costs.<sup>1</sup> The plaintiff also generally denies that there will be any saving of costs or convenience in trying in the County Court. It is practically useless for a defendant to appeal from the master's order.<sup>2</sup> The plaintiff may appeal, if the order is *obviously* wrong.<sup>3</sup>

The plaintiff must now lodge the writ and other proceedings and the order remitting the action, with the registrar of the County Court. Until this is done, the action remains in the Superior Court, which, consequently, has jurisdiction to vary the order.<sup>4</sup> As soon as the \* nec- \* 567  
essary documents are filed, the action becomes a County Court cause, as completely as if it were one duly commenced therein.<sup>5</sup> The County Court judge is bound to assume jurisdiction; he cannot inquire into the circumstances under which the order was made.<sup>6</sup> If the plaintiff omit to lodge the order of transfer within a reasonable time after it is made, the defendant can apply at chambers for an order dismissing the action for want of prosecution.

The plaintiff is required by County Court,<sup>7</sup> to lodge not only the writ and the order remitting the action, but also a statement of the names and addresses of the several parties to the action, and their solicitors, if any, and a concise statement of the particulars, such as would be required upon entering a plaint, signed by the plaintiff or his solicitor, and the registrar shall thereupon enter the action for trial, and give notice to the parties of

<sup>1</sup> *Counsel v. Garvie*, Ir. R. 5 C. L. 74; *Watson v. McCann*, 6 L. R. Ir. 21; and see *Sykes v. Sykes*, L. R. 4 C. P. 645; 38 L. J. C. P. 281; 17 W. R. 799; 20 L. T. 663.

<sup>2</sup> *Palmer v. Roberts*, 22 W. R. 577, n.; 29 L. T. 403.

<sup>3</sup> *Jennings and wife v. London General Omnibus Co.*, 30 L. T. 266; *Owens v. Woosman*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 469; 9 B. & S. 243; 37 L. J. Q. B. 159; 16 W. R. 932; 18 L. T. 357; *Holmes v. Mountstephen*, L. R. 10 C. P. 474; 33 L. T. 351.

<sup>4</sup> *Welpley v. Buhl* (C. A.), 3 Q. B. D. 80, 253; 47 L. J. Q. B. 151; 26 W. R. 300; 38 L. T. 115.

<sup>5</sup> *Moody v. Steward*, L. R. 6 Ex. 35; 40 L. J. Ex. 25; 19 W. R. 161; 23 L. T. 465.

<sup>6</sup> *Blades v. Lawrence*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 374; 43 L. J. Q. B. 133; 22 W. R. 643; 30 L. T. 378.

<sup>7</sup> Order XX. r. 2.

the day appointed for such trial, by post or otherwise, ten clear days before such day, and shall annex to the notice to the defendant a copy of the plaintiff's particulars.<sup>1</sup> The registrar shall forthwith indorse on the order the date on which the same was lodged and file the same, and the action shall proceed in all things as if it were an ordinary action in the County Court.<sup>2</sup>

The defendant upon being served with such a notice of trial may proceed in all things in the same way as if the action had been brought in the County Court, and the notice so served upon him was an ordinary summons.<sup>3</sup>

Thus he may, five clear days at least before the day named in such notice of trial, pay money into Court, either generally or under Lord Campbell's Act, paying a Court fee of 1s. in the £ on the amount paid in.<sup>4</sup> Or he may set up a counterclaim,<sup>5</sup> or plead Not Guilty by statute,<sup>6</sup> or a \* 568 justification,<sup>7</sup> or any other special defence, by sending in to \* the registrar a concise statement of the grounds of such special defence five clear days at least before the day named for trial.<sup>8</sup> If the defendant omit to send such statement, he will not be allowed to avail himself of the defence, unless the plaintiff consents thereto; but the judge will in a proper case adjourn the trial of the action to enable the defendant to give such notice.<sup>9</sup> So, too, if the defendant intends to avail himself of the provisions of sects. 1 and 2 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, he must give notice in writing of such intention, signed by himself or his solicitor, to the registrar five clear days before the day appointed for the trial of the action.<sup>10</sup> Such notice should be in form No. 55,<sup>11</sup> if under s. 1 of Lord Campbell's Act, in form No. 56,<sup>12</sup> if under s. 2.

Where in any action for libel or slander the defendant relies as a defence upon the fact that the libel or slander is true, he shall in his statement set forth that the libel or slander complained of is true in substance.<sup>13</sup> Such statement should be in form No. 54.<sup>14</sup>

Interrogatories may be administered in the County Court by leave of the registrar.<sup>15</sup> An affidavit is necessary which may be in form No. 52.<sup>16</sup> Any

<sup>1</sup> For a form of such statement of the plaintiff's particular, see Precedent No. 50, *post*, p. 644. For a form of the Notice of Trial sent to the defendant by the registrar, see Precedent No. 51, *post*, p. 645.

<sup>2</sup> County Court Order XX. r. 3.

<sup>3</sup> County Court Order XX. r. 2.

<sup>4</sup> County Court Order XII. rr. 4, 5, 6a, and 7.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* r. 14.

<sup>6</sup> See Precedents, Nos. 53, 54, *post*, p. 646.

<sup>7</sup> County Court Order XX. r. 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 648.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 647.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 646.

<sup>5</sup> County Court Order IX. r. 1a.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.* r. 13.

<sup>9</sup> County Court Order IX. r. 7.

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 647.

<sup>13</sup> County Court Order IX. r. 13.

<sup>15</sup> County Court Order XIII. r. 6.



objection to answer must be taken in the affidavit in answer. Discovery and inspection of documents may also be obtained as in the Superior Court.

The action may at the instance of either party be tried by a jury<sup>1</sup> of five,<sup>2</sup> upon a demand for one being made in writing to the registrar three clear days before trial.<sup>3</sup> In cases where no demand for a jury has been so made, but at the trial both parties desire one, the judge may adjourn the trial upon terms in order that the necessary steps may be taken for such trial to take place.<sup>4</sup> It is always desirable to have a jury in an action of libel or slander.

The trial takes place in all respects as in an ordinary County Court cause; save that if any pleadings were delivered in the action before the order was made remitting it to the County Court, the judge must not disregard them. Thus if a plaintiff has shaped his action differently on his statement of claim and \* on his writ, the judge must look \* 569 rather to the statement of claim than to the writ;<sup>5</sup> for the indorsement on a writ is superseded by a statement of claim except as to the amount claimed in the action.<sup>6</sup> Great care must be taken to ask the judge before delivering judgment to make a note of any point of law on which either party relies.<sup>7</sup>

Judgment is entered and all subsequent proceedings taken as in an ordinary County Court action. Any motion for a new trial must be made to the judge in the County Court;<sup>8</sup> any appeal, to the Divisional Court for hearing appeals from Inferior Courts, or if that be not sitting, to a judge at chambers, who must hear the case himself, and not adjourn it to the full Court.<sup>9</sup>

The costs will follow the event, unless the judge at the trial make any order to the contrary.<sup>10</sup> In taxing the costs incurred in the High Court of Justice previous to the transmission of the action to the County Court under sects. 7 or 10 of the County Courts Act, 1867, the registrar shall tax the same according to the scale of costs and fees in use in such High Court of Justice.<sup>11</sup> The costs subsequent to the order remitting the action will be

<sup>1</sup> County Court Order XVI. r. 3.

<sup>2</sup> 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 73.

<sup>3</sup> County Court Order XVI. r. 1.

<sup>4</sup> County Court Order XVI. r. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Johnson v. Palmer*, 4 C. P. D. 258; 27 W. R. 941.

<sup>6</sup> *Large v. Large*, Weekly Notes, 1877, p. 198.

<sup>7</sup> *Rhodes v. Liverpool Investment Co.*, 4 C. P. D. 425; *Pierpoint v. Cartwright*, 5 C. P. D. 139; 28 W. R. 583; 42 L. T. 295; *Seymour v. Coulson* (C. A.), 28 W. R. 664.

<sup>8</sup> County Court Order XXVIII.

<sup>9</sup> *Button v. Woolwich Mutual Building Society*, 5 Q. B. D. 88; 49 L. J. Q. B. 249; 28 W. R. 136; 42 L. T. 54.

<sup>10</sup> County Courts Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 88.

<sup>11</sup> County Court Order XXXVI. r. 2.

taxed according to the scale in use in the County Courts, by the express words of s. 10 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142. The Superior Court has no jurisdiction to make any order as to costs.<sup>1</sup>

*Other Inferior Courts.*

The Salford Hundred Court has power to hear all cases of libel or slander arising within the jurisdiction of the Court, provided the damages claimed do not exceed £50. If they exceed £50, it appears that the Court has no jurisdiction even by consent.<sup>2</sup> The costs follow the event,

\* 570 both in \*the Salford Hundred Court<sup>3</sup> and in the Liverpool Court of Passage,<sup>4</sup> and indeed wherever the case is tried by a jury; subject however to the power reserved to a judge by Order LV. r. 1, to deprive a successful plaintiff of his costs, on good cause shown. Section 29 of the County Courts Act, 1867, never applied to actions of libel or slander, for they never could have been brought in a County Court; but even if it did apply, it is a question whether it is not now repealed, as it is not expressly re-enacted by s. 67 of the Judicature Act, 1873.

<sup>1</sup> *Moody v. Steward*, L. R. 6 Ex. 35; 40 L. J. Ex. 25; 19 W. R. 161; 23 L. T. 465.

<sup>2</sup> 9 & 10 Vict. c. cxxvi.; *Farrow v. Hague*, 3 H. & C. 101; 33 L. J. Ex. 258.

<sup>3</sup> *Turner v. Heyland*, 4 C. P. D. 432; 48 L. J. C. P. 535; 41 L. T. 556.

<sup>4</sup> *King and another v. Hawkesworth*, 4 Q. B. D. 371; 48 L. J. Q. B. 484; 27 W. R. 660; 41 L. T. 411.

PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES.

This chapter naturally divides itself into two heads : —

- I. Proceedings by way of Indictment.
- II. Proceedings by way of Criminal Information.

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PART I.

PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF INDICTMENT.

*Proceedings before Magistrates.*

CRIMINAL proceedings for libel usually commence by the prosecutor summoning the accused before a police or stipendiary magistrate, or before two justices of the peace.

The offence of libel is not included in the Vexatious Indictments Act.<sup>1</sup> It is not essential, therefore, that the accused should be so summoned ; it is open to the prosecutor to go direct to the grand jury and prefer a bill. But it is very unusual so to do ; for, should the defendant in such a case be ultimately found Not Guilty, the prosecutor may be ordered to pay all the costs of the defence, under 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 2.

If the defendant does not obey the summons served upon him, the magistrate will issue a warrant for his arrest ; or he may, if he think fit, on good cause shown and information sworn, issue a warrant for his apprehension in the first instance without any previous summons.<sup>2</sup>

\* When the accused comes before the magistrate the prosecutor \* 572 has merely to prove publication, unless it is not clear that the libel refers to the prosecutor, in which case it may be necessary to call some one acquainted with the circumstances to state that on reading the libel he understood it to refer to the prosecutor. The magistrate must decide for himself whether the written matter before him is in point of law a libel.

<sup>1</sup> 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Butt v. Conant*, 1 Brod. & B. 548 ; 4 Moore, 195 ; Gow, 84 ; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, ss. 1, 8.

Unless it is clearly no libel he will, after proof of publication by the defendant, or some agent or servant on his behalf<sup>1</sup> commit the defendant for trial. But, before doing so, he must ask the defendant whether he desires to call any witnesses.<sup>2</sup> The defendant may then call witnesses to prove that he did not publish the libel, that it is a fair and *bonâ fide* comment on a matter of public interest, that it does not refer to prosecutor, etc.

But he may not (unless the information charges him with an offence under s. 4 of Lord Campbell's Act) give any evidence before the magistrate of the truth of the matters charged in the libel. "The duty and province of the magistrate before whom a person is brought, with a view to his being committed for trial or held to bail, is to determine, on hearing the evidence for the prosecution and that for the defence, if there be any, whether the case is one in which the accused ought to be put upon his trial. It is no part of his province to try the case. That being so, in my opinion, unless there is some further statutory duty imposed on the magistrate, the evidence before him must be confined to the question whether the case is such as ought to be sent for trial, and if he exceeds the limits of that inquiry, he transcends the bounds of his jurisdiction. This case was one of a charge of libel, and the magistrate had to inquire, first, whether the matter complained of was libellous, and, secondly, whether the publication of it was brought home to the accused, so far as that there ought to be a committal. Independently of statute, the magistrate could not receive evidence of the truth of the libel. The question then arises whether Lord Campbell's Act enables him to do so. In my opinion it does not, because by the provisions of the Act the defence founded upon the truth of the libel does not arrive at that stage, and cannot be put forward before the magistrate.

\* 573 \* Suppose the defendant had succeeded fully and entirely in showing the truth of the libel. What then would have been the duty of the magistrate? He would nevertheless have been bound to send the case for trial, because by the statute the truth of the libel does not constitute a defence until the statutory conditions are complied with, and they cannot be complied with at that stage of the inquiry."<sup>3</sup> But when the defendant is charged before the magistrate with an offence under the 4th section of Lord Campbell's Act, that is, with maliciously publishing a defamatory libel *knowing the same to be false*, there it is open to the defendant to call evidence of the truth of the libel, so as, if possible, to reduce the charge to the minor offence.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 362, 385.

<sup>2</sup> 30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 3, Russell Gurney's Act.

<sup>3</sup> Per Cockburn, C.J., in *R. v. Sir Robert Carden* (Labouchere's case), 5 Q. B. D. 6, 7; 49 L. J. M. C. 1; 28 W. R. 133; 41 L. T. 504; 14 Cox, C. C. 359.

<sup>4</sup> *Ex parte* Ellissen (not reported), approved by Lush, J., in *R. v. Carden*, 5 Q. B. D. 11, 13.

Since the decision in *R. v. Carden*, it has been ruled at the Mansion House that a defendant might not cross-examine his prosecutor "to credit," if the questions asked would also tend to show the truth of the libel. An adjournment for a fortnight was granted by Sir Thomas Owden to enable the defendant to apply for a *mandamus*, but no such application was ever made.<sup>1</sup>

The defendant may himself in every case make a statement before the magistrates, but it is more prudent for him to say nothing, except in cases where he has himself seen or heard something justifying the libel.

If the accused does not appear in answer to the summons, the magistrate may, on proof of due service, go into the case in his absence, but he more usually issues a warrant for the apprehension of the defendant.<sup>2</sup>

If the magistrate decide to send the case for trial, the defendant is entitled to be bailed. Reasonable, but not excessive, bail should be demanded, and it is for the justices to determine whether the sureties offered are sufficient. If no sufficient bail can be found, the accused must be committed to prison, but if sufficient sureties come forward, the magistrates have no discretion but to allow the defendant to be at large on bail.

\* In the case of an obscene libel, the prisoner may be committed \* 574 for trial to the Quarter Sessions; in every other case he must be sent to the Assizes or Central Criminal Court.<sup>3</sup>

Cases of libel are never disposed of summarily by the magistrate or justices in petty sessions. It is true that there is authority for holding that in some trifling cases of libel the justices have the power to demand sureties of good behavior from the libeller, instead of committing him for trial; and may themselves, in default of such sureties, commit him to gaol.<sup>4</sup> But such power is never exercised, and never should be, for it is clearly a violation of the principle of Fox's Libel Act, that libel or no libel is a question for the jury.

As to the powers of magistrates, &c., in the case of obscene books and prints, see *ante*, p. 405, c. XV. In case of a seditious libel, there is no power to issue a search warrant to seize the author's papers.<sup>5</sup>

### *Indictment.*

Counsel must next be instructed to draft the indictment. This requires great care; as the old rules of pleading apply in all their strictness. The

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Cripps*, *Times* for November 4th and 18th, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, ss. 1, 9.

<sup>3</sup> 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Haylock v. Sparke*, 1 E. & B. 471; 22 L. J. M. C. 67, overruling the *dictum* of Lord Camden in *R. v. Wilkes*, 2 Wilkes, 2 Wils. 151; 4 Burr. 2527.

<sup>5</sup> *Leach's case*, 11 St. Tr. 307; 19 Howell's St. T. 1002; *Entick v. Carrington* and others, 11 St. Tr. 317; 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029.

words must be set out *verbatim*, however great their length.<sup>1</sup> (a) Any material variation between the words as laid in the indictment and the words proved at the trial will still be fatal, in spite of the powers of amendment given by the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 1. (b)

If the words are in a foreign language they must be set out in the original, and a correct translation added.<sup>2</sup> The indictment must expressly charge the defendant with "publishing;" as merely writing a libel is no crime.<sup>3</sup> It must also declare that the libel was written and published

\* 575 "of and concerning" the prosecutor. (c). The \* omission of those words was held fatal in *R. v. Marsden*.<sup>4</sup> But if it sufficiently appears from other allegations in the indictment to whom the libel refers, it will be held good.<sup>5</sup> The indictment must also aver all facts necessary to explain the meaning of the libel and to connect it with the person defamed: for s. 61 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, applies only to pleadings in civil cases, so that in an indictment an innuendo still requires a prefatory averment to support it. Hence there is still considerable technicality in criminal pleading; although modern judges will never be quite so strict as their predecessors.<sup>6</sup> The innuendo can only explain and point the defamatory meaning of the words; it must not introduce new matter. The judgment of De Grey, C.J., in *R. v. Horne* (1777),<sup>7</sup> "has universally been considered the best and most perfect exposition of the law on this subject."<sup>8</sup> See further as to the office of the innuendo.<sup>9</sup> Extrinsic facts must be averred where without such averments the libel would appear innocent or unmeaning.<sup>10</sup> But where the writing on the face of it imports a libel, no innuendo is necessary, nor any introductory averments.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Bradlaugh and Besant* (C.A.), 3 Q. B. D. 607; 48 L. J. M. C. 5; 26 W. R. 410; 38 L. T. 118.

<sup>2</sup> *Zenobio v. Axtell*, 6 T. R. 162; 3 M. & S. 116; *R. v. Goldstein*, 3 Brod. & B. 201; 7 Moore, 1; 10 Price, 88; R. & R. C. C. 473.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Burdett*, 4 B. & Ald. 95.

<sup>4</sup> 4 M. & S. 164.

<sup>5</sup> *Gregory v. The Queen*, 15 Q. B. 957; 15 Jur. 74; 5 Cox, C. C. 247.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, pp. 118, 9. <sup>7</sup> Cowp. 682; 11 St. Tr. 264; 20 How. St. Tr. 651.

<sup>8</sup> Per Abbott, C.J., in *R. v. Burdett*, 4 B. & Ald. 316.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, pp. 100-104.

<sup>10</sup> *R. v. Yates*, 12 Cox, C. C. 283.

<sup>11</sup> *R. v. Tutchin* (1704), 14 How. St. Tr. 1095; 5 St. Tr. 527; 2 Lord Raym. 1061; 1 Salk. 50; 6 Mod. 268.

(a) See *Commonwealth v. Tarbox*, 1 Cush. 66; *Commonwealth v. Wright*, *ib.* 46; *Commonwealth v. Harmon*, 2 Gray, 289; *State v. Brownlow*, 7 Humph. 63; 1 Bishop, Crim. Proc. §§ 559-561.

402; *Commonwealth v. Sweeney*, 10 Serg. & R. 173; *State v. Brownlow*, 7 Humph. 63; *Walsh v. State*, 2 McCord, 248.

(c) *State v. Henderson*, 1 Rich. 179; *State v. Brownlow*, 7 Humph. 63; *Taylor v. State*, 4 Ga. 14.

(b) *Commonwealth v. Tarbox*, 1 Cush. 66; *Commonwealth v. Varney*, 10 Cush.

In 1652, Rolle, C.J., laid it down "that in an indictment a thing must be expressed to be done *falso et malitiose*, because that is the usual form."<sup>1</sup> But in *R. v. Burks*,<sup>2</sup> the Court of King's Bench decided that in an information, at all events, it is unnecessary to allege that the libellous matter is false. Still it is safer to insert such an averment, "because that is the usual form."

In some few cases it is necessary to aver a special intent. Thus where a letter is sent direct to the prosecutor, and published to no one else, an intention to provoke the prosecutor and to excite him to a breach of the peace must be alleged. An allegation that it was sent with intent to injure, prejudice, and aggrieve him in his profession and reputation cannot, in such a case, be supported.<sup>3</sup> So where a letter containing a libel on a married man \* is sent to his wife "it ought to be alleged as \* 576 sent with intent to disturb the domestic harmony of the parties."<sup>4</sup> So in the case of a libel on a person deceased, an intent should be alleged to bring contempt and scandal on his family and relations and to provoke them to a breach of the peace.<sup>5</sup>

There is no objection to joining several counts, each for a separate libel, in the same indictment.<sup>6</sup>

All who are in any way concerned in the composition or publication of a libel may be joined in the same indictment. For by the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 8, "whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any misdemeanor, whether indictable at common law, or by virtue of any statute, may be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender."

### *Pleading to the Indictment.*

When a true bill has been found by the grand jury the defendant is arraigned, the substance of the indictment is read over to him, and he is then called on to plead. At common law he might :—

- (1) Plead guilty ;
- (2) Plead to the jurisdiction of the Court ;
- (3) Plead specially in bar :—
  - (a) Autrefois acquit ;
  - (b) Autrefois convict ;
  - (c) Pardon ;
- (4) Demur to the indictment ;
- (5) Plead the general issue — Not Guilty.

By virtue of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6, he may now also —

<sup>1</sup> Anon. Style, 392.

<sup>2</sup> 7 T. R. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Per Abbott, J., in *R. v. Wegener*, 2 Stark. 245.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Topham*, 4 T. R. 126, *ante*, p. 376.

<sup>6</sup> Per Lord Ellenborough, in *R. v. Jones*, 2 Camp. 132.

(6) Plead a justification that the words are true and that it was for the public benefit that they should be published.<sup>1</sup> This plea may be pleaded with Not Guilty; it must be entered and filed at the Crown Office or with the Clerk of Assize, and a copy delivered to the prosecutor.

(7) If the prisoner stands mute of malice, or does not answer directly to the charge, a plea of Not Guilty shall be entered for him, and the trial shall proceed as though he had actually pleaded the same.<sup>2</sup>

There is now but little use in demurring to an indictment,  
 \* 577 \* except where the words are clearly not libellous in themselves, and are not reasonably susceptible of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo. In such a case it might be well to put an end to the case as quickly as possible. But if the demurrer be for a mere formal defect, the Court has power to amend, after the demurrer, either an information,<sup>3</sup> or now even an indictment.<sup>4</sup> If, on the other hand, the defect is one of substance, it will not be waived by pleading over, nor will it be cured by verdict; but the defendant may still bring error, or move in arrest of judgment after conviction.<sup>5</sup> Moreover there is this danger in demurring, that the defendant may not demur and plead Not Guilty at the same time:<sup>6</sup> hence, in strict law, if he fail on his demurrer, final judgment will be entered for the Crown on the whole case.<sup>7</sup> But the Court has power to permit the defendant afterwards to plead over, and in these more merciful days will generally exercise that power.<sup>8</sup>

The plea of Not Guilty puts the prosecutor to proof of every material allegation in the indictment. The defendant may show under this plea that the libel was a fair and *bona fide* comment on a matter of public interest, that the occasion of publication was privileged, and may indeed raise every other defence permitted him by law, except that the libel is true.

It is only in the case of a defamatory libel on a private individual that the defendant may justify under Lord Campbell's Act. And he does so at his peril: for placing such a plea on the record will be deemed an aggravation of his offence, should he fail to prove it. By the express words of Lord Campbell's Act, a plea of justification under s. 6 shall be pleaded "in the manner now required in pleading a justification to an action for defamation," as to which see *ante*, pp. 170, 485. But in spite of these words there is no power in any Court to order particulars of such a plea to an indictment or information. If sufficient details be not given in the plea,

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 388.

<sup>2</sup> 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28, s. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Wilkes*, 4 Burr. 2568; *R. v. Holland*, 4 T. R. 457.

<sup>4</sup> 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, ss. 1, 2, 3, 25.

<sup>5</sup> See 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 25.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Odgers*, 2 Moo. & Rob. 479.

<sup>7</sup> *R. v. Taylor*, 3 B. & C. 509, 515; 5 D. & R. 422.

<sup>8</sup> *R. v. Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co.*, 3 Q. B. 223, 233; 10 L. J. (M. C.)



the only course is for the prosecutor to demur.<sup>1</sup> To such a plea the prosecutor may \*reply generally, denying the whole thereof.<sup>2</sup> \* 578  
The other pleas mentioned above are now of rare occurrence.<sup>3</sup>

*Certiorari.*

An application is frequently made to the Queen's Bench Division for a writ of *certiorari* to bring up an indictment for libel from an inferior Court that it may be tried in a Superior Court. The application is frequently made before the indictment is found by the grand jury, the Court being asked to remove "any indictment which may be found." It must of course be made before verdict. In no other way can the Court change the venue in a criminal case.<sup>4</sup> The advantages obtained by the removal are, amongst others, that in the Queen's Bench Division a special jury can be secured, and that the defendant can move the Court for a new trial, if convicted.

Where the application is made by the Attorney-General officially, the writ issues as a matter of course.<sup>5</sup> But where a private individual applies for the writ, whether prosecutor or defendant, he will have to file affidavits showing some special ground for the removal, arising out of the circumstances of the particular case; and he must also enter into recognizances to pay all costs incurred subsequent to the removal, if he be ultimately unsuccessful.<sup>6</sup> The application may in vacation be made to a judge at chambers.<sup>7</sup>

One of several defendants may obtain the writ: if he does, this will remove the indictment as to all.<sup>8</sup> But the judge who grants the *certiorari* will require the defendant who applies for it to give security for the costs of the prosecution occasioned by the removal, in the event of any one of the defendants being convicted.<sup>9</sup>

The affidavits should be entitled "in the Queen's Bench Division" simply. The mere fact that the defendant desires a special jury is not alone a sufficient ground for removal.<sup>10</sup> \* Nor is it enough to show \* 579 on affidavit that difficult questions of law may arise,<sup>11</sup> especially if the indictment be in the Central Criminal Court.<sup>12</sup> But if it can be proved

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Hoggan*, *Times*, for Nov. 4th, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> See precedents of such plea and replication in Appendix A., Nos. 70, 71.

<sup>3</sup> For a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court in a criminal case of libel, and a demurrer thereto, see *R. v. Hon. Robert Johnson*, 6 East, 583; 2 Smith, 591; 29 How. St. Tr. 103.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Casey*, 13 Cox, C. C. 614.

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Thomas*, 4 M. & S. 442.

<sup>6</sup> 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, ss. 4, 5.

<sup>7</sup> 5 & 6 Wm. & Mary, c. 11, s. 3.

<sup>8</sup> *R. v. Boxall*, 4 A. & E. 513.

<sup>9</sup> *R. v. Jewell*, 7 E. & B. 140; 26 L. J. Q. B. 177; *R. v. Foulkes*, 1 L. M. & P. 720; 20 L. J. (M. C.) 196.

<sup>10</sup> *R. v. Morton*, 1 Dowl. N. S. 543.

<sup>11</sup> *R. v. Joule*, 5 A. & E. 539.

<sup>12</sup> *R. v. Templar*, 1 Nev. & P. 91.

that a fair and impartial trial of the case cannot be had in the Court below the application will be readily granted.<sup>1</sup>

Formerly in cases of misdemeanor the Court made the rule absolute in the first instance.<sup>2</sup> But now in all cases a rule *nisi* only is granted, unless there be great urgency. If a rule *nisi* for such a writ be obtained, the Court below will, as of course, order the trial to stand over till the rule can be argued. If the rule be made absolute, either prosecutor or defendant can apply for a special jury.<sup>3</sup> After the removal the defendant must appear in the Queen's Bench Division; and plead or demur to the indictment within four days, if not immediately; but the Court will grant him further time on good cause shown.<sup>4</sup>

The trial may take place, either at bar in the Queen's Bench Division at Westminster, or at the Assizes on the civil side, or at the Central Criminal Court.<sup>5</sup> A successful prosecutor will be entitled to his costs, whether he be "the party grieved or injured" by the defendant's words or not.<sup>6</sup> The costs will be taxed under a side-bar rule; and if they are not paid within ten days the recognizance will be estreated, and the sureties compelled to pay.<sup>7</sup> The sureties may then sue the defendant and recover the amount for which they became bail in an action for money paid at the defendant's request.<sup>8</sup>

A writ of *certiorari* may also be applied for to bring up an indictment in order that its validity may be considered and determined, and that it may be quashed, if proved invalid. Such an application must be  
 \* 580 made after the bill is found and \* before judgment has been given thereon, for after judgment has been given, the record can only be removed by writ of error.<sup>9</sup> The Court below has full power to hear a motion in arrest of judgment.

<sup>1</sup> R. v. Hunt and others, 3 B. & Ald. 444; R. v. Palmer, 5 E. & B. 1024.

<sup>2</sup> R. v. Spencer, 8 Dowl. 127; R. v. Chipping Sodbury, 3 N. & M. 104.

<sup>3</sup> 6 Geo. IV. c. 50, s. 30.

<sup>4</sup> 60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 4, ss. 1, 2.

<sup>5</sup> 19 & 20 Vict. c. 16, s. 1.

<sup>6</sup> R. v. Oastler, L. R. 9 Q. B. 132; 43 L. J. Q. B. 42; 22 W. R. 490; 29 L. T. 830; overruling R. v. Dewhurst, 5 B. & Ad. 405.

<sup>7</sup> 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, s. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Jones v. Orchard, 16 C. B. 614; 24 L. J. C. P. 229; 3 W. R. 554.

<sup>9</sup> R. v. Seton, 7 T. R. 373; *In re Pratt*, 7 A. & E. 27; R. v. Unwin, 7 Dowl. 578; R. v. Christian, 12 L. J. (M. C.) 26; R. v. Wilson, 14 L. J. (M. C.) 3.

*Evidence for the Prosecution.*

When the case comes on for trial, the *onus* lies on the prosecutor to prove :—

(1.) That the defendant published the defamatory words.<sup>1</sup>

(2.) That he published it in the county named as venue in the indictment. (a)

(3.) That the matter so published by the defendant is a libel. Where the words are not libellous on the face of them, this involves proof of the innuendoes and other prefatory averments.<sup>2</sup>

(4.) In a few cases the prosecution must also prove a special intent.<sup>3</sup> But malice need never be proved, unless the occasion be privileged.

(5.) If the indictment be framed under s. 4 of Lord Campbell's Act, the prosecutor must give some evidence that the defendant *knew* that the words were false. But in no other case need the prosecutor give any evidence to show that the libel is false.

(1.) The proof of publication in criminal cases is precisely the same as in civil cases, save that it is not essential to prove a publication to a third person, where the indictment alleges an intent to provoke a breach of the peace.<sup>4</sup> Section 27 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854,<sup>5</sup> as to comparison of handwriting, which was originally confined to civil proceedings (s. 103) now applies to criminal trials as well.<sup>6</sup> \* Who- \* 581  
ever requests or procures another to write or publish a libel will be held equally guilty with the actual publisher.<sup>7</sup>

(2.) It is, however, necessary to further prove in a criminal case that the prisoner published the libel in the county in which the venue is laid. However, if the defendant write a libellous letter and cause it to be posted, that letter is published both in the county where it is posted, and in the

<sup>1</sup> As to what is a sufficient publication in law, see *ante*, c. VI. pp. 150–168. As to constructive publication by the act of the defendant's servant or agent, see *ante*, pp. 360–365.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 575.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 376.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Wegener*, 2 Stark. 245; *Phillips v. Jansen*, 2 Esp. 624; *Clutterbuck v. Chaffers*, 1 Stark. 471.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 533.

<sup>6</sup> 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 8. See also *R. v. Beare*, 1 Lord Raym. 414; 12 Mod. 221; 2 Salk. 417; Carth. 409; Holt, 422; *R. v. Slaney*, 5 C. & P. 213.

<sup>7</sup> *R. v. Cooper*, 8 Q. B. 533; 15 L. J. Q. B. 206.

(a) It is not necessary to aver that the words were published within the State. *Emmerson v. Marvel*, 55 Ind. 265; *Offutt v. Earlywine*, 4 Blackf. 460; *Linnville v. Earlywine*, *ib.* 469. Indeed the allegation

of time and place is ordinarily immaterial. *Pegram v. Stoltz*, 67 N. Car. 144; *Potter v. Thompson*, 22 Barb. 89. It is usual however to allege them. See *e.g.* *Rathbun v. Emigh*, 6 Wend. 407.

county to which it is addressed.<sup>1</sup> If the person to whom it is addressed be not then at the address given on the envelope, and the letter be forwarded unopened to him at his lodgings in Middlesex, and there opened, then this is a publication by the defendant in Middlesex.<sup>2</sup> The post-mark is sufficient *prima facie* evidence that the letter was in the post-office named on the date of the mark.<sup>3</sup> These cases must be taken to overrule the *dictum* of Lord Ellenborough in *R. v. Watson*.<sup>4</sup> An admission by the defendant that he wrote the libel is no admission that he published it, still less that he published it in any particular county.<sup>5</sup>

(3.) The prosecutor must now put in the libel and have it read to the jury. The libel itself must, if possible, be produced at the trial. If it be in the possession of the defendant, and notice has been given to him to produce it, then if he refuses so to do, secondary evidence may be given of its contents.<sup>6</sup> Notice to produce must be given a reasonable time before the trial. No general rule can be laid down as to what is a reasonable time; each case must be governed by its particular circumstances; but if it appear that since the notice was given there was an opportunity of fetching the document the notice will be held sufficient.<sup>7</sup> Any other documents which explain the libel, and are referred to in it, may also be put in and read.<sup>8</sup>

Any variance between the words as proved and the words as \* 582 \* laid will be fatal, if it in any way affects the sense. But a variance which is immaterial to the merits of the case may be amended by the judge at the trial, if he thinks that such amendment cannot prejudice the defendant in his defence on the merits.<sup>9</sup>

The prosecution must further prove the innuendoes and all explanatory averments of extrinsic facts, whenever such proof is necessary to bring out the libellous nature of the publication, or to point its application to the person defamed. That asterisks or blanks are left where the name of the person defamed should appear is no defence, if those who knew the circumstances understood the libel to refer to the prosecutor. Any declarations of the defendant as to what he meant are admissible in evidence against him.<sup>10</sup> Strict proof must be given of all material and necessary

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Burdett*, 4 B. & Ald. 95; *R. v. Girdwood*, 1 Leach, 169; East P. C. 1120, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Watson*, 1 Campb. 215.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Plumer*, Russ. & Ry. 264; *R. v. Canning*, 19 St. Tr. 370; *R. v. Hon. Robert Johnson*, 7 East, 65; 3 Smith, 94; 29 How. St. Tr. 103; *Stocken v. Collin*, 7 M. & W. 515; 10 L. J. Ex. 227.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Camp. 215.

<sup>5</sup> *The Seven Bishops' Case*, 4 St. Tr. 304; *R. v. Burdett*, 4 B. & Ald. 95.

<sup>6</sup> *Attorney-General v. Le Merchant*, 2 T. R. 201, n.

<sup>7</sup> Per Bramwell, B., in *R. v. Barker*, 1 F. & F. 326.

<sup>8</sup> *R. v. Slaney*, 5 C. & P. 213.

<sup>9</sup> 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 20; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, ss. 1, 24, 25.

<sup>10</sup> *R. v. Tucker*, Ry. & Moo. 134.

allegations in the indictment, which the libel itself does not admit to be true.<sup>1</sup>

It will then be for the jury, after considering this evidence, to say whether the publication, when taken as a whole, is or is not a libel.

*Evidence for the Defence.*

The defendant may call evidence rebutting the case for the prosecution, *e.g.*, he may dispute the fact of publication, or negative the innuendo, or show that the libel referred to some one else, not to the prosecutor. He may give in evidence any facts which put a different complexion on the libel, *e.g.*, other passages contained in the same publication, fairly connected with the same subject.<sup>2</sup> So, too, the defendant may give evidence of any collateral facts which show that the libel complained of is a fair and *bonâ fide* comment on a matter of public interest, or is privileged by reason of the occasion on which it was published. Unless such privilege be absolute, the prosecutor may rebut this defence by evidence of express malice, precisely as in civil cases.<sup>3</sup>

The defendant may also cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses as to any previous statements made by them on the subject-matter \* of \* 583 the indictment, and if such statements were reduced into writing, such writing may be produced to contradict them.<sup>4</sup>

The defendant may call evidence to show that though he published the libel with his own hand, he was not at the time conscious of its contents. The *onus* of proving this lies on the defendant; the bare delivery of the letter, though sealed, being *primâ facie* evidence of a knowledge of its contents.<sup>5</sup> But if the defendant can prove that he cannot read, or that he never had any opportunity of reading the libel, but delivered it pursuant to orders, having no reason to suppose its contents illegal, this will be a defence.<sup>6</sup>

Again, where evidence has been given which has established a *primâ facie* case of publication against the defendant by the act of some other person acting by his authority, the defendant may prove that such publication was made without his authority, consent, or knowledge, and arose from no want of due care or caution on his part.<sup>7</sup> But it seems that no defendant has ever succeeded in proving such a defence.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Sutton*, 4 M. & S. 548; *R. v. Holt*, 5 T. R. 436; *R. v. Martin*, 2 Camp. 100; *R. v. Budd*, 5 Esp. 230.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Lambert and Perry*, 2 Camp. 398; 31 How. St. Tr. 340.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, c. IX. pp. 264-288.

<sup>4</sup> 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, ss. 4 & 5. As to proving a previous conviction of a witness, see *ante*, p. 546.

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Girdwood*, 1 Leach, 169; East P. C. 1120, 5.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, pp. 384, 7.

<sup>7</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7.

<sup>8</sup> See *R. v. Holbrook and others*, 3 Q. B. D. 60; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 26 W. R. 144;

Also, if the defendant has pleaded a plea under Lord Campbell's Act, but not otherwise, he may give evidence of the truth of the libel. But the truth alone is no defence, unless the defendant can also show that it was for the public benefit that the matters charged should be published. No such plea can be pleaded in the case of a blasphemous, obscene, or seditious libel.<sup>1</sup> If a general charge be made in the libel, specific instances must be set out in the plea. It will be sufficient, however, if at the trial two distinct instances are proved to the satisfaction of the jury.<sup>2</sup>

Evidence that the identical charges contained in the libel which is the subject of the indictment had, before the time of composing and publishing such libel, appeared in another publication which was brought to \* 584 the prosecutor's knowledge, \* and against the publisher of which he took no legal proceedings, is not admissible either at common law or under this section.<sup>3</sup> Where the libel contains several charges, and the defendant fails to prove the truth of any one of such charges, the jury must of necessity find a verdict for the Crown; and the Court, in giving judgment, is bound to consider whether the guilt of the defendant is aggravated or mitigated by the plea, and by the evidence given to prove or disprove it, and to form its own conclusion on the whole case.<sup>4</sup>

If no such plea has been placed on the record, no evidence can be given of the truth of the defendant's words. But if evidence be admissible on other issues in the case, it will not be excluded merely because it tends to show the truth of the libel.<sup>5</sup>

The defendant may also, as in other criminal cases, call evidence of his good character: but such evidence would be of very little use, except, perhaps, in cases of mistaken identity. Evidence in mitigation of punishment is not generally called before verdict; but affidavits may be filed for that purpose after the trial. That rumors to the same effect had previously been circulated in other newspapers is no justification for the defendant's repeating the statement in his own paper, especially if he purports to speak from authority.<sup>6</sup> So, too, it is no defence to a charge of publishing a seditious libel, that it is an extract from an American paper, reprinted as foreign news, especially if such seditious extracts be habitually published by the defendant, at a time of great political excitement, without one word of

37 L. T. 530; 13 Cox, C. C. 650; 4 Q. B. D. 42; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113; 27 W. R. 313; 39 L. T. 536; 14 Cox, C. C. 185; *ante*, pp. 364, 5.

<sup>1</sup> R. v. Duffy, 9 Ir. L. R. 329; 2 Cox, C. C. 45.

<sup>2</sup> R. v. Labouchere (Lambri's case), 14 Cox, C. C. 419.

<sup>3</sup> R. v. Holt, 5 T. R. 436; R. v. Newman, Dears. C. C. 85; 3 C. & K. 252; 1 E. & B. 268; 22 L. J. Q. B. 156; 17 Jur. 617.

<sup>4</sup> R. v. Newman, 1 E. & B. 558; 22 L. J. Q. B. 156.

<sup>5</sup> R. v. Grant and others, 5 B. & Adol. 1081; 3 N. & M. 106.

<sup>6</sup> R. v. Harvey and Chapman, 2 B. & C. 257.

warning or one note of disapproval.<sup>1</sup> Some of the judges permit the prisoner, although defended by counsel, to make a statement to the jury before his counsel addresses them. When this is done, however, it would appear that the counsel for the prosecution can claim the right to reply generally, after the counsel for the prisoner has concluded his speech.<sup>2</sup>

\* *Summing up and Verdict.*

\* 585

The judge at the conclusion of the case sums up the evidence to the jury, and directs the jury as to the law. Before Fox's Libel Act, it had come to be the rule that the judge, not the jury, should decide whether or no the publication was a libel. The judge would direct the jury to find the defendant guilty on proof of the publication, of the innuendoes, and of the other necessary averments.<sup>3</sup> But that Act<sup>4</sup> declares and enacts that on the trial of an indictment or information for libel the jury may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue before them. Or the jury may in their discretion find a special verdict as in other criminal cases.<sup>5</sup> The judge of course may still direct the jury on any point of law, stating his own opinion thereon if he think fit; but the question, libel or no libel, must ultimately be decided by the jury. Fitzgerald, J., thus addressed the jury in a case of seditious libel:—"You are the sole judges of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The judges are here to give any help they can, but the jury are the judges of law and fact, and on them rests the whole responsibility. In this sense the jury are the true guardians of the liberty of the press."<sup>6</sup> At the same time the jury should pay attention to the judge's statement of the law; and then take the alleged libel into their hands, and consider it carefully; not dwelling too much on isolated passages, but judging it fairly as a whole.

*Proceedings after Verdict.*

If at the trial the defendant was acquitted, no further proceedings can be taken; the verdict of the jury is conclusive in favor of the defendant.<sup>7</sup> If, however, the defendant was convicted, then, if the judge before whom the trial took place has reserved any point of law arising thereout for

<sup>1</sup> R. v. Pigott, 11 Cox, C. C. 46.

<sup>2</sup> Per Field, J., in R. v. Eyre (Leeds Assizes), *Times*, Nov. 6th, 1880.

<sup>3</sup> See R. v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661; R. v. Shipley (Dean of St. Asaph), 21 St. Tr. 1043; 3 T. R. 428 n.; 4 Dougl. 73; R. v. Withers, 3 T. R. 428.

<sup>4</sup> 32 Geo. III. c. 60, s. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.* s. 3.

<sup>6</sup> R. v. Sullivan, 11 Cox, C. C. 52.

<sup>7</sup> R. v. Cohen and Jacob, 1 Stark. 516; R. v. Mann, 4 M. & S. 337.

the consideration of the Court above, he may state a case in the  
 \* 586 \* manner pointed out by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78, s. 2. This case  
 will be argued in the Court for the consideration of Crown Cases  
 Reserved, when the conviction will be either quashed or affirmed.

If no such point has been reserved, then the prisoner may move in arrest of judgment, as in a civil case under the old procedure, on the ground that the words as laid do not sufficiently appear to be libellous, or on some other ground appearing on the face of the record. Power to make this motion is expressly reserved by Fox's Libel Act.<sup>1</sup> The absence of any essential introductory averment or innuendo will be a good ground for arresting judgment.<sup>2</sup> But mere formal defects cannot now be taken advantage of in such a motion.<sup>3</sup> And "it is a general rule of pleading at common law that where an averment which is necessary for the support of the pleadings is imperfectly stated, and the verdict on an issue involving that averment is found, if it appears to the Court, after verdict, that the verdict could not have been found on this issue without proof of this averment, then, after verdict, the defective averment which might have been bad on demurrer is cured by the verdict."<sup>4</sup> In all other cases, however, every objection which could have been taken by demurrer before the jury were sworn may still be taken either upon motion in arrest of judgment or by writ of error.<sup>5</sup> Hence if an indictment for publishing an obscene book does not set out the passage or passages of such book alleged to constitute the offence, but only refers to the book by its title, this defect is not cured

by a verdict convicting the defendants, nor is it waived by the de-  
 \* 587 fendant's omitting to demur.<sup>6</sup> \* Where, however, an indictment  
 or information contains several counts, if any one of them be found  
 good, the judgment will stand.<sup>7</sup>

A motion in arrest of judgment should be made before sentence. The judge at the trial may reserve the point for the consideration of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. If the defendant omit to make such motion, still

<sup>1</sup> 32 Geo. III. c. 60, s. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Shipley* (Dean of St. Asaph), 21 St. Tr. 1043; 3 T. R. 428 n.; 4 Dougl. 73; *R. v. Topham*, 4 T. R. 126.

<sup>3</sup> 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 25.

<sup>4</sup> Per Blackburn, J., in *Heymann v. The Queen*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 105, 6; 21 W. R. 357; 28 L. T. 162; per Brett, L.J., in *R. v. Aspinall*, 2 Q. B. D. 57, 8; 46 L. J. M. C. 145; 25 W. R. 283; 36 L. T. 297. See also Serjeant Williams' note (1) to *Stenel v. Hogg*, 1 Wms. Saund. 228; *R. v. Goldsmith*, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 79; 42 L. J. M. C. 94; 21 W. R. 791; 28 L. T. 881.

<sup>5</sup> Per Cockburn, C.J., 2 Q. B. D. 572; and per Bramwell, L. J. 3 Q. B. D. 624; *R. v. Larkin*, Dears. C. C. 365; 23 L. J. M. C. 125.

<sup>6</sup> *Bradlaugh and Besant v. The Queen* (C. A.), 3 Q. B. D. 607; 48 L. J. M. C. 5; 26 W. R. 410; 38 L. T. 118; 14 Cox, C. C. 68, overruling *R. v. Bradlaugh and Besant*, 2 Q. B. D. 569; 46 L. J. M. C. 236.

<sup>7</sup> *R. v. Benfield and others*, 2 Burr. 985.



the Court will of itself arrest the judgment, if on a review of the case it be satisfied that the defendant has not been found guilty of any offence in law.<sup>1</sup> On a motion in arrest of judgment the Court has no power to amend the record.<sup>2</sup> If the judgment be arrested, all the proceedings are set aside, and judgment of acquittal is given; but this will be no bar to a fresh indictment, for the defendant was never really in jeopardy under the defective indictment.<sup>3</sup> So if the judgment against him be reversed on a writ of error, he can be again indicted for the same offence.\*

The defendant may bring a writ of error, after conviction and sentence, on obtaining the *fiat* of the Attorney-General, which will be granted on a certificate signed by the prisoner's counsel whenever reasonable grounds are shown. That the same point has been raised by motion in arrest of judgment and decided against the prisoner is no bar to bringing error.<sup>5</sup> If the Attorney-General refuse to grant a *fiat*, the defendant has no remedy.<sup>6</sup> If the judgment below be reversed, the Court of Error now has power to pronounce the proper judgment.<sup>7</sup>

When the indictment or information either originated in the Queen's Bench Division or has been removed thither by *certiorari*, the defendant may also move for a new trial, as in a civil case. The motion should be made within the first four days of the next term; though the time may be extended *ex gratiâ* in a proper case, if counsel apply for an extension of time within the four days.<sup>8</sup>

\* A new trial may be moved for on the ground that the prosecu- \* 588 tor has omitted to give due notice of trial, or that the verdict has been contrary to evidence, or to the direction of the judge, or for the improper reception or rejection of evidence, or other mistake or misdirection of the judge, or for any gross misbehavior of the jury among themselves, or for surprise, or for any other cause where it shall appear to the Court that a new trial will further the ends of justice.<sup>9</sup>

The prisoner *must* be present in Court when a motion for a new trial is made and argued.<sup>10</sup> The rule is generally argued therefore when the defendant is brought up for judgment.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Per *cur.* in *R. v. Waddington*, 1 East, 146.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Larkin*, Dears. C. C. 365; 23 L. J. M. C. 125.

<sup>3</sup> *Vaux's case*, 4 Rep. 45a.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Drury and others*, 3 C. & K. 190; 18 L. J. M. C. 189.

<sup>5</sup> Per Mellor, J., in *R. v. Bradlaugh and Besant*, 2 Q. B. D. 574; 46 L. J. M. C. 286.

<sup>6</sup> *Ex parte Newton*, 4 E. & B. 869; *Re Pigott*, 11 Cox, C. C. 311.

<sup>7</sup> 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78, s. 5.

<sup>8</sup> *R. v. Holt*, 5 T. R. 436; *R. v. Newman*, 1 E. & B. 270; 22 L. J. Q. B. 156; Dears. C. C. 85; 17 Jur. 617; 3 C. & K. 252.

<sup>9</sup> *R. v. Whitehouse and Tench*, Dears. C. C. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *R. v. Spragg and another*, 2 Burr, 929; *R. v. Caudwell*, 2 Den. C. C. 372 n.

<sup>11</sup> *R. v. Hetherington*, 5 Jur. 529.

Where the verdict is on the face of it imperfect, so that judgment cannot be given upon it, the Court will award a *venire de novo*, instead of granting a new trial, the error appearing on the face of the record. In such a case the first trial is a mistrial and is treated as a nullity, and the prisoner does not plead again.<sup>1</sup> A *venire de novo* was awarded in Woodfall's case,<sup>2</sup> it being impossible to say what the jury meant by finding him "guilty of publishing *only*."<sup>3</sup>

When a motion for a new trial is allowed, or a writ of *venire facias de novo* awarded, the parties stand precisely as they did before the first trial, and the whole of the facts are to be reheard.

Where a new trial is ordered of an indictment removed into the Queen's Bench Division by *certiorari*, at the instance of the defendant, the Court may, in its discretion, order that the costs shall abide the event of the new trial.<sup>4</sup>

Sentence is seldom passed directly the verdict of Guilty is given, especially in the Queen's Bench Division. Formerly the defendant was kept in custody till sentenced; but now, unless the case be exceptional, he is allowed out on the same bail as before. In the interval, the defendant frequently files affidavits in mitigation of punishment, which the prosecutor may answer. Such affidavits may show that the defendant reasonably and *bonâ fide* believed in the truth of the charges made in the libel, but not that the libel is in fact true.<sup>5</sup> Or they may contain general evidence of good character. That the defendant voluntarily stopped the sale of the book complained of, as soon as proceedings were commenced,<sup>6</sup> or any other circumstance showing provocation by the prosecutor, or an absence of malice in the defendant, may be set out on affidavit. But the defendant should be careful not to attack the character of the prosecutor, or his witnesses, or impugn the justice of the verdict, lest he thereby aggravate his original offence.

If, in the interval since the verdict, the defendant has republished the libel, or continued its sale, or been guilty of other misconduct, the prosecutor may file affidavits in aggravation of punishment.<sup>7</sup> The judge in

<sup>1</sup> Per Abbott, C.J., in *R. v. Fowler and Sexton*, 4 B. & Ald. 273, 276.

<sup>2</sup> 5 Burr. 2661.

<sup>3</sup> And see *Campbell and another v. The Queen*, 11 Q. B. 799; 17 L. J. M. C. 89.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Whitehouse and Tench*, Dears. C. C. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Burdett*, 4 B. & Ald. 314; *R. v. Halpin*, 9 B. & C. 65; 4 M. & R. 8.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Williams*, Lofft. 759.

<sup>7</sup> See *R. v. Withers*, 3 T. R. 428. As to the procedure when the prisoner is brought up for judgment, see *R. v. Bunts*, 2 T. R. 683.

passing sentence will also consider whether the guilt of the defendant is aggravated or mitigated by any plea of justification which he may have placed on the record, and by the evidence given to prove or to disprove the same.<sup>1</sup>

Where judgment has been suffered by default, both parties should state their case on affidavit. If there is any matter in the prosecutor's affidavit which the defendant could not be expected to have come prepared to answer, he will be allowed an opportunity of answering it on a future day.<sup>2</sup> \* If the prisoner be found guilty of publishing a \* 590 blasphemous or seditious libel, all copies found in his possession may be seized and destroyed by an order of the Court, under 60 Geo. III. and 1 Geo. IV. c. 8, ss. 1, 2.

### *Costs.*

In the case of an indictment or information by a private prosecutor for the publication of a defamatory libel, if judgment shall be given for the defendant, he shall be entitled to recover his costs from the prosecutor.<sup>3</sup> Such costs must first be taxed by the proper officer of the Court before which the said indictment or information is tried; and his taxation cannot be reviewed by the Queen's Bench Division.<sup>4</sup> In the case of an information, the record being in the Queen's Bench Division, execution may issue on taxation in the ordinary way.<sup>5</sup> But in the case of an indictment not in the Queen's Bench Division, there is no way of issuing execution for such costs; they must be recovered therefore by an ordinary action at law.<sup>6</sup>

So if a defendant pleads, and fails to prove, a justification, the prosecutor may recover from the defendant the costs he has sustained by reason of such plea, whatever be the result of any other issues.<sup>7</sup>

But this section does not apply to Crown prosecutions, or to any proceedings for blasphemous, obscene, or seditious libels. And there is no provision enabling a prosecutor to recover the general costs of the prosecution. Sometimes, however, if a fine be imposed on the defendant as part of his sentence, the prosecutor may, by memorializing the Treasury, obtain a portion of the fine towards the payment of his costs.

<sup>1</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Archer*, 2 T. R. 203 n.; *R. v. Wilson*, 4 T. R. 487. As to the sentence that may be passed in the case of a defamatory libel at common law, see *ante*, p. 378; under the various statutes, p. 379; in the case of a blasphemous libel, p. 394; an obscene libel, p. 404; a seditious libel, p. 412.

<sup>3</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Newhouse*, 1 L. & M. 129; 22 L. J. Q. B. 127.

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Latimer*, 15 Q. B. 1077; 20 L. J. Q. B. 129; 15 Jur. 314.

<sup>6</sup> *Richardson v. Willis*, L. R. 8 Ex. 69; 42 L. J. Ex. 15, 68; 27 L. T. 828; 12 Cox, C. C. 298, 351.

<sup>7</sup> 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 8.

Where an indictment is removed into the Queen's Bench Division by *certiorari*, the party applying for the writ (not being the Attorney-General) must give security for all subsequent costs.

Where a municipal corporation have directed a prosecution for a \* 591 libel on one of their officers, the costs cannot be paid out \* of any borough fund.<sup>1</sup> Where the directors of a company have instituted a prosecution for libel, the costs should not be paid out of the assets of the company, though the directors will not, as a rule, be ordered to repay any costs already paid.<sup>2</sup>

## PART II.

### PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION.

#### *Motion for the Rule.*

The Clerk of the Crown may not file any information without express order of the Queen's Bench Division granted in open Court.<sup>3</sup> Counsel must move the Court upon proper affidavits for a rule *nisi* calling upon the defendant to show cause why an information should not be granted. The prosecutor must consent to waive his civil remedy by action, and must submit himself to the Court; and must be prepared to go through with the criminal proceedings to conviction. The affidavits on which the application is based should be carefully drawn up; as no second application may be made on amended or additional affidavits.<sup>4</sup> They should in the first place prove the publication by the defendant. Mere *prima facie* evidence of this will not be sufficient.<sup>5</sup> There must be before the Court legal evidence sufficient to justify a grand jury in returning a true bill for the same offence. Thus in *R. v. Stanger*,<sup>6</sup> the affidavits merely showed that the annexed copy of the *Newcastle Daily Chronicle*, the newspaper containing the libel, had been purchased from a salesman in the office of that paper, and that in a footnote at the end of that copy the defendant was \* 592 stated \* to be the printer and publisher of the newspaper, and the relator believed him so to be. Held that this was no legal evidence

<sup>1</sup> *R. v. Mayor, &c., of Liverpool*, 41 L. J. Q. B. 175; 20 W. R. 389; 26 L. T. 101.

<sup>2</sup> *Pickering v. Stephenson*, L. R. 14 Eq. 322; 41 L. J. Ch. 493; 20 W. R. 654; 26 L. T. 608.

<sup>3</sup> 4 & 5 Wm. & Mary, c. 18, s. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *R. v. Franceys*, 2 A. & E. 49.

<sup>5</sup> *R. v. Baldwin*, 8 A. & E. 168; *R. v. Willett*, 6 T. R. 294.

<sup>6</sup> L. R. 6 Q. B. 352; 40 L. J. Q. B. 96; 19 W. R. 640; 24 L. T. 266.

of publication, and the rule was discharged. If the defendant keeps an office or shop at which copies of the paper can be purchased, then an affidavit by a person who purchased a copy of the libel at such office or shop will be the best evidence of a publication by the defendant, and also that most easily obtainable. That the purchase was made expressly for the purpose of enabling such affidavit to be sworn is no objection.<sup>1</sup>

It is a doubtful point whether the omission of such strict proof of publication can subsequently be supplied by the admissions, if any, in the defendant's affidavits filed to show cause against the rule. The Courts have generally refused to look at defendant's affidavits to supply a defect in those of the prosecutor.<sup>2</sup> For the rule is that the prosecutor can at the argument refer to no document which does not appear on the face of the rule itself to have been read at the first application.<sup>3</sup> But Lord Kenyon, in *R. v. Mein*,<sup>4</sup> and Blackburn, J., in *R. v. Stanger*,<sup>5</sup> expressed an opinion that the Court might look at any evidence lawfully before them for any purpose they pleased.

The prosecutor must also swear to his innocence in all particulars of the charge contained in the libel.<sup>6</sup> For although at the trial of the information when granted truth will be no defence, except under Lord Campbell's Act, still it is "sufficient cause to prevent the interposition of the Court in this extraordinary manner;" the prosecutor must proceed by way of indictment in the ordinary course.<sup>7</sup>

If there is no specific charge in the libel, no such affidavit is necessary,<sup>8</sup> and it has also been dispensed with in other special circumstances. But as a rule there must be a specific denial on oath of the particular charges, even where it is a duke that is aspersed.<sup>9</sup> If a general charge be made and a specific instance alleged, the affidavit must expressly \* nega- \* 593  
tive not only the general charge, but also the specific instance.<sup>10</sup>

The affidavits should be sworn with *no* heading or title. The application must be made within two terms after the publication, or at all events within two terms after the libel came to the knowledge of the prosecutor. The prosecutor, too, must come to the Court in the first instance, and must not have attempted to obtain redress in other ways.<sup>11</sup> The affidavits should not contain irrelevant or improper matter; if the prosecutor abuses the

<sup>1</sup> *Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer*, 14 Q. B. 189; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Baldwin*, 8 A. & E. 169.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Woolmer and another*, 12 A. & E. 422.

<sup>4</sup> 3 T. R. 597.

<sup>5</sup> L. R. 6 Q. B. 355; 40 L. J. Q. B. 96; 19 W. R. 640; 24 L. T. 266.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Webster*, 3 T. R. 388.

<sup>7</sup> *R. v. Bickerton*, 1 Stra. 498.

<sup>8</sup> *R. v. Williams*, 5 B. & Ald. 595.

<sup>9</sup> *R. v. Haswell & Bate*, 1 Dougl. 387.

<sup>10</sup> *R. v. Aunger*, 12 Cox, C. C. 407.

<sup>11</sup> *R. v. Marshall*, 4 E. & B. 475, *ante*, p. 382.

alleged libeller, or shows an *animus* against him, the Court will very probably reject the application.<sup>1</sup>

The rule *nisi*, if granted, should be drawn up "Upon reading" the alleged libel and the affidavits and all other documents to which it is desired to refer on the argument of the rule. It should be personally served on the defendant.

### *Argument of the Rule.*

The defendant now shows cause. He generally files affidavits in reply. It is open to him to maintain that the libel is true.<sup>2</sup>

He may also, it seems, contend that the libel complained of did not apply to the relator. In a recent case the libel did not name the person alluded to; but described him "as a man of high descent, who has been regarded as a man not only of refined tastes and studious habits but as an artist of somewhat more than ordinary ability." The relator swore that he believed that the libel was intended to refer to himself. The Duke of Sutherland and others of his friends considered that it would be generally understood as applying to him; and a rule was granted. But upon the argument of the rule, the publisher and the author of the libel both swore positively that the relator was *not* the person referred to and that they were not in fact aware that he was either a man of refined tastes and studious

habits, or an artist of somewhat more than ordinary ability. And \* 594 the rule was therefore discharged.<sup>3</sup> \* This decision is perhaps to

be regretted; as it opens a door by which a libeller may escape punishment, provided he is careful not to expressly name his victim in the first place, and not too scrupulous to swear a falsehood afterwards. The writer of a libel may richly deserve punishment although it may not be clear to whom he intended the libel to apply; and the Court in granting a criminal information regards the interests of public morality and order rather than those of the individual prosecutor.

If the rule be discharged on the merits the Court generally gives the defendant his costs. And no second application may be made to the Court, even upon additional affidavits; <sup>4</sup> except in very peculiar circumstances, as where the only person who had made an affidavit on behalf of the defendant on the argument of the first rule had since been indicted or convicted of perjury in respect of such affidavit.<sup>5</sup> But though the prosecutor cannot apply a second time for a criminal information, he can still prefer an indictment in the ordinary way.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. v. Burn, 7 A. & E. 190.

<sup>2</sup> R. v. Eve and Parlbby, 5 A. & E. 780; 1 N. & P. 229. See *ante*, p. 592.

<sup>3</sup> R. v. Barnard, *Times* for Dec. 17th, 1878, and Jan. 13th, 1879.

<sup>4</sup> R. v. Smithson, 4 B. & Ad. 862.

<sup>5</sup> R. v. Eve and Parlbby, 5 A. & E. 780; 1 N. & P. 229.

<sup>6</sup> Per Lord Denman in R. v. Cockshaw, 2 N. & Man. 378.

*Compromise.*

Frequently, however, the defendant files exculpatory affidavits apologizing to the prosecutor, withdrawing all imputations upon him, and entreating the mercy of the Court. When this happens, the prosecutor is generally quite satisfied; he has obtained all he desired: and by no means courts the expense and notoriety of a prolonged criminal trial. But the Court is by no means disposed on that account to allow the proceedings to drop, even at the request of the prosecutor; and in more than one recent case the Queen's Bench Division have compelled a reluctant prosecutor to take a rule in the interest of the public. Having invoked the aid of the criminal law, it is his duty not to abandon the proceedings merely because his own private purpose is attained.<sup>1</sup>

*\*Trial and Costs.*

\* 595

If the rule be made absolute, the prosecutor must enter into a recognizance to effectually prosecute the information and abide by the order of the Court. The amount of the recognizance is fixed by statute<sup>2</sup> at 20*L.*, and this amount cannot be increased.<sup>3</sup>

The information must set out the libel, &c., with all the certainty and precision of an indictment.<sup>4</sup> As soon as it is filed a *subpœna* issues of which a copy must be served on the defendant. The defendant must appear thereto within four days. If he does not he may be attached under a judge's warrant.<sup>5</sup> After appearance the defendant has ten days within which to plead. His plea is duly entered on the record which is then made up and sent down for trial to the county in which the libel was published, unless a trial at bar be demanded. The record may be amended by a judge at chambers after plea and before trial.<sup>6</sup> The trial of an information for libel in all respects resembles the trial of an indictment; save that in *ex officio* informations, the counsel for the Crown (whether the Attorney-General himself or any one appearing for him) has the right to reply, although the defendant calls no witnesses.<sup>7</sup> The trial must take place within one year after issue joined; and if not, or if the prosecutor enters a *nolle prosequi*, or if, at the trial, the verdict pass for the defendant, the defendant will be entitled to recover his costs from the prosecutor. The judge at the trial has no longer any power to deprive a successful defendant of his costs by certifying upon the record that there was a reasonable cause for exhibit-

<sup>1</sup> See *R. v. "The World,"* 13 Cox, C. C. 305.

<sup>2</sup> 4 & 5 Wm. and M. c. 18, s. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *R. v. Brooke*, 2 T. R. 190.

<sup>4</sup> See *Precedents* Nos. 57, 60, *post*, pp. 649, 651.

<sup>5</sup> 48 Geo. III., c. 58, s. 1.

<sup>6</sup> *R. v. Wilkes* (1764-1770), 4 Burr. 2527; 2 Wils. 151.

<sup>7</sup> *R. v. Horne*, 20 How. St. Tr. 660; 11 St. Tr. 264; Cowp. 672.

ing such information, except in an *ex officio* information.<sup>1</sup> The master of the Crown office taxes the costs under a side-bar rule; and he may allow costs incurred by the defendant previously to the filing of the information.<sup>2</sup>

\* 596 \* On such taxation execution issues. There is no power, however, to condemn the defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution, if he be convicted or plead guilty, unless indeed he files a special plea of justification under Lord Campbell's Act, in which case he will have to pay the costs incurred by reason of that plea.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 4 & 5 Wm. and Mary, c. 18, s. 1, and 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 8; as explained in *R. v. Latimer*, 15 Q. B. 1077; 20 L. J. Q. B. 129; 15 Jur. 314.

<sup>2</sup> *R. v. Steel and others*, 1 Q. B. D. 482; 45 L. J. Q. B. 391; 24 W. R. 638; 34 L. T. 283; 13 Cox, C. C. 159; (C. A.) 2 Q. B. D. 37; 46 L. J. M. C. 1; 25 W. R. 34; 35 L. T. 534.

<sup>3</sup> See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 8, *post*, p. 674, Appendix C.



# \* APPENDICES.

\* 597

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## APPENDIX A.

### PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS.

#### CONTENTS.

##### I. PLEADINGS IN ACTIONS FOR LIBEL.

*Libel contained in a character given to a domestic servant by her late employer.*

1. Statement of Claim.
2. Statement of Defence. (Justification and Privilege.)

*Libel on architects (partners) in the way of their profession.*

3. Statement of Claim.

*Libel on the editor of a newspaper.*

4. Statement of Claim. (Injunction.)
5. Statement of Defence. (Justification and *Bona Fide* Comment.)
6. Reply and Demurrer.

*Libel contained in a Memorial to the Home Secretary.*

7. Statement of Claim.
8. Summons for Particulars.
9. Order for Particulars.
10. Particulars.
11. Statement of Defence. (Privilege.)
12. Reply.
13. Rejoinder.

*Libel contained in a placard.*

14. Statement of Claim.
15. Statement of Defence. (Privilege.)

*Action against the Manager of a Bank for showing to a customer an anonymous libellous letter.*

16. Statement of Claim. (Innuendoes.)
17. Statement of Defence. (Justification and Privilege.)

*\* Action for publishing a libellous novel.*

\* 598

18. Statement of Defence.

*Action against a newspaper proprietor.*

19. Statement of Defence, on the ground that the alleged libel is fair and *bonâ fide* comment on a matter of public interest.
20. Statement of Defence, on the ground that the alleged libel is a fair and impartial report of a judicial proceeding.
21. Interrogatories administered to a newspaper proprietor.
22. Interrogatories administered to the editor of a newspaper.
23. Notice of intention to give evidence of an apology in mitigation of damages under Lord Campbell's Act.

## II. PLEADINGS IN ACTIONS FOR SLANDER.

*Words imputing a crime.*

24. Statement of Claim. (Innuendo.)
25. Statement of Defence. (Charge made in Joke.)
26. Statement of Defence. (Justification.)

*Words imputing a contagious disorder.*

27. Statement of Claim.
28. Particulars.
29. Statement of Defence.

*Words spoken in a foreign language.*

30. Statement of Claim. (Translation.)

*Words spoken of a medical man,*

31. Statement of Claim. (Innuendoes.)

*Slander of a clergyman.*

32. Statement of Claim.

*Slander of a parish clerk.*

33. Statement of Claim.
34. Statement of Defence. (Apology and Payment into Court.)
35. Reply.

*Slander of a trader in the way of his trade.*

36. Statement of Claim.
37. Statement of Defence. (Justification.)

*Slander of a builder in the way of his trade.*

38. Statement of Claim.
39. Statement of Defence. (Justification and Privilege.)

## \* 599 \* III. PLEADINGS IN ACTIONS FOR SLANDER OF TITLE.

*Pleadings in the case of "The Western Counties Manure Co. v. The Lawes Chemical Manure Co."*

40. Declaration.
41. Pleas.
42. Replication and Demurrer.

- 43. Joinder in Demurrer.
- 44. Plaintiffs' points upon the argument of the Demurrer.
- 45. Interrogatories.

*Slander of title to goods.*

- 46. Statement of Claim.
- 47. Statement of Defence.

*Libel in the nature of slander of title.*

- 48. Statement of Claim.
- 49. Statement of Defence.

#### IV. FORMS OF PLEADINGS, NOTICES, ETC., IN THE COUNTY COURT,

- 50. Statement of the Plaintiff's Cause of Action in a remitted action.
- 51. Notice of Trial of such remitted Action.
- 52. Affidavit for leave to administer Interrogatories.
- 53. Notice of Set-off and Counterclaim.
- 54. Notice of Special Defence.
- 55. Notice under Lord Campbell's Act, s. 1.
- 56. Notice under Lord Campbell's Act, s. 2.

#### V. PRECEDENTS OF CRIMINAL PLEADINGS.

- 57. Information for a libel on a private individual. (R. v. Newman.)
- 58. Pleas thereto.
- 59. Replication.
- 60. *Ex Officio* Information for a Seditious Libel. (R. v. Horne.)
- 61. Indictment for a Blasphemous Libel.
- 62. Indictment for an Obscene Libel.
- 63. Indictment for Seditious Words.
- 64. Indictment for Slanderous Words spoken to a Magistrate whilst in the execution of his duty.
- 65. Indictment for a libel on a private individual at common law.
- 66. Indictment under s. 4 of Lord Campbell's Act.
- 67. Indictment under s. 5 of Lord Campbell's Act.
- 68. Demurrer to an Indictment or Information.
- 69. Joinder in Demurrer.
- 70. Pleas to an Indictment.
- 71. Replication to the above Pleas.
- 72. Demurrer to a Plea.
- 73. Joinder in Demurrer.

\* 600 \* I. PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS IN ACTIONS  
OF LIBEL.

No. 1.

*Libel contained in a Character given to a Domestic Servant by her late  
Employer.*

1880. — J. — No. 1973.

In the High Court of Justice,

Queen's Bench Division.

Writ issued Nov. 3rd, 1880.

Between Sarah Jones . . . . . *Plaintiff.*

and

Henry Roberts

and Alice his wife . . . . . *Defendants.*

STATEMENT OF CLAIM,

Delivered on the 16th day of Nov., 1880, by M. & N. of ———, in the City of London, agents for ———, of Cheltenham, in the County of Gloucester, solicitor for the above-named plaintiff.

1. The plaintiff is a housemaid, formerly in the service of the defendants, and now residing at ———.

2. The male defendant is a gentleman, residing at ——— Hall, near Eve-sham, in the county of Worcester; and the female defendant is his wife.

3. On the 15th day of September, 1880, the female defendant falsely and maliciously wrote and published of the plaintiff the words following, that is to say: — “While she (meaning thereby the plaintiff) was with us, she stole a quantity of our house-linen, and pawned it in the High Street.” \*

4. [Add a paragraph setting out special damage, if any exists.]

And the plaintiff claims £200 damages, and proposes that this action be tried in the county of Gloucester.

\* N.B. — No innuendo is necessary.

\* No. 2.

\* 601

## STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendants admit that the defendant Alice wrote and published the words set out in paragraph 3 of the Statement of Claim, but deny that she did so either falsely or maliciously.

2. The said words are true in substance and in fact. While the plaintiff was in the service of the defendants, to wit, on the 18th day of March, 1880, she stole two pair of sheets and one counterpane, of the goods and chattels of the defendant Henry, and pawned them at the shop of John —, No. —, High Street, Evesham. Wherefore the defendants, as they lawfully might, discharged the plaintiff from their service.

3. Subsequently the plaintiff was desirous of entering into the service of Mrs. M., of —, in the county of Warwick; and the said Mrs. M. wrote a letter to the defendant Alice inquiring as to the plaintiff's character, and asking especially why she left the defendants' service.

4. Thereupon it became and was the duty of the defendant Alice to write to the said Mrs. M., telling her what she knew as to the plaintiff's character, and stating the reason of her dismissal. In accordance with such duty the defendant Alice wrote to Mrs. M. a letter containing the said words. Such words were simply an answer to Mrs. M.'s inquiries, and were written under a sense of duty and without malice, and in the *bonâ fide* belief that the charge therein made was true and not otherwise. Wherefore the defendants say that the said letter is privileged by reason of the occasion on which it was written.

## REPLY.

The plaintiff joins issue with the defendants on their statement of defence.

No. 3.

*Libel on Architects (partners) in the way of their profession.*

Botterill and another *v.* Whytehead, 41 L. T. 588, *ante*, p. 219.

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiffs are brothers carrying on the profession and business of architects in partnership at —.

\* 2. At or about the time of the writing and publishing of the libels hereinafter complained of, the plaintiffs were, as the defend-

\* 602

ant well knew, employed by a committee formed for the restoration of a church at South Skirlaugh, near Hull, to superintend and carry out the restoration of the said church, and were appointed by the said committee as architects for that purpose.

3. On the 8th April, 1878, after the appointment of the plaintiffs as such architects as aforesaid, the defendant by a letter written and sent to Mr. Bethel, a member of the said committee, falsely and maliciously wrote and published of the plaintiffs, in relation to their profession and business of architects, and the carrying on and conducting thereof by them, the words following, that is to say :—

“ I see in the *Hull News* of Saturday that the restoration of Skirlaugh Church has fallen into the hands of an architect who is a Wesleyan, and can show no experience in church work. Can you not do something to avert the irreparable loss which must be caused if any of the masonry of this ancient gem of art be ignorantly tampered with? Your great influence would surely have much weight in the matter.”

Meaning thereby that the plaintiffs were incompetent to superintend and carry out the restoration of the said church, and that, if the restoration were left in the hands of the plaintiffs, the old masonry of the church would be ignorantly tampered with, and would not be treated with proper spirit and feeling, and would suffer from their incompetence and want of skill.

4. On or about the 16th April, 1878, and after the appointment of the plaintiffs as such architects as aforesaid, the defendant, by a letter addressed to Mr. Barnes, the incumbent of Skirlaugh Church, falsely and maliciously wrote and published of the plaintiffs, in relation to their profession and business of architects, and the carrying thereon and conducting thereof by them, the words following, that is to say :—

“ I am annoyed to see that you and your committee have engaged Messrs. B. as architects for the restoration of your church. Are you aware that they are Wesleyans, and cannot have any religious acquaintance with such work ? ”

\* 603      Meaning thereby that the plaintiffs were incompetent to \* undertake and superintend the restoration of the said church, and were unable to carry it out with adequate spirit and feeling.

5. By reason of the premises and the publication of the said libels, the plaintiffs have been and are injured in their said profession and business, and have suffered in their credit and reputation as architects.

## No. 4.

*Libel on the Editor of a Newspaper.*

Leyman v. Latimer and others, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 25 W. R. 751; 26 W. R. 305; 37 L. T. 360, 819.

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff resides at Dartmouth, in the County of Devon, and is the proprietor and editor of a newspaper published there, and called the *Dartmouth Advertiser*.

2. The defendants are, and at the time of the publications hereinafter mentioned were, the proprietors, printers, and publishers of a newspaper called the *Western Daily Mercury*, the head publishing office of which is at Plymouth, in the said county of Devon, and which also has branch publishing offices in Devonport, in the said county, and in the city of Exeter.

3. The defendants, or some or one of them, also edit and write for the said newspaper.

4. The defendants, in their said paper called the *Western Daily Mercury*, dated on the 24th day of April, 1876, wrote, printed, and published certain words, which words (omitting for the sake of brevity certain words appearing in the original at the places marked with asterisks) were as follows:—

“The narrative must be deferred till next week. \* \* \* The history of the *Advertiser*, too, must stand over. \* \* \* its present editor is a convicted felon. The case in which a certain John Leyman, printer, was sentenced to twelve months’ hard labor for stealing feathers—a case of which Mr. Foster may have heard, since he is so familiar with the chief actor—will be reproduced.”

5. The defendants, in their said newspaper called the \* *Western* \* 604 *Daily Mercury*, dated the 1st day of May, 1876, wrote, printed, and published certain words, which words (omitting for the sake of brevity certain words not personally relating to the plaintiff, and appearing in the original at the places marked with asterisks) were as follows:—

“There still remain to be recorded Mr. Foster’s controversies with the Town Council of Dartmouth. \* \* \* and the facts regarding his newspaper (meaning the plaintiff’s said newspaper, the *Dartmouth Advertiser*), and its bankrupt and felon editors (meaning the plaintiff). The narrative must be deferred till next week. It is worth the telling.”

6. The words set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 were written, printed, and published by the defendants of and concerning the plaintiff, and were so written, printed and published falsely and maliciously, and with a libellous and defamatory sense and meaning.

7. The said words so set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 were also so falsely and maliciously written, printed, and published of and concerning the plaintiff in his business and calling of a printer and newspaper editor, and his said occupation as proprietor and editor of the said *Dartmouth Advertiser* newspaper.

8. In consequence of the publications set forth in the 4th and 5th paragraphs, the circulation of the plaintiff's said newspaper, the *Dartmouth Advertiser*, has already been greatly injured, and has much decreased, and will be still further injured and decreased. The plaintiff has also already experienced difficulty in getting supplied with news and obtaining persons to be his correspondents, and will experience still further difficulty in getting supplied with news and obtaining persons to correspond with him. In particular one Mr. Robt. D., of Churston Ferrers, in the county of Devon, and one Mr. Robt. H., of Totnes, also in the county of Devon, who both had respectively supplied the plaintiff and his said newspaper with news, and acted as correspondents to the plaintiff's said newspaper, in consequence of the said publications refused and declined any longer so to act. The value of the goodwill of the plaintiff's said newspaper has, in consequence of the matters hereinbefore appearing, become and is greatly lessened.

• The plaintiff claims :

\* 605 \* 1. £1000 damages.

2. An injunction to restrain the defendants from similar publications in future.

3. Such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.

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## No. 5.

### STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendants do not admit that the plaintiff is the proprietor and editor of the *Dartmouth Advertiser* newspaper.

2. The defendants do not admit the allegations in paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of the statement of claim.

3. The defendants deny that the word "bankrupt" in the quotation from their said newspaper, in the fifth paragraph of the statement of claim set out, was intended to, or did, refer to the plaintiff.

4. And the defendants further say that the plaintiff has been convicted of felony, and was sentenced to twelve months' hard labor for stealing feathers.

5. The words in the 4th and 5th paragraphs of the statement of claim complained of were, and are part of certain articles printed and published



in the defendant's said newspaper, each of which articles was and is a fair and *bonâ fide* comment upon the conduct of the plaintiff in his public character and as the nominal editor and proprietor of the *Dartmouth Advertiser*, a public newspaper, and was printed and published by the defendants as and for such comment, and without any malicious motive or intent whatever.

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## No. 6.

## REPLY AND DEMURRER.

1. The plaintiff joins issue upon the 1st, 2nd, and 5th paragraphs of the defendants' statement of defence.

2. As to the 3rd paragraph of the statement of defence, the plaintiff admits the allegations in such 3rd paragraph contained.

\* 3. As to the 4th paragraph of the said statement of defence, \* 606 the plaintiff (so that such admission be not in any way extended or taken to mean that he ever was, in fact, guilty of the offence referred to) admits the allegation contained in such 4th paragraph. But the plaintiff further says that he has never been convicted of felony save on that one occasion, which is the occasion mentioned in the said 4th paragraph of the statement of defence. On that occasion he was convicted of the supposed felony by a Court duly having jurisdiction in that behalf, the Court of Quarter Sessions for the county of Cornwall; and the said Court, having jurisdiction as aforesaid, in the exercise of such jurisdiction, adjudged that, as a punishment for the said supposed felony, the plaintiff should be imprisoned and kept to hard labor for twelve calendar months. The said conviction took place several years ago, and the plaintiff, as the defendants well knew, duly endured the punishment to which he was so adjudged as aforesaid, for the said supposed felony, and thereby became, and was, and has ever since been, and is, in the same situation as if a pardon under the Great Seal had been granted to him as to the said supposed felony whereof he was convicted as aforesaid.

4. The plaintiff demurs to the said 4th paragraph of the statement of defence, on the ground that, while the statement of defence admits the publication of the whole of the libels alleged in the statement of claim, and the said paragraph is pleaded to the whole of the said libels, and a part of the libel charges that the plaintiff is a convicted felon, nevertheless the said 4th paragraph contains nothing which justifies or is otherwise a defence to that portion of the said libel; and the plaintiff also demurs upon other grounds sufficient in law to sustain this demurrer.

Demurrer by the defendants to the 3rd paragraph of the plaintiff's reply.

*Libel contained in a Memorial to the Home Secretary.*

J. S. and M. his wife v. G.

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiffs reside at —, in the County of Wilts, and the defendant at — House in the adjoining parish.

2. In the month of —, —, the night dress of a child of the plaintiffs accidentally caught fire, and the child was so seriously injured that he shortly afterwards died, and upon an inquest being held to inquire into the cause of his death, a verdict of accidental death was returned by the coroner's jury.

3. The defendant thereupon falsely and maliciously wrote and published of and concerning the plaintiffs, and spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiffs the words following, that is to say: "Mrs. S." (meaning the plaintiff M.) "was in the habit of unmercifully beating the child; she would kick it on the floor, and would invite the other children to do the same. The child was fed upon unwholesome and putrid food, jalap was administered in its food to induce diarrhoea, and cold boiled rhubarb was administered for the same purpose," meaning thereby that the plaintiffs had neglected to provide their said child with proper and wholesome food and nourishment as it was their duty to do, and had wilfully administered unwholesome food and drugs to their said child.

4. The defendant also falsely and maliciously wrote and published of and concerning the plaintiffs, and spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiffs the words following, that is to say: "The child" (meaning the plaintiffs' said child) "was also tied by the hands and feet and beaten with a cane which had a nail fastened in the end, and this nail was forced into the body of the child," and "the child was left uncared for and without food fastened to a bed in a garret whilst bleeding from chilblains," meaning thereby that the plaintiffs had treated and had been in the habit of treating their said child with great cruelty, brutality and harshness, and leaving him without food and seeking to compass his death.

\* 608 5. The defendant also falsely and maliciously wrote and \* published of and concerning the plaintiffs, and spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiffs the words following, that is to say: "It is impossible that the injuries the child" (meaning the plaintiffs' said child) "received, and which caused its death, could have been produced by the conflagration of a thin night dress (which was all the child had on)," meaning thereby that the plaintiffs had wilfully caused or contributed to

the injuries their said child received and which caused its death, and had been guilty of manslaughter or worse.

6. By reason of the premises the plaintiffs have been greatly injured in their credit, reputation and character, and have been exposed to contempt and odium, and have suffered great pain and anguish of mind.

The plaintiffs claim £5000 damages.

The plaintiffs propose that this action shall be tried in the City of the County of the City of Bristol.

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No. 8.

SUMMONS FOR PARTICULARS.

Queen's Bench Division.

S. and wife *v.* G.

Let the plaintiffs' solicitor or agent attend me, at my chambers at —, to-morrow at 11 of the clock in the forenoon, to show cause why he should not deliver to the defendant's solicitor or agent an account in writing of the particulars, showing when, where, and to whom the alleged libels and slanders were written, spoken and published; and why, in the meantime, all further proceedings should not be stayed until the delivery thereof.

Dated the — day of —, 18—.

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No. 9.

ORDER ON THE ABOVE SUMMONS.

Queen's Bench Division.

S. and wife *v.* G.

Upon hearing the solicitors or agents on both sides, I do order that the plaintiffs' solicitor or agent shall deliver to the \*defendant's solicitor or agent an account in writing of the particulars showing when, where and to whom the alleged libels and slanders were written, spoken and published, and that unless such particulars be delivered in seven days all further proceedings in this cause be stayed until the delivery thereof.

Dated the 5th day of February, 1878.

G. P.

## No. 10.

## PARTICULARS UNDER ORDER OF 5TH FEBRUARY, 1878.

The defendant on or about the 24th, 25th and 26th days of October, 18—, wrote, and published the libels complained of, to the Rev. F. S. F. and J. G. Esq., at — in the county of Wilts, to H. A. and his wife at — in the said county, to two police constables for the county of Wilts at — aforesaid, to H. F. at — in the said county, to G. M. G., M. M., R. M., and W. A., all at — and — in the said county, and on and between the 24th and 28th day of October, 18—, the defendant wrote and published the said libels to divers other persons in the several parishes of [B, C, and D] in the said county, whose names are at present unknown to the plaintiffs and on or about the 29th day of October, 18—, the defendant wrote and published the said libels so complained of to the Right Honorable R. Assheton Cross at the office of the Secretary of State for the Home department in London.

The defendant uttered the slanders complained of upon and between the same dates at the same places and to the same persons as are mentioned and described in the last preceding paragraph.

Dated 7th day of February, 18—.

## No. 11.

## STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant as to paragraph 1 of the statement of claim, says \* 610 that he and the plaintiffs reside in the same parish and not \* in adjoining parishes. Save as aforesaid the defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the statement of claim.

2. The defendant also admits the several allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim.

3. The defendant does not admit that he wrote or published or spoke or published the words set out in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim, or any or either of such words.

4. The defendant further, even if it be proved that he wrote or published or spoke or published the words alleged in the said paragraph 3 of the statement of claim, denies that he wrote or published or spoke or published such words with the sense or meaning alleged, or with any other defamatory or actionable sense or meaning.

5. The defendant denies that he wrote or published or that he spoke or published the words set out in paragraph 4 of the statement of claim or any or either of such words.

6. The defendant, even if it be proved that he wrote or published or spoke or published the words set out in the said paragraph 4 of the statement of claim, denies that he wrote and published or spoke and published the same with the sense or meaning alleged, or with any other defamatory or actionable sense or meaning.

7. The defendant denies that he wrote or published the words set out in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim.

8. The defendant, even if it be proved that he wrote and published them at all, wholly and entirely denies that he wrote and published the words alleged in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim with the sense or meaning in that paragraph alleged, or with any such sense or in any defamatory or actionable sense.

9. The defendant denies that the several words set out in paragraph 3, paragraph 4, and paragraph 5 respectively of the statement of claim, even if the same be proved to have been respectively written and published or spoken and published by him, were or that any or either of them were written or published or spoken or published of or concerning the plaintiff J. S.

10. The defendant further denies that the several words set out in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 respectively of the statement of claim, if the same or any or either be proved to have been \* written or published or \* 611 spoken or published by him at all, were false to the knowledge of the defendant at the time of such publication (if any) by him.

11. The defendant further, if the writing and publishing, or the speaking and publishing of the said words in paragraph 3, paragraph 4, and paragraph 5 respectively of the statement of claim, or of any or either of them be proved, wholly denies that he wrote and published or spoke and published the same or any or either of them maliciously.

12. The defendant further says that if it shall be proved that he did write or publish or speak or publish the said several words set out in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the statement of claim, he did so under the circumstances following. A child of the plaintiff's named F.S., had as mentioned in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim, accidentally met its death by burning, and an inquest had been held on it, as in the said paragraph 2 of the statement of claim is also mentioned. The plaintiff, M., had during the said child's lifetime, frequently ill-treated and neglected the said child. Rumors as to her ill-treatment and neglect of the said child, had been for some time before such child's death current in the neighborhood. After the said child's death such rumors still continued. Many of the inhabitants in the neighborhood entertained a strong feeling that the said inquest had been conducted in an unsatisfactory way, and that sufficient inquiry had not been made into the circumstances surrounding the death of the said child. The defendant was, and is one of the principal residents in the said

neighborhood, and the facts above stated came to his knowledge. He, after taking reasonable means to satisfy himself, in good faith believed that the case was one for further inquiry. It became and was his duty to take proper steps to obtain such further inquiry. He, in conjunction with others, prepared a Memorial to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Home Department for the purpose of obtaining such further inquiry, and signed and allowed others, who were also acquainted with the facts and were fit and proper persons to do so, also to sign the same. The writings, speakings, and publishings in the statement of claim complained of (if any such be proved) are the writing and publishing, and the reading, speaking and publishing of such memorial (the contents of which, however,

\* 612 the \*defendant as aforesaid does not admit,) to persons in the neighborhood who were interested in the matters aforesaid and were fit and proper persons to sign such memorial, and who signed or discussed with the defendant about signing the same in conjunction with the defendant, and are conversations held by the defendant with such persons as aforesaid under the circumstances aforesaid, and the sending of the said memorial to the said Right Honorable Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Home Department. And the defendant acted in good faith in the several publications (if as aforesaid any such publications be proved,) and made the statements in conversations (if any such statements be proved,) reasonably and in good faith believing the same to be true and acted in all the matters aforesaid wholly without malice. By reason of the facts hereinbefore appearing, the said several publications complained of were and are privileged communications.

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## No. 12.

### REPLY.

1. The plaintiffs join issue on the statement of defence herein save so far as it admits the allegations contained in the statement of claim.

2. As to paragraph 12 of the statement of defence, the plaintiffs deny that the plaintiff, M., frequently or ever neglected or ill-treated the said child during its lifetime, or that there was any feeling that the inquest upon the death of the said child had been conducted in an unsatisfactory and insufficient manner, and the plaintiffs further deny that there was any duty upon the defendant or upon any one to obtain any further inquiry. The plaintiffs deny that the publications of the said libels and slanders were made for the purposes of and in relation to the said memorial as alleged, or that they were made to persons who were interested in the matters aforesaid, and the plaintiffs deny that the said publications were or are privileged communications.

3. The plaintiffs further say that the defendant, in what he did, was actuated by malice.

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\* No. 13.

\* 613

## REJOINDER.

The defendant joins issue upon the second and third paragraphs of the reply.

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No. 14.

*Libel contained in a Placard.*

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

C. D. v. E. F.

1. The plaintiff is, &c.
2. The defendant is, &c.
3. The defendant on or about the 10th day of January, 18—, falsely and maliciously published a certain libellous placard referring to the plaintiff as follows :—

*“ Notice.*

“ I the undersigned decline the offer made to me by C. D., of Walcot, on Wednesday last of the sum of £50 to strike him and to cause me to commit a breach of the peace.

January, 10th, 18—.

E. F., of Walcot.”

4. On or about the 11th day of January, 18—, the defendant again published the same false, malicious, and libellous placard set forth in the last paragraph.

5. On or about the 15th day of February, 18—, the defendant published a third printed placard, which placard was false, malicious, and libellous, and was as follows :—

[*Here set out placard.*]

meaning thereby that the plaintiff, or some one at his instigation, was guilty of the acts alleged to have been committed.

6. On or about the 17th day of March, 18—, the defendant published a fourth placard which was false, malicious, and libellous, and was as follows :—

[*Here set out the placard.*]

7. In consequence of the above-mentioned placards published  
\* 614 \* by the defendant the plaintiff has suffered much annoyance and  
has been disgraced and subjected to loss of reputation and of business and also suffered in his credit and good name.

The plaintiff claims £1000 damages.

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No. 15.

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant admits the facts stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement of claim.

2. The defendant as to paragraph No. 3 admits the publication of the placard therein referred to, but denies the allegation that the same is false and malicious, and says that the matters stated in the said placard are true in substance and in fact.

3. As to paragraph No. 4 the defendant denies the allegation therein contained.

4. The defendant as to paragraph No. 5 admits the publication of the placard therein referred to, but denies the allegation that the same is false and malicious; the defendant also denies the alleged meaning, and says that the several matters stated in the said placard are true in substance and in fact, and were published by the defendant for the purpose of endeavoring to discover the person who committed the assault referred to in the said placard, and with the *bonâ fide* object and intention of bringing such person to justice and of prosecuting him to conviction and not otherwise.

5. The defendant as to paragraph 6 admits the publication of the placard therein referred to, but denies the allegation that the same is false and malicious; the defendant also denies the alleged meaning, and says that the several matters set forth in the said placard are true in substance and in fact, and were published by the defendant with the *bonâ fide* object of endeavoring to discover the person or persons guilty of causing the several annoyances and committing the several assaults and offences mentioned in the said placard and of bringing the offender or offenders to justice and not otherwise.

6. As to paragraph No. 7, the defendant denies the allegations therein contained and each and every of them respectively.



\* No. 16.

\* 615

*Action against the Manager of a Bank for showing to a Customer an Anonymous Letter.*

Robshaw v. Smith, 28 L. T. 423.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The defendant is the general manager of the London and Yorkshire Bank (Limited), and the plaintiff carries on business as a merchant at ——— Street, in the City of London.

2. Prior to the 31st of May, 1877, the plaintiff had had considerable business transactions with one J. H., also a merchant, from which he had derived large profits, and several such transactions were then in progress between the plaintiff and the said J. H., and the said J. H. would have continued to have such transactions with the plaintiff hereinafter referred to, and the said J. H. had offered the plaintiff to take him into his employment as manager, upon terms which would have given the plaintiff a salary of from £3000 to £4000 per annum for his services.

3. On the 31st May the said J. H. called upon the defendant, and the defendant then falsely and maliciously published to the said J. H. the following letter of and concerning the plaintiff :—

“16th of August, 1876.

“Caution and worth inquiry.

“Are you aware that the new partner of ——— is George Robshaw” (meaning the plaintiff), “formerly of George Robshaw & Co., manufacturers, of ———, bankrupts” (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been member of a firm which had become bankrupt), “into the burning of whose mills an inquiry was made” (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been guilty of, and suspected and accused of, arson), “who Mr. R., the accountant of ———, acting as trustee to the estate, wished to prosecute” (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had defrauded his creditors, and been guilty of offences against the bankruptcy laws), “but was unable to find, as he fled away to ———, where he became partner or manager, at different times, to two firms, both of whom after getting possession of considerable lots \* of goods fled away” (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been \* 616 guilty of obtaining goods by false pretences and other like offences).

“Robshaw was in prison at ——— for his share” (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been found guilty by law of the said offences, and had been in prison therefor). “He” (meaning the plaintiff) “is the same man who was brought before the ——— magistrates for the misappropriation of certain securities, and which case was compromised on his partner paying a portion

of the amount" (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been guilty of larceny). "Why has L. so suddenly become a buyer, but to keep himself afloat, and to keep the ball rolling as long as he can before the crisis arrives? He has no money left" (meaning that the plaintiff had become partner in, or manager of, a firm in an insolvent condition, which was entering into fraudulent transactions to defraud its creditors, and that the plaintiff was conniving at, aiding, and abetting in such fraud). "This is worth inquiry, and being communicated to your other branches, particularly at B., H. and S."

4. Owing to the conduct of the defendant set forth in the preceding paragraph, the said J. H. refused to have any further transaction with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff lost the profits he would otherwise have made thereby, and the said J. H. also refused to take the plaintiff into his employment as he would otherwise have done, and the plaintiff has lost the benefit of such employment and the emoluments thereof, and has been much injured in his credit, reputation, and business, and has been otherwise damnified.

The plaintiff claims £2000 damages.

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No. 17.

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1, 2, 3, 4. The defendant does not admit, &c.

5. The statements contained in the said letter are true in substance and in fact, according to the fair and ordinary meaning of the words used in the said letter.

\* 617 6. The publication of the said letter to H., if made, was \* privileged, and was made *bonâ fide* and without malice. H., having an interest in certain business transactions, in which the plaintiff and the defendant's bank were concerned, made inquiries of the defendant as to the plaintiff, and it was in answer to such inquiries that the publication, if any, of the said letter took place.

## No. 18.

*Action for Publishing a Libellous Novel.*

## STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendants admit that they printed and published the book or novel in the statement of claim mentioned, but deny that they did so falsely and maliciously. The defendants printed and published the said book or novel for the writer thereof, reasonably and *bonâ fide* believing the same to be a work of pure fiction. The defendants were not then aware, and do not now admit, that the said book or novel alluded to the plaintiffs or to any other living person.<sup>1</sup>

2. In answer to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, of the statement of claim, the defendants deny that they printed or published the words therein set forth of or concerning plaintiffs, or any of them, as is alleged.

3. In further answer to the said paragraphs the defendants deny that the words therein set forth bear the sense therein given to them.

## \* No. 19.

## \* 618

*Action against a Newspaper Proprietor.**Bonâ fide Comment on a Matter of Public Interest.*

## STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant is, and at the time of the alleged grievances was, the proprietor of the *Times* newspaper.

2. On the evening of the 12th of February, 1867, the plaintiff had presented to the House of Lords a petition making a serious charge against one of Her Majesty's judges; a debate ensued on the presentation of the said petition, and the said charge was utterly refuted.

3. The words set out in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim are a portion of the Parliamentary Report, published in the *Times* for the 13th of February, 1867. They are a fair and accurate report of the proceedings of the House of Lords on the preceding evening, and were published by the defendant *bonâ fide*, and without any malice towards the plaintiff.

4. The said petition, the charge it contained, and the said debate, were, and are, all matters of general public interest and concern.

5. The words set out in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim are a por-

<sup>1</sup> It may be doubted whether this is a defence to the action or only a plea in mitigation of damages; see *ante*, pp. 159, 384, 5, 7; *R. v. Knell*, 1 Barnard. 305; *Smith v. Ashley*, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 367.

tion of a leading article which appeared in the *Times* for the 13th of February, 1867. The said article was a fair and impartial comment on the matters above referred to, and was published by the defendant *bonâ fide* for the benefit of the public, and without any malice towards the plaintiff.

See *Wason v. Walter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73; 8 B. & S. 671; 38 L. J. Q. B. 34; 17 W. R. 169; 19 L. T. 409.

## No. 20.

### *Action against the Printers of a Newspaper.*

#### *Report of a Judicial Proceeding.*

#### STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendants are the printers and publishers of the — *County Gazette*.

\* 619 \* 2. On the — day of —, 1879, the plaintiff applied to the — bench of magistrates for the — division of the said county, at a special licensing sessions, for a spirit license. This application the magistrates refused.

3. On the — day of —, 1879, the defendants published, as usual, in their said *Gazette*, a report of the proceedings before the said magistrates on the preceding day, including an accurate and impartial account of the plaintiff's application, and the reasons stated by the bench for their refusal, which is the alleged libel.

4. Such account was published by the defendant *bonâ fide*, and without malice, and for the public benefit, and in the usual course of the defendant's business and duty as a public journalist; and was, and is, a correct, fair, and honest report of proceedings of public interest and concern.

5. And the defendants further say that the publication complained of is no libel.

As to paragraph 5, if it means anything more than has been already said in paragraph 4, see *ante*, p. 483.

## No. 21.

*Interrogatories in an Action against a Newspaper Proprietor* (allowed in *Lefroy v. Burnside*, 4 L. R. (Ir.) 340; 41 L. T. 199; 14 Cox, C. C. 260; *ante*, p. 514).

"Interrogatories on behalf of the above-named plaintiff for the examination of the above-named defendant :—

"1. Is it not the fact that in the said newspaper published on the 6th day of July, 1878, or some other and what date, an article appeared in the words and figures set forth in the sixth paragraph of the statement of claim in this action? If not how otherwise?

"2. Were not you, the defendant William Burnside, upon and before the said 6th day of July, 1878, or some other and what date, the proprietor, either alone, or jointly with some other and what person or persons, of the said newspaper?

"NOTE. — The defendant must answer all the above interrogatories on oath within ten days.

"Delivered by, &c."

*Interrogatories on the part of the Plaintiff, to be answered by an Officer of the "Leeds Daily News Company (Limited)," and by the Defendant, William Lauries Jackson.*

"1. Is the defendant, William Lauries Jackson, the editor or publisher of the 'Leeds Daily News,' and what position does he occupy in respect of the said newspaper?

"2. Is the said William Lauries Jackson a shareholder in the said company?

"3. Is it the duty of the said William Lauries Jackson to exercise a supervision over paragraphs of the nature of those set out in the statement of claim?

"4. Did the said William Lauries Jackson write, or have anything to do with the writing of, any and which of the paragraphs mentioned in the statement of claim: and, if not, who was the writer of such paragraphs, and of each of them?

"5. Did the said William Lauries Jackson see any and which of the said paragraphs before they were inserted in the newspaper, or before the newspaper was published or circulated, and did he sanction the publication of the said paragraphs, or of any and which of them?

"6. By whom, and in what way, were the said paragraphs brought to the office of the newspaper company; or were they received by any one else and whom on their account, at one time; and, if not, when were they received?

"7. Were the numbers of the 'Leeds Daily News' of the 13th August, 1875, 19th August, 1875, 10th September, 1875, and the numbers of the 'Leeds Daily News,' containing the paragraph commencing with the word 'Query,' printed and published by the Leeds Daily News Company

(Limited), or by the defendant William Lauries Jackson, or by both of them?"

N. B.—The words in italics were struck out by *Archibald*, J., at Chambers on January 8th, 1876; see Weekly Notes for 1876, p. 11; 1 Charley, 101; Bitt. 91; 20 Sol. J. 218; 60 L. T. Notes, 196.

*Notice of the defendant's intention of giving evidence of an Apology in Mitigation of Damages, to be delivered with the Plea, under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 1.*

In the High Court of Justice,  
Queen's Bench Division.

Between *A. B.* . . . Plaintiff,  
and  
*E. F.* . . . Defendant.

Take notice, that the defendant intends on the trial of this cause to give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, that he made [*or offered*] an apology to the plaintiff for the defamation complained of in the statement of claim herein, before the commencement of this action [*or as soon after the commencement of this action as there was an opportunity of making or offering such apology, the action having been commenced before there was an opportunity of making or offering such apology*].

Yours, etc.,  
*G. H.*, defendant's solicitor [*or agent*].

To Mr. *C. D.*, plaintiff's  
solicitor or agent.

For a precedent of a plea under the second section of Lord Campbell's Libel Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96,) see *ante*, p. 488.

## II. PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS IN ACTIONS FOR SLANDER.

### No. 24.

#### *Words imputing a Crime.*

#### STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff is a baker, carrying on business at —, in the county of Middlesex.

2. On or about the 8th day of May, 1880, the defendant \* falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff the \* 622 words following, that is to say : — “He is a regular smasher” ; the defendant meaning thereby that the plaintiff had uttered, and was in the habit of uttering, counterfeit coin, with the knowledge that such coin was counterfeit, and had been guilty of a misdemeanor.

3. The plaintiff has, by reason of the premises, been greatly injured in his credit and reputation.

And the plaintiff claims, &c.

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### No. 25.

#### STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant admits that he spoke and published the words set out in paragraph 2 of the plaintiff’s statement of claim, but denies that he spoke them maliciously or with the meaning in that paragraph alleged.

2. The defendant is, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, clerk to Mr. N., a wholesale baker. The plaintiff is one of Mr. N.’s retail customers. It is and was one of the duties of the defendant as such clerk to call on Mr. N.’s retail customers every Saturday morning and receive the money due for the bread delivered to them in the course of the week.

3. On the morning of Saturday, March the 27th, 1880, the defendant called on the plaintiff and took the money for the bread delivered to him during the week. Amongst the change then given by the plaintiff to the defendant was a counterfeit florin. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant knew or observed at the time that the florin was counterfeit.

4. Later in the day when the defendant was paying the money over at the office, his employer, Mr. N., discovered that the said florin was counter-

feit. The defendant thereupon took the said florin back to the plaintiff's shop, and the plaintiff gave him without demur two good shillings in exchange therefor.

5. On the morning of Saturday, May the 8th, 1880, when the \* 623 defendant called on the plaintiff as usual, the plaintiff \* again gave the defendant a counterfeit florin amongst the money for the bread. And again neither the plaintiff nor the defendant knew or observed at the time that the florin was counterfeit.

6. Again, when the defendant was paying the money over to his employer at the office, Mr. N. discovered that the florin was counterfeit. Thereupon the defendant, recollecting the similar occurrence mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, exclaimed:—"Why, that's the second bad florin Mr. H. has passed to me within the last six weeks. He's a regular 'smasher'!"

7. The defendant spoke these words as a joke, and never intended seriously to impute to the plaintiff any criminal offence.

8. The only persons who were present at the time or who heard the said words were the defendant's employer, Mr. N., and a fellow-clerk of his, one David Griggs. Both Mr. N. and David Griggs were aware of the circumstances detailed above, and knew to what the defendant was referring, and understood that he spoke in joke, and did not intend to make any serious charge against the plaintiff.

[N.B. This is a magnanimous and conciliatory line of defence. The plaintiff, if well advised, will at once settle the matter amicably. "All imputations withdrawn; defendant to pay a guinea to a hospital named by the plaintiff; each party to pay their own costs." If he does not, the defendant is almost sure of a verdict. See *ante*, pp. 107, 109; *Thompson v. Bernard*, 1 Camp. 48. But sometimes a defendant, if foolish and angry, insists on setting up a more vindictive defence. He denies uttering the words, so as to compel the tell-tale Griggs to come into the box and be cross-examined; and he then proceeds to justify. These tactics will infallibly lead to a verdict for the plaintiff with heavy damages.]

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## No. 26.

### STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the plaintiff's statement of claim, and each and every of them.
- \* 624 \* 2. The defendant does not admit that he spoke or published the words set out in paragraph 2 of the plaintiff's statement of claim; but, if he did, the same are true in substance and in fact. On March 27th, 1880, the plaintiff uttered and passed to the defendant a counterfeit florin, well knowing the same to be counterfeit. On May 8th,



1880, the plaintiff uttered and passed to the defendant another counterfeit florin, well knowing the same to be counterfeit. [*State any other instances in which the plaintiff passed bad coin to the defendant or others.*] Wherefore the defendant says that the plaintiff is a regular ‘smasher,’ and has uttered, and has been in the habit of uttering, counterfeit coin, well knowing the same to be counterfeit; and has been guilty of divers misdemeanors.

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No. 27.

*Words imputing a Contagious Disorder.*

L. v. K.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. At the time of the speaking and publishing by the defendant of the words hereinafter set out, the plaintiff was a tailor, and carrying on business as such, and was a married man.

2. The defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff the words following (that is to say): “I” (meaning the defendant) “hear L.” (meaning the plaintiff) “has, &c.,” thereby meaning that the plaintiff was suffering from a loathsome contagious disorder, and had communicated the same to his wife, and was unfit, by reason of such disorder, to be admitted into society.

3. By reason of the premises the plaintiff was injured in his credit and reputation,<sup>1</sup> *and brought into disgrace among his neighbors and friends, and has been deprived of, and ceased to receive their hospitality.*

4. The defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff, in relation to his said business, the words following (that is to say): “I” (meaning the defendant), \* “&c.,” thereby mean- \* 625  
ing that the plaintiff was in embarrassed pecuniary circumstances, and unable to meet his liabilities.

5. By reason of the matters in the preceding paragraph mentioned, the plaintiff was injured in his credit and reputation as a tailor, and in his business,<sup>1</sup> *and many persons, who had theretofore dealt with the plaintiff in his said business, ceased to deal with him.*

The plaintiff claims £—— damages.

<sup>1</sup> The plaintiff being unable to name the persons referred to in paragraphs 3 and 5, the statement of claim was amended by striking out the words in italics above.

No. 28.

L. v. K.

PARTICULARS.

The following are the best particulars the plaintiff can give of the times, places, and persons, when, where, and to whom the alleged slanders were uttered, and the damages sustained.

The said slanders were uttered in the month of October, 1876, in the presence of G. R., of — High Street, in the City of Bath, and his manager, W. K., at — High Street, Bath aforesaid.

The plaintiff cannot give the names<sup>1</sup> of the persons who have ceased to deal with him, but will prove a general diminution of receipts in business, and finds he is not invited and received into society as he used to be.

The above particulars are delivered pursuant to the order of Master Butler, dated the 18th day of December, 1877.

Dated this 9th day of March, 1878.

*R. & F.*, Plaintiff's agents.

To —.

Defendant's agent.

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L. v. K.

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant denies that he spoke and published of the plaintiff the words in the 2nd and 4th paragraphs of the statement of claim respectively set out.

2. The defendant does not admit the allegations in the 3rd and 5th paragraphs of the statement of claim contained.

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L. v. K.

REPLY.

The plaintiff joins issue with the defendant upon his defence.

<sup>1</sup> The plaintiff being unable to name the persons referred to in paragraphs 3 and 5, the statement of claim was amended by striking out the words in italics above.

## No. 30.

*Words spoken in a Foreign Language.*

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff is a farmer residing at Ll. in the county of Glamorgan.
2. The defendant is, &c.
3. On the — day of — 1880, the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff in the Welsh language the words following, that is to say: — [*Here set out the libel verbatim in the Welsh language.*]
4. The said words, being translated into the English language, have, and were understood by the persons to whom they were so published to have, the meaning and effect following, that is to say: — [*Here set out a literal translation of the libel in the English language, adding any innuendoes which may be necessary.*]
5. Whereby the plaintiff was injured in his credit and reputation, &c. [*Allege any special damage that may exist.*]

## \* No. 31.

## \* 627

*Words spoken of a Medical Man.*

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff is a M. R. C. S. of London and Edinburgh, and carries on the profession and business of a surgeon and general medical practitioner in the city of — and its neighborhood.
2. The defendant is a clergyman, residing in the said city.
3. On the 9th day of January, 1880, the plaintiff was called in by the defendant to attend his infant daughter, who was then lying dangerously ill. On the 14th day of January the said daughter died, through no negligence or default of the plaintiff.
4. Thereupon the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff in relation to his said profession and business, and the plaintiff's conduct therein, the words following, that is to say: — "Mr. E. (meaning the plaintiff) killed my child."
5. The defendant meant thereby that the plaintiff had been guilty of feloniously killing his said daughter by treating her improperly and with gross ignorance and with gross and culpable want of caution and skill, and thus causing or accelerating her death.

6. And in the alternative, the plaintiff says that the defendant meant thereby that the plaintiff had been guilty of misconduct and negligence in his said profession and business, and had acted in his said profession and business negligently, injudiciously, indiscreetly, and improperly, and had not done his duty by his patient, and was unfit to be employed as a medical man.

7. In consequence of the defendant's words, the plaintiff has been and is greatly prejudiced and injured in his credit and reputation, and in his said profession and business of surgeon and general medical practitioner.

*Slander of a Clergyman.*

A. v. C.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff is, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a clergyman of the Church of England, a doctor of divinity, and vicar of the parish of —.

2. The defendant is a farmer residing in the said parish.

3. It is, and was, the custom and the duty of the plaintiff as such vicar as aforesaid to constantly visit the parochial school in his said parish, and to superintend the management thereof. Miss E. B. was, and is, the mistress of the said school.

4. Whereupon the defendant, on the 25th day of April, 1880, well knowing the premises, and intending to injure the plaintiff in his good name and credit as a clergyman of the Church of England, and to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff had misconducted himself as such vicar as aforesaid falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff, in relation to his character and profession as a clergyman of the Church of England, and to his office and benefice as such vicar as aforesaid, and to the plaintiff's conduct therein, the words following, that is to say:—“Miss E. B. (meaning thereby the said schoolmistress), &c. . . .” Meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been guilty of undue familiarity with the said Miss E. B., and had habitually been guilty of conduct unbecoming a clergyman of the Church of England, and had misconducted himself in his office and benefice as such vicar as aforesaid, and was unfit to continue in the same, or to hold any other preferment.

5. And on divers other occasions between the said 25th day of April and the 4th day of May, 1880, the defendant falsely and maliciously repeated the same slander with the like meaning in the last paragraph assigned.

6. Whereby the plaintiff has been, and is, greatly injured in his credit and reputation, and in his said character and profession as a clergyman of the Church of England, and in his office and benefice as such vicar as aforesaid; and has been brought into public scandal, ridicule and contempt.

And the plaintiff claims £—— damages.

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\* No. 33.

\* 629

*Slander of a Parish Clerk.*

L. v. P.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff is a verger and church clerk, residing at ——. He has been since 1877 verger and church clerk of the district parish church of ——.

2. The defendant is the vicar or incumbent of the said church.

3. In or about the last week of April, 1879, the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published to one Mr. I. J. of the plaintiff as such verger and church clerk as aforesaid, and with reference to the conduct of the plaintiff in such office of verger and church clerk the words following: — “Luke” (meaning the plaintiff) “has broken offertory boxes open and taken money from them, and has also taken money from the collecting plates and used it for his own purposes,” meaning thereby that the plaintiff had feloniously stolen money forming part of contributions for sacred and benevolent purposes.

4. The defendant also, about the same time as mentioned in the last paragraph, with the like meaning, falsely and maliciously spoke and published the said words or other words to the same substance and effect of the plaintiff in relation to his conduct in the said office to Mrs. O. P. and to various other persons.

5. Through the said false and malicious statements of the defendant the plaintiff has been greatly injured in his credit and reputation, and has been by the churchwardens of the said parish forbidden to perform the duties of his said office of verger and church clerk.

## No. 34.

L. v. P.

## STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

\* 630 1. The defendant denies that the plaintiff was ever church \* clerk of the district parish church of ——. He was until recently verger and organ-blower at the said church.

2. The defendant does not admit that he ever spoke or published the words complained of, or any other words to the same substance and effect, as alleged in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the statement of claim.

3. Throughout the month of April and the early part of May, 1879, the defendant was suffering from acute mania, brought on by overwork; he has no recollection of having spoken any such words as alleged either then or at any other time. If, however, the defendant did in fact utter any such words (which he does not admit), they were not spoken seriously or maliciously, but solely in consequence, and under the influence of the said mania. There is and was no foundation whatever for any such charge;<sup>1</sup> and the defendant unreservedly withdraws all imputation on the plaintiff's character, and exceedingly regrets that he ever spoke the said words (if in fact he did speak them, which he does not admit).

4. The defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the plaintiff's statement of claim, and each and every of them. If the church-wardens of the said parish have forbidden the plaintiff to perform the duties of verger and organ-blower at the said church (which the defendant does not admit) they have not done so through or in consequence of any words uttered by the defendant.

5. The defendant does not admit that he is under any liability to the plaintiff; but he brings into Court the sum of £10, and says that the said sum is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim.

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No. 35.

L. v. P.

## REPLY.

1. The plaintiff joins issue on paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the statement of defence, except so far as any part of the statement of claim is thereby admitted.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 488-9.

\* 2. As to paragraph 5 of the statement of defence the plaintiff 631  
says that the said sum of £10 is not enough to satisfy the plaintiff's  
claim.

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No. 36.

*Words defamatory of a Trader in the way of his Trade.*

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. At all dates hereinafter mentioned the plaintiff carried on, and still carries on, the trade and business of a — at — in the county of —.

2. On or about the — day of —, A.D. —, the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff in relation to his said trade and business and of and concerning the plaintiff's mode of conducting the same, the words following, that is to say : — [*here set out the slander verbatim;*] meaning thereby that the plaintiff cheated or was guilty of fraudulent conduct in his said trade and business. [*Or, meaning thereby that the plaintiff was guilty of fraudulent and dishonest practices in his trade and business, and was, or had been, insolvent and unable to pay his just debts.*]

3. Whereby the plaintiff was injured in his credit and reputation as a —, and in his said business and trade, and X., Y., and Z., who had heretofore dealt with the plaintiff in his said business, ceased to deal with him [and L., M., and N., who had previously supplied the plaintiff with goods on credit, thereupon refused to sell any more goods to the plaintiff on credit, as they otherwise would have done].

And the plaintiff claims £ —.

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No. 37.

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant denies the several allegations contained in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim.

\* 2. The defendant never on any occasion or occasions spoke or \* 632  
published of the plaintiff, as such trader or otherwise, all or any of  
the words alleged in the said paragraph to have been spoken by the de-  
fendant.

3. The defendant did not speak or publish the said words of the plain-  
tiff in relation to his trade or business, or of or concerning his mode of  
conducting the same, or with the meaning in the said paragraph imputed  
to the said words, or in any other defamatory sense.

4. The said several words, without the said alleged meaning, if spoken and published by the defendant at all (which he denies), are respectively true in substance and in fact. Particulars are delivered herewith.

5. The defendant denies the several allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the statement of claim.

And by way of counter-claim, the defendant says :—

6. That heretofore, and before the publication of the alleged slander, the plaintiff, &c.

### No. 38.

#### *Slander of a Builder in the way of his Trade.*

S. v. W.

#### STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff is a builder carrying on business at C——; and the defendant is a mason, and was employed by the plaintiff from the month of October, 1878, until the month of August, 1879, when he left the plaintiff's employment.

2. After the defendant had left the plaintiff's employment he made a statement to the Rev. A. B., the vicar of C——, concerning the plaintiff in the following words :—“ Whilst he (meaning the plaintiff) was doing the work at Mrs. M.'s house he stole the hay from the stack there; John saw him cut the hay from the stack and take it away in his cart: he took two loads whilst he was at work there.”

3. The defendant also, on or about the 25th day of August, 1879, \* 633 made a statement to Mrs. M. concerning the plaintiff in the following words: “ Whilst he ” (meaning the plaintiff) “ was doing the work for you, he ” (meaning the plaintiff) “ stole your corn and hay, and cut and took away in his cart two loads of your grass; ” and in reply to a question put to him by the said Mrs. M., the defendant said “ he ” (meaning the plaintiff) “ got up into the loft and got down through a trap-door to where the corn was kept and stole it.”

4. On the same occasion as is mentioned in the preceding paragraph the defendant made the further statement to the said Mrs. M. of and concerning the plaintiff: “ Whilst he was working for you here, he ” (meaning the plaintiff) “ stole grass and corn from Mr. N., and he and Mr. N.'s gardener have taken baskets upon baskets of vegetables from Mr. N.'s garden; ” the defendant meaning that the plaintiff had induced Mr. N.'s gardener to rob his master and to give him the stolen goods.

5. On the same occasion the defendant made this further statement to the said Mrs. M. of and concerning the plaintiff: “ When S. (meaning the



plaintiff) was making that drain for Mr. N. he used a lot of rotten old pipes that were no use ;" meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been guilty of misconduct in his trade of a builder and had cheated the said Mr. N.

6. The whole of the said statements were false, and were false to the knowledge of the defendant, and were made maliciously with intent to injure the plaintiff.

7. By reason of the said statements the plaintiff has suffered loss in his trade as aforesaid, and has lost the society of his friends.

The plaintiff claims £50 damages.

### No. 39.

S. v. W.

#### STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant denies that he spoke or published the words set out in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5, or any or either of such words.

\* 2. The defendant was employed by the plaintiff to work at the \* 634 house of the Mrs. M. mentioned in the statement of claim. Whilst he was so employed, certain facts came to his knowledge relative to the disposition by the plaintiff and by the servants of the said Mrs. M. of certain portions of her property. It thereupon became and was the duty of the defendant to communicate such facts to the said Mrs. M., and to her son-in-law, the Rev. A. B., the vicar of C.<sup>1</sup> And the defendant says that these communications are the alleged slanders, if any, and that the same were made *bonâ fide* in the discharge of the said duty, and not maliciously, nor with intent to injure the plaintiff, and were and are therefore privileged.

3. The defendant denies that he spoke or published the words set out in paragraph 5 of the statement of claim with the meaning therein alleged, or at all with reference to the plaintiff's trade of a builder, or in any defamatory sense. The said words without the said meaning, and according to their fair and ordinary signification, are true in substance and in fact.

4. The defendant does not admit the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the statement of claim.

<sup>1</sup> A bad plea, surely, so far as the vicar is concerned : no facts being shown which create any duty to inform the vicar.

### III. PRECEDENTS OF PLEADINGS IN ACTIONS FOR SLANDER OF TITLE.

No. 40.

*Libel on goods manufactured and sold by another.*

Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co. (L. R. 9 Ex. 218; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 23 W. R. 5, *ante*, pp. 145, 148).

#### DECLARATION.

In the Exchequer of Pleas.

The 3rd day of February, A.D. 1874.

Devonshire to wit.

The Western Counties and General Manure Co., Limited, by William Harris, their attorney, sue the Lawes Chemical Manure Co., Limited, for that at the time of the committing of \*the grievances hereinafter mentioned the plaintiffs carried on business, and still do carry on business, as amongst other things manufacturers of and sellers of artificial manures, and had and still have upon sale certain artificial manures, and the plaintiffs say that the defendants well knowing that the plaintiffs were carrying on the aforesaid business and selling the said artificial manures, and contriving and intending to injure the plaintiffs in their said business, falsely and maliciously printed and published, and caused to be printed and published, of and concerning the plaintiffs, and of and concerning them as such manufacturers and sellers of artificial manures, and of and concerning them in the way of their said business, the words following, that is to say:—*[For the words of the libel, see the report of the case;]* meaning thereby that the said artificial manures so manufactured, sold and traded in by the plaintiffs were artificial manures of an inferior quality to the said other artificial manures, and especially were of an inferior quality to the said artificial manures of the defendants; whereas in truth and in fact the said artificial manures so manufactured, sold and traded in by the plaintiffs were not of an inferior quality and especially were not inferior in quality to the said artificial manures of the defendants *as the defendants well knew*;<sup>1</sup> and by reason of the premises certain persons and particularly George Snell and A. Rowe who before and at the time of the committing of the grievances hereinbefore mentioned had been used to buy the said artificial manures so manufactured, sold and traded in by the plaintiffs ceased to do so, and certain other persons and particularly Geo. May and Samuel Harvey who would have bought the said

<sup>1</sup> The words in italics were subsequently struck out by consent.

artificial manures of the plaintiffs were induced to refrain from buying the same; whereby the plaintiffs have been prejudiced and injured in their said trade and business, and the reputation of the said artificial manures so manufactured by the plaintiffs has been injured, and the sale thereof has been much diminished and fallen off, and the plaintiffs have been greatly injured in their credit, reputation and circumstances, and have been and are thereby prevented from acquiring divers great gains which they might and otherwise would have acquired.

And the plaintiffs claim £2000.

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\* No. 41.

\* 636

*Lawes Chemical Manure Co. ats. Western Counties and General Manure Co., Limited.*

PLEAS.

In the Exchequer of Pleas.

The 23rd day of February, 1874.

1. The defendants by Arthur P. Bower their attorney say that they are not guilty.

2. And for a second plea, the defendants say that the alleged words are true in substance and in fact.

3. And for a third plea, the defendants deny the allegations in the declaration contained that the said artificial manures manufactured, sold, and traded in by the plaintiffs were not inferior in quality to the said artificial manures to the defendants' knowledge, as alleged.

Feb. 23, 1874.

Order by Master George Pollock, giving the defendants leave to plead the several matters. Plaintiffs to be at liberty to demur to the third plea. Particulars of the second plea to be delivered within three days.

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No. 42.

*Western, &c., Co. v. Lawes, &c., Co.*

REPLICATION.

Feb. 27, 1874.

The plaintiffs join issue upon all the defendants' pleas.

And the plaintiffs say that the defendants' third plea is bad in substance.

[*In Margin.*]

A matter of law intended to be argued is that the defendants' knowledge that the plaintiffs' manures were not inferior to their own is immaterial, and that the plea is therefore no answer to the action.

\* 637

\* No. 43.

Lawes, &c., Co. *ats.* Western, &c., Co.

JOINDER IN DEMURRER.

Feb. 28, 1874.

The defendants say that the said third plea is good in substance.

No. 44.

POINTS.

The following are the points intended to be insisted on by the plaintiffs upon the argument of this demurrer :—

1. 'That the defendants' third plea is bad in substance.
2. That the defendants' knowledge that the plaintiffs' manures were not inferior to their own is immaterial, and that the plea is therefore no answer to the action.
3. That the declaration is good without the allegations denied in the third plea.

Subsequently for convenience sake, and by agreement between the counsel for the parties respectively, the plaintiffs amended their pleadings by striking out the averment "as the defendants well knew," and the defendants withdrew their third plea and demurred to the declaration instead. This demurrer was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, and the case was subsequently settled without going to trial. A *Stet Processus* was entered on October 9th, 1874.

No. 45.

In the Exchequer of Pleas.

Between the Western Counties and General Manure

Co., Limited . . . . . Plaintiffs,

and

Lawes Chemical Manure Co., Limited . . . Defendants.

Interrogatories to be answered by the secretary, or manager, or  
 \* 638 some other person on behalf of the defendants, by \* affidavit in

writing, to be sworn and filed in the ordinary way pursuant to the order of the Hon. —, dated the — day of —, A.D. 1874.

1. Was one W. M. W. an agent or servant, or in the employ of the defendants in or about the month of Feb., 1873, for the sale of their manures, or for any other purpose, in Plymouth or elsewhere, in the county of Devon, or in the county of Cornwall?

2. Was any, and what, inquiry made by the said W. M. W. of J. M., then the secretary of the Devon and Cornwall Chambers of Agriculture, in or about the month of Feb., 1873, respecting certain manures sent by the said J. M., for analysis, to Professor A.? Was the said inquiry, if any, made by the express authority of the defendants, or would it have been within the general authority of the said W. M. W. to make such inquiry? Did the said J. M., either then or at any time, give any, and what, accounts to the defendants or the said W. M. W., or any of their agents or servants, of the circumstances under which, the time when, the place where, and the person or persons from whom he had procured the said manures or samples of manures?

3. Were the said manures, or samples of manures, forwarded to Professor A. by the authority of the defendants, or their agents or servants, or which of them?

4. Was the said J. M., in or about the month of Feb., 1873, or at any other and what time, and for how long, and where, an agent or servant of, or in any way as a shareholder, customer, or otherwise connected with the defendants?

5. Did the defendants receive, in or about the month of Feb., 1873, or at any other and what time, from the said J. M., an analysis, or copy of an analysis, made, or purporting to be made, by Professor A. of certain manures, or samples of manures? Did the said J. M. give to the defendants, their agents, or servants, any, and what, account of the time when, the place where, and the person or persons from whom he received, or became possessed of, the said analysis?

6. Were the manures sold or manufactured by the plaintiffs among the manures so analyzed, or purported to be analyzed? Did the defendants print or circulate the said analysis?

7. Did the defendants send a copy of the said analysis to \* each \* 639 or any, or either of their agents, and to which of them? Give the names and addresses of the said agents.

8. Was one E. E., in or about the month of Feb., 1873, or at any other and what time, an agent of, or in any way as a shareholder or customer, or otherwise, connected with the defendants? Did he, by the authority or with the sanction of the defendants, procure from the plaintiffs, in or about the month of Dec., 1872, or when, any and what samples of their manures? What was done with the samples, if any, so obtained?

9. Have the defendants in their possession or power any of the manures or samples, or portions of the manures or samples submitted for analysis to Professor A.?

10. *Formal interrogatory as to books, letters, documents, &c.*

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No. 46.

*Slander of Title to Goods.*

C. v. D.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiff, at all the dates hereinafter mentioned, carried on and still carries on, the trade or business of a stonemason and contractor, at —, in the county of —.

2. On or about the — day of —, 1860, the plaintiff, in the ordinary course of such trade and business, was desirous of selling certain goods and chattels of the plaintiff's mentioned in the advertisement herein-after stated. He therefore caused to be printed an advertisement, of which the following is a copy:—"To be sold by auction, by Mr. F. S., on Monday and Tuesday, January 30th and 31st, 1860, at the above works, the whole of the working plant, the property of Mr. E. C., consisting of, &c. [*The advertisement then described a variety of articles, waggons, carts, sleepers, planks, and sundry other effects.*] The sale to commence each day at twelve o'clock: Cotsgate Hill, Ripon, January the 19th, 1860."

3. Thereupon the defendant, on the 25th day of January, 1860,  
 \* 640 falsely and maliciously caused to be printed and published \* of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning the said intended sale as advertised, the false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory libel following, that is to say:—[*here set out the words verbatim* ;] thereby meaning and intending to cause it to be believed, that the goods named in the said advertisement were the property of the defendant and not of the plaintiff, and that no person could safely purchase any goods to be exposed for sale at the said advertised sale.

4. There is and was no foundation or pretence for the claim set up by the defendant in the said libel, as he the defendant then well knew; and such claim was made maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause.

5. By means of the publication of the said libel, divers persons who were desirous of purchasing the said goods or some of them, and who would otherwise have attended at the said sale, and would have bidden for, and purchased the said goods or the greater part of them, particularly X., Y.

and Z., all of — in the said county, were hindered and prevented from attending at the time and place appointed for the sale by the said advertisement, and were deterred from bidding at such sale, and declined to purchase the said goods or any part thereof; and the plaintiff was then prevented from putting up the said goods and chattels for sale, and became unable to procure a fair and reasonable price for the same, and the said intended sale failed altogether; and the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in and about preparing for the said intended sale produced no advantageous result to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff was otherwise much injured and damnified.

And the plaintiff claims, &c.

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No. 47.

C. v. D.

STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant admits that the plaintiff caused to be printed the advertisement set out in paragraph 2 of the plaintiff's statement of claim; but denies that the goods mentioned in \* such advertisement \* 641 were the property of the plaintiff, and that the intended sale by auction was in the ordinary course of the plaintiff's trade and business.

2. The defendant admits that he caused to be printed and published the words set out in paragraph 3 of the plaintiff's statement of claim; but denies that he did so falsely or maliciously, or with the meaning in such paragraph alleged.

3. Before, and at the time of the publication complained of, the plaintiff had unlawfully detained, and was unlawfully detaining, from the defendant certain timber, carts, rails, plant, materials, and sundry other effects, the property of the defendant. The defendant was informed and believed that the plaintiff intended to dispose of the same (among other things) at the said intended sale by auction. Wherefore the defendant printed and published the said words for the purpose of warning all persons from purchasing the said goods and chattels so unlawfully detained by the plaintiff as aforesaid, and in the *bonâ fide* belief that such warning was necessary for the protection of the defendant's own property, and without any malice towards the plaintiff.

4. The defendant does not admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the statement of claim, or any of them.

No. 48.

*Libel in the nature of Slander of Title.*

*Hart and another v. Wall* (2 C. P. D. 146; 46 L. J. C. P. 227; 25 W. R. 373).

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM.

1. The plaintiffs were at the times hereinafter mentioned, and still are, vocalists, and had been and were engaged to sing at the "Sun Music Hall, Knightsbridge," and also at the "London Pavilion Music Hall," for reward payable to the plaintiffs for their services, and they appeared and sang in public under the name of "The Sisters Hartridge."

\* 642 \* 2. On the 15th of January, 1876, the defendant falsely and maliciously wrote and published of the plaintiffs, in the form of a letter addressed to E. Williams, Esq., the proprietor of the "Sun Music Hall," of the plaintiffs and of them as such vocalists, and of their engagement at the "Sun Music Hall," the words following; that is to say:—"January 15th, 1876. E. Williams, Esq. My dear Sir,—Although I know it is quite unintentional on the part of the lady advertisers (meaning the plaintiffs), the advertisement attached at foot, if relied upon in every particular by proprietors engaging them, is calculated to lead such proprietors to incur the penalties under the Copyright Act in certain cases, as I hold the power of attorney over the performing rights of certain musical publications belonging to two houses therein named, who only have the copyrights vested in them, and a separate and distinct property never held by them. If all proprietors knew this, it would be best; but I have not time to apprise them. I remain, yours truly, H. Wall;" meaning that the plaintiffs had no right to sing certain songs which they advertised themselves as about to sing at the said music hall.

3. In consequence thereof, and by the publication of the said words, E. Williams dismissed the plaintiffs from his service and terminated the said engagement at the "Sun Music Hall."

4. On the 19th of January, 1876, the defendant falsely and maliciously wrote and published of the plaintiffs, in the form of a letter addressed to E. Loibl, Esq., the proprietor of the "Pavilion Music Hall," of the plaintiffs, and of them as such vocalists, and their engagements at the said music hall, the words following; that is to say:—"January 19th, 1876. E. Loibl, Esq. Dear Sir,—That you may not be misled, I beg to state, that, with reference to an advertisement in the last *Era*, where the Misses Hart-ridge (meaning the plaintiffs) give notice that they have received unhesitating permission to perform any *morceaux* from any publication of certain publishers therein mentioned, it would be as well for you to know that, if two of the firms really had pretended to have given such unqualified sanc-



tion, that I hold powers of attorney over certain publications issued by them as to the sole liberty of public performance, which right they never possessed. But \* Messrs. Chappell & Co.'s representa- \* 643  
tive to-day informed me that they only granted permission for two songs in particular (which were named), and they were not aware it was for music hall singing, as they have a poor opinion of such creating any demand for their publications; and moreover that they require the advertisement to be altered. And Messrs. Metzler & Co.'s representative, in the presence and hearing of Mr. Brown (the head man of Mr. Cunningham-Boosey) yesterday stated to me that he had granted no permission whatever, but, on the contrary that they had informed the ladies (meaning the plaintiffs) that their charge for such permission would be 7s. per night (2l. 2s. per week), as much again as Messrs. Boosey named," (meaning that the plaintiffs had advertised themselves to sing at the said music hall songs which they had no right to sing).

5. In consequence of the publication of these words E. Loibl dismissed the plaintiffs from his service, and dispensed with their services, and refused to employ them to sing at the said music hall; and the plaintiffs were, and are, by means of the premises, otherwise injured.

And the plaintiffs claim 100l. damages.

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#### No. 49.

#### STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.

1. The defendant denies the whole of the allegations contained in the first paragraph of the statement of claim.

2. The defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the said statement of claim.

3. The defendant further denies that the alleged libels, and each of them as disclosed in paragraphs 2 and 4 respectively, were written and published as therein alleged.

4. The defendant further says that the alleged libels and each or either of them were privileged communications written by the defendant under the protection of privilege.<sup>1</sup>

\* 5. The defendant further says that the alleged libels, and each \* 644  
or either of them, and each and certain part or parts thereof, were true in substance and in fact.

#### REPLY.

The plaintiffs join issue with the defendant upon his statement of defence.

<sup>1</sup> This paragraph would now be deemed an insufficient plea of privilege, see *ante*, p. 484.

# IV. FORMS OF PLEADINGS, NOTICES, ETC., IN THE COUNTY COURT.

No. 50.

*Statement of Plaintiff's Cause of Action in Actions of Libel or Slander remitted for trial in a County Court.*

In the County Court of —, holden at —

Between A. B.	.	.	.	.	Plaintiff,
				and	[address and description],
C. D.	.	.	.	.	Defendant,
					[address and description].

Being an action of libel [or slander] commenced in Her Majesty's High Court of Justice, and remitted by order of Master —, under section 10 of "The County Courts Act, 1867," to be tried in this Court.

## *Libel.*

This action is brought :—

For that the defendant falsely and maliciously wrote and published of and concerning the plaintiff the words following : " *he is a liar, a black-guard, and a scoundrel ;* " and the plaintiff claims £200 damages.

## *Libel in the way of Trade.*

*Or*, For that the defendant falsely and maliciously caused to be printed and published of and concerning the plaintiff in the way of his trade as a grocer, the words following : " *Mr. A. B. sands his sugar and dusts his pepper,* " whereby the plaintiff was injured in his trade, and lost the custom of several persons, particularly X., Y., and Z., who had before dealt at the plaintiff's shop ; and the plaintiff claims £50 damages.

## *Slander.*

*Or*, For that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and

\* 645 \* published of and concerning the plaintiff the words following :—

" *A. B. is a thief, and stole Mrs. Brown's ducks ;* " and the plaintiff claims £30 damages.

## *Slander in the way of Trade.*

*Or*, For that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff, in the way of his business and calling as a ratcatcher, the words following : " *A. B. is a great rogue, and instead of doing his best to kill the rats he encourages the breed, so that he may have*

*more employment from the farmers,"* whereby the plaintiff was injured in his business, and several farmers, particularly X., Y., and Z., who had usually employed him to kill the rats on their farms, ceased to do so; and the plaintiff claims £20 damages.

Above is the statement of the plaintiff's cause of action.

Dated this — day of —, 18 —.

A. B., plaintiff,

or

E. F., plaintiffs solicitor.

To the registrar of the Court,  
and to the defendant.

[*N.B.* — *The above forms are only given as examples; and the statement of the plaintiff's cause of action must in all cases be according to the facts, and be as concise as possible.*]

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#### No. 51.

*Notice of Trial of Action of Libel or Slander remitted for trial in a County Court.*

Being an action of libel [*or slander*] commenced in her Majesty's High Court of Justice, and remitted by order of Master —, under section 10 of "The County Courts Act, 1867," to be tried in this Court.

Take notice that this action will be tried at a court to be holden on the — day of —, at — o'clock in the forenoon.

[*N.B.* — *To the notice sent to the defendant the registrar must annex a copy of the statement of the plaintiff's cause of action.*]

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#### \* No. 52.

\* 646

*Affidavit for leave to administer Interrogatories.*

We, A. B., of —, the above-named plaintiff [*or defendant*], and L. M., of —, solicitor in this cause for the said plaintiff [*or defendant*], make oath, and say, first:—

And I, the said A. B., for myself say:—

1. That I believe that I shall derive material benefit in this cause from the discovery which I seek by the interrogatories which I require to be delivered herein.

2. That I believed that I have a good cause of [*or defence to this*] action on the merits.

And I, the said L. M., say : —

3. That the plaintiff [*or* defendant] will derive material benefit by the discovery which he seeks by interrogatories.

4. That I believe that the plaintiff [*or* defendant] has a good cause of [*or* defence to this] action on the merits.

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No. 53.

*Notice of Set-off and Counterclaim.*

Take notice, that the defendant intends at the hearing of this cause to claim a set-off and to counterclaim against the plaintiff's demand, the particulars of which set-off or counterclaim are annexed hereto.

Dated this — day of —, 18 — .

The defendant [*or* defendant's solicitor].

To the registrar of the Court.

[*N.B. — The registrar is to annex to this notice the particulars of set-off and counterclaim, as furnished by defendant, sealed with the seal of the Court.*]

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No. 54.

*Notice of Special Defence.*

\* 647 Take notice that the defendant intends at the hearing of \* this cause to give in evidence, and rely upon the following ground of defence.

Dated this — day of —, 18 — .

The defendant [*or* defendant's solicitor].

To the registrar of the Court.

*Coverture.*

That the defendant is now [*or* that she was, at the time when the supposed claim arose, *or* the supposed contract or agreement was made], the wife of —, of —. And that she was married to him at —, in the county of —, on the — day of —, and that she resides at —, in the county of —.

*Statute of Limitations.*

That the claim for which the defendant is summoned is barred by a Statute of Limitation.

*Justification.*

That the libel [*or slander*] complained of is true in substance and in fact.

[*N.B. — Notices of Special Defence, in cases commenced in a Superior Court, and sent to the County Court for trial under section 10 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, must have, in addition to the usual heading, the heading of Form No. 50.*]

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No. 55.

*Notice to be given by Defendant under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 1, in an Action for Libel or Slander remitted for trial in a County Court.*

Being an action for libel [*or slander*] commenced in her Majesty's High Court of Justice, and remitted by order of Master — under section 10 of "The County Courts Act, 1867," to be tried before this Court.

Take notice, that the defendant on the trial of this action will give in evidence in mitigation of damages that he made [*or offered*] an apology to the plaintiff for the libel [*or slander*] complained of before the commencement of the action [*or as* \* soon after the commencement \* 648 of the action as he had an opportunity of doing so].

To the registrar of the Court  
and to the plaintiff.

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No. 56.

*Notice to be given by Defendant under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 2, in an Action for Libel remitted for trial in a County Court.*

Being an action for libel commenced in her Majesty's High Court of Justice, and remitted by order of Master — under section 10 of "The County Courts Act, 1867," to be tried before this Court.

Take notice, that the defendant on the trial of this action will give in evidence and rely upon the following ground of defence; (that is to say,)

That the libel was inserted in the newspaper called or known by the name of —, without actual malice and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action [*or as soon after the commencement of the action as he had an opportunity of doing so*] the defendant inserted in the said newspaper [*or offered to publish in any newspaper or periodical publication to be selected by the plaintiff*] a full apology for the said libel, and that the defendant has paid into Court £ — by way

of amends for the injury sustained by the plaintiff by the publication of the said libel.

Dated this — day of —, 18 —.

C. D., defendant,

or

E. F., defendant's solicitor.

To the registrar of the Court  
and to the plaintiff.

[N.B. — *If the libel was published in any periodical publication other than a newspaper, alter the notice accordingly.*]

## \* 649 \* V. PRECEDENTS OF CRIMINAL PLEADINGS.

No. 57.

*Information for a Libel on a Private Individual.*

R. v. Newman, 1 E. & B. 268, 558; 22 L. J. Q. B. 156; 17 Jur. 617;  
3 C. & K. 252; Dears. C. C. 85.

In the Queen's Bench.

Michaelmas Term, 15 Vict., A.D. 1851.

Middlesex to wit.

Be it remembered, that C. F. Robinson, Esq., coroner and attorney of our Lady the Queen in the Court of Queen's Bench, who prosecutes for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf, comes here into the said Court at Westminster, the 21st day of November, in the fifteenth year of the reign of our said Lady, and gives the Court to understand and be informed that John Henry Newman, doctor of divinity, late of the parish of Aston, in the county of Warwick, contriving and wickedly and maliciously intending to injure and vilify one Giovanni Giacinto Achilli, and to bring him into great contempt, scandal, infamy, and disgrace, on the 1st of October, A.D. 1851, did falsely and maliciously compose and publish a certain false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory libel, containing divers false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory matters concerning the said Giovanni Giacinto Achilli, that is to say:—[*Here follows the libel, set out verbatim with the necessary innuendoes.*] Which said false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel, the said John Henry Newman did then publish to the great damage, scandal, and disgrace of the said Giovanni Giacinto Achilli, in contempt of our said Lady the Queen, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in like case offending and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity. Whereupon the said coro-

ner and attorney of our said Lady the Queen, who for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf prosecuteth, prayeth the consideration of the Court here in the premises, and that due process of law may be awarded against the said John Henry Newman in this behalf to make him answer to our said Lady the Queen touching and concerning the premises aforesaid.

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\* No. 58.

\* 650

*Pleas to the above Information.<sup>1</sup>*

In the Queen's Bench.

Michaelmas Term, 15 Vict., A.D. 1851.

1. And the said John Henry Newman appears here in Court by Henry Lewin, his attorney, and the said information is read to him, which being by him heard and understood, he complains to have been grievously vexed and molested under color of the premises, and the less justly because he saith that he is Not Guilty of the said supposed offences in the said information alleged, &c.

2. And for a further plea, the said John Henry Newman saith that before the composing and publishing of the said alleged libel, to wit, on the 1st of January, 1830, &c. : [*Here follow facts showing the truth of the matters charged.*] And so the said John Henry Newman says that the said alleged libel consists of allegations true in substance and in fact, and of fair and reasonable comments thereon.

And the said John Henry Newman further saith, that at the time of publishing the said alleged libel, it was for the public benefit that the matters therein contained should be published, because, he says, that great excitement prevailed and numerous public discussions had been held in divers places in England on divers matters of controversy between the churches of England and Rome, with respect to which it was important the truth should be known ; and inasmuch as the said G. G. Achilli took a prominent part in such discussions, and his opinion and testimony were by many persons appealed to and relied on as of a person of character and respectability, with reference to the matters in controversy, it was necessary for the purpose of more effectually examining and ascertaining the truth, that the matters in the said alleged libel should be publicly known, in order that it might more fully appear that the opinion and testimony of the said G. G. Achilli were not deserving of credit or \* consideration by \* 651

<sup>1</sup> The pleas originally filed were demurred to, and amended ; the amended pleas were again demurred to, as being too general in their statements, and were then altered to the above form.

reason of his previous misconduct: [*Here follow other facts showing that it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published—*.] And so the said John Henry Newman says he published the said alleged libel as he lawfully might for the causes aforesaid, and this the said John Henry Newman is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment, &c.

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## No. 59.

## REPLICATION.

Hilary Term, 16 Vict., 1852.

The said C. F. Robinson, Esq., coroner and attorney of our said Lady the Queen, in the Court of Queen's Bench, who prosecutes for our Lady the Queen as to the plea first pleaded, puts himself upon the country, and as to the plea secondly pleaded, saith that the said J. H. Newman of his own wrong and without the cause in his said plea alleged, composed, and published the said libel as in the said information alleged, &c.

Issue joined, Hilary term, 16 Vict., 1852.

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## No. 60.

*Information ex officio for a Seditious Libel.*

R. v. John Horne, clerk (afterwards John Horne Tooke), Cowp. 672; 11 St. Tr. 264; 20 How. St. Tr. 651.

Michaelmas Term, 17 Geo. III. A.D. 1776.

London to wit.

Be it remembered, That Edward Thurlow, Esq., attorney-general of our present sovereign Lord the King, who for our said present sovereign Lord the King prosecutes in this behalf, in his proper person comes into the Court of our said present sovereign Lord the King before the King himself, at Westminster in the county of Middlesex, on Thursday next after fifteen days from the day of St. Martin in this same term, and

\* 652 \*for our said Lord the King giveth the Court here to understand and be informed, that John Horne, late of London, clerk, being a wicked, malicious, seditious, and ill-disposed person, and being greatly disaffected to our said present sovereign Lord the King, and to his administration of the government of this kingdom, and the dominions thereunto belonging, and wickedly, maliciously, and seditiously intending, devising,



and contriving to stir up and excite discontents and seditions among His Majesty's subjects, and to alienate and withdraw the affection, fidelity, and allegiance of His said Majesty's subjects from His said Majesty, and to insinuate and cause it to be believed that divers of His Majesty's innocent and deserving subjects had been inhumanly murdered by His said Majesty's troops in the province, colony, or plantation of the Massachusetts-Bay, in New England, in America, belonging to the crown of Great Britain, and unlawfully and wickedly to seduce and encourage His said Majesty's subjects in the said province, colony, or plantation, to resist and oppose His Majesty's government, on the 8th day of June, in the 15th year of the reign of our present sovereign Lord George the Third, &c., with force and arms at London aforesaid, in the parish of St. Mary-le-Bow, in the ward of Cheap, wickedly, maliciously and seditiously, did write and publish, and cause and procure to be written and published, a certain false, wicked, malicious, scandalous and seditious libel, of and concerning His said Majesty's government, and the employment of His troops, according to the tenor and effect following: "*King's Arms Tavern, Cornhill, June 7th, 1775.* At a special meeting this day of several members of the Constitutional Society, during an adjournment, a gentleman proposed, that a subscription should be immediately entered into (by such of the members present who might approve the purpose), for raising the sum of £100 — to be applied to the relief of the widows, orphans, and aged parents of our beloved American fellow subjects, who, faithful to the character of Englishmen, preferring death to slavery, were, for that reason only, inhumanly murdered by the King's (meaning His said Majesty's) troops, at or near Lexington and Concord, in the province of Massachusetts (meaning the said province, colony, or plantation of the Massachusetts-Bay, in New England, in America) on the 19th of last April; which sum being immediately \* collected, it was thereupon resolved, that Mr. Horne \* 653 (meaning himself the said John Horne) do pay to-morrow into the hands of Messieurs Brownes and Collison, on the account of Dr. Franklin, the said sum of £100, and that Dr. Franklin be requested to apply the same to the above-mentioned purpose. — John Horne" (meaning himself the said John Horne) in contempt of our said Lord the King, in open violation of the laws of this kingdom, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in the like case offending, and also against the peace of our said present sovereign Lord the King, his crown and dignity. [*Then follow several counts for the several publications of the same libel in the various newspapers.*]

And the said attorney-general of our said Lord the King for our said Lord the King further gives the Court here to understand and be informed that the said John Horne, being such person as aforesaid, and again unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously, and seditiously intending, devising, and

contriving as aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, on the 14th day of July, in the 15th year aforesaid, with force and arms at London aforesaid, in the parish and ward aforesaid, wickedly, maliciously, and seditiously did write and publish, and cause and procure to be written and published, a certain false, wicked, malicious, scandalous, and seditious libel, of and concerning His said Majesty's government, and the employment of His troops, according to the tenor and effect following: "I (meaning himself the said John Horne) think it proper to give the unknown contributor this notice, that I (again meaning himself the said John Horne) did yesterday pay to Messrs. Brownes and Collison, on the account of Dr. Franklin, the sum of £50 and that I (again meaning himself the said John Horne) will write to Dr. Franklin, requesting him to apply the same to the relief of the widows, orphans, and aged parents of our beloved American fellow subjects, who, faithful to the character of Englishmen, preferring death to slavery, were (for that reason only) inhumanly murdered by the King's (meaning His said Majesty's) troops, at or near Lexington and Concord, in the province of Massachusetts (meaning the said province, colony, or plantation of the Massachusetts-Bay in New England in America) on the 19th of April last, — John Horne" (again meaning himself the said John Horne)

\* 654 in contempt of our said Lord the \* King, in open violation of the laws of this kingdom, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in the like case offending, and also against the peace of our said present sovereign Lord the King, his crown, and dignity. [*Then follow other counts for other publications of the same libel.* Whereupon the said attorney-general of our said Lord the King, who for our said present sovereign Lord the King prosecutes in this behalf, prays the consideration of the Court here in the premises, and that due process of law may be awarded against him, the said John Horne, in this behalf, to make him answer to our said present sovereign Lord the King touching and concerning the said premises aforesaid, &c.

E. THURLOW.

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No. 61.

*Indictment for a Blasphemous Libel.*

—, to wit.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen upon their oath present that A. B., being a wicked and evil-disposed person, and disregarding the laws and religion of the realm, and wickedly and profanely devising and intending to bring the Holy Scriptures and the Christian religion into disbelief and contempt among the people of this kingdom, on the — day of —, A.D. —, unlawfully and wickedly did compose, print, and publish, and

cause and procure to be composed, printed and published, a certain scandalous, impious, blasphemous, and profane libel, of and concerning the Holy Scriptures and the Christian religion, in one part of which said libel there were and are contained, amongst other things, certain scandalous, impious, blasphemous, and profane matters and things, of, and concerning the Holy Scriptures and the Christian religion, according to the tenor and effect following, that is to say, [*here set out the first blasphemous passage*], and in another part thereof there were and are contained, amongst other things, certain other scandalous, impious, blasphemous, and profane matters and things, of and concerning the said Holy Scriptures and the Christian religion, according to the tenor and effect following, that is to say, [*here set out other blasphemous passages*]: to the high displeasure of Almighty God, to the \* great scandal and reproach \* 655 of the Christian religion, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen her crown and dignity.

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No. 62.

*Indictment for publishing and selling an Obscene Picture.*

—, to wit.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen upon their oath present that A. B., being a wicked and evil-disposed person, and unlawfully devising, contriving and intending to debauch and corrupt the morals of the young and of divers other liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, on the — day of —. A.D. —, in a certain open and public shop of him, the said A. B., situate and being at number — High Street, in the parish of —, in the town of —, in the county aforesaid, unlawfully, wickedly, designedly, and maliciously did publish and sell, and cause and procure to be published and sold, to one C. D. a certain lewd, scandalous and obscene picture [print, photograph, or engraving,] intituled —, and representing — [*here give such a detailed description of the picture as will manifestly show its indecency*] to the manifest corruption of the morals of the young, and of other liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, in contempt of our said Lady the Queen and her laws, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

## No. 63.

*Indictment for Seditious Words.*

—, to wit.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen upon their oath present that A. B., being a wicked, malicious, seditious, and evil-disposed person, and wickedly, maliciously, and seditiously contriving and intending the peace of our Lady the Queen and of this realm to disquiet and disturb, and the liege \* 656 subjects of our said Lady the Queen to incite and move to \* hatred and dislike of the person of our said Lady the Queen and of the government established by law within this realm, and to incite, move, and persuade great numbers of the liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, to insurrections, riots, tumults, and breaches of the peace, and to prevent by force and arms the execution of the laws of this realm and the preservation of the public peace, on the — day of —, A.D. —, in the presence and hearing of divers, to wit, — of the liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen then assembled together, in a certain speech and discourse by him the said A. B. then addressed to the said liege subjects so then assembled together, as aforesaid, unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously, and seditiously did publish, utter, pronounce, and declare with a loud voice of and concerning the government established by law within this realm, and of and concerning our said Lady the Queen, and the crown of this realm, and of and concerning the liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, committing and being engaged in divers insurrections, riots, and breaches of the public peace, amongst other words and matter, the false, wicked, seditious and inflammatory words and matter following, that is to say: — [*here set out the seditious words verbatim*]; in contempt of our said Lady the Queen, in open violation of the laws of this realm, to the evil and pernicious example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

## No. 64.

*Indictment for Defamatory Words spoken to a Magistrate in the Execution of his Duty.*

Middlesex, to wit.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen upon their oath present, that heretofore, to wit, on the — day of — in the year of our Lord, — one A. B. was brought before C. D., Esquire, then and yet being one of the justices of our said Lady the Queen, assigned to keep the peace of our said Lady the Queen in and for the county of Middlesex, and also to hear and

determine divers felonies, trespasses, and other misdeeds committed \* in the said county ; and the said A. B. was then charged before \* 657 the said C. D., upon the oath of one E. F., that he, the said A. B., had then lately before feloniously taken, stolen, and taken away divers goods and chattels of the said E. F. And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present, that the said A. B., being a scandalous and ill-disposed person, and wickedly and maliciously intending and contriving to scandalize and vilify the said C. D. as such justice as aforesaid, and to bring the administration of justice in this kingdom into contempt, afterwards, and whilst the said C. D., as such justice as aforesaid, was examining and taking the depositions of divers witnesses against him the said A. B., in that behalf, to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, wickedly and maliciously, in the presence and hearing of divers good and liege subjects of our said Lady the Queen, did publish, utter, pronounce, declare, and say with a loud voice to the said C. D., and whilst he the said C. D. was so acting as such justice as aforesaid, the false, wicked, malicious, and seditious words and matter following, that is to say : — [*Here set out the seditious words verbatim*] ; to the great scandal and reproach of the administration of justice in this kingdom, to the great scandal and damage of the said C. D., in contempt of our said Lady the Queen and her laws, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

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No. 65.

*Indictment for a Libel on a Private Individual at Common Law.*

—— to wit.

The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their oath, present that [before and at the time of the committing of the offence hereinafter mentioned, one C. D. was, and still is, a solicitor of the Supreme Court, and exercised and carried on the profession or business of such solicitor at ——, in the county of —— ; and that] A. B., being a person of an evil and wicked mind, and wickedly, maliciously, and unlawfully contriving and intending \* to injure, vilify, and prejudice the said C. D., and to \* 658 bring him into public contempt, scandal, infamy, and disgrace, and to deprive him of his good name, fame, credit, and reputation [in his said profession and business, and otherwise to injure and aggrieve him therein], on the —— day of ——, in the year of our Lord ——, wickedly, maliciously, and unlawfully did write and publish, and cause and procure to be written and published, a false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel

[in the form of a letter directed to one E. F., containing divers false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory matters and things] of and concerning the said C. D. [and of and concerning him in his said profession and business, and of and concerning his conduct and behavior therein], according to the tenor and effect following, that is to say :— [*Here set out the libel verbatim, with all necessary innuendoes,*] to the great damage, scandal, and disgrace of the said C. D. [in his said profession and business], to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

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No. 66.

*Indictment under s. 4 of Lord Campbell's Act.*

[*Commence as in the preceding precedent ; then set out the libel with all necessary innuendoes, and conclude as follows*] :— he, the said A. B., then well knowing the said defamatory libel to be false ; to the great damage, scandal, and disgrace of the said C. D., to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown and dignity.

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No. 67.

*Indictment under s. 5 of Lord Campbell's Act.*

[*This will precisely follow the preceding form, merely omitting the words :— “ he, the said A. B., then well knowing the said defamatory libel to be false.”*]

*Demurrer to an Indictment or Information.*

And the said A. B., in his own proper person, cometh into Court here, and, having heard the said indictment [*or information*] read, saith, that the said indictment [*or information*] and the matters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are above stated and set forth, are not sufficient in law, and that he the said A. B. is not bound by the law of the land to answer the same ; and this he is ready to verify : wherefore, for want of a sufficient indictment [*or information*] in this behalf, the said

A. B. prays judgment, and that by the Court he may be dismissed and discharged from the said premises in the said indictment [*or information*] specified.

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No. 69.

*Joinder in Demurrer.*

And J. N., who prosecutes for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf, saith, that the said indictment [*or information*] and the matters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are above stated and set forth, are sufficient in law to compel the said A. B. to answer the same; and the said J. N., who prosecutes as aforesaid, is ready to verify and prove the same, as the Court here shall direct and award: wherefore, inasmuch as the said A. B. hath not answered to the said indictment [*or information*], nor hitherto in any manner denied the same, the said J. N., for our said Lady the Queen, prays judgment, and that the said A. B. may be convicted of the premises in the said indictment [*or information*] specified.

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No. 70.

*Pleas to an Indictment.*

At the assizes and general delivery of the Queen's gaol for the county of —, holden in and for the said county on the \* — day \* 660 of —, A. D. —, cometh in Court the said A. B., in his own proper person, and having heard the said indictment read, saith he is not guilty of the said premises in the said indictment above specified and charged upon him, and of this, he the said A. B. puts himself upon the country, &c.

And for a further plea in this behalf, the said A. B. says that our Lady the Queen ought not further to prosecute the said indictment against him, because he says that it is true that [*Here state facts showing the truth of every matter charged in the alleged libel*]. And the said A. B. further saith that before and at the time of the publication in the said indictment mentioned [*Here state facts showing that it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published*], by reason whereof it was for the public benefit that the said matters so charged in the said indictment, and all and every of them should be published. And this he the said A. B. is ready to verify, wherefore he prays judgment and that by the Court here he may be dismissed and discharged from the said premises in the said indictment above specified.

## No. 71.

*Replication to the above Pleas.*

And thereupon J. N. [*the clerk of arraigns, &c.*] who prosecutes for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf as to the plea of the said A. B. by him firstly above pleaded, and whereof the said A. B. hath put himself upon the country, doth the like, &c. And as to the plea of the said A. B. by him secondly above pleaded, the said J. N., who prosecutes as aforesaid, says that our said Lady the Queen ought not by reason of anything in the said second plea alleged to be barred or precluded from prosecuting the said indictment against the said A. B.; because he says, that he denies the said several matters in the said second plea alleged, and saith that the same are not, nor are nor is any or either of them, true; but that the said A. B. of his own wrong, and without the cause and matter of defence in his said second plea alleged and set forth, committed the offence and published the said libel in manner and form as in \* the said indictment is mentioned. And this he, the said J. N. prays may be inquired of by the country, &c. And the said A. B. doth the like.

## No. 72.

*Demurrer to a Plea.*

And J. N., who prosecutes for our said Lady the Queen in this behalf, as to the said plea of the said A. B. by him above pleaded, saith that the same, and the matters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are above pleaded and set forth, are not sufficient in law to bar or preclude our said Lady the Queen from prosecuting the said indictment against him the said A. B., and that our said Lady the Queen is not bound by the law of the land to answer the same; and this he, the said J. N., who prosecutes as aforesaid, is ready to verify: wherefore, for want of a sufficient plea in this behalf, he the said J. N. for our said Lady the Queen, prays judgment, and that the said A. B. may be convicted of the premises in the said indictment specified.

## No. 73.

*Joinder in Demurrer.*

And the said A. B. saith, that his said plea, by him above pleaded and the matters therein contained, in manner and form as the same are above



pleaded and set forth, are sufficient in law to bar and preclude our said Lady the Queen from prosecuting the said indictment against him the said A. B., and the said A. B. is ready to verify and prove the same, as the said Court here shall direct and award : wherefore inasmuch as the said J. N., for our said Lady the Queen, hath not answered the said plea, nor hitherto in any manner denied the same, the said A. B. prays judgment, and that by the Court here he may be dismissed and discharged from the said premises in the said indictment specified.

# REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE LAW OF LIBEL.

Committee nominated :—Mr. Attorney General ; Sir John Holker ; Mr. Courtney ; Mr. Staveley Hill ; Mr. Alexander Sullivan ; Baron Henry de Worms ; Mr. Edward Leatham ; Mr. Gregory ; Mr. Blennerhassett ; Mr. Floyer ; Dr. Cameron ; Mr. Richard Paget ; Mr. Errington ; Mr. Master ; Mr. Hutchinson.

*The Select Committee re-appointed to inquire into the Law of Newspaper Libel have agreed to the following Report.*

Your committee have not thought it necessary to call witnesses upon the matters referred to them. They have had the advantage of the evidence taken by the Select Committee of 1879, who, owing to the short time at their disposal, were unable to report, and your committee are of opinion that through the labors of the former committee sufficient information has been accumulated for the purposes of their inquiry.

Your committee have confined themselves to an examination of the state of the law affecting civil actions and criminal prosecutions for newspaper libel, and to the changes which, in their judgment, should be made therein.

It appears to your committee that one of the most important points of the subject referred to them is the question of extension of privilege to newspaper reports of the proceedings of public meetings.

Your committee, after careful consideration, have come to the conclusion that the balance of convenience requires that further protection should be given to such reports.

Your committee accordingly recommend that any report published in any newspaper of the proceedings of a public meeting should be privileged, if such meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose, and was \* 663 open to the public, and if \* such report was fair and accurate, and published without malice, and if the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.

But your committee are of opinion that such protection should not be available as a defence in any proceeding if the plaintiff or prosecutor can show that the defendant has refused to insert a reasonable letter or state-

ment of explanation or contradiction by or on behalf of such plaintiff or prosecutor.

Your committee recommend that no criminal prosecution shall be commenced against the proprietor, publisher, editor, or any one responsible for the publication of a newspaper, for any libel published therein, without the *fiat* of the Attorney General being first obtained.

Your committee are also of opinion that the name of every proprietor of a newspaper, or, in the case of several persons engaged as partners in such proprietorship, the names of all such persons should be registered at the office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, with full particulars of the addresses and occupations of all such persons, or of any change therein.

14 July, 1880.

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 STATUTES.

## CONTENTS.

	PAGE
3 Edw. I. Stat. Westminster I. C. 34 . . . . .	665
13 Edw. I. stat. 4 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
2 Rich. II. st. I. c. 5 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
12 Rich. II. c. 11 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
13 Car. II. stat. I. c. 1 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
4 William & Mary, c. 18, s. 1 . . . . .	666
32 Geo. III. c. 60. (Mr. Fox's Libel Act) . . . . .	667
39 Geo. III. c. 79 . . . . .	668
51 Geo. III. c. 65, s. 3 . . . . .	669
60 Geo. III. & 1 Geo. IV. c. 8, ss. 1 & 2 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 4 . . . . .	670
6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 76, s. 19 . . . . .	671
1 & 2 Vict. c. 38, s. 2. . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
2 & 3 Vict. c. 12, ss. 2, 3, 4 . . . . .	672
3 & 4 Vict. c. 9 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
6 & 7 Vict. c. 96. (Lord Campbell's Libel Act) . . . . .	674
8 & 9 Vict. c. 75 . . . . .	677
9 & 10 Vict. c. 33, s. 1 . . . . .	678
11 & 12 Vict. c. 12, s. 3 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
15 & 16 Vict. c. 76 (C. L. P. Act, 1852), s. 61 . . . . .	679
18 & 19 Vict. c. 41 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>
20 & 21 Vict. c. 83 . . . . .	680
23 & 24 Vict. c. 32 . . . . .	682
* 43 & 44 Vict. c. 41 (Burial Laws Amendment Act, 1880), s. 7 . . . . .	<i>ib.</i>

## \* APPENDIX OF STATUTES.

\* 665

## THE STATUTE OF CIRCUMSPECTE AGATIS.

13 EDW. I. STAT. 4.

[A.D. 1285.]

THE King to his judges sendeth greeting : —

1. Use yourselves circumspectly in all matters concerning the Bishop of Norwich and his clergy, not punishing them if they hold plea, in Court Christian, of such things as be mere spiritual, that is to wit, of penance enjoined by prelates for deadly sin, as fornication, adultery, and such like, for the which sometimes corporal penance, and sometime pecuniary is enjoined. . . .

6. *And for laying violent hands on a clerk, and in cause of defamation, it hath been granted already, that it shall be tried in a Spiritual Court, when money is not demanded, but [a thing done] for punishment of sin, and likewise for breaking an oath. . . .*

12. *In causes of defamation, prelates may freely correct, the King's prohibition notwithstanding ; first enjoining a corporal penance, which, if the party will redeem, the prelate may lawfully receive the money, though the prohibition be showed.*

[N. B. — The words in italics, being rendered unnecessary by the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41, are now repealed by the Stat. Law. Revn. Act, 1863, 26 & 27 Vict. c. 125.]

## SCANDALUM MAGNATUM.

3 Edw. I. Stat. Westminster I. c. 34 . . . . . *ante*, p. 133  
 2 Rich. II. st. I. c. 5 . . . . . *ante*, p. 134  
 12 Rich. II. c. 11 . . . . . *ib*

13 CAR. II. STAT. I. c. 1.

[A.D. 1661.]

S. 3. AND to the end that no man hereafter may be misled into any seditious or unquiet demeanor out of an opinion that the Parliament begun and held at Westminster upon the third day of November, in the year of our Lord 1640, is yet in being which is undoubtedly dissolved and determined, and so is hereby declared and adjudged to be fully dissolved and determined, or out of an opinion that there lies any obligation upon him from any oath, covenant, or engagement whatsoever, to endeavor a change of government either in church or state, or out of an opinion that both Houses of Parliament, or either of them have a legislative power without the King, all which assertions have been seditiously maintained in some pamphlets lately printed, and are daily promoted by the active \* enemies of our peace and happiness ; Be it \* 666 therefore further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any person or persons at any time after the four and twentieth day of June, in the year of our Lord 1661,

shall maliciously and advisedly, by writing, printing, preaching, or other speaking express, publish, utter, declare, or affirm that the Parliament begun at Westminster upon the third day of November, in the year of our Lord 1640, is not yet dissolved, or is not determined, or that it ought to be in being, or hath yet any continuance or existence, or that there lies any obligation upon him or any other person from any oath, covenant, or engagement whatsoever, to endeavor a change of government either in church or state, or that both Houses of Parliament, or either House of Parliament have or hath a legislative power without the King, or any other words to the same effect, that then every such person and persons so aforesaid offending shall incur the danger and penalty of a premunire mentioned in a statute made in the 16th year of the reign of King Richard the Second. And it is hereby also declared that the oath usually called the solemn league and covenant was in itself an unlawful oath and imposed upon the subjects of this realm against the fundamental laws and liberties of this kingdom, and that all orders and ordinances or pretended orders and ordinances of both or either Houses of Parliament for imposing of oaths, covenants, or engagements, levying of taxes, or raising of forces and arms, to which the royal assent either in person or by commission was not expressly had or given, were in their first creation and making, and still are, and so shall be taken to be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever. . . .

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#### 4 WILLIAM & MARY, c. 18.

##### *An Act to prevent malicious informations in the Court of King's Bench.*

[A.D. 1692.]

S. 1. THE clerk of the crown in the said Court of King's Bench for the time being shall not without express order, to be given by the said Court in open Court, exhibit, receive, or file any information for any of the causes aforesaid, or issue out any process thereupon, before he shall have taken or shall have delivered to him a recognizance from the person or persons procuring such information to be exhibited with the place of his, her, or their abode, title, or profession, to be entered to the person or persons against whom such information or informations is or are to be exhibited in the penalty of twenty pounds, that he, she, or they will effectually prosecute such informations or information, and abide by and observe such orders as the said Court shall direct, which recognizance the said clerk of the crown and also every justice of the peace of any county, city, franchise or town corporate (where the cause of any such information shall arise), are hereby impowered to take, after the taking whereof by the said clerk of the crown, or the receipt thereof from any justice of the peace, the said clerk of the

\* 667 crown shall make an entry thereof upon record, and shall file \* a memorandum thereof in some public place in his office, that all persons may resort thereunto without fee. And in case any person or persons against whom any information or informations for the causes aforesaid, or any of them, shall be exhibited, shall appear thereunto and plead to issue, and that the prosecutor or prosecutors of such information or informations shall not at his and their own proper costs and charges within one whole year next after issue joined therein procure the same to be tried, or if upon such trial a verdict pass for the defendant or defendants, or in case the said informer or informers procure a *noli prosequi* to be entered then in any of the said cases the said Court of King's Bench is hereby authorized to award to the said defendant and defendants, his, her, or their costs, unless the judge before whom such information shall be tried shall at the trial of such information in open Court certify upon record that there was a

reasonable cause for exhibiting such information. And in case the said informer or informers shall not within three months next after the said costs taxed and demand made thereof, pay to the said defendant or defendants the said costs, then the said defendant and defendants shall have the benefit of the said recognizance to compel them thereunto.

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### MR. FOX'S LIBEL ACT.

32 GEO. III. c. 60.

[A.D. 1792.]

*An Act to remove doubts respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel.*

WHEREAS doubts have arisen whether on the trial of an indictment or information for the making or publishing any libel, where an issue or issues are joined between the King and the defendant or defendants, on the plea of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the jury impanelled to try the same to give their verdict upon the whole matter in issue: Be it therefore declared and enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that on every such trial the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue upon such indictment or information, and shall not be required or directed by the Court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried to find the defendant or defendants guilty merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant or defendants of the paper charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or information.

2. Provided always, that on every such trial the Court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be tried shall, according to their or his direction, give their or his opinion and directions to the jury on the \*matter in \* 668 issue between the King and the defendant or defendants, in like manner as in other criminal cases.

3. Provided also, that nothing herein contained shall extend or be construed to extend to prevent the jury from finding a special verdict, in their discretion, as in other criminal cases.

4. Provided also, that in case the jury shall find the defendant or defendants guilty it shall and may be lawful for the said defendant or defendants to move in arrest of judgment, on such ground and in such manner as by law he or they might have done before the passing of this Act, anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding.

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39 GEO. III. c. 79.

[A.D. 1799.]

S. 28. NOTHING in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to any papers printed by the authority and for the use of either Houses of Parliament.

S. 29. Every person who shall print any paper for hire, reward, gain, or profit, shall carefully preserve and keep one copy (at least) of every paper so printed by him or her, on which he or she shall write, or cause to be written or printed, in fair and legible characters, the name and place of abode of the person or persons by whom he or she shall be employed to print the same, and every person printing any paper for hire, reward, gain or profit who shall omit or neglect to write, or cause to be written or printed

as aforesaid, the name and place of his or her employer on one of such printed papers, or to keep or preserve the same for the space of six calendar months next after the printing thereof, or to produce and show the same to any justice of the peace who within the said space of six calendar months shall require to see the same, shall for every such omission, neglect, or refusal forfeit and lose the sum of twenty pounds.

S. 31. Nothing herein contained shall extend to the impression of any engraving, or to the printing by letter-press of the name, or the name and address or business or profession, of any person, and the articles in which he deals, or to any papers for the sale of estates or goods by auction or otherwise.

S. 34. No person shall be prosecuted or sued for any penalty imposed by this Act, unless such prosecution shall be commenced, or such action shall be brought, within three calendar months next after such penalty shall have been incurred.

S. 35. And any pecuniary penalty imposed by this Act, and not exceeding the sum of twenty pounds, shall and may be recovered before any justice or justices of the peace for the county, stewartry, riding, division, city, town, or place, in which the same shall be incurred, or the person having incurred the same shall happen to be, in a summary way.

S. 36. All pecuniary penalties hereinbefore imposed by this Act shall, when  
\* 669 recovered in a summary way before any justice, be applied and disposed \* of in manner hereinafter mentioned; that is to say, one moiety thereof to the informer before any justice, and the other moiety thereof to his Majesty, his heirs and successors.

[N. B. — The above sections are continued and re-enacted by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, schedule 2; while other sections of the same statute are repealed by schedule 1.]

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51 GEO. III. c. 65.

[A. D. 1811.]

S. 3. NOTHING in the said Act of the thirty-ninth year of King George the Third, chapter seventy-nine, or in this Act contained, shall extend or be construed to extend to require the name and residence of the printer to be printed upon any bank note, or bank post bill of the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, upon any bill of exchange, or promissory note, or upon any bond or other security for payment of money, or upon any bill of lading, policy of insurance, letter of attorney, deed, or agreement, or upon any transfer or assignment of any public stocks, funds, or other securities, or upon any transfer or assignment of the stocks of any public corporation or company authorized or sanctioned by Act of Parliament, or upon any dividend warrant of or for any such public or other stocks, funds, or securities, or upon any receipt for money or goods, or upon any proceeding in any court of law or equity, or in any inferior Court, warrant, order, or other papers printed by the authority of any public board or public officer in the execution of the duties of their respective offices, notwithstanding the whole or any part of the said several securities, instruments, proceedings, matters, and things aforesaid shall have been or shall be printed.

[N. B. — This section is continued and re-enacted by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, schedule 2.]



## 60 GEO. III. AND 1 GEO. IV. c. 8.

*An Act for the more effectual Prevention and Punishment of blasphemous and seditious Libels.*  
[30th December, 1819.]

WHEREAS it is expedient to make more effectual provision for the punishment of blasphemous and seditious libels : Be it enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that from and after the passing of this Act, in every case in which any verdict or judgment by default shall be had against any person for composing, printing, or publishing any blasphemous libel, or any seditious libel tending to bring into hatred or contempt the person of his Majesty, his heirs or successors, or the Regent, or the government \* and consti- \* 670 tution of the United Kingdom as by law established, or either House of Parliament, or to excite his Majesty's subjects to attempt the alteration of any matter in Church or State as by law established, otherwise than by lawful means, it shall be lawful for the judge or the Court before whom or in which such verdict shall have been given, or the Court in which such judgment by default shall be had, to make an order for the seizure and carrying away and detaining in safe custody, in such manner as shall be directed in such order, all copies of the libel which shall be in the possession of the person against whom such verdict or judgment shall have been had, or in the possession of any other person named in the order for his use, evidence upon oath having been previously given to the satisfaction of such Court or judge, that a copy or copies of the said libel is or are in the possession of such other person for the use of the person against whom such verdict or judgment shall have been had as aforesaid ; and in every such case it shall be lawful for any justice of the peace, or for any constable or other peace officer acting under any such order, or for any person or persons acting with or in aid of any such justice of the peace, constable, or other peace officer, to search for any copies of such libel in any house, building, or other place whatsoever belonging to the person against whom any such verdict or judgment shall have been had, or to any other person so named, in whose possession any copies of any such libel, belonging to the person against whom any such verdict or judgment shall have been had, shall be ; and in case admission shall be refused, or not obtained within a reasonable time after it shall have been first demanded, to enter by force by day into any such house, building, or place whatsoever, and to carry away all copies of the libel there found, and to detain the same in safe custody, until the same shall be restored under the provisions of this Act, or disposed of according to any further order made in relation thereto.

2. And be it further enacted, that if in any such case as aforesaid judgment shall be arrested, or if, after judgment shall have been entered, the same shall be reversed upon any writ of error, all copies so seized shall be forthwith returned to the person or persons from whom the same shall have been so taken as aforesaid, free of all charge and expense, and without the payment of any fees whatever ; and in every case in which final judgment shall be entered upon the verdict so found against the person or persons charged with having composed, printed, or published such libel, then all copies so seized shall be disposed of as the Court in which such judgment shall be given shall order and direct.

## 5 GEO. IV. c. 83.

[21st June, 1824.]

S. 4. . . . EVERY person wilfully exposing to view in any street, road, highway, or public place, any obscene print, picture, or other indecent exhibition, . . . shall be deemed a rogue and vagabond, within the true intent and meaning of this \* 671 Act; and it shall be lawful for any justice of the \* peace to commit such offender (being thereof convicted before him by the confession of such offender, or by the evidence on oath of one or more credible witness or witnesses) to the house of correction, there to be kept to hard labor for any time not exceeding three calendar months. . . .

## 6 &amp; 7 WILL. 4, c. 76.

[A.D. 1836.]

S. 19. IF any person shall file any bill in any court for the discovery of the name of any person concerned as printer, publisher, or proprietor of any newspaper, or of any matters relative to the printing or publishing of any newspaper, in order the more effectually to bring or carry on any suit or action for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of any slanderous or libellous matter contained in any such newspaper respecting such person, it shall not be lawful for the defendant to plead or demur to such bill, but such defendant shall be compellable to make the discovery required; provided always, that such discovery shall not be made use of as evidence or otherwise in any proceeding against the defendant, save only in that proceeding for which the discovery is made.

[N. B. — This section applies to Ireland. It was re-enacted by 32 & 33 Vict., c. 24, schedule 2, and therefore remains law, although the original statute, 6 & 7 Will. IV., c. 76, was wholly repealed without any allusion to this section, by the 33 & 34 Vict., c. 99. See *ante*, pp. 513, 514.]

## 1 &amp; 2 VICT. c. 38.

[A.D. 1838.]

S. 2. AND whereas by the said recited Act (*i. e.*, the 5 Geo. IV. c. 83, s. 4, and NOT as stated in the margin to the Revised Edition of the Statutes, vol. viii. p. 216, the 5 Geo. III. c. 83, s. 5,) it is enacted that every person wilfully exposing to view in any street, road, highway, or public place, any obscene print, picture, or other indecent exhibition shall, on summary conviction thereof, be liable to punishment as therein provided: And whereas doubts have arisen whether the exposing to public view in the windows of shops in streets, highways, or other public places, of any obscene print, picture, or other indecent exhibition, is an offence within the meaning of the said recited Act: Be it therefore declared and enacted, that every person who shall wilfully expose or cause to be exposed to public view in the window or other part of any shop or other building situate in any street, road, highway, or public place, any obscene print, picture, or other indecent exhibition, shall be deemed to have wilfully exposed such obscene print, picture, or other indecent exhibition to public view within the intent and meaning of the said Act, and shall accordingly be liable to be proceeded against, and, on conviction, to be punished under the provisions of the said Act.

## \* 2 &amp; 3 VICT. c. 12.

\* 672

[A.D. 1839.]

S. 2. EVERY person who shall print any paper or book whatsoever which shall be meant to be published or dispersed, and who shall not print upon the front of every such paper, if the same shall be printed on one side only, or upon the first or last leaf of every paper or book which shall consist of more than one leaf, in legible characters, his or her name and usual place of abode or business, and every person who shall publish or disperse, or assist in publishing or dispersing, any printed paper or book on which the name and place of abode of the person printing the same shall not be printed as aforesaid, shall for every copy of such paper so printed by him or her forfeit a sum not more than five pounds: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to impose any penalty upon any person for printing any paper excepted out of the operation of the said Act of the thirty-ninth year of King George the Third, chapter seventy-nine, either in the said Act or by any Act made for the amendment thereof.

S. 3. In the case of books or papers printed at the University Press of Oxford, or the Pitt Press of Cambridge, the printer, instead of printing his name thereon, shall print the following words, "Printed at the University Press, Oxford," or, "The Pitt Press, Cambridge," as the case may be.

S. 4. Provided always that it shall not be lawful for any person or persons whatsoever to commence, prosecute, enter, or file, or cause or procure to be commenced, prosecuted, entered, or filed, any action, bill, plaint, or information in any of Her Majesty's Courts, or before any justice or justices of the peace, against any person or persons for the recovery of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture made or incurred, or which may hereafter be incurred under the provisions of this Act, unless the same be commenced, prosecuted, entered, or filed in the name of Her Majesty's Attorney-General or Solicitor-General in that part of Great Britain called England, or Her Majesty's Advocate for Scotland (as the case may be respectively); and if any action, bill, plaint, or information shall be commenced, prosecuted, or filed in the name or names of any other person or persons than is or are in that behalf before mentioned, the same and every proceeding thereupon had are hereby declared, and the same shall be null and void to all intents and purposes.

[N. B. — The above sections are re-enacted by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, schedule 2; the rest of the Act is repealed by schedule 1.]

## 3 &amp; 4 VICT. c. 9.

*An Act to give Summary Protection to Persons employed in the Publication of Parliamentary Papers.* [14th April, 1840.]

WHEREAS it is essential to the due and effectual exercise and discharge of the functions and duties of Parliament, and to the promotion of wise \* legis- \* 673  
lation, that no obstructions or impediments should exist to the publication of such of the reports, papers, votes, or proceedings of either House of Parliament, as such House of Parliament may deem fit or necessary to be published: And whereas obstructions or impediments to such publication have arisen, and hereafter may arise, by means of civil or criminal proceedings being taken against persons employed by or acting under the authority of the Houses of Parliament, or one of them, in the publication of such reports, papers, votes, or proceedings; by reason and for remedy whereof it is ex-

pedient that more speedy protection should be afforded to all persons acting under the authority aforesaid, and that all such civil or criminal proceedings should be summarily put an end to and determined in manner hereinafter mentioned: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That it shall and may be lawful for any person or persons who now is, or are, or hereafter shall be, a defendant or defendants in any civil or criminal proceedings commenced or prosecuted in any manner soever, for or on account or in respect of the publication of any such report, paper, votes, or proceedings by such person or persons, or by his, her, or their servant or servants, by or under the authority of either House of Parliament, to bring before the Court in which such proceeding shall have been or shall be so commenced or prosecuted, or before any judge of the same (if one of the Superior Courts at Westminster), first giving twenty-four hours' notice of his intention so to do to the prosecutor or plaintiff in such proceeding, a certificate under the hand of the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, or the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, or of the Speaker of the House of Lords, for the time being, or of the Clerk of the Parliament, or of the Speaker of the House of Commons, or of the clerk of the same House, stating that the report, paper, votes, or proceedings as the case may be, in respect whereof such civil or criminal proceeding shall have been commenced or prosecuted, was published by such person or persons, or by his, her, or their servant or servants, by order or under the authority of the House of Lords or of the House of Commons, as the case may be, together with an affidavit verifying such certificate; and such Court or judge shall thereupon immediately stay such civil or criminal proceeding, and the same, and every writ or process issued therein, shall be and shall be deemed and taken to be finally put an end to, determined, and superseded by virtue of this Act.

2. And be it enacted, that in case of any civil or criminal proceeding hereafter to be commenced or prosecuted for or on account or in respect of the publication of any copy of such report, paper, votes, or proceedings, it shall be lawful for the defendant or defendants at any stage of the proceedings to lay before the Court or judge such report, paper, votes, or proceedings, and such copy, with an affidavit verifying such report, paper, votes, or proceedings, and the correctness of such copy, and the Court or judge shall immediately stay such civil or criminal proceeding; and the same, and  
 \* 674 every writ or process issued therein, shall be and shall be deemed and taken \* to be finally put an end to, determined and superseded by virtue of this Act.

3. And be it enacted, that it shall be lawful in any civil or criminal proceeding to be commenced or prosecuted for printing any extract from or abstract of such report, paper, votes, or proceedings, to give in evidence under the general issue such report, paper, votes or proceedings, and to show that such extract or abstract was published *bonâ fide* and without malice; and if such shall be the opinion of the jury, a verdict of not guilty shall be entered for the defendant or defendants.

4. Provided always, and it is hereby expressly declared and enacted, that nothing herein contained shall be deemed or taken, or held or construed, directly or indirectly, by implication or otherwise, to affect the privileges of Parliament in any manner whatsoever.

## LORD CAMPBELL'S LIBEL ACT.

6 &amp; 7 VICT. c. 96.

*An Act to amend the Law respecting Defamatory words and Libel.*

[24th August, 1843.]

For the better protection of private character, and for more effectually securing the liberty of the press, and for better preventing abuses in exercising the said liberty, be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that in any action for defamation it shall be lawful for the defendant (after notice in writing of his intention so to do, duly given to the plaintiff at the time of filing or delivering the plea in such action) to give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, that he made or offered an apology to the plaintiff for such defamation before the commencement of the action, or as soon afterwards as he had an opportunity of doing so, in case the action shall have been commenced before there was an opportunity of making or offering such apology.

2. And be it enacted, that in an action for a libel contained in any public newspaper or other periodical publication it shall be competent to the defendant to plead that such libel was inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication without actual malice, and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in such newspaper or other periodical publication a full apology for the said libel, or, if the newspaper or periodical publication in which the said libel appeared should be ordinarily published at intervals exceeding one week, had offered to publish the said apology in any newspaper or periodical publication to be selected by the plaintiff in such action, and that every such defendant shall, upon filing such plea, be at liberty to pay into Court a sum of money by way of amends for the \* injury sustained by the publication of such libel, \* 675 and such payment into Court shall be of the same effect and be available in the same manner and to the same extent, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as to payment of costs and the form of pleading, except so far as regards the pleading of the additional facts hereinbefore required to be pleaded by such defendant, as if actions for libel had not been excepted from the personal actions in which it is lawful to pay money into Court under an Act passed in the session of Parliament held in the fourth year of his late Majesty, intituled "An Act for the further amendment of the law, and the better advancement of justice," and that to such plea to such action it shall be competent to the plaintiff to reply generally denying the whole of such plea.

3. And be it enacted, that if any person shall publish or threaten to publish any libel upon any other person, or shall directly or indirectly threaten to print or publish or shall directly or indirectly propose to abstain from printing or publishing, or shall directly or indirectly offer to prevent the printing or publishing, of any matter or thing touching any other person, with intent to extort any money or security for money, or any valuable thing from such or any other person, or with intent to induce any person to confer or procure for any person any appointment or office of profit or trust, every such offender, on being convicted thereof, shall be liable to be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, in the common gaol or house of correction, for any term not exceeding three years: Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall in any manner alter or affect any law now in force in respect of the sending or delivery of threatening letters or writings.

4. And be it enacted, that if any person shall maliciously publish any defamatory libel, knowing the same to be false, every such person, being convicted thereof, shall be liable to be imprisoned in the common gaol or house of correction for any term not exceeding two years, and to pay such fine as the Court shall award.

5. And be it enacted, that if any person shall maliciously publish any defamatory libel, every such person, being convicted thereof, shall be liable to fine or imprisonment or both, as the Court may award, such imprisonment not to exceed the term of one year.

6. And be it enacted, that on the trial of any indictment or information for a defamatory libel, the defendant having pleaded such plea as hereinafter mentioned, the truth of the matters charged may be inquired into, but shall not amount to a defence, unless it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published, and that to entitle the defendant to give evidence of the truth of such matters charged as a defence to such indictment or information, it shall be necessary for the defendant, in pleading to the said indictment or information, to allege the truth of the said matters charged in the manner now required in pleading a justification to an action for defamation, and further to allege that it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published, and the particular fact or facts by reason whereof it was for the public benefit that the said matters charged should be published, to which plea the prosecutor shall be at liberty to reply generally, denying the whole

\* 676 thereof; and that if after such plea the defendant shall be convicted on such indictment or information, it shall be competent to the Court, in pronouncing sentence, to consider whether the guilt of the defendant is aggravated or mitigated by the said plea, and by the evidence given to prove or to disprove the same: Provided always, that the truth of the matters charged in the alleged libel complained of by such indictment or information shall in no case be inquired into without such plea of justification: Provided also, that in addition to such plea it shall be competent to the defendant to plead a plea of not guilty: Provided also, that nothing in this Act contained shall take away or prejudice any defence under the plea of not guilty, which it is now competent to the defendant to make under such plea to any action or indictment, or information, for defamatory words or libel.

7. And be it enacted, that whensoever, upon the trial of any indictment or information for the publication of a libel, under the plea of not guilty, evidence shall have been given which shall establish a presumptive case of publication against the defendant by the act of any other person by his authority, it shall be competent to such defendant to prove that such publication was made without his authority, consent, or knowledge, and that the said publication did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part.

8. And be it enacted, that in the case of any indictment or information by a private prosecutor for the publication of any defamatory libel, if judgment shall be given for the defendant, he shall be entitled to recover from the prosecutor the costs sustained by the said defendant by reason of such indictment or information; and that upon a special plea of justification to such indictment or information, if the issue be found for the prosecutor, he shall be entitled to recover from the defendant the costs sustained by the prosecutor by reason of such plea, such costs so to be recovered by the defendant or prosecutor respectively to be taxed by the proper officer of the Court before which the said indictment or information is tried.

9. And be it enacted, that wherever throughout this Act, in describing the plaintiff or the defendant, or the party affected or intended to be affected by the offence, words are used importing the singular number or the masculine gender only, yet they shall be understood to include several persons as well as one person, and females as well as

males, unless when the nature of the provision or the context of the Act shall exclude such construction.

10. . . . . nothing in this Act contained shall extend to Scotland.

[N.B.—The words in italics, in s. 2, were repealed by the Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, Schedule, part II.]

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\* 8 & 9 VICT. c. 75.

\* 677

*An Act to amend an Act passed in the Session of Parliament held in the Sixth and Seventh Years of the reign of Her present Majesty, intituled "An Act to amend the Law respecting Defamatory words and Libel."*

[31st July, 1845.]

WHEREAS by an Act passed in the session of Parliament held in the sixth and seventh years of the reign of her present Majesty, intituled "An Act to amend the law respecting defamatory words and libel," it is, amongst other things, enacted and provided, that the defendant in an action for a libel contained in any public newspaper or other periodical publication may plead certain matters therein mentioned, and may upon filing such plea be at liberty to pay into Court a sum of money by way of amends for the injury sustained by the publication of such libel, and it is thereby further enacted, that such payment into Court shall be of the same effect, and be available in the same manner and to the same extent, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as to payment of costs and the form of pleading, except so far as regards the pleading of the additional facts hereinbefore required to be pleaded by such defendant, as if actions for libel had not been excepted from the personal actions in which it is lawful to pay money into Court under an Act passed in the session of Parliament held in the fourth year of his late Majesty, intituled "An Act for the further amendment of the law and the better advancement of justice." And whereas the said Act of the fourth year of the reign of his late Majesty relates only to proceedings in the Superior Courts in England, but by an Act passed in the session of Parliament held in the third and fourth years of the reign of her present Majesty, intituled "An Act for abolishing arrest on mesne process in civil actions, except in certain cases, for extending the remedies of creditors against the property of debtors, and for the further advancement of justice, in Ireland," a like provision is made for payment of money into Court in all personal actions pending in any of the Superior Courts in Ireland as is contained in the said Act of the fourth year of the reign of his late Majesty in regard to actions pending in the Superior Courts in England, with a like exception of actions for libel, and it is expedient to prevent any doubts as to the application of the said recited Act of the sixth and seventh years of the reign of her present Majesty to actions pending in the Superior Courts in Ireland which may be created by reason of the omission of a reference in the last mentioned Act to the said Act of the third and fourth years of the reign of her present Majesty: Be it therefore enacted and declared by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that when in any action pending in the Superior Courts in Ireland for a libel contained in any public newspaper or other periodical publication the defendant shall plead the matters allowed to be pleaded by the said first-mentioned Act, and shall on

filing such plea pay money into Court as provided by such Act, such payment  
 \* 678 into Court shall be of the \*same effect, and be available in the same manner  
 and to the same extent, and be subject to the same rules and regulations now  
 in force or hereafter to be made as to payment of costs and the form of pleading, except  
 so far as regards the pleading of the additional facts so required to be pleaded by such  
 defendant, as if actions for libel had not been excepted from the personal actions in  
 which it is lawful to pay money into Court under the said recited Act of the third and  
 fourth years of the reign of her present Majesty.

2. And be it declared and enacted, that it shall not be competent to any defendant  
 in such action, whether in England or in Ireland, to file any such plea, without at the  
 same time making a payment of money into Court by way of amends *as provided by*  
*the said Act*, but every such plea so filed without payment of money into Court shall  
 be deemed a nullity, and may be treated as such by the plaintiff in the action.

[N.B. — The words in italics in s. 2 were repealed by the Civil Procedure Acts  
 Repeal Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, Schedule, part II. The Statute 3 & 4 Vict.  
 c. 105, s. 46, referred to in s. 1 is now repealed by the Stat. Law Rev. Act, 1875. See  
 the C. L. P. A., 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), s. 70, and for Ireland 16 & 17 Vict. c. 113,  
 s. 77; *ante*, pp. 491-4.]

## 9 &amp; 10 VICT. c. 33.

[July 27th, 1846.]

S. 1. It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to commence, prosecute,  
 enter, or file, or cause or procure to be commenced, prosecuted, entered, or filed, any  
 action, bill, plaint, or information in any of Her Majesty's courts, or before any justice  
 or justices of the peace, against any person or persons for the discovery of any fine  
 which may hereafter be incurred under the provisions of the Act of the thirty-ninth  
 year of King George the Third, chapter seventy-nine, set out in this Act, unless the  
 same be commenced, prosecuted, entered, or filed in the name of Her Majesty's Attor-  
 ney-General or Solicitor-General in England, or Her Majesty's Advocate in Scotland,  
 and every action, bill, plaint, or information which shall be commenced, prosecuted,  
 entered, or filed in the name or names of any other person or persons than is in that  
 behalf before mentioned, and every proceeding thereupon had, shall be null and void  
 to all intents and purposes.

[N.B. — This section is re-enacted by the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24, Schedule 2.]

## 11 &amp; 12 VICT. c. 12.

*An Act for the Better Security of the Crown and Government of the United Kingdom.*

[April 22nd, 1848.]

S. 3. If any person whatsoever after the passing of this Act shall, within  
 \* 679 the United Kingdom or without, compass, imagine, invent, devise, or \*intend  
 to deprive or depose our most Gracious Lady the Queen, her heirs or successors,  
 from the style, honor, or royal name of the imperial crown of the United Kingdom, or  
 of any other of Her Majesty's dominions and countries, or to levy war against Her  
 Majesty, her heirs or successors, within any part of the United Kingdom, in order by



force or constraint to compel her or them to change her or their measures or counsels, or in order to put any force or constraint upon or in order to intimidate or overawe both Houses or either House of Parliament, or to move or stir any foreigner or stranger with force to invade the United Kingdom or any other Her Majesty's dominions or countries under the obeisance of Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, and such compassings, imaginations, inventions, devices, or intentions, or any of them, shall express, utter, or declare, by publishing any printing or writing *or by open and advised speaking*, or by any overt act or deed, every person so offending shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be transported beyond the seas for the term of his or her natural life, or for any term not less than seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, as the Court shall direct.

[N.B. — The words in italics were not in the 36 Geo. III. c. 7.]

## COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT.

15 & 16 VICT. c. 76.

[June 30th, 1852.]

S. 61. IN actions of libel and slander the plaintiff shall be at liberty to aver that the words or matter complained of were used in a defamatory sense, specifying such defamatory sense without any prefatory averment to show how such words or matter were used in that sense; and such averment shall be put in issue by the denial of the alleged libel or slander; and where the words or matter set forth, with or without the alleged meaning, show a cause of action, the declaration shall be sufficient.

18 & 19 VICT. c. 41.

*An Act for abolishing the Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts of England and Wales in suits for Defamation.*

[26th June, 1855.]

WHEREAS the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in suits for defamation has ceased to be the means of enforcing the spiritual discipline \* of the \* 680 church, and has become grievous and oppressive to the subjects of this realm: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

1. From and after the passing of this Act it shall not be lawful for any ecclesiastical court in England or Wales to entertain or adjudicate upon any suit for or cause of defamation, any statute, law, canon, custom, or usage, to the contrary notwithstanding.

20 &amp; 21 VICT. c. 83.

*An Act for more effectually preventing the Sale of Obscene Books, Pictures, Prints, and other Articles.*

[25th August, 1857.]

WHEREAS it is expedient to give additional powers for the suppression of the trade in obscene books, prints, drawings, and other obscene articles: Be it enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

1. It shall be lawful for any metropolitan police magistrate or other stipendiary magistrate, or for any two justices of the peace, upon complaint made before him or them upon oath that the complainant has reason to believe, and does believe, that any obscene books, papers, writings, prints, pictures, drawings, or other representations are kept in any house, shop, room, or other place within the limits of the jurisdiction of any such magistrate or justices, for the purpose of sale or distribution, exhibition for purposes of gain, lending upon hire, or being otherwise published for purposes of gain, which complainant shall also state upon oath that one or more articles of the like character have been sold, distributed, exhibited, lent, or otherwise published as aforesaid, at or in connection with such place, so as to satisfy such magistrate or justices that the belief of the said complainant is well founded, and upon such magistrate or justices being also satisfied that any of such articles so kept for any of the purposes aforesaid are of such a character and description that the publication of them would be a misdemeanor, and proper to be prosecuted as such, to give authority by special warrant to any constable or police officer into such house, shop, room, or other place, with such assistance as may be necessary, to enter in the daytime, and, if necessary, to use force, by breaking open doors or otherwise, and to search for and seize all such books, papers, writings, prints, pictures, drawings, or other representations as aforesaid found in such house, shop, room, or other place, and to carry all the articles so

\* 681 seized before the magistrate or justices issuing the said warrant, or some \* other magistrate or justices exercising the same jurisdiction; and such magistrate or justices shall thereupon issue a summons calling upon the occupier of the house or other place which may have been so entered by virtue of the said warrant to appear within seven days before such police or stipendiary magistrate or any two justices in petty sessions for the district, to show cause why the articles so seized should not be destroyed; and if such occupier or some other person claiming to be the owner of the said articles shall not appear within the time aforesaid, or shall appear, and such magistrate or justices shall be satisfied that such articles or any of them are of the character stated in the warrant, and that such or any of them have been kept for any of the purposes aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the said magistrate or justices, and he or they are hereby required, to order the articles so seized, except such of them as he or they may consider necessary to be preserved as evidence in some further proceeding, to be destroyed at the expiration of the time hereinafter allowed for lodging an appeal, unless notice of appeal as hereinafter mentioned be given, and such articles shall be in the mean time impounded; and if such magistrate or justices shall be satisfied that the articles seized are not of the character stated in the warrant, or have not been kept for any of the purposes aforesaid, he or they shall forthwith direct them to be restored to the occupier of the house or other place in which they were seized.

2. No plaintiff shall recover in any action for any irregularity, trespass, or other wrongful proceeding made or committed in the execution of this Act, or in, under, or

by virtue of any authority hereby given, if tender of sufficient amends shall have been made by or on behalf of the party who shall have committed such irregularity, trespass, or other wrongful proceeding before such action brought; and in case no tender shall have been made, it shall be lawful for the defendant in any such action, by leave of the Court where such action shall depend, at any time before issue joined, to pay into Court such sum of money as he shall think fit; whereupon such proceeding, order, and adjudication shall be had and made in and by such Court as in other actions where defendants are allowed to pay money into Court.

3. No action, suit, or information, or any other proceeding, of what nature soever, shall be brought against any person for anything done or omitted to be done in pursuance of this Act, or in the execution of the authorities under this Act, unless notice in writing shall be given by the party intending to prosecute such action, suit, information or other proceeding, to the intended defendant, one calendar month at least before prosecuting the same, nor unless such action, suit, information, or other proceeding shall be brought or commenced within three calendar months next after the act of omission complained of, or in case there shall be a continuation of damage, then within three calendar months next after the doing such damage shall have ceased.

4. Any person aggrieved by any act or determination of such magistrate or justices in or concerning the execution of this Act, may appeal to the next general or quarter sessions for the county, riding, division, city, \*borough, or place in \* 682 and for which such magistrate or justices shall have so acted, giving to the magistrate or justices of the peace, whose act or determination shall be appealed against, notice in writing of such appeal and of the grounds thereof, within seven days after such act and determination and before the next general or quarter sessions, and entering within such seven days into a recognizance, with sufficient surety, before a justice of the peace for the county, city, borough, or place in which such act or determination shall have taken place, personally to appear and prosecute such appeal, and to abide the order of and pay such costs as shall be awarded by such court of quarter sessions or any adjournment thereof; and the Court at such general or quarter sessions shall hear and determine the matter of such appeal, and shall make such order therein as shall to the said Court seem meet; and such Court, upon hearing and finally determining such appeal, shall and may, according to their discretion, award such costs to the party appealing or appealed against as they shall think proper; and if such appeal be dismissed or decided against the appellant or be not prosecuted, such Court may order the articles seized forthwith to be destroyed: Provided always, that it shall not be lawful for the appellant on the hearing of any such appeal to go into or give evidence of any other grounds of appeal against any such order, act, or determination, than those set forth in such notice of appeal.

5. This act shall not extend to Scotland.

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#### 23 & 24 VICT. c. 32.

*An Act to abolish the Jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts in Ireland in Cases of Defamation, &c.* [July 3rd, 1860.]

[N.B. — The portions of this Act which refer to the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts in Ireland are now repealed as unnecessary by the Stat. Rev. Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 66. For the Ecclesiastical Courts themselves are altogether abolished by 32 & 33 Vict. c. 42, s. 21; and on January 1st, 1871, the Ecclesiastical law of Ireland ceased to exist as law.]

## BURIAL LAWS AMENDMENT ACT, 1880.

43 &amp; 44 VICT. c. 41.

[Sept. 7th, 1880.]

S. 7. ALL burials under this Act, whether with or without a religious service, shall be conducted in a decent and orderly manner ; and every person guilty of any riotous, violent or indecent behavior at any burial under this Act, or wilfully obstructing such burial or any such service as \*aforesaid thereat, or who shall, in any such churchyard or graveyard as aforesaid, deliver any address, not being part of or incidental to a religious service permitted by this Act, and not otherwise permitted by any lawful authority, or who shall, under color of any religious services or otherwise, in any such churchyard or graveyard, wilfully endeavor to bring into contempt or obloquy the Christian religion, or the belief or worship of any church or denomination of Christians, or the members or any minister of any such church or denomination, or any other person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

## GENERAL INDEX.

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### A.

ABATEMENT OF ACTION, 352, 355

“ABORTION,” 54, n.

ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE, 185-196

(i.) Parliamentary proceedings, 186

(ii.) Judicial proceedings, 188

words spoken by a judge, 188

words spoken by counsel, 190

words spoken by a witness, 191

(iii.) Naval and military affairs, 194

ABUSE,

mere general words of, 18, 109

ACCESSORIES

to the publication of a libel, 576

ACCIDENTAL PUBLICATION,

civil liability for, 6, 153, 154, 387

criminal liability for, 385, 387

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION,

plea of, 489

ACTION,

how commenced, 453

within what time, 455

and in what Court, 453

letter before, 453

notice of, 453

considerations before, 449

consolidation of, 466

previous, 456, 490

joinder of causes of, 458

who may maintain, 344, 372, 452

proceedings in, are privileged, 188-193

on the case for words, 87-92

for acts injurious to reputation, without express words, 8

ACTIONABLE *PER SE*,

what language is, 18, 53-81

what language is not, 82-87, 253, 308

## ACTS,

reputation may be affected by, 8, 148, 149

## ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

*bona fide* comments on, 44-46

publications reflecting on, 426-448

## ADMINISTRATORS,

right of action does not pass to, 355

## ADMISSION

by defendant, effect of, 534

## ADMONITION,

Communications by way of, 239

## ADULTERY,

words imputing, 59, 84

to a physician, 66, 83

to a clergyman, 64, 66

to a married woman, 85, 86

law on this point considered, 86, 87

## “ ADVENTURER,”

charge of being, libellous, 22

## ADVERTISEMENT

in newspaper, when privileged, 225

of tradesmen, may be criticised, 34, 50, 51

of cure, may be criticised, 50, 51

## ADVICE,

when privileged, 215, 239

on evidence, 524

## ADVOCATES,

privilege of, 190

reports of speeches of, 250-253

publication in vindication of character assailed by, 230

## AFFAIRS OF STATE

may be criticised, 42-44

## AFFIDAVIT,

defamatory statements in, privileged, 191, 192

in answer to interrogatories, 511

further and better answer, 519

on applications for leave to file criminal informations, 591

in aggravation of punishment, 589

in mitigation of punishment, 589

## AGENT

and principal, 358

publication of libel by master through agency of servants, 362, 365

principal's orders no defence, 359

evidence of authority to publish, 364, 365

ratification, 361

innocently publishing a libel, 153, 154, 359, 387

ignorant of the contents of the paper, 387, 583

**AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES**

must be justified, 169

**AGGRAVATION OF DAMAGES,**

wide circulation of libel, 298

malice, 296

by plea of justification, 178, 274, 485, 542

by injudicious cross-examination of plaintiff, 542, 547

plaintiff's good character, 298

**AGGRAVATION OF PUNISHMENT,**

affidavits in, 589

**AGREEMENT**

to accept the publication of mutual apologies, 489

to compromise, 550

**ALIENS, 356****ALLEGORY**

may be a libel, 8, 98, 130, 384

**AMBASSADORS,**

foreign, libels on, 383

**"AMBI-DEXTER," 75****AMBIGUOUS EXPRESSIONS,**

rule of construction as to, 93, n., 107-115

evidence as to meaning of, 539, 548

meaning as ascribed by innuendo, must be adhered to, 102

**AMENDMENT**

of pleadings, 498

at the trial, 537, 545

of variances between words laid and those proved, 471, 536-537, 545

on argument of demurrer, 478

of indictment, 577

of information, 595

**ANAGRAM**

may be a libel, 8

**ANATHEMA, 242, n.****ANGER — See PROVOCATION****ANONYMOUS LETTER,**

shown confidentially, 207

opinion as to handwriting of, when privileged, 237

**ANSWERS**

to interrogatories, 511

further and better, 515

**APOLOGY, 299, 487**

jury to judge of sufficiency of, 300, 560

notice of intention to give evidence of, 488, 621

statutory plea of, for libel in a newspaper, 299, 487

form of plea of, 488

any other plea may be pleaded at the same time, 487

## APPEAL,

proceedings in the Court of, 561  
from County Court, 569

## APPEALS

to the public, may be criticised, 50-52

## APPEARANCE, 462

## APPENDICES,

A. *Appendix of Precedents of Pleadings, &c.*, 596-661

Contents, 596

I. Precedents of pleadings in actions for libel, 600

II. Precedents of pleadings in actions of slander, 621

III. Precedents of pleadings in actions of slander of title, 634

IV. Forms of pleadings, notices, &c., in the County Court, 644

V. Precedents of criminal pleadings, 649

B. *Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Law of Libel*, 662

C. *Appendix of Statutes*, 664-683

Contents, 664

## APPORTIONMENT

of costs of issues, 338

## ARBITRATION,

costs where cause referred to, 338

## ARCHBISHOP,

language concerning, 28

## ARCHITECT,

criticisms on the works of, 49, 68, 172, 601

## ARGUMENT

of the rule for a criminal information, 593

## ARREST OF JUDGMENT,

motion for, in civil cases, 96, 118, 554

in criminal cases, 586, 587

## ARSON,

charge of, 114, 125

## ARTIST,

criticism on the pictures and works of, 48, 49

## ART-MASTER,

libel on, 25

## ASSAULT

with intent to rob, charge of, actionable, 55

## ASTERISKS,

put for plaintiff's name, 130, 582

## ATTACHMENT

for contempt, 433

## ATTEMPT

to commit a felony, charge of, actionable, 55, 57

words sufficient to impute, 123



**ATTORNEY,**

- slander of, 65, 74, 75
- libels on, 6, 7, 29, 30, 99
- plaintiff, proof of qualification, 530, 531
- acting as advocate, privilege of, 190
- not liable for objecting to title, 142, 226
- bill of costs of, not a judicial proceeding, 193

**AUCTIONEER,**

- words concerning, 67, 80
- libellous notice to, by person interested in proceeds of sale, 226

**AUDITÂ QUERELÂ,**

- proceedings by, abolished, 554

**AUTERFOIS ACQUIT,**

- plea of, 576

**AUTERFOIS CONVICT,**

- plea of, 576

**AUTHOR**

- liable as publisher, 155
- criticisms of works of, 48

**AUTHORITY**

- given to another to publish a libel, 360-365
- when implied, 360
- ratification, 361
- in criminal cases, 362, 385

**AVERMENTS,**

- when necessary, 118, 120
- in civil cases, need not be proved, 473
- except of plaintiff's office or trade, 530
- in indictments and criminal informations, introductory averments still necessary, 575
- of special intent, 376, 575

**B.****BACON, LORD,**

- his "Use of the Law," cited, 19

"BAD WOMAN," 84, n.

**BAIL**

- for appearance to take trial, 573

**BANKER,**

- refusing to honor a check, 8
- circulation of rumor that bank had stopped payment, 206, 282, 369
- refusing to accept check of a particular bank, 26, 236

**BANKRUPT**

- can sue for libel or slander, 354
- charges against, by trustee, privileged, 235, 281

**BANKRUPTCY,**

- words imputing, 7, 31
- proceedings before registrar, reports of, privileged, 248
- charge of having committed act of, 226, 235

**BARRISTER,**

- slander of, 74
- libels on, 29
- slander by, in legal proceedings absolutely privileged, 190
- libel by, in law-book, 6
- criminal information against County Court Judge for refusing to hear, 382

**BASTARD,**

- imputation that heir-apparent is, 139, 140
- charge of having had a bastard child not actionable, 85
  - except formerly under 18 Elizabeth, c. 3, 58

**BAWD,**

- charge of being a, not actionable, except in London and Southwark, 84, 85

**BAWDY HOUSE,**

- charge of keeping, is actionable, 56, 113, n., 131

**BEGIN,**

- right to, always with plaintiff, 530

**BELIEF**

- in truth of charge no justification, 169, n.
- in truth of charge, necessary to privilege, 199
- in truth, in mitigation, 302, 589
- hearsay is probable ground for, 214, 278

**BIGAMY,**

- what words amount to a charge of, 123
- charge of, is actionable, 55

**BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, 551****“BLACK-LEG,”**

- meaning of, 24, 61
- charge of being, not actionable, 83

**“BLACK-LIST,”**

- libel on a trader in, 249

**“BLACK-SHEEP,”**

- meaning of, 24, 61

**BLASPHEMOUS WORDS, 394-403**

- defined, 394
- intent to bring religion into contempt, 395
- honest advocacy of heretical opinions, 396
- justification not allowed, 398
- statutory provisions, 400
- jurisdiction of Ecclesiastical Courts, 402

**BLASPHEMOUS WORDS, — *continued.***

- reports of proceedings in Courts of Justice as to, are not privileged, 249, 399
- punishment, 394
- Common Law not affected by statutes, 401
- limitation of prosecutions for, 401
- Scotch Law as to, 394

**BOARD OF GUARDIANS,**

- reports of meetings of, not privileged, 260

**BONÂ FIDE COMMENT,**

- no libel, 34-52
- plea of, 483, 605, 618, 619

**BONA FIDES**

- of defendant, 199

**BOOK,**

- reviews and criticisms of, 48, 49
- in Latin, 161, 386
- libellous, sale of by bookseller's servant, 160, 362
- obscene, statute for preventing sale of, 405

**BOOKSELLER,**

- libel on, 34
- liability of, for sale of libellous book, 160, 362, 386

**BREACH OF PEACE,**

- libels tend to, 3, 373

**BRIBERY,**

- words imputing, actionable, 56
- in offices of public trust, 64, 71
- imputations of, in report by political committee, 43
- contempt of Court by offering a bribe to a judge, 429

**BROTHEL,**

- imputation of keeping, 8, 56, 131

**“BUNGLER,”**

- spoken of an artificer, is actionable, 65

**“BUNTER,” 111****BURGLARY,**

- charge of, actionable, 55

**BURNING**

- in effigy, 9

**BUSINESS,**

- slander of persons in, 65, 77-81
- libels of persons in way of, 31

**BUTCHER,**

- words concerning, 80, 236

**BYSTANDER**

- at inquest, remarks of, not privileged, 191, 254

## C.

## CALLING,

words injuring plaintiff in the way of his, when written, 22, 27-34  
when spoken, 65, 77-81

## CANDIDATE

for office, words concerning, 236, 241

## CANT, or SLANG TERMS, 110, 538

## CAPTAIN OF SHIP,

words concerning, 217

## CARICATURE,

libel by means of, 8, 22

## CARPENTER,

words concerning, 67

## CAUSES OF ACTION,

joinder of, 458

## CAUTION

to tradesmen, when privileged, 215, 218

## CENSORSHIP OF PLAYS, 13

## CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS, 9-12

## CENSURE,

words of, by a judge, 187, 189

## CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT, 579

## CERTAINTY,

how ensured formerly, 118  
early technicalities, 118  
of the imputation, 120  
criminal charges, 121  
indirect imputations, 125  
as to person defamed, 127

## CERTIORARI

for removal of indictment for libel, 578  
costs when indictment removed by, 590

## CHALK-MARK

may be a libel, 8

## CHALLENGE TO FIGHT,

sending, a misdemeanor, 377

## CHANCERY, COURT OF,

contempts of, 429, 448

## CHANGE OF VENUE, 528

## CHARACTER,

plaintiff's good character, 298  
plaintiff's bad character, 304  
proof of plaintiff's special, 530  
of servant, *primâ facie*, privileged, 200  
*bonâ fide* communications as to, 203-219

**CHARACTER** — *continued.*

- master not bound to give, 201
- evidence of good, not receivable unless impeached, 275, 298
- evidence of plaintiff's bad, 304
- evidence for defendant as to, on trial of indictment or information, 584, 589
- of witnesses, evidence to impeach, 546

**CHARGE**

- of crime must be precise, 121-127
- of attempt to commit a crime, 55, 123
- of an impossible crime, 61
- of being a felon, 58, 171, 603
- of being a returned convict, 179
- to a constable in his character as such, 204, 267

**CHARITABLE INSTITUTION,**

- criticisms on officers of, 47, 238, 239
- trustees of, words concerning, 28, 370, 377
- private, not to be criticised, 47

**CHASTITY,**

- charge of want of, not actionable, 84, 85
- actionable if in writing, 24

**"CHEAT,"**

- charge of being a, not actionable, 61, 80

**CHEATING,**

- charge of, libellous, 24, 25
- in way of trade, actionable, 80

**CHECK,**

- action for dishonoring, 8

**CHILD,**

- liability of, 352
- parent not answerable for wrongs by, 361

**CHOICE OF COURT, 453****CHRISTIANITY,**

- publications against, 394-402
- part of the common law, 397

**CHURCH DISCIPLINE,**

- words spoken in, 236, n.

**CHURCHWARDEN,**

- slander of, 62

**CIRCULARS**

- of tradesmen, may be criticised, 50, 51

**CIRCULATION OF LIBEL,**

- extent and mode of, 282, 293

**CIVIL REMEDY FOR DEFAMATION, 9, 390**

**CLAIM,**

- statement of, 469-474
- by husband for words defamatory of wife, 347
- by wife alone, 465
- joint and several, 365, 369, 465

**CLASS,**

- religious order or community, libels on, 376, 377, 381

**CLERGYMEN,**

- words affecting them in office, 28, 47, 64, 217, 219, 628
- charges of incontinency and immorality against, 66, 72, 73
- deprivation of office the ground of action, 72
- plaintiff must hold benefice or office at the time of the slander, 72
- slander by, in sermon, &c., 6, 242
- libels by, on schoolmaster in parish, 268
- general reflections on the clergy of a particular diocese, 382

**CLERK,**

- words concerning, 77, 285, 629
- to vestry, words concerning, 29
- to justices, words concerning, 29
- words by, not privileged, 190

**CLUBS,**

- "blackballed," 23
- notice posted in, 25

**COINING,**

- charge of, 58, 622

**COLLOQUIUM**

- or application of the slander, 118
- provisions of C. L. P. Act as to, 120

**COLONIAL COURTS,**

- power of, to commit for contempts, 438

**COLONIAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES,**

- power of, to commit for contempt, 425

**COMMANDS**

- of master no defence to servant, 359

**COMMENTS,**

- on matters of public interest, 34-52
- every citizen has a right to make, 35, 36
- not privileged in the strict sense of that term, 35, 36
- on matters of local interest, 41, 42
- bad motives must not be recklessly imputed, 37, 39
- honest belief in truth of, not alone sufficient, 38
- limits on, 36-41
- affairs of State, 42-44
- trials in law courts, 44-46
- local institutions and authorities, 46, 47
- parochial charity, 47
- ecclesiastical affairs, 47, 48

**COMMENTS** — *continued.*

- books and pictures, 48, 49
- architecture, 48, 49, 68, 172
- theatres and concerts, 49
- public entertainments, 49, 50
- appeals to the public notice, 50-52
- advertisements and circulars, 50, 51
- controversy in newspapers, 50-52, 228, 229
- plea of, 483, 605, 618, 619

**COMMISSION**

- to examine witnesses, 527

**COMMITTEE**

- of charity, communications to, 238, 239

**COMMODITIES**

- of tradesmen, verbal imputations upon, 79, 145
- libel on, 32, 145-148

**"COMMON FILCHER,"**

- not actionable, 61

**COMMONS, HOUSE OF,**

- libels on, 422
- contempts of, 423

**COMPANIES**

- and corporations, 367-369
- may sue for slander of title, 368
- may sue a shareholder for libel, 32
- proceedings of, at meeting of shareholders, privileged, 235, 242

**COMPARISON**

- of handwriting, 533, 580

**COMPETITION**

- between rival traders, 31, 145

**COMPROMISE**

- in civil case, 550
- not allowed in criminal cases, 596

**CONCERTS**

- may be criticised, 49

**CONDITION**

- in life of plaintiff, 293

**CONDUCT,**

- unfeeling, charge of, libellous, 24

**CONFESSION**

- of publication, 534

**CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS,**

- when privileged, 203-219

**CONFIDENTIAL RELATION,**

- defined, 210

CONFLICT OF LAWS, 54, n.

CONSIDERATIONS

before writ, 449

for defendant, 465

CONSOLIDATION

of actions, 466

CONSORTIUM,

loss of, 312

CONSPIRACY,

charge of, actionable, 56

CONSTABLES,

words concerning, 237, 285

words spoken on giving in charge of, are privileged, 204, 267

CONSTITUTION,

libels against the, 419-421

CONSTRUCTION, 93-132

what meaning the speaker *intended* to convey is immaterial, 93, 548

libel or no libel is a question for the jury, 27, 94, 550, 557

duty of the Judge, 94, 540, 544

words not to be construed *in mitiori sensu*, 95

jury to consider the words as a whole, 98, 551

when evidence may be given of other defamatory publications by defendant of plaintiff, 99, 272, 545

of the innuendo, 100, 538

the words must be set out *verbatim* in the statement of claim, 101, 470

words clearly defamatory, 105

words *prima facie* defamatory, 107

neutral words, 109

words *prima facie* innocent, 112

ironical words, 114, 116, 539

words clearly innocent, 116

after verdict, 558, 586

CONTAGIOUS DISEASE,

charge of having, 62, 63, 624

CONTEMPTIBLE,

words rendering plaintiff, libellous, 21, 22

CONTEMPTS

of the King, 413, 414

of the Government, 415-419

of Parliament, may be dealt with in the law courts, 422

how punished by the House of Lords, 423

how by the House of Commons, 423

the propriety of committal by, cannot be questioned in courts of law, 424

of Colonial Legislative Assemblies, 424

their power to exclude, 425



**CONTEMPTS, — *continued.***

- of courts of law and judges, 426
- of Superior Courts, 426
  - proceedings against offenders for contempts, 428
  - Judge at Chambers, 437, 438
  - attachment and committal, 433
  - publications prejudicial to fair trial of action, 429
  - injunctions to restrain, 13, 436.
  - Scotch law as to, 436
- of Inferior Courts of record, 440
  - no power to commit except for those committed in face of Court, 442
  - statutory powers, 445-447
  - county courts, 442, 445
- of Inferior Courts not of record, 444
  - sureties for good behavior, 444
- of ecclesiastical courts, 448

**CONTRACTS**

- as to libels cannot be enforced, 374

**CONTRIBUTION,**

- none between wrong-doers, 157, 374

**CONTROVERSY**

- in the newspapers, 50-52, 228, 229

**“ CONVICTED FELON,”**

- actionable, 58, 171, 603

**CONVICTION,**

- summary before justices, reports of, 243-248
- proof of, 546
- placards notifying, at railway stations, 173, 179

**COPYING LIBELS**

- from one newspaper into another, 100, 302, 549, 584

**COPYRIGHT,**

- none in immoral or libellous work, 374

**CORONER,**

- defamatory statement by, on inquest, 189
- has power to eject disturber, 442

**CORPORATIONS**

- may sue for libel, 32, 367
- may sue for slander of title, 368
- may be sued for libel, 368
- not for slander, 368
- may be sued for acts of agents, 368
- criminally liable, 369
- discovery against, by interrogatories, 501

**CORRUPTION**

- in office, charge of, 27, 28, 64, 71, n., 427

**COSTS, 334-343**

- now follow the event, 334
- all early statutes as to costs repealed by Judicature Act, 335
- application to deprive successful plaintiff of costs, 336
- of new trial, 338
- apportionment of costs of issues, 338
- after payment into court, 340
- of counterclaim, 341
- security for, 466, 553, 590
- practice as to asking for, 337, 553
- married woman liable for, 553
- special costs, 337, 553
- in actions remitted to County Court, 343, 468, 569
- in local Court of Record, 569
- on writ of inquiry, 337, 464
- jury not to consider question of costs, 295
- of indictment, 590
- of criminal information, 595

**COUNSEL,**

- privilege of, 190
- reports of speeches of, made in courts of justice, 250-253

**COUNTERFEITING, 55****COUNTS**

- in an indictment, 576, 587

**COUNTERCLAIM, 307, 494**

- costs of, 341

**COUNTY,**

- proof of publication within, 581

**COUNTY COURT,**

- no jurisdiction of actions for slander or libel, except by consent, 453
- remitting action to, 468
- subsequent proceedings, 565
- discoveries and interrogatories in, 568
- jury, 568
- taxation of costs in, 343, 468, 569
- contempts of, 442, 445
- criminal information against judge of, 382
- forms of precedents, notices, &c., 644-648

**COURT,**

- selection of, 453
- payment into, 491
- Divisional, proceedings in, 554-561
- of Appeal, proceedings in, 561-565
- proceedings in County Court, 565

**COURTS MARTIAL,**

- defamatory statements made in course of proceedings by, 189, 194

## COURTS OF JUSTICE,

- publication of proceedings of, 187
- contempts of Superior Courts of Record, 428
- Colonial Courts, 438
- Inferior Courts of Record, 440
- proceedings in County Court, 565
- other inferior, 569.

## COURTS OF PETTY SESSION,

- defamatory statements made in the regular course of proceedings at, privileged, 188
- reports of proceedings, privileged, 243-248

## "COZENER,"

- charge of being, not actionable, 61

## CREDIT

- of traders, libels affecting, 30-32
- words affecting, 7, 78, 79

## CRIME,

- libel is, slander is not a, 4, 373
- words conveying direct charge of, actionable, 54
- statement that plaintiff had been accused of crime, 24, 57
- words not necessarily imputing, actionable if written, 21, 22
- imputation must be specific, 121-127
- words of suspicion only, 57
- imputing the murder of a person yet alive, 61
- attempting to commit, 55, 57, 123
- solicitation or hiring to commit, 56
- justification as to charge of committing, 178, 548
- proof of conviction, 546, 548

## CRIMINAL INFORMATION

- for libel, 380-383
- discretion of the court as to granting, 380
- proceedings in, 591-596
- forms of, 649, 651

## CRIMINAL LAW, 373-393

- law common to all criminal cases, 383
- publication of a libel by one unconscious of its contents, 384
  - I. Criminal remedy by indictment, 9, 375
    - special intent, when necessary, 376
    - punishment at common law, 378
    - statutes, 379
  - II. Criminal remedy by information, 380
    - libels on foreign ambassadors, &c., 383
- considerations as to criminal proceedings for libel, 390
- suggestion of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 391

## CRIMINAL LIABILITY

- of a married woman, 351
- of an infant, 353
- of master or principal, 362, 385
- of a corporation, 369

CRIMINAL PLEADINGS,  
precedents of, 649-661

"CRITIC,"  
defined, 36

CRITICISM,  
right of, 34-52  
distinguished from defamation, 36, 37  
of public men and institutions, 42-47  
must be fair and *bonâ fide*, 38, 39  
on public entertainments, &c., 49-52  
of books, pictures, and architecture, 48, 49  
ridicule of author permitted, 48

CROWN CASES RESERVED,  
Court for consideration of, 585, 587

CRUELTY,  
charge of, libellous, 24, 607

"CUCKOLD,"  
charge of being, is not actionable, 84

CUSTOM,  
loss of, as special damage, 310  
evidence as to loss of, 314, 315, 319  
of London, as to charge of whoredom, 59, 84

CUSTOMERS,  
complaints by, privileged, 226

D.

DAMAGES, 289-333

general and special damage defined and distinguished, 289

I. *General Damages*, 291

general loss of custom, 293

II. *Evidence for the Plaintiff in Aggravation of Damages*.

(i) malice, 296

(ii) extent of publication, 298

(iii) plaintiff's good character, 298

III. *Evidence for the Defendant in Mitigation of Damages*.

(i) apology and amends, 299

(ii) absence of malice, 301

conflicting cases on this point, 303

(iii) evidence of the plaintiff's bad character, 304

(iv) plaintiff's previous conduct in provoking the publication,  
306.

(v) absence of special damage, 308

IV. *Special Damage where the words are not actionable per se*, 18, 308

what constitutes special damage, 309

special damage must be specially pleaded, 313

special damage subsequently arising, 317

V. *Special Damage where the words are actionable per se*, 318

**DAMAGES** — *continued*.VI. *Remoteness of Damages*, 321

damage resulting to the husband of the female plaintiff, 323

damage caused by the act of a third party, 325

not essential that such third person should believe the charge, 327

wrongful and spontaneous act of a third person, 328

originator of a slander not liable for damage caused by its repetition, 329

exceptions to this rule, 331

other actions, not to be considered, 549

vindictive, 292

evidence of, 542

excessive, new trial on ground of, 291, 558

inadequacy of, new trial on ground of, 559

**DANCING-MISTRESS**,

slander of, 67

“DAUB,” 40, n.

**DEAD**,

libels on the, 375

intent must be proved, 376

**DEATH**,

charge of being the cause of, 76, 122, 627

“guilty of the death of D.” is actionable, 121

of party to action, effect of, 355

**DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT**,

reports of, 257

**DEBT**,unfounded claim of, *bona fide* dispute as to, 8, 9**DECREES OF STAR CHAMBER**,

regulating the Press, 10, 11, 13, 14

**DEERSTEALING**,

charge of, actionable, 59

**DEFAMATION**,

defined, 17

jurisdiction of Ecclesiastical Courts abolished, 17, 59, 86

**DEFAMATORY WORDS**,

defined, 1, 17

classified, 17-92

**DEFAULT**,

judgment by, 463

judgment in, of pleading, 495

in pleading, 500

in making discovery, 522

## “DEFAULTER,”

charge of being, libellous, 24, 29

**DEFENCE**

that words are not defamatory, 483

justification, 169-181, 485

**DEFENCE** — *continued.*

- privilege, 484
- absolute privilege, 186–196
- qualified privilege, 196–263
- infancy, no defence, 353
- insanity, no defence, 354
- master's commands no defence, 359
- statement of, 475, 480–495
- accord and satisfaction, 489
- Statute of Limitations, 455, 490
- previous proceedings, 457, 490
- apology, 487
- payment into court, 491
- other defences, 490
- all may be pleaded together, 480
- justification in criminal cases, 178, 388, 650, 660
- innocent publication, 153, 359, 387, 617.
- publication to plaintiff only, 383
- evidence for the, 582

**DEFENDANT,**

- married woman, 350
- matters to be considered by the, 465
- may be called by plaintiff, 534
- evidence for, 545

**DEFENDANTS,**

- who are liable as, 344–372
- joint, 371
- no contribution between or indemnity to, 157, 374

**DEFINITION**

- of libel, 7, 21
- of slander, 7, 53
- of defamatory words, 1, 17, 36
- of reputation, 150,
- of confidential relationship, 210
- of malice, 265, 267
- of publication, 150

**DEMANDING MONEY WITH MENACES,**

- charge of, actionable, 55

**DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX, 18, 20****DEMURRER**

- to statement of claim, 475
- where words are not susceptible of any defamatory meaning, 26
- informal, 496
- to statement of defence, 497
- when to demur, 475
- points on, 578, 637
- to an indictment, 577, 650
- to a plea of justification, 577, 661
- joinder in, 637, 659, 661
- precedents, 606, 636, 659

**" DIFFICULTIES,"**

charge of being in, libellous, 23, 31

**DISCOVERY**

of documents, 515

what documents are privileged from, 517-519

state papers, 519

by interrogatories, 500-515

further and better affidavit, 519

inspection of documents, 520

default in making, 522

**DISEASE, INFECTIOUS OR CONTAGIOUS,**

charge of having, 62, 63, 624

**DISHONESTY,**

charge of, is actionable, if written, 21, 22, 32

imputation of, in giving character of servant, 203, 268, 275

**DISINHERISON,**

words tending to, 139

**DISSENTING MINISTER,**

words concerning, 28

**DISTRICT REGISTRY, 454****DIVORCE,**

assertions that husband is seeking, a libel on wife, 24

**DOCUMENTS,**

discovery of, 515-522

inspection of, 520

**DOUBTFUL MEANING,**

words of, 107-115, 539, 548, 586

**DRUNKARD,**

charge of being a, actionable, 66

**DUEL,**

challenge to fight a, 377

**" DUNCE,"**

actionable, if spoken of a lawyer, 39, n., 68

**DUTY,**

as ground of privilege, 198-233

may be moral or social, 198

**E.****ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS**

may be criticised, 47, 48

**ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS,**

jurisdiction of, in cases of defamation, 59, 85, 403

abolished, 17, 59, 86

law of, how far part of English Common Law, 402, 403

contempts of, 448

**EDITOR OF NEWSPAPER,**

- words concerning, 30
- may comment on matters of public interest, 34-52
- joint liability for publication of libel, 157, 261
- liability to proprietor, 157, 374

**EFFIGY,**

- libel by means of, 7, 8, 22
- burning in, 9
- assertion that plaintiff had been hung in, 25

**EMBEZZLEMENT,**

- words imputing, actionable, 55, 62, 124

**EMPLOYER,**

- liability of, 360, 362, 385

**EMPLOYMENT,**

- loss of, is special damage, 310

**ENDORSEMENT ON WRIT, 459****ENGAGEMENT,**

- notice of termination of, not libellous, 25

**ENGINEER,**

- libel on, 33

**ENTRY FOR TRIAL, 522****EQUITY, COURTS OF,**

- no jurisdiction over libels except as contempts, 13, 454

**ERROR,**

- writ of, abolished, in civil cases, 551
- in criminal cases, 587

**ESTOPPEL,**

- plea by way of, 490

**ETIQUETTE,**

- charge of a breach of, not actionable, 29

**EVENT,**

- costs to follow, 334

**EVIDENCE**

1. *In civil cases*, 449-570
  - advice on, 524
  - of appointment to office, &c., 530
  - of publication, 531
  - as to innuendo, 538
  - as to the libel, 535
  - secondary, 536
  - as to speaking the slander, 537
  - of plaintiff's good reputation, 298
  - that the words refer to plaintiff, 540
  - that the words were spoken of him in the way of his trade, 541
  - of malice, 272-275, 485, 541



**EVIDENCE, — *continued.***

- of other libels or slanders, 272, 296, 545
- of damage, 542
- of plaintiff's distress of mind, 312, 318
- of loss of trade, 310-317
- as to handwriting, 533, 580
- of admissions by defendant, 534
- of personal ill-will, 271
- for defendant, 545
- of privilege, 547
- of a justification, 169, 548
- of an apology, 299
- in aggravation of damages, 296-298
- in mitigation of damages, 301-308
- 2. *In criminal cases,*
  - for the prosecution, 580
  - for the defence, 582

**EXAGGERATION**

- may be evidence of malice, 281

**EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES BEFORE TRIAL, 526****EXCEPTIONS, BILL OF, 551****EXCESS**

- in mode and extent of publication, 282

**EXCOMMUNICATED,**

- charge of having been, is actionable, 59

**EXCOMMUNICATION, 242, n.****EXECUTION,**

- no stay of, on appeal, 564
- rule *nisi* for new trial is a stay of, 557

**EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 355****EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,**

- when allowed, 292

**EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS,**

- reports of, 244

**EXPERTS,**

- evidence of, 533

**F.****FAIR REPORT,**

- what is meant by, 250-256
- question for jury, 252

**"FALLING SICKNESS,"**

- charge of having, 62, 66, 74

**FALSE BOOKS,**

- charge of keeping, 80

- FALSEHOOD,**  
    need not be shown, 169  
    of the communication, may be evidence of express malice, 274
- FALSE IMPRISONMENT,** 9
- FALSE NEWS,**  
    devisers of, 378
- FALSE PRETENCES,**  
    charge of obtaining a horse by, 123
- FALSE WEIGHTS,**  
    charge of using, 80
- FEELINGS,**  
    injury to, 309, 312, 318
- “FELON,”**  
    charge of being a, is actionable, 24, 58, 171, 603
- FELONY,**  
    what amounts to a charge of, 120–127  
    imputation of, actionable, 55
- FICTITIOUS NAMES,**  
    use of, to conceal defamation, 129
- FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS,**  
    libel by, 106, 539
- FISHERY ACTS,**  
    charge of offence against, not actionable, 57
- FLOWER-SHOW**  
    may be criticised, 50
- FOREIGN AMBASSADORS,**  
    libellous reflections on, 383
- FOREIGN LANGUAGE,**  
    slander or libel in, 109, 110, 470, 626
- FOREIGNER**  
    plaintiff, security for costs by, 356
- FORGERY,**  
    \* charge of, actionable, 55  
    what words a sufficient charge of, 60, 122
- FORMER PROCEEDINGS,** 456
- FORMER RECOVERY,**  
    defence of, 490
- FORMS,**  
    of pleadings, notices, &c., in the County Court, 644–648
- FORNICATION,**  
    charge of, not actionable, 85
- FORSWORN,**  
    charge of being, 60, 123

FOX'S LIBEL ACT (32 Geo. III. c. 60), 12, 94, 585, 667

FOXES,

charge of poisoning, libellous, 25

charge of shooting, against a gamekeeper, actionable, 77

FRAUD,

charge of, must be proved to the letter, 225

charge of, actionable, if written, 21

if spoken in way of trade, 32

not otherwise, 61

FREEDOM

of the press, 10, 416, 420, 436

FROZEN SNAKE,

charge of being, libellous, 22

judicial notice of meaning of, 106, 539

"FUDGE,"

affixed to a newspaper article, 100

FURTHER AND BETTER ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES, 515

affidavit, 519

## G.

GALLOWS

may be a libel in effigy, 8

"GAMBLER,"

not actionable, 61

"GANG OF THIEVES," 122, n.

GENERAL DAMAGES,

defined and distinguished from special damage, 289

amount entirely in discretion of jury, 291, 552

on each count separately, 295

GENERAL ISSUE,

truth not admissible under, 177, n.

abolished in civil cases, 480

on trial of indictment or information, 577

GENERAL LOSS OF CUSTOM, 293

GIRDLING TREES, 54, n.

GIST

of an action of slander, 18-21

GONORRHEA,

charge of having, is actionable, 62

GOOD BEHAVIOR,

binding to, 378, 444, 574

GOODS,

slander of title to, 79, 145

libel on, 32-34, 145-148

## GOVERNMENT,

libels against, 415-418

patronage may be criticised, 44

## GOVERNOR,

official publication by, privileged, 257

communication to, privileged, 538

## GRAND JURY,

defamatory presentment by, privileged, 191

## GUARDIANS, BOARD OF, 260

## GUARDIANS OF THE POOR,

words concerning, 29

## GUNSMITH,

libel on, 33

## H.

## HANDBILL

of tradesman, may be criticised, 34, 50, 51

## HANDWRITING,

proof of, 533, 580

## HATRED,

words exposing plaintiff to, 21, 22

## "HEALER OF FELONS,"

meaning of, 114

## HEARSAY,

sufficient ground for *bonâ fide* belief, 214, 278

## HEIR,

slander of title of, 139

## HERESY,

no crime, 396

## "HERMAPHRODITE,"

not actionable, 54, n., 67

## HIEROGLYPHICS

may be a libel, 8

## "HIRELING MURDERER," 55, n.

## HISTORY,

matters of, may be discussed, 377

## "HOCUSSED," 102

## HOMŒOPATHIST,

charge of meeting in consultation, 29

## HONORARY OFFICE,

words of one in, 64

## HOSPITALITY,

loss of, 311, 324

**HOUSE OF COMMONS,**

- report of Select Committee of, 662
- observations on such report, 261, 391, 531

**HUSBAND AND WIFE, 345**

- one in law, 152
- claim by husband for words defamatory of wife, 347
- married woman defendant, 350
- plea that plaintiffs are not, 491
- where wife has obtained a protection order, 346
- repetition by wife to husband of charge affecting herself, 330, 332
- the like by husband to wife of a charge affecting others, 153, 332

**“HYPOCRITE,”**

- charge of being, is libellous, 22

**I.****IGNORANCE,**

- words imputing, 28, 29

**ILLEGAL OCCUPATION,**

- action for slander in respect of, not maintainable, 81

**ILLNESS,**

- as special damage arising from slander, 309, 312, 318

**IMMORALITY,**

- charge of, if written, is actionable, 21
- not if spoken, 84-87
- in a physician, 66
- in a clergyman, 64, 66, 72

**“IMPOSTOR,”**

- charge of being, is libellous, 22, 39, n.
- not actionable, if spoken, 85

***IMPRIMATUR***

- no longer necessary, 10, 11

**IMPUTATION**

- of crime must be specific, 121-127

**INCOMPETENCY**

- in office, 27

**INCONSISTENT PLEAS, 480, n.****INCONTINENCE,**

- words imputing, to unmarried women, 85, 86
- to married women, 312
- to clergymen, 66, 72

**INDECENT PUBLICATIONS**

- may be stopped in the post, 407

**INDICTABLE OFFENCE,**

- imputation of, in slander, 121-127

**INDICTMENT,**

- for libel, 574

INDICTMENT — *continued.*

- pleading to the, 576
- removal of, by certiorari, 578
- averments, 575
- amending, 577
- costs of trial of, 590
- forms of, 654-658

## INFAMOUS PUNISHMENT,

- what is, 54

## INFANCY,

- no defence, 353

## INFANTS, 352

## INFECTIOUS DISEASE,

- imputations of having, actionable, 21, 22, 624

## “INFERNAL VILLAIN,”

- libellous, 22

## INFORMATION,

- when privileged, though volunteered, 213-219, 286

## INFORMATION, CRIMINAL,

- for libel, 380-383
- practice on, 591-596
- forms of, 649, 651

## INGRATITUDE,

- charge of, libellous, 23

## “INHUMAN STEPMOTHER,” 25, n.

## INITIALS OF NAME,

- libel expressed by, 130, 582

## INJUNCTION

- will not be granted to restrain publication of libel, 13-16, 436, 454
- except after verdict, 16
- to restrain premature and unfair publication of proceedings in Chancery, 436

*INJURIA SINE DAMNO*, 17, 18

## INJURY TO REPUTATION,

- gist of action, 18-21

## INNKEEPER,

- libel on, 34
- slander of, 79

## INNOCENT PUBLICATION, 6, 154, 384-387, 617

## INNUENDO,

- office of, 100-117
- when necessary, 109, 112, 116
- when not necessary, 105, 107
- drafting the, 472
- evidence as to the, 538
- plaintiff bound by, 102

- INQUIRY,**  
communications in answer to, privileged, 203-207  
writ of, to assess damages, 464
- INSANITY,**  
charge of, is libellous, 23  
of the king, 414  
no defence, 354
- INSINUATION,**  
libel by, 98
- INSOLVENCY,**  
words imputing, 23, 31, 78, 79  
acts imputing, 8, 9
- INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS, 520**  
both parties may now obtain, 516
- INSTRUCTIONS FOR STATEMENT OF DEFENCE, 475**
- INSULTING LADIES,**  
charge of, libellous, 22
- INTEGRITY,**  
words imputing want of, 70
- INTENTION**  
without overt act, no crime, 57, 124  
of defendant, immaterial in civil cases, 5-7, 264  
unless occasion privileged, 264, 266  
of defendant, in criminal cases, immaterial, 388  
except in case of libel on dead, &c., 376  
to produce natural and necessary consequence of act, presumed, 5
- INTERCOURSE**  
of friends, of husband, loss of, words tending to cause, 22, 312
- INTEREST,**  
as ground of privilege, 233-243  
in actions for slander of title, 141  
public, matters of, may be criticised, 36-52  
where large body of persons interested, 237  
persons present who have no corresponding interest, 239
- INTERROGATORIES, 500-517**  
leave to administer, when necessary, 501  
tending to criminate, 504  
as to opponent's case, 506  
what allowed, 507  
striking out, 509  
answer to, 511  
what defendant may refuse to answer, 512  
further and better answers, 515
- INTOLERANCE,**  
religious, charge of, libellous, 23
- IRONICAL PRAISE**  
may be a libel, 8, 23

## IRONICAL WORDS

may be actionable, 8, 23, 116, 539

must be alleged to have been so spoken, 114, 539

## ISSUES, SEVERAL,

assessment of damages on, 295

apportionment of costs of, 338-340

## ITCH,

charge of having, actionable, if written, 22

not, if merely spoken, 63

## J.

## "JACOBITE,"

charge of being, 121, 418, 421

## JEST,

publication of libel in, no defence, 6

## JOINDER

of causes of action, 458

of parties, 369, 371, 452

## JOINT

plaintiffs, 369

defendants, 371

## JOINT PUBLICATION

of written language, 157, 328

## JOINT STOCK COMPANY,

action by, 367

## JOURNALIST,

privileges of, 36-41, 416, 420

libels on, 30

## JUDGE

of Superior Court, words concerning, 426-439

of Inferior Court, words concerning, 64, 440-448

at Chambers, 437

remarks by, absolutely privileged, 188

private letter to, not privileged, 191, 237

duty of, on question of Libel or No Libel, 94, 98

on uncontroverted facts to decide if publication is privileged, 185

when to nonsuit, 543

summing-up, 550

## JUDGES' CHAMBERS,

reports of proceedings in, 248

## JUDGMENT, 552

in suits for defamation not *in rem*, 1, n.

in default of pleading, 495

by default, 463

proceedings after, 554

arrest of, 96, 118, 554, 586, 587



## JUDICIAL NOTICE

of meanings of words, &c., 106, 116

## JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,

statements made in, absolutely privileged, 188  
*bonâ fide* comments on, protected, 44  
 private letter to judge is not privileged, 191, 237  
 attorney's bill of costs is not, 193  
 voluntary affidavit is not, 193  
 Courts martial, 189, 191  
 counsel, privilege of, 190  
 jury, 191  
 witnesses, 191  
 affidavits, &c., 191  
 reports of, 243-257  
*coram non judice*, 244  
*ex parte* proceedings, 244  
 reports must be fair and accurate, 250  
 no comments should be interpolated, 254  
 by party or solicitor, 256, 257, 429, 430  
 prohibited reports, 249, 436

## JURISDICTION

of County Court, 453, 468, 565  
 of Salford Hundred Court, 569  
 of Ecclesiastical Courts in suits for defamation, abolished, 17, 59, 86, 403, 679  
 none to restrain by injunction the publication of a libel, 13-16, 436, 454, 459  
 of quarter sessions, 374, 404, 574  
 removal of indictment by certiorari, 578  
 summary, of justices as to libels, 574

## JUROR,

privilege of, 191  
 withdrawing a, 550

## JURY,

to determine whether a publication be a libel or not, 16, 94, 98, 544, 557  
 to decide on the sufficiency of an apology, 300, 560  
 to construe the libel, 26, 94  
 to determine the meaning of words, 94-117  
 to read whole of libel, 27, 98, 551  
 to determine truth of the facts charged, 169, 170  
 must assess damages once for all, 295, 317, 320, 552  
 should not consider the question of costs, 295, 552  
 not to be dispensed with, 454, 523, 568  
 function of, in prosecutions for libel, 585  
 special, 528

## JUS IN REM,

right to reputation, 1, 18

**JUSTICE OF THE PEACE,**

- no jurisdiction in libel, 574
- words by, when privileged, 188
- words concerning, 64, 70, 72, 440, 441
- administration of the law by, is matter of public interest, 45
- reports of proceedings before, 243-248, 255
- cannot commit for contempt, 444
- sureties for good behavior, 444

**JUSTIFICATION, 169-181**

- onus* of proving words true is on the defendant, 169
- the whole libel must be proved true, 169
- the rule applies to all reported speeches or repetitions of slander, 173
- must justify the precise charge, 169
- heading must be justified, 98, 99
- of innuendo, 177
- must be proved in every material part, 170-174
- slight immaterial inaccuracy, 170
- of part only, in mitigation, 176, 306
- plea of, when evidence of malice, 274, 485, 542
- must be specially pleaded, 177, 485
- danger of pleading, 178, 274, 485, 623
- how proved, 548
- Roman law as to, 180
- forms of plea of, 485, 605, 616, 624
- in a criminal case, 178, 388
- not permitted at Common Law, 388
- under Lord Campbell's Act, 389
- not allowed in prosecutions for blasphemous, obscene, or seditious libels, 388, 398, 414, 577
- form of plea to information or indictment, 650, 660

**K.****KEEPING A BAWDY-HOUSE,**

- charge of, actionable, 56

**KIDNAPPING, 55, n.****KILLING,**

- charge of, actionable, 121, 627

**KING,**

- libels against the, 413, 414
- petition to, privileged, 223
- words cannot amount to treason, 410
- denying his title to the crown, 413
- disparaging his ministers, 415-419

**KNAVE,**

- charged of clergyman, 66, n.

**KNOWLEDGE**

- of defendant that his words were false, proof positive of malice, 267, 274
- in criminal cases, 379, 580

## L.

**LANDLORD**

and tenant, communications between, privileged, 217, 233, 236, 241

**LANDMARKS,**

charge of removing, 54, n.

**LANGUAGE,**

construction of, 93-117

certainty of, 118-132

ambiguous, 107-116

actionable *per se*, 21-81

actionable only by reason of special damage, 82-92

jury to determine meaning of, 26, 94, 98, 544, 550

**LARCENY,**

what will amount to a charge of, 61, 122

charge of, actionable, 55, 57, n.

charged on young child actionable, 57, n.

**LAW,**

ecclesiastical, 402

**LEAVE TO MOVE, 554****LECTURES,**

contract for hire of rooms for delivery of blasphemous, 374, 399

**LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES,**

libels on, 422-425

petition to, is privileged, 187

**LEPROSY,**

charge of having, 63

**LETTER,**

confidential, not privileged from inspection, 518

before action, 453

post-marks on, 533

libels by, in what county published, 581

shown confidentially, 207, 615

threatening, indictment for, 377, 379

**LETTERS PATENT,**

slander of title to, 144

**LIBEL,**

defined, 1, 7, 21, 22

malice not essential to, 5-7, 264

distinguished from slander, 3, 4

action for, maintainable without proof of special damage, 2-4

is criminal, 4, 56

in foreign language, 110, 470, 574

remedies for, civil and criminal, 9, 376, 390-393

how construed, 93-132

or no libel, pre-eminently a question for the jury, 16, 94, 98, 557

whole to be looked at, 27, 98, 551

LIBEL — *continued.*

- bona fide* comment, 34-52, 483
- on the dead, 375
- proof of the, 535
- contract for printing, cannot be enforced, 374
- blasphemous, 394-403
- obscene, 404-408
- sedition, 409-448
- precedents of pleadings in actions for, 600-621

## LIBEL ACT,

- 32 Geo. III. c. 60 (Mr. Fox's), 12, 94, 585, 586
- statute in full, 667
- 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (Lord Campbell's),
  - s. 1, 299, 465, 568
  - s. 2, 299, 301, 465, 487, 491, 497, 568
  - s. 3, 379
  - s. 4, 379, 572, 573, 580
  - s. 5, 379, 390
  - s. 6, 389, 576, 577, 589
  - s. 7, 363, 364, 365, 385, 583
  - s. 8, 590, 595, 596
- statute in full, 674, 675, 676

## “LIBELLER,”

- charge of being a, is actionable, 30, 56

## “LIBELLOUS JOURNALIST,”

- charge of being a, 30, 171

## LIBELLOUS WORKS,

- no copyright in, 374

## LIBERTY,

- of the press, defined, 10, 416, 420
- history of growth of, 9-12, 421
- not to be restrained by injunction, 13-16, 436, 454, 459

## LICENSED VICTUALLER,

- libel on, 31, 102
- words concerning, 79

## LIMITATIONS,

- statute of, 455
- defence under, must be pleaded, 490

## LOCAL INTEREST,

- matters of, may be criticised, 41, 46

## LORD CHAMBERLAIN,

- control over plays, 13

## LUNATICS,

- liability of, 264, 353

## M.

## MAGAZINE,

- joint liability of editor and printer for libel in, 361

**MAGISTRATES,**

- language concerning, 64, 70, 440, 441
- report of proceedings before, privileged, 243-248, 255
- cannot commit for contempt, 444
- proceedings before, 571

**MAINTENANCE,**

- loss of, by wife, as special damages, 324

**MALICE**

- not essential to the action, 5-7, 264
- history of, 6, n.
- unless occasion privileged, 5, 266
- need not be specifically averred, 6, n., 267
- onus* of proving lies on the plaintiff, 269
- proof of actual, 271-288, 541
  - I. Extrinsic evidence of, 271
    - former publications by defendant of plaintiff, 272, 541, 545
    - former quarrels, 271, 542
    - acts of defendant subsequent to publication, 273
    - that the words are false is alone no evidence of, 274
    - that defendant knew the words were false, is evidence of, 267, 274
    - plea of justification, 274, 485, 542
  - II. Evidence of, derived from the mode and extent of publication, the terms employed, &c., 277
    - (i) Where the expressions employed are exaggerated and unwarrantable, 280
    - (ii) Where the mode and extent of publication is excessive, 282
- absence of, tends to mitigate damages, 301
- in actions of slander of title, 142-145
- maliciously publishing a libel, knowing it to be false, 379, 580
- malice in law defined, 265, 267
- how malice in fact may be shown, 271, n.

**MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 9****MALPRACTICE,**

- charged on a physician, 76, n.

**MAN FRIDAY,**

- charge of being, not actionable, 25
- judicial notice of the meaning of the term, 114

**"MAN OF STRAW"**

- libellous, 22

**MANSLAUGHTER,**

- charge of, actionable, 55, 608, 627

**MARRIAGE,**

- loss of, as special damage, 309, 310, 474
- evidence of loss of, 316

**MARRIED WOMAN,**

- libel on, 24

**MARRIED WOMAN** — *continued.*

- slander of, 84-87, 312, 324
- charge of stealing goods of, 62, 96
- trader, 32, 346, 349
- as plaintiff, 345
- as defendant, 350
- rights of husband, 347
- criminal liability of a, 351
- may be ordered to find sureties for good behavior, 378
- cannot sue her husband for slander or libel, 346, 347

**MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 346, 350'****MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT AMENDMENT ACT, 351, 491****MASTER**

- and servant, 358
- his commands no defence for his servant, 359
- liable for words of his servant, spoken with his authority, 360
- ratification, 361
- giving character of servant, 200-203, 268, 600
- criminal liability of, 362, 385
- defence under Lord Campbell's Act, 363-365, 385, 583

**MASTER MARINER,**

- charge of drunkenness against, actionable, 29, 215, 217

**MASTURBATION, 84, n.****MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST, 36-52**

- what are, 41, 42
- matters of local interest may be, 41, 42
- affairs of state, 42-44
- parliamentary proceedings, 42, 43
- administration of justice, 44-46
- public authorities, 46, 47
- local institutions, 46, 47
- parochial charity, 47
- ecclesiastical affairs, 47, 48
- unpublished sermons, 47
- books, 48, 49
- pictures, 48, 49
- architecture, 48, 49
- theatres and concerts, 49
- public balls and entertainments, 49, 50
- flower show, 50
- appeals to the public, 50-52
- advertisement of cure, 50, 51
- circulars and handbills of tradesmen, 50, 51
- controversies in the newspapers, 50-52
- persons inviting public attention, 51, 52

**MAYOR,**

- words concerning, 28, 40, 440
- contempt of, 440, 445

**MEANING**

of words is a question for the jury, 93-117  
assigned by innuendo, must be adhered to, 102  
defendant may justify the words without the, 177, 487, 634

**MEDICAL MEN,**

slanders on, 68, 76, 83, 627  
libels on, 29, 34  
criticism on the advertisements of, 51, 173  
imputation upon, of immorality, 66, 316  
proof of qualification of, 530, 531

**MEETINGS,**

public, reports of proceedings at, not privileged, 260-263

**MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT,**

words concerning, 71, 236, 304  
privilege of speech of, 186, 236, 259

**MEMORIAL**

to Home Secretary, 222, 611

**MENTAL DERANGEMENT,**

imputations of, 23

**MENTAL DISTRESS**

is not special damage, 309, 312

**MERCHANTS,**

words concerning, 77-81  
imputations on their credit, 30, 78  
charge of keeping false account-books, 80  
imputations on their goods, 32, 79, 145-148

**MERCHANT'S CLERK,**

words concerning, 124, 228

**MIDWIFE,**

words concerning, 68

**MILITARY AND NAVAL OFFICERS,**

reports by, privileged, 144

**MILITARY OFFENCE, 54, n.****MINISTER,**

dissenting, words concerning, 28, 72, 73  
proof of special damage by, 316, 320

**MISCONDUCT,**

general, charge of, actionable only if written, 21  
in trade, charge of, is actionable always, 31, 80

**MISDEMEANOR,**

charges of, 54, 56, 123, 124

**MISFEASANCE,**

charged on officer, 69, n.

**MISJOINDER**

of parties, 344

## MISTAKE,

publication of libel by, 6, 153, 264, 387, 531

## MIS-TRIAL, 588

## MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES,

what amount to, 299-307

(i) apology and amends, 299

(ii) absence of malice, 301

conflicting cases on this point, 303

defendant's belief in truth of charge, 302, 589

(iii) evidence of the plaintiff's bad character, 304

(iv) plaintiff's previous conduct in provoking the publication, 306

(v) absence of special damage, 308

affidavits as to, receivable in criminal cases, 589

## MITIORI SENSU,

construction in, 93, n., 95-97

## MONEY,

unfit to be trusted with, charge of being, actionable, 23

## MOTHER-IN-LAW,

charge of suing in County Court, not libellous, 25

## MOTIVE

immaterial, unless occasion privileged, 5-7, 264, 265

in criminal cases, 376, 388

wicked, imputation of, libellous, 27

## MOTION

for judgment, 553

*non obstante veredicto*, 554

in arrest of judgment, 554, 586, 587

for a new trial, in a civil case, 105, 556

in a criminal case, 587

for a rule for a criminal information, 591

## "MULATTO," 54, n.

## MURDER,

charge of, actionable, 55, 608

what is a sufficient charge of, 121

what insufficient, 122

charge of, explained away by context, 108

## N.

## NAME AND ADDRESS

of printer and his employer, 12, 531, 532

## NAVAL AND MILITARY OFFICERS,

reports by, privileged, 144

## NEGRO,

charge of being, not libellous in England, 25

## NEW ASSIGNMENT, 496



## NEWS,

false, fabrication of, 378

## NEWSPAPER,

proprietor, liability of, 7, 157, 261, 391, 392, 618

criminal liability of, 364, 365, 386

libels on, 30, 33

cannot sue editor for contribution, 374

editor, liability of, 157, 261, 391, 392

libels on, 30, 603

printer of, 12, 157, 361, 384, 618

reporter, duty of, 245, 247, 254

letters written to, may be answered, 50-52

how much may be read in evidence, 545

not justified in publishing story told by plaintiff against himself, 6

proof of publication of, 531

latitude allowed to writers in, 38, 39, 416, 420

actionable language concerning, 30, 105

imputation that it has a small circulation, libellous, 30

advertisement in, when privileged, 225, 226

statutory provisions relating to, 12, 531

statutory plea of apology for libel in, 299, 487, 621

extent of circulation of libel in, increases damage, 31, 157, 158

discovery of proprietors, printers, and publishers of, 513, 514, 532, 619

copying libellous articles from another, 159, 302, 303, 584

reports in, of judicial proceedings, 243-257

reports in, of debates and proceedings of parliament, 257-259

reports in, of public meetings, not privileged, 260-263

comments in, on matters of public interest, 34-52

editor not bound to give up name of correspondent, 452-453

publications reflecting on suitors, witnesses, or prisoners, 44, 249, 429, 430, 436

## NEW TRIAL,

when granted, 556-561

application for, to what Court, 555, 557, 560

perverse finding of jury, 105, 558

for excessive damages, 558

for insufficient damages, 559

surprise, 559

verdict against weight of evidence, 557

on one of several issues, 557

costs of, to follow event, 560

on criminal information or indictment for libel, 587, 588

## NOMINAL DAMAGES,

jury not limited to giving, 293

## NONJOINER,

of parties, 344

## NONSUIT, 543

no action can be brought subsequently for same cause, 545

**NOT GUILTY,**

- plea of, abolished in civil cases, 480
- plea of, on trial of indictment, 576, 577

**NOTICE**

- to auctioneer, libel in, 226
- of exclusion from public room, 25
- of termination of engagement, no libel, 25
- that defendant will not accept payment in cheques on plaintiff's bank, 25
- of action, 453
- of intention to adduce evidence of apology in mitigation, 299, 488, 621
- to produce, 526, 536
- to inspect and admit, 526
- of trial, 522

**O.****OBSCENE WORDS, 404-408**

- test of obscenity, 404
- summary proceedings under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83, 405
- reports of proceedings of Courts of Justice as to, not privileged, 249, 407
- parties aggrieved may appeal, 406
- no copyright in, 374
- as to sending by post, 407

**OCCASION**

- of publication gives rise to absolute privilege, 186-196
- qualified privilege, 196-263

**OCCUPATION**

- of plaintiff, how proved, 530
- libels on plaintiff in way of, 27-33
- words concerning plaintiff in way of, 77-81

**OFFICE,**

- words concerning plaintiff in his, actionable whether written, 22, 27-30
- or spoken, 64-81
- proof of appointment to, 530
  - action lies whether the office one of profit or not, 64
  - distinction between imputation of want of ability and imputation of want of integrity, 28, 70
  - imputing ignorance in, 67, 68
- plaintiff must be in the present enjoyment of, in slander, 69, 70
- not so in libel, 27
- the words must affect plaintiff in his office, 65
- imputing corruption to officer of Court, 28, 71
- Judges of Superior Court, 64, 426
- Judges of Inferior Court, 28, 40, 440
- justices of the peace, 70, 71, 72, 440
- clergymen and ministers, 72, 73
- barristers-at-law, 74
- solicitors and attorneys, 74
- physicians and surgeons, 76

- OPINION,  
     words lowering plaintiff in people's, 22  
     of expert witnesses, when receivable, 533
- "OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT,"  
     charge of, libellous, 29
- OPTICIAN,  
     libel on, 31
- ORIGINATOR OF RUMOR  
     may escape punishment, 166, 329
- OUTLAW  
     action by, 357  
     civil proceedings in outlawry, now abolished, 357
- OVERSEER,  
     words concerning, 28, 29, 229  
     evidence as to appointment of, 530

## P.

- PAMPHLET,  
     publication of report of trial in, 251
- PARDON,  
     crime imputed for which pardon granted, 58, 497, 606
- PARENT,  
     not liable for acts of children, 361
- PARISH MEETINGS,  
     proceedings at, privileged, 234, 237  
     reports in newspapers of proceedings at, 260
- PARISH OFFICERS,  
     words affecting, 28, 29  
         constable, 71, 237  
         overseer, 28, 29, 229  
         churchwarden, 62  
         waywarden of a district, 46
- PARLIAMENT,  
     speeches in, absolutely privileged, 186  
     petition to, 43, 187, 222, 259  
     contempts of either House, 422-425  
     resolutions of House of Commons, 423  
     power of commitment, 423  
     Speaker's warrant not to be too closely scrutinized, 423
- PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS,  
     reports of, in newspaper, privileged, 257-259  
     may be freely commented on by every one, 35, 42, 43
- PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS,  
     liability for publication of, 187  
     statute protecting authorized publication of, 187, 672-674

## PAROCHIAL

affairs may be matter of public comment, 41, 42  
charity, privately organized, may not, 47

## PARTIALITY,

charging a judge with, is actionable, 28

## PARTICULARS

of statement of claim, 479, 608, 609, 625  
of plea, 485, 486, 632

## PARTIES

to action, 344-372, 452

misjoinder of, 344

non-joinder of, 344

1. Husband and wife, 345

claim by husband for words defamatory of wife, 347

married woman defendant, 350

criminal liability of a married woman, 351

2. Infants, 352

3. Lunatics, 353

4. Bankrupts, 354

5. Receivers, 355

6. Executors and administrators, 355

7. Aliens, 356

8. Master and servant — principal and agent, 358

master's commands no defence, 359

principal liable for words spoken by his authority, 360

ratification, 361

criminal liability of master or principal, 362

9. Partners, 365

10. Corporations and companies, 367

11. Other joint plaintiffs, 369

12. Joint defendants, 370

## PARTNERS

in trade, words imputing insolvency to one of, 81, 367

libels on, 32

service of writ on, 461

may join in the action, 365

previous recovery against one partner, 457

appear in their own name, 463

## PASSION. See PROVOCATION

## PATENT,

slander of title to, 144

## PATRONAGE,

Government, may be criticised, 44

## PAWNBROKER,

words concerning, 111

## PAYMENT INTO COURT

*under Lord Campbell's Act*, 299-301, 487

no admission of liability, 300

PAYMENT INTO COURT — *continued.*

- form of plea, 488
- under the Judicature Act*, 491-494
- no admission of liability, 493
- any pleas can be pleaded at same time, 480, 493
- form of plea, 494, 630

## PECUNIARY LOSS

- is special damage, 309
- when essential to action, 18-21

## PEERS

- and great officers of the realm, slander of, 133-136

## PENCIL MARK

- may be a libel, 7

## PERJURY,

- what amounts to a charge of, 123
- charge of committing, actionable, 24, 56
- charge of procuring one to commit, 56, 130
- justification of charge, 123, n.

## PERMANENT MARK OR SIGN,

- if scandalous, a libel, 3, 22

## PERSONS

- under various disabilities, 344-372

## PETITIONS

- for redress of injuries, privileged, 220-224
- to Parliament, are privileged, 222, 259
  - are matters of public interest, 43, 259
- to the Sovereign, 223

## PHYSICIAN,

- for city, 40, n.
- words concerning, 68, 76
- libel on, 29, 34
- imputation of adultery to, 66, 83, 316
- malpractice charged upon, 76, n.
- proof of qualification of, 530, 531

## “PICKPOCKET,”

- charge of being a, is actionable, 122

## PICTURES,

- libels by, 3, 22, 24
- libellous, public exhibition of, 374
- publicly exhibited, may be criticised, 48, 49

## PILLORY,

- punishment of, in former times, 394, 412

## PLACARD,

- on wall, proof of, 536
- publication by, 153, 283, 613

## PLACE

- of trial, change of, 528
- of publication, how far material, 110, 581

## PLAGUE,

charge of having the, 63

## PLAINTIFF,

who may be, 344-372

death of, 355

must be sufficiently pointed at and identified, 127, 540

general reputation of, 298, 304

conduct of, in provoking libel, &c., 306

evidence for, 530-542

matters to be considered by, 449

proof that the words refer to, 127-132, 540

special character, proof of, 530

joint plaintiffs, 369

infant, 352

married woman, 345

## PLEADINGS,

*In Civil Cases,*

statement of claim, 469-475

joinder of causes of action, 458

averments, what necessary, 118, 473, 531

innuendo, 100, 107, 538

*colloquium*, 118, 120

special damage, 138, 289, 308-333, 474

venue, 474

amendment of, 498, 537, 545

particulars, 479, 609, 625

demurrer, 475, 606

statement of defence, 480-494

bad for uncertainty, 487

counterclaim, 494

reply, 496

rejoinder, 498

amendment of, 498, 545

default in, 500

variance, 471, 536, 537, 545

precedents of, 596-661

in actions for libel, 600-621

of slander, 621-634

of slander of title, 634-644

*In Criminal Cases,*

indictment, 574

amendment of, 577

demurrer to, 659

forms of, 654-658

pleas, 576

forms of, 659

replication to pleas, 660

demurrer to plea, 577, 661

justification under Lord Campbell's Act, 389, 576

information, 595

PLEADINGS — *continued.*

- amendment of, 595
- form of, 649, 651
- form of pleas to, 650
- replication to pleas, 651

## POLICEMAN,

- slander of, 189, 332
- words published to, 221

## POLITICAL AUTHORS,

- privilege as to writings of, 38, 39, 416, 420

## POST-CARD,

- publication of libel by, avoids privilege, 151, 283, 284

## POST-MARK,

- as evidence of publication in a particular county, 581

## POST-MASTER,

- complaint as to, 217, 223

## POX,

- charge of having, 63

## PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES, 449-570

- considerations before writ, 449
- parties, 452
- letter before action, 453
- notice of action, 453
- choice of Court, 453
- district registry, 454
- Statute of Limitations, 455, 490
- former proceedings, 456
- joinder of causes of action, 458
- indorsement on writ, 459
- service of the writ, 460
- appearance, 462
- judgment by default, 463
- matters to be considered by the defendant, 465
- security for costs, 466
- remitting the action to County Court, 468
- subsequent proceedings in County Court, 566
- pleadings (*See* PLEADINGS), 469-498
- amending pleadings, 498
- default in pleading, 500
- interrogatories, 500-515
- discovery and inspection of documents, 515-522
- default in making discovery, 522
- notice of trial, 522
- entry for trial, 522
- advice on evidence, 524
- examination of witnesses before trial, 526
- special jury, 528
- change of venue, 528

**PRACTICE IN CIVIL CASES — *continued*.**

trial, 529-553  
 compromise, 550  
 costs, 553  
 proceedings after judgment, 554  
 application for a new trial, 556  
 proceedings in the Court of Appeal, 561  
 County Court proceedings, 565  
 other inferior Courts, 569

**PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF INDICTMENT, 571-591**

proceedings before magistrates, 571  
 indictment, 574  
 pleading to the indictment, 576  
 certiorari, 578  
 evidence for the prosecution, 580  
 evidence for the defence, 582  
 summing-up and verdict, 585  
 proceedings after verdict, 585  
 sentence, 589  
 costs, 590

**PRACTICE IN PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION, 591-596**

motion for the rule, 591  
 argument of the rule, 593  
 compromise, 594  
 trial and costs, 595

**PRECEDENTS**

of pleadings, &c., Appendix A, 596-661  
     in actions for libel, 600-621  
     in actions of slander, 621-634  
     in actions of slander of title, 634-644  
 of criminal pleadings, 649-661

**PREFATORY AVERMENTS,**

as to traverse and denial of, 452  
 evidence as to, 531

**PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, 178****PRESS,**

liberty of, defined, 10, 416, 420  
 history of growth of, 9-12, 421  
 abuse of liberty of, 10  
 censorship of, 9-12

**PREVIOUS ACTIONS, 456, 490****PREVIOUS REPORTS OR RUMORS, 165, 231-233, 305, 306, 584**

if *bona fide* repeated to person calumniated, 167, 217, 219

**PRIEST,**

words spoken by, 242



**PRINCIPAL,**

- liable for words spoken by his authority, 360
- criminal liability of 362, 385
- defence under Lord Campbell's Act, 363-365, 385, 583
- ratification, 361

**PRINTER,**

- liability of, 157, 361, 384\*
- to print his name and address on every publication, 12
- to preserve name of his employer, 12
- cannot recover wages for printing libellous matter, 374

**PRINTING,**

- libels by, 3, 156-158
- prima facie* evidence of publishing, 154, 155, 533
- a libel without publication, 152, 386

**PRIVILEGED OCCASIONS, 182-263**

- defence that words were spoken on a privileged occasion, 182
- occasions absolutely privileged, 183
- occasions on which the privilege is qualified, 183
- the Judge to decide whether occasion is privileged or not, 185
- presumption of privilege rebutted by evidence of malice, 264-288

**I. Occasions absolutely Privileged, 185-196**

- (i) Parliamentary proceedings, 186
- (ii) Judicial proceedings, 188
  - words spoken by a judge, 188
  - words spoken by counsel, 190
  - words spoken by a witness, 191
- (iii) Naval and military affairs, 194

**II. Qualified Privilege, 196-263**

- cases of qualified privilege classified, 196

**I. WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES CAST UPON THE DEFENDANT THE DUTY OF MAKING A COMMUNICATION.****(A.) Communications made in pursuance of a Duty owed to Society, 198**

duty may be moral or social, 198

- (i) Characters of servants, 200

- (ii) Other confidential communications of a private nature:

(a) Answers to confidential inquiries, 203

(b) Confidential communications not in answer to a previous inquiry, 207

(c) Communications made in discharge of a duty arising from a confidential relationship existing between the parties, 209

(d) Information volunteered when there is no confidential relationship existing between the parties, 213, 286

difficulty of the question, 215, 288

- (iii) Information given to any public officer imputing crime or misconduct to others, 220
- such officer must have some jurisdiction to entertain complaint, 223

PRIVILEGED OCCASIONS — *continued.*(B.) *Communications made in Self-Defence.*

- (iv) Statements necessary to protect defendant's private interests, 225
- (v) Statements provoked by a previous attack by plaintiff on defendant, 228  
statements invited by the plaintiff, 230

## II. WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE COMMUNICATION, AND THE PERSON TO WHOM THE COMMUNICATION IS MADE HAS A CORRESPONDING INTEREST, 233

where a large body of persons are interested, 237

if strangers present, the privilege will be lost, 239

## III. PRIVILEGED REPORTS, 243

- (i) Reports of Judicial Proceedings, 243  
matters *coram non judice*, 244  
reports not privileged, 249  
reports must be accurate, 250  
no comments should be interpolated, 254  
an accurate report may still be malicious, 256
- (ii) Reports of Parliamentary Proceedings, 257
- (iii) Other Reports, 259  
suggestion of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 261

## PRIVILEGE OF DOCUMENTS

from inspection, 517-519

## PRIVILEGE OF WITNESSES,

as to self-criminating evidence, 504, 534

as to production of state papers, 535, 536

## PROCEEDINGS,

former, 456, 490

after judgment, 554

in the Court of Appeal, 561

in the County Court, 565

before magistrates, 571

after verdict of guilty, 585

## PROCTOR,

words concerning, 30

## PROFANE LIBELS, 394-403

## PROFESSION,

words injuring the plaintiff in the way of, actionable whether spoken, 64-81

or written, 21, 27-30

## PROFITS,

loss of, is special damage, 293, 309, 313-320

## PROOF

of plaintiff's special character, 530

of publication, 531

of the libel, 535

**PROOF** — *continued.*

- of the speaking of the slander, 537
- that the words refer to the plaintiff, 540
- that the words were spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or trade, 541

**PROPRIETOR**

- of newspaper liable for all libels contained therein,
  - civilly, 7, 157, 261, 391, 392
  - criminally, 364, 365, 386

**PROSPECTIVE DAMAGES**, 317, 320**PROSTITUTE**,

- charge of being, not actionable, if spoken, 85
- charge of having under protection, libellous, 24

**PROSTITUTION**,

- words imputing, to a single woman, 84–87
  - to a schoolmistress, 84
  - to the shopwoman of a trader, 84
  - to a married woman, 84–87, 312, 324

**PROTECTION ORDER**, 346**PROVOCATION**

- by libel to a breach of the peace, 3, 373
- by plaintiff's conduct, 228, 306, 380
- by previous libels, when evidence in mitigation, 307, 380

**PUBLIC ATTENTION**,

- persons inviting, may be criticised, 51, 52

**PUBLIC BENEFIT**,

- when a defence on trial of indictment or criminal information, 389, 390
  - 650, 659

**PUBLIC INTEREST, MATTERS OF**,

- may be freely commented on, 34–52
- what are, 41–52
- affairs of State, 42–44
- Government patronage, 44
- debates and proceedings in Parliament, 42, 44
- petitions to Parliament, 43
- books and other literary publications, 48, 49
- paintings and works of art, 48, 49
- architecture, 48, 49
- advertisements, placards, circulars, 50, 51
- the performances at places of public entertainment, 49, 50
- the conduct of persons attending a public political meeting, 52
- management of public institutions, 46, 47
- parochial charity, 47
- ecclesiastical affairs, 47, 48
- the public conduct of public men, 34, 40, 41, 43
- persons inviting public attention, 50–52
- newspaper controversies, 50–52

**PUBLIC MEETINGS,**

- reports of proceedings at, not privileged, 241, 260-263
- comments on conduct of persons attending, permitted, 52

**PUBLIC MEN,**

- who are, 41
- their public conduct may be freely discussed, 34, 40-43
- libels on, by imputation of corrupt motives, 37-39, 43

**PUBLIC PERFORMANCES AND ENTERTAINMENTS**

- may be the subject of fair criticism, 49, 50

**PUBLIC POLICY,**

- ground for refusing to produce a document, 535, 536

**PUBLICAN,**

- libel on, 31

**PUBLICATION, 150-168**

- definition of, 150
- must be to a third person, 150, 152, 383
- plaintiff must prove a publication by the defendant *in fact*, 153
- publication *per alium*, 155
- publication in a newspaper, 157
- repetition of a slander, 161
- naming your authority now no defence, 162
- rule that every one repeating a slander becomes an independent slanderer, 166
- exceptions to this rule, 167
- by sale in a shop, 160, 384
- by telegram or postcard, 151, 283, 284
- by placard, 153, 536
- by copying from another newspaper, 159, 302, 303, 584
- by mistake, 6, 153, 385, 387
- by anticipation, 261
- by contrivance of plaintiff himself, 168, 231
- cannot be restrained by injunction, 13-16
- proof of, 531
- proof of, where libel is lost, 536

**PUBLISHER,**

- who is liable as, 156-166, 384-387

**PUFFING**

- own goods, no libel, 32, 33

**PUNISHMENT**

- at common law, 374, 378
- under s. 4 of Lord Campbell's Act, 379
- under s. 5, 379
- by requiring sureties for good behavior, 378, 444
- for a blasphemous libel, 394
- for an obscene libel, 404
- for a seditious libel, 412
- for contempt of court, 428, 433, 434
- pillory, 394, 412
- what may be shown in mitigation of, 589

**PUNITIVE DAMAGES, 6, n., 157, n., 292, n.**

## Q.

## "QUACK,"

charge of being a, libellous, 29-31

## QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, 196-263

cases of qualified privilege classified, 196

## I. WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES CAST UPON THE DEFENDANT THE DUTY OF MAKING A COMMUNICATION.

(A.) *Communications made in Pursuance of a Duty owed to Society*, 198

(i) Characters of servants, 200

(ii) Other confidential communications of a private nature, 203

(a) answers to confidential inquiries, 203

(b) confidential communications not in answer to a previous inquiry, 207

(c) communications made in discharge of a duty arising from a confidential relationship existing between the parties, 209

(d) information volunteered when there is no confidential relationship existing between the parties, 213

(iii) Information given to any public officer, imputing crime or misconduct to others, 220

such officer must have some jurisdiction to entertain complaint, 223.

(B.) *Communication made in Self-Defence.*

(iv) Statements necessary to protect defendant's private interests, 225

(v) Statements provoked by a previous attack by plaintiff on defendant, 228

statements invited by the plaintiff, 230

## II. WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE COMMUNICATION, AND THE PERSON TO WHOM THE COMMUNICATION IS MADE, HAS A CORRESPONDING INTEREST, 233

where a large body of persons are interested, 237

if strangers present, the privilege will be lost, 239

## III. PRIVILEGED REPORTS, 243-263

## QUARTER SESSIONS,

power to punish for contempts, 442

jurisdiction to try indictments for libel, 374, 404, 574

## R.

## RAILWAY COMPANY,

placarding conviction for infringement of by-laws, 173, 179

may be sued for libel, 369

## "RASCAL,"

libellous, 22

## RATIFICATION, 361

## RE-ASSERTION OF SLANDER

in reply to inquirer, 230-233

## REASONABLE DOUBT, 178

## RECEIVERS

appointed by Court of Chancery, 355

## RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS,

charge of, actionable, 56, 59

what a sufficient charge of, 60, 123

## RECOGNISANCES, 378, 444, 574

## RECORD,

courts of, 426-443

courts not of, 444-447

## REDRESS,

*bonâ fide* claim for, privileged, 220-228

## REGISTRY, DISTRICT,

issuing writ in, 454

## REJOINDER, 498, 613

## RELIGION,

publications against, 394-403

## RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE,

charge of, libellous, 23

## RELIGIOUS SECTS AND SOCIETIES,

libels upon, 376, 377, 381

sentence of expulsion from, 86, 87, 312, 319, 325

excommunication, 59

## REMEDIES FOR LIBEL,

civil and criminal, 9, 376, 390-393

## REMITTING ACTION

to the County Court, 468

## REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES, 321

damage resulting to the husband of the female plaintiff, 323

damage caused by the act of a third party, 325

not essential that such third person should believe the charge, 327

wrongful and spontaneous act of a third person, 328

originator of a slander not liable for damage caused by its repetition,  
329

exceptions to this rule, 331

## REPETITION

of slander heard from another, 161-168, 328-333

naming informant now no avail, 162, 165

formerly a defence, 162

*bona fide* repetition to person calumniated, 167, 217, 219

libellous articles reproduced from other newspapers, 159, 302, 303, 584

of libel, may be evidence of malice, 271, n., 273

of slander, by wife to husband, 152, 330, 332

## REPLICATION

in criminal cases, 651, 660

## REPLY,

- as to pleading, 496
- of pardon to a plea charging felony, 58, 497, 606
- to plea under Lord Campbell's Act, 299, 497
- precedents of, 605, 612, 630

## REPORTER,

- duty of, 245, 247, 254

## REPORTS,

- (i) Reports of judicial proceedings, 243
  - of *ex parte* proceedings, 244
  - of matters *coram non judice*, 244
  - must be accurate, 250
  - no comments should be interpolated, 254
  - an accurate report may still be malicious, 256
  - whole should be considered, 27
- (ii) Reports of parliamentary proceedings, 257
- (iii) Other reports, 259
  - suggestion of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 261

## REPUTATION

- defined, 150
- is property, 17
- injury to, gist of action, 17-21
- of plaintiff in aggravation of damages, 298
  - in mitigation of damages, 304

## RETRACTION, 299

## "RETURNED CONVICT,"

- actionable, 58

## REVENUE LAWS,

- charge of evading, 23, n.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS, PICTURES, &amp;c.,

- how far permitted, 36-41, 48

## RIDICULE,

- words which expose a person to, libellous, 21, 22
- as a weapon of criticism, 37, 48

## "RIDING SKIMMINGTON," 9

## RIGHT OF ACTION

- not assignable, 354

## ROBBERY,

- charge of, actionable, 56

## "ROGUE,"

- libellous, 22
- not actionable, if spoken, 61

## ROMAN CATHOLICS,

- penal statutes against, 58
- libel on monks and nuns, 126, 377
- attacks upon, 6, 44, 250, 260

## ROMAN LAW

as to justification, 180

as to malice, 184

## “ROUGH MUSIC,” 9

## RULE ABSOLUTE, 593

RULE *NISI*,

for a criminal information, 591

## RULE OF COURT,

contempt by disregarding, 431

## RUMOR,

existence of, no justification for a repetition of, 165, 231-233, 271, n.,  
305, 306, 584except *bonâ fide* repetition to person calumniated, 167, 217, 219

when evidence in mitigation, 305, 306

false rumors, wilfully circulated, 378

## “RUNAGATE,”

not actionable, 61

## S.

## SALFORD HUNDRED COURT,

jurisdiction of, in slander and libel, 569

costs in, 338

## SATISFACTION, ACCORD AND, 489

*SCANDALUM MAGNATUM*,

statutes of, 133-135

who may bring action of, 135

the nature of the words to support the action, 135

venue in actions for, 136

## SCHOOLMASTER,

words concerning, 66, 224

## SCHOOLMISTRESS,

imputing prostitution to, 67, 84

## “SCOUNDREL,”

charge of being, libellous, 23

## SECONDARY EVIDENCE,

when libel lost or destroyed, 536

## SECRETARY OF STATE,

letters to, privileged, 196, 211, 222-224

orders issued by, absolutely privileged, 196

## SECT,

libels on, 376, 377, 381

## SECURITY FOR COSTS, 346, 352, 466

## SEDITION,

charge of, actionable, 121



## SEDITIONOUS WORDS, 409-448

- defined, 409
- treasonable words, 410
- words defamatory of the sovereign himself, 413
- truth no defence, 414
- words defamatory of the king's ministers, 415
- words tending to subvert the government, 418
- words defamatory of the Constitution, 419
- latitude allowed to political writers, 420
- words inciting to disaffection and riot, 421
- words defamatory of either House of Parliament, 422
- commitment for contempt, 423
- Colonial legislative bodies, 425
- words defamatory of the Superior Courts of Justice, 426
- contempt of Court, 428
- wilful disobedience to an order of Court, 431
- attachment and committal, 433
- Colonial Courts of Justice, 438
- words defamatory of Inferior Courts of Justice, 440
- contempt of an Inferior Court of Record, 442
- sureties for good behavior, 444
- statutory powers of Inferior Courts, 445
- Ecclesiastical Courts, 448
- no justification that it first appeared in another paper, 584
- whether the publication is a seditious libel is a question for the jury, 420, 585
- copies of, may be seized after conviction for, 590

## SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

- report of, on the law of libel, 662
- observations on such report, 261, 391, 531

## SELF-DEFENCE,

- language published in, is privileged, 225-232

## SENTENCE, 589

*SENSUS VERBORUM EX CAUSÂ DICENDI ACCIPIENDUS EST*, 108

## SERMONS,

- not privileged, 6, 242
- unpublished, criticisms on, 47

## SERVANT,

- when liable as publisher, 358
- employer, when liable for acts of, 360-365, 385, 583
- charge against, when privileged, 203, 209, 226, 275
- communication to employer concerning, when privileged, 217
- giving character to, 200-203, 600
- delivery of libel by, not knowing contents, 359, 384, 585

## SERVICE OF THE WRIT, 460

## SHAREHOLDERS,

- proceedings at meeting of, privileged, 238, 242
- reports to, privileged, 235, 242

## SHIP,

libel on, 34, 132

slander of, 357

## SHIPOWNER,

words concerning, 34, 132

## SHOPKEEPER,

words concerning, actionable, 78-81, 226, 227

## SHOPMAN,

said to have scarlet-fever, 358

## SHOPWOMAN,

words imputing prostitution to, 84

## SICKNESS

is not special damage, 309, 312

## SLANDER,

defined, 1, 7

distinguished from libel, 3, 18-21

when not actionable without proof of special damage, 253, 308, 309

## I. Words imputing an indictable offence, 54, 621

early cases on this subject, 58

the charge must be specific and precise, 60, 120-127

the crime imputed must be possible, 61

## II. Words imputing a contagious disease, 62, 624

## III. Words spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or trade, 64

such words must affect him in such office, profession, or trade, 65

imputation of professional ignorance or unskilfulness, 67

plaintiff must be carrying on such trade, &amp;c., at the time he is defamed, 69

words imputing want of integrity to any one holding an office of trust, 70

words concerning clergymen, 72, 628

words concerning barristers, solicitors, &amp;c., 74

words concerning physicians and surgeons, 75, 627

words affecting traders in the way of their trade, 77, 631

imputations of insolvency, 78

imputations of dishonesty and fraud in the conduct of their trade, 79, 633

## IV. Words actionable only by reason of special damage, 82

words imputing immorality, 83

words imputing unchastity, 84

unsatisfactory state of the law on this point, 86

all words causing special damage are actionable, 87, 148

repetition of, 161-168, 328-333

naming informant, 162

*bonâ fide* repetition to person calumniated, 167, 217, 219

re-assertion in answer to plaintiff's inquiry, 230-233

proof of the speaking of the, 537

precedents of pleadings in actions of, 621-633

- SLANDER OF TITLE, OR WORDS CONCERNING THINGS, 137-149  
definition, 137  
I. Slander of title proper, 138  
actionable, if words *false* and *malicious*, and if *special damage* be proved, 138  
proof of malice, 142  
II. Slander of goods manufactured or sold by another, 145  
other words producing special damage, 148  
precedents of pleadings in actions of, 634-643
- SLANG TERMS,  
question for jury as to meaning of, 110  
evidence for jury as to, 538
- SMALL-POX,  
charge of having; not actionable, 63
- SMUGGLING, 55, n.
- SOCIETY,  
loss of, words tending to cause, 22  
of neighbors, 312  
of husband, 312
- SODOMY, 84, n.
- SOLICITORS,  
words concerning, 74, 75  
libels on, 29, 30, 99
- SOLICITING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME,  
charge of, actionable, 56
- SORCERY,  
charge of, formerly actionable, 59
- SPECIAL CHARACTER,  
proof of plaintiff's, 530  
mode of averring, 473, 474
- SPECIAL DAMAGE,  
when essential to action, 18  
defined, 289  
words causing, 82, 87, 148  
essential in slander of title, 138  
what constitutes, 309  
must be specially pleaded, 313, 474  
arising after action, 317  
where the words are actionable *per se*, 318  
where the words are not actionable *per se*, 308  
remoteness of, 321-333
- SPECIAL JURY, 528
- SPEAKING OF THE SLANDER, PROOF OF, 537
- SPEECHES  
in Parliament, reports of, 35, 42, 186, 257  
of counsel, reports of, 250-253

## SPIRITUAL COURT,

jurisdiction of, in cases of defamation, 17, 59, 85, 86

## STAR CHAMBER,

decrees of, regulating press, 10, 11, 13

criminal jurisdiction of, 14

## STATEMENT OF CLAIM, 469-475

joinder of causes of action, 458

the very words must be set out, 101, 470

averments, what necessary, 118, 473, 531

innuendo, 100, 107, 538

words in a foreign language, 470

special damage must be specially pleaded, 313, 474

venue, 474

particulars of, 479, 609, 625

demurrer to, 475, 605

precedents of, in libel, 600, 601, 603, 607, 613, 615  
in slander, 621, 624, 626, 628, 631, 632  
in slander of title, 639, 641

## STATEMENT OF DEFENCE, 475, 480

traverses, 481

*bonâ fide* comment, no libel, 483

privilege, 484

justification, 485

apology, 487, 621

accord and satisfaction, 489

previous action, 490

other defences, 490

payment into Court, 491

counter-claims, 494

judgment in default of pleading, 495

precedents in libel, 601, 605, 609, 614, 616, 617, 618  
in slander, 622, 623, 626, 629, 631, 633  
in slander of title, 640, 643

## STATE PAPERS,

privilege as to production of, 535

## STATUE

may be a libel, 8

## STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,

plea of, 455, 490

## STATUTES. See APPENDIX OF STATUTES, C, 664-683

contents of such Appendix, 664

See also TABLE OF STATUTES cited, xlvii.

TABLE OF RULES AND ORDERS cited, l.

## STAYING PROCEEDINGS IN ACTION, 479, 557, 564

## STEALING,

what amounts to charge of, 61, 122

goods of married woman, 62, 96

- STOCK-JOBBER,  
words concerning, 81
- STOLEN GOODS,  
charge of receiving, 56, 59, 60, 123
- STORY PREVIOUSLY TOLD BY PLAINTIFF AGAINST HIM-  
SELF, 25
- STRIKING OUT INTERROGATORIES, 509
- STRUCK OFF THE ROLLS,  
charge that an attorney was, or ought to be, 7, 30, 75, 173, 205
- “STRUMPET,”  
charge of being a, not actionable, 85  
except in London and Southwark, 59, 84
- SUBORNATION OF PERJURY,  
charge of, actionable, 56
- SUBSCRIBER TO A CHARITY,  
statement by, respecting the officers of charity, 238, 239  
substance of charge, 537
- SUMMARY JURISDICTION  
of justices to require sureties for good behavior, 444, 574  
to issue warrant to apprehend a libeller, 571  
to commit for trial, 573  
to take bail, 573  
truth of libel may not be inquired into, 572  
in cases of obscene libels, &c., 405-407  
seizure of other libellous papers, illegal, 574
- SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS  
before magistrates, reports of, 243-248
- SUMMING UP  
in a civil case, 550  
in a criminal case, 585
- SUMMONS  
for leave to plead and demur, 476  
for particulars, 479, 608  
to amend a pleading, 498  
for leave to administer interrogatories, 501  
to strike out interrogatories, 509  
for inspection of documents, 521  
for a commission, 527  
to change venue, 528  
for a special jury, 528  
before a magistrate, 571
- SUPERIOR COURTS,  
words concerning, 426  
contempts of, 428
- SUPERIOR OFFICER,  
reports to, privileged, 194, 195

**SURETIES**

for good behavior, 378, 444, 574

**SURGEON,**

slander of, 68, 76, 83

libels on, 29, 34

proof of qualification of, 530, 531

**SURPRISE**

as ground for new trial, 559

**SUSPICION,**

words of mere, not actionable, 57

*bonâ fide* communication of, 204, 217, 220, 222

**SWINDLER,**

charge of being a, libellous, 23

not actionable, if spoken, 61

**SYPHILIS,**

charge of having, 63

**T.****TELEGRAM,**

publication of libel by, avoids privilege, 151, 283, 284

**THEATRICAL PERFORMANCES,**

criticism on, permitted, 49

**THEFT,**

imputations of, 61, 122

“THIEVING,” 57, n.

**THING,**

slander of, 137-149

libel on, 32-34

**THREATENING**

to publish a libel with intent to extort money, etc, 378, 379•

a witness, or suitor, contempt of court, 430

**TITLE,**

slander of, 137-149

precedents of pleadings in actions of, 634-644

**TOWNSHEND**

on Libel and Slander, American treatise, 18-21

**TRADE,**

libel of persons in the way of, 21, 30-34, 64-81

humility of, no obstacle to right of action, 77

must be a lawful one, 81

**TRADE PROTECTION SOCIETY,**

circulars of, not privileged, 213

**TRADERS,**

libels on, 31-34

slander of, 77-81, 631

**TRADERS — *continued.***

- imputation of fraud and dishonesty in trade, 79, 80, 633
- of being a cheat or a rogue, 80
- words affecting the credit and solvency of, 7, 78, 79
- imputations on the goods or commodities of, 32, 33, 79, 137, 145-148
- caution to, not to trust a certain customer, 215, 218
- words affecting partners in trade, 32, 81, 365-367
  - married women traders, 32, 346, 349
  - a trading company, 32, 367-369
- that the commodities of one trader are inferior to those of another, 33, 145-148
- criticisms on advertisements and circulars of, 34, 50, 51
- evidence of loss of profits and of business, 314, 315, 319

**TRAVERSESES, 481****TREASON,**

- charge of, actionable, 56
- words cannot amount to overt acts of, 410
- what a sufficient charge of, 121

**TREES,**

- charge of girdling, 54, n.

**TRESPASS**

- to land of plaintiff, 83
- to building, 8
- to persons, 9
- imputation of, not actionable, 56

**TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES,**

- notice of, 522
- entry for, 522
- examination of witnesses before; 526
- special jury, 528
- change of venue, 528
- libel or no libel is a question for the jury, 16, 55, 94, 98
- evidence for plaintiff, 530-543
- nonsuit, 543
- evidence for defendant, 545-549
- compromise, 550
- summing up, 550
- the libel itself must be produced at, 535
- verdict, 551
- judgment, 552
- postponement of, 529
- reports of, 243-257
- comments on, 44-46
- application for a new, 556
- proceedings after, 554, 555

**TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES,**

- pleading to the indictment, 576
- certiorari, 578

TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES — *continued.*

- evidence for the prosecution, 580
- evidence for the defence, 582
- summing-up and verdict, 585
- proceedings after verdict, 585
- sentence, 589
- costs, 590
- of criminal information, 595

## “TRUCKMASTER,”

- charge of being, libellous, 24

## TRUSTEES OF A CHARITY,

- words concerning, 29, 370, 377

## TRUTH,

- as a justification in civil proceedings, 169–178
- evidence, how strong, 178
- why a defence, 179
- as a justification on the trial of an indictment or criminal information, 178, 388–390
- no justification, unless publication was for public benefit, 390
- belief in, in mitigation, 302, 589

## U.

## UNCHASTITY,

- charge of, not actionable, 84, 85
- unsatisfactory state of law as to, 86, 87

## UNCIVIL WORDS,

- not actionable, 18

## UNCONSCIOUS PUBLICATION OF A LIBEL, 154, 384–387, 617

## UNDER-SHERIFF,

- on writ of inquiry, has power over costs, 337, 464

## UNFEELING CONDUCT,

- charge of, libellous, 24

## UNNATURAL OFFENCES,

- charge of, actionable, 56
- words imputing, 124

## “USE OF THE LAW,”

- by Bacon, cited, 19

## V.

## “VAGRANT,” 54, n.

## VARIANCE

- between words laid and those proved, amendment of, 471, 536, 537, 545



**VENEREAL DISEASE,**

charge of having, actionable, 62, 63

**VENIRE DE NOVO, 588****VENUE,**

plaintiff to select, 474

application to change, 528

grounds for changing, 529

in indictment, 578

**VERDICT**

in civil case, 551

against weight of evidence, 557

in criminal case, 585

proceedings after, in a civil case, 552-561

in a criminal case, 585

cures certain defects, 477, 586

**VESTRY MEETINGS,**

reports of proceedings at, 260

imputation on parish officers at, 234, 237

**VEXATIOUS INDICTMENTS ACT,**

libel not within, 571

**VICE,**

words imputing, actionable if written, 21

not if spoken, 84-87

**“VILLAIN, INFERNAL,”**

libellous, 22

**VINDICATION**

of defendant's character from attacks, 228, 229, 230

**VINDICTIVE DAMAGES,**

when allowed, 292

**VOCALISTS,**

libel on, 34

**VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA, 168, 231****VOLUNTARY**

affidavit, not a judicial proceeding, 193

characters of servants given when not asked for, 202

**VOLUNTEERING COMMUNICATIONS**

in discharge of duty, 213-219

not evidence of malice where duty clear, 286-288

caution given to a tradesman, 215

**VULGAR ABUSE,**

mere words of, not actionable, 18, 109

## W.

## WALL,

libel by writing or drawing upon, 283, 536

## WARRANT OF ARREST, 571

## “WELCHER,”

not actionable, 61

## “WHORE,”

charge of being, not actionable, 84, 85

except in London and Southwark, 59, 85

## WIFE,

and husband, 345

claim by husband for words defamatory of wife, 347

as defendant, 350

## WILL,

charge of secreting, formerly not actionable, 54, n., 59

## “WITCH,”

charge of being, formerly actionable, 59

## WITHDRAWING A JUROR, 550

## WITNESS

cannot be asked how he understood the language published, 110, 538

privilege of, 191

commission to examine, before trial, 526

defendant as a, 534

proof of previous conviction of, 546

## WOMEN,

verbal imputations on, 84-87

## WORDS,

action on the case for, 87-92

actionable *per se*, 18

imputing crime, must be precise, 120-126

meaning of, how affected by circumstances, 98, 107, 108

general terms of abuse, not actionable, 18, 109

must be set out *verbatim* in the Statement of Claim, 101, 470

clearly defamatory, 105

*primâ facie* defamatory, 107

adjective, 126

ambiguous, 107-116, 539, 548

ironical, 8, 23, 114, 116, 539

neutral, 109

*primâ facie* innocent, 112

clearly innocent, 116

of a cant or slang character, 110, 538

indirect imputations, 125

of suspicion, 57

of interrogation, 126, 471, 537

in foreign language, 470

application of, to the plaintiff must be shown, 127-132, 540

## WORKMEN,

action for threatening, 149, 358

## WORKS OF ART,

criticisms on, 48, 49

## WRIT,

considerations before, 449

indorsement on, 459

service of the, 460

## WRIT OF ERROR, 587

## WRIT OF INQUIRY, 464, 465

under-sheriff has power over costs, 337, 464









